TITLE: The war of the rebellion: a compilation of the official records of the Union and Confederate armies. / Series 1 - Volume 40 (Part I) AUTHOR: United States. War Dept., John Sheldon Moody, Calvin Duvall Cowles, Frederick Caryton Ainsworth, Robert N. Scott, Henry Martyn Lazelle, George Breckenridge Davis, Leslie J. Perry, Joseph William Kirkley PUBLISHER: Govt. Print. Off., Washington, 1892 Page A Production Note Cornell University Library produced this volume to preserve the informational content of the deteriorated original. The best available copy of the original has been used to create this digital copy. It was scanned bitonally at 600 dots per inch resolution and compressed prior to storage using ITU Group 4 compression. Conversion of this material to digital files was supported by the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation. Digital file copyright by Cornell University Library 1995. This volume has been scanned as part of The Making of America Project, a cooperative endeavor undertaken to preserve and enhance access to historical material from the nineteenth century. Page B F? v~JQ p,~-, I THE GIFT OF ~Af Title Page Page R001 THE WAR OF THE REBELLION: A COMPILATION OF TIIV OFFICIAL IRECOIRDS OF THE UNION AN1~ CONFEDERATE ARMIES. PUBLISHED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF The Hon. STEPHEN B. ELKINS, Secretary of War, BY MAJ. GEORGE B. DAVIS, U. S. A., MR. LESLIE J. PERRY, MR. JOSEPH W. KIRKLEY, Board of Publication. SERIES IVOLUME XLIN THREE PARTS. PART IREPORTS. WASHINGTON: GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE. 1892. Page R002 1kH-3~6 L~- RNELL\ ~U NIVER~ ItY Page R003 PREFACE. The work of preparing the records of the war for public use was beguu under the resolution of Congress of May 19, 1864, by Adjt. Gen. E. D. Townsend, U. S. Army, who caused copies to be made of reports of battles on file in his office and steps to be taken to col- lect missing records. Under the provisions of joint resolution No. 91, of 1866, Hon. Peter H. Watson was appointed to supervise the preparation and formulate a plan for the publication of the records, but he did no work and drew no pay under this appointment, which expired July 27, 1868, by limitation.~f the resolution. This resolution also re- pealed the former one aAdWork ceased: The first decisive step taken in this work was the act of June 23, 1874, providing the necessary means to enable the Secretary of War to begin the publication of the Official Records of the War of the Rebellion, both of the Union and Confederate Armies, and directing him to have copied for the Public Printer all reports, letters, telegrams, and general orders, not heretofore copied or printed, and properly arranged in chronological order. Appropria- tions have been made from time to time for continuing such prepa- ration. Under this act the preliminary work was resumed by Gen- eral Townsend, who first outlined the plan on which the records are printed, though it appears that originally he contemplated publish- ing to the world only the more important military reports. Subsequently, under meager appropriations, it was prosecuted in a somewhat desultory manner by various subordinates of the War Department until December 14, 1877, when the Secretary of War, perceiving that the undertaking needed the undivided attention of a single head, detailed Lient. Col. Robert N. Scott, U. S. Army, to take charge of the bureau and devote himself exclusively to the work. The act of June 23, 1874, greatly enlarged upon the first crude scheme of publication. On this more comprehensive basis it was determined that the volumes should include not only the battle reports, but also all official documents that can be obtained by the compiler, and that appear to be of any historical value. Colonel Scott systematized the work and the plan and presented the records I Page R004 Iv PREFACE. in the following order of arrangement, which has been adhered to by his successors: The first series will embrace the formal reports, both Union and Confederate, of the first seizures of United States property in the Southern States, and of all mil- itary op~rations in the field, with the correspondence, orders, and returns relating specially thereto, and, as proposed, is to be accompanied by an Atlas. In this series the reports will be arranged according to the campaigns ana sev- eral theaters of operations (in the chronological order of the events), and tbe Union reports of any event will, as a rule, be immediately followed by the Confederate accounts. The correspondence, & c., not embraced in the reports proper will follow (first Union and next Confederate) in chronologicai order. The second series will contain the correspondence, orders, reports, and returns, Union and Confederate, relating to prisoners of war, and (so far as the military au- thorities were concerned) to State or political prisoners. The third series will contain the correspondence, orders, reports, and returns of the Union authorities (embracing their correspondence with the Confederate offi- cials) not relating specially to the subjects of the first and second series. It will set forth the annual and special reports of the Secretary of War, of the General- in-Chief, and of the chiefs of the several staff corps and departments; the calls for troops, and the correspondence between the National and the several State author- ities. The fourth series will exhibit the correspondence, orders, reports, and returns of the Confederate authorities, similar to that indicated for the Union officials, as of the third series, but excluding the correspondence between the Union and Confed- erate authorities given in that series. The first volume of the records was issued, in the early fall of 1880. The a~t approved June 16, 1880, provided for the printing and bind- ing, under direction of the Secretary of War, of 10,000 copies of a com- pilation of the Official Records (Union and Confederate) of the War of the Rebellion, so far as the same may be ready for publication, during the fiscal year; and that of said number 7,000 copies shall be for the use of the House of Representatives, 2,000 copies for the use of the Senate, and 1,000 copies for the use of the Executive De- partmeuts. Under this act Colonel Scott uroceeded to publish the first five volumes of the records. * * All subsequent volumes have been distributed under the act approved August 7, 1882, xvhich provides that: The volumes of the Official Records of the War of the Rebellion shall be distrib- uted as follows: One thousand copies to the Executive Departments, as now pro- vided by law. One thousand copies for distribution by the Secretary of War among officers of the Army and contributors to the work. Eight thousand three hundred copies shall be sent by the Secretary of War to such libraries, organiza- tAons, and individuals as may be designated by the Senators, Representatives, and Delegates of the Forty-seventh Congress. Each Senator shall designate not exceed- ing twenty-six, and each Representative and Delegate not exceeding twenty-one, of such addresses, and the volumes shall be sent thereto from time to time as they are published, until the publication is completed. Senators, Representatives, and Dele- gates shall inform the Secretary of War in each case how many volumes of those heretofore published they have forwarded to such addresses. The remaining copies of the eleven thousand to be published, and all sets that may not be ordered to be distributed as provided herein, shall be sold by the Secretary of War forcost of publication with ten per cent. added thereto, and the proceeds of such sale shall b Page R005 PREFACE. V Col. Robert N. Scott died March 5, 1887, before the completion of the work, which, during a ten years service, he had come to love so dearly. At his death some twenty-six books only had been issued, but he had compiled a large amount of matter for forthcoming vol- nines; con8equently his name as compiler was retained in all the books lip to and including Vol. XXXVI, although his successors had added largely to his compilations from new material found after his demise. The Secretary of War, May 7, 1887, assigned Lieut. Col. H. M. Lazelle, U. S. Army, to duty as the successor of Colonel Scott. He had continued in charge about two years, when, in the act approved March 2, 1889, it~xvas provided That hereafter the preparation and publication of said records shall be conducted, under the Secretary of War, by a board of three persons, one of whom shall be an officer of the Army, and two civilian experts, to be appointed by the Secretary of War, the compensation of said civilian experts to be fixed by the Secretary of War. The Secretary of War appointed Maj. George B. Davis, judge advo- cate, U. S. Army, as the military member, and Leslie J. Perry, of Kansas, and Joseph W. Kirkley, of Maryland, as the civilian expert members of said board. The board assumed direction of the pub- lication at the commencement of the fiscal year 1889, its first work beginning with Serial No. 36 of Vol. XXIV. Each volume includes a copious and accurate index, and for the further convenience of investigators there will be, in addition, a general index to the entire set when complete in a volume by itself. Nothing is printed in these volumes except duly authenticated contemporaneous records of the war. The scope of the boards work is to decide upon and arrange the matter to be published; to correct an(l verify the orthography of the papers used, and occasion- ally to add a foot-note of explanation. GEO. B. DAVIS, Major and J. A., U. S. A., LESLIE J. PERRY, Civilian Expert, JOSEPH W. KIRKLEY, Civilian Expert, Board of Publication. Approved: REDFIELD PROCTOR, Secretary of War. WAR DEPARTMENT, Washington, D. C., August 1, 1891. covered into the Treasury. If two or more sets of said volumes are ordered to the same address, the Secretary of War shall inform the Senators, Representatives, or D~iegates who have designated the same, who thereupoa may designate other libraries, organizations, or individuals. The Secretary of War shall report to the first session of the Forty-eighth Congress what volumes of the series heretofor& published have not been furnished to such Jibraries, organizations, and individuals. He shall also inform distributees at whose instance the volumes are sent Page R006 Table of Contents Page R007 CONTENTS. CHAPTER LII. Page. Operations in Southeastern Virginia and North Carolina. June 13July 31, 1864 1822 (VII Page R008 Additions and Corrections Page A001 THE WAR OF THE REBELLION: A COMPILATION OF THE OFFICIAL IIRECC)iIRDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES. ADDITIONS ANt) CORRECTIONS TO SERIES IVOLUME XL. (To be inserted in the volume. ~or explanation see G-eneral Index volume, Serial ~o. 130, page XXVIII.) PUBLISHEI) UNDER THE DIRECTION OF The Hon. ELIHU ROOT, Secretary of War, BY BRIG. GEN. FRED C. AD~SWORTH, CHIEF OF THE REcOII1 AN!) PENSION OFFICE, WAR 1)EPARTMENT, ANI) MR. JOSEPH W KIRKLEY. 1~Ir. JOHN S. J!IOODEY, Indexer. W A S H I N G TON: GOVERNMENT PRiNTING OFFiCE. 1902 Page A002 ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS. TEXT. PART i. Page 151. Warren to Hurnphreys, S a. in., tenth line, erase the word I. Page 225. Last line, for 2,236 read 2,326. Page 679. Michies report, fonrteenth line, for Weed read Weed. PART 3. Page 40. Fisher to Hnnsphreys, first line, for lakiug read laken. INDEX. Insert all words and figures in italics and strike out all in rbrackets]. References are to parts of volume. B. F. Correspondence with J. F [F.] Caldwell.. Bartlett, William F., 75j; Bartlett, Joseph J., [~] Bennett, .11. Ii. [ ] Berlin, Carl [14.] Bingham, George C Butler, Benjamin F. Correspondence with Bennett, H. H. [ ] Caldwell, J. F. [F.] Carter, Solon A. [H.] Cook, Thomas, 736 [726] Deno, James F. [C.] Dickinson, Sylvanus C. [0.] Fisher, Benjamin F. Mentioned, 729 [730] Fisher, Isaac B., 730 Fitzpatrick, Nathaniel P. [S.] G. G. A. Correspondence with 3. F. [F.] Caidwell. Gilliss [Gillis], James Goodwin, Hollister F Gregg, ThomasJ. [I.] Herring [Hening], Charles P Hoke, William J., 8s8; Hoke, Rohert F., [8i8]. Hubard [Huhhard], EW Kent, William H. [Newspaper Correspond- ent] Ker [Kerr], William H 14ynch, James C., 368 [14ynch, John C., 368] McGallister [McAllister], William McGilvery [McGilvey], Freeman McRae, Richard [McRea, ] Miles, Nelson A. Reports of Richmond, Va., Campaign, etc., 332 [322] Part. 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 .3 2, 3 3 3 3 3 2,3 3 3 Part. Monohansett [Monohauset], Steamer I 2 Nawlen [Nowlan], Garrett OKeefte [OKeefe], Joseph 3 Paul, Samuel B. [R.] 2 Pinkney [Piuckney], R. F 3 Pinney [Piney], Alfred W Randall, George M. [(Major)]. Mentioned, 334, .536 [Randall, George M. (lIeutenant), 534, 536] Richmond, Va., Campaign, June 13-July 31, 1864. Reports of Deno, James F. [C.] Nozelee [Nowlan], Garrett Ryder [Rider], Henry W 1,2,3 Smith, William F., Mel. Gee. Mentioned [730] 3 Smith, William F., ist Del., 730 3 Stewart, Charles S. [T.] 2 Strausbangh [Strashaugh], Barnard A Tompkins, John A. Mentioned, 256; Tompkins, Charles H., [256] 3 Travis,John [Elms F.] Van Rensselaer, William V Vaughn, Augustus D. [V.] War Department, C. S. Correspondence with Hnl,ard [Huhhard], E. W 3 Whittelsey, Charles H., 46 [~~] 3 Wilson, James H. (Br~g. Gee.). Mentioned, [~] 3 WilsonjamesH. (sd Md.),73j 3 Wood, 3. Taylor. Mentioned, 761 [Wood, John T., 761] 3 Special Index Page R009 C~NTENTS OF PRECEDING VOLUMES. VOLUME I. CHAPTER I Page. Operations in Charleston Harbor, South Carolina. December ~10, 1860-April 14, 1861 1317 CHAPTER H. The secession of Geoigia. January 3-26, 1861 313-325 CHAPTER III. Thesecession of Alabama and Mississippi. January 4-20,1861 326-330 CHAPTER IV. Operations in Florida. January 6-August 31, 1861 331473 CHAPTER V Page. The secession Ok North Carolina. Janw ary 9-May 20, 1861 474-488 CHAPTER VI. The secession of Louisiana. January 10- February 19,1861 489-501 CHAPTER VII. Operations in Texas and New Mexico. February 1-June 11,1861 502-636 CHAPTER VIIL Operations in Arkansas, the Indian Terri- tory, and Missouri. February 7-May 9, 1861 637-691 VOLUME II. CHAPTER IX. Page. Operations in Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and West Virginia. April 16-July 31,1861.... 1-1012 VOLUME III. CHAPTER X. Page. Operations in Missouri, Arkansas, Kansas, and Indian Territory. May 10-November 19,1861. .. 1-749 VOLUME IV. CHAPTER XI. Page. CHAPTER XIII. Page. Operations in Texas, New Mexico, and Operations in North Carolina and South. Arizona. June 11, 1861-February 1,1862. 1-174 eastern Virginia. August 1, 1861-Jaun CHAPTER XII. ary 11, 1862 566-721 Operations in Kentucky and Tennessee. July 1-November 19, 1861 175-565 VOLUME V. CHAPTER XIV. Page. Operations in Maryland, Northern Virginia, and West Virginia. August 1,1861-March 17,1862. 1-1106 VOLUME VI. CHAPTER XV Page. CHAPTER XVI. Page. Operationson the coasts of South Carolina, Operations in West Florida, Southern Al. Georgia, and Middle and East Florida. abama, Southern Mississippi, and Lou. August 21,1861-April 11,1862 1-435 isiana. Sept,mber 1,1861-May 12,1862. 436-894 VOLUME VII. CHAPTER XVII. Page. Operations in Kentucky, Tennessee, N. Alabama, and S. W. Virginia. Nov. 19,1861-Mar. 4,1862.. 1-940 41X Page R010 X CONTENTS OF PRECEDING VOLUMES. VOLlITME VIII. CHAPTER XVIII. Page. Operations in Missouri, Arkansas, Kansas, and Indian Territory. Nov. 19, 1861-April 10, 1862. 1-834 VOLUME IX. ~ CHAPTER XIX Page. CHAPTER XXI. Page. Operations in Southeastern Virginia. Jan- Operations in Texas, New Mexico, and uary 11March 17, 1862 lii Arizona. February 1-September 20, CHAPTER XX 1862 481-736 Operations in North Carolina. January 11-August 20,1862 72-480 VOLUME X-IN TWO PARTS. CHAPTER XXII. Operations in Kentucky, Tennessee, North Mississippi, North Alabama, and Southwest March 4-June 10, 1862 Virginia. Page. Part U-Reports 1-927 Part NICorrespondence, etc 1-642 VOLUME XIIN THREE PARTS. CHAPTER XXIII. The Peninsular Campaign, Virginia. March 17-September 2, 1862. Page. Part IReports, March 17-June 24 1-1077 Part IlReports, June 25-September 2 Part NIlCorrespondence, etc 1-691 VOLUME XIIIN THREE PARTS. CHAPTER XXIV. Operations in Northern Virginia, West Virginia, and Maryland. March 17-September 2, 1862. Page. Part IReports, March 17-June 25 1-818 Part lIReports, June 26-September 2 1820 Part IllCorrespondence, etc 1-966 VOLUME XIII. CHAPTER XXV. Page. Operations in Missouri, Arkansas, Kansas, the Indian Territory, and the Department of the Northwest. April 10-November 20, 1862 1-981 VOLUME XIV. CHAPTER XXVI. Page. Operations on the coasts of South Carolina, Georgia, and Middle and East Florida. April 12, 1862-June 11, 1863 VOLUME XV. CHAPTER XXVII. Operations in West Southern Southern Page. Florida, Alabama, Mississippi (embracing all operations against Vicksburg, May 18-July 27,1862), and Louisiana, May 12,1862-May 14, 1863; and oper- ations in Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona. September 20, 1862-May 14, 1863 1-113 Page R011 XII CONTENTS OF PRECEDING VOLUMES. VOLUME XXIHIN TWO PARTS. CHAPTER XXXV. Operations in Kentucky, Middle and East Tennessee, North Alabama, and Southwest Virginia. Jan uary 21-August 10, 1863. Page. Part IReports 1-858 Part ItCorrespondence, etc 1-986 VOLUME XXIVIN THREE PARTS. CHAPTER XXXVI. Operations in Mississippi and West Tennessee, including those in Arkansas and Louisiana connected with the Siege of Vicksburg. January 20-August 10, 1863. Page. Part IReports, January 20-May 15, including the General Reports for whole period. January 20-August 10 ~-787 Part lIReports, May 16-August 10 1-699 Part IllCorrespondence, etc 1-1070 VOLUME XXVIN TWO PARTS. CHAPTER XXXVII. Operations in Northern Virginia, West Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania. January 26-June 3, 1863. Page. Part I Reports 1-1123 Part IlCorrespondence, etc 1-862 VOLUME XXVIIN TWO PARTS. CHAPTER XXXVIII. Operations in West Florida, Southern Alabama, Southern Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas, and New Mexico. May 14-December 31, 1863. Page. Part [Reports, Union Correspondence, etc 1-920 Part IlConfederate Correspondence, etc 1-581 VOLUME XXVIIJN THREE PARTS. CHAPTER XXXIX. Operations in North Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Department of the East. June 3-August 3, 1863. Page. Part IReports 1-1059 Part IlReports 1-1005 Part IllCorrespondence, etc 1-1092 VOLUME XXVJIJIN TWO PARTS. CHAPTER XL Operations on the coasts of South Carolina and Georgia, and in Middle and East Florida. June 12- December 31, 1863. Page. Part IReports 1-755 Part IlCorrespondence, etc 1-609 VOLUME XXIXIN TWO PARTS. CHAPTER XLI. Operations in North Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia. Maryland, and Pennsylvania. August 4-De cember 31, 1863. Page. Part IReports 1-1018 Part lICorrespondence, etc .. 1-93 Page R012 xl! CONTENTS OF PRECEDING VOLUMES. VOLUME XXXIN FOUR PARTS. CHAPTER XLII. Operations in Kentucky, Southwest Virginia, Tennessee, Mississippi, North Alabama, and North Georgia. August 11-October 19, 1863. Page. Part 1Reports 1-1071 Part NIReports 1-821 Part 111Union Correspondence, etc 1-1017 Part IVUnion and Confederate Correspondence, etc 1-768 VOLUME XXXIIN THREE PARTS. CHAPTER XLIII. Operations in Kentucky, Southwest Virginia, Tennessee, Mississippi, North Alabama, and North Georgia. October 20-December 31,1863. Page. Part IReports and Union Correspondence 1-852 Part IlReports 1-782 Part 111Union and Confederate Correspondence, etc 1-893 VOLUME XXXIIIN THREE PARTS. CHAPTER XLIV. Operations in Kentucky, Southwest Virginia, Tennessee, Mississippi, Alabama, and North Georgia. January 1-April 30,1864. Page. Part 1Reports 1-703 Part 11Union and Confederate Correspondence, etc 1-833 Part IllUnion and Confederate Correspondence, etc 1-879 VOLUME XXi~III. CHAPTER XLV. Page. Operations in North Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania. Jan uary 1-April 30, 1864 1-1335 VOLUME XXXIV1N FOUR PARTS. CHAPTER XLVI. Operations in Louisiana and the Trans-Mississippi States and Territories. January 1-June 30,1864. Page. Part IReports 1-1058 Part IlUnion and Confederate Correspondence, etc 1-1107 Part IllUnion and Confederate Correspondence, etc 1-835 Part IVUnion and Confederate Correspondence, etc 1-701 VOLUME XXXVIN TWO PARTS. CHAPTER XLVII. Operations in South Carolina and Florida, and on the Georgia Coast. January 1-November 13,1864. Page. Part IReports, Union and Confederate Corre~pondence, etc 1-646 Part IlUnion and Confederate Correspondence, etc 1-65 Page R013 COINTENTS OF PRECEDING VOLUMES. ~xIIIr VOLUME XXXIN FOUR PARTS. CHAPTER XLII. Operations in Kentucky, Southwest Virginia, Tennessee, Mississippi, North Alabama, and North Georgia. August 11-October 19, 1863. Page. Part 1Reports 1-1071 Part NIReports 1-821 Part IllUnion Correspondence, etc 1-1017 Part IVUnion and Confederate Correspondence, etc 1-768 VOLUME XXXIIN THREE PARTS. CHAPTER XLIII. Operations in Kentucky, Southwest Virginia, Tennessee, Mississippi, North Alabama, and North Georgia. October 20-December 31,1863. Page. Part IReports and Union Correspondence 1-852 Part IlReports 1-782 Part 111Union and Confederate Correspondence, etc .. 1-893 VOLUME XXXIIIN THREE PARTS. CHAPTER XLIV. Operations in Kentucky, Southwest Virginia, Tennessee, Mississippi, Alabama, and North Georgia. January 1-April 30,1864. Page. Part 1Reports 1-703 Part ilUnion and Confederate Correspondence, etc 1-833 Part IllUnion and Confederate Correspondence, etc 1-879 VOLUME XXI~IJJ. CHAPTER XLV. Page. Operations in North Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania. Jan uary 1-April 30, 1864 1-1335 VOLUME XXXIV1N FOUR PARTS. CHAPTER XLVI. Operations in Louisiana and the Trans-Mississippi States and Territories. January 1-June 30, 1864. Page. Part IReports 1-1058 Part IlUnion and Confederate Correspondence, etc 1-1107 Part IllUnion a~d Confederate Correspondence, etc 1-835 Part IVUnion and Confederate Correspondence, etc 1-701 VOLUME XXXVIN TWO PARTS. CHAPTER XLVII. Operations in South Carolina and Florida, and on the Georgia Coast. January 1-November 13,1864. Page. Part IReports, Union and Confederate Corre~pondence, etc 1-646 Part IlUnion and Confederate Correspondence, etc 1-65 Page R014 MV CONTENTS OF PRECEDING VOLUMES. VOLUME XXXVIIN THREE PARTS. CHAPTER XLVIII. Operations in Southeastern Virginia and North Carolina. May 1-June 12, 1864. Page. Part IReports 1-1101 Part ItReports, Union and Confederate Correspondence, etc 1-1027 Part IllUnion and Confederate Correspondence, etc 1-903 VOLUME XXXVIIIN TWO PARTS. CHAPTER XLIX. Operations in Northern Virginia, West Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania. May 1-August 3,1864. Page. Part IReports, Union and Confederate Correspondence, etc 1-770 Part IlUnion and Confederate Correspondence, etc 1-606 VOLUME XXXVIIJIN FIVE PARTS. CHAPTER L. The Atlanta, Ga., Campaign. May 1-September 8, 1864. Page. Part IReports 1-936 Part lIReports 1-930 Part IllReports 1-1008 Part IVUnion and Confederate Correspondence, etc 1- Part VUnion and Confederate Correspondence, etc 1-1031 VOLUME XXXIXIN ThREE PARTS. CHAPTER LI. Operations in Kentucky, Southwest Virginia, Tennessee, Mississippi, Alabama, and North Georgia (the Atlanta Campaign excepted). May 1-November 13, 1864. Page. Part IReports 1-908 Part lIUnion and Confederate Correspondence, etc I -889 Part IllUnion and Confederate Correspondence, etc 1-91 Page R015 p bl p 1 0 Sunday. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Monday. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Tuesday. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Wednesday. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~: Thursday. ~ ~ ~: ~ ~ ~ Friday. .~ ~ Saturday. 0 0 0 .4 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Sunday. ~: ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Monday. ~ ~ ~ ~: ~ ~ Tuesday. ~ ~: ~ ~ ~: Wednesday. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~: Thursday. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Friday. _ -~ 0 ~3. ~ ~ ~T. 0 . .~ 0 ~ . 0 C~ Saturday Page R016 Page 1 CHAPTER LII. OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEASTERN VIRGINIA AND NORTH CAROLINA. June 13July 31, 1864. PART I. SUMMAI?~V OF TIlE PRINCJPAiL EVENTS. June 13July 31, 1864.T1~ Richmond (Virginia) Campaign. 2023, 1864.Expedition from Batchelders Creek to vicinity of Kinston, N. C., and skirmish (22d) at Southwest Creek. 2025, 1864.Expedition against the Wilmington and Weldon Railroad, N. C. 2223, 1864.Scout from Pinev Green to Sneads Ferry and Swanshorough, N. C. July 27Aug. 4, 1864.Expedition from Norfolk, Va., into North Carolina. 2831, 1864.Expedition from New Berne to Mannings Neck, N. C. JUNE 13JULY 31, 1864.The Richmond (Virginia) Campaign. SUMIVEARV OF TIlE PIRINCIPAL EVENTS. * June 13, 1864.Skirmish at White Oak Swamp. Lieut. Gen. Richard S. Ewell, C. S. Army, assigned to command of the Department of Richmond, vice Maj. Gen. Robert Ran- som, jr., ordered to Department of Western Virginia. Skirmish at Riddells Shop. 14, 1864.Skirmish near Harrisons Lauding. 15, 1864.Skirmish at Malvern Hill. Skirmish near Smiths Store. Brig. Gen. Alfred H. Terry, U. S. Army, in temporary command of the Tenth Army Corps, vice Maj. Gen. Quincy A. Gilimore. 1518, 1864.Assaults on the Petersburg lines. 16, 1864.Action on the Bermuda 1-Inudred front. 16-17, 1864.Actions at Fort Clifton.t 17, 1864.Skirmish on the Bermuda Hundred front. 18, 1864.-Skirmish at King and Queen Court-I-louse. I Maj. Gen. David B. Birney, U. S. Army, in temporary command of the Second Army Corps. Brig. Ge,i. William T. H. Brooks, U. S. Army, assumes command of the Tenth Army Corps. 19July 31, 1864.Siege of Petersburg and Richmond. 20, 1864.Skirmish at White House. Skirmish at King and Queen Court-House.f Of some of the minor conflicts noted in this Summary no circumstantial reports are on file. For 1i~nioa naval reports, see Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy, De- cember 5, 1864. I For reports, see Vol. XXXVI, Part I. 1 1~ 1~VQL XL~ PT II (1 Page 2 2 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. LII. June 21, 1864.Action at Howletts Bluff.~ Skirmishes at White House or Saint Peters Church and Black Creek, or Tunstalls Stationt 22, 1864.Engagement near the Jerusalem Plank Road. 22July 2, 1864.Expedition against the South Side and Danville Railroads, with skirmishes at Reams Station (22d), near Nottoway Court-House (23d), at Staunton River Bridge, or Roanoke Station (25th), and engagements at Sappony Church, or Stony Creek (2829th), and at Reams Station (29th). 23, 1864.Skirmish at Jones Bridge.t 24, 1864.Engagement at Saint Marys Church.t Action at hares Hill. 27, 1864.Maj. Gen. Wintield S. Hancock, U. S. Army, resumes command of the Second Army Corps. 28, 1864.Action at Howletts Bluff. 30July 1, 1864.Actions on Four-Mile Creek, at Deep Bottom. * July 12, 1864.Skirmish at Warwick Swamp. Skirmish at Turkey Creek. * 14, 1864.Action at Malvern Hill. 16, 1864.Action at Four-Mile Creek. * Action at Malvern Hill. 17, 1864.Skirmish at Herring Creek. 18, 1864.Brig. Gen. Alfred H. Terry, U. S. Army, in temporary command of the Tenth Army Corps. 19, 1864.Brig. Gen. John H. Martindale, U. S. Army, in temporary com- mand of the Eighteenth Army Corps, vice Maj. Gen. William F. Smith, relieved. 22, 1864.Maj. Gen. Edward 0. C. Ord, U. S. A#my, assumes command of the Eighteenth Army Corps. 23, 1864.Maj. Gen. David B. Birney, U. S. Army, assumes command of the Tenth Army Corps. 27, 1864.Skirmish near Lees Mill. 2729, 1864.Demonstration on the north bank of the James River and engage- ment at Deep Bottom (or Darbytown, Strawberry Plains, and New Market Road). 28, 1864.Action at Four-Mile Creck.~ 30, 1864.Explosion of the Mine and assault on the Crater. Skirmish at Lees Mill. REPORTS, ETC4 No. 1.Lient. Gen. U. S. Grant, U. S. Army, commanding Armies of the United States. No. 2.Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War. No. 3.Brig. Gen. Rufus Ingalls, U. S. Army, Chief Quartermaster of Armies oper- ating against Richmond. For Union naval reports, see Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy, De- cember 5, 1864. For reports, see Vol. XXXVI, Part I. See also Vol. XXXVI, Part 1, for the following reports of operations during the period covered by this volume, viz: Sheridan, June 13August 4; Torbert. June 1328; Custer, June 13-July 1; Alger, June 13-July 3; Walker, June 13July 1; Devin, June 13July 2; Merritt, June 1225; D. McM. Gregg, June 13July 7; Davies, ,June 13July 4; Kester, June 13August 17; .1. Irvin Gregg, June 13July 6; McParlin, June 12 July 30. For Thomas C. Devins report, covering period from July 4 to July 31, see Vol, XLIII, Part I Page 3 CHAP. LIT.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 3 No. 4.Record of the Court of Inquiry on the Mine Explosion. No. 5.Maj. Gen. George G. Meade, U. S. Army, commanding Army of the Po- tomac. No~ 6.Itinerary of the Army of the Pol~omac and Army of the James, & c. No. 7.Return of Casualties in the Union Forces~ No. S.Surg. Edward B. Dalton, U. S. Army, Chief Medical Officer of Depot Field Hospital, including operations June 14December 31, 1864. No. 9.Brig. Gen. Marsena R. Patrick, U. S. Army, Provost-Marshal-General, Army of the Potomac. No. 10.Maj. Benjamin F. Fisher, Signal Corps, IJ. S. Army, Chief Signal Officer, Army of the Potomac. No. 11.Brig. Gen. Henry J. Hunt, U. S. Army, Chief of Artillery, Army of the Poto- mac, including operations June 16October 31. No. 12.Maj. Nathaniel Micliler, Corps of Engineers, U. S. Army. No. 13.Maj. James C. Duane, Corps of Engineers, U. S. Army, Chief Engineer, Army of the Potomac, of operations July 30. No. 14.Brig. Gen. Henry W. Benham, U. S. Army, commanding Engineer Brigade, of operations June 12July 30. No. 15.Lient. Col. Ira Spaulding, Fiftieth New York Engineers. No. 16.Capt. George H. Mendell, Corps of Engineers, U. S. Army, commanding Engineer Battalion. No. 17.Maj. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock, U. S. Army, commanding Second Army Corps. No. 1S.Maj. Gen. David B. Birney, U. S. Army, commanding Second Army Corps, of operations June 22. No. 19.Lient. Col. Charles H. Morgan, Assistant Inspector-General, U. S. Army, Chief of Staff, of operations June 22. No. 20.Brig. Gen. Francis C. Barlow, U. S. Army, commanding First Division, of operations June 22 and July 2629. No. 21.Brig. Gen. Nelson A. Miles, U. S. Army, commanding First Division, of operations July 2630. No. 22.Brig. Gen. Nelson A. Miles, U. S. Army, commanding First Brigade. No. 23.Capt. James Fleming, Twenty-eighth Massachusetts Infantry. No. 24.Maj. Nathan Church, Twenty-sixth Michigan Infantry. No. 25.Capt. Lucius H. Ives, Twenty-sixth Michigan Infantry, of operations July 2630. No. 26.Maj. James E. Larkin, Fifth New Hampshire Infantry. No. 27.Maj. George Hogg, Second New York Heavy Artillery. No. 28.Capt. Oscar F. Hulser, Second New York Heavy Artillery, of operations July 2631. No. 29. Maj. George W. Scott, Sixty-first New York Infantry. No. 30.Lient. Col. William Wilson, Eighty-first Pennsylvania Infantry, of oper- ations July 2630. No. 31.Lient. James E. Deno, Eighty-first Pennsylvania Infantry. No. 32.Capt. Thomas Henry, One hundred and fortieth Pennsylvania Infantry. No. 33.Lieut. Col. George T. Egbert, One hundred and eighty-third Pennsylvania Infantry. No. 34.Maj. Gustavus A. Seidel, Seventh New York Infantry, Consolidated Bri- gade, of operations July 1930. No. 35.Capt. David A. Allen, Thirty-ninth New York Infantry. No. 36.Capt. George Degener, Fifty-second New York Infantry, of operations June 13July 26. No. 37.Capt. I. Hart Wilder, One hundred and twenty-sixth New York Infantry, commanding Fifty-seventh New York Infantry, of operations June 17-. July 30 Page 4 4 OPERATIONS IN SE. YA. AND N. C. [CRAP. LII. No. 38.Capt. Alexander Watts, Sixty-third New York Infantry. No. 39.Capt. Robert H. Milliken, Sixty-ninth New York Infantry. No. 40.Maj. Richard Moroney, Sixty-ninth New York Infantry. No. 41.Lient. Col. Denis F. Burke, Eighty-eighth New York Infantry. No. 42.Capt. Marcus W. Murdock, One hundred and eleventh New York Infantry, including operations June 13August 25. No. 43.Capt. Nelson Penfield, One hundred and twenty-fifth New York Infantry. No. 44.Capt. John B. Geddis, One hundred and twenty-sixth New York Infantry. No. 45.Lient. Col. William Glenny, Sixty-fourth New York Infantry, commanding Fourth Brigade. No. 46.Capt. Horatio N. Hunt, Sixty-fourth New York Infantry, of operations July 2630. No. 47.Lient. Col. William Glenny, Sixty-fourth New York Infantry. No. 45.Lient. Simon Pincus, Sixty-sixth New York Infantry. No. 49.Capt. Albert Gosse, Sixty-sixth New York Infantry, of operations July 2630. No. 50.Capt. Philip H. Schreyer, Fifty-third Pennsylvania Infantry, of operations July 2630. No. 51.Capt. James Patton, Fifty-third Pennsylvania Infantry. No. 52.Capt. David W. Megraw, One hundred and sixteenth Pennsylvania Infan- try, of operations July 2630. No. 53.Capt. Garrett Nowlan, One hundred and sixteenth Pennsylvania Infantry. No. 54.Capt. James H. Hamlin, One hundred and forty-fifth Pennsylvania Infan- try. No. 55.Capt. James F. Weaver, One hundred and forty-eighth Pennsylvania Infan- try. No. 56.Capt. Alfred A. Rhinehart, One hundred and forty-eighth Pennsylvania In- fantry, of operations July 2630. No. 57.Maj. Edward A. Springsteed, Seventh New York Heavy Artillery. No. 55.Lient. Col. Joseph M. Murphy, Seventh New York Heavy Artillery, of oper- ations July 2630. No. 59.Maj. Gen. John Gibbon, U. S. Army, commanding Second Division. No. 60.Brig. Gen. Byron R. Pierce, U. S. Army, commanding First Brigade, of oper- ations June 22. No. 61.Capt. Joseph W. Spaulding, Nineteenth Maine Infantry. No. 62.Capt. James C. Farwell, First Minnesota Infantry. No. 63.Maj. Timothy OBrien, One hundred and fifty-second New York Infantry. No. 64.Col. John Ramsey, Eighth New Jersey Infantry, commanding Second Bri- gade, of operations June 1216. No. 65.Col. James P. Melvor, One hundred and seventieth New York Infantry, commanding Second Brigade, of operations June 16July 14. No. 66.Col. Mathew Murphy, One hundred and eighty-second New York Infantry (Sixty-ninth New York National Guard Artillery), commanding Second Brigade, of operations July 1430. No. 67.Maj. John Byrne, One hundred and fifty-fifth New York Infantry. No. 68.Maj. John Beattie, One hundred and sixty-fourth New York Infantry. No. 69.Col. James P. Melvor, One hundred and seventieth New York Infantry. No. 70.Capt. John Coonan, One hundred and eighty-second New York Infantry (Sixty-ninth New York National Guard Artillery). No. 71.Maj. Erastus M. Spaulding, Eighth New York Heavy Artillery, of operations June 12-July 29. No. 72.Col. Thomas A. Smyth, First Delaware Infantry, commanding Third Bri- gade. No. 73.Col. Theodore G. Ellis, Fourteenth Connecticut Infantry. No. T4~Capt. John C. Broatch, Fourteenth Connecticut Infantry Page 5 CHAP. LH.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 5 No. 75.Capt. Patrick S. Tinen, Sixty-ninth Pennsylvania Infantry, of operations Jufie 22. No. 76.Capt. John R. Breitenbach, One hundred and sixth Pennsylvania Infantry. of operations June 22. No. 77.Brig. Gen. Gershom Mott, U. S. Army, commanding Third Division, of ~operations June 22 and July 2630. No. 78.Brig. Gen. P. Regis de Trobriand, U. S. Army, commanding First Brigade. No. 79.Capt. Madison M. Cannon, Fortieth New York Infantry. No. 50.Licut. Col. Michael W. Burns, Seventy-third New York Infantry. No. 81.Capt. John B. Vande Wiele, Fourth New York Heavy Artillery, including operations June 12August 5. No. 82.Brig. Gen. Byron R. Pierce, U. S. Army, commanding Second Brigade, of operations July 2630. No. 53.Maj. Nathaniel Shatswell, First Massachusetts Heavy Artillery, of oper- ations July 2630. No. 84.Capt. Daniel S. Root, Third Michigan Infantry, of operations June 22. No. 55.Col. John Pulford, Fifth Michigan Infantry, of operations July 2631. No. 56.Maj. Samuel McConihe, Ninety-third New York Infantry. No. 57.Lient. Col. William B. Neeper, Fifty-seventh Pennsylvania Infantry. No. 85Lient. Col. George Zinn, Eighty-fourth Pennsylvania Infantry. No. 89.Capt. John C. Conser, One hundred and fifth Pennsylvania Infantry, of operations July 2630. No. 90.Lient. Col. Casper W. Tyler, One hundred and forty-first Pennsylvania Infantry. No. 91.Capt. John Wilson, First U. S. Sharpshooters. No. 92.Col. Robert McAllister, Eleventh New Jersey Infautry, commanding Third Brigade, of operations July 2629. No. 93.Maj. Charles C. Rivers, Eleventh Massachusetts Infantry, of operations Jnly 2631. No. 94.Capt. Thomas C. Godfrey, Fifth New Jersey Infantry. No. 95.Capt. Thomas C. Thompson, Seventh New Jersey Infantry. No. 96.Maj. Virgil M. Healy, Eighth New Jersey Infantry. No. 97.Col. Robert McAllister, Eleventh New Jersey Infantry, of operations June 1216. No. 98.Lient. Col. John Schoonover, Eleventh New Jersey Infantry, of operations June 16-Jnly 28. - No. 99.Col. John C. Tidball, Fourth New York Heavy Artillery, commanding Artillery Brigade, of operations June 12July 1. No. 100.Maj. John G. Hazard, First Rhode Island Light Artillery, commanding Artillery Brigade, of operations July 130. No. 101.Capt. Edwin B. Dow, Sixth Maine Battery. No. 102.Capt. J. Henry Sleeper, Tenth Massachusetts Battery. No. 103.Capt. Frederick M. Edgell, First New Hampshire Battery. No. 104.Capt. A. Judson Clark, Battery B, First New Jersey Light Artillery. No. 105.Capt. Nelson Ames, Battery G, First New York Light Artillery. No. 106.Capt. James H. Wood, Fourth New York Heavy Artillery, commanding Mortar Battery, of operations June 1221. No. 107.-Capt. John E. Burton, Eleventh New York Battery. No. 108.Capt. George F. McKnight, Twelfth New York Battery. No. 109.Capt. R. Bruce Ricketts, Battery F, First Pennsylvania Light Artillery, of operations June 12Jnly 1. No. 110.Lient. G. Lyman Dwight, Battery A, First Rhode Island Light Artillery, of operations June 830. No. 111.Lient. Walter S. Perrin, Battery A, First Rhode Island Light Artillery, of operations July 829 Page 6 6 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. LII. No. 112.Lient John W. Roder, Battery K, Fourth U. S. Artillery. No. 113.Lient. James Gilliss, Batteries C and I, Fifth U. S. Artillery, of operations June 1230. No. I 14.Maj. Gen. Gouverneur K. Warren, U. S. Army, commanding Fifth Army Corps, of operations July 2730. No. 115.Col. William S. Tilton, Twenty-second Massachusetts Infantry, command- ing First Brigade, First Division. No. 116.Licut. Col. Joseph F. Ramsey, One hundred and eighty-seventh Pennsyl- vania Infantry. No. 117.Maj. Mason W. Burt, Twenty-second Massachusetts Infantry, Second Bri- gade. No. 11S.Maj. James A. Cunningham, Thirty-second Massachusetts Infantry. No. 119.-~--Maj. John D. Lentz, Ninety-first Pennsylvania Infantry. No. 120.Col. Alfred L. Pearson, One hundred and fifty-fifth Pennsylvania Infantry. No. 121.Maj. Oliver B. Knowles, Twenty-first Pennsylvania Cavalry (dismounted). No. 122.Maj. Ellis Spear, Twentieth Maine Infantry, Third Brigade, of operations June 1221. No. 123.Capt. Benjamin K Meservey, Eighteenth Massachusetts Infantry, of oper- ations June 12July 20. No. 124.Lient. Col. William A. Throop, First Mi.chigan Infantry. No. 125.Capt. Guy W. Fuller, Sixteenth Michigan Infantry. No. 126.Maj. Edward B. Knox, Forty-fourth New York Infantry. No. 127.Licut. Col. De Witt C. McCoy, Eighty-third Pennsylvania Infantry. No. 128.Lieu.t. Col. Charles P. Herring, One hundred and eighteenth Pennsylvania Infantry. No. 129.Col. Samuel A. Graham, Pu;nell Legion, Maryland Infantry, commanding Second Brigade, Second Division, including operations June 5Au- gust 20. No. 130.Col. Richard N. Bowerman, Fourth Maryland Infantry. No. 131.Licut. Col. Michael Wiedrich, Fifteenth New York Heavy Artillery, Third Brigade. No. 132.Brig. Gen. Samuel W. Crawford, U. S. Army, commanding Third Division, of operations June 17. No. 133.Brig. Gen. Lysander Cutler, U. S. Army, commanding Fourth Diyision. No. 134.Maj. Merit C. Welsh, Seventh Indiana Infantry, First Brigade. No. 135.Col. J. William Hofmann, Fifty-sixth Pennsylvania Infantry, commanding Second Brigade. No. 136.Capt. James E. Baily, Third Delaware Infantry. No. 137.Licut. Col. Charles E. La Motte, Fourth Delaware Infantry, of operations June 1-30. No. 135.Licut. Col. John E. Cook, Seventy-sixth New York Infantry. No. 139.Maj. Robert W. Bard, Ninety-fifth New York Infantry. No. 140.Lient. Col. George Harney, One hundred and forty-seventh New York Infantry. No. 141.Maj. John T. Jack, Fifty-sixth Pennsylvania Infantry. No. 142.Col. Charles S. Wainwright, First New York Light Artillery, commanding Artillery Brigade. No. 143.Lient. Robert E. Rogers, Battery B, First New York Light Artillery. No. 144.Lient. Lester I. Richardson, Battery D, First New York Light Artillery. No. 145.Lient. James B. Hazelton, Battery E, First New York Light Artillery, of operations July 1130. No. 146.Capt. Charles E. Mink, Battery H, First New York Light Artillery, of oper- ations June 18July 30. No. 147.Lient. Charles L. Anderson, Battery L, First New York Artillery. No. 145.Maj. Henry R. Dalton, Assistant Adjutant-General, U. S. Army, First Divis- ion, Sixth Ar my Corps, of operations June 12July 9 Page 7 CHAP. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 7 No. 149.Capt. Baldwin Hufty, Fourth New Jersey Infantry, First Brigade, of oper- ations .June 13July 10. No. 150.Brig. Gen. Emory Upton, U. S. Army, commanding Second Brigade, of operations June 12July 10. No. 151.Col. Oliver Edwards, Thirty-seventh Massachusetts Infantry, commanding Third Brigade, of operations June 12July 10. No. 152.Brie,. Gen. George XV. Getty, U. S. Army, commanding Second Division. No. 153.Brig. Gen. Frank Wheaton, U. S. Army, commanding First Brigade, of operations June 13July 10. No. 154.Maj. Thomas McLaughlin, One hundred and second Pennsylvania Infantry, of operations June 12July 9. No. 155.Maj. Robert Munroc, One hundred and thirty-ninth Pennsylvania Infantry, of operations June 13July 9. No. 156.Brig. Gen. Lewis A. Grant, U. S. Army, commanding Second Brigade, of operations June 12July 9. No. 157.Brig. Gen. l7Janiel D. Bidwell, U. S. Army, commanding Third Brigade, of - operations June 12July 2. No. 155.Col. William S. Truex, Fourteenth New Jersey Infantry, commanding First Brigade, Thirif Division, of operations June 12July 6. No. 159.Col. J. Warren Keifer, One hundred and tenth Ohip Infantry, commanding Secoud Brigade, of operations June 12July 6. No. 160.Col. John W. Horn, Sixth Maryland Infantry, of operations June 13-July 9. No. 161.Maj. Charles Burgess, Ninth New York Heavy Artillery, of operations June 12-July 7. No. 162.Licut. Col. Otho 11. Binkley, One hundred and tenth Ohio Infantry, of oper- ations June 13July 6. No. 163.Col. William H. Ball, One hundred and twenty-second Ohio Infantry, of operations June 13July 6. No. 164.Liect. Col. Aaron W. Ebright, One hundred and twenty-sixth Ohio Infan- try, of operations June 12July 6. No. 165.Col. Matthew R. MeClennan, One hundred and thirty-eighth Pennsylvania Infantry, of operations June 12July 6. No. 166.Capt. Charles XV. White, Fourth Maine Battery, Artillery Brigade, of operations June 12July 29. No. 167.Capt. Greenleaf T. Stevens, Fifth Maine Battery, of operations June 12 July 10. No. 165.Lient. Jacob Federhen, Battery A, Massachusetts Light Artillery, bf oper- ations June 12July 11. No. 169.Lient. Augustin N. Parsons, Battery A, First New Jersey Light Artillery. No. 170.Capt. Andrew Cowan, First New York Battery, of operations June 13 July 12. No. 171.Capt. William A. Ham, Third New York Battery. No. 172.Licut. Jacob H. Lamb, Battery C, First Rhode Island Light Artillery, of operations June 12July 11. No. 173.Capt. William B. Rhodes, Battery E, First Rhode Island Light Artillery. No. 174.Capt. George W. Adams, Battery G, First Rhode Island Light Artillery, of operations Jui~e 12July iL No. 175.Maj. Gen. Ambrose B. Buruside, U. S. Army, commanding Ninth Army Corps, of operations June 12July 30. No. 176.Brig. Gen. James H. Ledlie, U. S. Army; commanding First Division, of operations June 17 and Jnly 30. No. 177.Licut. Col. Joseph H. Barnes, Twenty-ninth Massachusetts Infantry, com- manding First Brigade, of operations June 14July 30. No. 175.Capt. Willard D. Tripp, Twenty-ninth Massachusetts Infantry, of oper- ations Jnly 30 Page 8 8 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. (CHAt. LII. No. 179.Lient. John M. Deane, Twenty-ninth Massachusetts Jiifantry, of oper- ations June 14July 25. No. 180.Lient. CoL Gilbert P. Robinson, Third Maryland Infantry, commanding Second Brigade, of operations July 30. N~. 181.Capt. Albert A. Terrill, One hundred and seventy-ninth New York Infan- No. - try, of operations June 11July 30. 182.Capt. Benjamin F. Smiley, Second Pennsylvania Provisional Heavy Artil- lery, commanding Mortar battery, of operations June 26July 30. No. 183.Brig. Gen. Robert B. Potter, U. S. Army, commanding Second Division. No. 184.Col. Zenas R. Bliss, Seventh Rhode Island Infantry, commanding First Brigade, of operations July 30. No. 185.Capt. Thaddens L. Barker, Thirty-sixth Massachusetts Infantry, of oper- ations July 30. No. 186.Capt. Everett S. Horton, Fifty-eighth Massachusetts Infantry, of operations July 30. No. 187.Col. John Fisk, Second New York Mounted Rifles (dismounted), of oper- ations July 30. No. 188.Maj. John G. Wright, Fifty-first New York Infantry, of operations July 30. No. 189.Capt. Theodore Gregg, Forty-fifth Pennsylvania Infantry, of operations July 30. No. 190.Lient. Col. Henry Pleasants, Forty-eighth Pennsylvania Infantry, of oper~ ations June 25July 30. No. 191.Maj. James T. P. Bucklin, Fourth Rhode Island Infantry, of operations July 30. No. 192.Capt. Percy Daniels, Seventh Rhode Island Infantry, of operations June 12 July 30. No. 193.Brig. Gen. Simon G. Griffin, U. S. Army, commanding Second Brigade, of operations July 30. No. 194.Lient. Col. Charles Cummings, Seventeenth Vermont Infantry, of operations June 12July 30. No. 195.Brig. Gen. Orlando B. Wilicox, U. S. Army, commanding Third Division. No. 196.Brig. Gen. John I~. Hartranft, U. S. Army, commanding First Brigade, of operations June 14July 30. No. 197.Lient. Col. Ralph Ely, Eighth Michigan Infantry. No. 198.Capt. Richard Vosper, Twenty-seventh Michigan Infantry. No. 199.Capt. Edwin Evans, One hundred and ninth New~York Infantry. No. 200.Capt. Joseph K. Bolton, Fifty-first Pennsylvania Infantry, of operations June 15-July 30. No. 201.Col. Samuel Harriman, Thirty-seventh Wisconsin Infantry. No. 202.Lient. Col. Colwert K. Pier, Thirty-eighth Wisconsin Infantry. No. 203.Lient. Col. Byron M. Cutcheon, Twentieth Michigan Infantry, command- ing Second Brigade, of operations June 16July 27. No. 204.Col. William Humphrey, Second Michigan Infantry, commanding Second Brigade, of operations July 30. No. 205.Col. Charles V. D~ Land, First Michigan Sharpshooters, of operations July 30. No. 206.Col. William Humphrey, Second Michigan Infantry, of operations June 1219. No. 207.Lient. Col. Byron M. ~utcheon, Twentieth Michigan Infantry. No. 208.Capt. Alphons Serviere, Forty-sixth New York Infantry. No. 209.Maj. Martin P. Avery, Sixtieth Ohio Infantry. No. 210.Col. Constant Luce, Seventeenth Michigan Infantry (acting division engi- neers). No. 211.Brig. Gen. Edward Ferrero, U. S. Army, commanding Fourth Division Page 9 ~JHAP. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 9 No. 212.Col. Joshua K. Sigfried, Forty-eighth Pennsylvania Infantry, commanding First Brigade, of operations July 30. No. 213.Col. Henry G. Thomas, Nineteenth U. S. Colored Troops, commanding Sec- ond Brigade, of operations July 30. No. 214.Lient. Col. J. Albert Monroe, First Rhode Island Light Artillery, Chief of Artillery, of operations July 30. No. 215.Capt. Albert F. Thomas, Second Maine Battery. No. 216.Capt. Ezekiel R. Mayo, Third Maine Battery, of operations July 30. No. 217.Lient. Seth A. Emery, Third Maine Battery, of operations July 930. No. 218.Capt. Adelbert B. Twitchell, Seventh Maine Battery. No. 219.Capt. Edward J. Jones, Eleventh Massachusetts Battery. No. 220.Capt. Joseph W. B. Wright, Fourteenth Massachusetts Battery. No. 221.Capt. Edward W. Rogers, Nineteenth New York Battery. No. 222.Capt. John B. Eaton, Twenty-seventh New York Battery, of operations June 14July 30. No. 223.Capt. Jacob Roemer, Thirty-fourth New York Battery. No. 224.Lient. George W. Silvis, Battery D, Pennsylvania Light Artillery. No. 225.Capt. Romeo H. Start, Third Vermont Battery. No. 226.Brig. Gen. David McM. Gregg, U. S. Army, commanding Second Division, No. Cavalry Corps, of operations July 730. 227.Asst. Surg. Elias J. Marsh, U. S. Army, of operations July 1930. No. 228.Brig. Gen. Henry E. Davies, jr., U. S. Army, commanding First Brigade, of operations July 2630. No. 229.Col. J. Irvin Gregg, Sixteenth Pennsylvania Cavalry, commanding Second Bri~,ade, of operations July 2630. No. 230.Brig. Gen. James H. Wilson, U. S. Army, commanding Third Division, of operations June 17July 30. No. 231.Brig. Gen. John B. McIntosh, U. S. Army, commanding First Brigade, of operations June 22July 2. No. 232.Maj. George 0. Marcy, First Connecticut Cavalry, of operations June 13 July 24. No. 233.Lient. Col. Charles C. Snydam, Third New Jersey Cavalry, of operations June 14July 25. No. 234.Col. Otto Harhaus, Second New York Cavalry, of operations July 27. No. 235.Lient. Col. George A. Purington, Second Ohio Cavalry, of operations June 13July 24. No. 236.Col. George H. Chapman, Third Indiana Cavalry, commanding Second Brigade, of operations June 13July 12. No. 237.Capt. Thomas W. Moffitt, Third Indiana Cavalry, of operations June 22 July 2. No. 235.Lient. Col. Benjamin T. Hutchins, First New Hampshire Cavalry, of oper- ations June 22-July 2. No. 239.Maj. Edmund M. Pope, Eighth New York Cavalry, of operations June 22-July 2. No. 240.Lient. Col. Johnson B. Brown, Twenty-second New York Cavalry, of operations June 22July 2. No. 241.Col. William Wells, First Vermont Cavalry, of operations June 22July 3. No. 242.Lieut. William N. Dennison, Battery A, Second IJ. S. Artillery, of oper- ations July 28. No. 243.Lient. Charles L. Fitzhugh, Battery E, Fourth U. S. Artillery, of operations June 2229. No. 244.Col. Henry L. Abbot, First Connecticut Heavy Artillery, commanding Siege Train, including operations June 14October 31. No. 245.Brig. Gen. Godfrey Weitzel, U. S. Army, Chief Engineer, Department of Virginia and North Carolina, of operations June 130 Page 10 10 OPEI~ATJONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHAP, LII. No. 246.Licut. Peter S. Michie, Corps of Engineers, U. S. Army, Acting Chief En- gineer, of operations July 131. No. 247.Capt. Lemuel B. Norton, Signal Corps, U. S. Army, Chief Signal Officer. No. 248.Capt. Gustavus S. Dana, Signal Corps, U. S. Army, in charge of Signal De- tachment, Tenth Army Corps, of operations July 131. No. 249.Brig. Gen. Robert S. Foster, U. S. Army, commanding First Division, of oper- ations Jnne 16. No. 250.Col. Joshua B. H6well, Eighty-fifth Pennsylvania Infantry, commanding First Brigade, of operations Juiie 16. No. 251.Capt. Leroy A. Baker, Thirty-ninth Illinois Infantry, of operations Jnne 16. No. 252Lient. Col. Josiah I. Plimpton, Third New Hampshire Infantry, Second Bri- gade, of operations Jnne 16. No. 253.Licut. Col. Thomas A. Henderson, Seventh New Hampshire Infantry, of operations June 16. No. 254.Col. Harris M. Plaisted, Eleventh Maine Infantry, commanding Third Bri- gade, of operations Jnne 16. No. 255.Brig. Gen. Robert S. Foster, U. S. Army, commanding Third Brigade, of oper- ations July 1112 and 2329. No. 256.Col. John L. Otis, Tenth Connecticut Infantry, of operations July 2627. No. 257.Col. Harris M. Plaisted, Eleventh Maine Infantry, of operations July 2327. No. 258.Brig. Gen. John W. Turner, U. S. Army, commanding Second Division, of operations June 23July 1 and July 30. No. 259.Col. N. Martin Curtis, One hundred and forty-second New York Infantry, commanding First Brigade, of operations June 1518 and July 30. No. 260.Licut. Col. William B. Coan, Forty-eighth New York Infantry, commanding Second Brigade, of operations July 30. No. 261.Col. Louis Bell, Fourth New Hampshire Infantry, commanding Third Bri- gade, of operations June 30 and July 30. No. 262.Maj. Gen. William F. Smith, U. S. Army, commanding Eighteenth Army Corps, of operations June 15. No. 263.Maj. Gen. Edward 0. C. Ord, U. S. Army, commanding Eighteenth Army Corps, of operations July 30. No. 264.Brig. Gen. Hiram Burnham, U. S. Army, commanding First Division, of operations July 30. No. 265.Col. Edgar M. Cullen, Ninety-sixth New York Infantry, commanding First Brigade, of operations June 2030. No. 266.Col. Aaron F. Stevens, Thirteenth New Hampshire Infantry, commanding First Brigade, of operations July 30. No. 267.Brig. Gen. Hiram Buruham, U. S. Army, commanding Second Brigade, of operations June 20July 1. No. 265.Col. Edgar M. Cullen, Ninety-sixth New York Infantry, commanding Sec- ond Brigade, of operations July 30. No. 269.Capt. Charles M. Coit, Eighth Connecticut Infantry, of operations June 1517. No. 270.Col. Guy V. Henry, Fortieth Massachusetts Infantry, commanding Third Brigade, of operations June 15July 30. No. 271.Capt. James F. Brown, Twenty-first Connecticut Infantry. No. 272.Brig. Gen. Adelbert Ames, U. S. Army, commanding Second Division, of operations July 30. No. 273.Col. Josiah Pickett, Twenty-fifth Massachusetts Infantry, First Brigade, of operations June 13iS. No. 274.Lient. Col. William C. Moegling, Eleventh Connecticut Infantry, Second Brigade, of operations June 15. No. 275.Brig. Gen. Edward W. Hinks, U. S. Army, commanding Third Division, of operations June 1519 Page 11 Cw. LII] TILE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 11 No. 276.Brig. Gen. Joseph B. Carr, U. S. Army, commanding Third Division, of operations July 2931. No. 277.Col. Joseph B. Kiddoo, Twenty-second U. S. Colored Troops, Second Bri- gade, of operations June 15. No. 278.Col. Alexander Piper, Tenth New York Heavy Artillery, Chief of Artillery, of operations July 30. No. 279.Lieut. Michael Leahy, Battery B, First U. S. Artillery, of operations June 2026. No. 280.Brig. Gen. August V. Kautz, U. S. Army, commanding Cavalry Division, of operations June 1530. No. 251.Col. Robert M. West, Fifth Pennsylvania Cavalry, commanding First Bri- gade, of operations June 2130. No. 252.Lient. Col. George W. Lewis, Third New York Cavalry, of operations June 15. No. 283.Capt. John M. Willson, Third New York Cavalry, of operations June 2130. No. 284.Col. Samuel P. Spear, Eleventh Pennsylvania Cavalry, commanding Second Brigade, of operations June 1530. No. 285.Maj. J. Stannard Baker, First District of Columbia Cavalry, of operations June 1530. N~p. 286.Capt. George B. Easterly, Fourth Wisconsin Battery, of operations June 1517. No. 287.Lient. William P. Powers, Fourth Wisconsin Battery, of operations July 2730. No. 288.Lient. Dorman L. Noggle, Fourth Wisconsin Battery, of operations July 30 August 1. No. 289.Capt. Amaya L. Fitch, Thirteenth New York Heavy Artillery, commanding U. S. steamer Parke, of operations July 1617. No. 290.Brig. Gen. John J. Abereroinbie, U. S. Army, of operations June 20. No. 291.Capt. Christian Woerner, Third New Jersey Battery, of operations June 20. No. 292.Medals of honor awarded for distinguished services. No. 293.General Robert E. Lee, C. S. Army, commanding Army of Northern Vir- ginia. No. 294.Brig. Gen. William N. Pendleton, C. S. Army, Chief of Artillery, Army of Northern Virginia. No. 295.Diary of the First Corps, Army of Northern Virginia. No. 296.Return of casualties in Brattons, Laws, Andersons, and Bennings bri- gades, Longstreets corps. No. 297.Col. George K. Griggs, Thirty-eighth Virginia Infantry, Bartons brigade, including operations June 17November 17. No. 298.Capt. Benjamin L. Farinholt, Fifty-third Virginia Infantry, of operations June 25. No. 299.Brig. Gen. John Bratton, C.. S. Army, comniandiug Brattons brigade, Fields division. No. 300.Col. James R. Hagood, First South Carolina Infantry. No. 301.Col. James P. Simms, Fifty-third Georgia Infantry, commanding Simums (Bryans) brigade, Kersh~ws division. No. 302.Maj. Gen. Bnshrod R. Johnson, C. S. Army, commanding Johnsons division. No. 303.Capt. W. T. Blakemore, Aide-dc-Camp, C. S. Army, of operations June 16. No. 304.Capt. William H. Whitner, Assistant Adjutant and Inspector General, C. S. Army, of operations July 30. No. 305.Maj. E. Pliny Bryan, Assistant Adjutant-General, C. S. Army, of operations July 1417. No. 306.Maj. Gen. Robert F. Hoke, C. S. Army, commanding Hokes division, of operations June 24 Page 12 12 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. LII. No. 307.Lieut. C. C. Haile, Twenty-third South Carolina Infantry, Elliotts bri- gade, unassigned troops, of operations July 30. No. 3OS.Itinerary of Hardaway Light Artillery Battalion, Jnne 16July 27. No. 309.Brig. Gen. Johnson Hagood, C. S. Army, commanding Hagoods brigade, of operations June 1624. No. 31QLieut. Gen. Richard S. Ewell, C. S. Army, commanding Department of Richmond, of operations July 27. No. 311.Col. Thomas H. Carter, C. S. Artillery, of artillery operations July 1316. No. 312.Brig. Gen. Roger A. Pryor, C. S. Army, of operations June 2324. No. 313.Maj. Gen. Wade Hampton, C. S. Army, commanding cavalry division, of operations June 2730. No. 314.Confederate Roll of Honor. No. 1. Reports of Lieut. Gen. U. S. Grant, U. S. Army, commanding Armies of the United AStates.* NEAR WILCOXS LANDING, VA., June 13, 18644.30 p. m. The advance of our troops have just reached this place. Will com- mence crossing the James to-morrow. Wilsons cavalry and Warrens corps moved from Long Bridge to White Oak Swamp to cover the cross- ing of the balance of the army. No fighting has been reported except a little cavalry skirmishing. Smiths corps went around by water and will commence arriving at City Point to-night. U. S. GRANT, Major.General HALLECK, Lieutenant. General. Washington, D. C. BER1~IUDA HUNDRED, VA., June 14, 18641.30 p. m. Our forces will commence crossing the James to-day. The enemy shows no signs yet of having brought troops to the south side of Rich- mond. 1 will have Petersburg secured, if possible, before they get there in much force. Our movement from Cold Harbor to the James River has been made with great celerity and so far without loss or accident. U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant- General. Major-General HALLECK, Washington, D. C. CITY POINT, VA., June 17, 186411 a. m. The Ninth Army Corps this morning carried two more redoubts, forming part of the defenses of Petersburg, capturing 450 prisoners ~ For Grants reference in his general report to operations of this period, see ~ol. XXXVI, Part I, pp. 2227 Page 13 CHAP. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 13 and 4 guns. Our successes are being followed up. Our forces drew out from within fifty yards of the enemys intrenchments at Cold Har- bor, made a flank movement of an average of about fifty miles march, crossing the Chickahominy and James Rivers, the latter 2,000 feet wide and 84 feet deep at point of crossing, and surprised the enemys rear at Petersburg. This was done without the loss of a wagon or piece of ar- tillery and with the loss of only about 150 stragglers, picked up by the enemy. In covering this move Warrens corps and Wilsons cavalry had frequent skirmishes with the enemy, each losing from 50 to 60 killed and wounded, but inflicting an equal, if not greater, loss upon the enemy. The Eighteenth CQrps (Smiths) was transported from White House to Bermuda Hundred by water, moved out near to Petersburg the night of its arrival, and surprised or rather captured the very strong works northeast of Petersburg before sufficient force could be got in there by the enemy to hold them. He was joined the night following this cap- ture by the Second Corps, which in turn captured more of the enemys redoubts farther south, and this corps was followed by the Ninth, with the result above stated. All the troops are now up except two divisions covering the wagon trains, and they will be up to-night. The~ enemy in their endeavor to re-enforce Petersburg abandoned their intrench- ments in front of Bermuda Hundred. They no doubt expected troops from north of the James River to take their place before we discovered it. General Butler took advantage of this and moved a force at once upon the railroad and plank road between Richmond. and Petersburg, which I hope to retain possession of. Too much credit cannot be given the troops and their commamiders for the energy and fortitude displayed during the last five days. Day and night have been all the same, no de- lays being allowed on any account. U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant- aeneral. Major-General HALLECK, Washington, D. C. CITY POINT, VA., June 23, 18649 a. m. Yesterday and this morning have been consumed in extending oar lines to the left to envelop Petersburg. The Second amid Sixth Corps are now west of the Jerusalem plank road. Yesterday, in muoving to this position, the two corps became separated. The enemy pushed out between them and caused some confusion in the left of the Second Corps, and captured 4 pieces of artillery. Order was soon restored and the enemy pushed back. This morning no enemy is found on the left. This will be pushed forward until the enemy is found. The Petersburg papers of yesterday state that Hunter has been routed and already 3,000 of his men have been captured. U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant- aeneral, Major-General HALLECK, Washington, D. 0. CITY POINT, VA., June 24, 18649 a. m. No special change or news to report for yesterday. The enemy ~ilowe4 himself in large force on our left in the evening, a~idl Qenera Page 14 14 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. LII. Meade ordered him attacked. Failing in getting the attack made be- fore dark, he then ordered the left corps back to the position. which they had just left. This was takell without being followed up by the enemy. U. S. GRANT, Major-General HALLECK, Liet{tenant- General. Washington. HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UMTED SfATES, June 24, 18642.30 p. m. T find the affair of the 22d was much worse than I had heretofore learned. Our losses (nearly all captures) were not far from 2,000, and 4 pieces of artillery. The affair was a stampede and surprise to both parties and ought to have been turned in our favor. Richmond paper of yesterday states that Hunter, at last accounts, was at salem, retir- ing by the route taken by Averell last fall. Our cavalry (small detach- ment) is now on the Weldon road destroying it. Wilson, with 7,000 cav- alry, started the night of the 22d. Richmond paper announces that he struck the South Side road in Dinwiddie. This morning, about 7 oclock, the enemy attempted an assault on General W. F. Smiths front, prisoners say in three lines. None but the skirmish line reached onr advance and most of them were captured. U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant- General Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLEUX, Chief of I~Jtaff. CITY POINT, VA., June 25, 186411.30 a. m. Richmond papers of yesterday state that Hunter at last accounts was at Fincastle. He will probably go to Beverly. There will be no use in Stahel attempting to reach him. All quiet here. Sheridan is now crossing the river where the army crossed. Yesterday evening Greggs division had a very severe fight with the enemy between Charles City Court-House and Long Bridge. I do not know the result, but understand unofficially that we saved all the wagon train, which seemed to be the object of the attack. The loss was said to be heavy on both sides, the enemy coming in close canister range. The same Richmond paper announces that Wilson reached Burkeville. I shall, try to give the army a few days rest, which they now stand much in need oL U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant- General. Major-General HALLECK, Washington, D. C. CITY POINT, VA., June 26, 18644 p. in. All is quiet and our men resting. Sheridan is crossing the river near Fort Powhatan unmolested by the enemy. Greggs lose was ~nngh 1~s Page 15 Ciw~. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 15 than I was led to suppose by the verbal report first received. General Sheridan says he thinks 225 killed, wounded, and missing will cover it, while he thinks the enemys killed and wounded is much greater. This is Greggs loss between the Chickahominy and James Rivers, not counting losses in previous ei~igagements. Nothing heard from Wilson since he left Burkeville. If it is possible I wish paymasters could be sent here to pay the troops. The officers particularly are suffering. U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant- General. Maj. Gen. H. W HALLECK, Chief of kSThff. CITY POINT, VA., June 27, 18643 r. m. All is quiet here now except from our own guns, which fire into the bridge at Petersburg from a distance of about 9,000 yards. Petersburg papers of the 25th state that Hunter is striking for Jackson River depot, about forty miles north of Salem, and say that if he reaches Covington, which they suppose he will do with most of his forces, but with loss of material, he will be safe. The same paper accuses Hunter of desttoying a great amount of private property and stealing a large number of wagons, horses, and cattle. The same paper~ also states that Wilson destroyed a train of cars loaded with cotton and furniture, burned the depot buildiimgs, & c., at Burkeville, and destroyed some of the track and w~is still pushing south. All the railroads leading into Richmond arc now destroyed and some of them badly. U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant- General. Major-General HALLECK, Washington, D. C. CITY POINT, VA., July 1, 1864. The enemys cavalry, finding that Sheridan was secure where he was crossing James River, left him and interposed themselves on the Weldon railroad between Wilson and return. Kautz, with his cavalry and a portion of Wilsons, succeeded in passing the enemy and getting in, but with the loss of his artillery and wagons. Wilson, with most of his command, was cut off, and is supposed to have gone back south. Immediately on receipt of news that Wilson was returning, General Meade sent Wrights corps to Reams Station to aid him. Sheridan was also ordered to join him. Wright and Sheridan are both now out, and the latter with orders to push on until he learns reliably from Wil- son. Our artillery is now so located that it plays easily on the bridges in - Petersburg. They were hit a number of times yesterday by Smiths guns. A small steamer lying at the Petersburg wharf was also hit and burned. U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant- General. Major-General ~IALLECK, Washington, P. C Page 16 16 OPERATIONS IN SE. YA. AND N. C. [CHAP. LII. CITY POINT, VA., July 27, 18649 p. m. The movement this morning to the north bank of James River re- sulted in the repulse of three brigades of the enemy from an in- trenched position, and the capture of four 20-pounder Parrott guns. The loss was very slight and capture of prisoners small. The troops having~marched all night were fatigued, and did not follow up their success as they otherwise would. Generals Sheridan and Kantz are now with Hancock, and the two together will try in the morning to push the enemy back into Richmond or south of the James River. U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant- General. Maj. Gen. II. W. HALLECK, Chief of $taff. CITY POINT, VA., July 28, 18643.30 p. m. The enemy have attempted to drive our cavalry from the vicinity of Charles City road near New Market. Casualties are not reported, but I suppose have been small. Torberts division repulsed the enemy in his front, capturing 150 of their number. At last report the enemy in front of Greggs division were still standing. I am just starting for the scene of action. U. S. GRANT, Lieutenau4- General. Major-General HALLECK, Chief of & aff. I CITY POINT, VA., July 28, 18649 p. rn. I have just returned from Deep Bottom. The enemy evidently became very restive over our move to the north bank of the river, and have been moving to meet it ever since they discovered it. The position of our troops to-day wasthe left of the Second Corps resting at Deep Bottom, and extendThg along Baileys Creek; Greggs and Torberts cavalry divisions were down to the right of the Second Corps, and ex- tend to the New Market road, with one brigade at Malvern Hill. In getting their position they were attacked by the enemy in heavy force. The fighting lasted several hours, resulting in a loss which Sheridan thinks will not exceed 200 on our side, the greater part of whom are but slightly wounded, and some are prisoners in the hands of the enemy. We have taken 200 prisoners, besides wounded, many of whom were left in our possession. The number could not be estimated because am - bulances were still engaged bringing them in when I left the ground. In front of Torberts division 158 of the enemys dead have been counted. There was equally as much, if not more, fighting in front of Gregg~s division, and probably as many of the enemys dead were left there. We have failed in what I had hoped to accomplishthat is, to surprise the enemy, and get on to their roads with the cavalry near to Richmond and destroy them oat to South Anna. I am yet iii hopes of turning this diversion to account, so as to yield greater results than if the first object had been accomplished. U. S. GRAiNT, Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, Lieutenant- Gen~ral~ Chief of & a~f Page 17 CHAP. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 17 CITY POINT, VA., July 30, 186410 a. rn. Finding that my effort to surprise the enemy by sending an army corps and three divisions of cavalry to the north bank of the James River, nnder cover of iiight, for the purpose of getting on to the rail- roads north of Richmond, drew all of his forces from Petersbnrg except three divisions, I determined to attack and try to carry the latter place. The enemys earth-works are as strong as they can be made, and the ground is very broken and favorable for defense. Having a mine pre- pared running for a distance of eighty feet along the enemys parapet, and about twenty-two feet below the surface of the ground, ready loaded, and covered ways made near to his line, I was strongly in hopes, by this means of opening the way, the assault would prove successful. The mine was sprung a few minutes before 5 oclock this morning, throwing up four guns of the enemy and burying most of a South Carolina regiment. Our men immediately took possession of the cI~ater made by the explosion, and a considerable distance of the parapet to the right of it, as well as a short work in front, and still hold them. The effort to carry the ridge beyond, and which would give us Petersburg and the soutfr bank of the Appomattox, f~iiled. As the line held by the enemy would be a very bad one for us, being on a side hill, the crest on the side of the enemy, and not being willing to take the chances nf a slaughter sure to occur if another assault was made, I have directed the withdrawal of our troops to their old lines. Although just from the front, I have little idea of the casualties. I think, however, our loss will be but a few hundred, unless it occurs in withdrawing, which it may not be practicable to do before night. I saw about 200 prisoners taken from the enemy. Han- cock and Sheridan returned from the north side of the river during the night, and are now here. U. S. GRANT, General. Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, Chief of Staff. CITY POINT, VA., August 1, 1864. The loss in the disaster of Saturday last foots up about 3 ~00 of whom 450 men were killed and 2,000 wounded. It was the saddest af- fair I have witnessed in the war. Such opportunity for carrying forti- fications I have never seen and do not expect agaiii to have. The enemy with a line of works five miles long had been reduced by our previous movements to the north side of James River to a force of only three divisions. This line was undermined and blown up, carrying a battery and most of a regiment with it. The enemy were taken coin- pletely by surprise and did not recover from it for more than an hour. The crater and several hundred yards of the enemys line to the right and left of it and a short detached line in front of the crater were oc- cupied by our troops without opposition. Immediately in front of this and not 150 yards off, with clear ground intervening, was the crest of the ridge leading into town, and which, if carried, the enemy would have made no resistance, but would have continued a flight already commenced. It was three hours from the time our troops first occu- pied their works before the enemy took possession of this crest. I am constrained to believe that had instructions been promptly obeyed that Petersburg would have beemi carried with all the artillery and a large 2 R EYOL XL7 PT Page 18 18 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. J~JI. number of prisoners without a loss of 300 men. It was in getting back to our lines tliat the loss was sustained. The enemy attempted to charge and retake the line captured from them and were repulsed with heavy loss by our artillery; their loss in killed must be greater than ours, whilst our loss in wounded and captured is four times that of the enemy.~ U. S. GRAINT, Lieutenant- General. Major-General HALLECK, Washington, D. C. ADDENDA. CITY POINT, August 2, 18649.30 p. rn. Major-General HALLEUK, Chief of Staff: I have the honor to request that the President may direct a court of inquiry, to assemble without delay at such place as the presiding officer may appoint, to examine into and report upon the facts and circum- stances attending the unsuccessful assault on the enemys position in front of Petersburg on the morning of July 30, 1864, and also to report whether, in their judgment, any officer or officers are censurable* for the failure of the troops to carry into successful execution the orders issued for the occasion, and I would suggest the following detail: Ma~j. Gen. W. S. Hancock, Brig. Gen. R. B. Ayres, Brig. Gen. N. A. Miles, Yolun- teer service; Col. E. Schriver, inspector-general and recorder. U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant- General. No. 2. Dispatches of Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War. MooDys, YA., June 13, 18646 a. m. (Received 7 p. in.) ~ cavalry crossed without opposition at Long Bridge about 8.30 p. m. yesterday. A pontoon bridge was laid at once, and War- rens corps got across and advanced upon and held the road leading toward Richmond. Smith, Wright, and Hancock withdrew from the lines before Cold Harbor without difficulty. Everything is going pros- perously forward. C. A. DANA. Hon. EDWiN M. STANTON, Secretary of War. LONG BRIDGE, YA., June 13, 18648 a. mu. (Received 9.15 p. in.) Everything quiet. Hancocks corps is all close up here rea(ly t~ cross. Wright and Burnside are moving to Jones Bridge. No enemy in the way on either road. General Warren reports that there is no obstacle between here and James River. Wilson, who is feeling out with his cavalry toward White Oak Swamp bridge and toward Bottoms * As received by Halleck this word is answerable Page 19 CHAP. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 19 Bridge also, finds no force of any moment before liim. We have reports from deserters that Beauregard is intrenched at Malvern Hill. Hancock and Warren are to move direct to Wilcoxs; Wright and Burmiside to Charles City. Hancock will reach his destination before dark. The army will cross the James at Fort Powhatan. There are strong indi- cations that Lee is moving troops to Petersburg. C. A. I)AXA. Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, & cretary of War. GENERAL BUTLERS HEADQUARTERS, June 14, 18642.20 p. m. (Received 2 a. iii. 15th.) Wrights corps reached the James River last nigh.t opposite Fort Powhatan. Buruside camped on the other side of the Chickahomiiiy. Warren camped at Saint Marys Church. Both these corps are up be- fore this time. The wagon train, with Ferreros division, reached the Chickahominy at the Windsor Shades, but did not cross, becaase they did not have enough bridge material. The deficiency has been supplied. Butlers engineers had begun work for the pontoon bridge at Fort Powhata~u before our arrival, and are now aided by heavy details from Hancocks corps. It is a pretty heavy job to corduroy the marsh, which is fully half a umile wide, and quite deep. When we left Wilcoxs Wharf at 9 oclock this morning there were three steam-boats there to begin ferrying Barlows division. No ferry-boats had yet appeared; however, the crossing will be made with all practicable rapidity, the troops crossing on boats, and the bridge being nsed for the trains only. The weather is cloudy, threatening rain, but I think we shall get every- thing out of the Chickahominy bottom upon the highlands along the James River before any trouble from that source. We know nothing of Lees movements. He has not yet sent troops to Petersburg. Gen- eral Grant desires me to inquire whether Quartermaster Holabird, at New Orleans, has been relieved. He has very bad reports concerning him. He also wishes that you would send him $500,000 in Confederate money for use in a cavalry expedition, on which he proposes to pay for everything taken. Your dispatch respecting Barnard was received and communicated. There is no reason for anxiety on that subject. Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, C. A. 1~ANA. Secretary of War. HEADQUARTERS, June 15, 18648 a. ma. (Received 9.50 p. in.) All goes on like a miracle. Pontoon bridge at Fort Powhatan finished at 2 a. m. Artillery trains instantly began crossing. Hancocks corps is nearly all landed by ferry at Wind-Mill Point; last of it will be over by 10 a. in. Hancock moves out instantly for Petersburg to support Smiths attack on that place, which was to have been made at daylight. General Warren will next be ferried, followed by Burnside and Wright. None of the boats sent by General Halleck, on General Grants order, have arrived. The great wagon train has not yet begun to come up from the Windsor Shades, the l)ontoons sent back there having been delayed. Wilsons cavalry pickets now extend from White Oak Swamp Page 20 20 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. LII. bridge, on the right, to Malvern Hill, on th4~ left. Wilson had constant sharp skirmishing on 13th, losing SO men. He has taken prisoners who report that Hill and Ewell are iiitrenched on the line from White Oak Swanip to Malvern Hill. Lee appears to have had no idea of our crossing the James River. General Grant moves his headquarters to City Point this morning- Weather splendid. C. A. DANA. Hon. E. lvi. STANTON, Secretary of War. CITY POINT, June 15, 1864~5.30 p. in. (Received 10.30 a. in. 16th.) The Petersbnrg Express newspaper of yesterday has a telegram sent to Extra Billy Smith from Lynchburg stating that Hunter entered Lex- ington on the 11th. They estimate Hiniters strength at 16,000; his advance was resisted by General MeCansland. The Richmond Enquirer of the 13th has official intelligence that Crook, with 8,000 men, was at Amherst Court-House, only twelve miles from Lynclmburg. They had destroyed the bridge over the Ta River. Lynchburg is defended, as Enquirer says, by a much larger force thau it had expected, aided by militia. Smith, with 15,000 men, attacked Petersburg this morning. General Butler reports from his observatory near Bermuda Hundred that there has beeu sharp fighting, and that troops and trains of the enemy were, as he writes, moving from the city across the Appomattox as if retreating. C. A. DANA. Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War. CITY POINT, VA., June 15, 18647.30 p. in. (Received 5 p. m. 16th.) Our latest report from Smith was at 4.04 p. in. He had carrieda line of intrenchments at Beatty~s house, the colored troops assaulting aiid carrying the rifle-pits with great gallantry, but lie had not yet carried the main line. He describes the rebel artillery fire as very heavy. He expected to assault this line jus~t before dark. Hancock is within three miles of Smith. C. A. DANA. Hon. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War. - CITY POINT, June 16, 18647 a. m. (Via Jamestown Island 11.45 a. m Received 4.45 a. in. 17th.) At 7.20 p. m. yesterday Smith assaulted and carried the principal line of the euemy before Petersburg, taking 13 cannon, several stand of colors, and between 300 aiid 400 prisoners. This line is two miles from Petersburg. Hancock got up and took position on Smiths left at 3 a. m. to-day. There was heavy firing in that direction there from 5 to 6. No report yet. C. A. DANA. Hon. E. lvi. STANTON Page 21 Cnip. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 21 HEIGHTS SOUTH OF PETERSBURG, June 16, 18648 a. rn. (Via Jamestown Island 12.30 p. m. Received 4 p. m. 17th.) The success of Smith last night was of the most important character. He carried these heights, which were defended by works of the most formidable character, and this gives us perfect command of the city and railroad. The enemy still hold south of the city and west of the river, but their position of little comparative value. General Smith says the negro troops fought magnificently. His loss is in round numbers 750, of which 500 were among the negroes. He took 16 cannon. C. A. DANA. Hon. E. M. STANTON. DOUTHATS LANDING, VA., June 16, 18641 p. m. (Received 11.45 p. in.) After sending my dispatch of this morning from the heights southeast of Petersburg I went over the conquered lines with General Grant and the engineer officers. The works are of the very strongest kind, more difficult even to take than was Missionary Ridge, at Chattanooga. The hardest fighting was done by the black troops. The forts they stormed were, I think, the worst of all. After the affair was over Gen- eral Smith went to thank them and tell them he was proud of their courage and dash. He says they cannot be exceeded as soldiers, and that hereafter he will send them in a difficult place as readily as the best white troops. They captured six out of the sixteen cannons which he took. The prisoners he took were from Beauregard~s command some of them said they had jusP crossed the James above Drewrys ~Blnff. I do not think any of Lees army had reached Petersburg when Smith stormed it. They seem to be there this morning, however, and to be making arrangements to hold the west side of the Appomattox; the town they cannot think of holding, for it lies directly under our guns. The weather continues splendid. C. A. DANA. Hon. E. M. STANTON, AS~ecretary of War. DOUTHATS LANDING, June 16, 18642.80 p. m. I have come down here from Petersburg to see how the crossing ad- vances. I find the rear of Warrens corps just being ferried across. The great wagon train will all be over the bridge by daylight to-morrow morning. The cavalry (Wilsons division) will also pass over in the night, leaving Wrights corps to hQld the rear. The line of defense across the neck here is about a mile long and very strong, extending from one swamp to another. The last of the army will no doubt be south of the James River by noon to-morrow. I must here say that the unprecedented pontoon bridge, nearly 700 yards long, constructed by Major Duane is of the most admirable solidity. After Duane had nearly finished it Benham came imp and took charge. C. A. DANA. Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary ~f War Page 22 22 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. LII. CITY POINT, VA., June 16, 18644 p. rn. (Via Jamestown Island 11.45 p. in. Received 5.30 a. m. 17th.) The Richmond Whig of yesterday says that General Stahel, with 2,000 cavalry, has passed west throngh Robertsons Gap, apparently to destroy the Tennessee railroad. The infantry force which had been at Aniherst Court-House is said to be moving in the direction of Buffalo Springs. A dispatch from the same paper General Lee reports that Hampton and Fitz. Lee have routed Sheridan at Trevilian Station, cap- turing 500 prisoners and 6 guns, and Sheridan is said to have left his dead and wounded on the field. The same paper has a dispatch from Atlanta stating that General Polk was killed by a cannon-ball at 11 a. m. Johnston, ilardee, and Jackson were with him when he fell. C. A. DANA. Hon. B. M. STANTON. CITY POINT, June 16, 18644.15 p. m. (Via Jamestown Island 11.45 p. m. Received 4.50 a. m. 17th.) General Butler reports from Bermuda Hundred that the enemy have abandoned the works in the front of that place. His troops are now engaged in tearing up the railroad between Petersburg and Richmond. Two divisions of the Sixth Corps, now coming up on steamers from Douthats Landing, will be sent to support Butler. C. A. DANA. Hon. E. M. STANTON. CITY POINT, June 17, 18649 a. m. (Via Jamestown Island 8p. m. Received 1.30 a. in. 18th.) I find that -J was wrong yesterday in regard to the points of the com- pass. The works taken by Smith on Wednesday evening are on the east and northeast of Petersburg, extending across the line of the City Point railroad. After the Second Corps got up a l)art of Smiths troops were relieved and the whole of the Second Corps was put in on the east of the city with its line inclining to the southwest. On the left of Han- cock came the Ninth Corps; its line, however, did not extend to the Nor- folk railroad. General Meade arrived on the ground at about 3 p. in. yesterday and took command. At S p. m. Hancock attacked up6n his whole front, supported by two brigades of the Eighteenth Corps. Bir- ney made considerable progress, taking some of the advanced works of the enemy and one of the main works of their first line. This morning at 4 oclock Buruside moved a strong assaulting column from his own right and broke through the rebel lines, capturing 2 redoubts, 4 guns, and 400 prisoners. General Meade reports that there was fighting along the line all night, the moonlight being very clear. He estimates his total losses at less than 2,000 killed and wounded. Colonel Kelly, com- inandino Irish brigade, and Lieutenant-Colonel McCreary, One hundred and forty-fifth Pennsylvania, arereportedkilled.* ColonelEgan, Fortieth New York; Lieutenant-Colonel McGee, Sixty-ninth New York; Colonel Hapgood, Fifth New Hampshire, wounded. The Fifth Corps reached the field about 11 p. m. yesterday. Two divisions of the Sixth Corps, McCreary was captured, not killed Page 23 CHAP. MI.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 23 under General Wright, have gone to help Butler in front of Bermuda Hundred, where he holds the position abandoned by the enemy yester- day. He reports three miles of the Richmond railroad torn up. C. A. DANA. Hon. E. M. STANTON. FORT MONROE, VA., June 17, 1864. (Received 2 a. m. 18th.) Add the following to Danas report of 9 a. in. 17th to the Secretary of War: CIPHER CLERK. General Grant is now there to see if anything can be done toward taking in the rear the rebel force at Petersburg. It does not appear that that force includes any considerable part of Lees army. Prisoners say that Hokes command, B ushrod Johnsons division, and Wises Legion are there, some say also a part of Longstreets corps. Admiral Lee re- ports having seen yesterday afternoon a column of troops, 40,000 to 50,000 in number, from Malvern Hill across Deep Bottom in the directiou of Richmond, whether to go to the city or to cross the James River at a pontoon bridge they have near Drewrys Bluff it was impossible to judge. This is the only light we have upon the mystery of Lees where- abouts. The crossing of our trains and troops at Fort Powhatan has gone on prosperously. Wilsons cavalry got over last night, and the last of the wagons, with Wrights remaining division and Ferreros colored division, will be on this side by noon. The bridge is to be brought up to Bermuda Hundred, and thrown across the James River. near Doves [Jones] Neck. The heat is very intense. C. A. DANA. CITY POINT, June 17, 18645.80 p. m. (Received 8.50 a. m. 18th.) On the 14th instant General Butler relieved General Gillinore from command of the Tenth Army Corps and ordere~d him to Fort Monroe to await a court of inquiry concerning his disgraceful failure to capture Petersburg after he had volunteered foi- the duty. On hearing Gill- mores explanation, Grant has modified the order so that Gillmore is reli& ved at his own request and ordered to Washington to report to the Adjutant-General for orders. C. A. DANA. Hon. E. M. STANTON. FORT MONROE, VA., June 18, 186412.30 a. m. Add to Danas report of the 17th, 5.30 p. in., to the Secretary of War the following: CIPHER CLERK. General Butler reports at 5.17 p. m. that the enemy have formed in line of battle, driven in his pickets, and occupies the powerful lines in front of Bermuda Hundred which they abandoned to him yesterday Page 24 24 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. LII. all this notwithstanding he had with him two divisions of the Sixth Corps, in addition to his own force. J was misinformed respecting Wil- 5Oli~5 cavalry. It has not yet crossed the bridge at Fort Powliatan. It remains north of th~ river to guard the great herd of cattle, which is not yet up, but will be there before dark. The cattle will be swum over and then the remaining troops wiji cross. I got my information, erro- neous information, from General Grant, who had received it from some officer of General Meades. No news from Petersburg since morning. General Grant is now there. C. A. DANA. CITY POINT, VA., June 18, 18648 a. m. General Burnside attacked at 3 p. m. yesterday with Wihicoxs divis- ion and gained ground. He attacked again at 8 p. inn. with Ledlies (late Crittendens) division, carrying what prisoners and deserters re- ported to be the enemys last and main line on that part of the defenses of Petersburg. Ledlie suffered severely, but no figures are yet reported, either of loss or captures. In the night Ledlie was driven back, but at 2 a. m. the rebels evacuated the line. Deserters report thatthey have taken up a shorter one~enxeloping the railroad bridge. General Meade reported at 5.30 this morning that he was moving forward to find and feel them, but that his men were so worn out with marching, fighting, and digging that they must have rest, unless some great opportunity should present itself. No report from General Butler since my last dis- patch. He was ordered to retake the position which the enemy had reoccupied, after leaving it open to him for thirty hours, but no sounds of his guns have been heard to indicate an attempt, though the two divisions of the Sixth Corps had been sent him expressly to secure the position. He had not even a line of battle or a cannon placed up the heights. With regard to the two French officers who wish to come here, General Grant now desires me to say that he will be glad to have them, but wishes them to understand that the campaign is carried on under the greatest inconveniences as respect personal comfort. Every- thing is across the river at Powhatan. Th a. m. to-day. e bridge was taken up at 3 lion. E. M. STANTON, C. A. DANA. Secretary of War. CITY POINT, VA., June 19, 18649 a. m. (Received 4.20 p. in.) General Meade advanced his forces yesterday morning until he found enemy occupying a new and shorter line of intrenchments, about a mile in front of Petersburg. Believing from the unanimous statement of prisoners that there was no force in his front except Beauregards three divisions he determined by a vigorous effort to push them over the Appomattox. A general assault was ordered at noon, and Martindale, having two divisions of the Eighteenth and one of the Sixth Corps, attacked promptly and successfully, occupying enemys line, and taking some 40 prisoners. Birney attacked at the same time, but made no progress. About 2 p. in., Warren and Buruside having got ready, ad- vanced for consid~rable distance without reaching enemy~5 main line. About 4 p. m. Birney again assaulted with nine brigades, but was no Page 25 CHAP. LIJ.1 THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 25 able to force the enemys line. Martindale also again attempted to advance farther, but failed. Both Birney and Martindale report the enemy before them in very strong force, with heavy reserves masked in the rear, from which General Meade infers that main body of Lees army has re-enforced Beanregard. General Meade says that these assanlts were well made, and that all men conld do under the circum- stances wa~ done. At 7 J). m. Willeox, of the Ninth Corps, and War- ren again assaulted, but in vain, and with that the days operations closed. Our advance lines are held and intrenched. The result of the three days operations since Meade took command there is the driving the enemy from two lines of intrenchments, the capture of 4 guns, 4 colors, and about 500 prisoners. I have not been able to witness the fighting of the last two days, having been kept in camp by sickness, but Comstock, of General Grants staff; tells me that it has not been equal to our previons fighting, owing to our heavy loss in superior offi- cers. The men fight as wcll, but are not directed with the same skill and enthusiasm. GeneralMeade gives no statement of casualties, but says they are no heavier than was to be expected from the numbers engaged. General Grant has directed that no niore assaults shall be made. He will now maneuver. I presume that Sheridans report, tel- egraphed here last night from West Point, was at the same time tele- graphed to you. His success in the great purpose of destroying the railroad seems to have been incomplete. Butler, with Grants assent, has assigned Brooks to command the Tenth Army Corps. Prisoners report that Ewells corps has gone to Lynchbnrg. C. A. DANA.. Hon. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War. CITY POINT, VA., June 19, 186411 p. m. (Received 10 a. m. 20th.) Richmond Examiner of yesterday says General Hunter, Thursday last, was at Forest Depot, on Virginia and Tennessee Railroad, destroy- ing that road. Forest Depot supposed to be where the railroad crosses Forest Creek, some eight or ten miles southwest from Lynchburg, and appears to be on a road from Lexington. General Meade reports his casualties of Thursday, Friday, and Saturday to be about 7,000. At- tacks of Thursday were made by General Grants orders, those of Fri- day and Saturday were made by General Meade himself. C. A. DANA. Hon. E. M. STANTON. CITY POINT, VA., June 20, 18645 p. in. (ReceiVed 8 a. m. 21st.) Meade is ordered to devote himself to swinging his army around upon the south and southwest of Petersburg. He reports that his cavalry is already upon the Jerusalem road, and thinks that by fortifying as he extends to his left he can soon and safely reach the Appomattox on that side. This will give him possession of the railroad from Petets- burg to Weldon and that to Lynchbnrg. He will be supported in thi Page 26 26 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. LIL movement by a similar extension to the left on the part of the troops of General Butler. Position of Meades forces are now as follows: On right, Sixth Corps holds works captnred Wednesday by the Eighteenth Corps, which last corps has returned within Geiieral Batlers lines. Next to Sixth is the Ninth, forming Meades present center, and next the Fifth, forming his left. The Second .Corps is in reserve in the rear. The movement begins by putting Second Corps upon left of the Fifth, and drawing back Sixth as a reserve, its place in the lines being taken by Eighteenth. These operations, I suppose, will be performed to-night. Next the Ninth Corps will be similarly withdrawn, and its place in the lines taken by all of the Tenth Corps which can be spared from Bermuda Hundred, where the works are so strong as to be safe with a small gar- rison, say of 5,000 men. As the object is to get possession of the rail- road and inclose the enemy fighting will riot be sought for, though, of course, it will not be avoided. Once extended to the Appomattox, the railroad will be thoroughly destroyed as far south as may be practicable, then if necessary Army of the Potomac may take ten days rations and move upon the Danville road, leaving its base of supplies here to be guarded by its fortifications and the forces of General Butler. A bridge is to be thrown across the James River to-night, and a bridge-head on the north shore fortified on Jones Neck. General Weitzel has charge of the operation. The bridge-head will require a garrison of 200 meii. It will allow us to send cavalry over into Charles City County, where the teeming crops already need our attention, and it will also menace Richmond with attack on that side. Sheridan is ordered to come here, crossing theChickahoininy at Long Bridge or Jones Bridge, and strik- ing the James River either at Wilcoxs and be ferried, or at the new bridge above spoken of. Wilson moves on a raid to-morrow night with his division, and half of Kautzs. He has general instructions to do all the harm he can, especially to the railroad. Richmond Examiner of Sunday mentions safe arrival of a train by that road, as if it were some. thing to be thankful for. General Meade notified Warren this morning that he must either ask to be relieved, or else he (Meade) would prefer charges against him. For past three days Hancock has been so far disabled by his old wound that Birney has commanded the Second Corps. General Grant has just sent Hancock ten days leave unasked. C. A. DANA. Hon. E. 3M. STANTON. CITY POINT, VA., June 21, 18649 a. m. (Received 0.30 p. in.) All quiet at Petersburg during night. The pontoon bridge at Jones Neck was successfully thrown last night. One of Butlers brigades under Foster passed over, and has constructed a bridge.head at Deep Bottom. Meade did not move the Second Corps last night, it being impracticable to get the Sixth and Eighteenth Corps ready to move simultaneously. It will be done to-night. Richmond papers publish Forrests official report of his fight with Sturgis. Forrest claims that he killed, wounded, and captured more men than he had in his own command. C. A. DANA. Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, & eretary of War Page 27 CHAP. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 27 CITY POINT, VA., June 21, 186410 a. rn. (Received 12.45 p. m. 22d.) General Meade reports that his former report of casualties on Thurs~ day, Friday, and Saturday last was erroneous. lnstead of 7,000 it should have been 9,500. C. A. DANA. Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, & eretary of War. HEADQUARTERS U. S. ARMIES, June 21, 1864. (Received 11 a. in. 22d.) The Petersburg Express of this morning contains a report that Gen- eral Hunter attacked Lynchburg on Saturday last and was repulsed. He approached the town by the Salem road. The report gives no ac- count of casualties on either side or other circumstances, and I judge from its statement that the attack was nothing more than a reconnais- sance. The Express says that a great battle was expected at Lynch- burg on Sunday. All has been quiet at Petersburg during the day, except that the enemy threw a good many shells at the right of our lines this morning, doing no damage. The President arrived here about noon and has just returned from visiting the lines before Petersburg. As he caine back, he passed through the division of colored troops commanded by General Hinks, which so greatly distinguished itself on Wednesday last. They were drawn up in double lines on each side of the road arid welcomed him with hearty shouts. It was a memorable thing to behold the President, whose fortune it is to represent the prin- ciple of emancipatiomi, passing bareheaded through the enthusiastic ranks of those negroes armed to defend the integrity of the American nation. C. A. DANA. Hon. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War. FORT MONROE, VA., June 22, 186411.30 a. m. (Received 0 p. in.) Insert in Danas of 21st, sent this morning, between doing no dam- age and the President arrived, the following: CIPHER CLERK. I was at Petersburg at Op. in. One division (Barlows) of the Second Corps had already taken up its position on the left of the Fifth, and the other two divisions were moving in the same direction. The Sixth Corps was all ready to withdraw fromn the lines on our right, and move to the left of the Second, or in case the Second should be attacked in the morning to support it. Th~ Eighteenth Corps was in the rear, wait- ing to occupy the lines in place of the Sixth. General Foster reports from Deep Bottom that his cavalry scouts had fallen in with a consid- erable infantry force of the enemy. A woman in the neighborhood had also informed him that a whole division under a General Lee was about to attack him, but as he received this information this morning, and no sound of battle has yet been heard from that direction, it is probable- that his anxiety was groundless. C. A. DANA Page 28 9 28 OPERATIONS TN SE. VA. AND N. 0. [CHAP. LII. CITY POINT, July 1, 186410.30 a. m. (~eceived 8 p. in.) I arrived liere an hour since, the boat having lain by last night and iiight before. The army Occupies about tile same lines as when you were here. The Eighteenth and Nii~th Corps are alone engaged in any- thing like siege work, their effort being to get possession of a knoll be- fore them. If they succeed in this the enemy will have to abandon this side of the Appomattox. On the left of the Ninth Corps the Fifth is posted, extending nearly southward across the Jerusalem road, but at so great a distance from the rebel fortifications as to have no immediate effect upon them. The Second and Sixth Corps are both well protected. No attempt has been made to establish intrenchments toward the Ap- pomattox on the left since the failure of the Second and Sixth Corps on Thursday night of last week. It seems that the rebels are very strongly fortified there, also, and that if we were to attempt to envelop them for the whole distance, we should not only render our lines weak from their great extension, but should have no free infruitry force to operate with elsewhere. Our batteries of heavy guns are used with much effect on Smiths front. He keeps silent the rebel fort, Clifton, which you will recollect is on the west side of the Appomattox, and, as he thinks, ha~ much damaged the railroad bridge. To this he is directing special atten- tion. Grant thinks all the railr~ads are well broken up. The Weldon road Wright has pretty thoroughly destroyed with his infantry. On Butlers front at Berlnud4 Hundred all is substantially as when you were here. 1 have in the most informal way conununicated to Grant the substance of what you said respecting iRosecrans and Curtis. He thinks the most useful way to employ IRosecrans would be. to station him at some convenient point on the Northern frontier with the duty of detecting and exposing rebel conspiracies in Canada. C. A. DANA. His Excellency the PRESIDENT, Washington. CITY POINT, YA., July 1, 186411 a. m. (Received 8.30 p. in.) Grant thinks the difficulty between Meade and Warren has been settled without tIme extreme remedy which Meade proposed last week. Butler is pretty deep in coimtroversial correspondence with Baldy Smith, in which Grant says Butler is clearly in the wrong. A report is here that Wilson has been surrounded and destroyed, but it is him- probable. ~iI1rant does not believe it; besides, he thinks Wilson to be as likely as any other luau to get safely out of a tight place. All that is certain is, that Kautz got separated from him, and that some men of Wilsons division came in with him. It appears that Wilson had riot the sort of roving commission which Grant supposed, but that Meade gave him explicit instructions as to exery part of his course. That portion of them which related to the Danville railroad he had fully ex- ecuted, except that it is not yet satisfactorily ascertained whether he succeeded in destroying the bridge over the Staunton River and had got back upon the Weldon road, near Stony Creek, when he was at- tacked by the whole body of the rebel cavalry. This had been set free by Sheridan crossing the James River and stopping to rest, and was imil at once pitched upon Wilsbn. No doubt he has had hard hghting and heavy losses, but I think he will bring in time mass of his divisio Page 29 ChAP. LII.]! THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 29 in safety. Sheridan has gone out to help him, but his horses are badly jaded, and he cannot move very rapidly. Wright has moved out to Reams Station to support Sheridan. C. A. DANA. Hon. E. M. STANTON, Washington. CITY POINT, Juiy 1, 18642 p. rn. (Received 8.20 a. m. 2d.) I have just seen General Kautz, and have obtained from him a clearer iden of the (lisaster to Wilsons cavalry. It seems Wilson had been led to believe, by a dispatch from General Meade, that our lines had ex- tended around to the Appomattox, or at least across the Weldon rail- road. He was, accordingly, confident of finding our pickets at ~ Station or neai~ there. After he crossed the Sappony, on what is called the stage road, he was attacked by hamptons cavalry; fought them Tuesday afternoon and night between that stream and Stony Creek, relying all the while on aid from the Army of the Potomac, which he supposed to be in hearing of his cannon. One of his aides, Captain Whitaker, also cut his way thr~ugh with a company and reported the case at General Meades, but succor could not be got up in season. Pushing on, Wilson crossed Stony Creek, when his advance, under Kantz, found before it an infantry force, which prisoners reported as consisting of three brigades, under Finegan. Wilson now determined to go back and break through Hamptons force, but on returning to Stony Creek found that Hamptons men had already destroyed the bridge. The case being desperate, he gave orders to destroy the train and artillery. The caissons were blown up, and the guns, twenty in number, spiked and hauled into a wooded niorass just as Finegan~s force with a body of cavalry canie up, charging so as to divide Kautz and Wilson. The former saw That he had a chance to bring off his command in safety, and thought that to rejoin Wilson would only be to expose himself to the danger of also being surrounded and captured.. Accordingly, he marched out, bringing off his division and about 1,000 men of Wilsons, including the whole of the Second Ohio Regiment. He does not think Wilson has been captured, but that lie has escaped with the mass of his troops, either passing to the southeast between Stony Creek and the Sappony and swimming or fording the Nottoway, or else by moving to the northwest toward Dinwiddie Court-House. Sheridan marched on Wednesday night, and left Prince George Court- House yesterday morning at 7 oclock, while the Sixth Corps went to. Reams Station, but nothing has been heard from them or from any of Wilsons troops. If Wilson took the road by Dinwiddie Court-House he would have to make a long circuit before he could again come within reach of us. Kautz says that the outermost pickets of our army were really not more than one mile and a half from the scene of these events. Up to that point the expedition had been exceedingly successful. It had thoroughly destroyed the Danville railroad from about four miles northeast of Burkes Station to the Staunton River, which General Meades orders fixed as the limit to their march in that direction. The bridge at that river they were not able to destroy. It was very strongly fortified and guarded. Most of the Danville track was of flat or strap iron laid upon pine scanthing, so that time destruction was easy as well as perfect. On the South Side road they destroyed about fou Page 30 30 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C [CHAP. LII. miles, working each way from the junction at Burkes. The expedition averaged forty miles a day, doing the work of destruction mostly by night. They found no great stock of supplies in the country. Their horses fed chiefly on green oats and wheat. About 3,000 negroes, who had joined the column in Dinwiddie and Amelia, were with it when it was attacked. Kautz estimates the losses of his own command at about one-quarter of his division, which at starting was about 2,500 strong, but has not yet received any accurate reports from his officers. C. A. DANA. Hon. E. M. STANTON, Wa8hington. CITY POINT, July 1, 18644.30 p. m. (Received 7.30 a. m. 2d.) I find that in my last dispatch I misunderstood Kautzs statement of the amount of railroad destruction accomplished by Wilsons expedition. It seems before reaching Burkes Station he had first destroyed about ouc mile and a half of the Weldon road, then he struck the South Side road, near Fords Station, and destroyed it as far as Blacks and Whites Station, after which he moved to the Junction and did what was re- ported in my former dispatch. C. A. DANA. Hon. E. M. STANTON. GRANTS HEADQUARTERS, July 1, 18645.30 p. m. (Received 8.10 a. m. 2d.) One of General ~ scouts is just in, who left Wilsons command this morning at 7 oclock on the road from Suffolk to Prince George Court-House, Wilson having yesterday succeeded in crossing the Black- water. The scout thinks he has most of his men with him, although he was obliged to abandon all property, and many of his men are dis- mounted. He will be in by night. C. A. DANA. Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War. CITY POINT, July 1, 18647.30 p. m. (Received 9.20 a. m. 2d.) Two of Wilsons officers have just come in to report. He reached the James River about six miles above P#whatan at 5 oclock. Men and horses are badly jaded, but the losses seem to be much less than we had supposed. He has with him also two of Kautzs regiments, which that officer considered lost. From present appearances the total casualties of the expedition will not exceed 750, including killed, wounded, and missing. Of the property nothing fell into the hands of the enemy except part of the artillery and the ambulances, which were full of men, wounded in the previous fighting. The wagons were all destroyed. When the column was attacked it had picked up in the country about 5,000 horses, but most of these were unable to stand the hard march by night and day and were lost before the escap Page 31 CHAP. LII.] IHE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 31 was complete. Yery many of the contrabands came safely off with the column. No particulars are yet reported, but this raid seems to have surpassed all others, except Hunters, in the damage inflicted on the enemy. C. A. DANA~ Hon. E. M. STANTON, Washington. GRANTS HEADQUARTERS, July 2, 186411 a. rn. (Received 4.50 p. in.) Everything quiet this morning. There was a good deal of firing both of musketry and artillery about 10 p. m. yesterday on Burusides front, but it amounted to nothing. Nothing heard yet from Sheridan. Wil- son is moving up to this vicinity to recruit his horses. The heat is excessive. C. A. DANA. Hon. E. M. STANTON. CITY POINT, VA., July 3, 18649 a. m. (Received 1.35 p. ix.) All quiet on lines and no new developments. The mine with which the rebel redoubt in front of Burnside is to be blown up is advancing well, but is a pretty heavy job, and will take some time yet. I have just come in from a visit to Wilsons cavalry camp. The men and horses are both iu much hetter condition than I had expected. Wilson estimates his total loss at from 75Q to 1,000 men, including those lost from K.autzs division. Of these some 600 were killed and wounded in fair fighting, of which they had plenty from the beginning. Wilson confirms Kautzs statement that the expedition averaged forty miles a day. In one thirty-six hours Kautz marched eighty miles. Of railroads fully sixty miles were thoroughly destroyed. The Danville road, Wilson says, could not be repaired in less than forty days, even if all the materials were at hand, and he has d& stroyed all the blacksmith shops where the bars might be straightened out, and all the mills where scantling for sleepers could be sawed. The thirty miles he broke up of the South Side road may be repaired in about ten days, if the work is not dis- turbed. That road has T rails and for want of suitable implements the rails could not be thoroughly destroyed, but only bent and twisted by laying them across piles of burning ties. The bridge across the Staun- ton or Roanoke Ri ver he was unable to destroy, because he could not cross the river to get in the rear of the fortifications, there being neither ford nor bridge for fifty miles, except this very railroad bridge. It had been garrisoned for protection against the cavalry of Hunters expedition. The river at that place is some 600 feet Wide. The same want of means of crossing prevented the expedition from crossing back on the south side of that river. It appears that the only means of passing it used by the inhabitants is small ferry-boats, and with these the expedition could not have been safely got over. The final misfor- tune resulted from ignorance of the fact that the Army of the Potomac had not been able to take up the position indicated in General Meades instructions to Wilson l~esides, all the scouts and country people re- ported that there was no rebel force between Stony Creek amid the Federal lines. Buj~ for this Wilson would have crossed the Nottowa Page 32 32 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. LII. and come in by the route he fiuially adopted, moving by Jarratts Station to the Blackwater near Waverly. At that place the column was de- tained for sonic ten hours to restore a destroyed bridge. The whole Cavalry Corps of the Army of the Potomac is flOW camped near ihight- house Point. General Sheridan thinks it will take teu days to recruit the horse~ so that they can resume the offensive efficiently. Wilson brought in about 400 negroes and many of the vast numbers of horses and mules gathered in his course. He reports that the rebels slaughtered without mercy the negroes they retook. Wilsons loss in proj )erty is a small wagon train, used to carry ammunition, his ambulance train, and 12 cannon. The horses of cannon and wagons were generally brought off. Of the cannon two were removed from the carriages, the wheels of which were broken, and the gumis thrown into the water, and one other gun had been disabled by a rebel shot breaking the trunnions before it was abandoned. C. A. DANA. Hon. E. M. STANTON. GENERAL GRANTS HEADQUARTERS, July 3, 18643.30 p. m. (Received 8 p. in.) There is pretty good evidence that Early is now here, and all of Ewells corps with him, but Breckinridge has not yet rejoined Lees army. If he is moving down the Valley, as Sigel reports, it is possible that he may have with him 10,000 men of all sorts, not more. C. A. DANA. Hon. E. iVI. STANTON, & cretary of War. GRANTS HEADQUARTERS, City Point, July 3, 18644 p. m. The Petersburg Express of yesterday proposes that the Yankee prisoners should be fed on bread and water only, rather than starve the Confederate soldiers and people in the two cities. This paper admits that while the roads are cut as at present supplies are very short; be- sides, if the roads should be repaired, it says there is no telling how soon they will be broken again. C. A. DANA. SECRETARY OF WAR. CITY POINT, VA., July 4, 18649.30 a. m. (Received 7.15 a. m. 5th.) No new developments at the front. Burusides mine is hindered by springs and quicksands. Smiths batteries of 30-pounder Parrotts and 8-inch mortars fire pretty steadily at the railroad bridge, and are be- lieved to have damaged it considerably. The enemy, who have repaired the road where General Butler broke it, in ake no attempt to run trains into Petersburg. Two citizens who came in from Richmond, having left that place on Thursday, report that the rebels are at work repairing the Virginia Central. It seems that the road between Gordonsville and Lynchburg has never been interrupted for any gj~eat length of time Page 33 CHAP. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 33 A good deal of sickness from the extreme heat is reported from both Smiths and Meades commands in f this morning, bnt no rain. ront of Petersburg. Weather cool C. A. DANA. Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War. CITY POINT, VA., July 4, 186412.30 p. rn. (Received 6.15 a. m. 5th.) Though General Grant fully acquiesced in your observations respect- ing General Barnard, still I deem it exceedingly desirable that the latter should be recalled from him. His advice tends to blunder and injury. General Meade is less positive than yesterday in his belief that Early is here. Deserters reported him here, but Meade states that he has captured~no men from his (Earlys) command. C. A. DANA. Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War. CITY POINT, VA., July 4, 18641 p. m. (Received 6.15 a. m. 5th.) General Barnard has laid before General Grant a memorandum ex- plaining various plans for immediate operations, aud concluded with an elaborate recommendation of an assault npon the key of Petersburg, which is a strong earth-work in front of Warren. It stands at the angle above the rebel lines on the east of the town which run pretty nearly north and south, joining those on the south whose general direction is abont east and west. Barnard proposes to make very careful prepara- tions to concentrate the fire of at least 100 cannon upon the point, and to attack with very heavy masses of men. I do not think that General Grant is much inclined to this idea, but he has sent to ask Meades opinion about it. All our experience shows that with the mass of Lees army to defend the works assailed they cannot be carried, and that the attempt, if made with vigor, would cost us at least 15,000 men. C. A. DANA. Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War. CITY POINT, VA., July 4, 18644 p. rn. (Received 5.55 a. m. 5th.) The Richmond Examiner of Saturday claims that they have taken 500 prisoners from Wilsons command, including 250 wounded, 16 can- non, and between 500 and 700 negroes of all sizes and sexes, 35 wagons, 33 ambulances, and a great train of carriages and buggies. Many of the negroes were dressed in the finery of their masters and mistresses. The captured soldiers were loaded, according to the Exainiuer, ~Tith stolen watches, silverware, and ladies and childrens clothing. That paper argues, in a bitter article two columns long, that they ought not to be treated as prisoners of war, but as bandits and assassins. It seems 3 R HVOL XL, PT Page 34 34 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHM~. LII. the recaptured negroes unanimously declared they had been forced away from their homes, and the Examiner says the men who com- mitted this outrage ought to be hung. C. A. DANA. SECUETARY o~ WAR. CITY POINT, VA., July 4, 18644 p. m. A deserter from the Sixty-first Virginia, who came into Hancocks lines this morning from the extreme right of the rebel army, says it was reported in their camp that Ewell had gone into Maryland with his own corps and the other forces lately operating in the Valley. He took only hard bread in his wagons and left all baggage at Staunton. The same deserter reports that the rations of Lees army have been reduced to one-quarter of a pound of meat, whilst the ration of sugar and coffee has ceased to be regularly issued. C. A. DANA. SECRETARY OF WAR, Washington, D. C. CITY POINT, VA:, July 5, 18648 a. m. (Received 6 p. in.) General Meade totally condemns Barnards project of assault. He says that he did his best against the very work Barnard desires to attack twelve hours after he got here and failed. It has since been much strengthened. Meade also condemns the idea of throwing a heavy force across the Appomattox, with ten days rations, to operate on the right of the enemy, for the reason that the column would have to cut loose from its base and from the rest of the army, and would probably be confronted by intrenched lines on that side also. He favors regular siege operations where we are, and places a good deal of dependence upon Burusides mine. That mine will be ready in a week. Meade holds to the plans of operating a~inst the rebel lines of communication by the cavalry alone, and says it will be a fortnight be~ fore Sheridan is ready to resume the offensive. An intelligent deserter says General Early is here in person, but does not know where his troops are. He also says Lee is about making a flank movement against this army, which means, if anything, that our left is to be attacked. On that wing both Hancock and Wright are massed. C. A. DANA. Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, AS~ecretary of War. HEADQUARTERS OF G~NERAL GRANT, City Point, July 6, 18648 a. m. (Received 12.10 p. in.) Ricketts division, of the Sixth Corps, with a force of dismounted cavalry, from 8,000 to 10,000 men in all, embark this morning for Bal- timore. Nothing new along the lines yesterday. Burnside reports that the gallery of his mine had advanced 290 feet yesterday morning. He intends to divide the gallery into five branches, and toputaton of powder in each., Some prominent officers say that the enemy is aware of the mine, and has constructed a new line within that he means to blow up. Meade told me yesterday that he was at last convinced tha Page 35 CHAP. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 35 Early and his troops had gone down the Valley. Ewell, as you are aware, is disabled, and commands in Richmond. The Richmond Ex- aminer of yesterday urges that no prisoners should be taken from raid- ing parties. Richmond is suffering for want of vegetables, bntter, and milk, all owing to the drought. 10 a. m~After another examination of the angle in the rebel lines in front of Warren, General Barnard yesterday te]egraphed* his former recommendation that it should be assaulted. He had satisfied him- self that the necessary position for artillery could not be obtained: C. A. DANA. Hon. B. iVI. STANTON, Secretary of War. CITY POINT, VA., July 6, 18641.30 p. rn. Ricketts is not yet embarked, but will be started in two or three hours. His division numbers 4,500. General Meade thinks the dis- mounted cavalry will make as many more, but we have no precise re- port yet. C. A. DANA. Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War. CITY POINT, VA., July 7, 18648 a. m. (Received 6 p. in.) A change in the commander of the Army of the Potomac now seems probable. Grant has great confidence in Meade, and is much attached to him personally, but the almost universal dislike of Meade which pre- vails among officers of every rank who come in contact with him, and the difficulty of doing business with him felt by every one except Grant himself, so greatly impair his capacities for usefulness and render suc- cess under his command so doubtful that Grant seems to be coming to the conviction that he must be relieved. The facts in the matter have come very slowly to my knowledge, and it was not until yesterday that I became certain of some of the most important. I have long known Meade to be a man of the worst possible temper, especially toward his subordinates. I do not think he has a friend in the whole army. No man, no matter what his business or his service, approaches him with- out heing insulted in one way or another, and his own staff officers do not dare to speak to him, unless first spoken to, for fear of either sneers or curses. The latter, however, I have never heard him indulge in very violently, but he is said to apply them often without occasion and with- out reason. At the same timeas far as I am able to ascertafnhis generals have lost their confidence in him as a. commander. His order for the last series of assaults upon Petersburg, in which he lost 10,Q00 men without gaining any decisive advantage, was to the effect that he had found it impracticable to secure the co-operation of corps command- ers, and therefore each one was to attack on his own account and do the best he could by himself. Consequently each gained some advan- tage of position, but each exhaust~d his own strength in so doing, while for the want of a general purpose and a general commander to direct and concentrate the whole, it all amounted to nothing but heavy loss to So in copy on file, but it shouI(i probably readwithdrew his former recommen- dation, & c., or, telegraphed withdrawal of his former, & c Page 36 36 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. LII. ourselves. Of course there are matters about which I cannot make inquiries, but what I have above reported is the general sense of what seems to be the opinion of fair-minded and zealous officers. For instance, I know that General Wright has said to a confidential friend that all of iVicades attacks have been made without brains and without generalship. The subfrct can~e to pretty full discussion at Grants headquarters last night on occasion of a correspondence between Meade and Wilson. The Richmoiid Examiner charges Wilson with stealing not only negroes and horses, but silver plate and clothing on his raid, and Meade, taking the statement of the Examiner for truth, reads Wilson a lecture and calls ou him for explanations. Wilson denies the charges of rob- bing women and churches, and hopes Meade will not be ready to con- demn his command because its operations have excited the ire of the l)ublic enemy. This started the conversation in which Grant expressed himself qnite frankly as to the general trouble with Meade ~nd his fear that it would become necessary to relieve him. In snch event he said it would be necessary to put Hancock in command. C. A~. DANA. Hon. E. M. STANTON. CITY POINT, VA., July 7, 18648.30 a. rn. Nothing of importance since yesterday morning. The firing on Smiths and Burusides lines was pretty constant during the day and night, and is active this morning. Drought continues. C. A. DANA. Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War. CITY POINT, VA., July 7, 18649 a. m. (Received 8.30 p. in.) An intelligent refugee, who came into our lines by way of Reams Station, reports that the rebels are at work repairing the Weldon rail- road. They have a large wagou train runmling from the break on the south toward Richmond by way of Dinwiddie Court-House. The same refugee says that as soon as Atlanta is taken Alabama will quit the Confederacy. C. A. DANA. Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War. HEADQUARTERS IN THE FIELD Gity Point, Va., July 8, 18649.30 a. m. (Received 3.15 p. in.) Nothing of munch importance this morning. Firing pretty active in the trenches yesterday, but without consequence. Directions have been given to make regular siege approaches to the rebel lines. General Meade reports that Burn sides mine will prove of no value. He thinks the best place to work at is the saliemit angle on the Jerusalem plank road mu Warrens front. This is the point which Barnard proposed to assault, as I reported several days since. We had a trifling shower yesterday, without effect 011 the dronght. C. A. DANA. Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War Page 37 Ciiip. LII.J THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 37 CITY POINT, VA., July 8, 18G41 p. m. (Received ~ p. IlL) General Mleade reports that a construction train went south from Pe- tersburg this morning, and that the rebel working parties engaged iu repairing the Weldon railroad are protecte(l by detachments of cavalry and infantry. General Grant has ordeued all of Sheridans cavalry that are iu condition for the work to move out upon that road, supported by the entire Second Corps, and to destroy it thoroughly as far south as Hicksford. They are to move day after to-morrow ni~ht. We have the Richmond Examiner of the 7th and 8th, full of fury over Wilsons raid. They complain that Richmond is running short of water owing to the drought. The fisheries have closed for the season, having prbduced almost nothing, because the Yankee gun-boats were in the way. The depot for prisoners of war at Andersouville, Ga., now contains 30,000, requiring 5,000 soldiers to guard them. All but the wounded have been sent there from Richmond. Another depot has been established farther south, at some place not named. C. A. DANA. Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, iS~ecretary of War. CITY POINT, VA., July 9, 18649 p. m. (Received 2 p. in.) About 5 p. in. yesterday, after heavy cannonade upon Smith and Bnrnside, a line of rebel infantry suddenly appeared along the crest of their parapets as if to advance upon our works. They fired a single volley, and received one from the men in our trenches, after which they fell back behind their breast-works. Our troops were all under cover, and we had no losses. The movement seems to have been for the pur- pose of ascertaining whether we were still there. The Richmond papers have of late abounded in reports that Grant was withdrawing his army. Weather hot; no rain. C. A. DANA. Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War. No. 3. Report of Brig. til en. Rufus Ingalls, U. S. Army, Chief Quartermaster of Armies operating against J2ichmond. OFFICE o~ CHIEF QUARTERMASTER, ARMIES OPERATING AGAINST RICHMOND, VA., GENERAL City Point, Va., August 28, 1864. On the 12th [Junel the army began another flank movement, to cross the Chickahominy at Long and Jones Bridges, over pontoons laid by our engineerR, and the James, at Fort Powhatan, another pontoon bridge, and to advance rapidly on Petersburg. The trains were con- ducted by Ti~rn talls Station on roads to White House and New Kent, thence by Slatersville, I3arhamsville, and Diascond, to Coles Ferry, * For portion of report (here omitte(I) covering operations from May 4 to June 12, 1864, s~e Vol. XXXVI, Part I, p. 276 Page 38 38 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. LII. where they crossed the Chickahominy over a pontoon bridge, constructed by the engineers, of more thau 2,000 feet in length. They were then conducted to Charles City and down the neck to Donthats, opposite Fort Powhatan, where they crossed the James over the pontoon bridge at that place, commencing at 2 p. m. on the 15th and closing at 7 a. m. on the flth. This movement was very complicated, difficult, aRd ardu- otis. It was one of the most important on record; but it was conducted with a skill and vigor by Captain Peirce that crowned it with inagnifi- cent success. On reaching the James and coming in contact with the command of Major-General Butler, I was announced on the 16th as chief quarter- master ~f armies operating agaiust Richmond and immediately took post at City Point, which had been ill(1ic~ted the principal depot by Generals Grant and Meade. After crossing the James over the pontoon bridge and by the ferries, the troops pressed forward into positions in front of Petersburg. The trains were placed in parks between the depot and those positions con- venicut to the railroad. Improvements were commenced at once to make the depot efficient and ample. Wharves and store-houses were constructed; the railroad to Petersburg was put in working oi~der up to our lines; and supplies were brought to the depot in the reqnired quantities, and issued. A uniform system of supply was put in force in both armies. Such was the posture of affairs on the 30th of June, 11864. My money accountability for the fiscal year is correctly stated below: On hand July 1, 1863 $266, 137.00 Received from officers (hiring the year 12, 603.49 Received from Treasury Department during the year 1, 100,000.00 Received from other sources during the year 146. 44 1, 378,886.93 Expended during the year 2, 144.09 Transferred to other officers during the year 1, 376, 742.84 1, 378, 886.93 According to the report of Mr. B. L. Wentz, chief engineer and su~ perintendent of railroads, 57 miles of railroads have been constructed and repaired, as follows: 20 miles of the Orange and Alexandria Rail- road relaid with new track; 15 miles of the Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac Railroad repaired; 4 miles of the Richmond and York River Railroad relaid with new track, and 13 miles repaired (13 miles of the Richmond and York River Railroad was afterward taken up and the iron removed to Alexandria); 5 miles of the City Point and Petersburg Road was relaid with new track; all making a total as follows: Miles. New track laid 29 New track repaired 28 New track taken up 13 On one railroad large construction parties have been constantly em- ployed making repairs. It is reported that abont 345 miles of telegraph lines have been con- structed, though it is difficult to obtain an accurate statement. As a rule, our headquarters have been in telegraphic communication with headquarters ~of each corps, with our depots, and Washington. Con- stantly changing positions has rendered it necessary to construct an unusual extent of telegraph lines Page 39 CHAP. LIII THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 39 I have during the year frequently reported my views as to the best and proper means of transportation for an army. I do not think that the kind and amount now furnished and allowed these armies can be improved upon. The common six-mule wagon has proved to be the most economical and durable for years past of any ever tested. Pack trains should be provided as prescribed in the order herewith, marked A. A special wagon or caisson should be furnished to carry all ammunition, small-arm as well as artillery. I forwarded a sketch of the carriage, with an explanatory letter of General Hunt, with my report of last year. The mules should be hitched to this wagon as they are to the common army wagon, with one driver, and not as in the artillery service. Our troops are undoubtedly loaded down on marches too heavily even for the road, not to speak of battle. I have witnessed great loss of knapsacks and articles of ch~thing on the routes taken by our troops at the commencement of campaigns. In my4eport of the Chancellors- ville campaign I showed you that the loss of knapsacks of those actu- ally engaged was at least twenty-five per cent. I am in favor of put- ting the lightest possible weight on the soldier, consistent with his wants and the character of the service. I do not think the knapsack should be dispensed with altogether, for it should, ordinarily, form a part of the equipment, but on short campaigns, and on the eve of battle, and when near the supply trains, a blanket rolled up and swung over the shoulder and looped up under the arm, is sufficient without knapsack or overcoat. The soldier can carry three days cooked food in his haver- sack. If necessary, he can carry two or three days bread and some underclothes in his blanket. Our men are generally overloaded, fed, and clad, which detracts from their marching capacity, and induces straggling. I do not propose any modification, however, as our com- manders understand these matters better than I do, probably; at any rate, they know what they want, and have the power to make such changes as they may deem proper. The reports referred to in paragraphs 2, 3, 5, and 7 of your orders will be furnished you in detail by the officers who have served under me. I desire to remind you of my profound obligations for the very prompt, cheerful, and powerful support you have uniformly extended to me. My warmest thanks are also due to General Rucker and his depot officers, who have always responded to my requisitions. To the soldierly and accomplished quartermasters serving with the armies I owe the deepest gratitude. They have performed their labori- ous and responsible duties, without exception, with unexampled zeal, energy, and intelligence. You have been good enough to cause many of them to be promoted. In the closing paragraph of my last report I called your attention to the merits of Captain~ Ferguson and Stoddard, then on duty at Alex- andria. I am pained to know now that both of us were deceived, and that our confidence was misplaced. There has been no instance of embezzlement or misappropriation of public moneys or property on the part of any quartermaster serving with these armies during the past fiscal year, so far as I have the means of being informed. I am, very respectfully, your most obedient servant, RUFUS INGALLS, Brigadier- General and Chief Quartermaster of - Armies operating against Richmond. Bvt. Maj. Gen. 1W. C. MEIG-s, Quartermaster- General U. S. Army Page 40 40 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. LII. A. ~S~pecial orders by Lieutenant- General Grant prescribing allowance of transportation and camp and garrison equipage. ORBE~5,) OFFICE OF CHIEF QUARTERMASTER, ARMIES OPERATING- AGAINST RICHMOND, No. 8. ) City Point, Va., June 29, 1864. The following special orders, issued by the lieutenant-general com- manding Armies of the United States, are printed for distribution to officers of thg qnartermasters department on duty with the Armies operating against Richmond ~ SPECIAL ORDERS, ~ HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES, No. 44. ~ City Point, Va., June 28, 1864. I. The following orders, prescribing the means of transportation, camp and garri- son equipage, for the armies in the field operating against Richmond are published: 1. For the headquarters of the lieutenant-general commanding the Armies of the United States, in the field, and major-generals commanding separate armies, such wagons, light spring-carriages, saddle-horses, and camp equipage as may be deemed necessary prom time to headquarters. time, to be assigned by the chief quartermaster at general 2. For the headquarters of an army corps, two wagons or eight pack-mules for baggage, & c., one two-horse wagon, one two-horse spring-wagon, and ten extra saddle- horses for contingent wants; two wall-tents for the personal use and office of the commanding general; one wall-tent for every two officers of his staff. 3. For the headquarters of a division, one wagon or five pack-mules for baggage, one two-horse spring-wagon, one two-horse wagon, and five extra saddle-horses for contingent wants; on e wall-tent for the personal use and office of the commanding general; one wall-tent for every two officers of his staff. 4. For the headquarters of a brigade, one wagon or five pack-males for baggage, one two-horse spring-wagon, and two extra saddle-horses for contingent wants; one wall-tent for the personal use and office of the commanding general; one wall-tent for every two officers of his staff. 5. The allowance of wagons and pack-mules to officers detached: to every three company officers when detached or serving without wagons, one pack-mule; to every twelve company officers, when detached, one wagon or four pack-mules; to every two staff officers when not attached to any headquarters, one pack-mule; to every ten staff officers when serving similarly, one wagon or four pack-mules. 6. These wagons and pack-mules will include transportation for all personal bag- gage, mess-chests, cooking utensils, desks, papers, & c. The weight of officers bag- gage in the field, specified by army regulations, will be reduced so as to bring it within the foregoing schedule. All, excess of transportation, camp and garrison equipage, now with the army corps, div~isrons, brigades, regiments, or batteries, over the allowance herein prescribed, will be immediately turned into the quartermasters department, at the general depot at City Point. 7. Commissary stores and forage will be transported in the supply trains. When they are not convenient of access, and when troops act in detachments, the quarter- masters department will assign wagons or pack-mules for that purpose, but the bag- gage of officers or troops, or camp equipage, will not be carried in the wagons or on the animals so assigned. S. For each regiment of infantry, cavalry, or battalion of heavy artillery: for bag- gage, Camp equipage, & c., two wagons; three wall-tents for field and staff~ one shelter-tent fir every other commissioned officer; one shelter-tent for every two non- commissioned officers, soldiers, servants, and camp followers. 9. For each battery: for personal baggage, mess-chest, cooking utensils, desks, pa- pers, & c., one wagon; two mall-tents for officers; shelter-tents s infantry and cavalry regiments. ame allowance as for 10. For the artillery and small-arm ammunition train: the number of 12-pounder guns multiplied by 122 and divided by 112; the number of rifled guns multiplied by 50 and divided by 140; the number of 20-pounder guns multiplied by 2, and the nina- ber of 4k-inch guns multiplied by 2t, will give the number of wagons allowed. The number of gnus in horse batteries, multiplied by 100 and divided by 140, will give the wagons allowed Page 41 Ciip. LII.I THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 41 For the reserve artillery ammunition of twenty rounds to each gun in the armies, the number of wagons allowed will be obtained as follows: multiply the number of 12-pounders by 20 and divide by 112, and the number of rifled guns by 20 and divide by 140. For every 1,000 men present, armed and equipped for duty, of cavalry, inf~utry, and heavy artillery, for small-arm ammunition, three wagons. For carrying fuses, powder, and primers, With the reserve artillery ammunition train, two wa.~ous. 11. For the general supply train: to each 1,000 men, cavalry, infantry, and heavy ar- tillery, for fora,e, subsistence, & c., seven wagons, sufficient to carry eight clays sup- ply; to each cavalry division, exclusively for forage, fifty wagons; to each battery, for its proportion of subsistence, forage, & c., four wagons; to each horse battery, for the same purpose, four wagons; to every twenty-five wagons of the artillery ammunition train, five wagons ~ldditional for the forage of the animals of the ammunition and ad- ditional wagons, bag~age, camp equipage, and subsistence of wagon-masters and teamsters. Ammunition trains will be loaded with ammunition exclusively, so far as practicable. The baggage of the drivers will be carried in the additional wagons allowed for that purpose. To each brigade of cavalry, infantry, and artillery, of not less than 1,500 men, for hospital supplies, three wagons; for every 1,000 men additional, one wagon. To each army corps, except the cavalry, for intrenching tools, eight wagons. To each army corps headquarters, for subsistence, forage, and other stores not pro- vided for herein, three wagons. To each division headquarters, for similar purposes, two wagons. To each bri~ade headquarters, for similar purposes, one wagon. To each brigade of cavalry, infantry, and artillery, for commissary stores for sale to officers, one wagon. For the ambulance train of each division, two wagons; for the ambulance train of an independent command less than a division, batteries excepted, one wagon. To each division of cavalry and infantry, for armorers tools, parts of muskets, ex- tra arms, and accouterments, one wagon. It is expected that each ambulance and wagon, except those of the artillery ammu- nition train, will carry the ne~cessary forage for its own team. 12. The unit of organization for the supply trains of subsistence, ordnance, and forage will be by division. Division quartermasters will be responsible for them. Brigade quartermasters will be responsible for the brigade baggage trains. Regi- mental quartermasters will be responsible for the regimental public property and baggage. Quartermasters will attend in person to the drawing of necessary supplies at depots, and will habitually accompany their trains on marches. 13. If corps, divisions, or brigade commanders take their guards or escorts from commands already furnished with the full llowance of transportation a correspond- ing amount should be taken by them to headquarters; but if they have not been pro- vided for at all then a proper number of wagons will be transferred by the depot quartermaster, on the requisition of the chief quartermaster, certified to and approved by the commanding general. 14. As a rule, quartermaster and commissary sergeants will not be allowed to ride public horses, nor will citizen or soldier clerks, except on the written order of a corps or other independent commander setting forth the necessity. 15. It has been shown by experience that the advantage of keeping up regularly organized pack trains is not commensurate with the expense. Two hundred pack-saddles will be carried in the wagon train of each corps. Whenever it becomes necessary to pack officers~ baggage, provisions, or ammunition for short distances, over rough roads and broken country, pack trains will be made up temporarily by taking mules from the wagons, not to exceed two to any one wagon. There will be allowed to each corps fifty extra mules to supply losses on the march and for use in packing. 16. In the armies operating against Richmond the maximum allowance of forage per day will be, for horses ten pounds hay and fourteen pounds rain; for mules ten pounds hay and eleven pounds grain; and when short fora~e only can be provided the allowance will be, for horses fifteen pounds, for mules thirteen. On a march, however, the forage ration will be only ten pounds grain. 17. A report of all property captured from the enemy or seized for the public serv- ice will be made monthly to the chief of the department at these headquarters to which it appertains. * , *. * * * * By command of Lieutenant-General Grant: T. S. BOWERS, A88istant Adjutant- General Page 42 42 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. tOHAP. LII. Chief quartermasters of corps and other independent commands will at once take measures to have these orders complied with, so far as in the power of the quartermasters department. RUFUS INGALLS, Brigadier- General and Chief Quartermaster of Armies operating against Richmond. OFFICE OF CHIEF QUARTERMASTER, ARMIES OPERATING AGAINST RICHMOND, VA., City Point, Va., & ptember 1, 1864. GENERAL: I desire to add to my annual report, just rendered, that I have always co-operated to the fullest degree with the medical directors and other medical officers of the Army of the Potomac and that of Geii- eral Butlers. They have very frequently conferred with me as to what assistance I could give them, and I have invariably found them pre- pared for any emergency, able to meet all demands upon their resources, very moderate and reasonable in their requisitions upon the quarter- masters department, and most officer-like in their communications with me. We were thrown much in contact with each other, and at times when our energies were heavily taxed, I have never known the medical department wanting in anything that human labor, skill, and persever- ance could overcome. The hospital system in the field is as complete as it would seem pos- sible to make it. The ambulance trains work admirably, and the sick and wound& d are as promptly and carefully taken care of as those in a city or town, and probably much better. The large field hospital at this place is well located and perfectly watered by steam power, with reservoirs, pipes, & c., and is large enough for all requirements. The medical department have many transports at their service for the transportation of the sick and wounded. When these are not sufficient, ordinary vessels are temporarily placed on such duty. I have the honor to ask that this may be filed with my last report. I am, very respectfully, your most obedient servant, RUFUS ING-ALLS, Brigadier- General and Chief Quartermaster of Armies operating against Richmond. Bvt. Maj. Gen. M. C. MEIGS, Quartermaster-General U. S. Army, Washington, D. C. No. 4. Record of the Court of Inquiry on the ]Jiliine Explosion. RECORD OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF A COURT OF INQUIRY INSTITUTED BY VIRTUE OF THE FOLLOWING ORDER: SPECIAL ORDERS, ?~ WAR DEPT., ADJT. GENERALS OFFICE, No. 258. * Washington, D. C., August 3, 1864. * * * * * * 43. By direction of the President, a Court of Jnquiry will convene in front of Petersburg at 10 a. m. on the 5th instant, or as soon there- after as practicable, to examine into and report upon the facts and ci Page 43 CHAP. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 43 cumstances attending the unsuccessful assault on the enemys position on the 30th of July, 1864. The Court will report their opinion whether any officer or officers are answerable for the want of success of said assault, and, if so, the name or names of such officer or officers. Detail for the Court: Maj. Gen. W. S. Hancock, U. S. Volunteers; Brig. Gem lit B. Ayres, U. S. Volunteers; Brig. Gen. N. A. Miles, U. S. Volunteers; Col. E. Schriver, inspector-general, U. S. Army, judge- advocate. By order of the Secretary of War: E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant- General. FIRST DAY. COURT-ROOM, HEADQUARTERS SECOND CORPS, August 6, 1864. The Court met pursuant to the foregoing orders: Present, Major-General Hancock, Brigadier-Generals Ayres and Miles, and Colonel Schriver, judge-advocate. The order instituting the Court was read and the Court and judge- advocate were sworn according to law. The judge-advocate then presented and read the orders issued from the headqu.arters of the Army of the Potomac on the 29th of July, 1864, containino the instructions for the guidance of all concerned ,in the operations against the enemys position before Petersburg on the 30th of July, as follows: ORDERS.] HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 29, 1864. The following instructions are issued for the guidance of all concerned: 1. As soon as it is dark Major-General Buruside, commanding Ninth Cotps, will withdraw his two brigades under General White, occupying the intrenchments be- tween the plank and Norfolk roads, and bring them to his front. Care will be taken not to interfere with the troops of the Eighteenth Corps moving into their position in rear of the Ninth Corps. General Burnside will form his troops for assaulting the enemys works at daylight of the 30th, prepare his parapets and abatis for the pas- sage of the columns, and have the pioneers equipped for work in opening passages for artillery, destroying enemys abatis, & c., and the intrenching tools distributed for effecting lodgment, & c. 2. Major-General Warren, commanding Fifth Corps, will reduce the number of his troops holding the intrenchments of his front to the minimum and concentrate all his available force on his right, and hold them prepared to support the assault of Major-General Burnside. The preparations in respect to pioneers,intrenching tools, & c., enjoined upon the Ninth Corps will also be made by the Fifth Corps. 3. As soon as it is dark Major-General Ord, commanding Eighteenth Corps, will relieve his troops in the trenches by General Motts division, of the Second Corps, and form his corps in rear of the Ninth Corps and be prepared to support the assault of Maj or-General Burnside. 4. Every preparation will be made for moving forward the field artillery of each corps. 5. At dark Major-General Hancock, commanding Second Corps, will move from Deep Bottom to the rear of the intrenchments now held by the Eighteenth Corps, resume the command of Motts division, and be prepared at daylight to follow up the assaulting and supporting columns, or for such other operations as may be found necessary. 6. Major-General Sheridan, commanding Cavalry Corps, will proceed at dark from the vicinity of Deep Bottom to Lees Mill, and at daylight will move with his whole corps, including Wilsons division, against the enemys troops defending Petersburg on their right by the roads leading to that town from the southward and westward. 7. Major Duane, acting chief engineer,will have the pontoon trains parked at con- venient points in the rear prepared to move. He will seethat supplies of sand-bags, gabions, fascines, & c., are in depot near the lines ready for use. He will detail engi- neer officers for each corps Page 44 44 OPEHATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. rOHAP. LIT. 8. At 3.30 in the morning of the 30th Major-General Burnside will spring his mine and his assaultin~ columns will immediately move rapidly upon the breach, seize the crest in the rear, and effect a lodgment there. He will be followed by Major-General Ord, who will support him on the right, directinghis movement to the crest indicated, and by Mqjor-General Warren, who will support him on the left. Upon the explo- sion of the mine the artillery of all kinds in battery will open upon those points of the enemys works whose fire covers the ground over which our columns must move, care being taken to avoid impeding the progress of our troops. Special instructions respecting the direction of lire will be issued through the chief of artillery. 9. Corps commanders will report to the commandin~ general when their prepara- tions are complete, and will advise him of every step in the progress of the operation and of everything important that occurs. 10. Promptitude, rapidity of execution, and cordial co-operation are essential to success, and the commanding general is confident that this indication of his expecta- tions will insure the hearty efforts of the commanders and troops. 11. Headquarters during the operation will be at the headquarters of the Ninth Corps. By conunand of Major-General Meade: S. WILLIAMS, Assistant Adjutant-Gen al. Whereupon the Court directed the judge-advocate to notify all the officers named therein of the institution and design of the Court, so as to enable them to be present during its sessions, which was done by ad- dressing the following circular to each: COURT-ROOM, HEADQUARTERS SECOND CORPS, August 6, 1864. SIR: The Court of Inquiry instituted by War Department Special Orders, No. 258, of August 3, 1864, for the investigation of the facts and circumstances which attended the unsuccessful assault on the enemys lines before Petersburg on the 30th ultimo, will meet here on the 8th instant, and the days following, at 10 a. in., an dlam di- rected to acquaint you thereof; so that you may be present at the Courts sessions should you desire to do so. Please acknowledge the receipt of this communication to me at the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac. Very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant, ED. SCHRIVER, inspector- General, Judge-Adrocate. (Addressed to Major-Generals Meade, Burnside, Warren, Sheridan, and Ord, Brig- adier-Generals White, Hunt, and Mott, and Major Duane.) The Court then adjourned to meet at 10 a. m. on the 8th instant. SECOND DAY. COURT-ROOM, HEADQUARTERS SECOND CORPS, The Court met pursuant to adjournment. August 81O a. in. Present, Major-General Hancock, Brigadier-Generals Ayres and Miles, an d Colonel Schriver, judge-advocate. Th~ proceedings of the first day were read and approved. The judge-advocate stated that he had engaged Mr. Finley Anderson, a phonographer, to record the proceedings so long as he should do so to the Courts satisfaction, and Mr. Anderson was sworn according to law. It is here recorded, also, that all officers of rank who, it is sup- posed, participated in the affair of the 30th ultimo have been informed that they could be present at the Courts sessions and make any state- ments they may regard important to themselves, should they see fit. Maj. Gen. G. G. MEADE, U. S. Volunteers, being duly sworn, says: I propose, in the statement flint I shall make to the Court (I presume the Court wants me to make a statement of facts in conuection with this case), to give a slight pre- liminary history of certain events and operations which culminated in the assault o Page 45 CHAP. MI.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 45 July 30, and which, in my judgment, are necessary to show to this Court that I had a full appreciation of the difficulties that were to be encountered, and that I had endeavored, so far as my capacity and judgment would enable me, not only to antici- pate but to take measures to overcome those difficulties. The mine constructed in front of General Buruside was commenced by that officer soon after the occupation of our present lines, upon the intercession of Lieutenant- Colonel Pleasants, I think, of a Pennsylvania regiment, without any reference to or any sanction obtained from the general headquarters of the Army of the Potomac. When the subject was brought to my knowledge I authorized the continuance of the operations, sanctioned them, an(l truste(l that the work would at some time result in forming an important part in our operations. But from the first I never considered that the location of General Burnsides mine was a pi~p~r one, because, from what I could ascertain of the position of the enemys works and lines erected at that time, the position against which he operated was not a suitable one in which to assault the enemys lines, as it was commanded on both flanks and taken in reverse by their posi- tion on the Jerusalem plank road and their works opposite the Hare house. I will now read to the Court the dispatches which passed between Lieutenant- General Grant, commanding the Armies of the United States, and myself which will bear in themselves a sort of history of those preliminary operationsa correspondence which resulted, as I said before, in the final arrangements for the assault on July 30. On the 24th of July I received a letter from the lieutenant-general commanding, which I will now read. I had been previously informed by the lieutenant-general commanding that he desired some operations to take place (offensive) against the enemy, and he had instructed the engineer officer at his headquarters, the engineer officer at General Butlers headquarters, and the engineer officer at the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac to make an examination of the enemys position, and give an opinion as to the probable result of an attack. Their opinion is contained in the following letter (document marked A, Appendix). I desire to call the particular attention of the Court to that communication, because it contains the views of the lieutenant-general commanding with reference to the assault which should be made on Petersburg, and I wish them to compare this com- munication with the orders and arrangements that I gave and made, so that they may see that to the best of my ability I ordered everything which he indicated to be done. At the time that this communication was made to me, however, I was under the hn- pression that the obstacles to be overcome were more formidable than the subse- quent operations led me to believe, and also that subsequent to that time there had been no movement of the army to produce that great ~veakeuing of the enemys front which afterward occurred. Therefore my reply was to the effect that I was opposed to our making the assault. The following is my reply sent on the 24th (documents B and B 2). In reply to that I received a communication or report from General Grant, the result of which was a suspension of the proposed attack (document C). Next day I made a closer examination, and in the mean time a signal station was erected in a pine tree in front of General Burnside, which gave us a more complete view than we had previously had of the enemys line. My observations modified my views, because I could not detect a second line, although I detected isolated batteries on the crest. I therefore wrote the followiiig communication to General Grant dated 12 m. July 26 (document D), to which I received the following reply (document E). There you perceive that the lientenant-geucral commanding ordered that whilst the Second Corps was across the James River I should immediately make an assault with the Ninth and Fifth, abandoning the line of the Fifth Corps. In answer to that I wrote him the following dispatch (document F). That produced a suspension of the order to attack until the return of General Han- cock. The next dispatch I received from General Grant was the following (document G). which I answered at 1 p. m. July 28, as follows (document H). I will here observe that Lieutenant-General Grant in consequence of the services which the Second Corps had performed across the river, desired, and gave m~ direc- tions verbally to that effect, to use the Eighteenth Corps in the assault, and to let the Second Corps take the place of the Eighteenth in the line. The next dispatch I received was the following, dated City Point, July 29 (docu- ment I). General Grant had CO~e to my headquarters at 4 p. in., and at that time I showed him the order for the assault next day, which had just then been prepared, and which order met with his perfect approbation. He read the order and expressed his satis- faction with it. No other dispatches passed between the lieutenant-general and my- self. Next morning between 3.30 and 4 oclock (before 4 oclock) he arrived on the ground at Geiieral Burusides headquarters, and all further communications between us were verbal until August 1 at 11.40 a in., when I received the following dispatch (document J) Page 46 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. 46 [cnx~. LU. We had given our respective views concerning the assault and I particularly im- pressed my views with reference to the difficulties to be overcome. When it was ascertained that the movement of the Second Corps had drawn over to the north bank of the James five of the eight divisions composing General Lees army, together with the information I had obtained that the enemy had no second line upon the ridge but only one or two isolated batteries, I came to the conclusion that the explo- sion o~ the mine and the subsequent assault on the crest, I had every reason to believe, wouldb e successful and would be followed by results which would have consisted in the capture of the whole of tbe enemys artillery and a greater part of his infantry. The plan sketched ont by Lieutenant-General Grant in his dispatch to me, which I endeavored to carry out, and for the execution of which I gave the necessary orders, was that the mine should be exploded as early as possible in the morningbefore daylight; that in the mean time the Ninth Corps should be massed and formed in assaulting columns; that every preparation should be made by removing the abatis so that the troops could d6bouch6, and particularly the assaulting columns; that as soon as the mine was exploded the assaulting columns should push forward; that a sufficient proportion should be left to guard the flanks of the main column, because they had to look for an attack on the flanks; that the main body should hold the lines during the attempt to gain the crest of the hill, and if it was successful then I intended to throw np the whole of the Eighteenth Corps, to be followed by the Sec- ond Corps, and, if necessary, by the Fifth Corps also. I do not suppose it is neces- sary to rend the order; I will read it, however (document K). Having read to the Court the correspondence which passed between the lieutenant- general and myself preliminary to the operations, and having read the order for the operations, I now propose to read and to accompany with some explanatory remarks the dispatches and correspondence which passed between myself and Major-General Burnside, who had the immediate activs operations to perform; afterward between myself and Major-General Ord, between myself and Major-General Warren, and be- tween myself and Major-General Hancock. These dispatches, when compared with each other and in connection with the remarks which I shall make, will show the facts so far as they came to my knowledge; and I wish the Court to bear in mind, and I desire to call their attention particularly to the paucity of information which was furnished me by Major-General Buruside of the operations which were made, and to the difficulty that a major-general commanding an army like the one I am command- ing labors under to give direct orders in the ignorance of matters transpiring in the front at the immediate scene of operations. Before those operations were concluded npon I called on Major-General Buruside to furnish me in writing what he proposed to do in case his mine was exploded, in response to which I received the following report (document L). The request made in that cominunicution by Major-General Buruside was complied withthat is to say, sand-bags were furnished him, but the amount of powder asked for, which was 12,000 pounds, was reduced to 8,000, upon the belief on my part, and on my engineers, that 8,000 pounds would be sufficient for the purpose. Another matter in that dispatch to which my attention was directed, and which was finally the subject of an order on my part, is the suggestion of Major-General Buruside to place the colored troops at the head of the assaulting column. That I disapproved, and I informed him of my disapproval, which was based upon the ground not that I had any reason to doubt, or any.desire to doubt, the good qualities of the colored troops, but that I desired to impress upon Major-General Buruside (which I did do in conversations, of which I have plenty of witnesses to evidence, and in every way I could) that this operation was to be a coup de main; that his assaulting column was to be as a forlorn hope, such as are put into breaches, and that he should assault with his best troops; not that I had any intention to insinuate that the colored troops were inferior to his best troops, but that I understood that they had never been under fire; not that they should not be taken for such a critical operation as this, but that he should take such troops as from previous service could he depended upon as being perfectly reliable. Finding General Burnside very much disappointedfor he had made known to General Ferrero and his troops khat they were to lead in the assault, and fearing that the effect might be injurious, and in order to show him that I was not governed by any motive other than such as I ought to be governed byI told him I would submit the matter with bis reasons and my objections to the lieutenant-gen- eral commanding the armies, and I would abide by the decision of the lieutenant- general as to whether it was expedient and right for the colored troops to lead the assault. Upon referring the question to the lieutenant-general commanding he fully concurred in my views, and I accordingly addressed to Major-General Buruside, or had addressed to him, the following communication (document M). The following dispatches read near the end of the testimony are here inserted, as directed, in their proper place (documents N 1 and N 2) Page 47 CHAP. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 47 The next dispatch to General Burnside was addressed by me at 9.45 p. m. July 29, the evening before. the action. I had received a dispatch from Gen~ral Ord stating that it would take him till very late to relieve the troops in the trenches. The following is my dispatch to General Buruside (document N). My idea was that General Burnside should form his columns of assault, make all his preparations, take all his men out of the trenches, and move forward; and that then General O~d should occupy his trenches in case he should find it necessary to return. No further dispatches passed between General Burnside and myself. I think it proper to state, however, that on the day previous to the assault I was at General Burusides headquarters and had the good fortune to meet his three division com- manders, and some conversation passed between us; and I would like the Court to inquire into what transpired on that occasion, because I would like to impress upon the Court, as I did impress upon General Buruside and his officers, that this operation which we had to perform was one purely of time; that if immediate advantage was not taken of the explosion of the mine, and the consequent confusion of the enemy, and the crest immediately gained, it would be impossible to remain there; for, that as soon as the enemy should recover from their confusio,i, they would bring their troops and batteries to bear upon us and we would be driven out; that there were two things to be done, namelythat we should go up promptly and take the crest, for, in my judgment, the mere occupation of the crater and the holding on to that was of no possible use to us, because the enemys line was not such a line as would be of advantage to us to hold except to go from it to the crest; and that the troops were to be withdrawn when the assault proved unsuccessful. General HANCOCK, president. Do you not mean that you met four division commanders instead of three, as you said, at the headquarters of General Buruside? General MEADE. No; I mean three. I saw Potter, Ledlie, and Willeox, audi men- tioned in the presence of those gentlemen the tactical maneuvers to be made between that crater and the crest; that the only thing to be done was to rush for the crest and take it immediately after the explosion had taken place, and that they might rest assured that any attempt to take time to form their troops would result in a re- pulse. Those were all the dispatches that transpired betwen General Burnside and myself before the day of the assault. On the morning of the 30th, about 3.15 oclock, when I was about preparing to go forward to General Burnsides headquarters, I found that it was very dark, and suggestions being made by some of my officers that it was too dark to operate successfully and that a postponement of the explosion of the mine might be advantageous, I accordingly addressed a dispatch to General Burn- side to the following effect (document 0). To that I received the following reply from General Burnside (document P). I then went over to General Burnsides headquarters, he, during these operations, being farther to the front. The hour had arrived; I stood waiting. I heard no re- port from General Buruside and no explosion of the mine. In th~ mean time Lieuten- ant-General Grant arrived. Finding that there was no explosion, I sent two staff officers, first Captain Jay and then (I do not recollect the name of the other), but I sent two staff officers to ascertain from General Buruside what the difficulty was (if there was any difficulty), why his mine did not explode, if he knew, to which I re- ceived no answer. At 4.10 the following dispatch was sent to him (document Q), and to this I got no answer. At 4.20 another dispatch was sent to him as follows (document R). I should have stated before this that in order to secure the speedy transmission of intelligence, I took the precaution to have a telegraph run from my headquarters in General Burnsides camp to where General Buruside had established his headquarters for the day, in the fourteen-gun battery. The following is the next dispatch I sent to General Buruside (document 5). To this I received no reply. Finding that no replies were received, and the lieutenant-general commanding desiring that an imme- diate assault should be made without reference to the mine, at 4.35 the following dispatch was sent to General Burnside (document T). The same orders, you will find, were sent to General Warren, to General Mott, and to General Hunt, to open the artillery. About this time however, about 4.40, the ~inine was exploded. In the mean time Captain Jay returned and informed me that the fuse had failed; that a defect was found, and the fuse had been overhauled about fifty feet or twenty-five feet (I forget the distance) from the entrance; that the de- fect had been ascertained, and had been remedied, and that finally the mine had been exploded. So far as my recollection goes the mine was exploded about 4.40 or 4.45. At 5.45 a. in., one hour after the explosion of the mine, the following dispateli was sent to General Burnside (document U). The following dispatch was received from him apparently as an answer to mine, although through a difference in time it is dated before it (document Y) Page 48 48 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. LII. About this time, 5.45 or 5.50I see by reference to the dispatch that it is 5.45an orderly came up to me and delivered me a dispatch which, npon opening, I found to be a dispatch from Colonel Loring, inspector-general of the Ninth Corps, written at the crater and addressed to General Buruside, which dispatch the orderly, not know- ing where to find General Buruside, had brought to his old headquarters, where it found me. That dispatch, so far as I recollect the purport of it, was to the effect that Gdi~eral Ledlies troops occupied the crater, but in his (Colonel Lorings) opinion he feared the men could not be induced to advance beyond. That dispatch was tele- graphed to General Buruside, and sent to him by an officer, so that I have no copy of it. That was the substance of it, however. It was shown to General Grant and General Humphreys, both of whom can give their recollection of it in confirmation of mine. It is an important matter to be taken into consideration here, that as early as 5.45 a. m. a dispatch was placed in my hand, stating that General Ledlies troops could not be induced to advance. In addition to that the following dispatch was sent to him (document W). Fearing that there might be some difficulty on the part of General Burnsides troops, Ithon ~hti t possible that by another corps going in on his right encouragement might be given to his men and a prompt assault might be made. The next dispatch I re- ceived was from an aide-de-camp, whom I had seat to General Burusides headquar- ters, to advise me of what was going on. It is dated 5.50, and is from Captain Sanders (document X). The next dispatch that I will read is one addressed to General Burnside at 6 a. m. (document Y). Dispatches were ~t this time also sent to Generals Ord and Warren. You can keep these dates in your mind. The next dispatch was received from Captain Sanders at 6.10 a. m. as follows (document Z). The following dispatches are next in order (documents 1, 2, and 3). At 7 a. m. Lieutenant-General Grant put into my hand a dispatch from Colonel Comstock, an officer whom he had sent to see the progress of operations (docu- ment 4). I read all these dispatches in order that you may see hbw I was situated on the occasion, and what I knew of wbat was going on. At 7.20, twenty minutes after- ward, I got the following dispatch from General Burnside (document 5). Upon the receipt of this dispatch from General Buruside, informing me that it wa~ hard work to take the crest (at the sametime he not having reported to me that any- body had attempted to take it, or that any part of his force had made any effort to take it), with the dispatches from my officers, the dispatch from Colonel Loring, and the dispatch from Colonel Comstock, to the effect that the troops were lying there, I came to the conclusion that possibly there might be some difficulty in getting the men to iiove forward, either from the enemys fire or some imaginary obstacle the troops had to encounter; that, as it was now 7 oclock, and that the place had been occupied at 5.30 I began to suppose that there was some reason for the delay which had not been officially reported. I considered it natural that General Burnside would be indisposed to make it known so long as he had hopes of overcoming the difficulty. To me, in my position as major-general commanding the army, it was a matter of the utmost importance, because it was my intention, during the assault and before it, that if we could not carry the crest promptly by a cout de main, to withdraw the troops as quickly and safely as possible. Impressed with this view, and in order to get at the exact condition of affairs, and to justify General Buruside if there was any reason of that kind, I addressed him the following dispatch (document 6). It is proper to say that immediately after sending that dispatch, and before receiv- ing General Burusides answer, I received a report, verbally, from Captain Sanders that an attempt had been made to make an attack on the right, I think by General Griffin, and tbat he had been repulsed. I immediately sent another dispatch to Gen- eral Bnrnside at S a. in., as follows (document 7). To the first of these two dispatches, subsequent to sending the second, I received this reply (document 5). The next dispatch that I received was one from Colonel Comstock, about the same time, S a. m. (document 9). The next dispatch I received was one dated 8.45 a. m. from Captain Sanders (doc- ument 10). At 9 a. m. I received the following dispatch from General Buruside (document 11). That was the first information I had received that there was any collision with the enemy, or that there was any enemy present. At 9.30 a. m. the following dispatch was sent to General Burnside (document 12). Then I received the following dispatch from Captain Sanders (document 13). The next dispatch was this from Colonel Comstock (document 14). The next dispatch to General Burnside, at 9.45, was the peremptory order to with- draw (document 15). Page 49 CHAP. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 49 Receiving information from some person, I dont know who it was, that there was some difficulty about withdrawing at that time, that the safety of the column might be jeopardized by undertaking to withdraw it, the foilowing dispatch was sent to General Burnside, and also to General Ord, who had troops there at that timenone of my dispatches to General Ord have been presented yet, because it would have con- fused matters. I will read them hereafter(document 16). About that time both Major-Gen~ral Burnside and Major-General Ord came to the headquarters ~rhere General Grant and myself were temporarily located. General Bnrnside seemed to be very much displeased at the order of withdrawal, and expressed the opinion that if allowed to remain there by night-fall he could carry that crest. As, however, he did not give any reason to show how he couldtake it, and as he had been from 5.30 in the morning till nearly 10, and not only had not taken it, but had his men driven out of the works he had been occupying, and as Major-General Ord, whose troops were also there, upon being asked if the crest could be carried, answered very positively that it was entirely out of the question, it was determined by the lieuten- ant-general commanding and myselfor rather, as I referred the matter to him and he desired the orders changedit was determined that no further attempt should be made to take the crest, but that the men should be withdrawn whenever that could be done with security. There is now a very important point to which I will call the attention of the Court, and which I want investigated very thoroughly, and that is the withdrawal from the crater. At the time the order was given to withdraw the troops, the report of Major-General Ord was that the crater of the mine was so overcrowded with men that it would be nothing but murder to send any more men forward there. I do not recollect as to whether the report of Major-General Burnside was so definite, but I believe the report of Colonel Loriug was that there was at least one division of the troops in there. The impression left upon my mind was that at that time there were as many men in the crater as would enable them to defend them- selves if attacked, and in case no defense was necessary, and there was no occasion on my part to order troops to be sent there, I presumed that Maj or-General Ord and Major-General Burnside, who was having charge of that operation, would see that the men would be properly withdrawn. This conclusion having been arrived at by the lieutenant-general and myself, and it not appearing necessary that we should re- main any longer at Major-General Burusides headquarters, the lieutenant-general commanding withdrew to City Point, and I withdrew to my former headquarters, where I was in telegraphic communication with Major-General Burnside, and where, nuder the common correspondence between a general officer commanding the army and his subordinates, not to say under a peculiar exigency, I expected to be informed of anything that should occur. I remained in total ignorance of any further trans- actions until about 6 or 7 oclock in the evening. About that hour a report or a rumor reached me that there were a number of our wounded men lying between the crater and our line, and I think an appeal was made to me by Genera I Ord if same- thing could not be done to remove those men. I was not aware that there was any difficulty in the way of removing them, and wondered why they had not been re- moved; presuming that our men were in the crater, and as no report had been made to me that they had been withdrawn, I directed a dispatch to be sent to Major-Gen- eral Burnside, calling upon him for information. That dispatch read as follows (document 17). You will remember that I left General Burusides headquarters about 10 oclock, with the understanding that the troops were to be withdrawn when they could be withdrawn with security. The following dispatches were subsequently read by the witness (documents 18, 184, 184~, 18k, 19, 194, 20). So far as any information from General Buruside is concerned, I had to go to bed that night without knowing whether his troops were in the crater or whether they were not. During the night dispatches were received referring to the relief of Gen- eral Ords troops. Next morning, July 31, at 8.40 and 9 a. in., the dispatches 18+ and 18j were sent and received by General Hurnphreys. No dispatch was received from General Buruside with reference to the withdrawal of these troops till 6.40 p. m. July 31 (marked 181), to which was sent the one marked 19. At 9.10 p. m. July 31 the dispatch was received from GeneralBuruside (marked 19+), and the reply (marked 20) was sent. Now I beg leave to call the attention of the Court to the fact that this dis- patch is dated 9.10 p. m. July 31, and although it does not give an official state- ment of the time of the withdrawal of the troops, I know, but only from other in- formation, that the withdrawal was at about 2 p. m. July 30, and as I consider that my conduct is here the subject of investigation, as much as that of any other officer or man engaged in this enterprise, I wish to repudiate distinctly aminy responsibility 4 R RYOL XL~ PT Page 50 4 50 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. LII. resting upon me for the manner of the withdrawal, beyond the orders I gave to the effect that the troops were to be withdrawn when they could be withdrawn with security, and, if they had becn able to repulse an attack of the enemy, it seems to me rather extraordinary that when another attack was threatened, after the success, that they should be withdrawn simply because they were threatened with another attack; but that is the point to which I wish to call the attention of the Court, and which .J wish to ha.ve thoronghly investigated. I believe those constitute the sum and substance of all the orders that passed between myself and Maj or-General Burnside; but 1 respectfully submit to this Court that so far as it was in my power, as the commanding general of this army, to give orders, I anticipated the difficulties that occurred, and endeavored to avoid them as much as I could do so, and that I cannot be held responsible for the failure which afterward resulted. Having finished my correspondence with and orders to Gen- eral Burnside, I now propose to read the correspondence with and orders to General Ord, who was the officer commanding the force next to be employed after those of General Buruside, and whose movements it is important to know. Major-General Ord was directed to relieve his corps by General Motts division, of the Second Corps, on the evening of the 29th. He was then to move and mass his troops in rear of the Ninth Corps, and it was intended that he should support the Ninth Corps whenever the Ninth Corps had effected a lodgment on the crest; that he was promptly to move up to them and support them on the crest. I had several interviews with General Ord on the 2Sth and 29th. I went with him and showed him the position, showed him exactly the ground, gave him all the informa- tion I had, and also caused him to send staff officers to select positiens for the troops, so that when it became dark they might know the roads. On the morning of July 30, when it became evident to my niind that General Burnsides troops were not going to advance farther than the crater, and when 1 had reason to suppose it was owing to some difficulty oii the part of the troops themselves (so far as any official report came to me), rather than obstacles presented by the enemy, I sent a dispatch to Gen- eral Ord, changing his previous orders, and directing him instead of supporting General Buruside to make an assault independent of General Burnside. That dis- patch and subsequent dispatches are as follows (documents 21, 22, 23, 23k, 23k, 24). There were some other dispatches to General Ord of a similar character, but I do not see them here, to endeavor to get him forward independent of the Ninth Corps, to make an isolated attackan attack of his own independent of the Ninth Corps. Owing to the obstacles presented, the fact that there was no proper dffiouch6for our troops to that portion of the enemys line, and the fact that the crater was overcrowded with men, General Ord, considering those obstacles insurmountable, confined his operations to sending forward, I think, only one brigade. But General Ord and his division com- manders have made reports which will he placed before you. I forgot to bring them with me to-day. At about 9.45 a. m. the same orders were sent to General Ord as to General Burnside with reference to the withdrawal of the troops. That finishes all that passed between General Ord and myself. The other supporting column was nuder Major-General Warren on the left. In the original order General Warren was directed to mass his available troops on the right of the line, and to make all his preparations to support General Burnside in the assault wherever he should be or~ dered. At 4.40 a. m. the following dispatch was sent to him (document 25). At 5.50, one hour afterward, and immediately after my receiving the information that Gen- eral Burnsides corps occupied the crater, the following dispatch was sent to him (document 26). 1 wish to call the attention of the Court to the fact that as early as 5.50 I authorized General Warren if he saw any opportunity of doing anything with his corps (not only in support of General Burnside, but as an independent operation of his own), that he should take advantage of it and push forward his troops. His reply, dated 6 a. ut., is as follows (document 27). At 6.15 a. m. another dispatch was received from him as follows (document 28). Then at 6.2G another dispatch (No. 29) came from General Warren, in which he states that what we thought was a heavy line of the enemy behind the line occupied by Burusides troops, as the sunlight comes out and the smoke clears away, proves to be our own troops in the enemys position. You willperceive that at 5.40 I authorized General Warren and directed him to make an attack without waiting for the support of General Burnsidethat is, if circumstances would justify his making an attack; and that his replies here indicate that no such attack was practicable. Coming to that conclusion and receiving information from the signal officers that the enemy had left their extreme right, which I presumed they would do, to mass on the center to receive our attack, the following dispatch was sent to General Warren at 6.30 oclock (docutuent No.30). General Burnside asked for the reading of the dispatch to General Wilson, commanding a cavalry division Page 51 CHAP. LH.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 51 General 1~1Ieade replied that he did not have the dispatch with him now, but would procure it for him. The order to General Wilson was written, he said, about the same time as the above dispatch to General Warren, about 6.30 a. m. General Burnside wished to be informed whether or not the order to General Wilson was rescinded. General Meade replied that the order to the cavalry was rescinded when the infantry was ordered to withdraw. General Meade then resumed the reading of dispatches, presenting documents 31 and 32. General BURNSIDE. I would like to know what that dispatch to the cavalry was and exactly what time it was rescinded. General HANCOCK. If you will recollect the matter wc will have it called for subsequently. General MEADE. Just make a memorandum of it and I will have it sent. Indeed I am not positive, but I think my dispatches to General Sheridan of the cavalry are here. If they are they will be read. The next dispatch in order is the following, dated 7.30 a. in., to General Warren (document 33). General Ayres still remained on the right, and the orders still existed to 410 any- thing with him that could be done to advantage. At 7.50 ~. in. we have the next dispatch from General Warmn (document 34). Nothing further was received while we awaited developments from General Craw- ford until 8 a. in., when the following dispatch was received from General Warren (document 35). N6twithstanding it was considered that Gener~ 1 Warrens original order authorized him to take the batteries if it could be done, inasmuch as he was directed to move and attack with General Crawford, and as it was suggested that General Ayrcs might be required it was thought proper to send him the following order at 8.45 a. m. (document 36). At 9.15 a. m. the following dispatch was received from General W~trrea (docu- ment 37). At this time the conclusion had been arrived at by the lieutenant-general com- manding and myself that the affair was over, and that nothing more was to be done; an(l soon afterward orders similar to those which were sent to others were sent to General Warren, that he should not make any attempt to take the two-gun battery. The following dispatches were sent to General Warren (documents 38, 381, 39, and 40). Those are all the orders and communications that passed between General Warren and myself. He was authorized to attack if he could see a good chance to attack. When he reported no chance to attack and was asked what force he had available, he reported that he had no force available except he moved Ayres. He was directed not to move Ayres until information was received from Crawford, only if he could attack the two-gun battery in his front he was ordered to attack it, and then the operations were subsequently suspended. Now I have read you the commummications that passed between myself aimd Gemmeral Grant, myself and General Burnside, mhyself amid General Ord, and ma yself and Gen- eral Warren. It now remain~ for me to read the comummmunications that passed be- tween myself and General Hancock and myself and General Mott. The first was a communication sent at 4.40 a. m. to General Mott (docum ent 41). At 4.50 a. m. the following dispatch was sent to the telegraph operator at the headquarters of the Eighteenth Corps (document 42). The following dispatch, dated July 30, 6 a. in., was sent to General hancock after the mine was occupied (document 43). The following dispatches were sent and received (documents 44, 45, 451, 451, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50,51, and 52). These include the dispatches sent to the cavalry. I would explain that the sepa- rate orders to General Wilson were issued because General Sheridan, commanding the Cavalry Corps, was across the James River at Deep Bottomu, with two divisions, and I had to issue separate orders to General Wilson so that he might be ready for the movement next day. Here are some dispatches which are of no particular consequence, but I will leave them here. They are dispatches from the ~ienal officers indicating the movements of the enemy Page 52 52 OPERATIONS IN SE. YA. AND N. C. [CHAP. LII. General BURNSIDE. I would suggest that all the dispatches should be left. General HANCOCK. General Meade is flow giving his direct testimony, and only such dispatches are numbered as he wishes to incorporate. The others will be left here and can be called for at any time. General MEADE. Well, I will read these dispatches and ypu can number them and put them down (documents 54, 55, 56, 57, and 58). it was on those reports pf the signal officers that General Warrens orders were predicated. The following is the report of the chief engineer (document 59). I believe I have now read every dispatch that I have received, and the Court are fully aware of all the information that I received on the ground. General Burnside said that before the Court adjourned he would like to ask what latitude was allowed in the investigation. General Hancock explained that the Court had gone back to the orders from General Meade, the orders from General Grant, and to the flrst inception of the mine. General MEADE. I would state that inthe general orders issued on the night pre- vious to the assault, the cavalry was ordered to make this attack on the left. Tw~ divisions of the Cavalry Corps were over at Deep Bottom. They could not cross the river until after the Second Corps had crossed, so that it was late in the day before they came np; indeed, the head of the column did not appear before the offensive operations were suspended. As General Wilson had been ordered to be in readiness, however, and in view of the unavoidable delay of Sheridan, orders were sent to General Wilson not to wait for General Sheridan, but to push on himself to the Weldon railroad and make an assault upon the enemy. No report was received from General Sheridan. General Sheridan was sick. General Gregg reported in the evening that he had advanced his cavalry, and that they found the enemy in force at Reams Station, at Gurleys house, and at various other points along the railroad. There was no attack made by the cavalry except at Lees Mill, where General Gregg, encountering cavalry, drove them way to water his horses. When it was known that our offensive operations were suspended, orders were sent to the cavalry that they should push on as far as possible and find cut the enemys position, but the original orders about going into town were modified~ inasmuch as the operations in our immediate front were suspended. I desire to say to the Court that it has not been my disposition or intention to throw censure upon anybody for the unfortunate fail- ure; that, indeed, I have not been furnished with the necessary information to enable me do so. I have not yet received Major-General Burnsides nor his subor- dinate commanders official reports. I have very little knowledge of what actually transpired except from the dispatches you have heard read here. I have been grop- ing in the dark since the commencement of the attack. I did not wish to take any unl)leasant measures; but I thought it my duty to suggest to the President of the United States that this matter should be investigated, and that the censure should be made to rest upon those who are entitled to it. What I have done has been to show that I tried to do all I could to insure success. During the day General Burnside and some of his staff Generals Potter and Ferrero, of the Ninth Corps, were pNsent. The Court adjourned to meet at 10 a. m. on the 9th. THIRD DAY. COURT-ROOM, HEADQUARTERS SECOND CORPS, August 9, 1864. The Court met pursuant to adjournment. Present, Major-General Hancock, Brigadier-Generals Ayres and Miles, and Colouci Schriver, judge-advocate. The reading of the record of the second day was proceeded with, until suspended at page 30, document 25, by General Burnsides verbal application to have all the documents bearing date after 2 p. m. on the 30th of July, and all evidence relating to events subsequent to that time Page 53 CHAP. LU.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 53 removed from the record, the reasons for which, by direction of the Court, were reduced to writing and presented as follows: HEADQUARTERS NINTH ARMY CORPS, Auynst 9, 1864. THE COURT OF INQUIRY, MAJOR-GENERAL HANCOCK, PRESIDENT: GENTLEMEN :1 beg to submit to the Court that all testimony, whether by dispatches or otherwise, relating to occurrences subsequent to 2 p. ul. on 30th July last, at which time our troops had withdrawn from the enemys line, and the assault was over, should be erased from the record, and no such evidence admitted in future. The terms of the order appoiut.ing the Court distinctly limit the action of the Court to reporting the facts and circumstances attending the unsuccessful assault on the enemys position on the 30th of July, 1864, and their opinion whether any officer or officers are answerable for the want of success of said assault, and whatever events happened subsequent to the withdrawal have no relation to the success or want of success of the assault and are not within the purview of the Court. More- over, certain of these subsequent occurrences have been made the subject of charges against me by the major-general 6ommanding the army, and on which charges I am to be tried by another court. They, therefore, should not be investigated by this C~nrt. I am, gentlemen, vei~y respectfully, your obedient servant, A. E. BURNSIDE, Major-General. The following paper was then submitted by Major-General Meade: I respectfully submit to the Court that the objection raised by Major-General Burnside is not tenable. As I have before said, I consider my conduct the subject of the Courts investigation. To show that Iwas not and could not be held responsible for the manner of the withdrawal, and the circumstances attending it, it is necessary for me to show that I was not furnished with any information, and furthermore I claim the right to show in evidence that no effort on my part was omitted to obtain the necessary information. Independent of this personal consideration, and my rights as one whose conduct is under examination, I beg leave, also, to submit that the receiving of these official dispatches in this case cannot in any way affect the case of General Burnside, when on trial on the char~es referred to by hini. Those charges are disobedience of orders, and have no reference to his management of affairs on the 30th, because even should it be proved to the satisfaction of the Court (and I shall be glad to hear that it is) that General Buruside is in no way responsi- ble for the lamentable failure on the 30th, it does not alter the facts of the case whether he obeyed or disobeyed my orders on that or any other occasion. This is a foreign matter, stands on its own merits, and hasno connection with the proceed- ings of this Court beyond the fact that these documents will be produced in both cases. Again, I respectfully submit, General Burusides objections should have been Inade earlier in the proceedings, because among the charges preferred against him is one based on the very disrespectful (lispatch sent by him to me at 8 a. in. July 30, and this dispatch should be thrown out on the same ground, which would at once prevent me from stating my case in the manner in which Iclaim I have the right to. I beg leave to call the attention of the Court to the hour of 2 oclock being specified in General Burnsides objections, and ask the Court to note that there is no evidence be- fore them when the assault, if any, was made, or what occurred at 2 oclock. I take it this Court must modify the rules which would govern courts of inquiry when the conduct of only one individua,l is called in question. This Court has to pass judgment on the conduct of numerous officers, and the relative rights of each should be considered. As I understand it, no one in particular is arraigned here, and there- fore what occurs here can only be repeated elsewhere to the detriment of any of the parties concerned, and must be repeated. These are official documents, part of the archives of the Army of the Potomac, and their production in my vindication will give no weight to their production against General Burnside, should he be tried on the charge of disobedience of orders. For these reasons I must respectfully insist on the Court receiving them. General Burnside then submitted the following: In reply to General Meades argument, I beg to say that there is no evidence on the record and none furnished by the documents in question that General Meade did in any way, by aide-dc-camp or otherwise, use means to obtain any information in reference to the withdrawal or anything that occurred after he left my headquarters, about 11 oclock, until after 6 oclock in the evening, instead of, as he states, no ef- fort being omitted on his part to obtain the necessary information; nor was suc Page 54 54 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. LII. effort made to my knowledge. General Meade himself states in his argument that the charges have no reference to the management of affairs on the 30th, and as these charges contain in full the documents to which I object, they therefore should be excluded here. A. E. BURNSIDE, Major-General. The Court was cleared. The Court was opened, and the following decision of the Court announced: The proper time for objection to the reception of evidence is when it is offered, and before accepted. Due notice wa~ given to all persons who were supposed to be interested in the investigation (of whom Gen- eral Burnside was one) to be present if they so willed. The Court, however, decides that the evidence, doeumentary and verbal, in ques- tion, has a bearing on the conduct of individuals other than General Buruside. The Court is ordered to examine into the facts and cir- cumstances attending the nnsuccessful assault on the enemys positiqn on the 30th of July, and the authorities permit a court of inquiry to enter into such incidental examination of particular points as may be- come necessary to a full understanding of the matter at issue. The Court therefore considers it a duty to examine into all the cir- cnmstances of the assault, the subsequent withdrawal of the troops, and everything connected therewith. The judge-advocate continued the reading of the record of the second day, and on completion it was approved, several corrections having been made by the witness, whose meaning had not been fully under- stood. The examination of Major-General MEADE was then resumed. By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE: Question. When did Motts division leave Deep Bottom and arrive at the Eighteenth Corps to relieve it ~ Answer. Ordhrs were given in person to Major-General Hancock, about 5 or 6 oclock on the evening of the 28th, requiring him to withdraw Motts division. then in his line of battle in the presence of the enemy, after dark, and send it to report to General Ord, commanding the Eighteenth Corps. Orders were subsequently given to General Ord, when the division came up, about daylight on the 29th, to mass it in the woods near the railroad, out of sight of the enemy, and at dark on the eve- ning of the 29th to put it in his trenches to relieve his corps. Adjourned till 10 a. m. on 10th. FOURTH DAY. CounT-RooM, HEADQUARTERS SECOND CORPs, August 10, 1864. The Court met pursuant to adjournment. Present, Major-General Hancock, Brigadier-Generals Ayres and Miles, and Colonel Schriver, judge-advocate. There were also present Generals Ferrero, Potter, and Willcox, of the Ninth Corps; General Mott, of the Second, and General Carr, of the Eighteenth. The proceedings of the third day were read and approved. TESTIMONY OF GENERAL MEADECONTINUED. Questions by General BURNSIDE: Question. Where were your headquarters during the action of the 30th Page 55 55 CHAP. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. Answer. From 4 oclock until about 11 (I am not exactly confident as to the time of leaving it) my headquarters, as announced in the order of battle on the day previ- ous, were established at the headquarters of the Ninth Corps. At 11 oclock, or about that time, as near as I can remember, I returned to the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac, which are situated about three-quarters of a mile to the east- ward of the headquarters of the Ninth Corps, and are in tele~raphid communication with the same headquarters, where I remained during the rest of the day. Question. How far was that from the scene of action? Answer. If by the scene of action is meant the crater of the mine and that portion of the enemys line in front of it, so far as I have knowledge of the ground, derived from maps, I should suppose that the headquarters of the Ninth Corps were possi- bly a mile to the eastward of the crater, and my headquarters are three-quarters of a mile, as I stated, beyond that still farther to the east. Question. Could anything of the action be seen from there? Answer. Nothing could be seen from any of the points that I occupied. Question. Did you go farther to the front during the action? If so, where? Answer. I did not leave the headquarters of the Ninth Corps during the active operations. Question. Did you not know that there were several positions on our line where you could see the action for yourself, and yet be in as proper a place for you as in General Burn sides permanent camp, and also have full personal communication with Generals Burnside and Ord, and be much nearer General Warren, and likewise have telegraphic communication with the rest of the army? Answer. I undoubtedly was aware that there were points of the line where I could see more of the action than I could see at the position I occupied, but I was not aware that there was any point where I could see any thing particularly, or on which I could base any orders. I adopted the position I did in consequence of its being a central one, and in telegraphic communication with all parts of the line where officers were stationed with whom it was necessary to communicate, and having a large staff and many communications to receive, and many persons to com- municate with, and being there in telegraphic communication I considered it more proper to remain where I announced to the army my headquarters would be and where all information could be sent to me, than to make any change of position as intimated in the question. Besides which, I desire to say to this Court that it has been a matter of policy with me to place myself in such position that my communi- cations made and the replies made thereto should be made in such way as a record could be kept of them, and not be confined to verbal communications, which are often subject to misapprehension and to misconstruction. There undoubtedly was telegraphic communication from General Burusides headquarters in the field, the fourteen-gun battery as it was called, with the other headquarters in the army. Question. Did you not have an aide-de-camp with General Burnside during most of the action? Answer. During a portion of the time I did have Captain Sanders, aide-de-camp, at the headquarters of General Burnside. I sent him there in consequence of not re- ceiving any communication from General Burnside, in the hope that he would be en- abled to send me some information. Question. Was not Captain Sanders sent there before the mine ex- ploded? Answer. No, sir; ne was sent there some considerable time after the mine ex- plodedthat is, upon the duty that I now refer to. I have previously stated to the Court that before the mine exploded I sent two officers to endeavor to explain the delay. One was Captain Jay, and one might have been Captain Sanders, but they returned before the explosion of the mine. After the explosion of the mine I sent Captain Sanders on the duty that I now refer to, which was to remain at General Burnsides headquarters, and communicate to me anything which he could ascertain. I think it further proper to add to this answer to this question,that finding I did not get the information which I desired to have, or which I thought I could have, and earing that my having sent an aide-de-camp, the object being to facilitate the tran Page 56 56 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. LII. mission of information, might be used to deter responsible officers from communicat- ing information to the commanding general, I withdrew Captain Sanders before the action closed, by an order, Question. For what purpose was lie sent~ Was it not to report to you the state and progress of affairs, and did. he not so report~ Answer. I have already answered the first part of that question. As to his re- ports, all the dispatches from him are on file in my evidence before the Court. As to whether be reported all that he should have reported, and all the information to be obtained, I presume the Court will ascertain from him and from other evidence. Question. Was there any information not furnished you by General Buruside, or through other sources, which, if received, would have in- fluenced your conduct of the action ~ If so, what ~ Answer. I have already informed the Court that all the information that I re- ceived has been placed before them in the shape of official documents. It is impos- sible for me to say what my action would have been if I had received any other in- formation. I acted upon the information I received. Question. What time did Captain Sanders leave General Buruside to return to you ~ Answer. I should say it was about 8.30; between that and 9, as near as I can recollect. I have a copy of the order to him which I can furnish, if desired. Question. You state that General Burnside~s dispatch of 9 a. m. was the first intormation you had received that any collision had taken place or that there was any enemy in our front. Had you not, before the re- ceipt of this dispatch, written to General Burnside in~reference to Gen- eral Griffins attack and repulse, also received a dispatch from Captain Sanders speaking of captured colors, also seen and examined rebel ~ris- oners taken that morning~ Answer. In reply to that question I would say that I am willing to assume that there is an apparent discrepancy in my testimony which I am very glad to have an opportunity of explaining. I should suppose that any one cognizant of the circum- stances that took place on that day, even of the most generall nature, would know that I never meant to say that I did not know that there was no enemy anywhere. I was fully aware that when the crater was occupied a number of prisoners were taken. I was also aware that the enemy occupied their lines both on the right and on the left of the position occupied by General Burnside, and I did know that Captain San- ders had made a report of captured colors and that an attack had been made in front of Griffin; but my whole attention was absorbed in the endeavor to have a charge made to the crest, and my thoughts were all upon that; and when I said this was the first intimation I had of there being any enemy in the front I meant any enemy so situated as to prevent a direct assault upon the crest. Besides which I must throw myself upon the consideration of the Court and say that the vastnumber of dispatches, the frequency with which they were sent and received, was such that my memory may not serve inc well, and the incidents may be, in a measure, not related in the exact order in which they occurred. I wish to call the attention of the Court to a very important fact, for the benefit of General Buruside, if it results to his benefit, as well as to mine, and that is the difficulty of having the time of these dispatches uniform. A dispatch is sent to me marked with the time of the officer who sends it, but the time by his watch may be ten or fifteen minutes different from mine. But I do honestly and conscientiously say that that was the first positive information, when I received that dispatch that the men of the Ninth and Eighteenth Corps were returning, that I had that there was any such force or disposition of the enemy as to render it questionable that that assault could be made. (General Buruside here remarked: I want the record in such a shape as to enable the casual reader and the revising officer to see that there was before that time an effort on my part, or on the part of some person near me, to givc information, and not an effort to cast any im- putation on General Meade; and I do not desire to invalidate his tes- timony, but simply to elaborate. I am confident that there is no dis- position on the part of General Meade to make erroneous statements. Page 57 Cu.& p. LII.] 0 THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 57 Question. Have you a note written you by me about two weeks before the assault as to the practicability of an assault in my front, my answer thereto, your second letter. and my reply, and will you be kind enough to furnish copies ~ Answer. I presume that those documents, like all other official documents, are on file. I will have a search made for them, and as soon as they are discovered will very cheerfully furnish General Burnside or the Court a copy of them. (General Burnside explain~ed that one of them was a semi-official let- ter, and General Meade, being reminded of the purport of, answered that he did not think he had it.) Bythe COURT: Question. What knowledge had you of the movements of the different divisions of the enemy on July 30 ~ Answer. I had very positive information from deserters, not only those who came within my own lines here, but those who came into the lines of General Butler and those who came into the lines of General Hancock, that there were but three divisions of the enemy in our front, consisting of Mahones division, of Hills corps, and Johnsons and Hokes divisions, of Longstreets corps, and that the other divisions of Lees army were on the north side of the James River confronting Generals Hancock and Sheri- dan on the 29th. I also received the same information from prisoners taken that morning. During the operations I received information from the signal officer on the plank road that the enemy were moving troops from their right to their center, which I anticipated, and upon receiving that information the orders were sent. to General Warren to endeavor to turn the enemys right by pushing forward General Crawford and to General Wilson to push on without delay, without waiting for the arrival of General Sheridan coming from Deep Bottom. Question. Did the order to suspend operations (given abont 9 a. m. July 30) originate with Lieutenant-General Grant~ Answer. No, sir; the order, I think, originated with myself. Some time before the order was given I informed Lieutenant-General Grant that so far as I could see there wa~ no prospect of our succeeding in the manner in which we had expected to do; that the time had passed for the coup de maim to succeed ; and I suggested to him that we should immediately withdraw the troops, to which he acceded. About that time a dispatch was received from the signal officer of the Fifth Corps stating that the colored troops had captured a brigade of the enemy with four of their colors, to which, although I did not attach much importance, not knowing how a signal officer could see an operation of that kind, when it did not come to me from the officer in charge of the operation, we, nevertheless, suspended this order and held it in abeyance until the arrival of the dispatch of General Buruside informing me that some of the men of the EPrhteenth and Ninth Corps were retiring, and 1 think also that the lieutenant-general~kimself rode down to our trenches and made some personal examination and had seen General Ord and had some conversation with him upon his return. From what he heard from General Ord, and subsequently an officer coming in and saying that the colored troops instead of capturing a brigade and four colors had themselves retired in great confusion, which information, I think, was given me by Major Fisher, the chief signal officer, I again referred the subject to the lieutenant-general and again gave him my opinion that as it was then about 9.25 it was unnecessary to make any other efforts and an unnecessary sacrifice of life, my idea being that they could be withdrawn without any difficulty then, or we should have difficulty later in the day in withdrawing them. To this he assented and the order was given to withdraw them. Afterward, when the information was received from General Buruside of the difficulty of retiring then, the order was mod- ified. Question. Were any instructions given for destroying the bridges in Petersburg in case the crest was gained ~ Answer. There were not, for two reasons And first hoped we would, in the enemy, if we had succeeded, as I overcoming we should have driven them across the Appomattox and should have wanted those bridges to follow them; but the contin- gency of their destroying those bridges was held in view, and it was to meet that contingency that the chief engineer was ordered to have a pontoon train brought up so that we could throw our own bridges. My expectation was that if we had suc- ceeded in the coup de maim, thai~ these three divisions of the enemy would have gon Page 58 - 58 OPERATION~ IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. ML out of our way and we would be enabled to cross not only the Appomattox but also Swift Run, and open up communication with General Butler, at Bermuda Hundred, before General Lee could send any re-enforcements from the five divisions that he was known to have north of the James River. Maj. Gen. A. E. BURNSJDE, U. S. Volunteers, duly sworn, says: Soon~after this army arrived before Petersburg I received a note from General Pot- ter, stating that if it was desirable the fort in front of his position could, in his opinion, be mined, and that he would, at my request, make a statement of the matter or would come to my headquarters with Colonel Pleasants, of the Forty-eighth Pennsylvania, and lay the matter before me verbally. I sent him word that I would be glad to take the matter into consideration; and accordingly he and Colonel Pleasants came to my headquarters and laid before me a plan for running a mine to that p9sition. In the course of the conversation Colonel Pleasants remarked to me that this thing had first been suggested by the men of his regiment who, I think, were stationed in the advance line and pretty much all of whom were miners from Schuylkill County, Pa. The matter was fully discussed, and I authorized General Potter to commence the work, making the remark, if I remember right, that it could certainly do no harm to commence it, and it was probably better that the men should be occupied in that way, and I would lay the matter before General Meade at my earliest opportunity. We parted witil that understanding, and the work was commenced. Probably at the first interview that I had with General Meade I mentioned the matter to him. He said to me that he bad no instructions in reference to siege opera- tions in his front; that that was a matter for the lieutenant-general to decide upon; that lie could not authorize any work of that kind, but he would acquiesce in it, and I am inclined to think that I have upon record a letter to the same effect from General Meade. This work was started and progressed with the full knowledge of General Meade; in fact, I was in almost daily communication with him, and much conversa- tion was had upon that subject. When the gallery was first started there were many discouragements in the way of prophecies as to its failure which had to be overcome, and a great many sug,estions as to the mode by which the work should proceed. I, how ever, left the matter entirely in the hands of General Potter, Colonel Pleasants, and his regiment, feeling satisfied that these miners had experience in matters of that kind which would enable them to accomplish this work. When it began to be demonstrated that we would probably reach a point under the enemys fort, conversations were had with reference to the feasibility of an assault after the explosion had taken place. Feeling that the old troops of the Ninth Corps had experienced very hard service during the campaign and had been in so many engagements, that they were very much wearied and their ranks thinned, I made up my mind if I was called on to make an assault with the Ninth Corps, to place the Fourth Division, under General Fcrrero, in the advance, inasmuch as that division had not suffered so severely, in fact had not been in any general engagement during the campaign, but had frequently been very honorably engaged on the outposts of the army. General Ferrero himself and all his officers expressed to me their utmost confidence in his troops, and especially his confidence in their ability to make a charge, or in other words a d sh. I accordingly instructed him to drill his troops with a view to leading the advance in case the Ninth Corps was called upon to make the attack. Soon after this General Meade called upon me for a statement as to the practicabil- ity of making an assault in my front, which call seemed to have been general, or rather, seemed to have been made upon all the generals commanding corps then on the advance line. I answered him, giving to him as I conceived to be under the cir- cumstances a proper opinion, stating that I thought the chances were fair that a suc- cessful assault could be made fr~m my front if it could be supported in a specific way, and I could have the discretion of determining when the supporting columns should be put in. General Meade answered me to the effect that he commanded this army and that he could not give to any one the authority to determine as to the time that his troops should be put in action; that he would be glad to~eceive from me at all times such suggestions as I might make, but that he himself would take the responsibility of re-enforcing any force that he should see fit to order in action, or words to that effect. I at once wrote him a letter stating that I had no disposition whatever to claim the right to put other troops than my own in action; that I had simply made this suggestion because I had given troops to other corps commanders to support their columns, which they themselves had used during the campaign without any interfer- ence on my part, and I simply meant to ask what I had granted to others; that while I was certainly not anxious to put my own troops in action the troops of any other corps could be called upon to make the assault; that I was fully willing to accord t Page 59 (Iiw~. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 59 General Meade more military skill than I possessed, and more ability to put troops in action, but that my troops had been given to corps commanders both on my right and on my left and placed in action by them; and, as I before said, I simply desired to have accorded to me what I had accorded to them. It was decided, I believe, at that time, that no assault should be made; but I, not- withstanding, sent for General Ferrero and directed him to go down to our advance line and select positions for concentrating his division, to look at the positions on the line over which he had to pass, and to reconnoiter the ground over which his division would have to pass in an assault upon Cemetery Hill. I also directed him to send his brigade commanders down for the same purpose, and indicated to him exactly the position which I wanted him to take, and the parts of the line over which I desired him to pass. I requested that he would present to me a plan for the maneuvering of his troops in case an assault of that kind were ordered. In accordance with that, General Ferrero presented me a plan which is in substance laid down in my plan of attack, and contained in the proceedings already before you. (See document L.) I approved of this plan, especially that part of it which con- templated the movement of troops to the right and left of the breach which we might make in the line in order to allow the other column to proceed to the front without any molestation from any of the enemy that might be left in the rifle-pits on the right and left of the bieach. This must have been fifteen or twenty days, if not more, be- fore the assault was made. I was afterward informed by General Ferrero that his troops had been drilled for a movement of that kind, and was informed by a large number of his officers that it was their understanding that they were to make an attack with them; that, if I mistake not, they had passed over lines of intrenchmeuts, performing the movement with a view to familiarizing their men with the movement, and they each and all expressed to me the greatest possible confidence in their ability to accomplish the work, which I considered a very material element in making the movement. Nothing of importance occurre4 for a few days before the mine was sprung, except ordinary conversations with reference to the charge which was to be placed in the mine. I myself from a long experience in experiments with gunpowder, having been a manufacturer of arms several years before the war commenced and in constant practice with fire-arms, had a particular view with reference to the mode in which the mine should be charged, and the amount of charge to be placed in it. It was not in accordance with the methods laid down in scientific works upon the subject of military mining, but entirely in accordance with all experience in mining and blasting by civil engineers within the last two or three years since the method of heavy tamp- ing had been abandoned. It is not worth while for me to enter here into an expla- nation of my theory, because I can present the report of the officer who built the mine, and that will explain the m~tter fully. It is sufficient to say that the mine was charged partially upon my theory and partially upon the theory of the old estab- lished plan of military mining. In the theory which I decided to be adopted large charges could be used without detriment, in my opinion, to persons in the imme- diate proximity of the mine, but persons who were not of my opinion felt that the effect of this mine at great distances, with the charge which I proposed to place in it, would be very great, and it became, from some cause or other, known to my troops, both officers and men, that a difference of opinion of that kind had arisen, and to such an extent that I have had general officers come to me and ask me if I did not think the charge I was putting in the mine was too large. I did not think the charge so large that there was danger of injuring our own men. This feeling among the men had a certain effect which I will leave for the Court to decide, and if they request it I will send them the names of witnesses who have mentioned to me that impression on the subject long before the mine was exploded, so that there can be no mistake as to the impression that prevailed at the tiiae. I myself was satisfied,without know- ing definitely, that the charge which I desired to place in the mine could be placed there with safety. I witnessed this anxiety among the troops with a good deal of concern, but that it did not prevail in the division which it was supposed would make the assault (it not being then upon our lines) was a source of gratification to me. This Court will see by looking at the documents which General Meade has presented that I was directed to keep the amount of powder placed in the chambers within the limits of rules prescribed by military works upon that subject. I, how- ever, in several verbal communications with General Meade, insisted upon the other method; audit was finally decided that we should place in the mine 8,000 pounds of powder instead of 12,000 pounds. The ground that I took was this: that the depth of the mine, or rather, the bottom of the chambers was fixed, the greater the explosion the greater the crater radius, and less inclination would be given the sides of the crater, and the greater breach on the right and left of the charges would be made, thereby giving a greater space for the troops to pass over, and a less inclination for them to pass up and down in the line.. It was, however, determined that 8,000 pounds o Page 60 60 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. LU. powder should be put in instead of 12,000, and the mine was accordingly exploded with that charge. The decision in reference to the charge to be placed in the mine was given in ample time to let me make arrangements for that amount of powder. The general facts and movements connected with this army for the first three or four days previous to the fight are so well known to the Court that I will not delay them by any statement as to my correspondence and personal intercourse or any- thing of that nature up to Thursday before the fight. On that day (Thursday, two days before the fight~ I went to General Meades head. quarters. He spoke to me in this way: I have received information that it is impossible for General Hancock to advance beyond his present position; he has succeeded in inflicting upon the enemy a severe punishment and captured some four pieces of cannon, but is not able to advance be- yond that point (or, at any rate, it was decided that he should not advance beyond that point). A large frrce of the enemy from this position has been attracted to that side of the river by this movement of General Hancock an sires that an attack should be made here. , d General Grant do- (I think he made that last remark, but I will not be positive; he either said that General Grant desired, or he himself desired, that an attack should be made.) He asked how long it would take to charge the mine. There was some correspondence before and after that time (I do not know if it is in your proceedings or not) in reference to the time necessary to charge the mine; I think it very likely that Gen- eral Meade has placed all the documents before you. Previous to this he had written to me to present my project for this movement, which is now before you. During this conversation on Thursday he said to me, I cannot approve of your placing the negro troops in the advance, as proposed in your project. I asked him why. He said, Because I do not think they should be called upon to do as impor- tant a work as that which you propose to do, certainly not called upon to lead, or words to that effect. I, in a considerable conversation, urged upon General Meade the necessity for placing General Ferreros division in the advance. I stated to him that the three white divisions had been on the advance line, and under fire from the moment of the establishment of the line, on the 18th or 19th of June, until that time; that they were very much wearied, had contracted a habit of covering themselves by every method within their reach, and that I was satisfied they were not in a con- dition to make anything like as much of a dash upon the enemys line as General Ferreros division, which had not been under any considerable fire from the time of its arrival at this place to that moment. I told him I considered my troops to be as good as they ever were, with the exception of this weariness an(l the habit, which had almost become a second nature, of protecting themselves from the fire of the enemy. In fact, upon this subject, I was very, very urgent. I will here present to the Court some of the reasons for forming this opinion, which reasons were presented to General Meade. Take an intermediate date, say the 20th of July, and there were for duty 9,023 muskets in the three old divisions of the Ninth Corps, which occupied the line. From the 20th of June, which was after the fight at this place, to the day before the fight on the 30th day of July, these divisions lost as follows: Killed, 12 officers, 231 men; wounded, 44 officers, 851 men; missing, 12 men; making a total of 1,150, which is over 12 per cent. of the command, with~uta single assault on the part of the enemy or of our own troops. These casualties were caused from picket-firing and shell firing, and extended pretty evenly over the whole time. I think that the whole of General Willeoxs division was on the line for thirty days or more without relief. General Potters and General Ledlies divisions had some small reliefs, enabling those gentlemen to draw some of their men off at inter- vals, for two or three days at a time, at certain intervals during this period. A con- siderable portion of our line was so situated as to render it impossible to keep pickets to the front of them. It was, in fact, si.tuated very much as a portion of the line occupied by the Second Corps at Cold Harbor. As I stated before, I stated these facts to General Meade, except that I will not say that I gave him these exact fig- ures; but the Pill substance of what I have stated here was given to him, together with the statement of the loss of officers and men, and the way in which the losses occurred. And, in fact, statements were made regularly to General Meade, so that these facts were in his possession, but were not made with the same particularity to him as I have made them here. The Ninth Corps also lost in the fight of the 17th and 18th of June 2,903 men, and in the action of the 30th of July 3,828. The following are the figures more in detail: June 17 and 18Killed, 29 officers, 348 men; wounded, 106 officers, 1,851 men; miss- ing, 15 officers, 554 men;~ 2,903. July 30Killed, 52 officers, 376 men; wounded, 105 officers, 1,556 men; missing, 87 officers, 1,652 men; 3,828. General Meade said to roe that he was going to see General Grant, and would sub- mit the question to him as to whether the colored troops would be allowed to take the advance or not. This,as I said,was on ThursdayI think in the forenoon. He said to me that he would start at 1 oclock, and would return that evening. I parte Page 61 THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 61 with him, and on the next morning, not having heard anything from General Meade, and knowing from information that I had received that he had returned from City Point during the evening, I imagined that no further action was to be taken in the matter, and that I was to be allowed to place the Fourth Division in the advance. On Friday forenoon General Willcox and General Potter, two of my division com- manders, came to my headquarters, and we talked over the matter of the flghtwhich was to take place on Saturday morning. I said to one or both of them to this effect: that I had been very much worried and troubled the day before lest General Meade would overrule that part of my plan which contemplated the putting in of the colored troops, but that I hoped nothing further would be heard from it because General Meade had gone to City Point the day before, and the matter was to be referred to General Grant, and that inasmuch as I had not heard from General Meade I took it for granted that he had decided to allow the thing to remain as it was. This I must necessarily give in substance, because my conversations with my division com- manders are not guarded. They can be called upon themselves to state what they know about the matter. Soon after that, say 11 oclock, Generals Meade and Ord came to my headquarters. I am under the impression that I broached the subject myself as to the colored division taking the advance, but whether I did or not he informed me that General Grant coincided with him in opinion, and it was decided thatIcouldnot~ntthatdivisioninadvance. Ifelt,andlsupposelexpressedand showed, very great disappointment at this announcement, and finally in the conver- sation which occurred, and to which there are two witnesses here present, I asked General Meade if that decision could not be changed. He said, No, general, it can- not; it is final, and you must put in your white troops. No doubt in the conver- sation I gave some of the reasons for not wishing to put the white troops in that I had given at his headquarters, but of that I am not certain. This was the day before the fight. I said to General Meade that that would necessarily change my plan. Now, this conversation either occurred at that time or it occurred at a later hour in the day, say 1 or 2 oclock, when General Meade returned to my headquarters, because he went off with General Ord for an hour or two, say, and returned to my headquarters. It is not impossible that this conversation occurred in the afternoon instead of in the forenoon of the 29th. After some conversation with Generals Willcox and Potter as to which troops should take the advance, one of them remarked to me that I had better send for General Ledlie and we would talk the matter over as to which one of the divisions should take the advance. I sent for General Ledlie, and after some discussion of the matter I decided that, taking everything into consideration, it would be but fair that these gentlemen should cast lots for the advance. General Wilicox was probably better situated, as to position, for the advance, as his troops then were, than either of the other divisionscertainly, than General Ledliebut his troops, as I stated before, had heen constantly on the line, with the exception of an intermission of a day or two, which rendered it, if anything, desirable that General Ledlies troops should lead instead of his. General Potters troops had been, next to General Willcoxs, more constantly on the line, and I think he was, next to him, better situated for the advance; but, as I have indicated by previous remarks, General Ledlies division was less fatigued, and, in my opinion, it was more just to call upon them to make the charge, and they had fought as gallantly as troops could fight on the 17th, and I therefore did not hesitate to call upon them in consequence of any lack of faith in their courage. So I said, It will be fair to cast lots. And so they did cast lots, and General Ledlie drew the advance. He at once left my headquarters, in a very cheer- ful mood, to make his arrangements for the advance, as no time could be lost in mak- ing the necessary arrangements, as it was then certainly 3 oclock in the afternoon and the assault was to be made next morning. I directed him to take his brigade commanders and go to the front with Colonel my ins~ecto~-general, who was entirely conversant with the ground, and I to Co onel Loring about the position I desired General Ledlie to take, and I also stated verbally to General Willcox and General Potter about the positions I desired them to take with their divisions, and the ground being familiar to all of us enabled us to talk very understandingly and easily upon the subject. General Pot- ter expressed some doubt as to finding room enough on the right of the covered way to place his troops, of which I was in doubt myself, the general instructions being for General Potter to mass all his troops, if possible, on the right of his covered way, General Willcox to occupy his covered way and such portions of the railroad cut as was necessary, and room to be found between the two for General Ledlie, who had the assaulting column. At all events, there was, as far as I know, a distinct under- standing between myself and my division commanders as to the positions to be oc- cupied by the troops. Not timat they did finally occupy exactly the positions which I indicated to them, because some of them were immaterially modified by correspond- ence, I think, between Generals Willcox, Potter, and myself. It is sufficient to say that General Ledlies troops weremassed in about the same position as I had desired to mas Page 62 62 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. LIL General Ferreros. The arrangement which General Meade objected to, of sending troops down to the right and left to clear the way, was (lispensed with, it having been understood before that that was a part of the plan, or of the arrangements. The plan was made to accord with General Meades views. In other words, in conse- quence of his objection, I did not give any instructions for troops to pass down to the right and left, but to make at ouce for the crest. The commanding general had been urgent in his views that in order to carry the crestthat is, Cemetery Hillthat a dash must be made at it without reference to formation; that there would be no time for maneuvering; that if we attempted to handle the troops as proposed in my plan he was satisfied it would he a failure. If Imistakenot,theamount of these views was expressed before General Potter and General Willeox. Generals Meade and Ord called at my headquarters and had a con- versation there in reference to my plans. General Ord went with General Meade to our signal station, and General Ord took a look at the position of the enemy. After returning to my headquarters, General Ord said he would send staff officers to me to report, in order that they also might reconnoiter the ground and pick out positions for troops. Instead of staff officers coming, I think that in almost every instance the general officers of General Ords corps came themselves. I gave them facilities for reconnoitering the position of the enemy, and also gave them instructions as to where their troops were to mass in rear of our lines. I received General Meades order, which is on your record. I sent him a copy of my order, which I have not here at present, but which I will procure and present at the end of my evidence. There were some details into which I did not enter in this order in consequence of the verbal understanding which existed between myself and my division commanders, that fact, I believe, being noted in the order. During that night our troops were concentrated in accordance with those orders ready for the attack, and General Ords troops were also concentrated as nearly as possible in accordance with my understanding with his officers. During the night some changes were necessarily made in the positions of General Ords troops; changes which are always consequent upon the movement of as large a body of men as a corps in the night, but every effort, in my opinion, was made by his officers, and also by my own, to c~rry out to the letter the instructions given by General Meade and by myself. Inasmuch as you will have an opportunity of examining both of these orders at your leisure it will not be necessary for me to enti~r into the details as to the movements that were directed. The action was to commence with the explosion of the mine, which was ordered to take place at 3.30 oclock. It may not be amiss to state here that the mine had been ready, charged, since the 23d. General Potter was ordered to see that Colonel Pleasants exploded the mine at the time indicated by General Meade. My order for the movement of the 30th stated that I would make my headquarters at the fourteen-gun battery, which is not far from the center of the line occupied by the Ninth Corps. Just before leaving my permanent headquarters, say at 2 oclock in the morning, there came from General Mcade a dispatch stating that if I desired to delay the time for the explosion of the mine in consequence of the darkness I could do so. I telegraphed him back that the mine would be exploded at the hour designated. I went to the place designated as my headquarters at the proper time, and, like every one else, awaited with great anxiety the explosion of the mine. I need not say to this Court that my anxiety on the occasion was extreme, particularly as I did not know the reason of the delay. I waited for several minutes, and think- ing that there was some miscalculation as to the time it would take the fuse to burn np to the charge, when I sent an aide-dc-camp to find out what was the reason of the delay. Soon after that I sent a second aide-dc-camp. Soon after that time Major. Van Buren arrived at my headquarters and told me the cause of the delay. In the mean time Captain Sanders, I think, or some other one of General Meades staff, came to my headquarters to know the reason. I said to him that I had sent to ascertain the reason; that I could not tell him then. Another dispatch, either written or ver- bal, came to know the reason; and I sent word again that I did not know the reason, but as soon as I could ascertain it I would give the general the reason. I then got another dispatch from General Meade that if the mine had failed I must make a charge independent of the explosion of the mine. Having almost made up my own mind that the mine had failed, or that something had occurred which we could not discover during that morning, and feeling the absolute necessity, as General Meade expressed in his dispatch, of doing something very quickly, I was on the eve of sending an order for the command to be ready to move forward as directed by Gen- eral Meade, but I said again, I will delay to ascertain what is the reason of the non-explosion of the niine. I had nothing that I could report up to the time that Major Van Buren came to my headquarters. I gave to those aides freely the state- ment that I did not know the reason of the non-explosion of the mine, but that as soon as I learned it I would inform the. commanding general. As I before stated, Major Van Buren came to my headquarters and told me that the fuse had gone out Page 63 CHAP. LU.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 63 and that a gallant soldier named Sergeant Reese, of the Forty-eighth Pennsylvania, had volunteered to go into the gallery to ascertain whether the fuse was really burn- ing still and burning slowly, or whether it had failed. lie discovered that it had failed and refired it; and Major Van Buren further said that General Potter told him that the mine was to explode at a certain minute. This was, I think, within eleven minutes of the time of the explosion. I am not sure that I did not receive a similar message from an aide-de-camp to General Potter. I think I did. Within one min- ute of the tim~ designated by Major Van Buren (and it was a fact which was cogni- zant to every one) I was not with the advance colnmn of troops that was to make the charge. 1 understand that there was considerable anxiety among the men after and before the explosion as to the effect that it might have upon them, and I have been informed by Colonel Loring, my inspector-general (who may be called before this Court), who was with the column, that it took probably five minutes to get the men in perfect condition to dash forward. After their ranks were re-established, they went forward, as far as I could see or know or hear, in the most gallant possible style until they arrived within the crater. Here, owing to the inequalities of the ground, and possibly other reasons which will be matters of investigation in this Court, there was a pause, the men to a considerable extent disorganized, and it was so reported to me. I will state here, though, that I have not been able to make np my mind that any set of troops of this army or any other army that had gone through the labor that these troops had gone through for the last thirty days could be made to do better than they did upon that occasion. I saw with me there at my headquarters Captain Sanders. I think I remarked to him that I was glad he was to be with me on that day, as he had been with me during the fight on the 18th, and had been the means of communication between General Meade and myself and 1 was very much pleased that he was present with me on that morning, and I think I so expressed myselt~ At all events my impression was, if lie did not tell me so, that he was to remain with me during the morning. The dispatches I received from General Meade, which I hope the Court will examine care- fully, bore the marks of very great anxiety, such as I was at the time feehin~, to learn the information which I was about the sanie time endeavoring to learn, and at the same time unable to nive him, and I so stated to his aides-de-camp. I, of course, was glad that no movement was made by me (as General Meade must be) in accord- ance with the order to attack in case the mine had failed. From that time until the time that the troops were withdrawn I endeavored to give at all important points (I do not mean in minutia), to General Meade by telegraph and to Captain Sanders by word, all the information of which I was possessed. I, of course, was in a position in which I could examine the movements of~he troops. For half an hour at a time I would be away from my headquarters. I went with General Warren once down the covered way to the front. The covered way was full of troops, and there was no way of going on horseback or of carrying any number of staff offi- cers, and from the positions we were to reconnoiter it would not have been advisable to carry any number of officers to that point. The dispatches that I sent to General Meade are, I think, on record, and I think if carefully examined without reference to the numerous dispatches Ireceived from him, it will be ascertained that at every important epoch correct and definite information was sent to him either by Captain Sanders or myself, up to the receipt of a dispatch which was misunderstood by me, and which appears upon your record, and bears the positive certainty of insubordina- tion for which I must be responsible and must necessarily suffer. I will state the circumstances under which the dispatch was given me. It was handed to me by Captain Jay, who came up to me and said, General Meade desires me to say that this is for you personally, or words to that effect, no doubt meaning that it was for my personal attention. I misunderstood the tenor of it, no doubt; readitandputin my answer, which is also on record before you. The orders that I gave froni time to time to my division commanders were princi- pally verbal orders given through my aides-dc-camp. I had with each division a responsible aide-de-camp, who was in constant communication with mc, and if I mistake not I did not receive from Generals Ferrero or Ledhie a single written dis- patch, aiid but one or two each from Generals Potter and Willcox~ bu~ at the same time I received verbally frequent information of all that was goihg on in order to enable mc to direct the movements of my troops. After giving orders for all the white troops to be shoved in, and sending additional orders forward, which were also reiterated by division commanders, for the troops to advance and move upon the crest in accordance with the understanding and plan of the night before, which were plain and distinct, I received from General Meade an order to put in my whole force and move for the crest at once. I had not done this because I was satisfied that there was very grent difficulty attending the formation of the troops in the crater in consequence of the great number there. I have since learned that considerable progress had been made in the formation at that time. Indeed, the troops were progressing to the right and leftand to my knowledge had driven the enemyGeneral Potter to the right and General Willeox to the left Page 64 64 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. LII. A dispatch which was intended for me, from Colonel Loring, went to my old head- qnarters and was read by General Meade. I was cognizant of that fact, and I knew that General Meade was aware of the circumstances which surrounded the troops at that place, because General Meade sent an orderly with a message stating that he had read the dispatch himself. It was, therefore, not necessary for me to recoin- municate the information I had received from Colonel Loring. After my three division~s had been put into the position they occupied in the works I hesitated to put in this colored division. I remembered having told General Meade that in case the colored division should falter in the advance I did not think it would affect our old white divisions, certainly as to holding their position; that if the white divis- ions were to falter in the advance it would be impossible to get the black division to pass them. I am not sure but I told him this the very day before the battle, in my tent. I received from General Meade an order to put in my whole force, which I did. I sent an order to General Ferrero to go to the top of the crest with his divis- ion. One of my aides was there at the time (Colonel Loring), and took the responsi- bility of saying that that should be stopped, because he was satisfied that I had not received his dispatch. He came to me and I said my orders were peremptory, to put in my whole command; and he himself told General Ferrero to put in his division at once and go to the top of the crest, if possible. The colored division was put in, and from what I can learn no officers or men behaved with greater gallantry than they did. After passing the white troops and attempting something like a formation they were driven back by the enemy and driven through the white troops, the white troops, orthe principal portion of them, still maintaining their position, fighting as gallantly as three divisions ever fought. I witnessed this repulse myself, and at the same time saw that the enemy had been repulsed by our own white troops, the black troops coming to the rear to a very considerable extent. There is one point to which I wish to call the attention of the Court. I sent to General Meade a dispatch at 6.20, stating that if General Warrens reserve force could be concentrated at that time I thought it would be well, or something to that effect, and I would designate to him when that force should be put in. To that dis- patch you have the answer. Not far from that time General Warren came himself to my headquarters, if not exactly at that time. I then said to him, General, let us look at this position, having in view answering the 4~uestiou which General Meade desired me to answer. General Warren and I went down to the front, leaving my headquarters and going down a covered way until we got to a position on the left- hand side of General Potters covered way beyond. We got on a mound of earth and reconnoitered the enemys position until we were satisfied. I said to General War- ren, I think your plan would be to strike across by the fort which enfiladed our lin~s, or something to that effect. At any rate, whaVi~ver opinion I expressed to General Warren it is sufficient to say that he told me that he should go back and ex- plain to General Meade the circumstances, and if possible to get him to come to the front and look for himself That, of course, satisfied me with reference to that point of General Meades inquiry. Although this narrative is very disconnected, I believe I have stated in it all the material points. I do not know of a single order of mine that was not carried out by my division commanders. I do not know of any lack of energy on their part in carrying out my views and the views of the commandino- general, except, possibly, in the case of General Ledlie, who was quite sick on that say, and who I thought after- ward ought to have gone to the crater the moment his men were in, but I understood that he was very sick and could hardly have walked that far under the oppressive beat. He was within 120 yards of his brigades, I should say. Between 9.30 and 10 oclock I received two dispatches from General Meade with ~reference to withdrawal. They are marked Nos. 12 and 15 in the record before you. I was very much equcerned in reference to the matter, because although we had met with some reverses, I could not help feeling myself that we could hold the position which we occupied, if we could not gain more ground. In fact I was under the im- pression at the time that we were gaining ground in the direction of the enemys rifle-pits to the right and left, and I felt that if troops were put in on our left flank that then we would have been enabled to establish ourselves on the enemys line, which, of coifrse, would have made our position secure. However that is simply a matter of opinion, upon which the commanding general had to decide. I also felt that if we could gain no more ground we could run out lines at an angle to the crater and establish a salient upon the enemys lines, which would be of material advantage to us in future operations, particularly in making him vacate that part of the line which is now opposite my front, and, in fact, as I had not given up all hopes of carry- ing the crest even, if a positive and decided effort were made by all the troops. But feeling disinclined to withdraw the troops, I got on my horse and rode over to Gen- eral Meades headquarters, which were at my permanent headqnarters. He and Gen- eral Grant were there together. General Ord and I entered the tent, and General Meade questioned General Ord as to the practicability of his troops being withdrawn Page 65 CHAP. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 65 I made the remark that none of General Ords troops were in the enemys line, and he would have no trouble in withdrawing; that none but th~troops of the Ninth Corps were in the line, and I thought that my opinion on that subject would probably be a proper one to be received; and I stated that I did not think that we had fought long enough that day; that I felt that the crest could still be carried if a decided effort were made to carry it. To that I received the reply that the order was final, or some- thing to that~ffect. General Meade in his evidence states that I gave no reasons why I thought the crest could be carried, and it will not be amiss for me to say that no reasons were asked, and that he simply stated that the order was final. I was then satisfied that the best time to withdraw those troops would be after night-fall; that it would be best to retain possession of the place till after night-fall. I thought from reports which I had received from my aides-dc-camp and division commanders that we could then withdraw the troops. I had myself witnessed a very handsome repulse of the enemy by our troops just before leaving to go to General Meades headquarters. At this point the Court took a recess. After recess General BURNSIDE resume4 his testimony, saying: I will supply one or two omissions in this disjointed narrative now. Some time before I received the order from General Meade to put in my whole force I received a verbal message from General Willeox by one of his aides, Captain Brackett, that it was useless to send more troops up that line at that point, that all the troops were there that could be handled, or could be used, or words to that effect; and that an immediate attack should be made both upon our right and left. That is as far as I can remember of the message. I am under the impression I immediately trans- mitted this message to General Meade either by a staff officer of my own or by one of his. I also said that in several conversations with General Meade I stilted to him that I was satisfied that the explosion of the mine in our front and the advance of our troops would enable a strong skirmish line to carry everything on the left. I am of the impression that I expressed that opinion to General Meade the day before the fight in the presence of General Potter and General Willeox. I know that I ex- pressed it to him half a dozen times. After it had been decided by General Meade finally that the troops were to be withdrawn I was necessarily very much exercised. as to the best method of withdrawal. I had directed General White, who was acting on that day as chief of staff, to remain on the line until he heard from me, and that I would send him the result of my interview with General Meade. I wish to read here the dispatch I sent him and the accompanying note written by General White: HEADQUARTERS NINTH CORPS, July 30, 1864. Brigadier-General WHITE, Chief of Staff: I have no discretion in the matter. The order is peremptory to withdraw. It may be best to intrench where we are for the present, but we must withdraw as soon as practicable and prudent. A. E. BURNSIDE, Major-General. [Indorsement.] Division commanders will instruct in accordance with the within dispatch, the officers on the line to consult and determine the time of evacuation. By order of Major-General Burnside: J. WHITE, Brigadier-General and Chief of Staff., I sent for my division commanders after sending that dispatch. Feeling confident that the reports I had received that our people would be able to hold the position which they then occupied nutil night, certainly, and feeling that if they were net, one time for evacuation was about as good as another, I thought it best to have a perfect understanding as to the method of withdrawal. They came to my head- quarters and it was decided that we should dig a trench or trenches from our main line to the crater, and thereby enable them to withdraw without serious loss. It will be remembered that this distance is but a little over 100 yards, and taking into consideration the radius of the crater it i~s probably less than that distance. General Willeox had already given instructions, as he informed me and as I know, to dig a trencli connecting our advance line wkh the crater, and I am not sure that the other division commanders had not commenced like operations. I remember the fact being stated at the conversation at my headquarters that the work was going on, and 5 R RVOL XL, PT Page 66 66 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. Lii. that was decided upon as the best method of withdrawal. The dispatch which I sent to General White, and which I have just handed to the Court, was received by him in time to be read hy two of the division commanders before thcy left the front for my headquarters, and was forwarded by them to the general officers in the crater. One of those general officers was taken prisoner and the other two are available as witnesses before this Court. Their names are Generals Hartranft and Griffin. As to the effe~t of this dispatch I will leave it for the persons present to give evidence of, particularly as an important dispatch from myself to General Meade, here, contains my opinions of it. Adjourned till August 11. FIFTH DAY. COURT-IROOM, HEADQUARTERS SECOND CORPS, August 11. The Court met pursuant to adjournment. Present, Major-General Hancock, Brigadier-Generals Ayres and Miles, and Colonel Seliriver, judge-advocate. The proceedings of the fourth day were read (General Burnsides tes- timony first) and approved after various corrections by General Burn- side. Generals Ferrero, Willcox, and Potter were present also. GENERAL BURNSIDES TESTIMONYCONTINUED. In concluding my testimony I simply desire to call the attention of the Court to the fact that important evidence before them would indicate that I had not given proper information of what was going on in my front during the action on the 30th, and to say to them that up to the time that the mine was exploded there was nothing possi- ble for me to report, because I could not answer questions which General Meade pro- pounded to me by one or two different dispatches, except by saying that I did not know the reason for the delay, and as soon as I learned it I wonld inform him of it, which I think I did by verbal communications, either by Captain Sanders or Captain Jay. As soon as I ascertained the cause of the delay I requested Maj or Van Buren, who informed me of it, to state to Captain Jay fully the causes, and he will be able to state to you whether he did so or not. The explosion of the mine, as I before said, was a fact evident to every one along the line, and each and every command then had its orders to do a certain work, which were so explicit as to enable them to move at once to that workfirst, orders to corps commanders under General Meade, next orders from corps commanders to their division commanders, and so on. I reported to General Meade by dispa~tch when we made a breach in the enemys works, as will be seen by your record. I also reported to him soon after in answer to probably frequent anxious dispatches that we were endeavoring to advance, that it was hard work, but that we hoped to succeed, which was the full extent of the knowl- edge then in my possession, and all that I could learn from personal observation of the contest in the neighborhood of the breach. Soon after he received the report of my inspector-general stating the condition of the troops in the crater and in the rifle-pits to the right and left of it. This report was intended for me, but was opened by Gen- eral Meade and sent to me by him. The obligation resting upon me to send him a copy was, therefore, removed, inasmuch as I knew that he had already seen its con- tents from his own statement. I reported to him a short time after that or just be- fore that I thought it was the proper time to concentrate General Warrens troops, and that I would indicate to him the time when I thought they ought to go in, for there was hardly room at that time for them to go in on our front. I received an an- swer from him stating the object of his dispatch, and that he desired to know if it was practicable for General Warrens force to be put in upon our left. At about that time, certainly before I could determine the fact, I came into contact with General Warren personally at my headquarters, and he and I made the personal reconnais- sance that has been before alluded to. I parted with General Warren with the dis- tinct understanding that he was to report to General Meade the condition of affairs in his front, and, as I before said, with the statement that he would endeavor to get General Meade to come to the front himself~ which I considered to be sufficient an- swer to General Meades dispatch, particularly as General Warren went directly from me to the telegraph office, It is possible that in this I niade a mistake, At aitothe Page 67 CHAP. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 67 juncture I reported to him that I thought that was the time for General Warren to be put in promptly. Soon after that time, and before it would have been possible for me to have sent any other intelligent report, I received orders to withdraw the troops to our own intrenchments. During the engagement General Meade also re- ceived from Captain Sanders, his aide-de-camp, who was at my headquarters, cer- tainly three written dispatches and one verbal dispatch, which he acknowledges, independentof the verbal dispatch which I speak of giving to him before the explo- sion of the mine. I desire to say that Captain Sanders was near me constantly, knows that I never failed to give an aide-de-camp, situated as he is, every possible informa- tion, heard all my conversation with my aides-de-camp, and I think had free access to every dispatch and report that reached me from the front or from my division commanders: I learned personally, in presence of General Humphreys, chief of staff of the Army of the Potomac, that that was the understanding of Captain Sanders. There were some papers which I desired to have removed from the record of this Court in consequence of certain conditions which surrounded them, and which this Court has made a very proper decision upon; but as they form a portion of the record it becomes necessary for me also to state some of the circumstances which surround one of these papers, which was a dispatch sent by me to General Meade containing an objectionable remark, which will be recognized oii the record by all the members of the Court. In conversatioii with two mutual friends of General Meade and myself, I became satisfied that I had misunderstood the note which he had sent me from the front on that morning. I obtained permission to go to City Point to see General Grant, and I stated to him the circumstances of the case, among other thiiigs upon which we conversed. I left him with the understanding that I should return and withdraw the letter which I had written to General Meade. General Wilson, of the cavalry, was present at this interview. I returned to my headquarters and found upon my table charges preferred against me, amid a request that I should be relieved from command in this army, against neither of which have I any complaimit to make, but simply make this explanation to remove any responsibility from the shoulder of General Meade which might possibly attach to the letter which he wrote to me, and which I imagined at the time indicated a belief on his part that I was not disposed to tell him the truth on the day of the action. When I went to my headquarters at my permanent camp and learned from General Meade himself tha.t the order to withdraw was final, I at the same fime learned that offensive operations had ceased on 1)0th the flanks of the line which we had occupied and to which we were ordered to withdraw. I have stated to the Court as well as I know how the means taken by me to effect that ithdrawal securely, with one ex- ception, I think, which is that I started General Ferrero off at once with definite instructions to put all the force that he could get to work to dig a trench or trenches from our old line to the crater, in order that our men might come out, and that he started off on the moment. What followed that will no doubt be inquired into by the Court. Soon after I learned that offensive operations were to cease on our flanks it be- came evident that all the operations of this corps were to be independent. General Meade left my headquarters; made no reqnest of me for information; I received no dispatch from him until the evening of the day after which the troops were driven out of the crater, and, to a certain extent, were re-established in our own lines. The negligence on my part to report after that time I will not attempt to justify myself for by any reasons before this Court, inasmuch as it will probably become the subject of charges pertaining to things that took place long after the troops had come inside of our own lines. I should not dwell so fully upon my rule of conduct in matters of this kind but for the fact that matters of a like nature have been elaborated upon in evidence which now lies before this Court. I can readily conceive General Meades anxiety which would induce him to write frequent dispatches, but in my rule of conduct with my officers I have rather cultivated the idea that frequent dispatches, unless they are well authenticated, are not desirable, particularly dispatches with reference to the condition of the troops and calls for re-enforcements. I endeavored during my movements on that day to obey every order that was given to me. I put every single man of the Ninth Corps in action. I was not called upon to fight a field fight; there was no opportunity to maneuver troops; there was no discretion about looking out for flanks beyond that which fell upon commanders managing their troops in action; there was simply an obligation on my part to rush these troops through the crater and gain the top of the crest without reference to formation; and I put three divisions in as promptly as I knew how, and when I re- ceived the order to put my vi~hole force in, I threw the Fourth Division in with the most positive and distinct orders to my division commanders, given in the evidence before this Conrt. I had no possible chance to push batteries forward to protect th Page 68 68 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. LII. flanks, or of moving troops forward to protect them; I simply had to gain the crest. I obeyed every order to the best of my ability and did everything that I could do to place my troops in that position. I have not elaborated as much as to the features of the ground in my front at the mine as I might have done, and I will not delay the Court with it now. I will en~ deavor to make that as distinct as possible in my official report, which will probably be pre~red by to-morrow morning, and will probably be laid before this Court, to- gether with the reports of the division and brigade commanders of my command. I desire now to insert certain papers here which relate to the evidence that I have given before you. The battle order of General Meade is already before you. The document I now hand yon is the circular containing the battle order to my corps (document 60). I sent a copy of this to General Ord, General Warren, and to the headquarters of the army; and I should have sent a copy to General Hancock had he been here at that time. I present now the order for the siege, dated July 9, directing operations on this line, and desire to state as the reason for presenting it, that the works on my front had been conducted with the understanding that there would be an attempt made to capture the position of the enemy by military operations conducted under the chief engineer of this army and the chief of artillery, together with the corps commanders (document 61). I now desire to present a copy of a correspondence between General Meade and myself early in July. The first is an answer of mine to a circular sent to corps com- manders with a view to ascertaining what were the chances of the success of an as- sault in their fronts, and is as follows (document 62). I beg to say here that this is specifically an answer in reference to an assault in my front, which was the only opinion I was required to give. The second document is General Meades answer to my letter and is as follows (document 63). My reason for stating that my answer to General Meade was semi-official,.and that the whole correspondence was of that nature, was the fact that it is marked at the top Confidential. The dispatches sent by General Meade to me were marked like- wise, but in this copy that is omitted. The envelopes, at least, were marked Con- fidential (document 64). Questions by the JUDGE-ADVOCATE: Question. Were you in a position to see all the operations of the as- sault before Petersburg, or how much of them? Answer. I was in a position at different times to see every particle of the assault before Petersburgat one time in one position, at another time in another. Not that I desire to convey the impression that I was all the time looking to the front, but that at proper intervals of time I could see all that was desirable to see. Question. What was the distance from the fourteen-gun battery to the crater? Answer. I should say 600 or 650 yards. I wish to state that whilst at my head- ~1uarters, in order to get a look at what was goiag on on certain portions of the front, we placed ourselves upon the magazine of the fort, or upon the high ground just in rear of the fort, or upon the high ground just to the right and left of the fort. I was, however, frequently, to a considerable extent, in advance of the fort, as was the case when General Warren and myself made our reconnaissance; and I also visited a commanding position on the opposite side of General Potters covered way during the engagement, from which other parts of the line could be seen. The fort I refer to is the fourteen-gun battery, which is established ininiediately in rear of the old brick wall and chimneys, and is essentially on our main line, say fifty yards to the rear. The advance line is about 115 yards from the crater, the main line is about 400 yards from that, and then the battery is a short distance, say fifty yards, in rear of the main line. But the position from which the most of the movements could be seen was in advance of the main line, between the two lines. Question. What preparatious were made for the passage of the at- tacking columns from the breast.works as directed by General Meades order? Answer. All the preparations were directed to be made that were possible, such as removing abatis and so forth, as directed by General Meades order; but it was Rot expected by any one that any considerable success could attend any work of that kind without serious loss to the command and discovery on the part of the enemy. The abatis in front, which was the only serious obstruction, was very much cut up by the enemys fire, and did not present as serious an ol~stacle to the moxi Page 69 ThE I~JCHMOND CAMPAIGN. CHAP. LIT.] 439 ment of troops as it would be supposed by a person hearing that the abatis still re- mained in front of the line. I have never ascertained from any one that the troops were at all obstructed in passing over, and I am, therefore, free to say I made no special inquiry upon that subject. If I remember right, it is the first time it has oc- curred to me since the reading of General Meades order, but I do remember that not much was expected to be done, in view of our close proximity to the enemy. This refers to the front over which the troops had to pass. I will state definitely that there was no ex~pectation on my part that that portion of the order could be carried out without discovery and without very great harm to the troops that would have to prepare this work, and in my order I place no clause of that nature, but it was dis- tinctly understood that the troops were to be provided with pioneer tools and other means of clearing away such obstru.ctions as might be in the way, understood be- tween myself and the division commanders. Question. Did you intend that the obstructions should not be re- moved until the pioneers advanced with the columns, or did you inteiid that they were to be removed by the division commanders the night before, and what division commanders were charged with the execu- tion of that order0? Answer. I did not intend any of my division commanders to do any work in the way of removing obstmictions on that night, because I did not expect that they could do it, and besides, I was ordered to be relieved on the line by General Ords troops, and to concentrate my troops for the assault; but I will state again that there was an understanding between the division commanders and myself, that anything that could be done in that direction would be done. I did not expect them to do any- thing; there was no order to that effect from me unless it was contained in my verbal orders to the division commanders. Myremarks now apply to work on the advance line, where I did not suppose that any work could be done without discovery by the enemy, in consequence of its close proximity to the enemys line to the front of the main line. There were covered Potters front. ways cut both to General Wilicoxs and to General Question. What time elapsed from the springing of themine to the for- ward movement of the assaulting columns, and how long was it befZre tliQ crater was reached by the storming party? Answer. At the risk of involving the same difference in time as in similar matters I will state that it was about five minutes until the advance column moved forward, and say tenminutes before the leading column reached the crater. This delay occurred in consequence of the hesitation which has been already alluded to in my evidence, but not personally known to me. And it is not impossible that I may be mistaken as to the time. There was only one column started to move to the crater, because the divisions were ordered to go in succession, the first division, General Ledlie com- manding, leading, in consequence of the probability that a breach would not be made sufficiently broad in the enemys line to admit more than one column, my intention up to the day of the attack being to make the assault by my plan, which you have before you. Question. To what did you attribute the halting of the troops in the crater, instead of proceeding to the crest immediately as by the order ~ Answer. To the breaking up of the column in consequence of the inequality of the ground and to the continual habit of the men for the last thirty or forty days of pro- tecting themselves by almost every obstruction they came in contact with. Question. In what order and tactical formation were your divisions ordered to go in? Answer. I ordered the division commanders to use their discretion in carrying their divisions in, giving them my general views on the subject, my general directions being to carry them in if possible in column by reginients, but the regiments being so un- equal, some being not more than 100 strong and some 600 or 700, it was thought best for them to go in in such formation as to be able to deploy rapidly in two lines as soon as they gained the crestGeneral Ledlie taking the center, General Potter taking the line perpendicular to the main line of works,~. and General Willeox the line parallel to the Jerusalem plank road. Question. Were these movements of the divisions successive or simultaneous? Answer. They were successive Page 70 io OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C~ [CHAP. LII. Question. What was the interval between them? Answer. General Ledlie was to move first; General Wilicox was to follow General Ledlie as soon as possible after General Ledlie had cleared the breach; then General Potter was to follow General Willcox. As soon as I ascertained that General Ledlie had made a halt I sent orders at once to General Willcox and to General Potter to proceed withont reference to General Ledlie in the order in which they had been directed~to move. I ordered them to go in at once without reference to going through the breach, and proceed at once as before directed, without reference to General Ledlie; thinking that if they could find room to get through to the right and left and could move forward, it would enable General Ledlie also to move forward with hi~ troops. And finally General Ferrero was moved upon the last order from General Meade to put in my whole force. I think that the troops were moved forward as rapidly as they could be moved forward under the circumstances and I know that they did not pass by the flanks of, General Ledlie to go to the crest, but it was in consequence of obstacles produced by the firing of the enemy and the rough ground in the crater of the enemys works. But they did go to the right and left, driving away a considerable portion of the enemy from those lines and made several distinct attempts to charge to the front. My own opinion is that the principal obstacle was the presence of the enemy to our right and left, which enabled them, the moment our troops attempted to advance to the top of the crest, to give them a fire in the rear. Question. For what distance on each side of the crater were the enemys works abandoned immediately after the explosion of the mine? Answer. I should say 150 yards or more on each side. Question. To your own personal knowledge, did any of your troops get beyond the crater, and how far toward the crest? Answer. As far as I could see there were lines formed beyond the crater and at- tempts made to charge, but the lines were repulsed, but to say how far I would not be willing to express an opinion. Qpestion. Can you tell how far it was from the crater to the crest? Answer. From the crater to the crest I should say was 500 yards. Question. How long did your troops remain in the crater before the order was given to retire? Answer. The order was given to retire, I think, about 9.30. When the order was given to retire I went to General Meade~s headquarters, consulted with hini, ascer- tained that it was final, and decided that our best method of retiring was to hold the crater until dark and then retire by trenches. (The question was repeated and the witness requested to give a more specific answer.) Question. How long did your troops remain in the crater before the order was given to retire? Answer. They remained there until about 2 oclock. I think the order reached them about 11.40. They remained there about four hours befire the order was given to me to retire. Question. Did Generals Willeoxs and Potters divisions attack the crest, or did they proceed perpendicularly along the enemys iuitrench- inents to the right and to the left? Answer. The principal part of their movements was in that directiofi, with all possible dimictions to Ino\e to the front as fast as possible. Question. Had you authority to put in the supports of other corps, or had any one else who was present and could see what was going on? Answer. Although I can designate no order upon which I had a right to put in supports, yet I am satisfied that any support which I called upon General Ord for would have been given to me; and it is almost impossible that there was such an order. At all events, he expressed every willingness to give me all the support pos- sible, no matter what the movements of his troops were, and consulted freely with me, and asked me at what points I thought he ought to. put his corps in. I told hi Page 71 1~0 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C~ [CHAP. TAI. Question. What was the interval between them ~ Answer. General Ledlie was to move first; General Wilicox was to follow General Ledlie as soon as possible after General Ledlie had cleared the breach; then General Potter was to follow General Willeox. As soon as I ascertained that General Ledlie had made a halt I sent orders at once to General Willeox and to General Potter to proceed without reference to General Ledlie in the order in which they had been directed to move. I ordered them to go in at once without reference to going through the breach, and proceed at once as before directed, without reference to General Ledlie; thinking that if they could find room to get through to the right and left and could move forward, it would enable General Ledlie also to move forward with hi~ troops. And finally General Ferrero was moved upon the last order from General Meade to put in my whole force. I think that the troops were moved forward as rapidly as they could be moved forward under the circumstances and I know that they did not pass by the flanks of~ General Ledlie to go to the crest, but it was in consequence of obstacles produced by the firing of the enemy and the rough ground in the crater of the enemys works. But they did go to the right and left, driving away a considerable portion of the enemy from those lines and made several distinct attempts to charge to the front. My own opinion is that the principal obstacle was the presence of the enemy to our right and left, which enabled them, the moment our troops attempted to advance to the top of the crest, to give them a fire in the rear. Question. For what distance on each side of the crater were the enemys works abandoned immediately after the explosion of the mine ~ Answer. I should say 150 yards or more on each side. Question. To your own personal knowledge, did any of your troops get beyond the crater, and how far toward the crest~ Answer. As far as I could see there were lines formed beyond the crater and at- tempts made to charge, but the lines were repulsed, but to say how far I would not be willing to express an opinion. Qpestion. Can you tell how far it was from the crater to the crest ~ Answer. From the crater to the crest I should say was 500 yards. Question. How long did your troops remain in the crater before the order was given to retire ~ Answer. The order was given to retire, I think, about 9.30. When the order was given to retire I went to General Meades headquarters, consulted with hini, ascer- tained that it was final1 and decided that our best method of retiring was to hold the crater until dark and then retire by trenches. (The question was repeated and the witness requested to give a more specific answer.) Question. How long did your troops remain in the crater before the order was given to retire ~ Answer. They remained there until about 2 oclock. I think the order reached them about 11.40. They remained there about four hours before the order was given to me to retire. Question. Did Generals Wilicoxs and Potters divisions attack the crest, or did they proceed perpendicularly along the enemys iuitrench- ments to the right and to the left ~ Answer. The principal part of their movements was in that directiofi, with all possible dirlctions to move to the front as fast as possible. Question. Had you authority to put in the snpports of other corps, or had aiiy one else who was present and could see what was going on Answer. Although I can designate no order upon which I had a right to put in supports, yet I am satisfied that any support which I called upon General Ord for would have been giv~in to me; and it is almost impossible that there was such an order. At all events, he expressed every willingness to give me all the support p05- sible, no matter what the movements of his troops were, and consulted freely with me, and asked me at what points I thought he ought to. put his CO~I)5 in. I told hin Page 72 CHAP. LIT.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 71 I thought it could move off to our right and make a very considerable diversion in our favor, or something to that effect; and he told me he had issued an order to that effect. He spoke of the ground being brokeitin that direction, and wanted to know if I thought he could go over my lines of works. I told him I thought he could; that it is the same ground that Generals Willeox and Potter fought over on the 18th, and that a portion of his column could move forward in that direction, the balance moving down the covered way. Question.~ Were you the senior officer present, and did you regard yourself responsible for putting in at the proper time the troops des- ignated as supports in orders? Answer. I was the senior officer present, in front of my own corps, but I never dreamed of having any authority whatever to order in the troops of any other corps. I might have had authority to call upon other troops, but I had no authority to order any in that I know of. Question. You dont consider yourself responsible for anything fur- ther than your own corps? Answer. No, sir; except as to make such suggestions as I thought were proper. I did not think that I had any general command that day. In fact, I had no authority to order in any other troops than my own corps, General Meade having specially re- served that right to himself in the correspondence before you. The Court then adjourned to meet at 10 a. m. on the 12th instant. SIXTH DAY. COuRT-RooM, II~ADQUARTERS SECOND Coiw~, Au~u8t 12, 1864. The Court met pursuant to adjournment. Present, Major-General Hancock, Brigadier-Generals Ayres and Miles, and Colonel Schriver, judge-advocate. The proceedings of the fifth day were read and approved. The testimony of Major-General BURNSIDE was resumcd. GENERAL EURNSIDES TESTIMONYCONTINUED. Questions by the JUDGE-ADVOCATE: Question. What brigade commanders were in and about the crater near the enemys line? Answer. All the brigade commanders of the corps, I think. Question. What division commanders? Answer. I do not know positively that any division commander was in the crater, unless, possibly, General Potter. Their headquarters were upon the advance line, something over 100 yards from the crater. Question. Please describe the covered ways through which the troops passed from the rear up to your line; how long they were and their direction with reference to your line of works? Answer. Both the covered ways were, in general direction, perpendicular to the advance line, particularly just before approaching it. There were advantages taken of the depression of the ground in rear that made certain portions of them at angles to the line, some obtuse and some acute. The covered ways were built so as to en- able columns to move under comparatively good shelter entirely up to our advance line, or in other words, to the low ground just in rear of our advance line, and were capable of allowing regiments to pass by twos if not by fours. The commencement of all the covered ways was in the depressed ground in rear of the main line, or, in other words, in the rear of the fourteen-gun battery, and I should think that they would average, including the zigzags, 1,000 yards. Question. In what formation did the colored troops move to the as- sault Page 73 t 72 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. LII Answer. The colored troops moved from their position in rear of our advance line by flank up to the position we had carried in the e deavored to move in line to the front. nemys line, and from there en- Question. Could General Ords troops get into action at any other point than at the crater~ Answer I received positive information from General Potter that his troops were not in the way, and that General Ord could have moved to the right; and I distinctly nnderstood from General Ord that he had given orders for his troops to move to the right of the ground that we occupied. As to how many obstacles they would have met in that movement I am not here prepared to say. I am satisfied of one thing, that General Ord dave the necessary orders for an advance in that direction. As to the efforts that were made I am ~ot personally cognizant. General Potter, who held the right of our line, is a more intelligent witness upon that point than I am. Question. IDid any officer report to you that his troops could not be got forward? Answer. No, sir; I received a report from Colonel Loring, which General Meade opened, stating to me that there was either great difficulty in getting the troops to move from that crater, or something to that effect. That paper is lost as far as I can find. I have ordered it to be looked for. But Colonel Loring was not a com- mander of troops; he was an aide-de-camp of mine. But no commander of troops reported to me that his troops could not be brought forward. Question. Please to state what were the obstaclesabatis or other obstaclesin front of the enerny~s line iu the neighborhood of the crater~ were they a serious opposition to the passage of troops? Answer. On the right and left of the crater beyond the parts that had been af- fected by the explosion there were both abatis and chevaux-de-frise, principally the latter, constructed by placing rails in the parapet, sharpening the points, and I sup- pose tying them back or putting in sticks to hold them in their positions, but of that I cannot say, because I was not close enough to deter~nine that fact. Consid- erable abatis was in one portion of the line lying upon these rails, which the enemy had not been able to place, in consequence of the constant fire from our troops in the front line. I do not think the obstacle was remarkably formidable, but it was a sufficient obstacle to stop the progress of troops. There would have been a neces- sity for their removal by pioneers before troops could have passed over. Question. How much of the enemys breast-works were blown up by the springing of the mine; how much of the abatis destroyed? Answer. The report of Colonel Pleasants will be before you, and he will give you that exactly. I should place it at from 145 to 150 feet, say 150 feet. There was not as much of their line disturbed as I expected. I supposed that for a considerable distance on the right and left of the line the earth would have been so much dis- turbed as to cause chevaux-de-frise to fall from the parapet. Question. Was the ground around the crater commanded by the ground held by the enemy? Answer. Yes, sir; to a very great extent. Question. What was your opinion at the time of the force of the enemy resisting your advance on the 30th of July? Answer. From data received by me, and especially from a dispatch received very soon before the order to withdraw came, I judged there was about a division and a halfcertainly not to exceed two divisions. This force consisted of troops that were in the line when the mine was exploded and troops that were moved from the enemys right. No troops were reported to me as having moved from the enemys left. There was a signal station in front of my line, from which I think any im- portant movement of troops from the enemys left could have been discovered. rhey certainly could not have approached our line from the enemys left without beingobserved. I received a dispatch from my signal officer, Captain Paine, stating that the enemys right was very much weakened. This was not communicated to me direct, inasmuch as I had left my headquarters to visit General Potters, and it did not reach me in time to eommunicate the substance of it to General Meade before the orders to withdraw came Page 74 OPERATIONS IN ~E. VA. AND N. C. 74 [CHAP. LII. Answer. That question is entirely answered by the answer to the question pre- viously put, but I will reiterate it. General Hartranft,unexpeetedly to me and to the division commanders, made a move with his brigade in consequence of the receipt of the dispatch to which I have referred, and the word was passed along the line to retire, upon which all the troops came back to our lines that could get back. Question. Where were the division commanders while the troops were in the crater? Answer. The division commanders were at their headquarters on our old advance line, say 115 yards from the crater, moving at intervals from one point to another at that line until it was decided that th~ order to withdraw was final, when I sent for the division commander to come to my headquarters to arrange for the with- drawal; soon after which I sent General Ferrero to make arrangements fc~r digging trenches. In fact, preparations had already been made for that purpose before the division commanders came to my headquarters. Before this work could be done the troops were driven from the crater in the manner in which I have designated. By the COURT: Question. How did all your troops cross from the advance line of works to the assault, by the flank or in line? Answer. Generals Ledlie and Willeox crossed in line, Generals Potter an4 Ferrero hy flank. Question. Could the troops of the different divisions have been formed the night previous to the assault in lines parallel to the advance line and near it? Answer. They were formed in that position as nearly as possible, all of the ad- vanced division being formed exactly in that way. Question. Was the mine placed under charge of the engineer depart- ment of the Army of the Potomac? Answer. No, sir; it was not. In fact, two of the young engineers who reported for duty at my headquarters stated expressly that they were instructed that they had nothing to do with the mine. Question. Were there working parties detailed to follow the assault- ing troops, carrying tools, gabions, and so forth, to crowii the crest when gained? Answer. Yes, sir; there was an engineer regiment detailed to follow each division of white troops, with all the necessary tools, and all necessary preparations were made for pioneers in the division of colored troops. There were no instructions to carry gabions, but all these engineer regiments were fully equipped with necessary tools for intrenchin~ if we had been successful in crowning the crest. Question. Why did not the division commanders go to the front, par- ticularly.when the troops ceased to advance? Answer. I do not know. Question. ~Tas General Hartranft in command in the crater? Answer. He was not in command in the crater. Question. Had you been permitted to put your corps into action according to your-own viewsthat is, the colored division in advance do you think the result would have been different? Answer. For reasons already given, and given hefore the fight, and from ohserva- tions on that day, I am forced to helieve that the Fourth Division (the colored divis- ion) would have made a more impetuous and successful assault than the leading division. The receipt of orders requiring the presence elsewhere of two mem- bers of the Court caused its adjournment until it should be reconvened by the President or sQme other proper authority Page 75 CHAP. LIII THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 75 SEVENTH DAY. HEADQUARTERS SECOND CORPS, Jones House, August 29, 1864. The Court met pursnant to the orders from the President at 10 a. m. Preseit, Major-General Hancock, Brigadier-Generals Ayres and Miles, and ADolonel Seliriver, judge-advocate. The proceedings of the sixth day were read and approved. The judge-advocate submitted a letter which he received from Majoy. Geueral Burnside respecting his testimony, as follows: COLEMANS EUTAW HOUSE, Baltimore, Augu8t 15, 1864. Colonel SCURIVEE, Inspector-General, Army of the Potomac, Judge-Advocate, 4-c.: COLONEL: You will remember that in answering the last question put to me, as to the reason none of my division commanders went into the crater, I made some explana- tion after saying I dont know; but it was finally decided to let the answer be I dont know. Lest it may be understood to be a rnrnsure upon those officers, I beg to add to the answer the following: I think General Potter was in the crater, and I am satisfied that the others felt they were in the best position to command, ex- cept General Ledlie, who, I understand, was sick. The Court can determine. Please lay this before the Court, and believe me, Yours, very truly, A. E. BURNSIDE, Major- General. These officers, with the exception of General Ledlie, have served with me long and gallantly, and I do not desire to do aught to injure their well-earned reputation. TESTIMONY OF MAJ. J. C. DUANE. Maj. J. C. DUANE, Engineer Corps, sworn, says: Qnestions by the JUDGE-ADVOCATE: Question. Were you present at the assault of the 30th of Jnly, and in what capacity did you serve~ Answer. I was on the Fifth Corps front, assisting in directing the artillery fire. Question. Can you produce maps showing the lines then occupied by the armies~ Answer. Yes, sir; I here produce two maps showing the general positions of the armies and the position of the Ninth Corps in detail. (These maps ~re marked INos. 65 and 66 Appendix.) Question. What in your opinion were some of the canses of failure on that occasion~ Answer. One cause was that the troops, instead of moving up by division front, (column of division), moved up by the flank. Another was that they stopped in the crater instead of pushing immediately forward. The points between which they could have taken on the ridge are the points on the map between Clarks house and Cemetery Hill. Those being taken, Petersburg was in our possession. I have no doubt the enemy had guns in that position, but I do not know that he had any works. If there were any works there they were screened by the trees. No guns were opened immediately after the assault. The distance from the crater to the crest is about 500 yards. Question. Could the troops have gone forward by division front~ Answer. I think they could if proper working parties had been sent to remove the abatis. Question. Were there any working parties with them ~ - Answer. I do not know. I was directed not to interfere with General Burnside in his operations. I had no control over the operations in that part of the line Page 76 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. 76 (CuAP. LII. Question. Were there engineer officers to lead or direct the assaulting columns? Answer. Lieutenant Benyaurd, of the Engineers, was on duty on that front, and was available in case the general commanding that corps wished to make use of an engineer. Captain Farquhar was also on duty with th~ Eighteenth Corps, and was present, but not under my orders. Question. What arrangements were made forfacilitating the d6bouch6 of the troops from our lines and passage over the enemys parapets? Answer. I do not know. Question. Were the obstructions at the enemys line formidableof what did they consist? Answer. They consisted of a strong rifle-pit with a good abatis in front. Such obstructions are formidable in case there are troops behind the parapets to defend them. In this instance there did not appear to be sufficient force behind the parapet to prevent those works being carried. Question. How was our artillery fire as to effectiveness on that occa- sion? Answer. It completely silenced the batteries of the enemy that were in position ~znd had been in position previous to this day on the Fifth Corps front. I had nothing to do with the right, which was on the Eighteenth Corps line. Question. In your opinion was the point of attack a judicious one? Answer. I did not consider it so, although there was a chance of success. The point of attack was on a re-entrant on the line, which exposed an attacking column to a fire on both flanks and front. Question. Did you at any time make that known to the authorities? Answer. I did, two or three days previous to the attack. Question. In written or verbal communications? Answer. I had frequently made it known verballytwo days previous to the at- tack, in writingto the general commanding the Army of the Potomac. Question. Can you produce that report? Answer. I can; and I will hand it to the judge-advocate. (It is marked 67.) Question. What is your opinion of the mine as a means of assault? Answer. It is a very unusual way of attacking field fortifications. I do not think that there was any reasonable chance of success by such an attack. Question. Had the engineer department anything to do with it? Answer. It had not. Question. Please to state what advantage would have resulted from holding the crater, simply. Answer. No advantage. By the COURT: Question. Did you see this explosion and assault? Answer. I saw the explosion. I did not see the assault distinctly; I was too far to the left. Question. You could not see how far to the right or left the enemys parapet was abandoned, from any fire that came from it? Answer. No, sir. Question. What artillery of the enemy did you see open and play upon that assaulting column within the first fifteen minutes after the explosion Page 77 77 CHAP. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. Answer. I did not see any. They opened on our batteries, but I did not see them open on the column. I did not see them open on the column, and do not think they did. They opened with 30-pounders on us. Question. Although you did not think the mine, as a means of as- sault, promised much success, do you believe, from the circumstances that transpired, it would have been a success had the troops gone to the top of the crest? Answer. I believe it would. Question. Do you believe that there was any difficulty in the way of the troops going to the crest during the first fifteen minutes? Answer. I do not think there was the slightest difficulty. Question. Do you think that immediately after the explosion, had there been proper working parties at work, the parapet of the enemy could have been cleared of sufficient of the obstructions and abatis within the first fifteen minutes to have allowed a brigade front to have passed over? Answer. Yes; I think there could. Question. There was no other difficulty in crawling over the parapet except the fire? Answer. No, sir; and the abatis was a loose abatis of limbs pitched over the para- pet. In some places it was a rail abatisrails inclined forward. Question. What should the storming party have done when they reached the crest had they reached it; what should have been rheir first operationto have proceeded to Petersburg or intrenched themselves? Answer. I think they should have intrenched on the crest. I do not think they could have staid in Petersburg, as it was commanded. Question. Had you ever been called upon for any gabions or any material for making a parapet upon the enemys intrenchments? Answer. No. sir. Question. Were any gabions prepared in this army except by the engineer department for those works? Answer. None. Question. Nor any other material of that kind, fascines and so-forth, to assist in making a parapet? Answer. No. TESTIMONY OF GENERAL AYRES. Brig. Gen. R. B. AYRES, U. S. Volunteers, sworn. By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE: Question. General, were you present at the assault on the 30th of July, and had you facilities for seeing the progress of affairs on that day? Answer. My division Was a part of the command of the Fifth Corps, massed uponthe right of the Fifth Corps, and upon the left of the Ninth Corps in the railroad cut, for purposes indicated in the order of assault. I was directed by General Warren to make my headquarters with his at the five-gun battery in the corner of the woods in front of the Avery house. I was in that position when the mine was sprung and the assaulting columns went forward. The general directions of those columns, as they marched forward, were visible from this position. As the troops filed out we could see them distinctly. After quite a large force filed out there, they seemed to have formed a line of battle at one time along in or near the enemys rifle-pits adjacent to the mine. Abody of troops also filedbehind thatlineto the left a~ welookedat tJ~em appa Page 78 78 OPERATIONS IN SE. YA, AND N. C. [CHAP. LIE. ently to march around the line and advance to the crest,which was the object tob~gained Cemetery Hill. Afteratimelsaw those troops go back againtoward the right, coming in still behind that line of battle standing. Directly after this I was requested by Gen- eral Warren to ride to the fifteen-gun battery to see what chance offered me to put my division in on the left of the troops still standing as I described. I went there, made an examination, turned to General Warren and stated to him that as the froops were massed in our old line in rear of the mine in great crowds it would be very difficult to march my division through there unless they made a way for me, but if a way was made I could march my division by the flank, face it to the left, sweep down to the left, carry a certain battery there was firing across, and clean out the rifle- pits they occupied. General Warren rode with me a second time there, immediately after this; first my division was ordered to be closed up as soon as possible to be in readiness; then we rode together to the fifteen-gun battery. As we crossed the field between this five-gun battery and the fifteen-gun battery I saw the negro troops com- ing back to the rearlike a sandslide. By the time we got to the corner of the fifteen-gun battery numbers of them were sweeping through that, sweeping around from different quarters, some one side and some another, some into the covered ways, and some into the field between. A close observation assured me that that line of battle which I first described was replaced by the enemy in the rifle-pits on the right of the mine; I saw their battle-flags, and their bullets fell around us. Some one then proposed that General Warren should immediately put in the Fifth Corps at that moment; Gen- eral Warren and myself concluded that the time was passed; they had lost what they had excepting those men who were left in the crater; and immediately after that we rode to our position at the five-gun battery, and I received notice that the movement was suspended, and a few moments after orders to send my division to its camp. Question. Please to relate some of the chief causes of failure on that occasion ~ Answer. Firstly, those troops that went to make their attack seemed to be going out simply by the right flank from two covered ways; therefore the heads of regi- ments arrived at the crater in that condition, when there should have been a line of battle arriving there. These men rushed into the crater, and a considerable amount of time was lost in endeavoring to get troops in some formation to advance properly in line of battle. Arrangements should have been made that when that mine was sprung the troops which were to make the assault to carry the crest, which looked down upon the city, should advanc~ in line of battle, so that they would have been in hand and subject to the command of their officers. That, in my judgment, was the principal cause of the failure. The commencement of the assault, in myjudg- ment, was the cause of its entire failure. If those dispositions had been made, aiid those troops had advanced in line of battle instead of in columns of regiments, I be- lieve they would have taken that crest. There wa.s a great deal of work which should have been done aloiig our old line nearest to the crater, and to the south of the line of the gallery, so that troops could have readily marched forward at least in two regiments abreast. That being done, and those troops advanced as I described, I believe they would have taken that crest readily, and I believe that then the supports would have been thrown in promptly, that crest would have been held, and success would have crowned the operation. After it was clear that the thing had failed I thiiik that prompt orders should have been given to withdraw, in one rapid move- ment, all the troops left in the crater, to bring them out in one body rapidly, back to their lines. TESTIMONY OF MAJOR-GENERAL WARREN. Maj. Gen. 0-. K. WARREN, U. S. Volunteers, sworn, says: By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE: Question. General, were you present at the assault on the 30th of July, the day the mine was sprung, near this place, arid, if so, in what capacity~ Answer. I was there in command of the Fifth Corps. Question. Will you please to state what in your opinion were some of the chief causes of that failure ~ Answer. To mention them all at once, I never saw sufficient good reasons why it should succeed. Inever had confidence in its success. The position was taken in reverse by batteries, and we must, as a matter of course, have expected a heavy fire of artillery when we gained the crest, though we did not get near enough to develop what that would be. I never should have planned it, I think Page 79 CHAP. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 79 Question. As it was planned, had you an opportunity of seeing whether the plan was carried out in the best manner, the plan having been adopted? Answer. I can mention some faults. There was great defect, I think, in the prep- aration for the movement of the assaulting column; I judge so from the way the col- umn moved, as I did not visit the exact point. And, second, I think the first force, instead of moving straight on to the hill, should have cleared the intrenchments rigbt and left of the crater, so as not to have exposed the advancing column to a flank fire. I tried to make a similar assault there on the 18th of June, and that very same battery that operated on the left flank of Burusides force that day was in op- eration on the previous occasion, and stopped all my efforts. Question. Could you mention that battery particularly by showing it on the map, or designating it in some way? Answer. It is the first battery on the south side of the mine. Question. Was our artillery fire effective on that occasion? Answer. As much so as it could be. I heard Colonel Abbot complain that a group of trees in front of one of his large batteries was left standing, and it was his desire to have it cleared away. Question. Did he say whose business it was to clear it away 0? Did he find fault with any one? In whose front was it~ Answer. In General Burusides front. I remember he said General Burnside had told him that he was afraid clearing it away might disclose his intention, but I do not think that he said whose fault it was that it was not done, or whether it was a fault, except in interfering with his batteries. By the ComuT: Question. Aside from any general principle with reference to the mat- ter upon which you predicated the chances of snccess, do you think that after the mine exploded there really was a chance of success? Answer. There are so many ifs in it. If we could have carried that first line of rifle-pits, and then maintained ourselves after we got to the crest, we would have had success; but I do not believe any troops will stand on an open plain, with artillery covered by redoubts playing upon them, and I think that is what the enemy bad then, or ought to have had, if they did not. If they have been there all this time without that preparation they are much more unprepared than I think they are. Question. Did they open much artillery fire for the first fifteen min- utes or half hour after the explosion? Answer. I should say not a great dealnot where I was; only a very little. There was no particular danger in my vicinity for a group of horsemen standing right out in plain sight, as we did all the time. Their batteries were mainly placed for enfi- lading any line attacking, and probably reserved their fire until that line ap- proached. Question. Aside from that operation of the Ninth Corps, if the Fifth Corps, supported by another, could have been thrown round on the en- emys right, occupying those two railroads and turning his right, what was the chance of success in that direction? Answer. It would be impossible for me to say. I do not know what the nature of their defenses were in that direction. I believe from what I have heard that the very brigade Which repulsed General Burnside was located there in the morning, and my corps at that time had no force in reserve except General Ayres division, and a brigade of General Crawfords, and a brigade of General Cutlers. Question. Was there any force of the enemy there strong enough to resist the number of troops we had disposable; had they been put in properly after the first ~issault had failed? Answer. I can answer that question and cover a little more: When we at- tacked in the first operation on Petersburg, we l~ad n4ore foroe than or~ this occasio Page 80 80 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. 0. [CHAP. LIt and the enemy had about the same, I think, and I dont believe that the blowing up of the mine made up for the difference in the increased strength of the earth- works as they were on the 18th of June and the 30th of July; and if the operation of the 18th of June decided anything I think it decided that the operation of the 30th of July would have met with the same result. Que~tion. Did you feel the want of any person on the field who could see for himself and give commands on the spot; had that any effect upon the result; or do you think that any person ought to have been present who should have had command of the storming party, and all the troops ready to take part in the operation ~ Answer. I think some one should have been present to have directed my command as well as General Burnsides and General Ords, some one person; but whether that would have affected the result or not I am not prepared to say. Question. Did you experience any uncertainties and doubts for the want of such a persons presence there ~ Answer. Yes. Question. Were there moments when such a persons presence was necessary in order to decide at once what should be done ~ Answer. I think it was necessary that some one should have been there. If you have my official report it will show you that I was in doubt whether to move to the left or move to the right to help General Burnside, and that I had to await the transmission of dispatches and corresponding answers. My report shows how much, but I do not know that that would have affected the main result at all. My report is a complete answer to your question. Sometimes in these badly planned or badly inaugurated assaults the longer and better they are pressed the worse we are off, great losses being sustained after the time and chance of success are gone. The Court adjourned to meet at 10 a. m. on 30th of July [August]. EIGHTH DAY. HEADQUARTERS SECOND CORPS Jones House, August 30, 1864. The Court met pursuant to adjournment. Present, Major-General Hancock, Brigadier-Generals Ayres and Miles, and Colonel Schriver, judge-advocate. The proceedings of the seventh day were read and approved. TESTIMONY OF GENERAL WARRENCONTINUED. By General MEADE: Question. What did you mean by saying some one should have been present to have directed my command together with the commands of Generals Ord and ~ ~ Were you not aware that the command- ing general of the Army of the Potomac was in the field and in tele- graphic communication with yourself and the other officers alluded to ~ Answer. I saw from my position, which was, I suppose, about 400 yards from Gen- eral Burusides, as well as could be seen in the morning in the smoke, that the as- sault was not going on very rapidly and that no effort had been made to do what I thought wasthe first essentialto take that battery on the left of the mine. I then went to General Burusides, which was as close to the scene of operations as a man could be and see well. There I found Generals Burnside and Ord engaged in con- versation. I suggested to General Burnside that that battery should be taken at once; he asked me to go down the line and take a look at it from another point, and I did so. Upon returning I said I was confirmed in my first opinion, and he asked me if my troops could not take it. At that time all the approaches leading down to where the mine was were filled with his troops still slowly moving down and there was no chance for me t~ get at the battery, except to go over the open field. I, how- ever, determined to put in General Ayres division at once and try to take it, and went back for that purpose, when I got t~ ~iispatch from General Mead~ ~the c Page 81 CnAP. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 81 act language of which I do not remember), to the effect that I would await informa- tion from some operations which had been directed or that were going on on the left; and then it was that I wrote one of the dispatches, in which I said that I thought some one shonid be there to direct whether I shonid attempt to take that battery, or go with lily division ronnd to the left, as General Crawford reported that he was unable to do anything with what force he had there on the plank road. I will qnalify what I said about the loss of time. I lost considerable time talking to General Bnrn- side; I lost some time in going to see the battery with him; I lost some time in writ- ing dispatches and awaiting answers; and in an operation of that kind every moment was of vital importance, for, before I got the order to go in and take the battery the enemy had driven nearly all of General Burnsides line ont of the intrenchments he had taken. If General Bnrnside had given me any orders, as I was there for the pnr- pose of snpporting him, I wonld have obeyed them; bnt he seemed to act as if what we did was to be done after consultation, and therefore I thought that some one should ha,ve been right there to have directed at once, without a moments loss of time, what should be done and what should not. Those dispatches show the extent of the loss of time. But, as I said in ray testimony yesterday, I do not know that it affected the result at all. But in reply to the direct question, if I thought there should have been some one there to give promptly positive orders what to do,~ gave my first answer. Question. How much time was occupied in these consultations, re- connaissances, and other matters referred to by you, and would not the commanding general, had he been at the point referred to by you, have been compelled to consume the same time ~ Answer. I do not remember how much time was lost, and cannot tell exactly unless I can have my official report or a copy of it, or some records of that kind, to refer to. But it was a point of observation at which I should have consulted with nobody. Everything was plainly to be seen. Different persons might look at it differently, but it was a position where any one man could see the whole. In my opinion, the most important time was lost before I went to that point. Question. Why did you consume the time which you acknowledge to have been lost, and why did you not at once telegraph the commanding general about what you saw and what you thought could or should be done~ Answer. The time that I speak of was consumed by General Buruside. In my in- structions I was directed to support him; and I informed him where my headqnarters were, as stated, not far from his. I waited there for his directions. I thought that my being with him, under orders to support him, the time lost was lost by him and not by me. I did keep the commanding general as promptly informed of everything as I possibly could. Even if I had chosen to have acted independently, aceording to my own discretion, subject to the approval of the commanding gencral,.all the ap- proaches to the point were occupied by General Burusides troops. I could not have moved mine without getting them mixed up with his. By the COURT: Question. Did you not mean in your previous answers that it was your belief that if the commanding general had been on that field there would have been a pressure brought to bear to push those troops of the Ninth Corps that occupied those trenches forward faster than they wend Answer. I think that the controlling power should have been there and nowhere else, so that there should have been no reference to anywhere else. Questi~n. When you replied to the last question put to you yesterday did you consider that the commander of the Army of the Potomac should have been present in person, or that some one should have been invested with the command of all the troops engaged in the assault as supports, reserves, & c., if said commander was not there ~ Answer. I meant that some one person having general command should have been there to have seen and directed all at once. 6 U UVOL XL, PT Page 82 82 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHXP. LII. TESTIMONY OF LIEIIT. GEK. IT. S. GRANT. Lient. Gen. U. S. GRANT, U. S. Army, being sworn and examined by the JITDGE-ADVOCATE, says: Que~tion. Will you please to state what in your judgment caused the failure of the attack on the enemys lines on the 30th of July~ Answer. It seemed to me that it was perfectly practicable for the men, if they had been properly led, to have gone straight through the breach which was caused by the explosion of the mine, and to have gone to the -top of Cemetery lull. It looked to me, from what I could see and hear, that it was perfectly practicable to have taken the men through; but whether it was because the men themselves would not go, or whether it was because they were not led, I was not far enough to the front to be qualified to say. Question. What orders which you issued were not executed, if any ~ Answer. I could send you copies of all the dispatches that I wrote. The orders for the assault were issued by General Meade in obedience to general instructions from me. I saw the detailed order of General Meade before the mine was exploded, and I thought that the execution of that order was practicable. That order I pre- sume you have before you. My order was to General Meade, and then General Meade made his order from what I directed him to do, and sent me a copy of it, and I thought It was all that could be required. I recollect that, failing on the north bank of the river to surprise the enemy as we expected or hoped to do, but instead of that drew a large part of his force to the north side, I telegraphed to General Meade that we would now take advantage of the absence of that force of the enemy to explode the mine and make an assault on Petersburg. By the COURT: Question. From your information how many of the enemy were in Petersburg at the time of this assault~ Answer. My information was that three divisions were left in Petersburg, with one brigade absent from those divisionsJohnsons. From the best evidence none of the enemys troops crossed the James River until 2 oclock of the 30th of July, on their way back. Then they had fully sixteen miles to travel to get back, with, how- ever, the advantage of a railroad near them to carry many of the men. The distance I guess at when I say sixteen miles. - TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT-COLONEL CONSTOCK, AIDE-DE-CAMP. Lieut. Col. C. B. (JoMS~TOCK, aide-de-camp, being duly sworn and ex- aminedby the JIJDGE-ADVOCATE, says: Question. Were you at or near the scene of the assault on the 30th of July ~ By whose orders, and in what capacity ~ Answer. I was at General Burnsides headquarters as aide-dc-camp to Lieutenant- General Grant, and afterward at Genefal Warrens headquarters by General Grants orders. Question. IDid you see General Burnside in person, and had you con- verMation with him~ Answer. I had some conversation with him. Question. Relate the conversation in brief. Answer. I went from General Burnsides headquarters to the position he had in the front to ascertain how things stood. I suppose the time was about an houi after the explosion of the mine. He told me that his troops were forming then for an assault to carry the crest of the hill. That was the only important point in the con- versation. - Question. Did he give you any information to commuiticate to General Grant? Answer, I do not recollect that he did Page 83 Gi~. LU.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 83 Question. Had you an opportunity of forming an opinion as to the cause or causes of the failure on that day ~ Answer. 1 had not, from anything that I saw myself. By the COURT: Questioti. Were you so situated that you could see this assault ~ Answer. I could not until I went to General Warrens headquarters, which was about 7 oclock. I could not see the details. Question. Had you made such an examination prior to the assault that would enable you to give a professional opinion as to the chaiices of success iu attempting to take Cemetery Hill by assault, considering the explosion of the mine as the basis of the assault ~ Answer. I had. Question. I wish you would state to the Court what the chances of success were, using this mine as a means of inaugurating the assault. Answer. I thought it entirely impracticable when the mine was made if the enemys line should be held in fall force. This opinion was formed a week or ten days prior to the assault. Afterward, with the knowledge I had of the movement of the enemys troops from the south to the north side of the river, I thought an assault was entirely practicable. Question. What do you suppose would have been the best plan for the assaulting troops to have followed after having reached Cemetery Hill made a lodgment on and fortified that place, or proceeded immediately frito the town of Petersburg ~ Answer. I suppose the first step should have been to have made a lodgment on Cemetery Hill, and then to have pushed up troops to hold it at all hazards. The dispositions of the troops would depend upon the nature of the ground. Question. From your knowledge of the nature of the intrenehmeuts our own and the enemysdo you think that immediately after the ex- plosion of the mine, if proper working parties had been arranged, there would have been any difficulty in removing sufficient obstructions to have enabled our troops to have moved against those intrenchments in line of battle ~ Answer. I do not think there would have been any difficulty. TESTIMONY OF GENERAL E. 0. C. ORD. Maj. Gen. E. 0. C. Ord, U. S. Volunteers, being duly sworn and ex- amined by the JUDGE-ADVOCATE, s.ays: Question. Please state what was your command at the assault on the 30th of July. Answer. My comniand was composed of two divisions to aid in the assault, one of which belonged to the Tenth Corps and was under General Turner, and the other to the Eighteenth Corps, under General Ames. The divisions numbered: General Ames about 3,500 and General Turners 4,000 available muskets, or probably a little less. Question. What were your troops ordered to do l Answer. My troops were ordered to a position in the rear of General Burusides corps, with a view to supporting it. The positions were selected by General Burn- side. Question. Did your troops experience any interference from the Ninth Corps moving into positiQn on that occasion l Answer. After General Burnsides troops had made the assault and pushed for- ward, probably about an hour or a little more after the explosion of the mine, he said to mae~ Now ~ron can move your troops forward, I sent orders immediately to th Page 84 84 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. LII. leading division to move forward rapidly according to the programme, following the division that was in front of it, which was the rear division of General Burnsides corps. In the course of twenty minutes afte~r the order was sent out by a staff officer, General Turner reported to me that he found the way blocked; that the ap- proach to the place of d6bouch~ was occupied by the divisions in front, and that he liad fo~und himself in front of General Potters troops. This was the report made by him to me. General Potters troops, according to the programme, were to precede his. Question. Were any arrangements made for the passage of troops through the abatis and over the parapets to go to the front on that day? Answer. When I went to the front I found the troops debouching by a single open- ing. The parapet had been thrown down and the abatis had been removed, and the troops were moved out by that opening. Question. Please state the dimensions of that opening. Would it admit of the passage of troops in column, or line, or how ~ Answer. I cannot give the exact dimensions, because my attention was occupied principally in watching what was going on in front of this place, but my impression is that the opening was large enough for a column of a company front to go out, over pretty rough ground. I do not know whether there was more than one opening; I only saw that one. Question. That was, the one your troops passed through? Answer. No; my troops did not all pass through that way. I directed a portion of my troops to go over the parapet. Question. Did you direct them to go over the parapet because in your judgment the opening was inadequate~ Answer. I gave those directions because the ground in front of this place of exit was occupied by the other troops and there was no room after they got out for them to be of service without moving for a considerable distance by the flank to the right and left. Question. How were the troops that d6bouch~d to the assault formed to advance? Answer. When I went to the front I saw white troops moving out by the flank into the crater and the trenches near. I say by the flank, but I will explain that they passed along by twos and threes and sometimes fours along this space, which was pretty well swept by the fire of the enemythe space between our trenches and the crater formed by the explosion of the mine. These white troops werefollowed afterward by some colored troops, who also moved out, as it were, by flank, though the appearance of moving by flank may have bcen caused by the columns being somewhat disordered and hesitating in the move, so that a few moving forward first and others following them would diminish the width of a column and give the troops the appearance of moving by flank. Question. in your opinion was this movement by flank judicious or was it unavoidable? Answer. I would not suppose it was a judicious move under the circumstances if it could have been avoided. I rather think if intended to be a movement with a front of one or more companies then the kind of formation I saw was caused by the hesitation of te troops in the rear and the natural disposition of those nien who are more or less timid, in following those in front, to string themselves out in almost single file. Question. What, in your opinion, were some of the causes of failure on that occasion? Answer. I think the first cause was that the troops were not well disciplined. They probably had not had time to become soldiers. The next cause may have been that they passed out of the trenches by one place of exit and through the covered way to a considerable extent, which necessarily impeded the progress of troops going out, especially as troops began coming in by the same covered way. Question. Were the obstacles met by our troops, in your opinion, forjn.idable Page 85 CHAP. III.] 85 THE RICHMOND CAMPATON. Answer. I did not go to the front until difficulties were reported in the way of carrying out the order received from General Meade to move my division out to the right, independent of the troops in my front, and endeavor to reach the crest of the hill. It was reported by the division commanders that the nature of the ground was such that they could not get out that way. I went down to inspect the ground my- self and I derived the impression that there were difficulties in the way of getting out from the po ition occupied by my men at that time except in one place. They were in the lor(g covered way, the way leading to the angle from which the troops d~bouch6d. The ground was swampy, coxrered with more or less undergrowth and trees, and appeared to run obliquely in front of the enemys trenche~ If the troops should get into that swamp and undergrowth it would have been difficult to have kept them in order, and the enemy would have had them at a greater disadvantage, raking them if they occupied the trenches. The covered way was a pretty deep one, and I supposed from the fact of its being there leading to the place of exit it was swept by a very heavy fire from the enemys batteries. It was reported that the stream running through the marsh was bridged in one place by a narrow bridge, where we crossed it, and that it was a difficult place for troops to pass over. When I got there I saw that it was very muddy, that delays would be occasioned, and that it was a difficult place to attempt to take the enemys intrenchments, and we would have got on the ground just under the enemys works and probably be exposed to a very severe fire. Question. Did any troops, to your knowledge, misbehave or disobey orders? Answer. None that I know of, except after when an assault was made by some cc5lored troops, followed by a brigade of the Tenth Corps, which assault was made about 8 oclock while I was in the front line of oar trenches and within less than 100 yards of the crater, and what I would call the movement of assault. The men were repulsed by a very heavy concentrated fire, which enveloped that point of exit, the enemy having massed forces on the right and front and some fire coming from the left. Question. In your opinion had the first troops that went forward not hesitated or halted in the crater could they not have got to the desirable pointthat is, Cemetery Hill? Answer. I knew nothing about their halting or the facilities that they had for getting forward, except through what I heard from others, I not having been present at that time. Question. How was our artillery firing, as far as you observedeffect. ive or otherwise? Answer. The artillery fired very rapidly and for a long time, and judging from the rep~rts in the enemys newspapers which I have seen since we must have done considerable damage by our artillery upon their columns moving across to the place of attack. Question. Were the obstructions north and south of the crater re- moved sufficiently to admit the passage of troops in line of battle, say brigade front? Answer. I did not see that any obstructions made by the enemys trenches had been removed when I was there, except what had been removed by the explosion of the mine at the crater. Their ditch still remained, and I counted the regimental flags of our troops in my front occupying the trench. I do not know whether there was a strong abatis before the attack; so that I refer only to the ditch and the parapet. By the COURT: Question. Do you think the assault would have been successful there had the best dispositions been made that you are conversant with? Answer. From what I learned afterward of the behavior of the troops after the explosion, when the enemy was most alarmed, I think that the assault, if it had been made with no more vigor, would have failed no matter what the disposition. If the troops had behaved properly elsewhere I think the probability of success would have been increased by having more ~penings, a simultaneous assault, and increased mate- r~al; but if the troops would have behaved as improperly as they are reported to have done in frontnot going forward when ordered I think the assault would have failed no matter what the disposition Page 86 86 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. V~HAP. tIt Question. In your opinion was there any necessity for an officer of rank being present who should have had a more general command than the commander of the troops making the assault and the commanders of the supports and reserves; should there have been an officer present to have combined the whole command, nearer than the commander of the army, who was only in telegraphic communication with the different commanders of troops on the field; should there have been one single person there invested with authority to direct the whole operation, and would the result have been different if such had been the case ~ Answer. The oiily commands referred to as present there, the assaulting corps and the reserves, were under General Burnside and myself; and upon reporting to General Burnside I accompanied him to Vhe trenches and told him I would obey any instruc- tions he gave me; so that the whole of the operations were under his orders, until the orders came from higher anthority to make the change referred to, and to discon- tinue the assault. General Buruside being the senior officer I considered that he had a right to give me orders. He directed me to place my troops in the rear until after his troops should have made the assault, and until he had learned when they would be necessary and where, which I did. General Buruside was to give me word when to move my troops and where to move them. I told him I considered myself bound to obey any instructions that he might give me, and that any instructions that he would give would be obeyed ivith alacrity. So that, so far as concerns the move- ments directed by him, I do not think the presence of any other officer in those two corps would have made any change in moving forward. Question. Could your troops when they were called into action have advanced to the front over the enemys parapet and have gotten through in line of battle in any front greater than that of two regiments, at the time you were sent in, on each side of the crater~ Answer. I think it probable that my troops might have gotten in on the left of the crater at that time if they had advanced through the opening by fronts of regiments, or even companiesgotten into the enemys trenches; but my answer must be under- stood to convey only a knowledge of what I saw. I do not know what force the enemy had on the left. I only knew that the resistance on the right was very great, and they appeared to have a severe fire upon the troops on the right of where we ad- vanced to the crater. My troops were directed to support General Buruside on the right. Question. Were you present when the mine exploded; do you con- sider that. the troops might have advanced to the top of Cemeteryllill o~i that ridge had they been properly led forward or the troops behaved properly? Answer. I do not consider I was present when the mine exploded. By General MEADE: Question. Where was your general position on the field during the operations of the morning ~ Answer. When the mine exploded, and probably for an hour and a half or two hours afterward, I was with General Burnside in the trenches in rear of one of the batteries about onethird or half a mile from the point of assault ; after that for half an hour I was up to the front as far as I could get without going into the crater or outside our line of intrenchments as far as the head of my advanced division was. I then returned, and General Burnside and myself occupied the same place in the rear of this battery for probably an hour, except that I rode to the rear where General Meade was and passed around a little trying to rally some troops who were going from the front. This took me till between 9 and 10 oclock, when General Buruside and my- self both rode to the rear to learn something about an order that was issued in re- gard to our future movements. Question. Could anything be seen from this point with sufficient dis- tinctness to have enabled the commanding general to give orders other than he did from the point occupied by him ~ Answer. Immediately after the explosion the fire from both our batteries andthe enexnya came very heavily, and the cloud of smoke prevented us from seeing anythin Page 87 FI~HE RICHMOND ~AMPAI~N~ t~HAP. 1n.~ that was going on there. We were-ignorant of the condition of tidligs except front the informatioit staff officers brought us or from the nature of the firing we heard, up to the time that I informed myself by going to the front. Question. Did you hear any staff officer report to General Burnside that the troops could not be got to advance from the crater ~ If so, how many officers so reported, and do you know their names ~ Answer. The first two or three reports that were brought to General Buruside were brought by officers whose names I do not know, and not until some consider- able time had expired after the explosion; and although I did not hear the reports distinctly enough to repeat them they were not satisfactory, and indicated that the troops could not be moved readily forward. Question. Did you not report to the commanding general that the troops were overcrowded in the crater and the enemys adjacent works, and that in your judgment there was no probability of the crest of Cemetery Hill being carriedthis, somewhere between 9 and 10 a. at the headquarters of the commanding general in the field ~ Answer. I did. I would say, in addition to my answer, that General Bnrnside and myself were present at the time, and the question was whether we could carry it at that time; and my answer tutended to convey whether we (General Burnside and myself) with our forces could have done so had they let us; and after the troops were disorganized and driven back those who made the attack later and those who made the attack earlier were packed in the trenches adjacent, that under the cir~ cumstances we could not carry it with all our troops at that point of attack. Question. Thd General Buruside, about 10 a. in., when at his command- ing generals headquarters on the field, say that he could maintain his lodgment in the crater, and that he could take Cemetery Hill before night, if so permitted ~ Answer. General Burnside disagreed with me when I said I did not think we could take it. I supposed he meant that he could take it with the force he had, consisting of his own corpsand my reserves, though he said something about it was time then for the Fifth Corps to move up. The remark was made by General Buruside with a view of persisting in the attack which he had commenced, and it had been my opin- ion, ever since I was near enough to see what was going on in the crater, that the sooner we withdrew our troops, when we got into such a bad position, the better, and any persistence in the attack at that point I looked upon as very improper. Question. Was it not understood at this time that offensive operations should cease, but that the crater should be held till the troops- could be securely withdrawn, and that this would probably be till night! Answer. I think such was General Bimrnsides understanding, and I know lie re- ceived such .orders. My troops were all inside the intrencliments except those who had run into the enemys trenches to avoid the tremendous fire which they met when they went out. By General WARREN: Question. Do you remember seeing General Warren at the battery at General Burnsides station! Answer. I do. Question. Was not the whole field at that time sufficiently clear from smoke to be visible, and had been so for some time previous at that point! Answer. I do not know whether it was after my return from the vicinity of the crater or before that I saw General Warren. My impression is that each time I looked from the parapet before I left the trencheswhich was two or three times that 1 rose to look to the front,the smoke obscured the view so that I, at least, could form no definite idea of what was going on at the front. After the firing from the batteries on our side ha& ceased, which was probably an hour from the time of the assault, the atmosphere was clearer, but even then I could make out really little of what was going on in front, from the distance, the peculiar position of the point of attack, and from the fact, too, that I do not see very well because I am near- 8iglited Page 88 88 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. LII. TESTiMONY OF GENERAL POTTER. Brig. Gen. II. B. POTTER, U. S. Volunteers, being sworn and ex- amined by the JUDGE-ADVOCATE, says: Question. Were you in a position to see the operations of the assault before Petersburg on the 30th of July, and in what- capacity~ Answer. I was; commanding the Second Division, Ninth Army Corps. Question. Do you regard it as a failure or otherwise ~ Answer. I regard it as a failure. Question. To what cause or causes do you attribute this? Answer. Firstly, to the failure of the troops who had the advance on that day to carry out the orders to advance through the enemys line and seize the hill. Secondly, that when it was evident that this part of the plan had failed no attempt was made at a diversion at any other part of the line to enable the troops which were thrown into confusion at this point to be reformed. I would further state that I do not think the preliminary arrangements were very perfect. Question. What preparations were made, or what orders were given for the same, to pass troops through the abatis and over the parapet in front of the Ninth Corps? Did you receive any orders yourself? Answer. I received no orders whatever in relation to that matter except what are contained in the general order from the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac. 1 was furnished a copy of that order, but no other order. Question. But what preparations were made, or what orders were given for the same, to pass troops through the abatis and over the par- apet in front of the Ninth Corps? Answer. The general order of General BurnsideI suppose it might be called the order of attackwas the only order given in writing. Verbal instructions were given to have the pioneers of the different regiments, and a sort of pioneer regiment that we call the Engineer Regiment, in each division, prepared with their tools, and so forth, to prepare the breast-works for the passage of field batteries in case we were successful in moving forward. My regiment was immediately in the neighborhood of the breast-work ready to carry out these instructions, and my pioneers were also prepared. I had orders not to disturb anything immediately in the vicinity of the niine so as not to attract the attention of the enemy to that point. I was told to withdraw everything from that part of the line for a space of 200 or 300 yards, ex- cept a thin line of skirmishers, and not to attract the enemys attention there if I could help it. Question. How were the Ninth Corps troops formed for the assault your own division, for instance? Answer. My own division was to have been formed left in front to move forward by the flank, so that when my troops had passed the line of the enemys intrench- ments by fronting their front would be to the right, my division being intended to cover the right of the advance. One brigade of my (livision was massed between the railroad and the advance line of works on the right-hand side of my covered way and south of the mine. I had orders not to allow any troops on the left of the cov- ered way. The other brigade was partially in the trenches and about to be relieved by some of the troops of the Eighteenth Corps. Two or three regiments which I was ordered not to put in the assault were not in the trenches. Question. What time elapsed from the springing of the mine till the forward movement of the assaulting columns? Answer. I do not know, sir. I did not see the movement of the First Division. The first of my regiments commenced to move, I should think, about eight or ten min- utes after the mine exploded. My division was to move third in order, but I took the liberty of altering the programme a little. After I received the order of Major- General BurnsideI received the order about 9 oclock at nightafter thinking the matter over it occurred to miie that it would be a long time before my division would Page 89 CHAP. LIT.] THE RIChMOND CAMPAIGN. 89 have an opportunity to get forward, as the divisions of Generals Ledlie and Wilicot were to precede me. I therefore commanded General Griffin, Who had the lead in my division, to deploy a line of skirmishers to the right of this crater, and in case the assault seemed to be successful, and General Ledlie moved forward, he should ad- vance his skirmishers to the right, and if he did not find so much serious opposition as to detain him there he should push his troops forward to the right, and move for- ward nearly parallel with General Ledlie. I gave him these orders about 12 oclock at night, and Ldo not think that I communicated to General Burnside that I had made this change. Therefore my troops commenced moving as soon as General. Griffin found that General Ledlies column had started. This leading division com- menced moving and passed into the ri,,ht of the crater and turned down to the right. Question. iDid the troops halt in the crater. Answer. Yes, sir. Question. Why? Answer. No reason at all that I know of. Question. What was the nature of the obstructions in the enemys line, formidable or otherwise? Answer. To the right of the crater there was an ordinary line of rifle-pits with a sort of chevaux-de-frise in front of it made by pointed stakes being driven into the ground. Immediately in rear of this and to the right of it there were two covered ways. One seemed to be a covered way, and one perhaps a place dug to carry some- thing ont of the fort. There were transverse lines of rifle-pits, and some coverings thrown up by the men to protect themselvesone running in these angles between the advance line and this covered way, which runs up toward Petersburg, and another running on the bank of the ravine which runs up through the enemys line to the right of the mine, about the line I was ordered to take. Question. What was the degree of artillery firing on that point, the point of assault? Answer. Immediately after the assault very light; afterward the fire was very severe indeed, as severe as I ever saw. Questidn. What time elapsed, as near as you can tell, from the time of the assault till the time this severe fire commenced? Answer. I should think fully half an hour. Question. Was the ground around the crater commanded. by the ground held by the enemy? Answer. Yes, sir; that is, immediately in rear of the enemys line which we had pierced the ground commanded it, and the gronnd to the right on the other side of the ravine commanded it. In speaking of the right I mean our right. The ground to the left I did not notice so well because I had no business there. Question. For what distance on each side of the crater were the ene- mys works abandoned after the explosion of the mine? Answer. To the right of the crater the front line was abandoned for a space of 250 or 300 yards, I should thinkthat is, the enemys troops rushed out of this line back to these covered ways and so forth. From the hasty glance I gave to the left there did not seem to be anybody within 300 yards. Perhaps it would be better to say that the line was only partially abandoned; they did not all gosome went and some did not. Question. Could the troops have proceeded to the crest immediately after reaching the crater? Answer. I do not know any reason why they could not. Question. Did any troops that you know of advance from the crater to the crest? Answer. Some of my troops advanced from the right of the crater toward the crest. I suppose they went upward of 200 yards, and they were driven back. Question. Why, do you suppose, were they driven back? I Page 90 OPERATIONS IN ~E. VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. LII. Answer. At that time they were driven back by the fire. They were too weak to advance farther. Question. By the fire of artillery or of infantry? Answer. Both. Question. At what hour was that ~ Answer. That must have been about half or three-qnax~ter~ of an hour after the mine exploded. Question. Do you think that if your men had been adequately sup- ported they conid have gone forward to the crest, notwithstanding the obstacles that presented themselvesfiring and so forthat that hour? Answer. I think that if I had had my whole divisiou together at that time, if the ground had been such that I could have had my whole division together and made that charge, I could have gone to the crest. Question. When these troops fell back, where did they go? Answer. They fell back partially into this covered way leading from the fort to the right, and a few were driven into the crater of the mine. Question. How long was it after they got in before they were ordered to retire; how long were you in that place, or wherever they were? Answer. Until the general order came to withdraw the troops. Question. How long would you estimate that time to be? Answer. It must have been five or six hours. It seems to me we did not get that order till about 11 oclock. General Burnside sent for me, I should think, about 10 oclock iu the niorning and stated that he had received an order to withdraw, and asked me if I thought we could hold the position. I told him I thought we could hold the position, but nnless something was going to be done there was no use in it. He said it was an important point, or something of that sort; and I asked him if I could make arrangements to withdraw, and he told me, No, that he was going to see General Meade, and that I should wait until he should have consulted wfth him. Half or three-quarters of an hour afterward I received a copy of a telegram to Gen- eral White, who was acting as his chief of staff, with an indorsement on the back of the dispatch to theeffect that it should be submitted to the officers in the crater, or something to that effect, for their opinion as to how tliey should withdraw. Subse- quently I started to go into the crater to consult with them, and I received an order from an aide-de-camp of General Buruside to xeport in person at his headquarters. Question. Was the time a fit one to withdraw, in your opinion? Answer. The troops were not withdrawn at all; they were driven out by the enemy. Question. When did the chief loss of men occur? Answer. The chief loss in my division occurred between 6.30 and 10 oclock in the morning. The heaviest loss was at the time that some of the troops of the Fourth Division (the colored division) met with a check and were repulsed. Question. Was it in the ac.t of retiring from the crater? Answer. More than half the prisoners I lost were lost in the crater. I should ex- plain that I had very few men in the crater, that seeing how it was overcrowded, and that one or two regiments that attempted to pass through were lost among the other troops, I endeavored to get my troops out of there, but when some of the other troops gave way, and the operation of General Ferreros troops was unsuccessful, and they gave way, I had some stragglers forced into the crater. I suppose I had not more than 200 men in there. My troops were holding the line to the right of that mostly. Question. By whom was this removal of the troops conducted? Answer. It was not .conducted at all, sir. The circumstances were these: After we hnd receivedthis order General Buruside directed me to report at his headquarters. I went to his headquarters, met there the other division commanders, and we con- sulted upon the best plan which should be adopted to withdraw the troops. I had previously sent out orders to connect my right with the crater by an intrenchmen Page 91 U~. LII.] Th~ I~ICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 91 if possible. While we were returning from this consultation an assault was made npon the crater, and uhe eacmy recovered possession t~f it. Then all the troops were forced back to our line, except two regiments that I had sent beyond the ravine to silence a batte~ry, and these I withdrew about 4 oclock in the afternoon. Question. Do you know whetlier any troops misbehaved or disobeyed orders in any way or at any time during the action? Answer. I do not know that I can answer that exactly. I know by the reports of my staff officers and so forth. But I saw troops lying there when they had been ordered to go forward immediately after the mine exploded, probably within ten ~minutes. Colonel Pleasants, who had charge of the explosion, and whose regiment, having built the mine, being relieved from duty on that day, except as a sort of pro- vost guard with orders from the Ninth Army Corps, had volunteered as an aide on my staff, and as soon as the mine was exploded he rushed forward into the crater, and the tr& ops were moving up, and he reported to me that the troops could not be made to move forwardthat was, the troops of the First Division. He showed me his hand, which was blistered in driving them up. It was Marshalls brigade, of Ledlies division. By the COURT; Question. What tools were the engineer regiments supplied with? Answer. Axes, spades, and picks. The engineer regiment I think was supplied particularly with axes to cut down the abatis Question. Did they move forward? Answer. Yes, sir. Question. Did they destroy the abatis? Answer. The chevaux-de-frise on the enemys lines for 200 or 300 yards was broken down. Question. WaA there any difficulty in passing a brigade or regimental front over our intrenchmnents and on either side of that crater to the front? Answer. It might have been done on the left, but not on the right. Question. What was the difficulty on the right? Answer. The difficulty on the light was that where you would have to form your troops you would have to pass through a wooded ravine and swamp. A heavy regi- ment, which charged through in regimental front, I think got very badly broken up. They would have succeeded better farther to the right. Question. Where did you stay during the attack? Answer. Most of the time I staid on the hill on this side of the railroada point where you can see the ground. Question. Did all of your troops go into action? Answer. My troops all went into action except my engineer regiment, which had just moved up to the front. Question. Did they all get as far as the crater? Answer. All except one regiment got beyond the crater. Question. Did you ever go to the crater? Answer. I never went to the crater myself; I was within about eighty yards of it, just off to the right of it. Question. At the time your skirmish line was ordered up the hill did any individual members of your division get to the top of the crest? Answer. I do not think there did. It was reported to me that some did, bmmt hav- ing investigated the matter since I am satisfied that they did not. The Court adjourned td meet at 10 oclock on 31st of July [August] Page 92 92 OPERATIONS IN ~ VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. LII. NINTH DAY. HEADQUARTERS SECOND CORPS, The Court met pursuant to adjournment. August 31, 1864. Present, Major-General Hancock, Brigadier-Generals Ayres and Miles, and Colonel Seliriver, judge-advocate. The proceedings of the eighth day were read and approved. TESTIMONy OF GENERAL FERRERO. Brig. Gen. EDWARD FERRERO, U. S. Volunteers, being duly sworn, to questions by JUDGE-ADVOCATE, says: Question. Were you at the assault on the 30th of July, and what was your command? Answer. I was commanding the Fourth Division of the Ninth Army Corps (colored troops). Question. What was their formation for the attack? Answer. There was no formation further than moving down in rear of the Third Division, as directed in the orders, by the flank, in the covered way. Question. Was this the most judicious? Answer. It was the only formation that could be adopted under the circiim- stances. Question. Please to state the circumstances. Answer. There being no position to mass the troops. Question. Why was there no position? Answer. On account of there being three other divisions in advance of mine, which would occupy all the available ground where my troops could have been formed. Question. What orders had you to prepare the parapet for the d~bouch6 of troops? 9 Answer. I had no orders whatever. Question. State some of the causes of the failure, if you regard it so. Answer. I do regard it as a failure. Question. State some of the causes, briefly. Answer. The failure of the First Division to go forward immediately after the ex- plosion. Question. Do yon attribute their halting and not going forward to misbehavior on their part? Answer. Not being present there that I could not say. In my opinion there is no reason that I know of why they should not have gone forward; Question. State the reasons why you arrived at that conclusion. Answer. I would state that there could have been no obstructions whatever at that time, from the fact that the crater was crowded with troops, in and about it, when my division went through and passed over the obstacles, not only the ob- stacles occasioned by the explosion, but also the mass of troops in the crater. They went through and passed beyond those troops at a time when there was heavy firing, whereas, those troops that had gone forward on the lead could have gone forward with a very sliott loss in my opinion. I would state that in my opinion the order of the battle ~or the novements of troops on that day was extremely faulty. If I understand it right, the object to be attained was to gain the crest on Cemetery Hill, and to take advantage of the momentary paralyzation of the troops in and about the crater, caused by the explosion of the mine. It was necessary that th Page 93 CHAP. 1111.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 93 troops that made the assault should move with the utmost rapidity to gain that crest. I contend that the point of the assault was not properly selected to carry out that object; that the obstructions which the explosion of the mine would natu- rally create would disorganize the troops and prevent them moving forward with the rapidity that was desired. Furthermore, I would state that the manner in which the troops went in would not lead them to attain the object that was desired. The two divisio~.s that followed the leading division were to have protected the flanks of the same: Now, how could they protect the flank when the leading division (the head of that column) would hardly have reached the crest before the Second Divis- ion would have reached the crater, subjecting the First Division to flank fires and to be taken in reverse ~ And, even had the Third Division, which had the second posi- tion in column, have gotten through, it would have taken a long time bef6re the Second Division, which was the third in column, could have reached its proper point to protect the right flank of the First Division. I mean to convey the idea that either other movements should have been made on the flank of the leading division, or that division should have deployed to the right and left, engaging the enemy on the flank, so as to give the assaulting column an opportunity to advance rapidly to the crest of the hill. By the COURT: Question. How long was it after the explosion of the mine before the assaulting column moved forward? Answer. I was not with the leading division; therefore I cannot give you the ex act time, but it was very shortly after. By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE: Question. State to the Court how the Fourth Division (colored troops), your own command, conducted themselves on the occasion. Answer. I would state that the troops went in in the most gallant manner; that they went in without hesitation, moved right straight forward, passed through the crater that was filled with troops, and all but one regiment of my division passed beyond the crater. The leading brigade engaged the enemy at a short distance in rear of the crater, where they captured some 200-odd prisoners and a stand of colors, and recaptured a stand of colors belonging to a white regiment of our corps. Here, after they had taken those prisoners, the troops became somewhat disorganized, and it was some little time before they could get them organized again to make a second attempt to charge the crest of the hill. About half an hour after that they made the attempt and were repulsed by a very severe and galling fire, and, I must say, they retreated in great disorder amid confusion back to our first line of troops, where they were rallied, and there they remained during the rest of the day and behaved very well. I would add that my troops are raw, new troops, and never had been drilled two weeks from the day they entered the service till that day. Question. If your division had been the leading one in the assault would they have succeeded in taking Cemetery Hill? Answer. I have not the slightest doubt from the manner in which they went in, under very heavy fire, that had they gone in in the first instance, when the fire was comparatively light, but that they would have carried the crest of Cemetery Hill beyond a doubt. By the COURT: Question. Did you go forward with your division? Answer. I went to our first line of works and there remained to see my command go through. I would state that I deemed it more necessary that I should see that they all went in than that I should go in myself, as there was no hesitation in their going forward whatever. Iwas at no time at a farther distance than eighty or ninety yards from my division. Question. Where were you after they had all passed the crater, and were, as you say, at one time half an hour in reorganizing? An~wer. I was immediately in front of the crater on our front line of works. I would also state that one regiment was checked between the crater and our front line unable to get through, and I was at that time making every effort to get that regiment through with the intention of passing through myself as soon as they got past, but it was impossible for me to do so from the crowded state of the troops that were there Page 94 94 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. LOHAP. LU. Question. Were the obstructions in front of the first line of works of a character to admit the passage of a horseman or a piece of artillery after the whole corps had passed ~ Answer. They would not admit of the passage of either because the parapet of the rifle-pit had never been dug away. I was compelled to remove abatis on our own front, under fire, to get my command through by the flank. TESTIMONY OF GENERAL WILLUOX. Brig. Gen. 0. B. WILLOOX, U. S. Volunteers, being duly sworn, says to questions by JUDGE-ADVOCATE: Question. Were you in a position to see the operations of the assault before Petersburg on the 30th of July, and in what capacity ~ Answer. I commanded the Third Division of the Ninth Army Corps. At the time of the explosion of the mine I was at Roemers battery, just in rear of my Second Brigade, and in good position to observe the assault. Question. IDo you regard the attack as a failure l Answer. I do. Question. State some of the causes of it. Answer. The first and most obvious cause was the failure of the First Division to go forward when there was no firing, for the fire of the enemy was suspended for fif- teen to twenty minutes. In the next place 1 think that the troops that went in sup- port of the leading division should have gone in almost simultaneously with it, and should have gone to the right and left avoiding the crater, but going near it, and then bearing down the enemys works to the right and left so as to have prevented the enemy bringing flank and reverse fires to bear on the advancing columns. The order of attack stated that my division should wait until the First Division had cleared the enemys works. For that reason of course the, three divisions could not have gone in simultaneously. It was the published order that prevented it in part. The attention of the enemy was not attracted to any other point than the crater. I consider that the third reason. Almost as soon as the enemys first astonishment was over they concentrated an almost circular fire around the crater. Their field batteries came out in position on different points on the Jerusalem plank road and on Cemetery Hill. They kept up a flank and reverse fire; and a battery in the grove of trees on our right was so situated, the line of the rebel works taking a direction a little re-entering, that almost as soon as they opened fire at all they began to fire nearly in rear of the crater. I would say that at the meeting in General Burusides tent, where Generals Ord and Meade were present, I supposed it was intended that the two divisions, fol- lowing the leading division, should move to the right and left, and that the duty of the Ninth Corps was to clear the ground to enable the Eighteenth Corps to move for- ward. If that p~au had been carried out I think it would have been successful, but I do not think that the temporary occupation of Cemetery Hill by a small force would have insured the success of that attack. I think that ultimately they would have been driven out unless we had a large force (two corps at least) to fight a battle at those works. Now, to go back to the interview which General Buruside had with his division commanders where General Meade was present: it was a well understood thing there that this was intended to be a surprise, and it was thought by all the generals, including General Meade himself, that unless it should be a complete sur- prise it would be a failure; and the written order which was published to the com- manders did not fully, in fact did not substantially, give the order of attack as it was understood at this interviewI mean General Burnsides order of attack. At the time the matter was talked over I certainly understood that I was to move down and clear the enemys works on the left, and then move up toward the Jerusalem plank road. The order stated that I. would bear to the left and take a positiou on the Jerusalem plank road. Question. What preparations were made and what orders were given to pass troops over the parapet and through the enemys works ~ Answer. None but the written orders before the Court. The abatis, what was left Qf it when my divisiou passed over, was imo obstacle whatever Page 95 CHAP. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 95 TESTIMONY OF MAJOR-GENERAL HUMPHREYS. Maj. Gen. A. A. IIU1VuHREYS, U. S. Volunteers, chief of staff, being duly sworn, says to questions by JUDGE-ADVOCATE: Question. Were you with General Meade during the assault on the 30th of July ~ Answer. I was. Question. What was the substance or language of a dispatch which he received from Lieutenant-Colonel Loring, assistant iuspector-general of the Ninth Corps, but addressed to General Burnside, about 5.45 a. m. of that day~ Answer. The substance of the dispatch was, that some of the troops there, I think Ledlies division, were in the crater and would not go forward, and asking that some other division or some other troops should he sent to go forward to the crest. The main point with me, however, was that his troops were in the crater and were not going forward as they ought to have done. Question. Relate what passed at the interview between General Burnside and Generals Grant and Meade after the former had been directed to withdraw the troops from the crater and prior to the with- drawal of the troops. Answer. I recollect the directions to General BurusiJe, which were that if he could not withdraw his troops with security during the day they should be with- drawn at night; that the best time for the withdrawal of the troops he himself should be the best judge of. My impression is that General Burnside did not wish to withdraw them. He certainly so expressed himself to me after General Meade left, for I did not leave the headquarters of General Burnside the same time as General Meade, but remained there a short time. I do not know whether he so expressed himself to General Meade and General Grant or not. I thought I understood the conditions that existed there, and there was no question in my mind as to the neces- sity of withdrawing them. Question. Did you understand it to be his wish to maintain his posi- tion in the crater ~ Answer. I did not pay much attention to what he said to General Meade and Gen- eral Grant, but he so expressed himself to me afterward~ but inasmuch as he stated no facts which put a different aspect on the condition of things I did not consider that he gave very good reasons for his wish. He certainly differed from General Ord. Question. Did you hear General Ord give any opinion ~is to the prob- able success of carrying the crest if persisted in for a certain time, and, if so, what was it ~ Answer. I heard him then or before express the opinion that the time was past; he was averse to it. I did not pay so much attention to what was said at that time, for the reason that the facts were all known and the conclusions come to in regard to them. Question. Were you at the fourteen-gun battery near which General Buruside had his temporary headquarters on that day ~ Answer. Yes; I rode out there. I think it was between 10 and 11 oclock when I rode out there. I had been there before, and am somewhat familiar with the ground. Question. Could anything be seen from there with sufficient distinct- ness to have enabled the commanding general to give orders other than he did from the point occupied by him ~ Answer. I think not. I do not think it made any difference whether he was there or whether he was at the point he occupied. In the gratification of a personal wish to see, simply, he might have seen something more, hut it would not have made any difference in the conclusidus arrived at. He would have understoQd mi~tters a~ thoroughly where he w~s as if he had seen them Page 96 96 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. LII. Question. Ought the assault on that day to have been successful ~ Answer. I think so; I was confident that it would have been successful. TESTIMONY OF GENERAL HUNT. Brig. Gen. II. J. HUNT, 11. S. Volunteers, chief of artillery, Army of the Potomac, being duly sworn, says in answer to questions by JUDGE- ADVOCATE: Question. Please to state in what capacity you were serving during the assault on the enemys lines on the 30th of July and days preced- ing it. Answer. I am chief of artillery of the Army of the Potomac, and had charge of the siege operations on this side of the Appomattox. Question. Relate briefly what arrangements were made for opposing the enemys artillery fire on that occasion, and if they were successfully carried out. Answer. Batteries that had been constructed several weeks preceding the assault had armaments placed in them, from the plank road to the Hare house. There were eighteen siege guns in the line, eighteen large mortars, and twenty-eight Coehorns along in th~ lines in front, and some eighty field pieces. The object was to silence the fire of the enemys batteries in the redoubt which formed their salient on the plank road, and especially all of their guns which bore upon the ground in front of the mine. The fire was opened immediately npon the explosion of the mine, and was very suc- cessful in keeping down the enemys fire. Question. Was the enemys artillery fire formidable, and particularly directed to the point of our assault, after the explosion of the mine ~ Answer. The fire did not become very formidable. It was almost entirely silenced soon after it opened, with the exception of one gun in a battery next to the mine, and a battery on the crest beyond the mine, and a few guns that were used by the enemy on our right of the mine toward the railroad. The gun that was in the work next the mine was so placed that it was protected from all direct fire, and a sufficient num- ber of mortars could not be brought to bear upon it to stop it. No large mortars had been placed to control that battery, as, according to the plan of assault, that work might reasonably be supposed to fall into our hands within ten or fifteen minutes after the explosion. All the guns in that battery were silenced, however, excepting that one. The battery on the crest of the hill, directly in front of the mine, was almost shut up after firing two or three rounds, as we had some heavy guns bearing on it, and a number of field guns. I was not where I conld see the fire from our right of the mine. I had Colonel Monroe in charge there, and he reported that the fire was pretty well kept down. On the left they occasionally fired a shot. Question. Under the circumstances, then, ought not the assault have succeeded ~ Answer. I think so. That is, so far as it depended upon us. I do not know what the enemy had behind the crest. The object was to take the crest. Question. ilave you formed any opinion as to the causes of the fail- ure of the assault on that occasion ~ Answer. I do not know what other causes might have existed, but I attributed the failure to the want of promptitude in pushing forward assaulting columns im- mediately on the explosion of the mine. I believed from the first that if that were not done promptly the attack would probably fail. Question. Was the enemys fire directed upon the point of attack very formidable at any time so as to prevent reasonably resolute troops from pushing forward ~ Answer. I think not. Certainly not within the period within which their advance ahould have taken place Page 97 CHAP. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 97 TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT BENYAURD. Lieut. W. II. II. BENYAURD, U. S. Engineers, being (lilly sworn, says to questions by JUDGE-ADVOCATE: Question. Were you present at the assault on the rebel lines on the 30th of July, and in what capacity? Answer. I was with General Burnside on that morning. I wa ~ sent by Major Duane to report to him for duty as an engineer. Question. Were you in a situation then to s on that day? , , ee the progress of events Answer. Not all the time. A portion of the time I was with General Burnside at his headquarters; and then, afterward, I was at different points along the front. I was not in such a position that I could see everything that was going on. Question. Were there working parties for the assaulting columns, and engineer officers to lead them? Answer. Not that I know of. Question. No arrangements had been made with you by General Burnside for anything of that sort? Answer. No, sir; not previous to the assault. Question. iDo you know if any arrangements were made for the d6- bouch6 of our troops from our lines and their passage over the enemys? Answer. No, sir. General Burnside did not give me any instructions in regard to taking away the abatis on the rifle-pit on the front line. Question. Were the obstructions on the enemys line formidable, and of what did they consist? Answer. They had a pretty strong abatis in front of their rifle-pits. Question. Could they have been removed by working parties that usually accompany assaulting columns? Answer. I did not go near enough to. the crater along that line to judge of that, although it appeared to be merely the usual abatis .placed in front of works and placed in the usual position. Question. Did you see the explosion of the mine? Answer. Yes, sir. Question. Was its effect to clear for any distance, ai~d, if so, how much, the enemys parapets? Answer. Only a portion of the parapet was blown down. A portion of it remained standing. I suppose the crater that was formed might bave been forty or fifty yards long and perhaps twenty wide. Question. Was the breach sufficient and practicable for the passage of troops in line? Answer. I did not go in to look at the crater, and consequently I could not say whether they could go in without further work being done or not. I could not tell how deep it was. Question. As an engineer, would you criticise that point of attack? Answer. I had been there working on that front before, and I had frequently ex- pressed the opinion that the enemy could bring a flank fire all along therethat is, their line formed a kind of re-entering there. Question. Did you ever chance to hear why that point was selected, or do you know? - Answer. I did hear that that mine was made because that hollow in front was a good position to run a mine from. 7 R RYOL XL, PT Page 98 98 OPERATIONS IN SE; VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. LII.. Question. State briefly some of the causes, in your opinion, of the failure of the assault. Answer. I think one cause was the way in which the troops were taken in by the flank, passed down these covered ways, one on the right and the other on the left, on which General Ferreros troops went down. I understand that only a portion of our parapet was taken away, and the troops had to go through by the hank instead of advancing in line. The portion of the ground south of the covered way was the way along which the troops could have advanced in line. The railroad cut being only six feet high in one place, the troops could have easily advanced through that. The troops were not in their proper positions at the tinie of the assaultthat is, a portion of the troops were away back beyond the edge of those woods when they should have been in the hollow. By the CounT: Question. Had you been placed in charge of a proper working party, suitably equipped, could you not, immediately after the explosion of the mine, have leveled the enemys parapets so as to have allowed troops in hue of battle to have passed through ~ Answer. I think I could. When the enemy afterward had a flank fire between the enemys line and ours, I offered to General Buruside to run a covered way from our line to the enemys line, on the right and left of the crater. (Lines marked on map 66 A and A.) By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE: Question. Would any advantage have ensued from simply holding the crater without advancing farther ~ Answer. No, sir; I do not think so. By the COURT: Question. Were there any preparations made in the way of collecting gabions, and so forth, so that if the troops had been successful we could have crowned the crest ~ Answer. No, sir; not that I know of. Question. Were tools collect~d or usedpicks, shovels, axes, & c. ~ Answer. I did not see any. The Court adjourned to meet at 10 oclock on 1st of September. TENTH DAY. HEADQUARTERS SECOND CORPS, 864. The Court met pursuant to adjournment. & ptember 1 1 Present, Major-General Hancock, Brigadier-Generals Ayres and Miles, and Colonel Schriver, judge-advocate. The proceedings of the ninth day were read and approved. GENERAL WILLUOXRECALLED. By JUDGE-ADVOCATE: Question. In your testimony yesterday you stated that at the time of the explosion of the mine you were at IRoemers battery. Where were you the rest of the time ~ Answer. Immediately after the explosion I started for the head of my column, which was on left and in rear of the First Division. I arrived at the front line of works nearest the crater before the whole of the First Division had crossed. The head of my column had already commenced mdving for the crater, and was then oc- cupying the left portion of the enemys works Page 99 CHAP. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 99 By the COURT: Question. You stated that General Burnsides order directed that your division should bear to the left, and take up a position on the Jerusalem plank road. What was the cause of the failure to execute this maneuver ~ Answer. The First Division was to move on Cemetery Hill. I would state that Cemetery Hill bore rather to the right of my front, so that it was necessary that Cem- etery Hill should be occupied before any groniA beyond it could be occupied. In pursuance of my original expectation, I had given orders that the leading regiment should turn down to the left in the line of works, and the Twenty-seventh Michigan started down that line. As soon as General Burnside. perceived that the First Divis- ion was not moving forward, he sent me orders to move forward my diviAion direct npon Cemetery Hill. My idea was to carry out the spirit of what was nnderst~od the day before, and my plan was to throw the whole division on the left into line, so that the right would rest on the Jerusalem plank road; and that would have com- pletely protected the flank of the First Division. This movement was be un, but the commanding officer of the Twenty-seventh Michigan was shot, and the way the First Division moved forward by division created more or less confusion; and by the time I received the order to advance on Cemetery Hill, or before that, in fact, the enemy had concentrated such a fire that we could not advance any farther. TESTIMONY OF BRIG. GEN. S. G. GRIFFIN. Brig. Gen. S. G. GRIFFIN, U. S. Volunteers, being duly sworn, says to questions by JUDGE-ADVOCATE: Question. Were you at the assault on the 30th of July, and what was your command~ Answer. I was at the assault. My command was the Second Brigade, Second Di- vision (General Pottt~rs), Ninth Army Corps. Questiou. Did you regard that assault as a failure0? Answer. Yes, sir; I think I should, because we did not hold the ground. Question. State some of the causes that you attribute this to. Answer. In the first place I should say that the troops in the front did not ad- vance exactly as they should, nor as far as they should. Probably the best ground was not selected. Then the cause of our not holding the ground was the piling in of so many troops in certain parts of the ground where there was no room for them, and a panic having seized those troops caused the disaster. The enemy concentrated all their fire upon that point as soon as we attacked, which was another great reason, no doubt. We received their fire at that point from all directions, and very soon after we first arrived there it was a very sharp fire. Question. Why were all the troops directed to that point ~ Answer. I do not know. Question. Do you think that arrangement was faulty ~ Answer. The execution of the plan seemed to be faulty. Question. Were any arrangements made for passing the troops through the abatis of our line and over the parapet in front of the enemy~s? Answer. For my part, in niy brigade I had a pioneer corps., and skirmishers to clear the way for them. Question. Did your command go beyond the crater ~ Answer. It did. Question. About how far~ Answer. I should judge 200 yards; it might be more or it might be less; it could not have been much less, however; that is as near as I can judge Page 100 100 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. LII. Question. Why did you retire? Answer. My troops were driven back from that point. They afterward retired from the crater under orders. They were driven back from the advanced position at the time the panic seized the negroes, which more or less affected all our troops, and the negroes rushing through them as they did carried them back. The rebels made a very desperate attack at the same time. Question. If the enemy~s parapets had been leveled on each side of the crater or made practicable for the passage of troops what would have been the probable result? Answer. I am not sure that I can tell what the result would have been. Probably the troops might have advanced more readily and with more force, but it was not a thing easy to do. Question. Do you know anything that prevented th~ troops, having attained the crater, from going forward immediately to the crest of Cemetery Hill? Answer. Nothing more than the sharp fire from the enemy. Question. What kind of fire? Answer. All kinds. I would state here that there is another reason why my troops could not go forward. The ground where they were was broken up with covered ways and numerous rifle-pits of the rebels. We had just driven the rebels out, and my troops occupied their places; therefore in that position, disconnected, as many of them were, it was difficult and almost impossible to form them to make a direct charge; but if a column had moved farther to the left I did not see any reason why they should not have gone iu. Question. Suppose you had had working parties to level the works, those working parties being supplied with fascines and other necessary preparations to render a passage practicable, could you not have gone forward then? Answer. I do not think there was time for that workit would have taken hours. I think the time to go forward was at the first, because very soon after we went there the enemy concentrated their troops and poured into us at that point a terrible fire from every quarter. Question. The great mistake, then, was the halting of the troops in the crater? Answer. Yes, sir. Question. Whose troops were they? Answer. General Ledlies division. Question. Could the troops have gone over the enemys parapets on the left of the crater, in line of battle, immediately after the explosion of the mine? Answer. I think they could; but I could not say positively because my attention was directed more particularly to the right of the crater. Question. Could they have done it on the right? Answer. No, sir; on account of those numerous cross lines and pits and covered ways which were full of the enemy even after we arrived there; and others kept pouring in in addition to those that were already there. Question. When the troops retired from the crater was it compulsory from the enemys operations or by orders from your commander? Answer. Partly both. We retired because we had orders. At the same time a column of troops came up to attack the crater and we retired instead of stopping to fight. This force of the enemy came out of a ravine, and we did not see them till they appeared on the rising ground immediately in front of us. Question. Where was your position during the contest? Page 101 CHAP. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 101 Answer. I went up with my brigade, and while we were there I was most of the time in the crater, or near it, with my troops all the time. Question. What was the forces that came out to attack youthe force that was exposed in the open ~ Answer. Five hundred or 600 men were all that we could see. I did not see either the right or left of the line. I saw the center of the line as it appeared to me. It was a good line of battle. Probably if we had not been nnder orders to evacuate we should have fought them and tried to hold our position; but according to the orders we withdrew. TESTIMONY OF GENERAL HARTRANFT. Brig. Gen. J. F. HARTRANFT, U. S. Volunteers, being duly sworn, says to questions by JUDGE-ADVOCATE: Question. Were you at the assault on the 30th of July, and what was your command? Answer. I was there. My command was the First Brigade of the Third Division (General Willcoxs) of the Ninth Corps. Question. IDid you regard the attack as a failure0? Answer. I did. Question. What, in your opinion, were some of the causes of that failure? Answer. The massing of the troops in the crater where they could not be used with any effect. I think that the troops, instead of being sent to the crater, should have been sent to the right and left, so as to have moved in line of battle, then they could have advanced in some kind of shape; but after they came into the crater in the confusion they were in, other troops being brought up only increased the con- fusion, and by that time the enfilading fire of the enemys artillery and infantry had become very annoying, which also made it very (lifficult to rally and form the troops. Question. Do youknow any reasons why the troops did riot go to the right and left of the crater? Were there any physical obstacles to pre- vent them? Answer. No; I think troops could have been sent there. The Second Brigade of my division was sent to the left of the crater; they took a portion of the pits. If a vigorous attack had been made on the right and left of the crater I think the enemys pits could have been taken without any difficulty and the line occupied. Question. What was the formation of your command in moving for- ward? Answer. I for med my command, which was immediately in rear of the First Divis- ion (which was the assaulting division), in one or two regiments frontI put two small regiments togetherand my instructions were, after I passed through the crater with my advance, to form to the left of the First Division, protecting its left flank while they were advancing, and form my line as the regiments would come up, so as to form a line of battle on the left of the First Division. Question. If the troops that first went into the crater had not delayed there, could they not, considering the consternation that the explosion of the mine made in the enemys camp, have got forward to the crest of Cemetery Hill? Answer. I think they could have moved up to that crest immediately, if they had made no halt at all, nuder the consternation of the enemy. I think they would have had to re-enforce them speedily in order to hold that hill. Question. The re-enforcements were there, were they not? Answer. Yes, sir. Question. And there-was nothing to prevint that result? Answer. No, sir. I have thought sometimes that it would have been difficult to have sent troops through the crater in sufficient force to sustain the First Division i Page 102 102 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N C. [CHAP. ML advance on that hill; that the troops would have had, after all, to have been sent to the right and left of the crater, because, very soon after I was in the crater myself, the enemy were seen on the hill about the position we were to take and was moving troops to the right. A dozen rebels were seen in the corn-field. My brigade moved right on after the First Division, and after my fourth regiment had gone forward I went forward myself to the crater. The fifth regiment was then ordered forward and was going up. Question. Did you remain till the troops retired ~ Answer. Yes, sir. Question. Did they retire in confusion ~ Answer. Yes, sir. Question. Driven out~ Answer. They were driven out at the same time that I had passed the word to retire. It was a simultaneous thing. When they saw the assaulting eolumn within probably 100 feet of the works, I passed the word as well as it could be passed, for everybody to retire, and I left myself at that time. General Griffin and myself were together at that time. The order to retire we had indorsed to the effect that we thought we could not withdraw the troops that were there on account of the enfilad- ing fire over the ground between our rifle-pits and the crater without losing a great portion of them, that gronad being enfiladed with artillery and infantry fire. They had at that time brought their infantry down along their pits on both sides of the crater, so that their sharpshooters had good range, and were in good position. Ac- cordingly we requested that our lines should open with artillery and infantry, bear- ing on the right and left of the crater, under which fire we would be able to with- draw a greater portion of the troops, and, in fact, every one that could get away. While we were waiting for the approval of that indorsement and the opening of the fire this assaulting column of the enemy came up, and we concluded~General Grif- fin and myselfthat there was no use i.n holding it any longer, and so we retired. Bythe COURT: Question. What was the fault owing to-.owing to the orders that were given, or to the execution of those orders? Was it that the plan was bad, or that the troops or their commanders behaved badly? Answer. Not being familiar with all the orders and arrangements I could not say. So far as my own command was concerned we did all that we could do. Question. Could you have been ordered to have done it in a better way? Answer. I think if they had gone forward in line of battle it would have been successful. I consulted with General Bartlett, and General Griffin, and Colonel Humphrey, and we were all of the opinion that no more troops should be sent to the crater. After that the colored division passed right through the crater while we were in it. Question. How did those colored troops behave? Answer. They passed to the front just as well as any troops; but they were cer- tainly not in very good condition to resist an attack, because in passing through the crater they got confused; their regimental and company organization was com- pletely gone. Question. What general officers were in or about the crater on the enemys line during all this time? Answer. General Griffin, General Bartlett, and myself, of the Ninth Corps; and the general commanding the division of the Tenth Corps that was there (General Tur- ner). I did not see any others, although there might have been others there. TESTIMONY OF SURGEON CIIUBB. Snrg. 0. P. CITUBE, Twentieth Michigan Volunteers, Ninth Corps, being duly sworn, says to questions by JUDGE-ADVOCATE: Question. Were you at the assault on the 30th of July? Answer. I was Page 103 CHAP. LII.) THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 103 Question. State what you did there. Answer. I accompanied the Second Brigade of the Third Division of the Ninth Corps across the ravine and up to within ten rods of our breast-works, at the point where the troops passed through immediately after the explosion of the mine. I took position in a bomb-proof which had been used as some regimental headquarters, and remained there for the purpose of dressing wounds. This bomb-proof is located at a point aT~out ten rods in rear of our line. Shortly after I took up that posi- tion General Ledlie, of the First Division, and Ferrero, of the Fourth, came up to the front of the bomb-proof, and shortly afterward came in and took seats. This was in the morning about half an hour after the explosion of the mine. That was some time before the colored troops came up. The Third Division (General Wilicoxs) was then lying in a little dip of the groundlying flat upon the ground to avoid shelling at that point, and General Ledlies troops of the First Division had crossed over our breast-works and gone over to the fort immediately after the explosion. I saw them go up. I was where I could see the explosion and the movement of the troops as they passed over the space between our works and the fort. Our division, and our bri- gade of that division, remained in that position for some time. General Ledlie came there and sat down in front of the place where I was; remained there some little time, and afterward went inside and sat down. I could not tell how long, but not a great length of time after he came, General Ferrero came in. His troops were then lying in the covered way and on the flat. They had not yet come up to go into action. While things were in that position our Third Division made a move, charged over the works, some of them went to the fort and some, I believe, came back. Then General Ferrero had brought his division up to that point, and seemed to be waiting for some orders or movement. General Ledlie received orders in my hearing to move his troops for- ward from where they were then lying. The order came something like this, as near as I can recollect: The, general wishes you to move your troops forward to the crest of the hill and hold it. To the best of my recollection that was the meaning of the order, at least, and I think very near the words. I do not know who the order came from. It was brought by an officer, and I supposed that the general meant General Buruside. General Ledlie dispatched an aide or some other officer to order that done. Then shortly afterward came an order to General Ferrero to move his division through and charge down to the city. He replied that he would do so as soon as those troops were out of the way. He did not jesignate what troops, so that I understood those troops meant the troops that were already there, but this order came two or three times, and the last time it came the order was peremptory to move his troops forward at once. His answer to the order always was that he would do so as soon as those troops were out of the way, andwhenever General Fer- rero made that answer General Ledlie sent an aide to orderthe troops out of the way and see that it was done, so that it became my impression that it was his troops that were in the way. These two general officers were in the bomb-proof with me. General Led- lies troops were in the crater and General Ferreros were in the rear. After General Ferrero received this last, peremptory order, he went out, General Ledlie went out with him, and the colored troops commenced moving past the door of the bomb-proof as it was in the track that troops tookand moved up; and I stepped out and saw them go over our works just in front of where General Ledlies division passed over. Then they passed out of sight of where I was standing, but in a very short time I heard they were coming back, and, sure enough, they poured down all along in that vicinity with a good many white troops mixed with them. About that time Gen- eral Ferrero returned. I am not positive if General Ledlie returned or not, and in answer to somebody who asked him how the battle was going, General Ferrero said we had lost everything, or something to that effect; that we were repulsed. He said it was nonsense to send a single body of troops (colored or white) forward at one single place, in front of lines held by us, to throw them in the face of a re-enforced enemy, or an enemy who had opportunities to bring other forces to bear. General Ferrero said he thought his division was needlessly slaughtered. By the COURT: Question. IDid you see General Ledlie when his division advanced ~ Answer. No, sir; I did not. Our division was lying in the covered way at the point in our first line of works about opposite the fourteen-gun battery, as it is called, and I had passed up the line of the hill to the crest where I looked over the breast- work and saw those troops move forward, but I could not see everything distinctly because there was considerable distance across the ravine or hollow to his division. Question. Was there any conversation between those generals and yourself while they were in the bomb-proof bearing on this subject?. Answer. I asked General Ledlie, soon after he came in, if his division had been properly supported. The reason of my asking it was that I thought I heard som Page 104 104 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. LU. remark of his that led me to think it had not been, and besides I myself was en- tirely in the dark in regard to the delay, and so I asked him if his division had been properly snpported as it was intended, and he said it had. Question. iDid you liear him give any reason for the division halting ~ Answer. No, sir. From the efforts he made to have them ordered forward some- where I,jndg~d that it was contrary to his expectations that they did 4ialt. He fre- qnently sent up aides to have them moved forward somewhere, and from the order that came to him I ~npposed it was to the crest of the hill. The aide who brought the order said, The general wishes yon to move forward to the crest of the hill. Question. Do you know any reason why he was not with his troops himself? Answer. No, sir. Bnt during almost the last moments of his stay there he sent an aide to ascertain how things were going on, and remarked that he conid not go himself as he had been hurt in the side by a spent ball. I cannot state positively when this occurred; it seemed to be after 1 first saw him, but I recollect him having mentioned that fact quite late in the forenoon, nearly noon, for the first time. I have a strong impression that he came back there after General Ferreros troops moved forward, but I could not say so positively. TESTIMONY OF COL. H. G. THOMAS. Col. II. G. THOMAS, Nineteenth U. S. Colored Troops, being duly sworn, says to questions by JUDGE-ADVOCATE: Question. Were you at the assault on the 30th of July, and what was your command? Answer. I was at the assault on the 30th of July, and commanded the Second Bri- gade, Fourth Division, Ninth Corps (colored troops). Question. What was the formation of your troops iu going to the as- sault? Answer. The formation was by file left in front, which brought us faced by the rear rank when we made the charge. Question. The head of your troops struck the ene~ny~s line, where? Answer. I forced my brigade around the right of the crater, contrary to orders, because the crater was so full that no man could get throughthat is, I left two staff officers to force them through. I ~vent straight to the front and filed to the right, and went into these rifle-pits in the enemys line as far as the head of the Firsf Bri- gade of our division, which I was ordered to support. Question. Did you get beyond the line of the crater with your troops? Answer. I did sir. Question. flow far? Answer. I should say about between 300 and 400 yards to the right of the crater, and in front of it. I was ordered to support the First Brigade when it made its charge. Question. Did you get beyond the enemys line? Answer. I did, sir. I led a charge which was not successful. The moment I reached the head of the First Brigade I started out the Thirty-first Colored Regi- ment which was in front, but it lost its three ranking officers in getting in position, and did not go o~t well. Question. What, iu your opinion, were some of the causes of the fail- ure of the general assault on that day? Answer. So far as I can judge from my own stand-point, my utter inability to make a decent charge with my own brigade was the fact that the pits into which we were sent were entirely occupied by dead and dying rebel troops and our own, from the First Division of our corpsGeneral Ledlies. There was no room for us to move up. We were delayed, I should think, an hour and a half, in the covered way through which we moved, from the fact, so far as I can learn, that the First Division did not make the charge. We were to occupy the pits after they made the charge Page 105 CHAP. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 105 Question. Do you know why the First Division did not go forward 6? Answer. I do not, sir. Question. iDid you see any of the appliances for overcoming obstacles tnat usually accompany troopsworking parties with tools 6? Answer. I saw no such preparations to remove obstacles in the enemys line. I had no such assistance. Questiom Do you think the mode of marching up your command was a judicious onethe form I mean6 Answer. No, sir; it was injudicious, for two reasons. First, we moved up by the flank. That I consider injudicious. And secondly, we were ordered up left in front which made us face by the rear rank, which was not a satisfactory way of maneu- vering. Question. Was it a verbal or a written order, and by whom was it issued 6? Answer. It was a verbal order issued by General Ferrero about 11 oclock oii the night before. The order to me that night was to go np by division, follow the First Brigade, and to move left in front. But early in the morning I learned from a staff officer whom I sent out to tell me when the First Brigade moved, that it was filing along the covered way. My instructions were to follow the First Brigade. I was detained at least an hour and a half in the covered way by the troops in front, and by the order ot~the assistant inspector-general of the corps. He, finding the pits into which we were to go full of troops, suspended the other order until lie could see General Burnside. Question. How did your particular command retire from the front 6? Answer. In confusion. Question. Driven 6? Answer. Driven back by a charge of the enemy. Question. And not by any orders 6? Answer. No, sir; they received no orders. They were ordered to stop by myself and all my staff officers who were in the pits. When I got into this position on the right of the crater the fire was very severe; there was also a very severe enfilading fire from the right. I attempted one charge without success the moment I reached there. I could not get more than fifty men out. I sent word to General Buruside by Major Van Buren, of his staffas he was the only staff officer I saw in the pits except my ownthat unless a movement was made to the right to stop the enfilading fire not a man could live to reach the crest; but that I should try another charge in ten minutes, and hoped I would be supported. In about eight minutes I received a written order from General Ferrero in pretty near these words, Colonels Sigfried and Thomas, commanding First and Second Brigades: If you have not already done so, you will immediately proceed to take the crest in your front. It was signed in the ordinary official manner, By order of General Ferrero: George A Hicks ,cap- tam and assistant adjutant-general. I cannot produce that order because I de- stroyed it when I was captured in Petersburg. Colonel Sigfried had, I think, already received it as he was in the crater. I sent word to Colonel Sigfrieds brigade, on my right, where I supposed the colonel to be, that I was about to charge, that we shonid go over with a yell, and that I hoped to be supported. I went over with two re,,iments and part of a third, but I was driven back. The moment they came back the white troops in the pits all left and they after them. I was not supported at all in my charge. Question. Where was the division commander all this time 6? Answer. I do not know. When I went up with my brigade he was in the bomb- proof on the left, with the commanding officer of the First Division. Generals Will- cox, Ledlie, and Ferrero were in the bomb-proof on the left. Question. Was the bomb-proof a good place to see what was going on 6? Answer. No, sir; there wei~e places near there where something could be seen, but the earth about the crater prevented almost anything being seen immediately to the left of it. The dirt was thrown up very high. There were I t places near there where a view could be got. , hink, however Page 106 106 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. 0. [CHAP. LII. Question. From what you know of affairs that day is it your opinion that the assault ought to have been successful if the troops engaged in it had performed their duty? Answer. Going up so late as I did I am not a good j adge, but I think, from what I could see at the late hour at which I got in, that if the division that went in first had gone ahead there is no question of our taking the crest on that ridge (Cemetery Bill), hardly with the loss of a man. We waited in the covered way over an hour with almost no musketry on our right. We were detained there; we could not get up. By the COURT: Question. iDid you ever go over that ground afterward? AnAwer. I did, sir. Question. Under what circumstances? Answer. I went over it two days afterward, the 1st of August, when the flag of truce was out. Question. iDid you see anything in the nature of the enemys defenses that would change the opinion you formed on the day of the assault? Answer. No, sir. Question. IDid you see any obstacles in the nature of the ground? Answer. No, sir. Question. Did you ha~ie an opportunity of seeing what the enemy had on the top of Cemetery Hill? Answer. No, sir; I did not have an opportunity of seeing just what they might have had there. Question. Did you see any works there? Answer. No, sir; I did not think there were any. Question. How did the colored troops behave? Answer. They went up as well as I ever saw troops go upwell closed, perfectly enthusiastic. They came back very badly. They came back on a run, every man for himself. It is but justice to the line officers to say that more than two-thirds of them were shot, and to the colored troops that the white troops were running back just ahead of them. TESTIMONY OF COL. CHARLES S. RUSSELL. Col. CHARLES S. RUSSELL, Twenty-eighth U. S. Colored Troops, being duly sworn, says to questions by JUDGE-ADVOCATE: Question. Were you at the assault on the 30th? Answer. Yes, sir. Question. And what was your command? Answer. I was a lieutenant-colonel, commanding six companies of the Twenty- eighth U. S. Colored Troops, Thomas brigade, of Ferreros division. Question. IDid your command participate in the assault? Answer. Yes, sir; we left the covered way to make the assault before 5 oclock, and 10 minutes after S part of my regiment, with two others, went over the outside of the enemys line into what seemed to be a covered way beyond, to go to Cemetery Hill; mine was to have been third in order, but it became second. Question. How far in advance did you get toward Cemetery Hill? Answer. Not exceeding fifty yards ; we were driven back. Question. By what? Answer. I should judge by about from 200 to 400 men (infantry) which rose up from a little ravine and charged us. Being all mixed up, and in confusion, and new troops, we had to come back Page 107 CEAP. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 107 Question. Do you think you could liave maintained yourself in that - position if you had been supported by troops that were known to have been in the crater at that time? Answer. No, sir; I do not think we could, considering our condition. There were no two companies together. The officers were shot down and the troops were very much dispirited. They were all in tjiere just as thick as they could possibly stick. The orders were to advance and take the crest of that hill at once, and I went right over with all the men I could gather, supposing that all the rest would follow. Not more than 150 or 200 men out of the three regiments went outside. Question. Did your troops sustain a good deal of loss in that affair? Answer. Yes, sir; I lost nearly half; and 7 officers out of 11. By the COURT: Question. Do you think that if you had advanced on the right or left of the crater, where the ground was more practicable, you would have done better? Answer. Yes, sir; I think that if.we had gone up there an hour before we could have carried the crest, for there was but little musketry fire at that time. Question. Where were you during that interval? Answer. In the covered way in rear of a battery of 4j-inch guns. Question. Was the division commander around there? Answer. The division commander was at the head of the division. I saw him when we went into the crater. I passed him and spoke to him. He was then on the left of the first line of rifle-pits built by our peopleI mean the most advanced line of rifle-pits. Question. What did Colonel Sigfrieds brigade do? Answer. That brigade, instead of going into the crater, as near as I can tell, seemed to file to the right. At least that was my impressio~i. Question. Did they go over the enemy~s breast-works? Answer. I do not know, sir; my impression is that they did not. Question. I mean the breast-works of which the crater was a contin- uation. Answer. No, sir; I do not think they did. By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE: Question. Did you form any opinion as to the cause of that failure? Answer. Yes, sir. Question. What was it? Answer. Delay. It was Lieutenant-General Grant who moved us up, about 5 oclock, for we had not started from our bivouac in those woods at 5 oclock. Gen- eral Grant rode up and asked what brigade that was, and what it was doing there. That wns some time after the explosion of the mine and the cannonading had com- menced. General Grant told us to move on. The order was not given to me directly; it was given to Colonel Thomas. Then we moved into the coiered way and remained there till 8 oclock. The Court adjourned to meet at 11 oclock on the 2d of September. ELEVENTH DAY. SEPTEMBER 2, 1864. The Court met pursuant to adjournment. Present, Major-General Hancock, Brigadier-Generals Ayres and Miles, and Colonel Schriv~r, judge-advocate. The proceedings of the tenth day were read and approved Page 108 108 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N~ C. tOHAP. LII. TESTIMONY OF GENERAL AMES. Brig. Gen. A. AMES, U. S. Volunteers, being (lilly sworn, says, in answer to questions by JUDGE-ADVOCATE: Question. Were you present at the assault on the 30th of July, and what ~ras your command~ Answer. Yes, sir; I was present where I could see the last part of it. I had a division of the Eighteenth Army Corps. Question. Did your troops experience any interference from the Ninth Corps in moving into position in rear on that occasion ~ Answer. Not directly. My division was a support. I understood from the com- manding officer of the corps that my troops were held in reserve for any emergency that might arise or a battle that might be fought after we had taken possession of the heights, and at no time were my troops farther advanced than the woods in rear of our own works. At one time I was ordered to take my division in to support General Turners. The idea was that he was to advance, and I was to carry my di- vision in on his right, being careful not to get in in advance of him, so as to have his left flank interfered with. Upon receiving the order I un(lerstood that I was expected to move to the front through the covered way, but I found that there was still a brigade of General Turners division -in reserve, and as I passed through the covered way I saw that it was blocked up by one of General Turners brigades. As it was intended that I should go to the front with my troops, I first went to see what kind of ground I was to pass over, and found that the covered way was blocked up by troops, as well as in some places by wounded coming to the rear, and in others by men carrying ammunition to the front. When I got to our most advanced position beyond the creek, or bottom, I found that General Turner had a hrigade massed there, and that there were evidently more troops in front than could be well handled. I had a conversation with General Turner, and the state of affairs was such that we thought it desirable that General Ord, from whom we received our orders, should know that it was impossible for us to move to the front at once, going down through the covered way, as he intended that we should. I immediately wrote a note to Gen- eral Ord, requesting him to come down to the front and see the state of affairs for himself; otherwise his orders would probably not be obeyed. I went to the rear and found him, and came down to the front with him, and he then decided that our troops, at least that my division, should not move forward. - Question. Were the arrangements that were made for the passage of troQps through the abatis near the parapet to go to the front adequate? Answer. I think not. I did not examine it in particular, but I was down there when part of General Turners command went to the front, and, having nothing else to do, I drove some of his men over the parapet, and I found that they experienced great difficulty in getting through the abatis. The place that I refer to was at our right of the mine. Question. State some of the causes for the failure of the assault on that occasion, in your opinion. Answer. I then formed the opinion (and I have not seen any cause to change it) that at the time I was there a clear head, where it could see what was going on and see the difficulties at the front, might have corrected a great many of the faults that then existed. I think the trouble was no one person at the front who was responsi- ble, in con sequence of which there was no unity of action. It took a long time for commanders in the front to communicate with those in the vicinity of the fourteen- gun battery in the rear, on the top of the high hill. My idea is that everybody ap- peared to be acting for himself with no particular determination to go any. farther than he was compelled to. So far as I could see when I arrived there, that appeared to be the state of the case. Question. Will you, as far as your observation goes, remark upon the formation of the troops as they went forward, and also as to their prep- aration with all things needful for pushing over the enemys line of works and establishing them on the farther side. Answer. I remained in the rear with my troops until I was ordered to advance, and at this time part of the Tenth Corps had already advanced to our most advanced work Page 109 CHAP. LH.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 109 and the rest, as I stated, were in the covered way; and I did not see any of the Ninth Corpsthe white troops of itmake any movements whatever. They had all moved forward and occupied the crater before I had gone to the front, so that I am ignorant of their formation. I know that the colored troops went down the covered way before the division of the Tenth Corps. It was my opinion, the case bein as it was, that the division of the Tenth Corps should not have passed down the cov- ered way; thaVthey might have passed down the hill to the bottom, then passed over our works, and then up over the open ground toward the enemys. I think all the troops should have gone that way. The massing of our troops at our most ex- treme advanced position, and then, crowded as they were, forming them for an advance created more or less confusion. It would be likely to do so among the best of troops, and certainly it did in the Ninth Corps. I was going to remark that it was my opinion that instead of waiting to have moved down the covered way, it would have been proper for me to have avoided the covered way and moved over the open ground. There was very little fire upon that ground, and the enemy could have probably brought but little there at best; and I think the division could have been moved down the hill and up over the open ground without serious lossno more than might be expected; and then the troops would have been already in position to have acted with some considerable vigor, and with a reasonable hope of adequate results. Question. IDo you know of, or did you see, anything like fascines, gabions, or such things as are generally used and considered necessary, indeed, for an affair of that kind on the ground~ Answer. No, sir. When I saw the difficulty of passing our troops from our most advanced work to the crater, and saw that there was a little depression where the ground rose on each side of it (not much to be pure, but almost enough to cover the troops), I recommended to my superiors, General Ord, and also his staff, that men with shovels should go out and throw up, certainly on the left of the crater, on a little rising ground, a rifle-pit or breast-work to cover our men so that they could pass from our line of works to the crater without danger; but I learned that there were no tools there for any such work, but it was concluded that these tools should be obtained, and afterward Captain Farquhar, of the Engineers, told me that he had sent for these tools, and that they woul~I go to work and make this covered way, but before anything could be accomplished the troops were running back. Question. IDo you think the plan for the assault was one that with ordinary diligence and skill the assault ought to have been successful? Answer. I dont see how ordinary troops, with good commanders and one head to direct, could have possibly failed under the circumstances. It was necessary4jziat some one person should be present to direct the various movements and make them one operation. If there had been perhaps the result would have been different. Question. Do you think it would have been any benefit to our arms to have held the crater simply? Answer. That I think would depend upon our ultimate object. I think it would have been no use to have held the crater if we had remained inactive, or on the de- fensive, as we have done since. If it was our intention to work up to the crest by mining it would have been so many hundred yards to our advantage. Question. Would it not have been difficult to hold the place in con- sequence of the fire that could have been brought to bear upon it; is not that the re-entrant point in the line? Answer. Yes, sir. The enemys fire, at least as I saw it, was at least a semi-circle that is, a continuation of the line of fire from one side in the direction of the crater would strike the enemys works on the other, making the line of fire a semi- circle. Question. You regard the order to withdraw the troops at the time it ~vas given a judicious one, do you? Answer. I think so, under the circumstances. I understood -that the troops in the crater did not move forward; and that being the case, the sooner they went back the better Page 110 110 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N C. [CHAP. LIL TESTIMONY OF COL. H. L. ABBOT. Go]. H. L. ABBOT, First Connecticut Artillery, being duly sworn, says to questions by JUDGE-ADVOCATE: Question. Did you participate in the assault on the 30th of July, and what was your commaud, and what were your particular duties at that time? Answer. I did participate in the as~ault. I was in command of all the heavy guns and mortars, eighty-one in all. I remained most of the time on the left, in charge of the mortar batteries especially. We expected fire from the enemys salient, and I had sixteen mortars to keep it down, and I remained chiefly there and by Van Reeds battery. Question. Do you regard the artillery fire on that occasiou as very effective, and was it what it ought to have been, and what it was meant to be? Answer. I do, sir; I think it accomplished all we hoped to do. Question. Were there at any point obstacles to the fire of the artil- lery which ought to have been removed? Answer. Yes, sir; in front of what we call the fourteen-gun battery. Qucstion. Please to state What they were. Answer. This battery is nearly in front of the mine, and some trees were growing a little to its left, which masked the fire of the guns upon the next rebel battery to our left of the mine. These trees it w~is our wish to have removed. They had not been when the battery was first established, because we did not wish to show the enemy what we were doing. As soon as the six 4j-inoh guns were in position, I was anxious to have them cleared away. Question. What measures did you take to effect that? Answer. I had on several occasions conversations with General Burnside on the sub- ject, in which I referred to the necessity of their being cleared away before we could use the battery to advantage. On the night of the 27th working parties were ordered by him to cut the trees, but they were driven off after accomplishing very little. On the jmight of the 28th I represented the matter to General Hunt, chief of artillery, at the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac. I went with him to the telegraph office when he telegraphed General Buruside, I should think about 7 oclock in the evening, urging him to have the trees removed. One of my captains (Captain Pratt), who commanded the battery, was so desirous of haying his field of fire clear that he took some of his own company and cut partially that night. No working parties coming, on the night of the 29th the matter was again raisedby whom I do not knowbut General Burnside declined to have an~ trees cut on that night, lest it might give the rebels an idea of the attack. But a party was formed which did begin to cut as soon as the mine exploded. It partially but not entirely cleared away the trees, and the guns were enabled to do some service, but they could not see one flanking gun, which did us a good deal of harm. I could not see myself from where I was exactly what that gun was doing. I received orders from General hunt, I should think about 7.30 oclock, but I cannot be sure as to the exact time, to try to turn some of my mortars upon it, as it was making trouble. I did so, and made some good shots in that direction, bnt I do not think the fire of the gun was stopped. The battery was too far off. The trees that were removed were removed partly by my men and partly by the negroes. Question. Were you in a situation to tell the Court whether the artil- lery fire of the enemy was at all effective and how soon after the explo- sion of the mine? Answer. It would be very difficult to state positively, on account of the smoke ~d the noise of our own guns. I do not think that they fired any guns for nearly an hour. I could not detect any, although I was watching carefully at Van Reeds battery, so as to make any alteration in our fire that might be necessary. I am sure they did not fire from the place we expected it mostin front of the Fifth Corps. I do not think they fired during the day from here to do any damage. They fired a few shots, however. They fired from a 30-pounder at our battery, which, of course, did no Page 111 CHAP. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 111 amount to anything. This gun was on the plank road. Over on .the right I could not form any exact idea of what they were doing, but I could see that there was cer- tainly no heavy firing. There were only a few straggling shots in that direction. Where we most feared the fire we did not get any at all. The firing that they did, according to the reports I have received, was from a light battery on the crest, and it was once moved from its position by our mortar batteries on onr right near the left of the Eigl~eenth Corps. We expected fire from the two flanks, and we had a heavy fire of mortars to stop both fires. TESTIMONY OF GEN,ERAL MOTT. Brig. Gen. G. MOTT, U. S. Volunteers, being d& Iy sworn, says to questions by JUDGE-ADVOCATE: Question. Will you state to the Court what time and under what cir- cumstances you relieved the Eighteenth Corps previous to the assault on Petersburg? Answer. I left across the James River on the night of the 28th of July. I crossed the river at 9 oclock, and one of General Ords aides met me and putme in position before daylight next morning. As soon as it was dark on the night of the 29th I relieved the Eighteenth Corps and one division of the Tenth in the intrenchments, and com- pleted the operation about 11 oclock. Question. What did General Ord say to you as to the practicabihty of making an assault in your front in connection with the operation of the mine? Answer. He wished me to say to General Hancock (and he said that he had also tele- graphed to General Meade) that it was not practicable to make an assault there, on acconnt of a good abatis being in front of the enemys works, and on account of their being well wired, so that it was impossible for th~ men to get through. Question. During the assault of General Burnside through the crater and subsequent to that time did you make any examination to see whether the enemy had left your front or not? Answer. Yes, sir. Question. What was the result? Answer. I sent a staff officer to each brigade commander to instruct them to make a demonstration to see if the enemy had left. General Dc Trobriand, commanding the First Brigade, attempted to advance his pickets which he had out. In doing so he had 1 officer and 15 men hilled. Colonel Madill, commanding the Second Brigade, said he had a position from which he could see if any one left his front, and not a man left since daylight. Colonel McAllister, commanding the Third Brigade, made a demonstration by sounding the bngle for a charge, and snapped some caps, and he immediately received a volley from the enemys works. He had no pickets out in the daytime. Question. What time was this? Answer. I Think it was about 7 oclock; about the time Igot a dispatch when Gen- eral Buruside reporfed that the enemy had left his front. The Court then adjourned to meet at 10 oclock on the 3d of September. TWELFTH DAY. SEPTEMBER 3, 1864. The Court met pursuant to adjournment. Present, Major-General Hancock, Brigadier-Generals Ayres and Miles, and Colonel Schriver, judge-advocate. After taking testimoiiy~of all the witnesses present on this day the proceedings of the eleventh day were read and approved Page 112 F[CHAP LII. 112 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. MAJOR DUANERECALLED. Question. Were there pontoon trains, sand-bags, & c., in readiness at convenient points near the place of assault on the 30th of Jnly, as ordered by Major-General Meade? Ans er. There were. Question. Were engineer officers detailed for each corps ~ Answer. There were. Question. You stated in your former testimony that you were near the Fifth Corps at the time of the assault. Were there arrangements made for passing the field artillery through the works in front of that corps ~ Answer. I think not. I did not understand that it was part of the plan that the troops of the Fifth Corps should advance through that part of their froat. They were to have advanced on the Ninth Corps front. I nuderstood it was intended that they should pass through the enemys lines opposite the left of the Niath Corps. I had no conversation with General Meade on that subject. I merely inferred it from what I had heard. Question. Were the pioneers equipped for destroying the enemys abatis, and were intrenching tools in readiness for use when required for the Fifth Corps in their progress against the rebel lines ~ Answer. I do not know. The pioneers were not under my orders. Question. Why did not the engineer department take charge of the engineering operations and be responsible for their execution ~ Answer. General Buruside took charge of the operations, and I was directed b~ General Meade not to interfere with them. I had once or twice attempted to send officers to direct the operations and General Buruside would not allow them to do so. TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT-COLONEL BARNES. Lient. Col. JOSEPH II. BARNES, Twenty-ninth Massachusetts Volun- teers, being duly sworn, says to questions by JUDGE-ADVOCATE: Question. Were you in the crater at the assault on the 30th of July, and what was your command ~ Answer. No, sir; I was not in the crater. Question. Were you near it ~ Answer. I was near iton the outside. Question. In what formation did your command go forward ~ Answer. It will be necessary to state that I did not go forward with my command proper. On the night previous I was in command of the division picket, and on the picket being relieved, in accordance with orders I had received, I followed my com- mand, but did not reach my command proper until after they had moved forward to the assault. I went forward to the crater at the head of the troops of the Fourth Division (colored troops). Question. What was the condition of things in or about the crater when you arrived there ~ Answer. When I arrived at the crater the negro troops were pouring through the opening down into the crater. I hesitated about going in there with them (there was so much confusion at the bottom of the crater), and I remained outside with a captain who had been brigade officer of the day, who was with me. We remained outside the crater until all the negro troops had passed in; then, my orders being to join my command, and seeing a color in the earth-works about 100 yards to the right of the crater, I moved to the right, supposing it might be my color, keeping all the time about 100 yards from the ditch. Arriving at that point, I found it wa Page 113 CHAP. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 113 not my regimental color, but meeting the commanding officer of the Thirteenth In- diana Regiment, of the Tenth Corps, I stopped to converse with him. There were in front of me at this time, lying ontside the earth-works, negro troops in two linesthat is to say, four deep. They were lying on their faces in line of battle immediately on the ontside of the ditch. Directly in front of them was another line of negro troops, in the ditch, mingled with the white troops of the First Division. I did not go into the crater because I was desirous, if possible, of learning where my regiment was be- fore getting iii. In justice to myself, I might say that it wns a much more exposed position outside the ditch than it was inside, but. as I said before, I desired to find my regiment first. Bnt being unable to do so, I had determined to go in and look for it in the ditch. Just as I was about to step forward, about half a dozen officers of the iiegro troops rose up and attempted to get their commands out of the work, for the pnrpose of advancing I should judge, although I knew nothing of what the move- ments were to be, and therefore only judged so from their actions. About 200 men (white and black) rose right in my front, their officers attempting, as I understood, to advance them, but they immediately fell back, and thereupon the two lines of negro troops that had been lying in front of me near ~he ditch rose to their feet and went back to the rear, marching over the Thirteenth Indiana Regiment, which re- mained in its position. This was about 100 yards on the right of the crater. Question. The white troops in the crater belonged to what division? Answer. They belonged to the First Division (General Ledlies). Question. State to the Court, if you know, or give your opinion as to why they hesitated or stopped in the crater and did not go forward. Answer. Of my own knowledge I do not know. Question. Did any of the troops of the First Division get beyond the crater toward the enemy? Answer. I do not know. Question. In your opinion how did this hesitation or rest in the crater affect the result of the action? Answer. In my opinion it affected it in this manner: The hesitation and the length of time consumed in reorganizing or rearranging the men for moving forward enabled the enemy immediately in front to be prepared not only for our advance, which they were, but to advance against ns, which they did. Question. iD& you know whether the division and brigade command- ers were present when the troops halted in the crater? Answer. No, sir; I do not know of niy own knowledge. By the COURT: Question. How many troops were there in those two lines which lay just along the enemys rifle-pit? Answer. The number from the crater to a short distance to my right was, I should judge, 600 or 700, possibly more. I could not say how many more there might be because of the nature of the ground, there being a descent in the ground beyond which I could not see. Question. Did they at any time charge up the slope toward Cemetery Hill? Answer. They did not to my knowledge. Question. When they rose up and went to the rear, in what order did they ~o? Answer. In disorder. Question. Were those troops again brought forward that day? Answer. Not to my knowledge. Some of them were rallied in rear of the next line in the rear. 8 R RYOL XL, ]!T Page 114 114 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. LII, TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT-COLONEL ROBINSON. Lient. Col. GILBERT P. ROBINSON, Third Maryland Battalion, being duly sworn, says to questions by JUDGE-ADVOCATE: Question. Were you in the crater at the assault on the 30th of July, and what was your command on that occasion? Answer. I was in the crater at the assault, and I formed part of the third line making the assault. The brigade was in three lines. I belonged to the Second Bri- gade of the First Division. - Question. In what formation did your command go forward? Answer. In column by battalions. Question. Did any of your troops get beyond the crater? Answer. Yes, sir; some of them did. My brigade went to the right of the crater to the breast-work in front of the battery, which was in accordance with the orders from Colonel Marshall the night before. Question. Did the mass of the troops of the First Division halt in the crater ani about it, or did they go forward toward the crest? Answer. I did not see any of them go forward toward the crest. A majority of them went through the crater perpendicular to our front. I kept to the right. Question. You know the fact that those troops halted there? Answer. Yes, sir. Question. Do you know why they halted? Answer. I could not positively say why, without it was in consequence of the ground being so small, and so many of them getting together in the crater. There was great confusion in the crater. Question. Was there not plenty of ground in frontwhy did they not go? Answer. Yes, sir; I cannot answer about what transpired on the left. I went to the right and kept up a fire, and advanced as far as I could until I got to an angle in the works which was held by the rebels. I used the Spencer rifle upon them. The battalion numbered only fifty-six men. Question. Was there confusion at that point of attack, or were the troops in any order? Answer. I could not see any order at all. There was nothing but confusion in the crater. What was in the covered way beyond the crater toward Petersburg I could not say. Question. Did you have an opPortunity of observing whether efforts were made by division and brigade officers to relieve the troops from this disorder? Answer. Yes, sir; every effort that could be made was made by Colonel Marshall and myself, for he had given orders that I should l)e obeyed, as I was next in com- mand. I saw no division commander in the crater at the time. Question. What was the cause of this confusion that you say existed in the crater? Answer. I cannot assign any reason for the confusion if it was not as I said the ground being so much torn up and the place being so small, and when they got in there the fire was pretty strong. Question. What was the nature of the enemys fire at that time, heavy or otherwise? Answer. When we got there the fire was not so strong as it was half an hour after- ward Page 115 CRAP. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 115 Question. What kind of fire was it, artillery or musketry? Answer. Both. I would call it a moderate fire. I do not thuiik the heavy fire com- menced until after 8 oclock. I think we had fire there from their mortar batteries. TESTIMONY OF MAJOR RANDALL. Maj. GEORGE M. IRANDALL, Fourteenth New York Heavy Artillery, being duly sworn, says to questions by JUDGE-ADVOCATE: Questioii. Were you in or about the crater on the 30th of July, and what was your command 0? Answer. I was in the crater, and was acting aide to General Ledlie. Question. In what formation did your division go forward? Answer. It went forward as I should judge by the flank. They did not go forward in solid column as we expected they would do. Question. Do you know any reason why they did not? Answer. No, sir. Question. Were you near the head of the column, or were you among the first that got into the crater? Answer. I was about the second line. I was ordered by General Ledlie to go for- ward with the advancing column. Question. Had you an opportunity of observing why the troops halted in the crater? Answer. Yes, sir. I saw the Fourteenth New York and the Second Pennsylvania Heavy Artillery pass through the crater and occupy traverses in rear of the fort. And there they remained. Question. Were efforts made to urge them forward according to the plan? Answer. Yes,sir. Question. And at a time, too, when they were not in disorder? Answer. They were very much in disorder when they arrived at the crater. That was just the difficulty. If the reginients had been in their proper places when they arrived at the crater we would have taken the crest of the hill, but they were scat- tered, and it was impossible to get any of the regiments together. Colonel Robinson and myself attempted to get theni forward, but could not do so. Question. While this was going on was there a fire of any account from the enemy? Answer. No, sir; there was not much when we first advance(l in there. Question. Please to state in your opinion what it arose from. Answer. I c nnot tell exactly. I suppose it was because when the mine exploded they were so much excited, for when the mine exploded they hardly knew what they were doing. It appbared to be the opinion of all who were there that immediately after the explosion one good regiment in solid column could have gone forward with- out any difficulty. But we were in there only a short time when the enemy opened on our right and left. Question. Was the division commander present during this con- fusion? Answer. Not in the crater. Question. It is your opinion that this hesitation affected the result of the action? Answer. Yes, sir Page 116 116 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. (ChAr. LII. Question. Do you know whether there were any pioneers with tools or engineer troops with fascines or gabions ready to come forward to crown the crest in the event of yonr getting up on Cemetery Hill ~ Answer. I think I saw the Twenty-fifth ~Thirty-flfth] Massachusetts (First Divis- ion), with shovels and spades; I cannot positively say bnt I think I saw them there somewhere. By the COURT: Questiou. To all appearances were the rebels awake and vigilant before and up to the time of the springing of the mine, or were they apparently asleep and unprepared l Answer. They appeared to he awake. When I was on the first linethe line that General Willeoxs division oecnpiedshots were continually fired by the enemy from the fort before the mine exploded; they came from the right or left, at least from the immediate vicinity of the fort. Question. Are you certaiu they came from the enemy l Answer. Yes, sir; I am positive of it. Question. Where was the division commander during the assanltl Answer. He was in rear of the first linethe line occupied by General Willeoxs troops. I carried orders to him and found him always in rear of the first line, sit- ting down behind the parapet. Question. Do you know any reason why General Ledlie was not with his division in front l Answer. No, sir. TESTIMONY OF COLONEL MONROE. Col. J. A. MONROE, First Rhode Island Artillery, being duly sworn, says to questions by JUDGE-ADVOCATE: Question. Were you at the assault on the 30th of July, and in what capacity did you serve l Answer. I was there as chief of artillery of the Ninth Army Corps. Question. What preparations were made, such as making openings, for passing field artillery through oar line of works when it should be- come necessary in the front l Answer. No such preparations were made to my knowledge. Question. What preparations were made for unmasking our artillery, such as cutting (lown the trees and obstructions there were in front l Answer. No preparations had been made immediately before the explosion. Some had been made weeks before. The trees in front of what is known as the heavy work were left standing until the morning of the 30th, directly after the explosion of the mine, when a few of the trees were cut down. Question. Do you understand that some of the batteries were masked by those trees? .Answer. They were not exactly masked, but the trees obstructed the fire of the batteries. Question. Were you aware that the Fifth Corps artillery was to find its way to the front through openings that were to be made in the Ninth Corps front? Answer. No, sir. Question. What have you to say about the fire of the enemys artil. lery, as to its commencement and its formidableness on that day Page 117 CHAP. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 117 Answer. It was not severe at all at first. Half or three-quarters of an hour after- it might have possibly been an hourthey had a battery firing which enfiladed our line on the right. That fire came apparently from one or two guns on Cemetery Hill. By the CoURT: Question. What troops occupied that line? Answer. I think it was the First Division of the Ninth Corps, which had endeav- ored to move up toward the crest of Cemetery Hill, by the way of the Chimneys, where there is another battery. The fire of the enemys hattery on Cemetery Hill was not formidable, because the heavy battery of ours kept it almost completely silenced. Question. Had those trees been removed, could our batteries have played on the enemys guns on our right of the crater, which were firing across the plain over which our troops were to charge? Answer. Yes, sir. They could also have fired upon a battery in the edge of the woods, almost in front of the crater, that was enfilading our line. Question. What is the reason the trees were not cut down? Answer. I called General Burusides attention to it three weeks before. I went to the general the night before the explosion of the mine, and tried to get a large party to cut those trees down, and he said no trees should be cut down until the mine should have exploded. I asked him for a detail, and he gave me eighty men, which were to be set at work immediately after-the explosion of the mine. I put them to work, two men to a large tree and one man to a small one, and they commenced cutting, but only a few trees were cut down, the party was so small. TESTIMONY OF CAPTAIN GREGG. Capt. THEODORE GREGG, Forty-fifth Pennsylvania Volunteers, Ninth Corps, being duly sworn, says to questions by JUDGE-ADVOCATE: Question. Were you at the assault on the 30th of July, and what was your command? Answer. I was at the assault on the 30th of July. My command was the Foxty- fifth Pennsylvania Veteran Volunteers, First Brigade, Second Division, Ninth Army Corps. Question. State brk~fiy what you observed about the operations on that day. Auswer. My regiment was in the intreuchments opposite the rebel fort that was blown up. About 3.30 oclock on the morning of the assault I received orders from Captain Raymond, aide to Colonel Bliss, commanding the brigade, to leave part of the regiment deployed as skirmishers and go back with the remainder to the edge of the woodlands and form on the right of the Fourth Rhode Island, and remain there until further orders. When the explosion took place I was ordered by Captain Peckham, who was also an aide to Colonel Bliss, to follow the Fourth Rhode Island. We marched by the flank, left in front, through the covered way. On arriving at our front line of works opposite the crater the order was given to double-quick across the open plain. On arriving in front of the rebel works we found several regiments lying down on the ground, and a great many men killed and wounded. I then received orders to charge across the crater; I gave the command face by the right flank, in order to march in line of battle; and on arriving at the edge of the crater I faced again by the left flank, and marched in single file around and in rear of the crater. The crater was filled with the troops of the First and Second Divis- ions of the Ninth Army Corps. General Bartlett, commanding the First Brigade, First Division, General Griffin, commanding the Second Brigade, Second Division, and General Hartranft, were in the crater. They appeared to be endeavoring to rally the troops for the purpose of charging forward to some buildings about 400 yards in rear of the crater toward Petersburg, and I believe on Cemetery Hill. I was ordered by General Bartlett to charge across the plain and secure those build- ings so that we could use them to operate as sharpshooters against the enemys artillery. At the same time Captain Peckham ordered me to form in line of battle and then charge down in rear of the enemys line of rifle-pits on the rightthat is to face by the rear rank and charge the enemy in the rifle-pits on the right. As soo Page 118 118 OPERATIONS IN SE VA. AND N. C. (CHAP. LII. as they should see the colors of the Forty-fifth other regiments of the First Brigade of the Second DMsion were to charge forward. As soon as I had the regiment formed in line I received an order from General Griffin ~nd other officers to charge to the left of the crater in order to create a diversion in favor of other regiments of the Second Brigade. The crater was filled with troops. Question. What troops were they? Answer. I knew them to be troops of the First and Second Divisions by seeing General S. G. Griffin and other officers, as well as men whom 1 had known before. They were very nuich mixed up and could not be got forward by their officers. Some officers attempted to rally them and some did not. Question. Was there any firing at this time? Answer. There was. The enemys fire could not reach the men in the crater, but there was heavy firing at this time in front of the crater from field-pieces about those buildings. The enemy also had an enfilading fire of artillery from the fort, situated on our left, and from another battery on our left and at a deep cut in the railroad. I received so many orders from so many different commanders at that time that I did not know which to obey. Question. Where was your division commander? Answer. I do not know where he was. I did not see the division commander there at any time during the action. I understood that he was on the ground. He might have been there and in the confusion I not have seen him. Neither did I see our brigade commander. General Potter was our division conimander and Colonel Bliss our brigade commander. TESTIMONY OF SURGEON SMITH. Surg. H. E. SMITH, Twenty-seventh Michigan Volunteers, Ninth Corps, being duly sworn, says to questions by JUDGE-ADVOCATE: Question. Were you at the assault on the 30th of July, and in what capacity? Answer. I was in ~harge of the surgeons on the field of the Third Division, to see that the wounded were attended to and taken to the rear. Question. Had you an opportunity on that occasion of observing any of the military movements? Answer. Nothing more than seeing troops advance over our breast-works. I wa~ there when the colored troops were ordered to advaiLce, and heard General Burusides aide give repeated orders to General Ferrero to take his troops up and charge toward Petersburg. I think he gave the order three times. The third order General Burn- side sent to General Ferrero was an imperative order to advance. To the previous orders General Ferrero would make the answer thnt the other troops were in his way and he could not possibly advance while they were there an taken out of the way he would go ahead. , d if they would be Question. General Ferrero was present? Answer. Yes, sir. Question. Any other generals? Answer. General Ledlie was present. Those were the only generals I saw. Question. Did General Ledlie make any reply that you heard when this order was given to General Ferrero? Answer. I did not hear him make any reply or any statement on the subject of that order from General Buruside. Question. What troops did you understand General Ferrero to allude to as being in the way? Answer. I did not understand. I supposed they were those troops that had made the charge. The general was in front of a bomb-proof, which had been used as a regimental headquarters, and was situated about ten or twelve yards, as near as I could judge, in rear of the work. This bomb-proof was fronting to the rear Page 119 CHAP. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 119 Question. Did General Ferrero leave that place and accompany his troops to the front when they left~ Answer. He did. General Ledlie, I think, left the bomb-proof for a very short time. That was about the time of the stampede of the darkeys. Then, I think, both General Ledlie and General Ferrero returned about that time. I am not positive, however, for I was busy seeing that the wounded were being attended to. General Ledlie asked me for stimulants, and said he had the malaria and was struck by a spent ball. He inquired for General Bartlett, as he wanted to turn the command over to him and go to the rear. It was one of General Bartletts aides, I believe, who replied that he was iii the crater. Question. You say that during the stampede Generals Ferrero and Ledlie returned to the bomb-proof. How long did they remain there? Answer. General Ferrero remained a very short time. He was exhausted. I think he came in for the purp6se of getting some stimulants, too, and I think he went out immediately after I gave him the stimulants. General Ledlie remained some time longer, probably half an hour, I should judge. Question. You mention stimulants. What were theyhartshorn, materia medica, or what? Answer. It was rum, I think. I had rum and whisky there, and I think I gave them runi. Question. How often did you administer stimulants to those two officers during that day? Answer. I think that once was the only time. I was not in the bomb-proof all the time while they were there. It was perfectly safe in there, but it might not have been outside. I had to go out to look after the wounded. Question. Were there any brigade or regimental commanders in the bomb-pioofany commanding officers besides those whom you have named? Answer. Yes, sir. Question. Name them. Answer. There was a colonel commanding a brigade of colored troopsColonel Sigfried, I believe. He came there after the stampede quieted down a little; after the troops stopped going to the rear. Also Lieutenant-Colonel Cutcheon, of the Twentieth Michigan. He came in from the crater about the middle of the day to see General Willeox to learn if anything could be done to relieve the troops in the crater, as they were suffering very much for water, and also from the artillery fire of the enemy. Question. What was the reply? Answer. General Willeox was not there, sir. Question. How long did the colonel stay there? Answer. Half an hour, at least. He was very much exhausted in running over. He said he had come through a very heavy fire and come from the crater to that place. it was almost certain death to TESTIMONY OF GENERAL CARR. Brig. Gen. J. B. (DARR, U. S. Volunteers, being duly sworn, says to questions by JUDGE-ADVOCATE: Question. Were you at the assault on the 30th of July, and what was your command? Answer. Yes, sir; I was at the assault. My command was the First Division of the Eighteenth Army Corps, and a portion of a colored division, of the one known as Hinks division of colored troops. I had one brigade of that division. Question. Had you opportunities of observing the ~progress of events on that day? Were you in a situation to see things Page 120 120 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHAr. LII. Answer. Nothing but my own command. I took position in the trenches with my command. I relieved the troops of General Burnsides command, the Ninth Army Corps, on the evening before, with the exception that I had one brigade which I did not pnt in the front line. I kept that in reserve to fill the vacancy left in our line at the point where the assaulting column was to d~bouch~ from onr intrenchments. Question. Could you see the formation of the assaulting column? Answer. Yes, sir; I saw it before it made the assault. Question. What was the formation? Answer. I should judge it was in column of battalions. Question. Was that the First Division? Answer. I think it was, sir. It was very dark, not yet daylight in the morning. I left General Burnsides headqnarters at 20 minutes after 3 oclock, and as I passed going down I could see the column on my left, in column of battalions I should judge. The position I had did not afford me a good opportunity for observing any- thing but my own immediate command, as I was in the trenches during the engage- ment and remained there until 12 oclock that day. At about 8.30 oclock General Turner, of the Tenth Corps, was ordered to form his division in rear of the intrench- ruents, and in doing so he found that it would crowd too much on the troops in his front, and that there was no room to get his division in there. He immediately sent for General Ord to come downI think it was General Ames who called upon General Ord to come downafld see the position of the troops for himself, and he went down to see the position of the troops in the trenches. As General Turner was forming hi~ command an attempt was made by the troops on my right to charge the rifle-pits. I saw a vacancy, a gap, that I thought about four regiments would till and assist that line of battle that was going over our breast-works to take those rifle-pits. I imme- diately took command of part of Turners division and ordered them over the line to join the line of troops then advancing, and told them to charge the rifle-pits in their front, which they did. That was about 200 yards on the right of the crater. After putting those troops in I stepped back from the intrenchments some ten ~r fifteen yards toward the covered way, and I had scarcely got back to the lower end of the covered way when the stampede began, and I suppose 2,000 troops came back, and I was lifted from my feet by the rushing mass and carried along with it ten or fifteen yards in the covered way. What staff I had with me assisted me in stopping the crowd in the covered way and in putting some of them in position in the second line. Some were in the first line. I left General Potter in the covered way. Question. Was there any good reason that you know of for this retire- ment of the troops? Answer. No, sir. Question. Did you notice any arrangements that were made for the passage of troops over the parapet and through the abatis of our lines? Answer. No, sir. There was no abatis in the front where I was, at least, I did not notice any abatis. There was abatis to the right of it. Question. If you had moved your troops to the front how would you have got through our lines ; what mode would you have taken to get them through; what formation would you have adopted? Answer. I should have formed a column of divisions. Question. Were there intervals made in our line for the passage of such a column? Answer. I could not say, sir. All I know is what was in my immediate front. I saw that there were no obstructions to prevent troops passing over our intrench- ments to the enemys work. The rifle-pit I speak of was an advanced work of the enemy where they had a thin line of skirmishers. The main line was behind it. Question. Did the enemy fire from the main line upon your party that took the pits? Answer. Yes, sir; briskly with musketry. I do not know the exact hour; but I think that was about 8.30 a. m Page 121 CHAP. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 121 Question. How did those troops of the Tenth Corps that you took forward pass over the parapet of our line?. Answer. They went over by a flank movement. Question. How long did those troops of the Tenth Corps hold the pits that they took 0? Answer. Juist as long as I was walking about thirty paces. I had just got into the mouth of the covered way when they came back. I saw officers waving their swords on the pits, but they did not stay a great while. The Court then adjourned to meet at 10 oclock on the 5th of Septem- ber. THIRTEENTh DAY. HEADQUARTERS SECOND Coups Jones House, & ptember 5, 1864. The Court met pursuant to adjournment. Present, Major-General Hancock, president, Brigadier-Generals Ayres and Miles, and Colonel Schriver, judge-advocate. TESTIMONY OF CAPTAIN FARQUHAR. Capt. F. U. FARQUHAR, U. S. Engineers, being duly sworn, says to questions by JUDGE-ADVOCATE: Question. Were you at the assault on the 30th of July, and in what capacity? Answer. I was present, and was chief engineer on the staff of General Ord, com- manding the Eighteenth Corps. Question. Were you in a situation to observe the operations on that day? Answer. I was, a portion of the time, after the smoke cleared away. Question. Did you witness the explosion of the mine? Answer. Yes, sir; I saw tlie explosion of the mine. Question. Relate what you saw done unusual on such occasionsoct casions of assault; state some of the omissions, if any, and the T)riucipal causes which conduced to the failure of the assault. Answer. At or near 15 minutes before 5 a. m. the explosion of the mine took place. Immediately on the explosion the artillery opened, and I should judge three or five minutes afterward we heard the cheer of the assaulting party. Nothing could be seen from the time of the opening of the artillery for twenty-five minutes or half an hour, when the smoke commenced to clear away. At the time of the explosion the general officers in command were in the covered way in rear of the fourteen-gun battery near what are known as Thomas Chimneys, I believe. Between half and three-quarters of an hour after the explosion Lieutenant-Colonel Loring, of General Burnsides staff, came from the front and reported that the troops that were in the crater were lying there and could not be pushed forward or gotten out of it. It was fully three-quarters of an hour after the explosion of the mine before the enemy opened any artillery, and then not at all severe. At the time of the explosion Tur- ners division, of the Tenth Corps, which was under General Ords conimand, was lying at or near the mouth oi or entrance to the covered way on the right of the fourteen-gun battery. Ames division, of the Eighteenth Corps, was in rear of that strip of woods which is in rear of the fourteen-gun battery. Both the covered ways on the right and left of this fourteen-gun battery were filled with troops of the Ninth Corps, the negro division being in the left covered way. There seemed to be an unaccountable delay in the advance of the supports to the first assaulting column. I cannot tell the exact time. I did not see the second one go up, but I heard the cheer some time after, how long I cannot recollect. Somewhere between 6.30 and 7 oclock I went to the front line to which the assaulting columns had started. The ground im- mediately in front of our salient, from which our forces started, was favorabl Page 122 122 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. (CHAP. LII. for charging over, as the troops were ptsrtially protected pretty near all the way up, from the left flanking fire, by a very small ridge; the men could have passed over easily, and there were very few dead or wounded lying on that space between our line and the crater. The men seemed to be lying in the crater and on our side of the crater, but no movements seemed to be taking place. I saw General Turner at that time going to the crater. There seemed to be a lack of enthusiasm or spirit in both officers and men. The negro division filed over our parapet and went utto the crater by the flank, exposing their whole line, as they passed over from our line to the enemys, to the fire from both sides of the crater. At between 9 and 10 oclock the cross-fire of the enemy in front of the salient had become so severe that hardly a man could pass from our salient to the crater without being hit. At this front line that I went to there seemed to be no person of any authority to meet any emergency that might arise, and in that, in my opinion, lies oiie of the chief causes of the disaster. The chief causes of fidlure are, in the first place, that the mine was in the wrong place, because it was in a re-entrant, and, in the second, that there was no officer present to make any new dispositions or movements to meet any emergency that might arise. It seemed to me, so far as I could see, that the troops were not ready to move. They were in the covered way, and so situated that you could not follow the assaulting columns up with the necessary supports. As it was, the assault- ing column if it had gone forward would be a mile ahead before the supports could get up. I was present when General Turner sent back a note to General Ord saying that he could not get his troops forward on account of General Burnsides troops be- ing in the way. General Ord then sat down and wrote a letter to General MeadeI believe it was to General Meadetelling him that he would advance Turners division as soon as General Burasides troops were out of the way. He showed it to General Burnside, who asked him not to send it, for he would have his troops out of the way immediately; but whether he ever sent it or not I do not know. General Ord then went to the front himself, at the time that General Turner said he could not get his troops forward, and found the same state of things existingthat the covered way was filled up with General Burusides troops going to the front, and that the wounded were being brought to the rear in the same covered way that the troops going for- ward to fight were going forward in. There was no reason why the troops should move through the covered way at all. From the position of the assaulting columns and the troops fighting, the enemy could not notice troops passing down the slope of the hill without going through the covered way. The colored troops seemed to be well led, and followed their officers with as much enthusiasm as any other troops that day. They seemed to go about 200 or 250 yards to the right of the crater going toward the enemys intrenchments. Then there came a halt, and by that time Gen- eral Turner had got one of his brigades to the front, and he ordered an assault with this brigade. Instead of passing along the edge of the crater as the other troops had done, which gave them a temptation to lie down, he charged to the right of the crater. It was just then that the negroes came back and his men were carried back with them. I went to the front immediately after this affair, where I saw General Turner, and he seemed to be very much distressed about it. Question. State if there were any means taken for crowning the crest if gainedworking parties with fascines, gabions, intrenching tools, & c. Answer. I can speak only with reference to myself. I had my sappers and miners equipped with tools ready to move with the Eighteenth Corps when it should move. Question. With the ordinary performance of their duties by officers and men on such occasions, ought not the assault to have been suc- cessful? Answer. It was successful, for the line was carried. It only wanted some person present to tell them what to do afterward. I think that had there been any person of authority at the place, even at our own front line, at the salient, to have given directions at the proper time we had ninety-nine chances in one hundred of being successful in the object expected to be gained. From my own experience I know that it would take you at least three minutes to get to the front through the covered way, because it was so crowded, and three minutes to get back again to where the general was, and then count your time for observation besides; and at that time, when the opposing forces were so close to each other, ten minutes would make a great deal of difference. I think that, with the exception of a lack of enthusiasm, the troops behaved as well as troops ever behaved. What they wanted was handling. Just in front of the crater, in rear of the enemys line, there was a sort of a redoubt or earth- work upon the hill, from which not a shot was fired. There was not a soul between the crater and that position, and I believe that position was the objective point o Page 123 Ciui~. LII.] TIlE RICHMONI OAMPAbTh. 123 the assault. And I think, had the troops been pushed forward properly, the columns following as one column shonid have followed another, there would have been no difficulty in the place being carried. Question. Then there were no physical obstacles in the way of our success ~? Auswer. No, sir. Question. Is it your opinion that if wehad not had the mine we would have been more successful? Answer. No, sir. The mine of itself was a snecess. The consternation of the en- emy in couseqnence of the explosion of the mine more than compensated for the flanking fire which they opened npon ns. But it was three-qnarters of an hour be- fore they opened fire. Question. Were adequate preparations made for the passage of our troops over our parapets and through the abatis? Answer. There seemed to be room enongh at our salient to pass overcertainly in regimental front. Question. Could artillery have passed through? Answer. No, sir. I saw no place where artillery could have passed throngh at any point within 200 or 250 feet of the salient. I do not know how practicable it was farther to the right or left. Leading np from the hollow to the front the covered ways were very narrow, not at all adeqnate to the necessities of the occasion for convey- ing troops to the front. And there was room enonoh in that hollow to have massed all the troops under cover of darkness. Had that been done, as it was not light when the mine should have exploded, they would have all been in the enemys lines before they could have been much hurt. Question. Who gave you orders for preparing the fascines, gabions, and intrenching tools and working parties in the Eighteenth Corps? Answer. I got them from General Ord. All I had were shovels, spades, picks, and sand-bags. Question. Did you see General Buruside on that occasion? Answer. Yes, sir; I saw him quite frequently. Question. Any of his division or brigade commanders? Answer. I only noticed one division commander. Question. Name him. Answer. General Potter. If the others were there I did not happen to see them. There being no more witnesses in attendance the Court adjourned to meet at 10 oclock on 6th of September. FOURTEENTH DAY. HEADQUARTERS SECOND Coups, Jones House, September 6, 1864. The Court met pursuant to adjournment. Present, Major-General Hancock, president, Brigadier-Generals Ayres and Miles, and Colonel Schriver, judge-advocate. The proceedings of the twelfth and thirteenth days were read and approved. There being no more witnesses a present the Court was cleared. The record of evidence was referred to, and discussions took place, after which the Court adjourned to meet at 10 a. m. on the 7th of Sep- tember. a The following-named officers, on account of sickness or absence, did not appear as witnesses before the Court: Brigadier-Generals Ledlie, Turner, and Burnham; Colonel Sigfried, and Lieutenant-Colonels Loring and Pleasants Page 124 124 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. (CHM~. LIL FIFTEENTH DAY. HEADQUARTERS SECOND Coups, The Court met pursuant to adjournment. .7, 1864. Pre~ent, Major-General Hancock, president, Brigadier-Generals Ayres and Miles, and Colonel Schriver, judge-advocate. Discussion was resumed, and the Court then adjourned till 10 oclock on the 8th of September. SIXTEENTH DAY. HEADQUARTERS SECOND CORPS, The Court met pursuant to adjournment. September 8, 1864. Present, Major-General Hancock, president, Brigadier-Generals Ayres and Miles, and Colonel Schriver, judge-advocate. Lieat. A. A. SHEDD; Forty-third U. S. Colored Troops, being duly sworn, says to JUDGE-ADVOCATE: Question. Were you at the assault on the 30th of July, and in what capacity? Answer. As aide-de-camp to Colonel Sigfried, commanding First Brigade, Fourth Division, Ninth Corps. Question. Were you in the crater at any time? Answer. I was. Question. Were any of your troops there? Answer. They were; they went in under Colonel Sigfried; they were not all in. Question. If they halted there, why did they so? Answer. There were so many troops in before they caine; that is one reason. Question. What efforts were made to push them forward beyond the crater? Answer. The colonel through; that is the (Bates) of the Thirtieth Regiment Colored Troops led his only one I saw go through the crater. Question. Was Colonel Sigfried present with his troops in the front all the time? Answer. He was. He came out when the troops did, about 10 to 11 oclock. Capt. E. T. RAYMOND, Thirty-sixth Massachusetts Volunteers, duly sworn, says to JUDGE-ADVOCATE: Question. Were you at the assault on the 30th of July, and in what capacity? Answer. I was, as brigade inspector, First Brigade, Second Division, Ninth Corps. Question. What was your general position on the field on that occa- sion? Answer. In the crater a portion of the time; part near the right of our brigade in our works. Question. Under whose immediate orders were you serving? Answer. Col. Z. R. Bliss, Seventh Rhode Island Volunteers, commanding the brigade Page 125 CHAP. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 125 Question. Was he with his troops all the time l Answer. He was. At 7 oclock we moved down the covered way from in rear of our batteries in front of our reserve camp. Three regiments went into the crater, the remainder of the brigade stopped in the works. About 8 oclock I was sent into the crater by Colonel Bliss to ascertain why the three regiments in front did not charge, he rernainin~ in the works with four regiments of the brigade. I went, and found the thre~ regiments were formed in the covered way beyond the crater toward Cemetery Hill. Question. Where did the covered way strike the enemys pits to the left of the crater? Answer. Facing their front, it led a little to our right of the crater, tending off a little to the right of Cemetery Hill. Question. What efforts were made to bring up the regiments which were left in the works, by their commanders? Answer. The three regiments which went forward were first to charge before the rear regiments were to move forward. Question. With what part of the brigade was Colonel Bliss? Answer. With the portion that was left behind; he remained with the last regi- ment, and did not go forward at all to my knowledge. The Court, after discussion with closed doors, adjourned to meet at 10 oclock on the 9th of September. SEVENTEENTH DAY. HEADQUARTERS SECOND CORPS, The Court met pursuant to adjouriiment. ~eptembcr 9, 1864. Present, Major-General Hancock, president, Brigadier-Generals Ayres and Miles, and Colonel Schriver, judge-advocate. The proceedings of the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth days were read and approved. The Court, with closed doors, then resumed the discussion of the tes- timony, and decided on the following finding and opinion: FINDING. After mature deliberation on the testimony adduced the Court find the following facts and circumstances attending the unsuccessful as- sault on the 30th of July: The mine, quite an important feature in the attack, was commenced by Major-General Buruside soon after the occupation of his present lines without any directions obtained from the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac. Although its location (and in this the engineers of the army concur) was not considered by Major-General Meade a proper one, it being commanded from both flanks and reverse, the con- tinuance of the work was sanctioned. It was not the intention of the lieutenant-general commanding or of the major-general commanding the Army of the Potomac, it is believed, to use the mine in the operations against Petersburg until it became known that the enemy had withdrawn a large part of his forces to the north side~ of the James River, when it was thought advantage might be taken of it in an assault. All the Union troops sent north of the James had been recalled in time to participate in the assault, so that the whole of the forces op& rating in front of Petersburg were disposable. The mine was ordered to be exploded at 3.30 a. in., but owing to a dQ. fective fuse it did not take place till 4.45 Page 126 126 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. (CHAP. LII. The detailed order or plan of operations issued by Major-General Meade is in accordance with General Grants instructions, and was seen and approved by the latter previous to its publication. (It is marked K in the Appendix.) It is the concurrent testimony that had the orde~ been carried out succesP would have attended the attack. Also it is in evidence that General Meade met General Bnrnside and three of his division com- manders the day before the assault and impressed upon them that the operation was one of time; that unless prompt advantage were taken of the explosion of the mine to gain the crest it would be impossible to get it or the troops to remain outside of their lines. That order directed that General Burn side should form his troops (the Ninth Corps) for assaulting, and that General Ord, commanding the Eighteenth Corps, and General Warren, commanding the Fifth Corps, should support the assault on the right and left respectively. Major-General Bnrnsides order (No. 60, Appendix) directed Brigadier- General Ledlies division, immediately on the explosion of the mine, to be moved forward and crown the crest known as Cemetery Hill. Brig- adier-General Willcox was to move his division forward as soon as pos- sible after General Ledlies, bearing off to the left, and Brigadier-Gen- eral Potter was to follow and go to the right. Brigadier-General Fer- rero was to move his (colored) division next, and pass over the same ground that General Ledlies did. Five minutes after the explosion of the mine General Ledlies division went forward, and it was followed by those of Generals Willcox and Potter, though it is in evidence that the latter did not move in the pre- scribed order, and that they were not formed in a manner to do the duty assigned them. General Ledlies division, instead of complying with the order, halted in the crater made by the explosion of the mine and remained there about an hour, when Major-General Meade received the first intimation of the fact through a dispatch from Lieutenant-Colonel Loring, assist- ant inspector-general of the Ninth Corps, intended for General Burn- side, in which he expressed the fear that the men conld not be induced to advance. This crater was on the enemys line of works, and was 50 to 60 yards long, 20 yards wide, and 20 to 25 feet deep. It was about 500 yards from the cemetery crest. General Burnside was then (at 5.40 a. in.) ordered to push forward to the crest all his owu troops, and to call on General Ord to move for- ward his troops at once. It is in evidence that when the order was communicated to General Ferrero, commanding the colored division, he said he could not put in his troops until the troops already in front should be moved out of the way. They did go forward, however, after some delay, bnt only to be driven back and in their flight to rush mi- petnously against other troops, destroying their formation and produc- ing disorder. At 6.10 a. in., inquiry being made of General Burnside if it would be an advantage for Warrens supporting force to go in at once on the left, the answer was there is scarcely room for it in our inimediate front. The importance of the utmost promptness and the securing ~f the crest at once at all hazards were urged upon him at 6.50 a. m. At 7.20 a. m. General Burnside reported to General Meade that he was doing all in his power to push forward the troops, and, if possible, carry the crest, and also that the main body of General Potters divis- ion was beyond the crater. It does not appear in evidence, however Page 127 Ciw~. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 127 that they ever got any considerable distance, not exceeding 200 yards, beyond the crater toward the crest, whence they were driven back im- mediately. This was also the fate of the few colored troops who got over the enemys line for a moment. At 9 a. m. General Buruside reported many of the Ninth and Eight- eenth Corps~were retiring before the enemy, and then was the time to put in the Fifth Corps. It having just been reported, however,by two staff officers (not General Burnsides) that the attack on the right of the mine had been repulsed, and that none of the Union .troops were beyond the line of the craterthe commanding general thouglit differently, and the lieutenant-general concurringGeneral Buruside was directed at 9.50 a. m. to withdraw to his own intrenchments immediately or at a later period, but not to hold the enemys line any longer than was required to withdraw safely his men. This order brought General Burnside to General Meades headquarters, where he remonstrated against it, say- ing by night-fall he could carry the crest. No other officer who was present, and who has testified before the Court, concurred in this opin- ion. The troops in the crater were then ordered to retire, but before it could be effected they were driven out with great loss at 2p. m. These troops, however, were making preparations to retire, and but for that would probably not have been driven out at that time. The Fifth Corps did not participate at all in the assault, and General Ords command only partially, because the condition of affairs at no time admitted of their co-operation as was contemplated by the order of assault. The causes of failure are: 1. The injudicious formation of the troops in going forward, the movement being mainly by flank instead of extended front. General Meades order indicated that columns of assault should be employed to take Cemetery Hill, and that proper passages should be prepared for those columns. It is the opinion of the Court that there were no proper columns of assault. The troops should have been formed in the open ground in front of the point of attack parallel to the line of the enemys works. The evidence shows that one or more columns might have passed over at and to the left of the crater without any previous prep- aration of the ground. 2. The halting of the troops in the crater instead of going forward to the crest when there was no fire of any consequence from the enemy. 3. No proper employment of engineer officers and working parties, and of materials and tools for their use, in the Ninth Corps. 4. That some parts of the assaulting column were not properly led. 5. The want of a competent common head at the s~ene of the assault to direct affairs as o& currences should demand. Had not failure ensued from the above causes, and the crest been gained, the success might have been jeopardized by the failure to have prepared in season proper and adequate d6bouch~s through the Ninth Corps lines for troops, and especially for field artillery, as ordered by Major-General Meade. The reasons why the attack ought to have been successful are: 1. The evident surprise of the enemy at the time of the explosion of the mine and for some time after. 2. The comparatively small force in the enemys works. 3. The ineffective fire of the enemys artillery and musketry, there being scarcely any for about thirty minutes after the explosion, and our artillery being just the reverse as to time and power Page 128 128 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. LII. 4. The fact that some of our troops were able to get 200 yards be- yond the crater toward the crest, but could not remain there or proceed farther for want of supports or because they were not properly formed or led. OPINION. The Court having given a brief narrative of the assault, and the facts and circumstances attending it, it remains to report that the following- named officers engaged therein appear from the evidence to be answer- able for the want of success which should have resulted: I. Maj. Gen. A. E. Buruside, U. S. Volunteers, he having failed to obey the orders of the commanding general. 1. Iii not giving such formation to his assaulting column as to insure a reasonable prospect of success. 2. In not preparing his parapets and abatis for the passage of the columns of assault. 3. In not employing engineer officers, who reported to him, to lead the assaulting columns with working parties, and not causing to be provided proper materials necessary for crowning the crest when the assaulting columns should arrive there. 4. In neglecting to execute Major-General Meades orders respecting the prompt advance of General Ledlies troops from the crater to the crest; or, in default of accomplishing that, not causing those troops to fall back and give place to other troops more willing and equal to the task, instead of delaying until the opportunity passed away, thus afford- ing time for the enemy to recover from his surprise, concentrate his fire, and bring his troops to operate against the Union troops assembled uselessly in the crater. Notwithstanding the failure to comply with orders and to apply proper military principles ascribed to General Burnside, the Court is satisfied he believed that the measures taken by him would insure suc- cess. II. Brig. Gen. J. II. Ledlie, U. S. Volunteers, he having failed to push forward his division promptly according to orders and thereby blocking up the avenue which was designed for the passage of troops ordered to follow and support his in the assault. It is iu evidence that no coni- mander reported to General Buruside that his troops could not be got forward, which the Court regards as a neglect of duty on the part of General Ledhie, inasmuch as a timely report of the misbehavior might have enabled General Buruside, commanding the assault, to have made other arrangements for prosecuting it before it became too late. In- stead of being with his division during this difficulty in the crater, and by his personal efforts endeavoring to lead his troops forward, he was most of the time in a bomb-proof ten rods in rear of the main line of the Ninth Corps works, where it was impossible for him to see anything of the movement of troops that was going on. III. Brig. Gen. Edward Ferrero, U. S. Volunteers. 1. For not having all his troops formed ready for the attack at the prescribed time. 2. Not going forward with them to the attack. 3. Being in a bomb-proof habitually, where he could not see the operation of his troops, showing by his own order issued while there that he did not know the position of two brigades of his division ~r whether they had taken Cemetery Hill or not Page 129 Ca& p. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 129 IV. Col. Z. R. Bliss, Seventh Rhode Island Volunteers, commanding First Brigade, Second Division, Ninth Corps. In this, that he remained behind with the only regiment of his brigade which did not go forward according to the irders and occupied a position where he could not properly command a brigade which formed a portion of an assaultino- column, and~where he could not see what was going on. V. Brig. Gen. 0. B. Wilicox, U. S. Volunteers. The Court is not satisfied that General Willcoxs division made efforts commensurate with the occasion to carry out General Burusides order to advance to Cemetery Hill, and they think that more energy might have been exercised by Brigadier-General Wilicox to cause his troops to go forward to that point. Without intending to convey the impression that there was any dis- inclination on the part of the commanders of the supports to heartily co-operate in the attack on the 30th of July, the Court express their opinion that explicit orders should have beeu given assigning one officer to the command of all the troops intended to engage in the assault when the commanding general was not present in person to witness the operations. WINFD S. HANCOCK, Major- General, U. S. Volunteers, President of Court. ED. SCHRIVER, - Inspector-General U. S. Army, Judge-Advocate. The court then adjourned sine die. WINFD S. HANCOCK, Major- General, U. S. Volunteers, President of Court. ED. SCHRIVEIt, Inspector- General U. S. Army, Judge-Advocate. APPENDIX. A. HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES, Maj. Gen. G. G. MEADE, City Point, Va., July 24, 1864. Commanding Army of the Potomac: GENERAL: The engineer officers who made a survey of the front from Bermuda Hundred report against the probability of success from an attack there. The chances, they think, will be better on Burn- sides front. If this is attempted it will be necessary to concentrate all the force possible at the point in the enemys line we expect to pen- etrate. All officers should be fully impressed of the absolute ne- cessity of pushing entirely beyond the en~inys present line if they should succeed in penetrating it, and of getting back to their pres- ent line promptly shonld they not succee(l in breaking throngh. To the right and left of the point of assault all the artillery l)Ossible should be brought to play upon the enemy in front during the assault. Thin lines would be sufficient for the support of the artillery, and all the reserves conld be brought on the flank of their commands nearest to the point of assault, ready to follow in if successful. The field ar- tillery and infantry held in the lines during the first assault should be in readiness to move at a moments notice, either to their front or to follow the main assault, as they should receive orders. One timing, however, should be impressed on corps commanders: If they see the enemy giving way in their front, or moving from it to re-enforce a 9 R RYOL xL~ PT Page 130 130 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [Ciw. LII. heavily-assaulted position of their line, they should take advantage of suchknowledge and act promptly without waiting for orders from their army commander. General Ord can co-operate with his corps in this movement, and about 5,000 troops from Bermuda Hundred can be sent .to re-~nforce you, or can be nsed to threaten an assault between the Appomattox and James i~ivers, as may be deemed best. This should be done by Tuesday morning if done at all. If not attempted we will then start at the date indicated to destroy the railroad as far as Hicks- ford, at least, and to Weldon, if l)ossible. Please give inc your views on this matter, and I will order at once. In this I have said nothing of the part to be taken by the cavalry in case the enemys lines are assaulted. The best dispositiondo be made of them, probably, would be to I)lace them on the extreme left, With in- structions to skirmish with the enemy and drive him back, if possible, following np any success gained in that way according to the judgment of the commander or orders he may receive. Whether we send an ex- pedition on this railroad or assault at Petersburg,Burn~ides mine will be blown up. As it is impossible to hide preparations from our own officers and men, and consequently from the enemy, it will be well to have it understood, as far as possible, that just the reverse of what we intend is in contemplation.* I am, general, very respectfully, U. S. GIRANT, Lieutenant- General. B. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 24, 1864. Lient. Gen. U. S. GRANT: GENERAL: I have received your letter per Lieutenant-Colonel Coin- stock. In reply thereto, I have to state that I yesterday made in per- son a close and careful reconnaissance of the enemys position in my front. Although I could not detect any positive indications of a second line, yet from certain appearances at various points, I became satisfied that a second line does exist on the crest of the ridge just in rear of the position of Burusides mine. I have no doubt of the successful explo- sion of the mine, arid of our ability to crown the crater, effect alodg- ment, and compel the evacuation of the enewys present occupied line; but, fromn their redoubt on the Jerusalem plank road, amid front their position in front of the 1-lare house, their artillery fire would render our lodgmnent untenable and compel our advance or withdrawal. The ad- vance, of course, should be made, but its success would depend on the question whether the enemy have a line on the crest of the ridge. lf they have, with the artillery fire they can bring to bear on the ap- proaches to this secomid hill, I do not deent it practicable to carry the line by assault, and, from nmfexamnination, together with the evident necessity of their having such a line, I am forced to believe we shall find one there. I cami not therefore advise the attenipt being made, but should it be deemed expedient to take the risks, amid there is undoubt- edly room for doubt, I would like a little more time than is given in your note, in order to place in 1)OsitiOui the maximum amnount of artillery to bear upon the lines not assaulted. In reference to the assaulting force, it will be composed of the Ninth and Second Corps. The Fifth Corps will have to remaimi in their pres- ent position and be prepared to meet arty attempt of the enemy to turn ~ J~or version of this letter, as re eoraed iu Grants letter-book, see Part 111 Page 131 CHAP. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 131 our left flank, which is not altogether unlikely, particularly if we should fail in our assault and be compelled to withdraw. I am fully impressed with the importance of taking some immediate action, and am satisfied that, excepting regular approaches, the spring- ing of Burusides mine and subsequent assault is the most practicable, and I am not prepared to say the attempt would be hopeless. I am, however, of the opinion, so far as I can judge, that the chances of its success are not such as to make it expedient to attempt it.* Yery respectfully, yours, 0-EG. G. MEADE, Major- & ~eneral, Commanding. P. S.I inclose you a report of Major Duane, which confirms my view. If Wright is soon to return, and we can extend our lines to the Weldon railroad, we could then advance against the salient on the Jerusalem plank road, and make an attempt to carry them at the same time we assaulted in Burusides front. This was my idea some time ago, and we have been preparing the necessary siege works for this purpose. llTnder your instructions, however, none of the heavy guns and mate- rials have been brought to the front, and it would take, perhaps, two days to get them up. G.G.M. B2. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, OFFICE CHIEF ENGINEER, Major-General MEADE, July 24, 1864. Commanding Army of the Potomac: GENERAL: In reply to your communication of this date I have the honor to state that the line of the enemys works in front of General Burusides is not situated on the crest of ~ie ridge separating us from Petersburg; that the enemy have undoubtedly occupied this ridge as a second line. Should General Burnside succeed in exploding his mine he would probably be able to take the enemys first line, which is about 100 yards in advance of his approach. Beyond this I do not think he could advance until the works in front of the Fifth Corps are carried, as the Ninth Corps columns would be taken in flank by a heavy artil- lery fire from works in front of the ceuter of the Fifth Corps and in front by fire from the works on the crest near the Cemetery Hill. I do not believe that the works in front of the Fifth Corps can be car- ried until our lines can be extended to the left so as to envelop the enemy~s line. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, ~. C. DUANE, Major Engineers, U. ~. Army. C. HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES Major-General MEADE, City Point, July 24, 1864. 6ommanding Army of the Potomac: GENERAL: Your note, Wrought by Colonel Comstock, i~ received. It will be necessary to act without expecting Wright. lie is new in For vcrsioui of this letter, as received by General Grant, see Part III Page 132 132 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. LII. Washington, but it is not fully assured yet that Early has left the Vah ley, and if Wright was to start back no doubt the Maryland raid would be repeated. I am not willing to attempt a movement so hazardous as the one against intrenched lines against the judgment of yourself and your engineer officers, an(i arrived at after a more care- ful survey of the ground than I have given it. I will let you know~ however, in the morning what determination I come to. Very respectfully, your obedient servant~~~ ~. GRANT, Lieutenant- General. T~. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 26, 186412 m. Lient. Gen. U. S. GRANT: More critical examinations from a new signal station would lead to the conclusion that the enemy have detached works on the ridge in front of Burnside, but they have no connected line. This fact increases the chances of a successful assault, and taken in connection with the fact that General Buruside does not now think the enemy have discov- ered his mine, on the contrary believes they are laying the platforms for a battery right over it, I have suspended the order to load and discharge it to-morrow, a~ it may yet be useful in connection with fur- ther c~perations. I am afraid the appearance of McLaws division, to- gether with Wilcoxs, previously reported, will prevent any chance of a surprise on the part of our people to-morrow. Yesterdays Richmond Examiner also says your strategic movements are known and prepara- tions made to meet them, referring, I presnme, to Posters operations. There was considerable shelling by the enemy yesterday afternoon all along our lines, brought on, I think, by Burnsides discovering a camp he had not before seen and ordering it she1led.~ No serious casualties were produced on our side, but the Fifth Corps working parties were very much annoyed and interrupted. With this exception all was quiet. GEG. G. MEADE, ]Jfajor- General. E. CITY POINT, July 26, 18643 p. m. Major-General MEADE: The information you have just sent, and all information received on the subject, indicates a probability that the enemy are looking for a formidable attack either from General Burnside or north of the James River, and that they will detach from Petersburg heavily to preVent its success. This will make your remaining two corps with the Eighteenth relatively stronger against the enemy at Petersburg than we have been since the first day. It will be well, therefore, to prepare for an assault in General Burnsides front on justifies it. If made it , ly to be made if further development , would be necessary to abandon most of the front now held by the Fifth Corps.* U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant- General. * ]~or version of this dispatch, as recorded in Grants letter-book, sec Part III Page 133 LEAP LIII THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. i~3 F. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 26, 18645.30 p. m. Lient. Gen. U. S. cTRANT: Telegram, 3 p. in., received. The oniy preparation that can be made is the loading of Burnsides mine. I cannot advise an assault with the Second Corps absent, for some force must be left to hold our lines and protect onr batteries. The withdrawal of the Fifth Corps would pre- vent any attempt on our part to silence the fire of the enemys guns in front of the Fifth Corps, and unless tliese gaiis are silenced no advance can be made across the open ground in front of the Ninth Corps. It is not the numbers of the enemy which oppose our taking Petersbnrg; it is their artillery and their works which can be held by rednced nuiii- bers against direct assault. I have just sent yon a dispatch indicating an attack on my left flank by the enemy. This is my weak point, and a formidable attack turning my flank, would require all my force to meet successfully. GEG. G. MEADE, Major- General. G. CITY POINT, July 28, 186412.20 p. rn. Major-General MEADE: Your dispatch of 12 m. received. Unless something tnrns up north of the James betWeen this and night that I do not expect, yon may withdraw Hancock, to be followed by Sheridan, and make arrangements for assault as soon as it can be made. We can determine by the move- ments of the enemy before the time comes whether it will be advisable to go on with the assault. I will put in the Eighteenth Corps or not, as you deem best. U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant- General. II. HEADQUARTERS ArMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 28, 18641 p. m. Lieutenant-General GRANT: Your dispatch of 12.20 received. On reflection,~I think daylight of the 30th is the earliest time it would be advisable to make the assault. Besides the time required to get up heavy guns and mortars we require the night to make certain preliminary arrangements, such as massing troops, removing abatis from the d6bouch~ of the assaulting , & c. I shall make the assault with the Ninth Corps, supported by the Sec- ond. The reserves of the Eighteenth should be held in readiness to take part, and if developments Justify it all of Ords and Warrens commands can be put in. GEG. G. MEADE, Major- General Page 134 134 Ot~ERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. ~CHAP. LII. - I. HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNTTED STATES, City Point, Va., July 29, 1864. Maj. Gen. GEORGE G. MEADE, Commanding Army of the Potomac: GENERAL: I have directed General Butler to order General Ord to report to you for the attack on Petersburg. The details for the assault I leave for you to make out. I directed Geueral Sheridan, whilst we were at Deep Bottom last evening, to move his command immediately to the left of Warren from Deep Bottom. It will be well to direct the cavalry to endeavor to get round the enemys right flank. Whilst they will not probably succeed in turning the enemy they will detain a large force to prevent it. I will go out this evening to see you; will be at your headquarters about 4 p. m. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant- General. P. S.lf you want to be any place on the line at the hour indicated inform me by telegraph, and I will meet you wherever you may be. U. S. G. J. CITY POINT, August 1, 18649.30 a. m. (Received 11.40 a. in.) Major-General MEADE: Have you any estimate of our losses in the miserable failure of Sat- urday ~ I think there will have to be an investigation of the matter. So fair an opportunity will probably never occur again for carrying fortifications. Preparations were good, orders ample, and everything, so far as I could see, subsequent to the explosion of the mine, shows that almost without loss the crest beyond the mine could have been carried. This would have given us Petersburg with all its artillery and a large part of the garrison beyond doubt. An intercepted dispatch states that the enemy recaptured their line with General Bartlett and staff, 75 commissioned officers, and 900 rank and file, and recaptured 500 of their men. U. S. GRANT Lieutenant- General. K. ORDERS.1 HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC July 29, 1864. The following instructions are issued for the guidance of all con- cerned: 1. As soon as it is dark Major-General Burnsi4e, commanding Ninth Corps, will withdraw his two brigade~ under General White, occupying the intrenchments between the plank and Norfolk roads, and bring them to his front. ~Care will be taken not to interfere with the troops of the Eighteenth Corps moving into their position in rear of the Nint Page 135 CHAP. LIT.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 13~ Corps. General Burnside will form his troops for assaulting the enemys works at daylight of the 30th, prepare his parapets and abatis for the passage of the columns, and have the pioneers equipped for work in opening passages for artillery, (lestroying enemys abatis, and the in- trenching tools distributed for effecting lodgments, & c. 2. Major-General Warren, commanding Fifth Corps, will reduce the number of his troops holding the iutrenchmeiitsof his front to the mini- mum, and concentrate all his available forces on his right and hold them ~)repared to support the assault of Major-General Burnside. The prepa- rations in respect to pioneers, intreuching tools, & c., enjoined upon the Ninth Corps will also be made by the Fifth Corps. 3. As soon as it is dark Major-General Ord, commanding Eighteenth Corps, will relieve his troops in the trenches by General Motts division, of the Second Corps, and form his corps in rear of the Ninth Corps, and be prepared to support the assault of Major-General Burnside. 4. Every preparation will be made for moving forx~ard the field artil- lery of each corps. 5. At dark Major-General Hancock, commanding Second Corps, will move from Deep Bottom to the rear of the intrenchments now held by the Eighteenth Corps, resume the command of Motts division, and be prepared at daylight to follow up the assaulting and supporting columns, or for such other operations as may be found necessary. 6. Major-General Sheridan, commanding Cavalry Corps, will proceed at dark from the vicinity of Deep Bottom to Lees Mill, and at daylight will move with his whole corps, including Wilsons division, against the enemys troops defending Petersburg on their right, by the roads leading to that town from the southward and westward. 7. Major Duane, acting chief engineer, will have the pontoon trains parked at convenient points in the rear prepared to move. He will see that supplies of sand-bags, gabions, fascines. & c., are in depot near the lines ready for use. He will detail engineerofficers for each corps. 8. At 3.30 in the morning of the 30th Major-General Buruside will spring his mine, and his assaulting columns will immediately move rapidly upon the breach, seize the crest in the rear and effect a lodg- mnent there. He will be followed by Major-General Ord, who will sup- port him on the right, directing his movement to the crest indicated, and by Major-General Warren, who will support him on the left. Upon the explosion of the mine the artillery of all kinds in battery will open upon those points of the enemys works whose fire covers the ground over which our columns must move, care being take to avoid impeding the progress of our troops. Special instructions respecting the direction of fire will be issued through the chief of artillery. 9. Corps commanders will report to the commanding general when their preparations are complete, and will advise him of every step in the progress of the operation, and of everything important that occurs. 10. Promptitude, rapidity of execution, and cordial co-operation, are essential to success, and the commanding general is confident that this indication of his expectations will insure the hearty efforts of the com- manders and troops. 11. Headquarters during the operation will be at the headquarters of the Ninth Corps. By command of Major-General Meade: S. WILLIAMS, .A~ssistant Adjutant- General Page 136 13G OPERATIONS IN SE. VA AND N. C. tOHAP. LII. L. HEADQUARTERS NINTH ARMY CORPS, July 26, 1864. Major-General HUMPHREYS, Chief ~f Staff: GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your notes of this morning by Captains Jay and Bache, also of a telegram from the commanding general relating to the same subject. It is altogether probable that the enemy arc cognizant of the fact that we are milling, because it has been inentiolled in their newspapers and they have been heard to work on what are supposed to be shafts in close proximity to our galleries, but the rain of night before last no doubt filled their shafts and much retarded their work. We have heard no sounds of work in them either yesterday or to-day, and nothing is heard by us iu the mine but the usual sounds of work on the surface above. This morning we had some apprehension that the left lateral gallery was in danger of caving in from the weight of the batteries above it and the shock of their firing, but all possible precautions have been taken to strengthen it and we hope to preserve it intact. The placing of the charges in the mine will not involve the necessity of making a noise. It is therefore probable that we will escape discovery if the mine is to be used within two or three days. It is nevertheless highly important, iii my opinion, that the mine should be exploded at the earliest possible moment consistent with the general interests of the campaign. I state to yon the facts as nearly as I can, and in the absence of any knowledge as to the meditated movements of the army I must leave you to judge the proper time to make use of the mine. But it may not be improper for me to say that the advantages reaped from the work would be but small if it were exploded without any co- operative movement. My plan would be to explode tile mine just before daylight in the morning or about .5 oclock in The afternoon, mass the two brigades of the colored division in rear of my line in col- umn of divisions, double column closed in mass, the head of each bri- gade resting on the front line, and as soon as the explosion has taken place move them forward with instructions for the (liviSiOu to take half distance, and as soon as the leading regiments of the two brigades pass through the gap in the enemys line, the leading regiment of the right brigade to come into line perpendicular to the enemys line by tile right companies, on the right into line wheel, the heft companies on the right into line, and proceed at once doxvn the line of tIme enemys works as rapidly as possible, the leading regiment ofthe left brigade to execute the reverse movement to the left, moving up the enemny~s line. The re- mainders of the two columns to ~nove directly toward the crest in front as rapidly as possibl~1 diverging in such a way as to enable them to deploy into columns of reginments, the right columnn making as nearly as may be for Cemetery Hill. These colunmus to be followed by the other divisions of this corps as soon as they can be thrown in. This would involve the necessity of relieving these divisions by other troops before the movement, and of holding columns of other troops in readi- ness to take our place on the crest in case we gain it and sweep down it. It would be advisable, in mny opinion, if we succeed in gaining the crest, to throw the colored division right into the town. There is a neces- sity for the co-operation, at least in the way of artillery, of the troops on my right and left. Of the extent of this you will necessarily b~ the judge. I think our chances of success in a plan of this kind are more than even Page 137 CHAP. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 137 The main gallery of the mine is 522 feet in length, the side galleries about 40 feet each. My suggestion is that eight magazines be placed in the lateral galleries, two at each end, say a few feet apart, in branches at right angles to the side galleries, and two more in each of the side galleries similarly placed, situated by pairs equidistant from each other and the ends of the galleries, thus: Tamping beginning at the termination of the main gallery for, say, 100 feet, leaving all the air space in the side galleries. Run out some five or six fuses and two wires to render the ignition of the charges cer- tain. I propQse to pnt in each of the eight magazines from 1 200 to 1,400 pounds of powder, the magazines to be connected by a trough of powder instead of a fuse. I beg to inclose a copy of a statement from General Potter on the subject. I would suggest that the powder train be parked in a wood near our ammunition train, about a mile in rear of this place. Lieutenant-Colonel Peirce, chief quartermaster, will furnish Captain Strang with a guide to the place. I beg also to request that General Benham be instructed to send us at once 8,000 sand-bags to be used for tamping and other purposes. I have the honor to be, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant, A. E. BUiRNSIDE, Major-General, Commanding. M. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 29, 186410.15 a. m. Major-General BURNSIDE, Commanding Ninth Corps: I am instructed to say that the major-general commanding submitted to the lieutenant-general con~mnanding the armies your proposition to form the leading columns of assault of the black troops, and that he, as well as the major-general commanding, does not approve the proposition, but directs that those columns be formed of the white troops. A. A. HUMPUREYS, ]Ifajor- General and Chief of & aff Page 138 138 OPEflATION~ IN ~E. VA. AND N. 0. (CHAP. LII. M 1. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 26, 186412 m. Major-General BURNSIDE: I wish you would submit in writing your project for the explosion of your mine, with the amount of powder required, that these preliminary questions may be definitely settled. You had better also look for some secure place in the woods where the powder reqaired can be brought in wagons and kept under guard, thus saving the time it will take to unload it from the vessels and haul it to youfrcamp. Whenever you report as above and designate a point I will order the powder brought lip. GEO. G. MEADE, ]lfajor- 6Yneral. M 2. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Major-General BURNSJDE, July 26, 1864. Commanding Ninth Corps: GENERAL: The major-general commanding directs me to inquire whether anything has transpired connected with your mine that leads you to believe that it is in danger from countermining. If it is your conviction that it is so endangered, then the commanding general au- thorizes you to make every preparation for springing it, but directs that you do not explode it earlier than to-morrow afternoon W day, the 27th, say at 4 oclock, if not otherwise ordered. The ednes- command- ing general further directs me to say that the charge -of the mine should be determined by the usual rules governing such subjects. It is not intended by the commanding general to follow up the explosion of the mine by an assault or other operation. if, therefore, the mine can be preserved for use at some early future day when circumstances will ~tdmit of its being used in connection with other operations, the comnluan(liImg general desires that you take no steps for exploding it as hereimi pre- scribed. A. A. HUMPIIREYS Major. General and Chief of Staff. N. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Major-General BURNSJDE, July 29, 18649.45 p. rn. Commanding Ninth Corps: A dispatch from General Ord refers to the late hour at which his troops will relieve yours in the trenches. The commanding general has informed General Ord that it is not necessary for you to wait for yomir troops to be relieved in the trenclmes by General Ords, before forming them for the assault. They should be formed for the assault at the honr you deem best without any reference to General Ords troops, who will enter the vacated trenches as soon as they caii. A. A. HUMPHREYS, ]JJiajor-General and Chief of Staff Page 139 CHAP. LILl THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 139 0. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 30, 18643.20 a. m. Major-General BURNSIDE: As it is still so dark, the commanding general says you caii postpone firing the mine if you think proper. A. A. I1UMPHP~EYS, Major-General and Chief of Staff. P. NINTH ARMY CORPS, July 30, 18643.20 a. rn. Major-General HUMPHREYS: The mine will be fired at the time designated. My headquarters will be at the fourteen-gun battery. A. E. BURNSJDE, Major- General. Q. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 30 18644.15 a. m. Major-General BURNSIDE: Is there any difficulty in exploding the mine ~ It is three-quarters of an hour later than that fixed upon for exploding it. A. A. IIUMPHREYS, Major- General and Chief of Staff. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 30, 1864. OPERATOR AT GENERAL BURNSIDES FIELD HEADQUARTERS: Is General Burnside at his headquarters ~ The commanding general is anxious to learn what is the cause oI~delay. A. A. HUMPHREYS, Major- General and ~hief of Staff. S. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 80, 18644.35 a. rn. Major-General BURNSIDE: If the mine cannot be exploded something else must be done, and at once. The commanding general is awaiting to hear from you before determining. A. A. HUMPHItEYS, - Major-General and Chief of Staff Page 140 140 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. 0. R~UAP. LII. T. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Major-General BURNSIDE. July 30, 18644.35 a. m. Commanding Ninth Corps: The commanding general directs that if your miiie has failed tliat you make an assault at once, opening your batteries. A. A. HUMPIIREYS, Major- General and Chief of Staff. U. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 30, 18645.40 a. m. Major-General BURNSIDE: What news from your assaulting column l Please report frequently. GEG. G. MEADE, Major- General. F. BATTERY MORTON, July 30, 18645.40 a. m. General MEADE: We have the erremys first line and occupy the breach. I shall en- deavor to push forward to the crest as rapidly as possible. A. E. BURNSJDE, Major- General. P. S.There is a large fire in Petersburg. W. W. SANDERS, Captain, d~e. W. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Major-General BURNSIDE, July 30, 18645.40 a. m. Commanding Ninth Corps: The commanding general learns that your troops are halting at the works where th mine exploded. He directs that all your troops be pushed forward o he crest at once. Call on General Ord to move for- ward his troops at once. A. A. HUMPIIREYS Major- General and Chief of Staff. x. HEADQUARTERS, Fourteen- Gun Battery, July 30, 18645.50 a. m. General MEADE: The Eighteenth Corps have just been ordered to push forward to the crest. The loss does not appear to be heavy.. Some prisoners com- ing in. W. W. SANDERS, Captain and Commissary of Muster8 Page 141 CHAP. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 141 y. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 30, 18646 a. in. Major-General T~URNSJDE: Prisouer~ taken say there is no line in their rear, and that their men were falling back when ours advanced; that none of their troops have returned from the James. Our chance is now; push your men forward at all hazards (white and black), and dont lose time in making forma- tions, but rush for the crest. GEG. G. MEADE, Miajor- General. z. HEADQUARTERS, Fourteen- Gun Battery, July 30, 18646.10 a. m. General MEADE: General Buruside says that he has given orders to all his division commanders to push everything in at once. W. W. SANDERS, Captain and Commissary of Musters. 1. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 30, 18646.05 a. m. Major-General BURNSIDE Commanding Ninth Corps: The commanding general wishes to know what is going on on your left, and whether it would be an advantage for Warrens supporting force to go in at once. A. A. HUMPHREYS, Major- General and Chief of Staff. 2. HEADQUARTERS NINTH CORPS, July 30, 18646.20 a. m. (Received 6.20 a. in.) Major-General MEADE: If General Warrens supporting force can be concentrated just Pow, ready to go in at the proper time it would be well. I will designate to you when it ought to move. There is scarcely room for it now, in our immediate front. A. E. BURNSIDE, Major- General. 3. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 30, 18646.50 a. in. Major-General BURNSIDE: Warrens force has been concentrated and ready to move since 3.30 a. m.* My object in inquiring was to ascertain if you could judge of * Reads ~.2O a, m, in Meados letter-book Page 142 142 OPERATIONS iN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. LIT. the 1)racticability of is advancing without waiting for your column. What is the delay in your column moving ~ Every minute is most precious, as the enemy undoubtedly are concentrating to meet you ou the crest, and if you give them time enough you cannot expect to suc- ceed. There is no object to be gained iu occupying the enemys line; it cannot be held under their. artillery fir.e without much labor in turning it. The great point is to secure the crest at once, and at all hazards. GEG. G. MEADE, Major. General. 4. FIFTH ARMY CORPS, July 30, 18647 a. m. Lieutenant-General GRANT: Several regiments of Burusides men are lying in front of the crater, apparently, of the mine. In their rear is to be seen a line of battle of a brigade or more, under cover, and, I think, between the enemys line and ours. The volley firing half hour ago was from the enemys works in Warrens front. C. B. COMSTOCK, Lieutenant-Colonel. 5. HEADQUARTERS NINTH CORPS, July 30, 1861. (Received about 7.20 a. in.) General MEADE: I am doing all in my power to push the troops forward, and, if pos- sible, we will carry the crest. It is hard work, but we hope to accom- plish it. I am fully alive to the importance of it. A. E. BUIRNSJDE, Major- General. 6. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 30, 18647.30 a. m. Major-General BURNSIDE: ~What do you mean by hard work to take the crest ~ I understand not a man has advanced beyond the enemy~s line which you occupied immediately after exploding the mine. Do you mean to say your offi- cers and men will not obey your orders to advance~ If not, what is the obstacle ~ I wish to know the truth and desire an immediate answer. GEO. G. MEADE, Major- General. 7. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 30, 18648 a. m. Major-General BURNSIDE: Since writing by Oaptain Jay, Captain Sanders has come in and re- ported condition of affairs. He says Griffin has advanced and been checked. This modifies my dispatch; still I should like to know th Page 143 CHAP. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 143 exact morale of your corps. Gid reports he cannot move until you get out of the way. Caut you let him pass out on your right, and let him try what he can do ~ GEG. G. MEADE, Major- (Jeneral. 8. HEADQUARTERS NINTH CORPS, Battery Morton, July 30, 1864about 7.35 a. m. General MEADE: Your dispatch by Captain Jay received. The main body of General Potters division is beyond the crater. I do not mean to say that my officers and men will not obey my orders to advance. I mean to say that it is very hard to advance to the crest. I have never in any report said anything different from what I conceived to be the truth. Were it not insubordinate I would say that the latter remark of your note was unofficerlike and ungentlemanly. iRespectfully, yours, A. B. BURNSIDE, Major- aeneral. 9. FIFTH ARMY CORPS, July 30, 1864& a. m. Lieutenant-General GRANT: About a brigade more of our men have moved up to the crater, and then filed off to the right, along the enemys line. They are still moving to the right. C. B. COM~TOCK, Lieutenant- Colonel and Aide-de- Camp. 10. HEADQUARTERS NINTH ARMY CORPS, Jaly 30, 18648.45 a. m. General MEADE: One gun has just been taken out of the mine and is now being put in position. Have not heard anything from the attack made from the left of mine. One set of colors just sent in captured by the negroes. W. W. SANDERS, Captain and Commissary of Musters. 11. HEADQUARTERS NINTH CORPS, July 30, 18649 a. m. General MEADE: Many of the Ninth and Eighteenth Corps are retiring before the enemy. I think now is the time to put in the Fifth Corps promptly. A. E. BUItNSIDE, Major- (Jeneral Page 144 144 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. LII. 12. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 30, 18649.30 a. m. Major-General BURNSIDE, Commanding Ninth Corps: The major-general commanding has heard that the result of your attack has been a repulse, and directs that, if in your judgment nothing further can b~ effected, you withdraw to your own line, taking every precaution to get the men back safely. A. A. HUMPHIREYS, Major- General and Chief of Stafl~. General Ord will do the same. A. A. HUMPIIJ~EYS, Major-General and Chief of #S~taff. 13. HEADQUARTERS NINTH ARMY CORPS, July 30, 18649 a. m. General MEADE: The attack made on right of mine has been repulsed. A great many men are coming to the rear. W. W. SANI)I~RS, Captain and Commissary of Musters. 14. HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY CORPS, July 30, 1864935 a. m. Lieutenant-General GRANT: I cannot see that we have advanced beyond the enemys line in the vicinity of the mine. From here it looks as if the enemy were holding a line between fhat point and the crest. C. B. COMSTOCK, Lieutenant- Colonel and Aide-de- Camp. 15. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 30, 18649.45 a. m. Major-General BURNSIDE, Commanding Ninth Corps: The major-general [commanding] directs that you withdraw to your own intrenchments. A. A. HUMPHImYS, Major- General and Chief of & aff. 16. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 30, 18G4-40 a. m. M~jor-Generals BURNSIDE and ORD: You can exercise your discretion in withdrawing your troops now or at a later period, say to night. It is not intended to hold the enemys line which you now occupy any longer than is required to withdraw safely your men. GEG. G. MEADE, Major- General Page 145 CHAP. LIII THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 145 17. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 30, 18647.40 p. m. Major-General BURNSIDE, Commanding Ninth Corps: The major-general commanding desires to know whether you still hold the crater, and, if so, whether you will be able to withdraw your troops from it safely to-night, an(l also to bring off the wounded. The commanding general wishes to know how many wonnded are probably lying there. It will be recollected that on a former occasion General Beauregard declined to enter into any arrangements for the succor of the wounded and the burial of the dead lying under both fires, hence the necessity of immediate and active efforts for their removal in the present case. A. A. HUMPHIIEYS, Major- General and Chief of Staff. 18. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 30, 186410.35 p. m. Major-General BURNSIDE, Commanding Ninth Corps: The major-general commanding desires to know whether you have any wounded left on the field, and directs me to say that he is awaiting your reply to the dispatch of 7.40 p. m. A. A. HUMPHIIEYS, Major- General and Chief of Staff. 18*. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 31, 18(18.40 a. m. Major-General BUENSIDE, Commanding Ninth Corps: The major-general commanding directs me to call your attention to the fact that you have made no report to him upon the condition of affairs in your front since he left your headquarters yesterday, and that you have made no reply to the two special communications upon the subject sent you last night at 7.40 and at 10.40. I am also directed to inquire as to the cause of these omissions. A. A. HUMPHREYS, Major- General and Chief of Staff. 184. NINTH CORPS, July 31, 18649 a. rn. Major-General IIUMPHREYS. Your dispatch was received just as I was making out a report of our casualties. 1 have used every me~ts to get something like accurate re- ports, but it has been difficu1t~ jhe runor~ aro yory numerous and 10 H RYOL XL~ ~~!? Page 146 146 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. LIL exaggerated. I will sell(I report by messenger. The order to retreat caused great confusion, and we have lost largely ill prisoners. General Ords men on onr line were not relieved. A. E. BULINSIDE, Major- General. 18g. NINTH CORPS, July 31, 18646.40 p. rn. Major-General HUMPHREYS: The loss in this corps, in the engagement of yesterday, amounts to about 4,500, the great proportion of which was made after the brigade commanders in the crater were made aware of the order to withdraw. A. E. BURINSIDE, Major- General. 19. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 31, 18647.20 p. m. Major-General BURNSIDE, Commanding Ninth Corps: Your dispatch relative to the loss in your corps yesterday is received. The cominauding general requests that you will explain the meaning of the latter part of the dispatch, and again reminds you that he has re- ceived no report whatever from you of what occurred after 11 a. in. yesterday. A. A. HUMPHREYS Major-General and Chief of Staff. 194. NINTH CORPS, July 31, 1864. (Received 9.10 p. in.) Major-General IIUMPHREYS, Chief of Staff: Your dispatch of 7.20 p. m. received. Just before the order for with- drawal was sent in to the brigade commanders in the crater the enemy made an attack upon our forces there and were repulsed with very severe loss to the assaulting column. The order for withdrawal, leaving the time and manner of the execution thereof to the brigade commanders on the spot, was then sent in, and while they were making arrangements to carry out the order the enemy adxTanced auother column of attack. The officers knowing they were not to be supported by other troops, and that a withdrawal was determined, ordered the men to retire at- once to our old line. It was in this withdrawal and consequent upon it that our chief loss was made. In view of the want of confidence iii their situation, and the certainty of no support consequent upon the receipt of such an order, of whose moral effects the general command- ing cannot be ignorant, I am at a loss to know why the latter part of my dispatch requires explanation. A. E. BURNSIDE, Major- General Page 147 CHAP. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 147 20. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 31, 18649.30 p. m. Major-General BURNSIDE, Commanding Ninth Corps: Your dispatch explanatory of that in relation to the loss in your corps yesterday is received. The major-general commanding directs me to say that the order for withdrawal did not authorize or justify its being done in the manner in which, jndging from your brief report, it appears to have been executed, aiad that the matter should be inquired into by a court. The malor-general commanding notices that the time and manner of withdrawal were left to the brigade commanders on the spot. He desires to know why there was not a division commander present where several brigades were engaged, and by whom the with- drawal could have been conducted. A. A. HUMPHItEYS Major- General and Chief of i~taff. 21. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 29, 18649.45 p. m. Major-General ORD, Commanding Eighteenth Corps: Your dispatch of 9.25 p. m. is received. The commanding general does not consider it necessary for General Buruside to wait for your troops to relieve his in the trenches. General Burnside can form his troops for the assault without reference to yours, and your troops can file into the trenches at any time after they are vacated. General Buruside is telegraphed to that effect. A. A. HUMPHItEjYS, Major-General and Chief of Staff. 22. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 30, 18644.50 a. m. Major-General ORD, Cornmanding Eighteenth Corps: General Buruside is ordered if his mine has failed to open all his batteries and assault at once. You will consider the orders the same as if the mine had exploded, and the assault made in consequence. A. A. HUMPHIREYS, Major- General and Chief of Staff. Just before this was finished the mine exploded and the batteries opened. It was not sent. A.A.H. 23. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 30, 18646 a. m. Major-General ORD, Cornmandi~~g Eighteenth Corps: The major-general commanding directs that you at once move for- ward your corps rapidly to the crest of the hill independently of Gen- eral Burusides troops and make a lodgment there, reporting the result as soon as attained, A. A. HUMPHREYS, Major- General and Chief of Sta Page 148 148 OPERATIONS IN SE VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. LII. 234. HEADQuARTERS NINTH ARMY CORPS, July 30, 18648 a. rn. General MEADE: Gene~ral Turner. in my front, reports that the only place I can get out of the line is opposite the crater. It is already full of men who cannot develop. I shall put in my Column as soon as I can. It is impossible, by reason of the topography, to charge in the manner you indicate. I must go in by head of column and develop to the right. This is reply to orders from General iNleade to push for crest of hill regardless of General Burusides troops. General Ames makes similar reports. B. 0. C. ORD, Major- General. 23A-. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 30, 18649.45 a. m. Major-General ORD, Commanding Eighteenth Corps: The major-general commanding directs that you withdraw your corps to the rear of the Ninth Corps in some secure I)lace. A. A. HUMPHPEYS, Major-General and Chief of Staff. 24. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 30, 186410 a. m. Major-Generals I3URNSIDE amid ORD: You can exercise your discretion iu withdrawing your troops now or at a later period, say to-night. It is not intended to hold the enemys line which you now occupy any longer than is required to withdraw safely your mimen. GEG. G. MEADE. Major- General. 25. HEAnQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 30, 18644.40 a. m. Major-General WARREN, Commanding Fifth Corps: General Burrmside is directed if his mine has failed to open all his bat- teries and assault. Upon hearing his batteries open you will open all in your front. A. A. HUMPHRBYS Major- General and Chief of Staff. 26. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC July 30, 18645.50 a. m. Major-General WARREN, Comman ing Fifth Corps: General I3urnside is occupying the crater with sonic of his troops. LI rcport~ that 11Q C CIR~/ i~ 5~1 L~ I hQiI P UC. lOW 45 it ill ~OUI ~ront Page 149 150 OPEEATJONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. ~CHAP. Lfl. if it is practicable that you make an attack in that direction. Prison- ers say there are but three divisions in the works, and but one line of intrenchments, thinly filled with their troops. A. A. HUMPIIREYS, Major- General and Chief of Stafl~. A dispatch just going to Wilsoii to make a lodgment on the Weldon railroad and mo~~ up along it to the enemys right hank. 31. HEADQITARTERS FIFTH ARMY CoRps, July 30, 18646.40 a. rn. General HUMPHREYS: I have all my troops on my right except General Crawfords. I have sent him your dispatch, with (lirections to do whatever he can on the left with Baxters brigade and half of Lyles. Do you mean for me to move Ayres in that direction? The enemy have a 30-pounder battery on the main ridge in my front behind their first line. We caiinot make out what this second line is. Respectfully, G. K. WARREN, Major- General. 32. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 30, 18G47 a. m. Major-General WARREN, Commanding Fifth Corps: What about attacking the enemys right flank near the lead-works with that part of your force nearest to it? A. A. HUMPHREYS, Major- General and Chief of Staff. 33. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 30, 18647.30 a. m. Major-General WARREN, Commanding Fifth Corps: Your dispatch -respecting attacking the enemys extreme right re- ceived. The commanding general will await General Crawfords recoii- naissance before determining whether you should send Ayres also in that direction. A. A. HUMPHREYS, Major-General and Chief of Staff. 34. HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY CORPS, July 30, 18647.50 a. m. Major-General IIUMPHREYS: I have just returned from the scene of General Burnsides operations. In my opinion the battery of one or two guns to the left of General I3urnside should be taken before attempting to seize the crest. i Page 150 - CHAP. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 151 seems to me it can be done, as we shall take the infantry fire quite obliquely. This done the advance upon the main hill will riot be diffi- cult. I think it would pay you to go to General Burusides position. You can see in a moment, and it is as easy to communicate with me as by telegraph. It will be some time before we can hear from Crawford. Respectfully, G. K. WARREN, ]Jfajor - General. 35. HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY CORPS, July 30, 18648 a. rn. Major-General HUMPHREYS: I sent your dispatch to General Crawford with directions to do what he could. He says the lead-works are over a mile from the angle of my picket-line. I do not think an attack upon the enemys works at or near that point at all practicable with the force I can spare. I can make a demonstration if it is desired. The cavalry are moving and I will have my left uncovered. He sent word he will await further orders. He [is] so far off that I do not think it well to wait anything more he can do, and I renew my suggestion that you take a look at things from General Burnsides headquarters, and direct me either to go in with Buruside or go around to my left with Ayres division and I do the other thing. G. K. WARREN, Major- General. 36. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Major-General WARREN, July 30, 18648.45 a. m. Commanding P~/th Corps: Yonrdispatchis received. The major-general commanding directs that you go in with Burnside, taking the two-gun battery. The movement on the left need not be carried further than reconnaissance to see in what force the enemy is holding his right. The cavalry are ordered to move up on your left, and to keep up connection. A. A. HUMPHREYS, Major- General and Chief of Staff. 37. HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY CORPS, July 30, 18649.15 a. m. Major-General HUMPHREYS: Just before receiving your dispatch to assault the battery on the left of the crater occupied by General Burnside, the enemy drove his troops out of the place and I think now hold it. I can find no one who knows for certainty or seems willing to admit, but I think I saw a rebel battle- flag in it just now, and shots coming from it this way. I am, therefore, if this [be] true, no more able to take the battery now than 1 was this time yesterday. All oar advantages are lost. I await further instruc- tions, and am trying to get at the condition of affairs for certainty. G. K. WARREN, Jlfajor- General Page 151 152 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. LII. 38. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 30, 18649.25 a. rn. Major-General WARREN: The httack ordered on the two-gun battery is suspended. GEG. G. MEAPE, Major- General. 384. HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY CORPS, July 30, 18649.45 a. m. Major-General JJUMPHREYS, Chief of Staff: GENERAL: J find that the flag I saw was the enemys, and that they have reoccupied all the line we drove them from except a little around the crater, which a small force of ours still holds. Respectfully, G. K. WARREN, Major- General. 39. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 30, 18649.45 a. m. General WARREN, Ninth Corps Headquarters: A dispatch has been seut to your headquarters rescinding order to attack. All offensive operations are suspended. You can resume your original position with your command. GEO. G. MEADE. 40. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 30, 18645 p. m. Major-Generals WARREN and BURNSIDE: Signal officers report the enemy returning rapidly from the north side of the James. Every preparation should be made to strengthen the line of works where any obstacles have to-day been removed. The lines should be held strongly with infantry and artillery posted wher- ever practicable. Available reserves held in hand ready for movement in case it becomes necessary. I anticipate offensive movement on the part of the enemy, and expect it will be by a movable column turning our left and threatening our rear. GEG. G. MEADE, Major- General, Commanding. Major-General Hancock will, to-night, resume his former position, and General Ord his; also Page 152 CHAr. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 153 41. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Brigadier-General MOTT, July 30, 18644.40 a. m. Comdfl. Division, in intrenehments of Eighteenth Corps, old headquarters of Eighteenth Corps: General Buruside is ordered if his mine has failed to open all the batteries on his front and assault at once. Upon hearing his batteries open have all the batteries of the Eighteenth Corps opened. A. A. HUMPHREYS, Major- General and Chief of Staff. 42. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 30, 18644.50 a. m. OPERATOR AT HEADQUARTERS EIGHTEENTH CORPS: Send following message by orderly to General Hancock: Maj or-General HANCOCK, Commanding Second Corps: The commanding general wishes yon to be abont the headquarters of the Eight- eenth Corps, so that he can communicate with yon at any time. A. A. HIJMPHREYS Major-General and Chief of Staff. 43. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Major-General HANCOCK, - July 30, 18G46 a. m. Commanding Second Corps: The major-general commanding directs me to say that General Burnside reports the enemys line in his front abandoned, and the pris- oners taken say that there is no second line. The commanding general may call on yon to move forward at any moment, and wishes you to have your troops well up to the front, prepared to move. l)o the en- emys lines in front of Motts division appear to be thinly Occnl)icd, and is there any chance to push forward there? A. A. HUMPHREYS, Major- General and Chief of Stafr~. 44. HEADQUARTERS SECOND ARMY CORPS, July 30, 18646 a. m. Major-General HUMPHREYS: It is not possible to say about the line in front of General Mott, as both parties keep down, firing whenever a head is shown. General Ord left word for me with General Mott that there was no place to as- sault here, as the line was not only protected by abatis bnt by wire. This was the decision of himself and his division commanders, amid he requested General Mott s~o to inform me. I know nothing more abont it. I will be prepared for your orders. W. S. HANCOCK Page 153 Cnxr. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 153 41. HEADQUARTERS AR~uY OF THE POTOMAC, Brigadier-General MOTT, July 30, 18G44.40 a. m. ComIg. Division, in intrenehments of Eighteenth Corps, old headquarters of Eighteenth Corps: General Buruside is ordered if his mine has failed to open all the batteries on his front and assault at once. Upon hearing his batteries open have all the batteries of the Eighteenth Corps opened. A. A. HUMPHREYS, Major- General and Chief of Staff. 42. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 30, 18644.50 a. m. OPERATOR AT HEADQUARTERS EIGHTEENTH CORPS: Send following message by orderly to General Hancock: Maj or-General HANCOCK, Commanding Second Corp8: The commanding general wishes you to be about the headquarters of the Eight- eenth Corps, so that he can communicate with you at any time. A. A. IHJMPHREYS Major-General and Chief of staff. 43. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Major-General HANCOCK, - July 30, 1864~~.~:6 a. m. Commanding Second Corps: The major-general commanding directs me to say that General Burnside reports the enemys line in his front abandoned, and the pris- oners taken say that there is no second line. The commanding general may call on you to move forward at any moment, amid wishes you to have your troops well up to the front, prepared to move. Do the en- emys lines in front of Motts division appear to be thinly occupied, and is there any chance to push forward there ~ A. A. HUMPHIREYS, Major-General and Chief of Staff. 44. HEADQUARTERS SECOND ARMY CORPS, July 30, 18646 a. m. Major-General HUMPHREYS: It is not possible to say about the line in front of General Mott, as both parties keep down, firing whenever a head is shown. General Ord left word for me with General Mott that there was no place to as- sault here, as the line was not only protected by abatis but by wire. This was the decision of himself and his division commanders, ai~d he requested General Mott so to inform me. I know nothing more abont it. I will be prepared for your orders. W. S. HANCOCK Page 154 154 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [ChAP. ML 45. HEADQUARTERS SECOND Conps, July ~0, 18646.20 a. rn. Major-General HUMPHREYS, Chief of Staff~: I have sent out to have General M~tts line examined as far as prac- ticable to see how strong the enemy appear to hold their line in Gen- eral Motts front. W. S. HANCOCK, Major- General. 45k. HEADQUARTERS SECOND CORPS, July 30, 18646.30 a. rn. General HUMPHREYS: I have directed General Mott to advance a skirmish line to see whether the enemy hold a strong line in his front. W. S. HANCOCK, Major- General. 45~i HEADQUARTERS SECOND ARMY CORPS, July 30, 18646.50 a. m. General GEORGE G. MEADE: The brigade next to General Burusides attempted an advance of a skirmish line .just now, and lost the officer in command of the line and several men in getting over the parapet. The enemys mortars are at work, but they cannot tire much artillery other than this. The other brigades have not yet been heard from. Your dispatch is jnst received. I will continue to watch the enemy in my front. W. S. HANCOCK, Major- General. 46. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 30, 18647 a. rn. Major-General HANCOCK: The report from prisoners would indicate weakness in the enemy~s line, and that a considerable portion of it has been vacated. If Burn. side and Ord gain the crest, the enemy cannot hold in your front, for they will be open to attack from front and rear. It was to take advan- tage of this contingency that I wanted you to have your troops in hand. The orders to Mott are all right. If the enemy are in force and pre- pared you will have to await developments, but if you have reason to believe their condition is such that ami effort to dislodge them would be successful I would like to have it made. Buruside now occupies their line, but has not pushed up to the crest, though lie reports he is about dolug so. GEG. G. MEADE Page 155 C~r. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 155 47. HEADQUARTERS SECOND CORPS, July 30, 18647 a. m. General HUMPHREYS, Chief of Staff: Report from the Second Brigade, of General Motts division, shows that the enemy are there in sonic strength, having two batteries which they fire seldom, owing to the close proximity of our riflemen. The com- manding officer of the brigade says he can see every man who leaves his front to their right, and none have left since daylight. He is nsing mortars effectively. I will report any change of troops. W. S. HANCOCK, Major- General. 48. HEADQUARTERS SECOND ARMY CORPS, July 30, 18649 a. m. Major-General HUMPHREYS: General Motts remaining brigade deceived* the enemy in their front by putting their hats on rammers above the parapet, which elicited qnite a spirited volley. W. S. HANCOCK, Major- General. 49. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 30, 18649.25 a. m. Major-General HANCOCK: Offensive operations have been saspended. You will for the present hold in force the lines held by the Eighteenth Corps. Make your dis- positions accordingly. GEO. G. MEADE, Major- General, Commanding. 50. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 29, 186410 p. m. Major-General SHERIDAN, Commanding Cavalry Corps: The commanding general directs that you keep up cwinection with our left in the operations of to-morrow. A. A. HUMPHREYS, Major-General and Chief of Staff. 51. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 29, 186410 a. m. Brigadier-General WILSON, Commanding Third Division Cavalry: The major-general commanding directs that you concentrate your division on the left, somewhere near the plank roa(l, an(l hold its avail- In the original this word. is de~e1oped. See Part III Page 156 15(3 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. LII. able force ready for prompt movement. The guard left with trains should be merely sufficient to protect them against any small irregular parties of the enemy. The dismounted men should form this guard. Please report your location as soon as established. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, A. A. HUMPHREYs, Major-General and Chief of Staff. P. S.The patrols and pickets on the north side of the Blackwater should be reduced to the minimum consistent with watching the main avenues of approach. 52. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Brigadier-General WILSON, July 29, 18642.30 p. m. Commanding Cavalry Division, Jordans Point: The commanding general considers that not more than one regiment should remain north of the Blackwater, and that be so posted as to be brought in rapidly to-morrow morning. A. A. HUMPHItEYS Major- General and Chief of Staff. 53. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Brigadier-General WILSON, July 29, 18643.15 p. m. Commanding Third Division, Cavalry Corps: GENERAL: Major-General Sheridan is ordered to move at dark to Lees Mill, and at daylight against the enemys troops, defending Petersburg on their right by the roads leading to that town from the southward and westward. Your division will accompany him, and the commanding general directs that you be prepared to call in your patrols and pickets early to-morrow morning and move with the Cavalry Corps. You will send a staff officer to meet General Sheridan and receive his Instructions. A. A. HUMPHI~EYS, Major- General and Chief of Staff. 54. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Brigadier-General WHITE July 29, 18643 p. m. Commanding Tempoarily Division Ninth Corps: The major-general commanding directs that as soon as it is dark you withdraw yonr command from the iutrenchments you are now holdino- and move to the position of the Ninth Corps, and report to your corps commander. You will call in your pickets upon moving. You will at once report to Major-General Bnrnside, and receive his instructions as to the route you will take. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, A. A. HUMPHREYS, Major- General and Chief of Staf Page 157 Cu~w. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 157 55. HEADQUARTERS AuMx- OF THE POTOMAC, July 30, 18644.45 a. m, Colotiel WAINWEIGHT, Chief of Artillery, P~fth Corps, Hdqrs. PVth Corps: General Burnside is directed if his mine has failed to open all the batteries on his front and assault at once. Upon hearing his batteries open those of the Fifth Corps will open als. A. A. HUMPHREYS, Major- General and Chief of S/a if. sf3. PLANK ROAD S1~NAL STATION, July 30, 18645 a. in. Maj. B. F. FISHER: There are no tents or the sign of any force on the right of the enemys line near lead-works. The two batteries directly in front of station which opened heavily this morning have ceased firing. A Ia4e build- ing is burning in the city. I have seen ito movement of the enemys troops. J. B. DUFF, Lieutenant and Signal Officer. 57. PLANK ROAD SIGNAL STATION, July 30, 18646.20 a. m. Major FISHER: The enemy~s infantry has been passing to onr right for twenty mm- ntes; first noticed them at a point due west of the station marching in rear of their line. They came out in plain view at a point northwest from station. The column was at least a strong brigade. All the camps, one- quarter mile of lead-works, have been broken up. The largest visible from station has just beeu broken up, and the troops moved to our right. - J. B. DUFF, Signal Officer. 58. FIFTH ARMY Con ps, July 30, 1864. Major FISHER: The enemy are wholly concealed along the line in view of this station. Not one has been seen; only three guns and those in redoubt at Gregory house reply to us. I. S. LYON, Lieutenant, 4w, (Copy sent to Gener~ii Warren. Page 158 158 OPERATIONS IN SE. YA. AND N. C. [CHAP. LII. 59. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, OFFICE OF CHIEF ENGINEER, Brig. Qen. S. WILLIAMS, August 5, 1864.. Assistant Adjutant- General, Army of the Potomac: SIR: In compliance with directions received from you to-day, I have the honor to make the following report of the duty performed by the engineer officers during the assault of July 30: In compliance with directions from the chief of staff I detailed an officer of engineers for duty with each corps that was ordered to take part in the attack on the 30th of July. Major Michier, who was charged with selecting the position of the column on the right, after having reconnoitered the position, reported to General Ord and was informed that his subordinate generals had already examined the position, were thoroughly acquainted with the ground, and required no further assist- ance. They had already determined to take the same position indicated by Major Michler. Two engineer officers belonging to the Eighteenth Corps accompanied the movement. Lieutenant Benyaurd (Engineers), who has been on duty on the Ninth Corps front, reported to General Buruside and remained with him during the whole affair. After having consulted with the commanding general of the Fifth Corps as to the direction his column would take, I proceeded to the batteries in front of that corps and assisted Colonel Abbot in directing their fire so as to silence that of the enemy against the assaulting columns. I then re- paired to the right of this line. By this time, however, the attack had been abandoned, and my services were no longer required. Very respectfully, J. C. DUANE, Major Engineers. 60. CIRCULAR.] HEADQUARTERS NINTH ARMY CORPS, July 29, 1864. I. The mine will be exploded to-morrow morning at 3.30 by Colonel Pleasants. General Potter will issue the necessary orders to the colonel for the explosion. II. General Ledlie will immediately upon the explosion of the mine move his division forward as directed by verbal orders this day, and if possible crown the crest at the point known as Cemetery Hill, occupy- ing, if possible, the cemetery. III. General Willcox will move his division forward as soon as pos- sible after General Ledlie has passed through the first line of the en- emys works, bearing off to the left so as to effectually protect the left flank of General Ledlies column, and make a lodgment, if possible, on the Jerusalem plank road to the left of General Ledlies division. IV. General Potter will iuove his division forward to the right of General Ledlies division as soon as it is apparent that he will not inter- fere with the movements of General Willcoxs division, and will as near as possible protect the right flank of General Ledlie from any attack on that quarter and establish a line on the crest of a ravine which seems to run from the Cemetery Hill nearly at right angles to the enemys main line directly in our front Page 159 CHAP. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 159 V. General Ferrero will move his division immediately after General Wilicoxs until lie reaches our present advance line, where he will remain until the ground in his front is entirely cleared by the other three divis- ions, when he will move forward over the same ground that General Ledlie moved over; will pass through our line and, if possible, move down and occupy the village to the right. VI. The formations and movements of all these divisions, together with their places of rendezvous, will be as near as possible in accordance with the understanding during the personal interviews with the divis- ion commanders. The headquarters of the corps during the movement will be at the fourteen-gun battery in rear of the Taylor house. If fur- ther instructions are desired by division commanders they will please ask for them at once. By order of Major-General Buruside: W. II. HARRiS, Captain Ordnance, U. ~. Army. 61. ORDERS.] HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 9, 1864. 1. The operations of this army against the intrenched position of the enemy defending Petersburg will be by regular approaches on the fronts opposed to General Burusides and General Warrens corps. 2. The siege-works will be constructed under the direction of the acting chief engineer of the army, Maj. J. -C. Duane, Corps of Engi- neers, upon plans prepared by him and approved by the commanding general. Those plans that relate to the employment of the artillery will be prepared jointly by the acting chief engineer and the chief of artil- lery of the army, Brig. Gen. H. J. Hunt, U. S. Volunteers. Duplicates of the plan of siege will be furnished the commanders of the iNiuth and Fifth Corps. 3. The engineer officers and troops of the army will receive their orders from the chief engineer, who will regulate the hours at which they will go on duty. 4. The siege artillery will be served under the direction of the chief of artillery of the army, who will prescribe the hours at which artillery officers and troops go on duty. o. A general of th~ trenches will be detailed daily for each of the two fronts designated, where the siege operations are carried on by the commanders of the Ninth and Fifth Corps, respectively. Guards of the trenches will in like manner be detailed daily from those corps. The strength of the guard will be determined by the com mander of the corps furnishing it. - The general of the trenches is responsible for the security of the siege operations, and the police and discipline of the trenches, and will dis- pose the guard so as to protect the working parties and repel sorties. For armed purposes, as well as for police and discipline, he commands all in the trenches. He will report for instructions at the headquarters of his corps on the day previous to going on duty, and will confer with the officers of engineers and artillery in charge of the trenches and bat- teries, and visit the localities of the siege-works, so as to make himself familiar with the ground and determine upon the best disposition of t~e guard. He will go on duty at 8 a. in., and, upon being relieved Page 160 160 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. LU. will turn over to his successor, all or(lers and instinctions and infor- mation that he is possessed of pertaining to thc dnties specified. The commander of the guard of the trenches will i epoit to him for instruc- tions at 8 a. m.~ The guard of the trenches ~x ill go on duty at dark. Previous to the commencement of his tour of ~cix ice the commander will report for instructions to the general of the trenches. The coin- rnan(ler-of the guard will report hourly to the oenemil of the trenches what is transpiring in front and immediately inytlung of importance. The general of the trenches will make similar reports to the corp~ coin- mnander, who will transmit anything important to the connnaider of the army. Upon being relieved the general of the trenches will make a written report to his corps conmniand~r of the operations carried on during his tour, which will be forwarded to the commanding general of the army. ~5. For the work of the trenches details from the two corps named will be made upon the requisitions of the chiefs of engineers and artil- lery. These requisitions will specify the character and locality of the work to be performed. An officer of high rank will be detailed daily to take charge of the working l)arties of each corps. He will be respon- sible for the faithful and energetic performance of duty by the working parties, and will see that they conform to the directions of the engumeer and artillery officers in charge of the works. In time event of an attack he will comumnamid the working parties under the orders of time general of the trenches, and as soon after the commencement of his tour of duty as practicable he will report to that officer the manner in which the working parties are distributed. He will report for instructions at the headquarters of his corps on the~day before lie goes on duty, and will confer with the engineer and artillery officers in charge of the trenches, and receive informnation from them as to the manner of per- forming the work, amid visit the localities before dark, so as to make himself familiar with the same. He will go on duty at S a. m. Upomi being relieved he will turmi over to his successor all orders, instructions, and information pertaining to the duty that he may be possessed of. Working parties will go on duty just before daylight. They will be equipped for action. Upon being relieved lie will make a written re- port to his corps comnumander of the work executed by the workimig parties under his charge, which will be forwarded to tIme major-general commanding the arumy. 7. Materials for the siege will be prepared by working parties detailed from the corps not in the trenches, upon requisitions of the acting chief engineer amid chief of artillery. 8. The corps will relieve each other in the duties of the trenches should it be found necessary. 9. The acting chief en ineer and chief of artillery will report every twelve hours to the commanding general time progress made in the operations. The niorning report will include a statement of the work proposed to be executed in the next -twenty~fonr hours following the tour of working duty then going on. These reports will be accomn- panied by drawings exhibiting the saume. h)uplicates of these reports will be furnished to the commanders of the corps on whose fronts time operations are conducted. By command of Major-General Meade: S. WILLiAMS, Assim~tamt Adjutant- ~ii~ertcral Page 161 CHAP. Lii.] THE RICHMOND 4JAMPAIGN. 161 62. HEADQUARTERS NINTH ARMY CORPS, Major-General MEADE, July 3, 18G4. Gommanding Army of the Potomac: I have delayed answering your dispatch until I could get the opinion of my division commanders and have another reconnaissance of the lines made by one of my staff. If my opinion is required as to whether now is the best time to make an assault (it being understood that if not made the siege is to continue) I should unhesitatingly say wait until the mine is finished. If the question is between making the assault now and a change of plan looking to operations in other quarters I should un- hesitatingly say assault now. If the assault be delayed until the com- pletion of the niine I think we should have a more than even chance of success. If the assault be made now I think we have a fair chance of success, provided my corps can make the attack and it is left to me to say when and how the other two corps shall come in to m5~ support. I have the honor to be, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant, A. E. BUIRNSIDE, Major- General, Commanding Ninth Army Corps. 63. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 3, 1864. Major-General BURKSIDE, Commanding Ninth Corps: GENERAL: Your note by Major Lydig has been received. As you are of the opinion there is a reasonable degree of probability of success from an assault in your front I shall so report to the lieutenant-general commanding and await his instructions. The recent operations in your front, as you are aware, though sanctioned by me, did not originate in any orders from these headquarters. Should, however, it be determined to employ the army under my command in offensive operations on your front I shall exercise the prerogative of my position to control and direct the same, receiving gladly at all times such suggestions as you may think proper to make. I consider these remarks necessary in con- sequence of certain conditions which you have thought proper to attach to your opinion, acceding to which in advance would not in my judg- ment be consistent with my position as commanding general of this army. I have accordingly directed Major Duane, chief engineer, and Brigadier-General Hunt your lines, and to , chief of artillery, to make an examination of confer with you as to the operations to be carried onthe running of the mine now in progress and the posting of artil- lery. It is desirable as many guns as possible bearing on the point to be assaulted should be placed in position. I agree with you in opinion the assault should be deferred ~till the mine is completed, provided that can be done in a reasonably short periodsay a week. Roads should be opened to the rear to facilitate the movements of the other corps sent to take part in the action and all the preliminary arrangements possible should be made. Upon the reports of my engineer and artil- lery officers the necessary orders will be given. Respectfully, yours, GEG. G. MEADE, Major. General, Commanding. 11 ii I~-VOt XIS, 1T Page 162 162 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. LLL 64.* CONFIDENTIAL.] HEADQUARTERS NINTH ARMY CORPS, July 4, 1864. Major-General MEADE, Gommanding Army of the Potomac: GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your let- ter of last evening. I am very sorry that I should have been so unfor- tunate in expressing myself in my letter. It was written in haste, just after receiving the necessary data upon which to strengthen an opinion already pretty well formed. I assure you in all candor that I never dreamed of implying any lack of confidenii~e in your ability to do all that is necessary in any grand movement which may he undertaken by your army. Were you to personally direct an attack from my front I wouldfeeltheutmostconfidence,andwerelcalledupontosupportan attack from the front of the Second or Sixth Corps, directed by your- self or by either of the commanders of those corps, I would do it with confidence and cheerfulness. It is hardly necessary for me to say that I have had the utmost faith in your ability to handle troops ever since my acquaintance with you in the Army of the Potomac, and cer- tainly accord to you a much higher position in the art of war than I possess, and I atthe same time entertain the greatest respect for the skill of the two gentlemen commanding the Second and Sixth Corps; so that my duty to the country, to you, and to myself, forbids that I should for a moment assume to embarrass you or them by an assumption of position or authority. I simply desired to ask the privilege of calling upon them for support, at such times and at such points as I thought advisable. I would gladly accord to either of them the same support, and would be glad to have either of them lead ~the attack~ but it would have been obviously improper for me to have suggested that any other corps than my own should make the attack in my front. What I asked in reference to calling upon the other corps for support is only what I have been called upon to do and have cheer- fully done myself in regard to other corps commanders. If a copy of my letter has been forwarded to the General-in-Chief, which I take for granted has been done, that he may be possessed of my full opinion, it may make the same impression upon him as upon yourself, and I beg that you will correct it; in fact I beg that such impression maybe as far as possible removed wherever it has made a lodgment. My desire is to support you, and in doing that I am serving the country. With ordi- nary good fortune we can pretty safely promise to finish the mine in a weekI hope in less time. I have the honor to be, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant, A. E. BURNSIDE, Major- General, Commanding Ninth Army Corps. 67. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 24, 1864. Maj. J. C. DUANE, Acting Chief Engineer, Army of the Potomac: MAJOR: Please ~give me, with as little delay as practicable, your views on the expediency of an assauJt on the enemys works after a sue- * Nos. 65 and 66 are maps to appear in the Atlas Page 163 Cu~. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 163 cessful springing of General Burnsides mine, and particularly your views as to the subsequent operations after carrying the enemys first line and following up a lodgnient on the crater of the mine. Respectfully, yours, GEG. G. MEAI)E, Mojor- General, Commanding. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, OFFICE OF CHIEF iENGITqEER, July 24, 1864. Major-General MEADE, Commanding Army of the Potomac: - GENERAL: In reply to your communication of this date I have the honor to state that the line of the enemys works in fron~ of General Burnside is not situated on the crest of the ridge separating us from Petersburg; that the enemy have undoubtedly occupied this ridge as a second line. Should General Bnrnside succeed in exploding his mine he would probably be able to take the enemys first line, which is about 100 yards in advance of his approach. Beyond this I do not think he could advance until the works in front of the Fifth Corps are carried, as the Ninth Corps columns would be taken in flank by a heavy artil- lery fire from works in front of the center of the Fifth Corps, and in front by fire from the works on the crest near the Cemetery Hill. I do not believe that the works in front of the Fifth Corps can be carried until our lines can be extended to the left, so as to & ivelop the enemys line. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, J. C. DUANE, Major of Engineers. No. 5. Reports of JIaj. Gen. George G. llieade, U. S. Army, commanding Army of the Potomac. HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES, City Point, Va., August 22, 1864. Maj. Geii. H. W. HALLECK, Chief of Staff of the Army: GENERAL: Inclosed herewith I send you reports of the operations of the 30th ultimo against Petersburg. As the whole matter of our de- plorable failure on that occasion has been submitted to investigation I will not make any report myself until after the report of the Court of Inquiry is submitted, and then will probably confine myself to remarks on their proceedings. I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant, U.S. GRANT, Lieutenant- General. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, August 16, 1864. COLONEL: I have the honor to submit herewith a report of the oper- ations on the 30th ultimo, when an unsuccessful assault was made on the enemys works in front of Petersburg Page 164 - 164 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. LII. Soon after occupying our present lines Major-General Burnside, com- manding Ninth Corps, at the suggestion of Lieutenant-Colonel Pleas- ants, Forty-eighth Pennsylvania Volunteers, commenced the running of a gallery from his line to a battery occupied by the enemy with a view of placing a mine under this battery. When my attention was called to this-Work I sanctioned its prosecution, though at the time, from the reports of the engineers, and my own examination, I was satisfied the location of the mine was such that its explosion would not be likely to be followed by any important result, as the battery to be destroyed was in a re-entering part of the enemy~s line exposed to an enfilading and re- verse fire from points both on the right and left. The mine being com- pleted, and the movement of the Second Corps to the north side of the James having drawn off the greater portion of the Confederate army, the lieutenant-general commanding directed the explosion of the mine, and the assaulting the enemys works. For this purpose the Eighteenth Corps was placed under my command in addition to the Army of the Potomac. On the 29th ultimo a general order of battle was issued, a copyofwhichisherewithannexed,markedA*whichwillservetoshow the plan of the proposed attack. On the 30th, owing to a defect in the fuse, the explosion of the mine was delayed from 3.30 to 4.45 a. in., an unfortunate delay, because it was designed to assault the crest of the ridge occupied by the enemy just before daylight, when the movement would, in a measure, be ob- scured. As soon as the mine was sprung the First Division, Ninth Corps, Brigadier-GSneral Ledlie commanding, moved forward and occu- pied the crater without opposition. No advance, however, was made from the crater to the ridge, some 400 yards beyond, Brigadier-General Ledlie giving as a reason for not pushing forward that the enemy could occupy the crater in his rear, he seeming to forget that the rest of his corps and all the Eighteenth Corps were waiting to occupy the crater and follow him. Brigadier-Generals Potter and Willeox, commanding the Second and Third Divisions, Ninth Corps, advanced simultaneously with Ledlie and endeavored to occupy parts of the enemys line on Led- lies right and left, so as to cover those flanks, respectively, but on reaching the enemys line Ledlies men were found occupying the va- cated parts, both to the right and left of the crater, in consequence of which the men of the several divisions got mixed up, and a scene of disorder and confusion commenced, which seems to have continued to the end of the operations. In the mean time the enemy, rallying from the confusion incident to the explosion, began forming his infantry in a ravine to the right and planting artillery, both on the right and left of the crater. Seeing this, Potter was enabled to get his men out of the crater and enemys line, and had formed them for an attack on the right, when he received an order to attack the crest of the ridge. Not- withstanding he had to change front in the presence of the enemy, he succeeded not only in doing so, but, as he reports, advancing to within a few yards of the crest, which he would have taken if he had been supported. This was after 7 a. in., more than two hours after Ledlie had occupied the crater, and ~yet he had made no advance. ile, how- ever, states he was forming to advance when the Fourth Division (col- ored troops), General Ferrero commanding, came rushing into the crater and threw his men into confusion. The Fourth Division passed beyond the crater and made an assault, ~~hen they encountered a heavy fire of artillery and infantry, which threw them into inextricable con- Here omitte~L It appears as Appendix K, p. 134 Page 165 CHAP. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 165 fusioii, and they retired in disorder through the troops in the crater and back into our lines. In the mean time, in ignorance of what was occurring, I sent orders to Major-General Ord, commanding Eighteenth Corps, who was expected to follow the Ninth, to advance at once on (he right of the Ninth and independently of the latter. To this General Ord- replied the only d6bouch~s were choked up with the Ninth Corps, which had iiot all advanced at this time. He, however, pushed a bri- gade of Turners division over the Ninth Corps parapets, and directed it to charge the enemys line on the right, where it was still occupied. While it was about executing this order the disorganized Fourth Divis- ion (colored) of the Ninth Corps came rushing back and carrying every- thing with them, including Turners brigade. By this time, between 8 and 9a.m., the enemy, seeing the hesitation and confusion on our l)art, having planted batteries on both flanks in ravines where our artillery could not reach them, opened a heavy fire not only on the ground in front of the crater but between it and our lines, their mortars at the same time throwing shells into the dense mass of our men in the crater and adjacent works. In addition to this artillery fire, the enemy massed his infantry and assaulted the position. Although the assault was repulsed and some heroic fighting was done, particularly on the part of Potters division and some regiments of the Eighteenth Corps, yet the exhaustion incident to the crowding of the men and the intense heat of the weather, added to the destructive artillery fire of the enemy, pro- duced its effect, and report was brought to me that our men were retir- ing into our old lines. Being satisfied that the moment for success had passed, and that any further attempts would only result in useless sacrifice of life, with the concurrence of the lieutenant-general com- manding, who was present, I directed the suspension of further oWen- sive movements, an(l the withdrawal of the troops in the crater when it could be done with security, retaining the position till night, if neces- sary. It appears that when this order reached the crater (12.20) the greater portion of those that had been in were out; the balance re- mained for an hour and a half, repulsing an attack of the enemy, but on the enemy~s threatening a second attack, retreated in disorder, losing many prisoners. This terminated this most unfortunate and not very creditable operation. I forbear to comment in the manner I might otherwise deem myself justified in doing, because the whole subject, at my request, has been submitted for investig tion by the President of the United States to a court of inquiry, with directions to report upon whom, if any one, censure is to be laid. I transmit herewith the reports of corps, division, and brigade coin- manders, giving the details of the operations of each corps. There are two remarks in the report of Major-General Buruside; which justice to nmyself requires I should notice. General Burnside has thought proper to state A plan of attack was submitted involving the putting the colored division in ad- vance, anci~a certain formation of troops, and that this plan was disapproved in these two particulars. This statement is not accurate. The proposition to place the colored division at the head of the assaulting column was disapproved, but no control was exercised over General Burnside in the tactical formation of his columns. This will be seen by reference to the correspondence that passed upon the subject,. marked B and C.* * Here omitted. They appear as Appendixes L and M, pp. 136, 137 Page 166 166 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND Th C. [CHAP. LII. Again, Major-General Burnside. says: Peremptory orders from the commanding general directed me to throw in all my troops, and direct them against the crest. Under these orders I directed the Fourth Division (colored) to advance, which division I had hitherto held back, nnder the belief that these new troops could not be used to advantage in the crowded condi- tion of the portion of the enemys line held by us. I presume Major-General Burnside here refers to the dispatch addressed to him at 6 a in., as follows: HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 30, 1864G a. m. Major-General BURNSIDE: Prisoners taken say there is no line in their rear, and that their men were falling back when onrs advanced; that none of their troops have retnrned from the James. Onr chance is now; pnsh your men forward at all hazards (white and black) and dont lose time in making formations, bnt rnsh for the crest. GEG. G. MEADE, Major-General. It was not intended by that order, nor is there any such construe- tion justified by its terms, to push forward the colored division into the overcrowded crater, there to add to the disorganization and con- fusion already existing, and the existence of which I was utterly ignorant, but of which it is to be presumed from the extract from his report General Burnside was aware. The order required that the men in the crater should be pushed forward at all hazards to the crest beyond, and when they moved the colored division advanced after them. It will be seen to be the concurrent testimony of all parties that the failure of success was in a great measure due to the injudicious advance of the colored division into the overcrowded crater and adjacent parts of the enemys line, and to the confusion produced by their retiring a disordered and disorganized mass, after attempting an assault. From the reports transmitted I cannot perceive that the colored troops are open to any more censure for their conduct than the other troops engaged. I inclose herewith a list of casualties amounting in all, in the Army of the Potomac and Eighteenth Corps, to 4,400 killed, wounded,and missing. Two hundred and forty-six prisoners, 2 colors and 2 guns were captuied, but the latter were abandoned in retiring from the crater. In closing this report I cannot forbear from expressing the poignant regret I experienced at the failure of an operation promising such bril- liant results had it been successful. Had the mine been sprung at 3.30 and the crest promptly seized, as it is believed it could have been done in thirty minutes after the explosion, such a force could have been poured onto the crest as to have rendered its repossession by the enemy impos- sible and thus have rendered untenable all his lines around Petersburg. But the operation was essentially a coup de main, depending for success upon the utmost promptitude of movement and the taking advantage of the shock produced on the enemy by the explosion of the mine. The causes of the failure justice to all parties requires I should leave to the Court of Inquiry to ascer& ain. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, GEG. G. MEADE, Major- General, (Jonimanding. Lient. Col. T. S. Bowuns, Asst. Adjt. Gen., Headquarters Armies in the Field Page 167 THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 167 [Inelosure.] Report of casualties in Army of the Potomac for July 30, 1864. Killed. Wounded. Missing. Total. 53 a Command. ,~ as a a . a . . a . a a a a a a ~5 0 ~ 0 ~ 0 ~ 0 ~ Second Corps 2 1 25 1 27 28 Fifth Corps 7 6 24 6 31 37 Ninth Corps 47 363 117 1,506 19j 1819 255 3,688 3,943 Tenth and Eighteenth Corps 6 13 22 281 50 28 364 392 Total 51 405 146 1,836 91 1,869 2901 4,110 4,400 GEG. G. MEADE, ill ajor- General, Commanding. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, November 1, 1864. COLONEL :* By the 14th [Junej the army was massed around Charles City Court- House. Trallsports having been assembled the Second Corps com- menced Crossing in them at noon. Brigadier-General Benham, in charge of bridge train, arrived *early on the morning of the 14th and proceeded to lay the bridge, the site for which, and the approaches on each side, having been prepared by Brigadier-General Weitzel, chief engineer Department of Virginia and North Carolina. The bridge, over 2,000 feet in length, and the channel-boats anchored in over thir- teen fathoms water, was completed by midnight. During this day (the 14th of June) the greater portion of the Second Corps was ferried across the river. In the evening orders were sent to Major-General Hancock to move early the next morning and take position in front of Peters- burg. He was, however, authorized to delay for the receipt of subsist- ence stores, whicli,in the absence of our supply trains, were to be sent down from Bermuda Hundred. Major-General Hancock moved with-. out the supplies, his leading division, under Birney, reporting to Maj. Gen. W. F. Smith about an hour before that officers attack on the enemy, and by direction of General Smith Bi left of General Hinks. Soon after, or riley took position on the about dark, Major-General Han- cock arrived with the rest of his corps, and on communicating with Major- General Smith was by that officer requested to place his colnmand in a part of the works captured from the enemy. Late in the evening this day, the 15th, orders were received from the lieutenant-general commanding, then at City Point, to dispatch another corps to Peters- burg, when Major-General Buruside, with the Ninth Corps, was imme- dmately put en route for that place, reaching it about noon the next day. At the same time orders were given to Warren to cross his corps at early daylight by the ferries and proceed to Petersburg, he reaching there about dark of the 16th. Having made these dispositions, early on the morning of the 16th I proceeded to City Point, and from thence to Petersburg, meeting, when * For portion of report (here omitted) covering operations from May 4 to June 13, 1864, see vol. xxxvi, Part I, p. 188. CHAP. LII. Page 168 168 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. LIL about half way to the latter place, the lieutenant-general commanding, by whom J was instructed to take command of the troops then in front of Petersburg, and, if practicable, push the enemy across the Ap- pomattox. At the same time orders were sent to Wright to move up his artillery and one division of his infantry to Petersburg, and to take the other two divisions by water to City Point. Proceeding on I reached Petersburg about 2 p. in., and after communicating with corps com- manders orders were given for an assault by Hancock and Burnside at 6 p. in., Smith demonstrating, he having reported. an assault not expe- dient on his front. The assault was made, as directed, by Hancock, and resulted in taking and holding part of the enemys line. The fighting continued till late in the night, and at early dawn of the 17th of June a gallant assau]t was made by the Ninth Corps, capturing a re- doubt, 4 guns, several colors, and many prisoners. During the night of the 16th Keills division Si , relieving Brooks division, of the Eighteenth, , xth Corps, arrived who, accompanied by Major-General Smith, returned to Bermuda Hundred, leaving General Martindale in com- mand of Smiths troops. Warren, with the Fifth Corps, also came up during the night of the 16th an Corps. d was posted on the left of the Ninth During all of the 17th the enemy was vigorously pressed, Martinda~le pushing him back on the right, and the whole line gradually advanc- ing. An assault of the whole line was ordered for daylight on the 18th, but on advancing it was found the enemy during the night had retired to a line about a mile nearer the city, the one he now occupies. Orders were immediately given to follQw and develop his position, and, so soon as dispositions could be made, to assault. About noon an un- successful assault was made by Gibbons division, Second Corps. Martindales advance was successful, occupying the enemys skirmish line and making some prisoners. Major-General Birney, temporarily commanding Second Corps, then organized a formidable column, and about 4 p. m. made an attack, but without success. Later in the day attacks were made by the Fifth and Ninth Corps, with no better re- sults. Being satisfied Lees army was before me, and nothing further to be gained by direct attacks, offensive operations ceased and the work of intrenching a line commenced, which line is part of that at present held. During these operations the supply trains were crossed at the bridge, covered by Wilsons division of cavalry and Ferreros division of cQlored troops. On the 18th of June news was received from Sheridan, who,on the 16th, was at Walkerton, on the Pamunkey. He reported having reached Trevilian Statioii on the Central railroad, near Gordo~msville, where he was attacked by Hamptons cavalry, whom he repulsed and drove off. Sheridan then commen~ed the destruction of the railroad, but was soon interrupted by the return of Hampton, re-enforced with infantry from Gordonsville. Sheridan was again successful in his encounter with these forces, but finding his ammunition being ex- hausted, the country destitute of supplies, and hearing nothing of General Hunters movement, he deemed it prudent to abandon the further prosecution of the expedition and accordingly returned. Orders were sent to General Sheridan to proceed to the White House, resupply himself and then escort to the James the garrison of that place. Sheridan reached the White House just as Hampton was about attack- ing it, compelling Hampton to retire. After breaking up the depot, Sheridan moved over to the James, sending Greggs division to cove Page 169 C~IAP. MI.) THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 169 - the roads toward White Oak Swamp. Hampton fell on Gregg, hand- ling him severely, but he was finally driven off and the command reached the James and were safely ferried over near Fort Powhatan, on the 29th of June. On the 21st of June, the Ninth Corps relieving the Second, and the Eighteenth the Sixth, the two corps were moved across the Jerusalem plank road, to which road t~e Fifth Corps was extended. The Second Corps was placed in position on the left of the Fifth and an effort for several days was made by means of the Sixth Corps to extend the lines to the Weldon railroad. The enemy resisted most persistently, and several skirmishes and small affairs were had, in which, owing to the character of the country, being a dense thicket, and want of knowl- edge on our part of the topography, the enemy was enabled to defeat our~ purpose, capturing a number of prisoners and taking from Gibbons division, Second Corps, four guns. The lines were established about half way to the Weldon road, but before they could be extended, early in July, the Sixth Corps was ordered from this army to Washington. This necessitated a contraction of our lines, the left being drawn in to the Jerusalem plank road and there refused. On the 22d of June Wilson, with his division of cavalry and Kautzs division, of the Department of Virginia and North Carolina, proceeded to Burkeville, the junction of the Danville and South Side railroads, with a view of destroying both these roads and cutting the enemys communications. Wilson crossed the Weldon road at Reams Station, destroying the depot and several miles of road, and struck the South Side road about fifteen miles from Petersburg, destroying some twenty- two miles of this road to near Nottoway Station, where he met W. H. F. Lees division of cavalry, and after a sharp fight defeated him. Kautz reached Bnrkeville on the afternoon of the 23d, where he de- stroyed the station and track and moved to Meherrin Station, forming a junction at this place with Wilson the 24th of June. The two then destroyed the road as far as Roanoke bridge, a distance of twenty-five miles. At this point the enemy was in position and could not be dis- lodged. In returning Wilson met on the evening of the 28th the enemys cavalry in force at the Weldon railroad crossing of Stony Creek, where he had a severe engagement. He then made a detour 4zy his left, and endeavored to reach Reams Station, presuming it to be mu our possession; but he here encountered not only the enemy~s cavalry but a strong force of infantry. Being largely outnumbered he was overwhelmed and forced to retire with the loss of his trains and artil- lery, but succeeded in crossing the Nottoway and coining in on our left and rear, bringing nearly all his command with him. The first intima- tion I had of Wilsons situation was the intelligence brought by one of - his aides, who cut his way through from Reams Station. The Sixth Corps was immediately sent to that point and Sherida~m ordered up with the cavalry, but before the troops could reach there the affair was over and the enemy withdrawn. Although regretting the disaster at the termination of the expedition, the brilliant success of the operation amid the heavy injuries inflicted on the enemy were deemed ample com- pensation for the losses we sustained. The greater portion of July was devoted to strengthening the line of intrenchments from the Jerusalem plank road to the Appomattox, con- structing redoubts and siege batteries. On the 26th of July, this line being held by the Fifth; Ninth, and Eighteenth Corps, the Second Corps, with two divisions of cavalry under Sheridan, the whole unde Page 170 170 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. (CHAP. LII. Major-General Hancock, were crossed to the north side of the James at Deep Bottom. The enemys works at this point Were carried, capturing four guns and a number of prisoners, arid a line occupied extending from the James to the Long Bridge and Xew Market roads. This demonstration drew to the north side of the James the greater portion of Lees army, only three divisions being left to hold the lines in front of Petersburg. This was considered a suitable time to explode a mine which Major-General Burnside had excavated nnder one of the enemys batteries in his front. Accordingly Hancock was withdrawn on the night of the 29th, relieving Ord, commanding Eighteenth Corps, who was moved in rear and on the right of Burnside. Warren was directed to mass his available force on the left of the Ninth Corps. Burnside was ordered to mass his corps on the night of the 29th, organize his assaulting columns, take down his parapet and clear, away the abatis and other obstructions, and make every preparation for an immediate assault as soon as the mine should be sprung, and he was particularly cautioned not to permit his columns to halt in the crater but to press on and crown the crest of Cemetery Hill, which was the important point to seize, for, this being once gained, the mass of men ready to follow wonld render resistance by the enemy with their diminished force out of the question, and this crest iu our possession Petersburg would cer- tainly fall. Every preliminary order was given and 3.30 a. in. of July 30 designated as the hour for springing the mine. Some delay occurred from an imperfect fuse, but the mine was sprung at 4.45. Soon after Ledlies division moved out and without opposition crowned the crater. The division, however, did not move beyond, but other troops were sent who crowded into the crater and the adjacent parts of the enemys line found vacated. Finding delay in the movement of Burnsides column Ord was ordered to l)ush forward his corps, but reported it iinpracti- cable from there being no d*~bouch6 from our lh~tes but the one in front of the Ninth Corps, still crowded with troops. The delay in pushing for- ward to Cemetery Hill enabled the enemy to rally and concentrate his forces~ and soon he brought his batteries to bear from several points and opened on the crater. The operation being essentially a coup de main and dependent entirely on the prompt movement at the beginning, when 9 oclock arrived and no advance of any consequence having been effected, I was satisfied a longer continuance of the attack would only result in a useless slaughter of the troops, and they were therefore recalled. Authority was given to Major.General Burnside to exercise his judgment as to the precise time of withdrawal. The troops were withdrawn about 2 p. in., after repulsing several attacks of the enemy, but losing many prisoners in the withdrawal. I forbear to comment on the failure of an attack that seemed at first to promise the most complete success, because the whole subject, at my request, has been investigated by a court of inquiry, the proceedings of which are now and have been for some time in the hands of the Presi- dent of the United States.* ~Tery respectfully, your obedient servant, GEG. G. MEADE iViajor- General, Commanding. Lient. Col. T. S. BOWERS, Assistant Adjutant- General. For continuation of report, see Vol. XLII, Part I. [For statements of casualties, captures of guns, colors, and prisoners from May 5 to November 1, 1864, see VoL XXXVI, Part I, pp. 195, 196. Page 171 Cn& p. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 171 ADDENDA. HEADQUARTERS SECOND CORPS, August 2, 1864. ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL, Army of the Potomac: GENERAL: I inclose herewith the proceedings of a board of ofijeers convened at this place by virtue of Special Orders No 205 4, Army of the Potomac. , , paragraph Very respectfully, general, your obedient servant, ED. SCHIIIVEIR, Inspector- General, Recorder. [Indorsement.] HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, August 2, 1864. Respectfully forwarded for the information and action of the lieuten- ant-general commanding. The points raised by the Board are, in my judgment, valid, particu- larly so far as expressing an opinion ou the facts collected. The Board might be instructed to collect facts without expressing any opinion, but nnder the circumstances I would prefer not giving any fnrther instruc- tions, but would respectftilly suggest the matter be referred to the President of the United States, with the reqnest that he either con- firm the powers given to the Board or constitute them into a court of inquiry. I am clearly of opinion the interest of the army and of the country are involved in having an investigation. I am desirous that my conduct, as well as that of all others concerned, should be thoroughly examined. This examination should be immediate and prompt. There is the broad fact, that well-laid plans, executed under the most favorable circumstances, have failed. Yet the absence of official ~reports, and the difficulty of getting them, prevent my having the necessary knowledge to act in the premises, and it appears that this Board,whichwas convened to collect the facts onwhichlmight act, is of doubtful legality. I trust you will exercise your influence to induce the President to confer upon the Board the necessary authority, and for this purpose I would suggest an officer being sent to Wash- ington. GEG. G. MEADE,. Major- General. [Inclosure.] Proceedings of a board of officers which convened on the 2d of August, 1864, pursuant to the following orders: SPECIAL ORDER S,~ IIDQRS. ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, No. 205. * August 1, 1864. * * * * * 4. A board of officers will assemble at such time and place on Tues- day, the 2d instant, as the presiding officer may appoint,to examine into and report upon the facts and circumstances attending the unsuccessful assault on the enemys position in front of Petersburg on the morning of July 30, 1864. The board will also report whether in their judg- ment any party or parties are censurable for the failure of the troops to carry into successful execution the orders issued for the occasion Page 172 172 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. LII. The board will consist of Maj. Gen. W. S. Hancock, Brig. Gen. iR. B. Ayres, Brig. Gem IN. A. Miles, Volunteer service C spector-general, recorder. ol. E. Schriver, in- By command of Major-General Meade: S. WILLIAMS, Assistant Adjutant-General. AUGUST 2, 1864. The Board met at 10 a. in., at the headquarters of the Second Corps, agreeable to the notification from Major-General Hancock, the presid- ing officer. Present: Maj. Gen. W. S. Hancock, B rig. Gen. li. B. Ayres, Brig. Gen. N. A. Miles, Volunteer service~ Col recorder. , . B. Schriver, inspector-general, The order for the Court was read. At the outset the Board fin~ls itself embarrassed by the requirements of the order, viz, to report upon the facts and circumstances of a failure of the troops to execute certajn orders on the 30th of July, and whether any one is answerable therefor. There is demanded of it a duty, which has always been performed by a court of inquiry, but the powers of which required by law (see Ninety- first Article of War), such as summoning of witnesses and their exam- ination on oath, in presence of those whose conduct may be censured in the finding of the Board, should they desire to appear, it does not possess. This alone would he a bar to legal and just proceeding. But without this obstacle, the Board is of opinion that the Rules and Ar- ticles of War especially forbid the institution of a tribunal, by what- ever name it may be designated, for an object like that specified in the special order, unless directed by the President of the United States, or on the demand of the accused, who in this case, althougl~ not actually known to exist, may become no less a real personage by the finding of the Board, bnt who will not have had the privilege of being present throughout the investigation and of confronting witnesses by whose evidence he is placed in the position of an accused party. The Board, therefore, unanimously directs that these preceedings be submitted to the commanding general. On motion the Board ad,journed until it shall be directed to meet again by the proper authorities. W. S. HANCOCK, Major-General, Pre.~ident of Board. B. B. AYIIES, Brigadier- General. NELSON A. MILES, Brigadier-general, U. S. Volunteers. ED. SCIIRIVER, Inspector- General, ~eeorder. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. August 3, 1864. Brig. Gen. JOHN A. RAWLINS Chief ol Staff: GENERAL: I am compelled from a sense of duty to ask the lieuten- ant-general commanding that Maj. Gen. A. E. Bnrnside, corninanding Ninth Corps, be relieved from duty with this army. The inclosed charges and specifications will show in part the gravamen of the reasons which require I should ask the removal of Major-General Burn-. side. The whole course of that officer on the 30th ultimo, and subs Page 173 CHAP. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 173 quently, has been of such a character that it is impossible I can prop- erly command this army if he continues in command. The lieutenant- general commanding is himself aware of the difficulty experienced on the 30th ultimo of obtaim~ing any detailed or accnrate information from General Burnside of what was actually occurring at the front. At about 5.30 a.~m. I had accidentally placed in my hands a dispatch from Colonel~ Loring, of General Burnsidcs staff, to General Burnside, writ- ten at the crater of the exploded mine, informing General Burnside of the occupation without resistance of the crater by the advance of his corps, but stating his (Colonel Lorings) fears that the men could not be got to advance. Subsequent information from other sources led me to fear the existence of some obstacle of this kind to account for the non-advance of the column in accordance with my orders. Anxious to be advised of the exact condition of affairs, and considering it natural General Buvnside should wish to defer any such report as long as he had hope of removing this obstacle, I wrote the dispatch asking to be advised of the truth, meaning the exact or true state of the case in order that I might be governed by it, as if it was really the case that the column could not be got to advance, my judgment was clear it should be withdrawn before the enemy could mass his troops and ar- range his batteries to render, as he subsequently did, that withdrawal not only precarious but disastrous and, as I fear, not very creditable to us. In reply to this communication I not only received no satisfactory in- formation, but was answered by a personal insult. After it was determined by the lieutenant-general commanding and myself that it was useless to make any further efforts to advance, orders were given to General Burnside to withdraw, and on his repre- sentation of the precariousness of this operation, he was authorized to withdraw at such time and in such manner as would render the move- ment secure, and he was directed if necessary to hold the position till after dark. It was represented to me at this time that the crater and adjacent parts of the enemys lines occupied by us were so overcrowded by our troops that it was impossible any more could leave our lines until an advance was made from the crater. At this time, between 10 and 11 a. in., in conjunction with the lieutenant-general commanding, I left General Burusides headquarters and returned to my own, where I was in telegraphic communication with him. From that time till 7 p. m. I heard nothing from General Buruside, and, presuming our forces still in possession of the crater, I did not call for any information. At 7 p. m. a rumor reached me that the enemy had driven us out of the work, whereupon I addressed a telegram of inquiry to General Burnside. Not receiving any reply to this telegram, another was sent to General Buruside at 10 p. in., repeating the call for information, to which no more respect or attention was paid than to the first. The night passed without any reply, and about 9 a. m. of the 31st another call was made on General Buruside, and his attention directed to the previous calls. This last likewise failed to elicit any information, and it was not till 9 a. m. of the 1st instant that any report of the withdrawal and the cir- cumustances attending it was made to me by General Buruside, and I then learned for the first time the extraordinary construction General Buruside had placed upon the order to withdraw, which justified ap- parently, in his estimation, the faihir e of his command to make any de- fense to a threatened attack, and this in the face of his acknowledg- ment that they had just successfully repelled one Page 174 174 OPERATIONS IN SE~ VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. LII. I respectfully submit the foregoing plain statement of facts is of itself snificient to justify my application for General Burnside being relieved, and to convince the lieutenant-general commanding that I cannot be, and onght not to be, held responsible for the handling of this army where such an extraordinary course is adopted by a subordi- itate officer. The. lieutenant-general commanding having ordered an investigation into the causes of the recent lamentab]e failure to take advantage of what I consid& r one of the most brilliant opportunities for saccess offered in this war, I have omitted in the charges and specifications now inclosed any charge against Ma.jor-General Burnside for neglect of duty and disobedience of orders in the conduct of that affair, al- though I have reason to believe that in the l)relilninary arrangements and subsequent handling of his troops his course is open to criticism, if not grave censure. The lieutenant-general commanding is aware Major-General Buruside, although my senior in rank, was placed under my command for the better securing an efficient organization and ad- ministration of the forces operating together. Although professing the utmost willingness to serve under my command, General Burnside has nevertheless repeatedly in various ways performed acts and exercised powers inconsistent with his position as a subordinate, and among others was that of assuming the authority to take off of the telegraph wires messages not addressed to him, and thus frequently making public matters which both the lieutenant-general and myself desired to keep secret. This assumption of authority, I regret to say, has con- tinued after my distinctly informing General Burnside such action was irregular and unauthorized. Upon several occasions General Buruside has thought proper to place a construction on my official acts and dis- patches utterly inconsistent with the relations existing between us, and not justified by any reasoning based on ordinary charity and coni- mon sense. .Jn these cases an appeal to his intelligence, when his passion has subsided, has produced an expression of regret on his part for his unguarded ebullitions of temper, and I should be disposed to treat in the same way his amusing charge of unoffic~r-like and un- gentlemanly conduct, because in the exercise of my prerogative as com- manding general on the field of battle, I wished to be advised of the exact condition of affairs, but my patience and forbearance are ex~ hausted, and I think the time has arrived when General Burnside should understand disrespectful and insubordinate language cannot be used in official communications with impunity. I have no personal feeling in this matter, and fully appreciate the many good qualities of General Burnside, especially his earnest zeal in the discharge of his duties, but it is out of the question, after what has passed, that there can be that harmony and co-operation between us which ought to exist, and I am compelled to ask his relief. I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servan~t GEG. G. MEADE, ]Ifajor- General, Commanding. [Inclosure.] Gharges and specifications preferred against 31aj. Gen. Ambrose B. Burn- side, commanding iYinth Army Corps. CHARGE. J.Disobedience of orders. Specification lst.In this: That Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Buruside, com- manding Ninth Army Corps, being charged with certain importan Page 175 OHAP. MI.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 175 duties in the action before Petersburg, Va., on the 30th of July, 1864, and having been duly ordered by his commanding officer, Major-General Meade, in orders dated headquarters Army of the Potomac, July 29, 1864, to advise him of every step in the progress of the operatiou and of everything important that should occur iu that action and connected therewith within the command of him, said General Buruside, did fail to obey said~ order, although he was repeatedly called on verbally and in writing to do so. This before Petersburg, Va., on or about the 30th day of July, 1864. AS~peciftcation 2d.Jn this: That Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Buruside, com- maiiding Ninth Army Corps, being charged with certain important duties in the action before Petersburg, Va., on the 30th of July, 1864, aiid having been duly ordered by his commanding officer, Major-General Meade, in orders dated headquarters Army of the Potoniac, July 29, 1864, to advise him of every step in the progress of the operation and of everything important that should occur in that action and connected therewith within the command of him, said General Burnside; did fail to advise the commanding general, Major-General Meade, of any steps in the progress of the operations, or to make any report of any kind to him between the hours of 11 a. m. July 30, 1864, and 9 a. m. July 31, 1864, although events of importance occurred within that time in con- nection with said action ,within his, said General Burusides, command. This before Petersburg, Va., on or about the 30th and 31st days of July, 1864. ~peciftcation Sd.In this: That Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Buruside, coin- manding Ninth Army Corps, being charged with certain important duties in the action before Petersburg, Va., on the 30th of July, 1864, and having been duly ordered by his commanding officer, Major-General Meade, in orders dated headquarters Army of the Potomac, July 29, 1864, to advise him of every step in the progress of the operation and of everything important that shonld occur in that action and connected therewith within the command of him, said General Buruside, and having been specifically ordered by his said commanding officer, by tele- graph, at abont forty minutes after 7 p. in. on the 30th of July, 1864, to report to him (said specific order being in form and manner following) HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 30, 18647.40 ~~. m. Major-General BUENSIDE, Commanding Ninth Corps: The major-general Commanding desires to know whether you still hold the crater, and, if so, whether you will be able to withdraw your troops from it safely to-night, and also to bring off the wounded. The conimanding general wishes to know how many wounded are probably lying there. It will be recollected that on a former occasion General Beauregard declined to enter into any arrangement for the succor of the wounded and the burial of the dead lying under both - fires, hence the neces- sity of immediate and active efforts for their removal in the present case. A. A. HUMPHREYS, Major-General and Chief of Staff. did fail to give the information required by said telegram, or to make any reply thereto. This before Petersburg, Va., on or about the 30th day of July, 1864. AS~fJeciftcation 4th.In this: That Maj. Gen. .Ambro~e E. Burnside, com- manding Ninth Army Corps, being charged with certain important duties in the action before Petersburg, Va., on the 30th of July, 1864, and having been duly ordered by his commanding officer, Major-General Meade, in orders dated headquarters Army of the Potomac, July 29, 1864, to advise him of every step in the progress of the operation an Page 176 176 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [Cnxr. LII of everything important that should occur in that action and connected therewith within the command of him, said General Burnside, and hay- lug been specifically ordered by his said commanding officer, by tele- graph, at about forty minutes after 10 p. m. on the 30th of July, 1864, to report to him (said specific order being ill form and manner~ following) HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Major-General BURNSIDE, July 30, 186410.35 p. m. Commanding Ninth Corps: The niajor-general commanding desires to know whether you have any wounded left on the field, and directs me to say that he is awaiting yonr reply to dispatch of 7.40 p. in. A. A. HUMPHREYS, Major-General and Chief of Staff. did fiuil td give the information required by said telegram, or to make any reply thereto. This before Petersburg, Va., on or about the 30th day of Jlily, 1864. A~peciftcation 5th.Jn this: That Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Buruside, coin- manding Ninth Army Corps, having been ordered by Major:General Meade, commanding the Army of the Potomac, to relieve at once the troops of the Eighteenth Corps in his (said General Burusides) line, did fail to relieve said troops. This before Petersburg, Va., on or about the 31st day of July, 1864. CHARGE 11.Conduct prejudicial to good order and military disci- pline. Sjpeciftcation.Jn this: That Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Buruside, U. S. Volunteers, commanding Ninth Army Corps, having been ordered by Major-General Meade, commanding the Army of the Potomac, to assault the enemy~5 works before Petersburg, and to advance his troops to the crest in his front, and having received from Major-General Meade an official dispatch concluding as follows Do you mean to say your officers and men will not obey yonr orders to advance? If not, what is the obstacle? I wish to know the truth, and desire an immediate an- swer. GEG. G. MEADE, Major- General. did address and send to Major-General Meade, his commanding officer, a dispatch in form and manner following, to wit: HEADQUARTERS NINTH ARMY Conps, Battery Morton, July 30, 1864. General MEADE: Your dispatch by Captain Jay received. The main body of General Potters division is beyond the crater. I do not mean to say that my officers and men will not obey my orders to advance. I mean to say that it is very hard to advance to the crest. I have never in any report said anything different from what I conceived to be the truth. Were it not insubordinate I would say that the latter remark of your note was nnofficer-like and nngentlemanly. Respectfully, yours, A. E. BURNSIDE, Major-General. This in the action before Petersburg, Va., on the 30th day of July, 1864. GEG. G. MEADE, Major- General, Commanding Army of the Potomac. Witnesses: Maj. Gen. A. A. Humphreys; Maj. Gen. E. 0. C. Ord; Maj. Geii. John Gibbou; Brig. Gen. Seth Williams; Capt. William Jay, aide-de.eamp; Messrs. Caidwell and ~m rick, telegraph operators Page 177 THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 177 Abstract from tn-monthly returns showing the present for dnty eqnipped, or effective strength of the armies operating against I?ichrnon~l, under tient. Gen. U. S. Grant, for Jnne 30, July 20, and July 31, 1864. JUNE 30. Command. ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. Provost Guard (Patrick) Battalion U. S. Engineersn (Men- deli). Artillery Park (Hunt) Second Army Corps (Hancock). Fifth Army Corps (Warren) Sixth Army Corps (Wright) Ninth Army Corps (Buruside). Cavalry Corps (Sheridan) Total ARMY OF THE JAMES. Infantry. 0 58 5 3 761 819 682 621 774 301 108 13,737 15, 187 14, 194 13, 575 Cavalry. 24 594 2. 949 57, 876 622 Tenth Army Corps (Brooks) 482 11, 697 Eighteenth Army Corps (Smith) . - 453 11, 913 1st New York Engineers (Serrell) - 6 136 Cavalry Division (Kautz) 1 4th Massachusetts Cavalry (Iland) 1st Connecticut Heavy Artillery (Ahhot). 2d U. S. Colored Artillery, Bat. tery B (Choate). 36th U. S. Colored Troops (Draper) 15 37th U. S. Colored Troops (Chain 23 berlain). Total 979~ 380 2 55 2 47 11, 344 11, 826 120 9 67 1,460 8 65 646 506 24, 898 84 Artillery. 62 1, 695 32 1, 171 36 1, 391 33 1, 061 20 780 183 6, 098 24 735 22 800 3 140 56 1. 208 3 111 TotaL 0 82 5 3 825 851 720 654 614 3, 754 515 475 6 70 8 56 3 15 23 1, 154 301 108 15, 487 16, 358 15, 632 14, 636 12, 124 75, 800 12,552 12,713 136 1, 600 65 1,208 111 646 506 1, 645 108 2, 994 1, 171 29, 537 Grand total 3.928 82,774 706 13,471 291 9,092 a Effective strength of the Volunteer Engineer Brigade (Benhams) not reportei 4, 925 105, 337 - on return. JULY 20. ARMY OF TRE POTOMAC. Provost Guard (Patrick) Guards am orderlies Artillery (Hunt) Second Army Corps (Hancock). Fifth Army Corps (Warren) Ninth Army Corps (Burnside).... Cavalry Corps (Sheridan) Total ARMY OF TEE JAMES. Tenth Army Corps (Terry) Eighteenth Army Corps (Martin. dale). Cavalry Division (Kautz) 1st Connecticut Heavy Artillery (Abbot). 4th Massachusetts Cavalry (Rand). 1st New York Mountea Rifles (Patton). 1st New York Engineers (Serrell). 1st Pennsylvania light Artillery, Batter y A (Simpson). 17. 5. Co ore Troops (at Point of Rocks). 37th New Jersey (Grubb) Total Grand total 33 683 807 664 834 10,641 13, 900 13,443 19 3 2 563 362 74 50 10, 280 33 142 35 33 19 852 2, 854 1, 192 1, 080 731 52 3 33 825 842 699 582 1,196 74 852 13,495 15,092 14, 573 11, 011 1, 248 77 885 14,320 15, 934 15, 272 11, 593 2, 187 38, 818 587 10, 766 262 6, 709 3, 036 56, 293 59, 329 645 13,508 11 96 27 817 683 14,421 15,104 417 10,204 44 1,262 461 11,466 11,927 78 1,880 3 133 81 2,013 2,094 39 778 39 778 817 9 157 9 157 166 16 381 16 181 397 5 121 . 5 121 126 3 90 3 90 93 72 2,258 72 2,258 2,330 33 573 33 573 606 - 1, 172 26, 664 114 2, 514 116 .3, 980 1, 402 32, 258 5,359 65,482 701 13,280 378 9,783 4,438 88,551 13, 660 92,989 12 R RYOL XL, PT I CHAP. LII.] Aggre. gate. 1,236 306 111 16,312 17, 209 16, 352 15, 290 12, 738 79, 554 13, 067 13, 188 142 1, 670 73 1,264 114 661 529 30, 708 110. 26 Page 178 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHAr. LII. Ab8tract from tn-monthly returns showing the present for ditty eqi~ipped, ~-c.Contd. JULY 31. Infantry. Cavalry. Artillery. Total. Command. ~ ~ Q~ 0 a a a a 0 ~ 0 0 0 ~ ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. Provost Guard (Patrick) Artillery (Hunt) Second Army Corps (Hancock).... Fifth Army Corps (Warren) Ninth Army Corps (Burnside).... Cavalry Corps (Sheridan) Total ARMY OF THE JAMES. Tenth Army Corps (Birney) Eighteenth Army Corps (Ord) Cavalry Division (Kautz) 1~t Connecticut Heavy Artillery (Abbot). 1st New York Mounted Rifles (Patton). 1st Pennsylvania Light Artillery, Battery A (Simpson). U. S. Colored Troops (at Point of Rocks). 37th New Jersey (Grubb) 3d New York Light Artillery, Battery E (Mowers). Total 52 767 817 428 733 10, 941 14, 518 9, 127 8 1 329 156 61 5,768 59 125 37 32 1,586 2,779 1, 157 1,051 60 59 892 854 461 329 889 1,586 13,720 15, 675 10, 239 5, 768 949 1, 645 14,612 16, 529 10,700 6, 097 2, 064 35, 319 338 5, 985 253 6, 573 2, 655 47, 877 50, 532 587 11,741 17 261 26 730 630 12,732 13,362 411 9,688 40 1,194 451 10,882 11,333 78 1,880 3 133 81 2,013 2,094 43 762 43 762 805 16 361 16 361 377 3 111 3 111 114 67 2,183 67 2,183 2,250 26 476 2~ 476 502 4 120 4 120 124 1,091 24,088 111 2,502 119 3,050 1,321 29,640 30,961 Grand total 3, 155 59, 407 449 8, 487 372 9, 623. 3, 976 77, 517 81, 493 No. 6. Itinerary of the Army of the Potomac and Army of the James, d~c.* ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. SECOND ARMY CORPS.t June 12 and 13.Moved by Long Bridge, on the Chickahominy, to Charles City Court-House. June 14 to 15.Crossed Jaules River by boat at Wilcoxs Landing. June 15.Moved to Petersburg. June 16.Assault on the enemys position near the Friend house, gaining ground ~tnd carrying rifle-pits. June 17.Major-General Hancock relinquished command to Major- General Birney. June 18.Enemy withdrew to another position. At 12 m. unsuccess- ful attack on enemys position. At 4.30 p. m. second attack unsuc- cessful. June~21.Moved to the left, crossing Jerusalem plank road to Will- iams house; took position on the left; First Division skirmishing with the enemy and capturing prisoners. June 22.Unsuccessful attempt to advance the line on the left; loss of prisoners and 4 guns. From returns of the commands indicated for June and July, 186t iCommanded by Maj. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock. 17 Page 179 CHAP. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 179 June 27.Major-General Hancock resumes command. June 30.in position before Petersburg, Va. July 1.In position on the line in front of Petersburg. July 12.Destroyed the corps line of intrencliments and massed at Williams house. July 13.-Moved to vicinity of Deserted House, going in reserve. July 15.Second Division placed on left of the line. Jul~j 26.Moved across Appomattox and James Rivers to Strawberry Plains. July 27.Engaged with the enemy, capturing prisoners. July 28.Third Division moved back to vicinity of Petersburg. July 29 and 39.Returned to vicinity of Petersburg and massed in rear of Ninth Corps. In reserve during the action of the 30th; in the evening returned to vicinity of Deserted House. First Division. June 13.Crossed at Long Bridge and marched to Wilcoxs Wharf; on James River. June 14.Crossed the James River in transports. June 15.Marched to present position, near Petersburg. June 16.Assaulted the enemys works. June 17.Assisted General Burusides corps in capture of redoubts. June 18.Assaulted. June 21.Marched to the left, near Williams house; advanced to within one mile and a quarter of Weldomrailroad, but were recalled. June 22.Advanced, but were obliged to return to first position to prevent betng outflanked. July 2.Moved to Williams house, destroying the intrenchments previously held by the division. At 6 p. m. of the same day moved to the junction of the Jerusalem plank and Reams Station roads, return- ing to Williams house at 11 p. m. July 13.Moved to position in rear of Fifth Corps. July 26.Moved across Appomattox and James Rivers. July 27.First Brigade advanced and took the position occupied by the enemy, capturing four 20-pounder Parrott guns. July 29.Recrossed the James and Appomattox Rivers. July 30.Moved in rear of the Eighteenth Corps. At 8 p. m. re- turned to former position in rear of the Fifth Corps. * First Brigade, First Division. June 13.Crossed the Chickahominy at 9 a. m. at Long Bridge; marched in the direction toward Charles City; arrived on the banks of the James at Swynyards Landing at 4 p. in., and bivouacked for the night. June 14.Remained in camp until 11.45 p. in.; moved to the landing. June 15.At 2.30 a. m. we embarked; crossed the James and landed at Wind-Mill Point. At 6 a. m. marched about one mile from the land- ing and bivouacked in an open field all forenoon. At 1.20 we moved, and arrived within three miles of Petersburg at 11.30 p. in. June 16.At 3 a. m. moved to within sight of Petersburg, and from thence moved to the left about two miles. At 5.30 a. m. formed the second line for a charge- on the enemy~s works. June 17.At 4 a. m. charged the enemys works in conjunction with Buruside Page 180 180 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. LII. June 18.At 6 a. m. moved forward and occupied the enemy~s works, the enemy having fallen back during the night. At 12 in. we marched to near the railroad, in rear of Petersburg, and took up a position on a crest commanding the railroad. June 20.At 10 p. m. we were relieved by a portion of Burusides troops ~1zid moved about one mile to the rear. June 21.At 6 a. m. we nioved to the left marched until 2 p. in., and arrived near the Weldon railroad. June 22.At 4 p. in. resisted a determined assault of A. P. Hills corps on our breast-works and captured 40 f)risoners. June 23.Moved to the left in front and relieved a brigade of the Sixth Corps. June 24.-.---At 6.30 p. in. marched back to our old position behind the breast-works, and remained in the second line the rest of the month. July 10.At 1 a. in. we moved from our position about two miles to our left and relieved the Sixth Corps picket, and remained on picket until 2 p. m. the 12th. July 12.At 5 p. m. we moved out on the Jerusalem plank road, and at 11 p.- m. we were ordered back to our old position at Williams house. July 13.At 5.30 a. m. we marched to the right and arrived opposite Petersburg at 10.30 a. m. July 14.The whole brigade worked on the trenches. July 20 to 25.Worked on the trenches. July 2G.At 5 p. m. we moved toward the Appomattox. At 11.30 p. m. we crossed. July 27.At 1 a. m. crossed the James. Marched a short distance and bivouacked in an open field. At 6 a. in. we threw out ~kirmishers. At 7 a. m. charged the enemy and captured four 20-pounder Parrott guns and about 20 prisoners. At 11 a. in. we advanced our skirmish line about one mile through the woods. July 28.At 6 p. m. we went back about one mile to the edge in the open field, where we charged the battery on the 27th. July 29.At 8.30 p. in. we moved back across the James and Appo- mattox arriving opposite Petersburg at 5 a. m. of the 30th. July 30.Remained all day in supporting distance of the Ninth Army Corps. About 6 p. m. we moved back in tIme same camp which we oc- cupied before the march across the James. Consolidated Second Brigade, First Division. June 11.Reached the James River at 4 p. m. Threw up breast- works. June 15.Crossed the river. Marched all day. June 1G.Reached a point at 3 a. m. about five miles south of Peters- burg. Remained in line until 4 p. in., when the command took part in the charge made by the corps. At midnight made another charge and carried the enemys works and 4 guns. June 19.~!~Moved to the left. June 22.Took part in time severe engagement of the corps on the left of the line. Remained in the vicinity building works and strength- ening position. No further movement up to June 30. July 2G.At 4 p. m. this command marched from camp, in front of Petersburg, Va., in the direction of the Appomattox. Crossed in rear of Butlers line at 8 p. m. Marched all night Page 181 CHAP. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 181 July 27.Crossed the James River at Deep Bottom at (laylight. Formed line of battle and took part in the capture of the enemys works and 4 guns. Remained at Deep Bottom until the evening of the 30th [29th]; again recrossed the James River. Marched all night and reached a point in rear of the Eighteenth Army Corps. Formed line and remained on reserve during the action of the Ninth Corps of that day [30th]; retnrne(l to this camp at 8 p. in.~ Fourth Brigade, First Division. June 13.Crossed the river at noon, and reached the bank of the James opposite Wind-Mill Point at 5 p. in. June 14.Crossed at 9 p. in.; moved a few miles up the river and rested for the night. June 15.Marched at noon. June 16.At 3 a. m. reached a point within a few miles of the de- fenses of Petersburg. After a few hours rest the command advanced and took position on the left of the line. At (3.30 an attack was made on a rebel fort in the left and front, which was not successful. The brigade lost heavily in officers and men. Colonel Beaver, commanding, was wounded severely while at the left of the line directing the advance. After the repulse the brigade fell back to the breast-works. June 17.Supported a part of the Ninth Corps in a charge on the enemys works farther to the right. June 18.Advanced half a mile and intrenched. June 20.Being relieved by other troops, the brigade withdrew from the line; passed the night near its first position. June 21.Marched in the direction of the Weldon railroad. Before taking up a line some sharp skirmishing occurred; breast-works were thrown up and occupied. June 22.The lines were advanced some distance, but failed to hold the position, the enemy penetrating to the rear of the line, and the brigade fell back to the rifle-pits, where it remained to the close of the month. July 12.The command moved from its old position toward the Williams house, where it laid in line until dark, when it took up a line of march south on the Jerusalem plank road to snpport Greggs divis- ion of cavalry, returning at midnight to the Williams house. July 13.At daylight the brigade proceeded on the road toward the James River, halting about noon in front of Petersburg, where the command halted and remained until the afternoon of the 26th. July 26.Took up the line of march; crossed the James River at Deep Bottom to support a cavalry force. July 30.Not being engaged with the enemy, it returned to the old 4 -.~ place of encampment in the evening, losing only 1 man wounded. Second Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. John Wbbon. June 13.Crossed the Chickahiominy and bivouacked near Charles City Court-House. June 14.Crosse(l James River and reached fortifications in front of Petersburg on the 15th instant, relieving a portion of the Eighteenth Army Corps. Participated in the several engagements with the enemy in front of Petersbnrg to the 30th instant. During the month ending July 31 this command occupied a position on the left flank of the army in front of Petersburg until the evenin Page 182 182 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. (CHAP. LII. of the 26th, when, with the corps, it moved to the extreme right of the army, crossing the James River and participating in the skirmishes occurring in that vicinity. July 29.Recrossed the James River marched until daylight of the 30th, when it was assigned position in rear of the Eighteenth Army Corps. ~Ou the evening of that day it returned to its former position on the left. Third Brigade, Second Division, commanded by Cot. Thomas A. Smyth, First Delaware Djantry. June 13.Crossed the Chickahominy and bivouacked near Charles City Court-House until the next day. June 14.Crossed James River. June 15.Marched to and reached fortifications around Petersburg, relieving a portion of the Eighteenth Army Corps. Participated in the engagements before Petersburg with the division until the close of the month. During the month [of July] this brigade occupied a position upon the left flank of the army in front of Petersburg until the evening of the 26th, when, with the corps, it broke camp and took up the line of march to the James River. July 27.Arrived at Jones Neck at early dawn; crossed the river; participated in the skirmishes occurring there. July 29.iRecrossed the river at dusk;. marched all night, reaching Petersburg at daylight of the 30th. July 30.Massed in rear of the Eighteenth Corps, ready; if necessary, to render its services in the engagement of that day, but were not called upon. At night the brigade again returned to its former position on the left. Third Division. June 13.Crossed the railroad at Dispatch Station at 5 a. in., and the river at Long Bridge, resting at Wilcoxs Landing, on the James River, at 6 p. in.; threw up earth-works. June 14.Moved at 10 a. m. to the river and commenced crossing to Wind-Mill Point which was accomplished by 4.30 p. in., and the troops massed near the Wilcox house. June 15.Two regiments moved at 7 a. in. as far as Cockes Mill (or Powells Creek), where they awaited the remainder of the division, which arrived about 11 a. in. During the remainder of the day the march was steady and severe, and the head of the column arrived near the ground where General Smith was engaged at 6.15 p. nt, and at midnight the whole command was in position in front of the works which the enemy had evacuated. June 16.Attacked at 6 a. in. with one brigade; at 6 p. in. with the division, and intrenched on the advanced position gained. June 17.Major-General Birney was placed in command of the corps, and Brigadier-General Mott in command of division. June 18.Advanced at daylight, crossing two lines of the enemys works, and coming upon them strongly intrenched near the New Market race-course; intrenched. At 4.30 p. in. the First and Second Brigades, commanded by Colonel Madill, One hundred and forty-first Pennsyl- vania Volunteers, and Colonel Chaplin, First Maine Heavy Artillery, respectively, charged the enemys works and were repulsed with grea Page 183 CHAP. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 183 loss. The Third nnd Fourth Brigades reported to General Gibbon in the morning, and participated in an attack made by his division (Sec- ond) about noon. June 20.Relieved at midnight by Ninth Army Corps; moved to left and rear about one mile and massed. June 21.-.~.Marc1md at 8 a. in., crossing the Norfolk railroad and tak- ing position on the west of the Jerusalem plank road. June 22.Advanced to take new line, which we were intrenching, when, at 4 p. in., the enemy turned the flank of the division on our left, which caused us to fall back to the point occupied iu the morning. June 23.Advanced at 9 a. in., and found the enemy had retired. Retained this position without change of importance until the 30th in- stant. July 1 to 11.Division occupied the breast-works, right connecting with the Fifth Corps, with no firing of importance by us or from the enemy. July 12.Division, except the picket-line, withdrawn froni the in- trenchments at about 3 a. m. by way of the Jones house and plank road, massing about one mile to the left and rear, near the Williams house. July 13.Moved to the right about three miles and encamped in rear of the Fifth Corps; remained in camp performing fatigue duty until the 26th. July 26.At 5 p. m. broke camp and marched, crossing the James River, via Point of Rocks and Jones Landing. July 27.Arrived at Deep Bottom at daylight and attacked the en- emy. July 28.Recrossed the James River at 9 p. in. July 29.Relieved the Eighteenth Corps in the trenches. July 30.At dark returned to our former camps in rear of the Fifth Corps. First Brigade, Third Division. June 12.Accompanied the arm~y on the march toward Petersbnrg. June 14.Crossed the James River. June 16.Participated in a severe conflict with the enemy, iu which it was successful, our troops behaving nobly, since which time we have occupied the front line of the works, holding the center of the division. Nothing of inteiest occurred up to July 26, when the brigade broke camp and marched toward, the James River, crossing the Appomattox about 11 p. m. July 27.Arrived at the James River, near Deep Bottom, at daylight. We immediately crossed the James River and attacked the enemy; had a brisk skirmish, in which the brigade lost 4 officers and 44 men. July 28.Recrossed the James at night and marched until daylight. July 29.At dark we relieved General Turners division, of the Eighteenth Corps, in the trenches. July 30.We were relieved at night, and returned to our present camp. & eond Brigade, Third Division. June 12.We received-marching orders, and the same night the bri- gacle startei with the rest of the division for James River. June 13.Arrived at the river at night Page 184 184 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. 4ND N. C. [CHAP. LII. June 14.Crossed to the south side of the James River. The Fourth Maine, whose term of service expired on the 13th, was relieved by Special Orders,~ No. , dated headquarters Second Army Corps, June 14, 1864. No records were left showing the number discharged, but those who were not sent to Maine for that purpose were transferred to the Niheteenth Maine, Second Division, Second Army Corps. The loss by expiration of term of service and transfer amounted to 474. The same day the brigade marched for Petersburg, where it arrived the same night. June 16.In the afternoon a charge was made upon the enemy~s works, which resulted in our driving their front line and securing a position near their works. Co]. Thomas 11. Tannatt, commanding bri- gade, was wounded. Loss iu the brigade w~s 274. Col. H. McAllister, Eleventh New Jersey Volunteers, was assigned to the command of the brigade. June 18.The brigade made another charge at 4 a. in., driving the enemy through the woods toward Petersburg and gaining a position on the plank road leading to that place. Here the brigade was temporarily assigned to the command of Brig. Gen. B. H. Pierce during the oper- ations of to-day. At noon another charge was made with the intention of taking the enemys earth-works in our front, which were about 350 or 400 yards distant. The charge in this respect was unsuccessful, owing to the murderous fire of musketry, grape, and canister sweeping through the open field in our front. But the brigade gained two points 100 yards in advance and on the right and left of our line, respectively, where rifle-pits were immediately constructed, which enabled us to throw up strong earth-works in that position afterward. June 20.The brigade was relieved from this position at night. June 21.The brigade, with the rest of the division and corps, marched farther to the left, taking up a new position on the left of the Fifth Corps, an advanced position. The division on our left was forced back by the enemy, which necessitated onr falling back to the first line of earth-works, with a loss of killed, wounded, and mis~ing. In the evening the brigade was ordered to charge across an open field in our front, a distance of 250 yards, to a piece of woods, which was very successful. June 25 this .Brig. Gen.B. H. Pierce was assigned to the command of brigade. July 1.Brigade encamped in line of earth-works near Petersburg, where we remained until the 12th. July 12.We leveled the works in our front and withdrew from that portion of the line. The brigade then moved to th& rear and estab- lished camps, remaining in that position until the 23d. July 23.Orders came for us to occupy the earth-works on the left of the line encamping in the rear of a redoubt at that point. July 26.The brigade, together with the rest of the division, went on a reconnaissance to the north side of the James River toward Rich- mond. Brig. Gen. B. R. Pierce, then commanding the brigade, who had been ill for several days, was sent to the hospital at City Point, which left Col. Daniel Chaplin, ~irst Maine Heavy Artillery, in com- mand; we marched all night. July 27.At daybreak crossed the James River. After a short rest we were moved into position, and an action was commenced with the enemy without, apparently, the least exertion on our part. As we ad- vanced the enemy retreated, as they usually do when this division ad- vances. Skirmishing was kept up all day with a view to developing their position and strength Page 185 CHAP. III.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 185 July 28.Our position was changed somewhat, and we intrenched preparatory to an attack of the enemy; but as they concluded that dis- cretion is the better l)art of valor, they did that valiant deed and left us alone. On this date the First Maine Heavy Artillery was tempora- rily transferred to the First Brigade, and the One hundred and forty- first Pennsylvania Volunteers transferred to this ibrigade, Col. H. J. Madill, of the One hundred and forty-first Pennsylvania, assuming com- mand of the brigade. At night we were ordered back to the south side of the James River, which order was executed, getting into position at daybreak. July 29.In the evening we marched to the front lines and relieved a part of the Eighteenth Corps in the trenches. During the engagement of the 30th we had sharp skirmishing with the enemy, in which our loss was 1 killed and 4 wounded. The same evening we were relieved by the Eighteenth Corps and returned to our former camp, that we occupied on the 26th, arriving there on the morn- ing of the 31st, where we remain at the present time. Third Brigade, Third Division. June 13.At 10.30 a. m. crossed the Chickahominy River at Long Bridge and marched in the direction of James River. June 14.At 10 a. m. marched to the banks of the.river. At 2p. m. commenced crossing in transports from Wilcoxs Wharf At 6.30 p. iii. the command had crossed the river and halted at a point two miles dis- tant from Wind-Mill Point. June 15.Marched in the direction of Petersburg, arriving in front of that place about 10 p. m. June 1G.Went into position in front of the enemys works and in- trenched. At 4 p. m. advanced on the enemy along the Petersburg road. At 9p. m. intrenched The position gained during the advance. June 18.At 4 a. m. advanced upon the enemy and took possession of another line of rifle-pits. At 4 p. m. the brigade made an assault on the enemys works in front of Hares house with heavy loss. June 20.Moved to the left and rear about one mile and massed. June 21.At 10 a. m. marched three miles to the left, crossing the Petersburg and Suffolk Railroad; went into position and threw up a line of works to the left of Second Division of this corps; advanced skirmishers and discovered the enemy~s works in our front. June 22.Moved to an advanced position in front of the works we had occupied and commenced to intrench. About 4 p. m. the enemy made an attack upon the troops of the First Division of this corps, which occupied a position in our immediate left, causing them to fall back in confusion. The enemy then advanced upon our rear and flank and the brigade fell back to the position occupied yesterday. Remained in this position until the present date [June 30]. July 1 to 12.RemnaiLed in camp in front of Petersburg. July 12.Moved to the left one mile and massed on the Jerusalem plank road near the Williams house. July 13.Moved to the right about two miles rear of the Dunn house. ~, and went into camp in July 26.Marched at 4 p. in., crossing the Appomattox River at 10.30 p. in., arriving at the banks of the James River at Deep Bottomn about daylight, an(I went-into position near the point of crossing. July 28.Recrossed the river at 9 p. ut; marched until 3.30 a. inn. of the 29th, and massed the brigade near the headqnarters of the Eighteenth Army Corps Page 186 186 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. LII. July 29.Marched at clark and occupied the works ill froiit of the enemy vacated by the Eighteenth Army Corps. July 30.At 9 p. m. was relieved by the troops of the Eighteenth Army Corps and marched to our present position. Artillery Brigade, commanded by ]IJiaj. John G. ifazard, Pir8t Rhode Island Light Artillery. June 13.Arrived at the James River. June 15.Six batteries moved with the corps, arriving at Peters- burg. June 16.Engaged; the remaining batteries arrived at 4 p. in.; also engaged. Engaged till June 23 more or less in the numerous assaults on the works around Petersburg. Quiet the remainder of the month; now near the Jerusalem plank road, three miles from Petersburg.* Moved from the neighborhood of the Jerusalem plank road to the Deserted House; in camp until the 26th. July 26.Moved across the James River to Deep Bottom. July 27.Four batteries engaged. July 29.Recrossed the James River. July 30.Lay in reserve during the assault. July 31.Returned to former camp near the Norfolk road. FIFTH ARMY CORPS.I June 13.Moved out to White Oak Swamp, and skirmished with enemy. At 7 p. m. set out for Charles City Court-House; marched all night. June 14.Reached Charles City Court-House. June 16.Crossed James River at Wind-Mill Point, and marched until after midnight, arriving at Petersburg. June 17.Part of corps engaged in supporting Ninth Corps. June 18.Advanced against enemy; drove him to his intrenchinents and made heavy assault at 3 or 4 p. in.; took up position close to etiemys lines. Remnai~ed in this position skirmishing with the enemy daily during rest of the mouth. During the past month [July] the corps has been in position in froimt of Petersburg, Va. It has been constantly engaged in constructing works for the purpose of advancing the siege, and in holding the left flank of this army. July 30.The artillery and a portion of the corps were engaged with the enemy during the assault upon his works by the Ninth Corps. Pirst Division, commanded by Brig. Gen. Charles Griffin. June 13.In the morning crossed the Chickahominy at Long Bridge, and resumed the march for Charles City Court-House the same even- ing. June 14.Reached the James River. June 16.Crossed the James River near Wilcoxs Landing; resumed the march for Petersburg~ going into position near that place the same evening. End of the June record. t Commanded by Maj. Gen. Gonverneur K. Warren Page 187 THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 187 CHAP. LII.] The~livision participated in the assault made on the interior line on the 18th instant. From that time np to the present date [Juie 30] the command has remained in front of the enemy at this place. [July 31.]Since June 30 the division has remained in front of Petersburg, performing picket duty and constructing earth-works and batteries~. First Brigade, Fi~rst Division, commanded by Gol. William S. Tiltom~, Twenty-second ]liliassachusetts Infantry. June 13.It crossed the Chickahominy at Long Bridge, and halted ~r the day on the south side of the river; at night-fall it again moved forward. June 14.Encamped in the afternoon near Charles City Court- house. June 16.Crossed the James River in the morning on transports at Wilcoxs Landing, and marched in the direction of Petersburg. The brigade participated in the assault made on the interior line of the enemys works on the 18th instant. From that time to the present date [June 30] the command has remained in the front line of earth- works. No enlisted men have been transferred to the Veteran Reserve Corps during the month. [July 31.]The brigade still occupies the position it held at date of last monthly return, and the troops of the command have been engaged in doing picket duty and building breast-works and batteries. Third Brigade, First Division, commanded b~t4 Brig. Gen. Joseph J. Bartlett. July 1 to 31.In the trenches before Petersburg, Ya. Second Division, commanded by Brig. Gen. Bomeyn B. Ayres. Two brigades (Second and Third) occupied the trenches in front of Petersburg, Va., until the 27th and 28th [July], when they were re- lieved by the First Division, the First Brigade being already in reserve. July 30.The division was marched to the support of the Ninth Corps, and held in reserve during the assault upon the enemys line. Second Brigade, Second Division, commanded by Gol. Nathan T. Dushane, First Maryland Infantry. June 13.Crossed the [Chickahomniny] River at 4 a. in., and moved in a westerly direction about two miles. June 14.Brigade marched to Charles City Court-House, at which place we remained during the 15th. June 16.At 11 a. m. brigade crossed James River on board trans- ports, and extended our march in direction of Petersburg. June 17.The brigade moved up to the trenches. June 18.At 3 a. in. the brigade was ordered to support General Cutler, occupying the extreme left of the army; were ordered by Gen- eral Cuth~r to form in line of battle, throwing out skirmishers, and ad- vanced on the line to find the enemy; pressed forward and found him. We sustained a loss of 6 killed and 19 wounded. At 2 p. in. we joined our division, and took position on the south side of the Petersburg and Norfolk Railroad. Remained in camp until 5 p. m. of the 22d, whe Page 188 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. 188 [CHAP. LII. the brigade was ordered to report to the Jones house, and froi~ there to General Birney, commanding Second Army Corps, who ordered the brigade to the support of General Barlow; returned to camp during the night. June 23.At 5 p. m. the brigade was ordered to report to General Wright, commanding Sixth Army Cszrps, at Williams house; werd placed in line on the extreme left of the army, protecting the flank; threw np earth-works. At 12 oclock, midnight, the brigade was ordered to take position on the left of Williams house, where it remained until 5 p. m. of the 24th, when it rejoined division. June 25.At 8.30 p. m. the brigade relieved the Third Brigade, which was occupying the trenches in front of the enemy, at which place the brigade remained during the balance of the month. The brigade re- mained in the trenches until the 28th [July], when it was relieved and moved to the rear, and encamped. July 30.It marched to the front, supporting the Ninth Army Corps, which made an assault on the enemys works. At 10.30 a. in. brigade returned to camp. Third Brigade, Second Division, commanded by Col. J. Howard Kitch- ing, Sixth New York Heavy Artillery. June 13.In the morning crossed the Chickahominy at Long Bridge. June 1G.Crossed the James River on transports. June 18.Advanced on the enemys works at 4 p. in.; engaged them and established our line about 350 yards in advance, and encamped in front of Petersburg and commenced building works. June 30.Position unchanged. July 1 to 27.This command has occupied tIme rifle-pits in front of Petersburg, Va. July 27.Was relieved from the rifle-pits and sent to the rear in re- serve. July 30.Ordered to the front as a reserve for the Ninth and Eight- eenth Corps. At night was again ordered to the rear in reserve. Third Division, commanded by Brig. Gen. Samuel W. Crawford. June 13.Crossed the Chickahominy at Long Bridge at 1 a. in.; halted at daylight in line of battle; advanced about 6 a. mu. in support of the cavalry (General Wilson), about three miles, near the Charles City Cross-Roads. At 10 p. m. moved to Saint Marys Church and halted for the night. June 14.Continued our march at 6 a. in., passing Ladds Store and Georgetown; halted at 11 a. m. about one mile from Charles City Court-House. June 16.Broke camp at daylight; marched three miles to James River; embarked at plantation landing on transports; landed at Wind- Mill Point on the south side of the river~ marched to within three miles of Petersburg; halted at 2.30 a. m. June 17.At 11 a. m. advanced three-quarters of a mile to the outer works of Petersburg; formed line of battle; at dark advanced in sup- port of First Division, Ninth Army Corps (General Ledlie), Third Bri- gade in front, the First and Second Brigades in supporting distance; captured the Thirty-ninth North Carolina Regiment, colors and all. June 18.Commenced advancing to our left at 4 a. in.; advanced our lines about a mile, crossing the Suffolk railroad; threw up intrenc Page 189 CHAP. LII.] THE RI~HMOND CAMPAIGN. 189 melts; remained in line, much annoyed by sharpshooters, until June 24, when we were relieved by General Willeoxs division, Ninth Army Corps; moved to the left about three miles; relieved General Gibbons division, Second Corps. June 28.Portion of our line thrown forward, making close connec- tion with the Second Army Corps. June 30. In line of battle on the Jerusalem plank road. July 12.The division was withdrawn from intrenched line in front, connecting on the right with Griffins (First) division. The First and Second Brigades occupy the large and small redoubts on our left flank, the Third Brigade in reserve; position of picket-line unchanged. July 13.Two hundred men of the Second Corps picket, connecting with the left of Third Division picket, relieved by same number from Second Brigade. July 14.Relieved all of the Second Corps picket-line from the Jeru- salem plank road near Williams house, on the left, to the point of woods where the line breaks to the rear on the right by Third Brigade. First Brigade, Third Division, commanded by Col. Peter Lyle, Ninetieth Pennsylvania Infantry. June 13.Took position near White Oak Swamp bridge; skirmished during the day, and after dark marched to Saint Marys Church, biv- ouacking. June 14.Encamped near Charles City Court-House. June 1G.Crossed the James River, and halted three miles from Petersburg. June 17.Remained in reserve. June 18.Advanced and drove the enemys skirmishers across the Norfolk railroad into their works; threw up intrenchments, connecting with the Ninth Corps on the right. Remained in this position until the morning of the 24th, losing many men daily from the close- proximity of the enemys works. June 24.Moved to the left; relieved a portion of the Second Corps, on the Jerusalem plank road, where the brigade remains at this date June 30. [July 31.]Since July 1 no movements or changes of importance have transpired. The command has been engaged in building fortifications. Transferred to Veteran Reserve CorpsSixteenth Maine Volunteers, three men, Ninetieth Pennsylvania Volunteers, four men, One hundred and fourth New York Volunteers; one man. Total, eight enlisted men. Second Brigade, Third Division. June 13.Brigade ordered to relieve the cavalry; Ninety-fourth New York deployed as skirmishers, the enemy opening on them; threw up breast-works and remained in position all day. At dark marched to Saint Marys Church. June 14.Reached that point at 4 a. m. At 6 a. m. started, reaching Charles City Court-House. June 15.Remained in same position. June 1G.Moved at 3 a. in.; crossed the James River on transports; - rested two hours. At 2 p. m. marched on the road leading to Peters- burg. June 17.Arrived near that city at 8 a in.; at the outer works di Petersburg in the evening; marched to the left in support of Ninth Corps; returned same night to former position Page 190 190 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. LII. June 18.Marched to left, formed in line of battle, and advanced on the position held by the enemy. At 4 p. m. brigade and one of the First Division pressed forward. On getting out of the woods behind the bank (where the line had been formed) the enemy~opened a heavy :fire. Losing heavily, and not being supported, the brigade fell back behind the bank, remaining until dark, then retired to the next crest and threw up a line of breast-works, working all night. June 19.Lay behind the works all day. June 20 to 26.Same position. June 26.Moved at 12 p. in., relieving the Third Brigade, taking posi- tion in their works on the Jerusalem road. June 30.Remained in same position. July 1.Tn intrenchments on Jerusalem plank road; remained until July 11; moved to the rear one mile, leaving a detachmnent as picket. July 17.Brigade commenced building abatis. July 18.Built breast-works on the left, connecting with Second Corps. July 29.Received orders at 12 p. m. to prepare for an attack; troops under arms at 3 a. m. [30th]; this brigade not engaged. Third Brigade, Third Division. June 13.Crossed the Chickahominy in the morning with Wilsons cavalry; engaged the enemy near White Oak Swamp from 2 to 10 p. in., then marched to near Saint Marys Church. June 14.Arrived at that place in the morning, making a distance from Providence Church of twemity-five miles; marched to Charles City Court-House, a distance of five miles. June 16.Moved at an early hour; crossed James River at Wind- Mill Point on steamers; marched until the morning of the 17th, a dis- tance of twenty-two miles, and encamped near Petersburg, Va. In the evening had an engagement, and captu-red a number of prisoners, arms, & c.; had daily skirmishes with the enemy until the 22d. June 23.Crossed the Petersburg and Norfolk Railroad and relieved a brigade of the Second Corps, under a galling fire of artillery and musketry; remained in rifle-pits until the end of the month. [July 31.]The entire brigade has been engaged doing picket and fatigue duty daily to the left of the Jerusalem plank road up to the 14th, at which time they relieved a division of the Second Corps, doing picket duty at the extreme left of the line the remainder of the month. Fourth Division, commanded by Brig. Gen. Lysander Cutler. June 13.Crossed the Chickahominy at 5 a. mu. at Long Bridge; marched at 5 p. in. as train guard, and bivouacked about two miles from Charles City Court-House. June 16.Moved at 4.30 a. m. to cross the James River; embarked at 10.30 oclock, and landed on south side about three miles above Wind-Mill Point. At 3.10 p. m. moved on Petersburg; bivouacked at house of Mr. Burchett, about two miles beyond Prince George Court- House. June 17.At 7 a. m. moved one mile and a half to the front; en- countered the enemy, when we intrenched; shelling all day; loss slight. June 18.Moved at 4 a. in.; passed the enemys outer and second line of works, which they had abandoned during the night. At 3 p. in Page 191 CHAP. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGNS 191 made an unsuccessful charge upon the enemys works in front of us; loss very hea~ intrenched at 10 p. in.; have occupied the same ground since; loss each day from sharpshooters has been very heavy. No movement of the division has been made since last report [for June]. Heavy details have been furnished during the month for fatigue duty, diggiiig trenches, roads, & c. July 30.Engaged the enemy with musketry during operations of Ninth and Eighteenth Army Corps, without leaving the trenches. First Brigade, Fourth Division, commanded by Col. Edward S. Bragg, Sixth Wisconsin infantry. The brigade was engaged in the action of Bethesda Church [May 31], and participated in the skirmishing, marching, and fighting of the corps from that time to the end of the n~onth [June], at which time it is in the works southeast of Petersburg. June 11.Those of the Second Wisconsin Volunteers whose term had not expiyed were transferred to the Independent Battalion Wiscon- sin Volunteers, and the remainder left for Wisconsin to be discharged the service. [Juiy.]Participated in the siege of Petersburg. Second Brigade, Fourth Division, commanded by Col. J. William Hof- mann, Fifty-sixth Pennsylvania Infantry. June 13.Crossed the Chickahominy at 5 a. m. at Long Bridge; marched at 5 p. m. as train guard, and bivouacked about two miles from Charles City Court-House. June 16.Moved at 4.30 a. m. to cross the James; embarked at 10.30 oclock, and landed on south side about three miles a1x~ Wind-Mill Point. At 3.10 p. m. moved on Petersburg; bivouacked at house of Mr. Burehett, about two miles beyond Prince George Court-House. June 17.At 7 a. m. moved one mile and a half to the front; en- countered the enemy, when we intrenched; shelling all day; loss slight. June 18.Moved at 4 a. ni.; passed the enemys outer and second line of works, which they had abandoned during the night. At 3p. m. made an unsuccessful charge upon the enemys works in front of us; loss very heavy; over 300 killed and wounded; about 1,300 engaged; intrenched at 10 p. in.; have occupied same ground since; loss each day from sharpshooters h~s been very heavy, amounting in all to 102 men. June 28.Were relieved from line by Braggs brigade, and moved into woods in rear of line. Artillery Brigade, commanded by Gol. Charles S. Wainwright, First New York Light Artillery. June 13.Crossed Chickahominy at daylight; marched three miles; left at evening; marched all night, to Charles City Court-House; dis- tance, fifteen miles. June 14 and 15.Headquarters at Wilcoxs house. June 16.Crossed James River below Wind-Mill Point; marched to near Petersburg; arrived oii the morning of the 17th; distance, thirteen miles; three batteries engaged. June 18.Fought all day; lines advanced about one mile Page 192 192 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. ML June 19.Before Petersburg; headquarters at Averys house. No general engagement has taken place since this date. [July.]Nothing of importance trauspired prior to the 30th instant, when all the batteries of this commani were engaged with those of the enemy. SIXTH ARMY CORPS.* June 13.Crossed Chickahominy at Jones Bridge and encamped. June 14.Moved to Charles City Court-house. June 15.Remained at Charles City Court-House. June 1G.Meved to vicinity of pontoon bridge and intrenched; at night Second Division crossed pontoon bridge and reported to General Meade. The First and Third Divisions embarked on transports for Bermuda Hundred and reported to G neral Butler. June 18.Remained in General But eis department. June 19.Crossed the Appomattox; joined Army of the Potomac; took position on right of the line. June 20.In same position. June 21.At night moved to extreme left of line. June 22.~Ioved out about two miles; had slight skirmish. Juno 23.Had another skirmish and fell back afterward to original line. June 24.Advanced skirmish line to position of previous day. June 25 to 28.In same position. June 29.Moved to Reams Station. June 30.Destroyed three miles of railroad; at night moved back to Tucker house, on Jernsalem plank road. July 1.Camp near Warwick Swamp. July 2.Returned to original position on left of the line, near Peters- burg. July 6.Third Division marched at daylight to City Point and em- barked for Baltimore. July 10.First and Second Divisions embarked at City Point for Washington. First Brigade, First Division, commanded by Col. William H. Penrose, Fifteenth New Jersey Infa~mtry. [June 30.]The brigade has been engaged in all the battles in which the Sixth Corps participated, from Cold fl9arbor, Va., to and before Petersburg, Va. July 9.The brigade left Petersburg, Va., for Washington, D. C., by transports, and arrived July 11, since which time the brigade has been attached to the Department of West Virginia. & eond Brigade, First Division, commanded by Col. Emory Upton, One hundred and twenty-first New York Infantry. June 13.Crossed Chickahominy at 7 p. m. amid encamped; guarded artillery and trains during the march. June 14.Resumed the march; at 7 p. m. reached James River near Fort Powhatan. June 17.Took transports at Wilsons Wharf at 1 a. in.; disembarked at Bermuda Hundred at~ a. m. and marched to Point of Rocks. Commanded by Maj. Cell. Horatio C. Wriglit Page 193 CHAP. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 193 June 19.Marched at 5 a. in. for Petersburg; relieved Stannards brigade at 10 p. m. and constructed rifle-pits along his skirmish line. June 21.Relieved by Stannards division and marched to left of Second Corps. June 29.Marched to Reams Station to support Wilsons cavalr and returned to the Jerusalem plank road on the 30th. July 1 to 9.Remained in camp near the Jerusalem plank road. July 9.Moved to City Point. July 10.Embarked for Washington. Third Brigade, First Division, commanded by Lieut. Col. Gideon Clark, One hundred and nineteenth Pennsylvania Infantry. June 14 and 15.On fatigue duty opposite Fort Powhatan. June 16.In the evening shipped on board transports. June 17.In the morning landed at Bermuda Hundred; remained within the lines of General Butlers army until the morning of the 19th. June 19.Marched to the front of Petersburg; on picket on the banks of the Ap~omattox from that time until the evening of the 21st; moved that night with the rest of the corps to a position on the extreme left of the army, having been relieved by the Eighteenth Corps. Changed positions frequently between the 21st and 25th. June 29.Moved out toward Reams Station, on the Petersburg and Weldon Railroad; on that day and the next, with other troops of the division, effectually destroyed several miles of that road. July 2.Left bivouac on the Jerusalem plank road, and returned to the position on the left of the army. July 9.Marched to City Point. July 10.On the evening of this day and morning of the 11th the command was shipped on board of transports, arriving at Washington on the 12th. Second Division, commanded by Brig. Gen. Thomas H. Neill. June 13.Left trenches at 7 p. m. and marched all night. June 14.Marched all day to the west bank of the Chickahominy. June 1.5.Moved to Charles City Court-House. June 16.Marched to and crossed James River. June 17.Arrived near Petersburg and relieved Eighteenth Corps. June 18.Assaulted the enemy and carried a liner of works. June 21.Moved to a position south of the Jerusalem plank road. June 22.Charged the enemy and established a line. June 29.Moved to Reams Station to support cavalry. June 30.Remained near Reams Station. July 1.Marched from Reams Station back to old camp near Jeru- salem plairk road. July 9.Marched at 9 p. m. to City Point. July 10.Embarked at 11 a. m. for Washington. Third Division, commanded by Brig. Gen. James B. Ricketts. June 13.Marched, by way of Vias, Hopkins Mills, Providence Church, Emmaus Church, to J6nes Bridge, Chickahominy; after cross- ing about three-quarters of a mile encamped for the night. June 14.Marched at 4.45 a. m. by way of Vaidens Cross-Roads, and encamped about three miles from Charles City Court-House, June 15.Moved camp about one ~ I~ ~RYQb M~ PT I Page 194 194 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [Ca& r. LU. June 1G.Moved about one mile and a half from landing at Pow- hatan Point and threw up works to cover crossing of the James River. At 4.45 p. m. reached the landing and embarked on transports, landing at Bermnda Hnndred, and marched to the intrencliments midway be- tween the James and Appomattox Rivers. Juni 17 and 18.Remained in sa~ne place. June 19.Marched across the Appomattox to a position in rear of the line fronting Petersburg. June 20.Remained in same place. June 21.Marched at 4.40 p. in.; crossed the Petersburg and Weldon [Norfolk and Petersburg ~] Railroad; went into position west of the plank road, ne~ir Williams house. June 22.Threw up works; some skirmishing~ about dark; advanced the lines about one mile. June 23 to 28.Remained at same ilace. June 29.Marched at 2 p. in., striking Petersburg and Weldon Rail- road at Reams Station at 7.30 p. in. June 30.Threw up works and destroyed railroad. At 4.30 p. in. marched back to where we last left the plank road~ near Williams house. July 1.Remained near the plank road. July 2.Returned to old camp near Williams hoi~se. July 3 to 6.Remained at ~amne place. At 7 a. in. of the latter day the division moved out of their works and marched to City Point. At 2 p. m. embarked on transports for Baltimore. Second Brigade, Third Division. Juume 14.Encamped near Charles City Court-House. June 16.Embarked in transports for Bermuda Hundred; landed at Point of Rocks. June 17.Took position in the works of Bermuda Hundred. June 19.Moved across the Appomattox to Petersburg~ June 21.Moved to extreme left of the line, near Weldon railroad; intrenched. June 22.Heavy skirmishing until evening, when we charged to Weldon railroad, but found no enemy in force. June 23 and 24.Were outflanked and fell back to our former posi- tion near Williamn& house. June 29.Marched to Reams Station. June 30.Marched back to within three miles of Williams hous& . NINTH ARMY CORPS.* June 13.Moved at 11 a. in.; crossed the Chickahominy at Jones Bridge and halted for the night. The Fourth Division marched to New Kent Court-House. June 14.Marched to James River and encamped near Wilcoxs Landing; Fourth Division marched beyond Slatersville. June 15.Crossed the James River at night, and moved in the direc- tion of Petersburg. Arrived in front of the latter place at Op. m. [16th]. The Fourth Division marched to the Chickahominy River. June 16.Fourth Division crossed the Chickahominy; marched to the James River and encamped. * Commanded by Maj. Geu. Ambrose E. Burnside Page 195 CHAr. LII.] THE RICHM& ND CAMPAIGN. 195 Juno 17.Attacked the enemy in front of Petersburg. The Second Division made an attaek at 3 a. m. and carried the enemys positioii, capturing 4 gnns, 3 stand of colors, and several hundred prisoners. The Fourth Division crossed the James River. June 18.Attacked the enemy and gained a position across the Petersburg and Norfolk Railroad. Loss in Third Division quite severe. The Fourth Division arrived at the front. ehmne 19.Engaged in intrenching and strengthening position. June 30.Hold about the same position as on the 19th, since which time the troops have been engaged in skirmishing and strengthening line of works. First Division, commanded by Brig. Gem James IL Ledlie. June 12.The Fourth and Tenth U. S. infantry, in accardance with telegram from headquarter~ Army of the Potomac, were transferred to the Fifth Corps. On the evening of the same day the division left the intrenchments near Cold Harbor and marched all night. June 13.Arrived at Tunstalls Station at daybreak; started again at 11 a. in., and halted for the night near Jones Bridge, over the Chick- ahominy. June 14.Marched to James River; encamped about two miles below the pontoon bridge, and remaijied there until the night of the 15th. June 15.Soon after dark started and marched all night and until 6 p. mu. the next day, arriving in front of Petersburg. June 17.Advanced at daybreak in support of the Second Division. This division not engaged until late in the p. in., when they charged, with severe loss, and took a line of works interior to those captured by General Potter, but in the night were obliged to leave them again on being attacked, as both flanks were entirely unprotected. The enemy, however, retired before morning to the line of works they now hold. June 18.In accordance with authority from headquarters Ninth Army Corps, the Twenty-first Massachusetts, Third Maryland, One hun- dredth Pennsylvania Volunteers, and the One hundred and seventy- ninth New York Volunteers were transferred from the Second Brigade to the First; the Twenty-ninth Massachusetts Volunteers from the First to the Second, and the Fourteenth New York Heavy Artillery and Sec- ond Pennsylvaiiia Heavy Artillery from the Third to the Second Special Orders, No. 27, of these headquarters. The division remained in reserve until the night of the 20th, when they relieved General Bar- lows division, Second Arniy Corps, in the trenches, where they still [June 30] remain, the Second Division, Ninth Army Corps, on their left, and General Turners division, Tenth Army Corps, on their right. July 1 to 29.Remained in trenches in front of Petersburg, Va., with constant .sharpshooting and artillbry practice, strengthening the works and erecting new ones, especially a mortar battery near the left of the line held by the division. July 21.Brig. Gen. W. F. Bartlett, U. S. Volunteers, having reported to the general commanding the division, was assigned to the command of the First Brigade, to which the Twenty-ninth Massachusetts Volun- teers was transferred from the Second Brigade. The Third Marylamid and One hundred and seventy-ninth New York Volunteers were trans- ferred from the First to the Second Brigade, to the command of which Col. E. G. Marshall, Fourteenth New York Heavy Artillery, was as- signed Page 196 196 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. LU. July 29.The division was relieved by Brigadier-General Carrs di- vision (colored), of the Eighteenth Army Corps, and formed in column of assault behind the line held by General Potter, commandtng Second Division. July 30.Took part in the action of the exploded fort in front of. Petersburg, Va., forming the advance of the charging column. The division suffered very severely, both brigade commanders being cap- tured, among other casualties. July 31.Remained in rear, and after dark returned to the old posi- tion in the trenches, relieving General Carrs division. Second Brigade, First Division, commanded by Col. Ebenezer W. Peirce, Twenty-ninth Massachusetts Infantry. June 12 to 16.Marched across the Peninsula.. June 17.Severe action in front of Petersburg. June 18.Brigade reorganized. Jane 21 to 30.In front line on right of Ninth Corps, intrenching, picketing, skirmishing, and sharpshooting. This brigade was organized June 18 by order of Brigadier-General Ledlie. July 1 to 29.In First Divi~ion line before Petersburg, Va., intrench- ing, picketing, and sharpshooting. July 29.Moved to line of Third Division for assault. July 30.Action of the exploded fort; moved back to old camp. Second Division, commanded by Brig. Gen. Robert B. Potter. June 15.Moved at dark and crossed James River about midnight. June 1G.Reached position near Petersburg; division held in support of Barlows division, Sixth [Second] Corps, in attack on enemys lines at 6 p. in.; two brigades slightly engaged. June 17.Division attacked at 3 a. m. with bayonet; carried enemys position, capturing 4 guns, 3 colors, and several hundred prisoners; loss slight. June 18.Advanced lines one mile; enemy falling back. First Bri- gade attacked in afternoon and pushed lines well up to enemys front, crossing Petersburg and Norfolk Railroad. June 30.Division in intrenched position before enemys lines around Petersburg. More or less skirm~ishing night and day. Occasionally heavy artillery fire from both sides. During the month the division has been in position before the enemys works around Petersburg. July 30.A mine, under the superintendence of Lieutenant-Colonel Pleasants, Forty-eighth Pennsylvania Volunteers, and excavated by the enlisted men of the regiment, wiis sprung successfully. The divis- ion, in concert with the other divisions of the corps, charged the enemys position, carried hi~ first line of rifle-pits, and advanced to a position overlooking a ravine as ordered. Being unsupported, the division fell back to the original lines. First Brigade, Second Division, commanded by Lieut. Col. Henry Pleas- ants, Forty-eighth Pennsylvania Infantry. June 14.Arrived at camp near James River, Va. ~Ji~n~ 157L~ft there Page 197 CHAP. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 197 June 16.Arrived near Petersburg, Va., where we still [June 30] remain. July.]Engaged in siege operations in trenches before Petersburg, Va. July 30.Assault on enemys works. Second Brigade, Second Division, commanded by Brig. Gen. Simon G. Uriffin. June 12.At night quietly withdrew from the works in front, moving in the direction of James River. June 15.Crossed the river at night. June 16.Arrived in front of the enemys works at Petersburg in the afternoon. June 17.At daylight the brigade made a most splendid and suc- cessful assault upon the works of the enemy,. carrying the works and capturing 2 pieces of artillery and about 375 prisoners. Since then the lines have been gradually advanced, and the br~ade now holds a very strong positions in close proximity to the rebel lines.* Third Division, commanded by Brig. Gen. Orlando B. Wilicox. June 15.Crossed James River at Wind-Mill Point on pontoon bridge. Ordered to Petersburg to support of Eighteenth Corps. June 1G.Took up l)osition in front of Petersburg at 4 p. in.; Christs brigade in position on left of army; Hartranfts brigade ordered to sup- port of Birneys division, Second Corps. June 17.Formed for assault at 9 a. in.; attacked at 12 in. Failed to carry the works, but gained and held some ground to the front and leftof Second Corps; supported First I)ivision, Ninth Army Corps, with one brigade. At 5.30 p. m. in second assault captured 1 stand of colors (Thirty-fifth North Carolina) and 100 prisoners. Loss during day heavy. June 18.Pressed forward at daylight; soon became engaged. At 12 m. charged the enemys line and carried a deep-cut track of Norfolk and Petersburg Railroad one mile from Petersburg. At 4 p. m. as- saulted enemys new line; failed to take it; loss in killed and wounded severe. June 19.Held all ground gained and intrenched heavily. Were relieved from front line by Second Division, Ninth Army Corps. June 20.Relieved General Motts division, Second Corps, on King George Court-House road at Hare house; opened fire from battery on Petersburg. June 23.~Erected work for artillery within 200 yards of enemys main line, and bailt abatis along whole line under heavy fire. June 24.Moved to the left ~nd relieved General Crawfords divis- ion, Fifth Corps, on front line, under fire. June 25 to 29.Engaged iii strengthening and straightening lines and getting artillery in position, building abatis, & c. June 30.Mortar battery, four guns, put in position. Since June 17 division constantly nuder fire, losing more or less men every day. Since June 20 in the trenches without support. The Forty-sixth New York Veteran Volunteers assigned to division June 2, Second Brigade. ~ End of the June record. No itinerary for July on file Page 198 198 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. 0. [CHAP. LTI. The Twenty-fourth New York Cavalry (dismounted) assigned to divis- 1011 June 9, from First Division, Second Brigade. The Thirty-seventh and Thirty-eighth Wisconsin Volunteers assigned to division June 11, First Brigade. The Thirteenth Ohio Volunteer Cavalry (dismounted) assigned to division June 29, First Brigade. July 1.The division was in the trenches in front of Petersburg and remained there, defending the line and fortifying the position, until July 25, when one brigade (Humphreys) was taken to the rear, on being relieved by a brigade of the Fourth Divisiomi, Ninth Army Corps (colored), Colonel Sigfried commanding. July 26.Humphreys brigade (Second) was moved to the left of the army, on the Suffolk road, and occupied works held by the Second Corps. July 29.Humphreys brigade (Second) withdrawn from the left and moved to the rear of the First Brigade. July 30.The division was engaged in the assault on the enemys lines at the crater, supporting the First Division of the corps; carried a portion of the enemny~s breast-works on the left of crater by a front attack and captured 100 prisoners; First Brigade dug up.two pieces of artillery from the crater produced by the blowing up of the enemys fort and turned theni on the enemy. The division helped to repulse two attacks, losing quite heavily in killed and wounded. At 3 p. in. returned from works captured into our original lines by orders. July 31.One brigade (Second) is on the front line repairing damage done to our works by charging over them; First Brigade (llartranfts) in camp in the rear. First Brigade, Third Diri~ion, commauded by Brig. Gen. John P. Hart- rauft. June 15.Crossed the James River at Wind-Mill Point at midnight and marched to within three miles of Petersburg, where we halted at 4p~ m. of the 16th and formed our line of battle. At dusk we were moved to the right to support Birneys division, of the Second Corps. June ~l7.We advanced this morning and charged the enemys works at 2 p. in., but owing to a severe flank fire of artillery and mus- ketry from the lefty and onr line of direction being too much to the right, we withdrew with severe loss and supported the First Divisiomi, which made an advance at the same point during the night. June 18.At 5 a. m. the whole line made an advance for about a mile, the enemy having withdrawn from our immediate front during the night. At 12 m. we made another advance to the railroad, and at 3.30 p. m. attempted to storm the enemys works, which was not accom- plished. Remained here until midnight, when we were relieved by the Second Division, Ninth Army Corps. Loss in this brigad~ very heavy. June 20.Moved about a muile to the right, and relieved Motts divis- ion, of the Second Army Corps. June 24.Were relieved by troops of the Tenth Army Corps and we in turn relieved Crawfords division, of the Fifth Corps, on the left of the position held by us on the 18th. Here we still [June 30] remain, having advanced our line and thrown up heavy works. This brigade held its OWII position under fire of the enemy ~before Petersburg, Va., up to July 30. During the month a great amonnt of labor was performed by the troops in fortifying and strengthening the lines, erecting bomb-proofs, digging covered ways, & c. The entire loss of the brigade from the 1st to the 29th, inclusive, on the line was 17 killed and 106 wounded Page 199 THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 199 CHAP. LII.] July 30.The command took part in the assault made by the Ninth Army Corps on the enemys works. Time loss sustained was as follows: Killed, 5 officers and 67 men; wounded, 14 officers and 248 men; miss- ing, 4 officers and 127 men. At night the troops were withdrawn amid put into camp about one mile in the rear of our lines. & cond Brigade, Third Divisjon, commanded by Col. William Humphrey, & cond Michigan Infantry. June 15.Crossed the James River at night. June 1G.About noon arrived in front of Petersburg. June 17.Participated in tIme charge made by the division. June 18.Were engaged again, losing heavily. Colonel Christ, com- manding brigade, was woun(led, when time command was assumed by Colonel Raulston, Twenty-fourth New York (dismuounted) Cavalry. He was wounded also, and Col. Williammi Humphrey, Second Michigan Volunteers, was assigmied to the comman(l on the 19th by order of Gen- eral Willcox, comnmammding division. The Secomid Michigan Volunteers was transferred fromn the First to this brigade th~ same day. Since the 19th 4he brigade has been in the trenches in front of Peters- burg. No general engagement has taken place.* July 1.Occupied the advance line on the extreme left of the Ninth Corps line in front of Petersburg. Remained here, nothing occurring worthy of note until the 25th. July 25.The brigade relieved by a part of the First Brigade, Third Division, and a part of the First Brigade, Fourth Division, moved to the rear a short distance and encamnped in the open field. July 27.Received orders to report to Brigadier-General White, com- manding Fourth Division; marched to the extreme left of our limme and occupied a position, our left resting on the old Norfolk road. July 29.Orders were received to recall pickets and be ready to march at dark. Moved at 9 p. mu. toward our old position and halted near the headquarters of the Fifth Corps from 10.30 oclock until about 3 a. in. next morning, when we moved toward the front. July 30.Participated in the assault on the enenmys line in front of Petersburg; made one charge, which was partially successful. The loss of the brigade on this day was: Killed, 2 commissioned officers and 14 emmlisted muen; wounded, 13 commissioned officers and 99 enlisted mnen; missing, 5 commissioned Qificers and 85 emilisted men. Aggregate loss, 218. July 31.Occupy the front line, formnerly h~ld by the First Brigade of this division, excepting the First, Second, and Twentieth Michigan Regimnemits, which have been relieved, having suffered severely in yester- days engagement. Fourth Division, commanded by Brig. Gem Edward Ferrero. June 13.Marched to New Kent Court-House. June 14.Marched to and beyond Slatersvihle. June 15.Marched to Chiekahominy River. June 16.Crossed Chickahomniny River~ in _on time James River. , arched to and encamped June 17.Crossed the James River. June 18.Marched tQ the front. June 19.Rejoined the Ninth Corps. * End of the June record Page 200 200 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. LII. June 20.Relieved Second Corps in the second line of intrencliments. June 23.Relieved by part of Tenth Corps, and took position in rear of Second Division, Ninth Army Corps. June 27.Marched to Prince George Conrt-llonse. June 30.Took np position on left of army, relieving the Sixth Corps. July 2.Left camp on Jerusalem plank road and marched nine miles, taking np position on Norfolk road. July 9.Moved to extreme left of line beyond Jernsalem plank road. July 12.Moved near Norfolk road. July 30.Took part in the charge on the enemys works; fonght two or three hours; were repnlsed and lost heavily. First Brigade, Fourth Division, commanded by Col. Joshua K. Sigfried, Forty-eighth Pennsylvania Im~fantry. June 13.Marched to New Kent Court-House; ten miles. June 14.Marched to and beyond Slatersville; six miles. June 15.Marched to Chickahomniny River; fonr miles. June 16.Crossed Chickahominy and encamped on James River op- posite Wilcoxs Landing; nineteen miles. June 17.Crossed James River; three miles. June 18.The.brigade ceased to-day gnarding the trains of the and moved np to the front;~ marched twenty-two miles rmy June 19.Marched two miles near front and rejoined Ninth Army Corps. June 20.Relieved Second Corps in second line of intrenchments. June 23.Part of Tenth Corps relieved brigade, and it took np posi- tion in rear of Second Division, Ninth Army Corps. June 26.Reviewed by General Ferrero. June 27.Marched to Prince George Court-House; fonr miles and a halt. June 30.Took np position on left of army occupied by Sixth Corps; marched seven miles to-day. Second Brigade, Fourth Division, commanded by Col. ifenry G. Thomas, Nineteenth U. S. Colored Troops. June 13.Went to New Kent Court-House. June 14.Went to Diascoud bridge. June 15.Started for the Chickahominy; went a short distance and staid all night. June 16.Crossed the Chickahominy River and went to within ~iie mile of the James River. June 17.Crossed the James River; moved a mile and went into camp. June 18.Marched up near Petersburg. June 19.Moved a little farther to the left of the line. June 20.Went into the works in front remained until the night of the 23d. Jm~ne 23.Moved to the rear and left of our old position, where we lay until the 27th. June 27.Marched to Prince George Court-House. June 30.Moved to near Jerusalem plank road, on the extreme left of our lines. - July 1.Were near Jerusalem plank road Page 201 CHAP. LII.) THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 201 July 2.Moved up on the Norfolk pike, where we remained until 11 p. m. of the 9th, when we moved to the left of the Second Corps. iRe- mained until the 12th, when we went back on the Norfolk pike and built a redoubt. Remained in this position until the 22d. July 22.Moved up to the old camp-ground near corps headquarters, where we remained until the 27th. We again went to the left near the redoubt. Remained until the night of the 29th, when we moved up to ~the rear of our corps; went into column and lay there until morning, when we went into the engagement of the 30th and lost very heavily. Came out and went into camp near where we left in the morning and staid until August 1. CAVALRY CORPS2~ First Dieision, commanded by Brig. pen. Alfred T. A. Torbert. June 7 to 27.Was engaged in expedition to vicinity of C ordons- ville, fighting the enemy at Trevilian Station June ii amid 12, rejoining the army via Spotsylvania Court-House, Bowling Green, Walkerton, King and Queen Court-House, Dunkirk, White Honse~ Jones Bridge, and Wilcoxs Landing; crossed the James River on ferry, and moved to Prince George Court-House to assist General Wilson e Reams Station on the miight of Juiie 30. g at First Brigade, First Division, commanded by Brig. Gen. Geoige A. Custer. June 13 to 20.En route to White House. June 20 to 25.En route to James River. June 2G and 27.In camp. June 28.Crossed the James River at Wind-Mill Point. June 29.Moved to Prince George Court-House, Va. July 1.On ami expedition beyond Prince George Court-House, Va. July 3.Went into camp at Light-House Poimit; iii camp until the 23d. July 24.Started on an expedition to I)eep Bottomn, on the James River; no casualties; returned to City Point, Va., and went into camp. Second Brigade, First Division, com manded by 6~o1. Thomas C. Devin, Sixth New York Cavalry. June 13.Marched by Twymans Store, Shady Grove Church, Spot- sylvania Court-House, Bowling Green, Newtown, Clarksville, and Walkerton to King and Queen Court-House, arriving at that point on the 18th. June 19.Marehed by Walkerton and Clarksville to Dunkirk; crossed the Mattapony on the 20th, and marched by King William Court- House to Lanesville on the same day. June 21.Crossed the Pamnukey at White House and engaged the enemy near Saint Peters Church. June 22.Marched #o Jones Bridge and crossed the Chickahominy. June 23.-.~--Engaged the enemny on the Long Bridge road. June 24.Marched by Charles City to James River. June 25.Marched to Wyanoke Landing. June 27.Crossed James River to Wind-Mill Point. ~ Commanded by Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan Page 202 202 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. LIT. June 28.Marched to Prince George Court-House. June 29.Marched to J erusaleni plank road; thence back to Lees Mill. June 30.Marched to Jerusalem plank road. fJuly.]Tlie brigade encamped near Light-House Point until July 14, when ordered on picket to the left of the army, near Reams Station, Weldon railroad. July 27.Crossed the James River at Jones Neck. July 28.Engaged the enemy (in conjunction with Wilcoxs division~ of infantry*) near New Market; captured 2 battle-flags and 74 1)risoflers. & eond Division, commanded by Brig. Gen. David 111cM. Gregg. June 13 to 19.On march to White House. June 20.Crossed the Mattapony and encamped at White House. June 21.Crossed the Pamunkey, and skirmished with and drove the enemys cavalry, who had attacked the train the previous day. June 22.Encamped near Tunstalls Station and fought the enemy. June 23.Marched to Chick~hoininy; crossed at ~ Bridge, and encamped near Saint Marys Church. June 24.Moved to Saint Marys Church and took position; enemy in front. This division was ordered to hold cross-roads until train had passed Charles City Court-House; position attacked by the enemy, with Fitz. Lees and Hamptons divisions of cavalry, and held for some time; finally driven back with heavy loss. Capt. W. Phillips, First Maine Cavalry, assistant commissary of musters on my staff, was killed at Saint Marys Chnrch on the 2tth. To say of this officer that he was a true gentleman, an excellent soldier, is but a slight tribnte to his mem- ory. - June 25.Encamped near Wilcoxs Landing, on James River. June 26 to 28.lu camp; First Brigade crossed the river on ferry- boats; Second Brigade crossed and encamped back of Fort Powhatan. June 29 and 30.On march to Templetons, on Jerusalem plank road, about four miles from Reams Station; portion of comumand under Col- onel Stedman, Sixth Ohio, sent to Freemans Bridge, over Kottoway River. July 1.Marched to Warwick Swamp, onb Jerusalem plank road; bivouacked at Teumpletons. July 2.Marched from Templetons to Prince George Court-House and encamped. July 4.Broke camp at 7 a. m marched to within four miles of Jor dans Point. July 6 to 11.Picketing about Prince George Court-House and Light- House Point. July 11.At 6.30 p. iii. broke camp and marched during the night. July 12.Reached left of the army about S a. mu. and moved omit on plank road; First Brigade moved out to Reams Station; Second Bri- gade moved out on plank road; met the enemny and drove him across Warwick Swamp; command camped on plank road. July 13.Marched to Warwick Swamp; took position at Lees Mill and established picket-line toward Jerusalem plank road. July 14.Quiet; in camp; enemy made slight demonstration on Reams Station road near Proctors Store. July 15.Quiet. So in original, but Devin was engaged with Wilcoxs Confederate infantry Page 203 CHAP. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 203 July 16.Relieved by First Division; marched back to near Jordans Point and went into camp. July 17.Quiet. July 18 and 19.Quiet; Captain Treichels appointment as assistant commissary of musters confirmed by War Department; is ordered to enter upon the duties of the office in place of Captain Phillips, First Maine Cavalry, killed in action; Captaii~ Harper, First New Jersey Cavalry, appointed provost-marshal; Doctor Rezuer, acting surgeon-in- chief, relieved by Doctor Marsh, U. S. Army. July 20.Quiet. July 21.Quiet; camp inspected by corps and division inspectors. July 22.Camp inspected by commanding general. July 23.Quiet. July 24 and 25.Quiet; ordered to supply ourselves with four days rations and two of forage. July 26.At 5 p. in. marched from camp to Appomattox; crossed and proceeded to Jones Neck, on James River, marching all night. July 27.Crossed James River in rear of Second Corps and moved out toward Malvern Hill; bivouacked at Allens Chapel. July 28.Moved out toward Riddells Shop; the encjny attacked us with large infantry force, driving us back and capturing one gun, but af- terward retreated, leaving their (lead and wounded in our hands. Our loss in the fight was 108 killed, wounded, and missing. Being relieved by our infantry, returned to Allens Chapel. July 2.9.Quiet; division in line 6f battle all day; the First Brigade dismounted and the horses sent across the river; at night began cross- ing to south side of the river and marclied all night. July 30.Still marching; crossed Appomattox at 0 a. in.; passed in rear of the Ninth Corps, going toward Lees Mill; took position; met the rebels, consisting of a portion of Butlers brigade, and after a sharp skirmish drove them away and obtained water for our ~nimals; re- lieved by First Division at 11 p. m. July 31.Ffrst Brigade marched to and took position on Norfolk railroad, picketing in front and connecting on right with First Divis- ion; Second Brigade took position at Prince George Court-House and established line with First Brigade. The line of this division perfect from railroad to Jamnes River; division headquarters near Prince George Court-House. First Brigade, Second Division, commanded by Brig. 4~en. Henry II. Davies, Jr. July 1 to 11.The brigade was engaged in doing picket duty. July 11.Moved toward Reams Station, where it encountered the enemy on the forenoon of the following day, driving him a considerable distance with but slight loss to the command; withdrew the same night and was again engaged in picket duty. July 2G.Moved, in conjunction with the rest of the corp~, across the Appomattox and James Rivers, encountering the enemy [28th] near to Malvern Hill, ~vhere a heavy engagement took place. The enemy, being for the most part infantry, succeeded in driving back our skirmishers and capturing one gun from Dennisons battery, which the command was unable to bring off. July 30.The brigad& recrossed the rivers mentiomied above, ~nd marched to take position on the left of the army, where it is engaged on picket duty at the close of the month Page 204 204 OPERATIONS TN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. LII. $econd Brigade, Second Division, commanded by Col. J. Irvin Gregg, ~ixteenth Pennsylvania Cavalry. FIRST MAINE CAVALRY. June 22.Having crossed the river at White House, skirmished with the e~~emy the greater part of the day near Black Creek with consid- erable loss. June 24.Engaged at Saint Marys Church with considerable loss; estimated number of miles traveled, 275. July 1.In camp near Lees Mill. July 4.Moved to Light-house Point. July 10.Received orders to report to Colonel Bryan, commanding cavalry detachment at army headqn arters. July 11.Went on picket on the left of infantry. July 17.Moved to Light-House Point and went into camp. July 26.Broke camp and crossed the Appomattox; next day crossed the James River. July 28.Had one squadron engaged with the enemy near Malvern Hill; 4m en wounded. July 29.On picket. July 30.The enemy drove in our pickets, but not the reserve; 3 men wounded. The same night witlmrew to south side of James River. July 31.Crossed the Appoinattox and marched to Lees Mill, where the enemy were found in position OR the opposite side; were held iu re- serve as a support for the battery; marched during the month 100 miles. SECOND PENNSYLVANIA CAVALRY. June 11.Advanced to Trevilian Station and fought; 3 men wounded. Remained there until midnight, when we marched, via Po River, Bowl- ing Green, Spotsylvania Court-House to Point, where we encamped on the Mattapony River near West night of the 18th. June 19.Marched to Dunkirk. June 20:Marched to White House and crossed the river~ dism before daylight of the 21st. ouiited June 22.Marched to near Jones Bridge. June 24.Moved to Saint Marys Chureji and engaged the enemy; 1 officer and 19 men wounded; 2 officers an d27 men missing. Moved at night to Charles City Court-House. June 25.Marched to near James River and remained until June 29; crosse(l river in transports and encamped near Fort Powhatan. June 30.Marched, via Prince George Court-House, to near Temple- tons, and made scout after Third Division. July 1.Reached Prince George Court-House and moved to Temple- tons, from which place made scout to near Nottoway River in search of Third Cavalry Division, and returned to Templetons same day. July 2.Marched, via Prince George Court-House, to near City Point and encamped. July 4.Moved to near Jordans Point and camped. July 5.-On picket near Prince George Court-House. July 6.Marched to near Jordans Point. July~11.At dark marched to infantry, on Jerusalem plank road. July 12.Moved toward ~ farm, via Jerusalem plank road, and met the enemy;~ 10 men wounded and 3 officers and 28 men captured or wounded and taken prisoners Page 205 CHAP. tli.i THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 205 July 13.Marched to Lees Mill and established picket-lines. July 17.Went to camp near Jordans Point. July 24.Marched to near junction of Norfolk railroad and road to Lees Mill and picketed; 2 men wounded on post by guerrillas. July 25.Marched to camp near Jordans Point. July 26.iLeft camp at 6 p. m. and marched, via Poilit of Rocks, to Jones Neck. July 27.Crossed James River on pontoon bridge and formed on right of Second Corps, near New Market road. July 28.Moved to near Malvern Hill and niet the enemys infantry (Longstreets and Hills troops) about three miles from James River; 2 men killed and 4 wounded; captured 13 of the enemy. After the enemy retreated we returned to near James River and encamped. July 29.Formed in line of battle (dismounted) in front of pontoon bridge and sent horses to the rear. At 5 p. m. mounted regiment and moved to near river-bank and encamped. July 30.Recrossed James River at 2 a. m. and marched, via Point of Rocks and Cedar Level~ to Mill~ where we met the enemy and drove him a mile or two from Warwick Swamp. At 10 ~ in. moved to Prince George Court-House and encamped there about 7 a. in. on the 31st. July 31.At 10 a. in. marched on Light-House Point road two miles in direction of that place, and picketed on roads in that vicinity. FOURTH PENNSYLVANIA CAVALRY. June 21.Reached White House. June 22.Skirmished with the enemy at Macons Mill. June 23.Marched to Jones Bridge. June 24.In the battle at Saint Marys Church, in which Lient. Col. George H. Covode was mortally wounded; Lieutenant Yoummg missing. June 30.At Prince George Court-House. July 1.Regiment near Lees Mill. July 2.Moved and encamped two miles from Prince George Court- House. July 4.On picket at Prince George Court-House. July 5.Relieved and joined brigade near Light-House Point; a scout under Lieutenant Paul sent to ascertain the fate of Colonel Covode. July 7.A party nuder Captain Parke recrossed, bringing the remains of Colonel Covode into our lines. July 8 to 11.In camp, when we broke camp, marching all night, pass- ing to the left of our army. July 12.Moved on the Jerusalem plank road; the Second and Fourth Pennsylvania Cavalry on a reconnaissance; attacked by a brigade just across Warwick Swamp and driven back across the swamp, the Second losing heavily, the Fourth very lightly; on l)icket on the Petersburg and Norfolk Railroad. July 13.Relieved and encamped near Lees Mill. July 16.Reported to Colonel Bryau for picket; relieved and marched all night, going to our old camp near Light-House Point. July 26.At Sp. m. left camp, and marching all night crossed James River on the morning of the 27th. July 27.On picket near New Market road; lost 2 men in action. July 28.The regime~nt was not engaged. July 29.Lay in dismounted line all day. At 11.30 p. mu. moved out, passing over our lines to Lees Mill, where some force was met Page 206 206 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CILLP. LIL July 30.The regiment lightly engaged, Captain Martins command repelling a saber ch~ge; moved at night. July 31.Encamped at 4 p. in. near Prince George Court-Honse. EI~HTIf PENNSYLVANIA CAVALRY. June 12.Regiment on picket; 9 p. in., relieved by Tenth New York Cavalry, and taking the advance, moved toward North Anna. June 14.Crossed the North Anna; moved to Corbins Bridge, on Po River; regiment ~n picket at Todds Tavern twenty-fonr miles. June 15.Moved by Spotsylvania Court-House to beyond Weed Tavern and encamped; twenty miles. June 1G.Marched through Bowling Green; moved to White House road, near the Mattapony, and encamped; thirty miles. June 17.Moved, via Newtown, Chapel Hill, and Edwards Store, to near Weavertown [Walkerton] and encamped; cighteemi miles. June 18.Moved by Weavertown [Walkerton] to beyond King and Queen Court-House and encamped; fourteen miles. June 19.Regiment detailed Point; eighteen miles. to escort prisoners and wagons to West June 21.Crossed Mattapony on transports. June 22.Moved from West Point to White House; rejoined brigade and encamuped; twenty-one miles. June 23.Moved from White House, crossed Chickahominy at Jones Bridge, to near Charles City Court-House; fifteen miles. June 24.Moved out on road to Malvern Hill; muet the enemys pickets at Saint Marys Church; drove them one mile; Companies D, I, F, and H dismounted. At 3 p. in. the enemy advanced upon our lines with heavy force of cavalry and infantry, driving in our lines; regiment charged on enemy, driving them to woods; regiment was theii dis- mounted and engaged the enemy, but the enemy having received re- enforcements the whole line was compelled to fall back beyond Hope- well Church and encamped near Charles City Court-House. June 25.Moved to Douthats Landing and went into camp; fifteen miles. June 26 ~nd 2Z.Jn camp. June 28.Crossed James River and encamped near Fort Powhatan. June 29.Moved at 5 p. in. toward Prince George Court-House, reaching that place at daybreak. June 30.Marched to Blackwater and encamped; thirty miles. July 1.At Lees Mill; moved out to Proctors farm; regiment went out to support Second Pennsylvania on reconnaissance to tke Notto- way River; returned to near Proctors farm and went on picket on the road to Sussex Court-House; twenty miles. July 2.Moved back through Prince George Court-House toward Jordans Point and encamped; eighteen miles. July 4.Regiment ordered to report to Col. T. M. Bryan, command- ing cavalry, on Jerusalem plank road, and went into camp at McCanns house; eighteen miles. July 5 to 9.Regiment on picket on Lees Mill, Gurley, and plank roads; regiment was relieved and moved back to camp. July 10.Relieved from duty with Provisional Brigade. July 11.Moved bac to near Light-House Point and went into camup; fifteen miles. At 7 p. mu. regiment moved toward front; six miles Page 207 CHiP. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 207 July 12.Moved out on Jerusalem plank road; regiment went on scout to Lees Mill; returne(i to plank road a~ 12 p. in.; thirty-six miles. July 13.Moved out to Lees Mill and encamped; seven miles. July 14 to 16.hi camp. July 16..-Moved to near Light-House Point and went into camp; twelve miles~ July 23.Regiment went on picket to Prince George Court-House; six miles. July 25.Regiment relieved and moved into camp; six miles. July 26.Broke camp, near Light-House Point; moved to Point of Ro& ks, crossed the Appoinattox, and encamped; eight miles. July 27.Moved towiird James River; crossed, moved on road to Malvern Hill, and encamped on Allens farm; six miles. July 28.Moved toward Malvern Hill; command was engaged with the enemy; regiment made a reconnaissance over the battle-field, and at 3.30 p. n~. moved back to Allens farm and encamped; thirteen miles. July 29.Command dismounted; formed line of battle; brigade massed in close column at 4 p. m. ; regiment returned at 7 p. in.; moved oat one mile and a half; remained in line until 9 p. in.; moved back and encamped; four miles. July 30.i a. in. broke camp on Allens farm; moved to and crossed J ames River; moved toward Point of Rocks, crossed the Appomattox at that point, and moved out to Lees Mill; regiment on picket; twenty- five miles. July 31.Command moved back to Prince George Court-House and went into camp; ten miles. THIRTEENTH PENNSYLVANIA CAVALRY. June 24. Met the enemy at Saint Marys Church, with loss of 2 killed, 14 wounded, and 28 missing. June 30.In camp near Prince George Court-House. July 1.Fell back from the Blackwater and encamped near City Point, Ya. July 5.Moved camp to Light-House Landing. July 12.Took up line of march in direction of Petersburg, Weldon and Danville Railroad. At this point the regiment was ordered to protect the right flank of the First Brigade, which was then attacking the enemy. We lay in line from 10 a. m. until 4 p. in. We were then ordered back to the brigade and detailed for picket omi the plank road. During the night a squadron under Lieutenant Brown made a scout in the direction of the enemys lines, driving in their pickets, capturing 2; returned to camp without any loss. July 16.Again joined the brigade and fell back to the vicinity of the Blackwater, where we remained until the 17th, when we were re- lieved by the. First Division and ordered to move to our old camp near Light-House Landing. Here we remained until the 20th, when the regiment was detailed on picket in the vicinity of Prince George Court- House. July 23.Relieved by the Second Pennsylvania Cavalry and returned to our old camp. July 25.Ordered to be ready to march with all available force at a moments imotice in the direction of James River, with a view to crossing, which we did on the same night; crossed the Appomattox at Point of Rocks and the James at Turkey Bend Page 208 208 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. (CHAP. LII. July 27.Moved out some two miles from the river and engaged the enemy, and fell back to the pontoon the same evening. July 28.The regiment remained in line of battle until 4 p. in., when it was ordered to relieve the First Maine Cavalry, which was then pick- eting in the vicinity of Malvern Hill. July 29.At 12 p. m. were ordered to be ready to fall back at any moment, and at 2 a. m. withdrew our pickets and recrossed the river at the above-mentioned point. Marched toward the Blackwater, where division attacked the enemy and regiment was ordered to support bri- gade battery. From here we fell back to our present camp [Prince (leorge Court-House]. SiXTEENTH PENNSYLVANIA CAVALRY. June 13.Encamped on north bank of North Anna River. June 14.Encamped near Todds Tavern; lost 1 man on picket. June 15.On march and encamped at 9 p. m. June 1G.Encamped near Sparta. June 17.Encamped near Walkerton. June 18.Encamped near King aiid Queen Court-House. June 19.Encamped at Dunkirk. June 20.Crossed Mattapony River and encamped at White House. June 21.Crossed Pamunkey River; dismounted and engaged the enemy near Tunstalls Station~ horses. , no casualties; at dusk returned for our June 22.On scout to Webbs house. June 23.Destroyed railroad bridge across Pamunkey, and formed rear guard on march to Charles City Court-House, where encamped. June 24.Engaged with enemy near Saint Marys Church; formed rear guard on leaving field; lost 1 killed,7 wounded, 3 missing. June 25 to 28.In camp back of Fort Powhatan. June 29.5 p. in., on march. June 30.On scout; encamped at Templetons. Jnly 1.Encamped near Lees Mill; went on scout to Nottoway River. July 2.Marched with brigade to near Prince George Court-House. July 4.Changed camp to near Light-House Point. July 7.Went on picket to Prince George Court-House; relieved by Sixth Pennsylvania Cavalry same day. July 8.In camp near Light-House Point. July 11.Marched to Jerusalem plank road. July 12.In line of battle near bridge on plank road. July 13.Marched to Lees Mill. July 14.Relieved Fourth Pennsylvania Cavalry; on picket at Old Shop Church. July 1G.Relieved by First Cavalry Division; marched to camp near Light-House Point. July 2G.Crossed the Appomattox River; marched to Jones Neck. July 27.Crossed James River and encamped. July 28.Marched to near Malvern Hill; had a fierce encounter with the enemy; lost 14 men and 1 officer wounded and 3 men killed. July 29.In hue of battle dismounted. July 30.Marched with brigade back to Lees Mill. July 31.Marched to camp at Primuce George Court-House Page 209 CHAP. LU.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 209 Third Division, commanded by Brig. Gen. James H. Wilson, June 13.Drove him [enemy] across White Oak Swamp bridge; engaged him there until relieved by a brigade of General Crawfords division; advanced on New Market road, meeting enemy at cross-roads; sharp and obstinate fight during the day, resulting in severe loss to the enemy; withdrew from near White Oak Swamp during the itight; marched to Saint Marys Church and bivouacked. June 14.Marched to near Harrisons Landing, where the two bri- gades were joined; drew rati6ns and then posted one brigade near Phillips, the other at Saint Marys Church, holding the country across from the James River to the Chickahominy at Jones Bridge. June 15.Pushed out strong reconnoitering force from both brigades toward their respective fronts; sharp fight near Smiths Store by Col- onel McIntoshs brigade, without results. June 17.Crossed the Janies River near Fort Powhatan; moved be- yond Prince George Court-House and bivouacked. June 18.Moved to Zion Church n , id encamped until June 22. , ear the Blackwater ai June 21.General Kautz, with 2,500 men, reported for d~ity with the division. June 22.At 2 a. m. broke camp and moved to Reams Station, de- stroying the track there and depot; thence to Dinwiddie Court-House, skirmishing with the enemy in our rear; thence to Fords Station,on South Side road, and bivouacked for five hours, destroying the track completely all along the march, and buruin g a~l railroad buildings, water-tanks, & c., 2 locomotives, and 30 cars. June 23.At 2 a. m. marched toward Burkeville Station, General Kantz in the advance. The Third Division encouutered General W. H. F. Lees division of cavalry on the railroad between Blacks and Whites Station and Nottoway Creek; brisk and obstinate fighting from 2 p. m. until dark~ daylight. , punished the enemy severely; withdrew at June 24.Marched by way of Hnngarytown to Meherrin Station, where General Kautzs command again joined the division, having com- pletely destroyed all railroad property at Burkeville Station and the track from Burkeville as far as Meherrin, and thence to Keysville; bivouacked at Keysville until daylight. June 25.Took up the march toward Roanoke Station, continuing the destruction of the railroad track, saw-mills, depots, & c., as far as the Roanoke or Staunton River; arriving at the bridge at Op. in., we en- gaged the enemy with General Kautzs command. Simultaneously with onr attack upon the bridge a division of cavalry attacked our rear (the same met and defeated by us on the 23d instant at Nottoway Creek), compelling Colonel Chapman to form line of battle; slight skirmishing ensaed, with little consequence. June 26.At 12.30 a. m. withdrew from position, nioving past the enemys fortifications eastward to Wylhiesburg, where we halted and fed. At 7 a. m. took up the march to Christianville, and thence to within five miles of Saffolds Bridge, where we bivouacked. June 27.~Crossed the Meherrin early in the morning; marched on road to Smoky Ordinary and bivouacked at night near Great Creek. June 28.Took the road to the Nottoway River at the Double Bridges; crossed there at 2 p. in.; halted two hours; mna~ched toward Stony Creek, where we came up with the enenmys (Hamptons and W. H. F. Lees cavalry) advance. A general engagement followed, in 14 R UVOL XL, PT Page 210 210 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. LII. which the enemy at first were driven by our men, who held the ground gained, notwithstanding frequent and spirited assaults by the enemy in largely superior numbers. Toward daybreak on the 29th moved via Stony Creek to Reams Station; heavy attack on our i:ear by the en- eniy in great force, the brigade of Colonel Chapman losing many killed and wounded. At Reams Station found enemys infantry and artillery in position; tried to cut through, but failed. Began retrograde move- meut toward Jarratts Station at 3 p. in., after destroying and leaving our train. Marched all night; crossed the iDouble Bridges at 12 in. June 30.Struck the Weldoii railroad at early dawn; marched east- ward on conntry roads to Peters Bridge, on the Kottoway River; bridge destroyed; forded the river and halted two hours. At 6 p. ni. took the road to Waverly; traveled all night; reached Blunts Bridge, on the Blackwater, at about midnight. July 1.Found the bridge destroyed over the Blackwater; built a bridge; crossed by single file in three hours; marched beyond Cabin Point and went into camp. July 2.Joined Cavalry Corps in camp at Light-House Point, pickets ing alternately with the divisions the Prince George Court-House road and the left of the rmy. July 29.Moved near Jerusalem plank i~oad, picketing the left of the army. July 30.Massed the command umear Allens house, preparing to at- tack the enemys right; order countermanded; conimand went into camp near Westbrook. Reserve Brigade, commanded by Brig. Gen. Wesley Merritt. June 7 to 27.Engaged in expedition to vicinity of Gordonsville, fighting at Trevihian Station on the 11th and 12th, rejoining the arniy via Spotsylvania Court-House, Bowling Green, Walkerton, King and Queen Court-House, Dunkirk, White House, Jones Bridge, and Wil- coxs Landing; crossed the James River by ferry amid moved to Prince George Court-House to assist General Wilson, encamping at Reams Station on the night of the 30th. - ARTILLERY. * Brigadier-General Hunt was placed in charge of siege operations in front of Petersburg and south of the Appomattox June 27. During the month of July the Fourth Regiment New York Foot Artillery, Lieu- temmant-Colonel Allcock commanding, was engaged iii constructing field- works and in preparing materials for the siege, the regiment having reported to chief of artillery Army of the Potomac July 14. Siege oper- ations against the city [Petersburg were pushed from south side of Appomattox. July 30.Under instructions from the chief of artillery, fire was opeped on the enemys works from all the batteries south and east of Petersburg at about 4.30 a. in., immediately after the explosion of a mine under the advanced salient of his hue. The cannonade was re- newed during the day as circumstances required. ENGINEER BRIGADEt June 13.All bridge materialabout 3,100 feet in charge of Cap- taimms Lubey, Henderson, and Robbins, sent to Fort Powhatan, on the James River, by order of Lieutenant-General Grant. - * Commanded by Brig. Gen. Henry J. Hunt. Commanded by Brig. Gen. Henry W. Benliam Page 211 Ciw~. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 211 June 14.The brigadier-general commanding went ill) to near Fort Powbatan by order, first, of General Butler and afterward by General Meade; completed bridge of some 2 ~ at Fort Powhatan. ,~00 feet (104 boats) across the Janies June 15 to 17.Occupied in crossing the army. June 18..~At 3 a. m. finished taking up the bridgerafted and brought it to City Point by order of General Meade; disembarked and went into camp on the banks of the Appoinattox. June 19.Occupied in overhauling and arranging pontoon rafts. June 20.Sent Captain Lubey, with thirty-six boats, to lay a bri(lge at Jones Landing, which was done without difficulty on the 21st. June 23.The Fifteenth New York Engineers engaged in building a road from the I andiiig at City Point to the quartermasters~corrals fin- ished on the 27th. June 29.Orders froni General Grant to prepare and hold ready a bridge of twenty boats subject to the order of General W. F. Smith. July 1.Canvas train of twelve boats, with t Washington. rucks, & c., arrived from July 21.A detail from the Fifteenth Regiment at work on the de- fenses at City Point, and continued at work through the month. July 22.A train of thirty boats with material sent to Captain Lubey, at Jones Neck. July 26.A bridge of thirty-six boats, under Captain Slossoi~, laid at Broadway Landing, on the Appomattox. July 29.A~ bridge of thirty-sii boats, under Lieutenant OKeefe, sent to Deep Bottom. July 30.Bridge returned, not being required. ARMY OF THE JAMES.~ TENTH ARMY CORPS. June 14.Major-General Gillmore relieved by special orders this date, Department of Virginia and North Carolina. June 17.Brig. Gen. W. T. II. Brooks assigned to command of the corps by special orders this date D Carolina. , epartment of Virginia and North June 19.Corps reorganized by special orders this date, Department of Virginia and North Carolina. June 20.Brig. Gen. li. S. Foster, with Third Brigade of First Di- vision, took permanent position on the left bank of the James at Deep Bottom. June 23.The Second Division temporarily assi~ned to duty with the Eighteenth Corps before Petersburg. July 15.Resignation of Brig. Gen. W. T. H. Brooks accepted, Special Orders, No. 238, Adjutant-Generals Office. July 18.7Brig. Gen. A. H. Terry temporarily assigned to command of the corps, Special Orders, No. 61, Aj~mies of the United States. July 21.Maj. Gen. D. B. Birney assigned to command of the corps, Special Orders, No. 64, Armies of the United States. July 30.The Second Division, Tenth Corps, Brigadier-General Turner commanding, supported the assaulting column of Major-General Buruside upon the enemys works at Petersburg. July 31.The Second Divisioii relieved from duty with the Eighteenth Corps before Petersburg and returned to Bermuda hundred. And other forces of the Department of Virginia and North Carolina Page 212 212 OPERATIONS IN SE. YA. AND N. C. jUaAr. LII. First Division, commanded by Brig. Gen. Alfred H. lerry. June 14.Brig. Gen. A. II. Terry assigned to temporary command of the Tenth Corps; Brig. Gen. R. S. Foster assigned to temporary com- mand of the division. Juiw 16.Maj. Gen. W. F. Smith, with Eighteenth Corps, attacked and carried outer line of defenses of Petersburg. General Beauregards force withdrawn for the defense of that city from the works in front of our lines, which were immediately occupied by the troops of this divis- ion and the brigades of Brigadier-Generals Ames and Turner, the whole force being under the immediate c~minaiid of Brig. Gen. A. II. Terry. The troops of this division were then pushed out upon the Itichmond and Petersburg turnpike, which they held against the advance of Lees army, marching from the north side of the James River to the relief of Petersburg until near night-fall, when they were withdrawn by order of Major-General Butler. The brigades of Brigadier-Generals Ames and Turner, thus covered by this division, tore up and destroyed over two miles of the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad near Port WalthalJ Junction. At night our picket-line was stationed in that portion of the rebel works nearest our intrenchments. June 17.The enemy advanced heavy columns against the center of our picket-line, which was driven in, thus giving them possession of the works abandoned by Beauregard on the morning of the 16th. 4n at- tack made upon the right of the picket-line was repulsed with loss. General Lee in person said by prisoners to have directed attack on the center. June 21.Brig. Gen. W. T. II. Brooks having been assigned to com- inand of Tenth Corps, Brig. Gen. A. II. Terry resumed command of the division, and Brig. Gen. R. S. Foster assigned to command of Third Brigade, With which he crossed James River at Deep Bottom, and in- trenched to cover the pontoon bridge at that point. Second Brigade, First Division, commanded by Gol. Joseph B. Hawley, Seventh Connecticut Infantry. June 16.Participated in the advance on the Petersburg and Rich- mond Railroad. The aggregate loss in killed, wounded, and missing is 203. June 17.The Sixth and Seventh Connecticut Infantry were attacked while endeavoring to hold the original picket-line, and though they inflicted severe loss on the enemy they suffered themselves to the ex- tent of near 70. [July.]The brigade has not moved during the month.~ It has held the extreme right of the Bermuda Hundred line of intrenchments, and has been engaged in performance of picket duty. Second Division, commanded by Brig. Gen. John W. Turner. This division was organized per general orders, headquarters l)epart- mnent of Virginia and North Carolina, dated June 19, 1864, and was stationed at Point of Rocks, on the Appomattox River Va June 23.The division reported for temporary duty to Major-Gen- eral Smith, coinmamjding Eighteenth Army Corps, near Petersburg, Va., and was at once l)laced in the trenches on the left of the corps, where it h~s remained up to the present time ~June 30} Page 213 CHAP. LIT.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 213 [Juiy.]This division was temporarily attached to the Eighteenth Army Corps during the month. July 1 to 29.On dnty in the front, near Petersbnrg, Va. July 30.The division supported the assaniting column of Major- General Burhside agaitist the enemys works near Petersbnrg, Va., in which actioi~ it lost 312 killed, wounded, and missing. July 31.Returned to camp near Hatchers, Va., and assigned to dnty in the line of intrencliments at Bermuda Hundred. First Brigade, Second Division, commanded by Col. N. Miartin Curtis, One hundred and forty-second New York Infantry. This brigade was organized by virtue of general orders, headquarters iDepartment of Virginia and North Carolina, June 21, 1864. June 23.Marched from Point of Rocks to the advance line of our forces before Petersburg, Va., where it has since [to June 30] remained. Second Brigade, Second Division. June 12.Received orders to proceed to the White House, where the brigade embarked for Point of Rocks, rejoining Tenth Army CQrps. June 13 to 22.Holding intrenchments in front of the enemy, on picket, and other similar duties. June 23.Marched to front of Petersburg, Va., arriving at day- break, and immediately went into rifle-pits, and have ever since been engaged in heavy skirmishing and constantly suffering under the fire from the shells of the enemy. In this position this report [dated June 30] leaves the brigade. [July 1.]The monthly return for June left this brigade in the in- trenchments in front of Petersburg, Va., where it sustained a heavy fire during the entire night. July 2.Lieut. Col. William B. Coan, Forty-eighth New York Infan- try, assumed command of the brigade by order of Brigadier-General Turner. July 6.Deserter informed that the enemy intended to charge that night; no assault. July 7 to 25.Constant skirmishing along picket-lines, with inter- vals of heavy shelling, & c., and occasional casualties. July 26.Enemy opened a very heavy fire of artillery. July 29.Received orders to move at dark, taking position in rear of Ninth Corps, some distance to the left of our former positioii. July 30.The brigade was advanced some 200 yards and close to the enemys works. Got into position to charge, when the troops on the left gave way and the brigade was compelled to fall back. Then, after hold- ing the intrenchments for over two hours, were relieved by the Third Brigade and ordered back to its old position. July 31.Ordered to proceed to City Point; order countermanded, and directed to proceed to intrenchments at Bermuda Hundred, where it now remains. Third Division, commanded by Brig. Gen. Orris S. Ferry. IDivision organized by g~neral orders from headquarters Department of Virginia and North Carolina, dated June 19, 1864. First Brigad Page 214 214 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. LIL stationed on the James River at Fort Powliatan, ~ Wharf; and Bermuda Landing; Second Brigade doing duty on the left of the line of intrencliments in front of Bermuda Hundred. EIGHTEENTH ARMY CORPS.* June 12.Left Cold Harbor. June 13.Embarked at the White House for Bermuda Hundred. June 15.Arrived near Petersburg, Va. First Brigade, First Division, commanded by Cot. Aaron F. Stevens, Thirteenth New Hampshire Infantry. During the month rJnly] this brigade has been doing duty iii the trenches near Petersburg, Va. July 29.The conunand moved at 6 p.m. from the trenches and went to the support of the Xinth Army Corps. July 31.Returned to its old position at 12 p. in. Second Brigade, First Division. June 12.Marched from Cold Harbor to White House. June 13.Embarked on transports and set sail for Bermuda Huii-- dred. June 14.Arrived at Bermuda Hundred; disembarked and marched to the front. June 15.Crossed the Appomattok at Point of Rocks; moved up the right bank of that river and participated in the attack on Peters- burg. The brigade assaulted and carried Battery No. 5, capturing 1 color, 5 guns, 2(~0 prisoners, many small-arms, and an amount of camp equipage. June 17.Marched back to Bermuda Hundred. June 21.Returned to Petersburg and remained there to tlm~ end of the month, participating in the siege of that city. The brigade retained its position on the right of the lines before Petersburg until the night of the 29th [July], when the command was relieved by a portion of the Second Corps and moved to the left of the Ninth Corps, relieving a portion of that corps at daylight on the 30th. July 30.During the engagement of this day the~brigade held a por- tion of the line immediately on the left of Reservoir Hill. Late in the night were relieved by a portion of the Ninth Corps. J~ely 31.At daybreak returned to former position, on the right of the lines. AS~ecofld Brigade, Second Division, commanded by 6~ol. Griffin A. Sted- many Jr., Eleventh Connecticut Infantry. June 12.Left Cold Harbor and marched to White House. June 13.Embarked on transports and arrived at Bermuda Hun- dred. June 14.Since this date have been engaged in the siege of Peters- burg, Va. During the last month [July] the brigade has been lying in the trenches near Petersburg, Va. Commanded by Maj. Gen. William F. Smith Page 215 Ca& ~. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 215 July 30.It participated in the assault upon the enemys lines by General Burnside, the officers and men showing by their coolness and bravery a zeal for the cause which cannot be surpassed by any other brigade in the service. Third Brigade, Second Division, cJ~nrnanded by Col. Harrison S. Fair child, Eighty-ninth New York Infantry. This brigade during the month [July] performed the duty of guard- ing the intrenchinents and breast-works in front of the enemy, alter nating forty-eight hours on duty, forty-eight hours in camp. July 29.Under orders, this brigade, with the rest of the Eighteenth Army Corps, marched in the evening to the left of the line to support General Burnside. July 30.In the morning the Ninth Army Corps, under Major-Gen- eral Burnside, made an assault on the enemys line, the Eighteenth Army Corps, including this brigade, supporting the Ninth Corps. This brigade was not called into action, but was for a short time ex- posed to the artillery fire of the enemy, in which the casualties were small, as appears in detail on this report. 1t~ the evening the brigade returned to camp. Third Division. June 15.Colonel Duncans brigade and the First [U. S. Colored] Regiment and Fifth Massachusetts Cavalry, of the First Brigade, engaged the enemy before Petersburg with considerable loss. June 19.The above troops were withdrawn to Point of Itocks, where the remaining regiments of the division were encamped. The First and Second Itegimnents Colored Cavalry were ordered to report to inc for duty, and the division was reorganized by general orders, head- quarters Department of Yirginia and North CaVolina, June 19, 1864. June 21.The division was moved to the front before Petersburg, where it is now doing picket and fatigue duty. June 28.The Thirty-seventh [U. S. Colored] liegiment and the Fifth Massachusetts Cavalry were detached from the First Brigade and ordered to report to department headquarters. [July.]The division has beeii on duty in the trenches before Peters- burg and on i~icket on the Appomattox during the month. July 1.General links relinquished command of the division, and Colonel ilolman, First U. S. Colored Troops, assumed command, which he retained until the 27th, when he obtained a thirty days leave of absence. Col. S. A. Duncan, of the Fourth U. S. Colored Troops, as- sumned command until relieved by Brig. Gen. Joseph B. Carr, July 29, in compliance with the provisions of paragraph 5, Special Orders, No. 91, current series, from corps headquarters. July 29.In the evening the Second Brigade relieved a portion of General Ledhies division, of the Ninth Corps, and were held in reserve during the engagement of the 30th, returning to their formuer I)osition on the night of the 31st, having suffered a loss of 1 enlisted man killed and 3 officers and 14 men wounded. First Brigade, Third Division, commanded by Brig. Gem Edward A. Wild. June 15.The First U; S. Colored Troops was the oiily regimnent of this brigade which participated in the battle before Petersburg of this date Page 216 216 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. Viixp. LU. June 1G.Brigade headquarters were moved from Wilsons Wharf to Point of Rocks. June 21.The brigade moved from Point of Rocks to the field near Petersbnrg, Va., where it has been and is now [June 30] doing picket duty upon the line of Appomattox River. & cond Brigade, Third Division, commanded by Gol. Samuel A. Dun can, Fourth U. S. Colored Troops. The Second U. S. Colored Cavalry assigned to Second Brigade per General Orders, No. 31, headquarters Third Division Corps, June 22, 1864. Eighteenth Army June 14.The brigade moved over the Appomattox; encamped near Spring Hill. June 15.Marched toward Petersburg; found the enemy in rifle-pits at Baylors farm, four miles from Petersburg. Brigade formed and ad- vanced in line of battle; charged and captured the works with one piece of artillery; moved on toward the city; reached the enemys main works at Jordans farm, two miles and a half from the city, at 6 p. in., with Brooks division on the right; charged and took these works, this brigade capturing Batteries Nos. 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11, with 5 pieces of artillery; remained near the front under fire until the 19th. June 19.Moved across the Appomattox; encamped near Point of Rocks. June 22.Crossed the Appomattox and marched to the front. [July.]Brigade remained during the month in front of Peters- burg, Va.; did duty in trenches for twenty-six days of the month; was not engaged in any military operations of importance. CAVALRY DIVISION. * June 21.Division left Point of Rocks, and reported eral Wilson at Mount Zion Church. same day to Gen- June 22.Left at daylight for Reams Station (Petersburg and Weldon Railroad), which station and railroad were destroyed; from thence to Fords Station, on same railroad, destroying locomotives, station, and road at that place. Left at midnight for junction of Petersburg and Richmond and Danville railroads, which was also destroyed. June 23.Left junction at daylight, and during the 24th and 25th de- stroyed all that portion of the road as far as Roanoke Station. June 27 to 29.Occupied in returning to our lines, the last day of which had a severe engagement with the enemy, losing a large number of men. June 30.Went into camp on the James River, above Bermuda Hun- dred. July 1 to 26.The division remained in camp near Jones Landing, on the James River. July 27.Umider command of Major-General Sheridan crossed the James River to Deep Bottom. July 28.Took part in the cavalry engagement near Malvern Hill. July 30.Recrossed the James River and returned to camp near Jones Landing; same day crossed the Appomattox near Point of Rocks and reported to Major-General Sheridan. - July 31.Stationed at Lees Mill, doing picket duty. - Commanded by Brig. Gen. August V. Kautz Page 217 CHAP. LTh~ THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 217 First Brigade, commanded by Col. Robert 711. West, Fifth Pennsylvania Cavalry. June 15.Attacked the enemys works in front of Petersburg and were repulsed. June 17.Returned to camp, having marched sixty miles. June 21.Left camp on raiding expedition with Generals Kantzs and Wilsons divisions; destroyed the Petersburg and Lynchburg, Peters- bnrg and Weldon, and Richmond and Panville Railroads. June 25.Attacked the enemy at Staunton bridge and were re- pulsed. June 29.Was attacked by an overwhelming force near Reams Sta- tion, in which affair this brigade lost 21 officers and 550 men. June 30.Reached camp near Jones Landiiig; marched 400 miles. ME1VLORANDuM.At the date of signing the report the aggregate loss has been redneed in this brigade by arrival from the scene of the con- flict on the 29th to 7 officers and 231 enlisted men. Secomi Brigade, commanded by Col. Samuel P. Spear, Eleventh Pennsyl vania Cavalry. June 15.The brigade again advanced upon Petersburg; engaged the enemy, and returned to camp on the 17th. Loss, 1 officer killed, 1 wounded; 4 enlisted men killed,3 wounded. June 21 to 30.On raid under General Wilson; participated in the destruction of Reams Station, 20 miles of railroad track on the Wel- don and Petersburg road; Fords, Wilsons, Blacks and Whites, and Nottoway Stations, and railroad track on the Petersburg and Lynch- burg Railroad a distance of 30 miles; [Burkeville] Junction, KeysvilLe, Meherrin, Drakes Branch, and Roanoke Stations, saw-mills, shops, turnouts, and over 40 miles of track on the Richmond and Danville road. En route destroyed a large amount of Government stores, 2 locomotives, a number of platform and other cars, and made a most effectual destruction of the railroad. Engaged the enemy at Staunton River railroad bridge, and on returning at Reams Station, where the brigade suffered very heavily. Loss, 19 officers and 670 enlisted men killed, wounded, and missing, 712 horses an (12-pounders). d 2 mountain howitzers July 1 to 26.Brigade stationed near ~ Landing, on James River. July 27.Crossed James River at Strawberry Plains and participated [28th] in cavalry engagement at Deep Bottom under General Sheridan. July 30.Recrossed James River and proceeded to camp at Jones Neck; crossed the Appomattox at Point of Rocks, and arrived at Lees Mill, seven miles southwest of Petersburg, on the 31st, where the bri- gade is now doing picket duty. DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA.~ SUB-DISTRICT OF NEW BEitNE. June.]Au expedition under the immediate command of Col. P. J. Claassen, commanding One hundred and thirty-second New York Vol- unteers and New Berne outposts, and consisting of detachments of One * Commanded by Brig. Gen. Innis N. Palmer Page 218 [CHAP. LII. 218 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. hundred arid thirty-second New York, Fifteenth Connecticut Volun- teers, Third New York Light Artillery (four pieces), and Companies B andD, Twelfth New York Cavalry, went to the immediate vicinity of Kinston, N. C.; returned with a loss of 1 killed and 3 wounded; cap- tured 5 officers and 48 men, with a number of horses, mules, and other property. SUB-DISTRICT OF BEAUFORT. June 20.The One hundred and fifty-eighth New York, Ninth Ver- mont, with one section of Battery C, Third New York Light Artillery, Lieutenant Jones; one section of Battery C, First U. S. Artillery, Lieutenant Wilson; First Squadron, Twenty-third, and Company E, Twelfth New York Cavalry, and Company L, First North Carolina Volunteers (mounted), marched from Croatan via Pollocksville, Youngs Cross-Roads, and Jacksonville. At the same time 100 men of the Ninth Vermont landed at Sneads Ferry, destroyed the ferry-boats, took prisoners, & c.; returned on the 26th, having captured about 25 prison- ers, horses, arms, & c.; destroyed 2 ferry-boats and 1 schooner loaded with salt and turpentine. Several brisk skirmishes occurred on the road. No.7. Return of Casualties in the Union Forces. [Compiled from nominal list of casualties, returns, & c.] JUNE 1530, 1864. [With exceptions noted in particular cases, the roster of organizan)ns is given as it stood June 30. As far as shown by the records (which are more or less confused and incomplete) the succession of bri- gade and superior commanders is given for the whole period represented.] Killed. Wounded. Captured or missing. Command. -~ 9 0 0 0 GENERAL HEAI)QUARTERS. Lieut. Gen. ULYSSES 5. GRANT. ESCORT, ETC. 5th U. 5. Cavalry, Companies B, F, and K 4th U. S. Infantry5 ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. Maj. Gen. GEORGE G. MEAnE. PROVOST GUARD. Brig. Gen. MARSENA It. PATRICK. 1st Indiana Cavalry. Companies I and K 1st Massachusetts Cavalry, Companies C and U. 80 h New York Infantry (20th Militia) 3d~ Pennsylvania Cavalry 08th Pennsylvania Infantry 114th Pennsylvania Infantry 1 1 TotalProvostGuard 1 I I ~ June 22; for losses June 15 to 21, see First Brigade, Second Division, Fifth Corps, p. 224 Page 219 219 THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. Return of Casualties in the UMion ForeenContinned. Killed. Wounded. Captured or missing. Command. B bI Q a a Q Q ~ ENGINEER BRIGADE. Brig. Gen. HENRY W. BENHAiII. 15th New York (five companies) 50th New York (five companies) BATTALION U. S. ENGINEERS. Capt. GEORGE H. MENDELL. GUARDS AND ORDERLIES. Independent Company Oneida (New York) Cav- alry. ARTILLERY.* Brig. Gen. HENRY J. HUNT. ARTILLERY PARK. Lient. Col. FREEMAN MCGILVERY. 15th New York Heavy Artillery, Company F.... SIGNAL CORPS. Capt. BENJAMIN F. FISBER. SECOND ARMY CORPS. Maj. Gen. WINFIELD S. HANCOCE.( ESCORT. 1st Vermont Cavalry, Company M ENGINEERS. Maj. WESLEY BRAINERD. 50th New York (1st Battalion) FIRST DIVISION. Brig. (len. FRANCIS C. BARLOW. First Brigade. Brig. (len. NELSON A. MILES. 28th MassaclIusetts~ 26th Michi g BIb 5th New HBmpshi~-e 2d New York Heavy Artillery 01st New York 81st Pennsylvania 140th Pennsylvania iSId Pennsylvania Total First Brigade~ 4 20 I 4 1 18 1 1 1 9 1 54 8 1 27 7 211 1 59 4 1 26 1 5 1 l7~ 1 1 5 2 20~ 1 2 3......~ 24K..... 6 4~ OIl 1131 399~ II 87 27 25 73 306 38 25 31 33 558 All organizations of artillery are entered in the rosters of the commands with which they served. From June 18 to 27 Maj. Gen. David B. Birney commanded the corps, General Hancock being physically (lisabled. During the same period Brig. Gen. Gershom Mott commanded the Third Division, and ~ol. Daniel Chaplin the Third Brigade of that division. Transferred from the Second Brigade June 20. CSIAN. LII. Page 220 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. Return of Casualties in the Union ForcesContinued. Killed. Wounded. [CHAP. LII. Captured or missing. Command. 0 1 1 Second Brigade.* Col. PATRICK XELLY.I 63d New York (six companies) 69th New York (six companies) 88th New York (three companie~ 116th Pennsylvania Total Second Brigade Third Brigade. Col. CLINTON ID. MACBOUGALL. 39th New York 52d New York~ 57th New York 111th New York 125th New York 126th New York Total Third Brigade Fourth B ade. Col. JAMES A BEAYER. Lieu~. Col. Joan HASTINGS. Col. JOHN FRASER.jj Lient. Col. JOHN ~ASTINGS. 2d Delaware (five companies) 7th New York Heavy Artillery 64th New York 66th New York SId Pennsylvania 145th Pennsylvania 148th Pennsylvania Total Fourth Brigade Total First Division 5ECOND DIVISION. Maj. Gen. Joan GInnon. Provost Guard. 2d Company Minnesota Sharpshooters First Brigade. Brig. Gen. Bvaow R. PIERCE. Maj. WILLIAM F. SMITH. Lient. Col. FRANCIS F. PIERCE.** 19th Maine 15th Massachusetts 19th Massachusetts 20th Massachusetts 1st Company Andrew (Massachusetts) Sharp shooters 7th Michigan 1st Minnesota (two companies) 42d New York 59th New York (four comp~ flies) 82d New York (four companies) 184th Peansylvanla 36th Wisconsin 5 2 9 5 2 3 1 3 27 19 19 12 1 1 2 19 i7~ 31 28 2 14 9 97 4 95 2 4 3 9 7 14 9 4 1 4 1(1 2 5 4 24 19 35 43 39 17 53 43 55 70 221 24 2 1 18 30 3 52 54 53 77 85 32 6 46 26 .197 78 353 3 2 12 1 28 46 1 32 7 145 11 105 501 2 1 8 1 20 32 1 5 2 11 6 47 72 10 1 32 3 53 99 5 2 27 10 101 145 1 4 6 19 3 43 76 3 61 21 254 35 597 971 15 182 69 938 - 42 857 2,103 1 4 1 1 4 1 4 1 1 17 16 2 I 1 1 1 2 5 8 4 8 15 4 17 11 10 8 20 102 1 4 6 2 9 4 8 60 63 186 49 1 22 91 57 111 176 1 75 73 202 70 1 6 44 104 73 121 223 123 Total First Brigade 1 50 14 207 271 816 1,115 5Consolidatecl with tile Third Brigade to form the Consolidated Brigade June 27. The latter was commanded by Col. Clinton D. MacDongall June 27 to 30. Killed June 16. ~ Detachment 7th New York attached. ~ Wounded June 16. - H Assigned JUne 21 and captured Jane 22. Relieved June 22, and assigned to S *Assigned June 27. econd Brigade, Third Division, Jane 24. 22 Page 221 221 THE RICHMOND CAM~PAIGN. Return of Casualties in the Union ForcesContinued. Command. Second Brig de.* Col. JOHN FRASER. Maj. TIMOTHY OBRiEN. 152d New York 69th Pennsylvania 72d Pennsylvania 106th Pennsylvania Total Second Brigade Third Brigade. Col. THOMAS A. SMYTH. 14th Connecticut 1st Delaware 12th New Jersey 10th New York (six companies) 108th New York 4th Ohio (four companies) 8th Ohiot 7th West Virginia (four companies) Tot4 Third Brigade Fe rth Brigede. Col. JOHN RAMSEY.II Col. JAMES P. MclVOR. Col. WILLIAM BLAISD LL4~ Col. JAMES P. Mclvoa. 8th New York Heavy Artillery 155th New York 164th New York 170th New York 182d New York (69th New York National Gnard Artillery) Total Fourth Brigade Total Second Division THIRD DIVISION. Miii. Gen. DAVID B. BIRNEY. First Brigede. Col. THOMAS W. EGANI! Col. HENRY J. MADILL. 20th Indiana 17th Maine 1 40th New York 86th New York 124th New York 1 99th Pennsylvania 2 110th Pennsylvania 141st Penns4tlvania 1 2d U. S. Sharpshooters Killed. Wounded. Captured or nilsslng. ci IL _ _ I___ K. ~ 4 28 40 10 1 19 1 72 103 .5 1 10 1 37 55 5 1 76 3 82 167 1 20 9 219~ 165 1 3 9 1 2 I _________________ 7 4 9 2 4 7 2 99 12 58 1 1 4 1 9 13 4 4 11 8 23 15 78 1 41 14 247 1 4 308 2 15. 3 59 79 5~ 3 51 4 63 2 20 5 106 1 2 136 1 18 6 69 1 9 104 6 99~ 31 532 3 19 690 8 177 52 910 39 1,063 2,249 5 13 13 5 2 3 6 2 2 3 1 4 1 3 42 67 26 13 17 27 17 16 35 2 49 4 87 2 45 2 17 1 20 . 34. 2 25 3 24 26 72 Total FirstBrigade 7 48 16 260 1 2 40 I 373 * Broken up and its regiments assigned to the First and Third Brigades June 26. Assigned to Fourth Brigade, First Division, June 21. t Ordered home for muster-out June 25; veterans and recruits assigned to 4th Ohio. ~ Changed to Second Brigade June 26. U Wounded June 16. Assigned June 20 and killed June 23 Page 222 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. Return of Casualties in the Union ForcesContinued. Command. Second Brigade. Col. THOMAS ill. TANNATT.* Maj~ LEVI B. DUFF. Ma). J OHN WILLIAN. Col. ROBERT MCALLI5TER.I Bri,,. U en. BYRON R. PIERCE4 1st Massachusetts Heavy Artillery 5th Michigan 93(1 New York 57th Pennsylvania 63d Pennsylvania 105th Pennsylvania 1st U. S. Sharpshooters Total Second Bria ade Third Brigade. Brig. Gen. GERSHOM MOTT. 1st Main Heavy Artillery 16th Massachusetts 5th New Jersey 6th New Jersey 7th New Jersey 8th New Jersey 11th New Jersey 115th Pennsylvania Total Third Brigade Killed. Wounded. Captured or missing. Cl a a be 1 1 Fourth Brigade. Col. WILLIAM H. BREWSTER. 11th Massachusetts (five companies) 71st New York 72d New York (three coinpanies)II 73d New York 74th New York (six companies) 120th New York 84th P~nnsylvania Total Fourth Brigade Total Third Division ARTILLERY BRIGADE. Col. JOHE C. TIDHALL. Maj. JOHN G. HAZARD. Maine Light, 6th Battery (F) Massachusetts Light, 10th Battery blew Hampshire Light, 1st Battery 1st New Jersey a eryB New Jersey Light, 3d Battery 4thN ew York H eavy 1 1st New York Light, Battery G New York Light, 11th Battery New York Light, 12th Battery 1st Pennsylvania Light, Battery F .. .~ 1st Rhode Island Lieht, Battery A 1st Rhode Island Light, Battery B 4th United States, Battery K 5th United States, Batteries C and I 10 17 4 8 8 8 15 2 3 2 9 4 207 52 17 17 28 21 20 6 2 1 1 188 19 11 6 15 9 5 447 92 36 11 54 43 34 1 80 29 162 10 253 717 6 84 24 415 11 580 2 23 2 26 5 1 42 4 54 6 1 13 5 45 1 5 1 42 2 40 91 5 3 28 11 47 1 6 43 3 16 67 1 1 5 . 5 12 9 113 33 650 3 114 922 1 1 18 20 5 2 13 1 23 1 2 1 10 14 1 5 6 2 1 7 10 1 1 6 8 2 1 12 15 2 14 6 71 ~ 96 21 255 84 1, 341 15 410 2, 128 2 1 is 1 1 8 87 1 1 1 7 1 1 10 2 1 104 4 9 11 I 7 1 1 3 Total Artillery Brigade 1 20 1 113 ~I 144 Total Second Army Corps I 45 634 I 206 3, 304 I 96 2, 339 6, 624 Wounded June16. Assigned June 16. ~ Assigned June 24. ~ Transferred to 110th Pennsylvania June 22. I Attached to 120th INew York. 1st and 2d Battalions assigned, respectively, to First and Second Brigades, Third Division, June 2~, 222 [CHAP. LII Page 223 Cn~. LII.] THE RICH1~LOND CAMPAIGN. Jlettern of Casiealties in the Union ForcesContinued. Killed. Command. 0 FIFTH ARMY CORPS. Maj. Gen. Gouv RNEUR K. WARREN. ESCORT. - Lieut. WILLIAM 11. WHEELER. 1st Michi,sn Cavalry (detachnieiit) PROVOST GUARD. Capt. HENRY W. RIDER. 5th New York (battalion) FIRST DIVISION. Brig. Gem CHARLES GRIFFIN. First Brigade. Col. JOSHUA L. CHAMBERLAIN.* Col. WILLIAM S. TILTON. 121st Pennsylvania 142d Pennsylvania 143d Pennsylvania 149th PeunsVivania 150th Pennsylvania 187th Pennsylvania Total First Brigade Second Brigade. Col. JACOH B. SWEITNER. 22d Massachusetts I 12d Massachusetts 4th Miclligan ~ 62d Pellllsylvania 91st Penllsylvaula 155th Pennsylvania 21st Penusylvallia Cavalry (dismounted) XVoIIIlded. 223 Captured or missing. 0 ~ 1 3 6 1 10 1 11 12 7 3 42 52 3 1 23 27 4 20 24 23 6 159 1 189 41 10 261 2 314 7 11 3 1 11 11 11 Total Secoiid Brigade 1 Ihird Brigade. Brig. Gen. JOSEPH J. BARTLETT. 20th Maine 18th Massacllusetts 1st Michigan 16th Michigan) 44th New York 83d Pennsylvania 118th Pennsylvania Total Third Brigade 1 Total First Division I SECOND DIVISION. Brig. Gell. ROMEYN B. AYRES. 2 2 1 1 5 19 26 4 12 67 65 81 55 ~ 274 4 1 6 4 11 26 122 Staff I 2 4 2 8 21 8 9 5 56 26 39 8 79 77 98 1 1 2 23 591 5 340 8 8 27 12 24 5 89 743 1 1 * Wonnded June 15. 2d Company Massachusetts Sharpshooters attached. t Ordered home for muster-out June 19; veterans an(1 recruits transferred to 1st Michigan. ~S Transferred from First Brigade, Second Division, June 15. II Bradys company Michigan Sharpshooters attached Page 224 224 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. LII. Return of Casualties in the Union ForcesContinued. Killed. Command. 0 First Brigade. Col. EDGAR M. GREGORY. Brig. (len. JOSEPH HAYES.0 Staff 5th New York 140th New York 146th New York 4th United Stalest 10th United States (three companies) 11th United State, (six companies) 12th United States 14th United States 17th United States Total First Brigade Second Brigade. Col. NAThAN T. PUSHANE. 1st Maryland 4th Maryland 7th Maryland 8th Maryland Purnell Legion (Maryland) Total Second Brigade Third Brigade. Col. J. HOWARD KITcHIIeo. 6th New York Heavy Artillery 13th New York Heavy Artillery Total Third Brigade Total Second Division THIRD DIVISION. Brig. (len. SAMUEL W. CRAWFORD: First Brigade. Col. PETER LYLE. Staff 16th Maine 13th Massachusetts 39th Massachusetts 104th New York 90th Pennsylvania 107th Pennsylvania Total First Brigade Second Brigade. Col. JAMES L. BATES.0 Brig. (len. HENRY BAXTER. 12th Massachusetts 94th New York 97th New York 11th Pennsylvania 88th Pennsylvania Wounded. Captured or missing. I 0 0 11 1 4 1 1 I) 3 1 31 1 3 1 1 17 17 11 4 6 15 20 22 3 117 4 2 1 7 1 33 22 17 8 8 26 23 24 3 165 1 9 5 1 7 13 1 2 3 8 4 18 22 1 5 6 4 14 18 17 3 47 67 7 84 1 92 10 2 71 84 17 2 155 1 176 65 15 319 1 8 409 1 .~ 1 1 2 14 17 2 15 17 8 2 21 31 3 25 1 29 4 1 21 26 4 3 20 27 22 9 116 1 148 6 22 28 6 1 22 2 31 5 1 48 2 56 1 1 23 25 3 1 18 22 Total Second Brigade 21 4 133 4 162 * Assigned June 20. t Transferred to headquarters Armies of the United States June 22. t Relieved (expiration of term) June 25. ~ Ordered home for muster-out June 24; veterans and recruits transferred to 39th Massacliusotbi Page 225 THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. Return of Casualties in the Union ForcesContinued. Killed. Wounded. Captured or missing. Command. 0 0 0 Third Brigade. 1 12 8 Col. JAM 5 CARLE. 190th Pennsylvania (1St Veteran Reserves) 191st Pennsylvania (2d Veteran Reserves) Total Third Brigade Total Third Division FOURTH nIvIsION. Brig. (len. LYSANDEE CUTLER. Provest Guard. Lieut. HENRY NAEGELY. Independent Battalion (Wisconsin) First Brigade. Col. ED~WARD S. BRAGG. 7th Indiana 19th Indiana 24th Michigan 1st Battalion New York Sharpshooters 6th Wisconsin 7th Wisconsin Total First Brigade Seeend Bi gade. Col. J. WILLIAM HOFMANN. Staff 3d Delaware 4th Delaware 76th New York 95th New York l47thNew York .... 56th Pennsylvania 157th Pennsylvania Total Second Brigade Total Fourth Division ARTILLERY ISRIGADE. Col. CHARLES S. WAINwRIGMT. Massachusetts Light, 3d Battery (C) Massachusetts Light, 5th Battery (F) Massachusetts Light, 9th liattery 1st New York Light, Battery B 1st New York Light, Battery C 1st New York Light, Battery D 1st New York Light, Battery E* 1st New York Light, Battery H 1st New York Light, Battery L New York Light, 15th Battery 1st Pennsylvania Light, Battery B 4th Unite4 States, Battery B 5th United States, Battery D Total Artillery Brigade Total Fifth Army Corps I 12 377 Mortar battery. 5 4 38 47 56 59 1 20 9 85 115 1 .63 22 334 5 425 3 2 7 2 39 5 55 10 3 45 58 1 7 3 33 1 45 4 12 1 17 7 2 38 10 57 1 11 5 47 04 4 46 15 214 17 296 1 1 4 52 65 21 4 87 11? 10 3 28 41 8 1 36 1 46 1 9 1 46 57 1 10 1 33 45 7 2 31 40 31 73 17 313 1 407 I 119 .32 530 18 706 2 1 1 ... 2 4 5: 7 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 1 1 3 3 1 1 2 1 3 2 2 6 1 10 11 1 8 2 31 42 94$ 1,805: 1 37 2, 236 3 15 R 2RYOL XL~ PT I CHM. LII.] 22 Page 226 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. Return of Casualties in the Union ForcesContinued. Killed. Wounded. Captured or missing. Command, uS a a . a a o ~ u 0 a a a b~i 0 ~ 0 ~ 0 ~ -~ SIXTH ARMY CORPS. Maj. Gen. HORATIO G. WRIGHT. ESCORT. Capt. CHARLES E. FELLOWS. 8th Pennsylvania Cavalry, Company A RNGINEERS. Maj. EDMUND 0. BEERS. 50th New York, 2d Battalion FIRST DIYISION. Brig. Gen. DAvID A. RUSSELL. First Brigade. Col. WILLIAM H. PENROSE. 1st Delaware Cavalry (dismounted) 4th New Jersey 10th New Jersey 15th NewJersey Total First Brigade Second Brigade. Brig. Gen. EMORY UPTON. 2d Connecticut Heavy Artillery 5th Maine * 121st New York 95th Pennsylvania 96th Pennsylvania Total Second Brigade Third Brigade. Lieut. Col. GIDEON CLARE. 6th Maine 49th Pennsylvania 119th Pennsylvania 5th Wisconsin Total Third Brigade Fourth Brigade. Col. NELSON CROSS.I Col. JOSEPH E. HAMIILIN. 65th New York 67th New York~ 122d New York 23d Pennsylvania 82d Pennsylvania Total Fourth Brigade Total First Division 1 2 3 1 1 3 3 3 3 8 2 10 8 3 12 8 31 1 8 9 4 4 8 13 3 24 8 48 1 1 2 .. 2 . 2 3 4 7 1 1 . 2 2 6 5 13 2 2 2..~ 4 6 1 2 3 1 13 14 1 2 3 5 20 2 28 1 20 3 58 17 99 *Ordered home for muster-out June 22; veterans and recruits transferr~d to 6th Maine. Ordered home for muster-out June 20.- ~ Ordered home for muster-out June 20; veterans and recruits transferred to 6~th New York, 226 [CMAP. LII. 2 Page 227 Cii~. LILI THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. Return of Casualties in the Union ForcesContinued. Command. SECOND DIVISION. Brig. Gen. THOMAS H. NEILL.* Brig. Gen. FRANK WHEATON. Brig. Gen. GEORGE W. GETTY.I First Brigade. Brig. Gen. FRANK WHEATON. Col. JOHN F. BALLIER. Brig. Gen. FHANK WHEATON.I 62d New ---- - 98d Pennsylvania 98th Pennsylvania 1024 Pennsylvania 139th Pennsylvania Total First Brigade Second Brigade. - Brig. Gen. LEWIS A. GRANT. 24 Vermont 3d Vermont 4th Vermont 5th Vermont 6th Ve~rnont 11th Vermont (1st Heavy Artillery) Total Second Brigade Third Brigade. Col. DANIEL D. BIDWELL. 7th Maine 414 New York 49th New York 77th New York 61st Pennsylvania Total Third Brigade Fourth Brigade. Col. OLIVER EDWARDS. 7th Massachusettsl 10th Massachusetts~ 37th Massachusetts 2d Rhode Island (detachment) Total Fourth Brigade Total Second Division THIRD DIVISION. Brig. Gen. JAMES B. IIICEETTS. First Brigade. Col. WILLIAM S. TRIJEX. 14th New Jersey 106th New York 151st New York 87th Pennsylvania 10th Vermont Killed. Wonnded. 0 9 8 3 2 3 4 20 1 1 2 20 15 14 18 11 Captured or missing. I 10 78 a bfj Is 38 19 17 21 15 10 110 1 I 1 1 2 1 6 1 17~ 8 133 166 1 1 1 4 s 1 8 361 18 239 302 2 16 1 601 26 372 477 2 s I 1 1 3 I . 7 I 4 4 ...... 17~ 5 .22 1 7 8 3 7 10 1 1 4 1 14 19 2 40 4 169 26 387 628 1 3 4 1 4 3 8 7 33 3 61 104 8 6 2 16 Total First Brigade 17 46 3 I 66 132 5Transferred to Eighteenth Army Corps June 21. Resumed command June 28. ~ Ordered home for muster-out, respectively, June 14 and 19; veterans and recruits transferred to 37th Massachusetts. 22 Page 228 228 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. Beturn of Casualties in the Union ForcesContinued. Killed. Wounded. Captured or missing. a Command. ,,. a II a a . a . a . a ~ a ~ a ~ II a a a II 0 Second Brigade. Col. BENJAMIN F. SMITH. 6th Maryland 9th New York Heavy Artillery, 1st and 3d Bat. talions. 110th Ohio 122d Ohio 126th Ohio 67th Pennsylvania 138th Pennsylvania Total Second Brigade Total Third Division CAVALRY DETACHMENT. Col. TIMOTHY M. BRYAN, Jr. 3d New Jersey* 22d New York (detachment) 18th Pennsylvania* (detachment) Detachment 1st and 2d Cavalry Divisions ARTILLERY BRIGADE. Col. CHARLES H. TOMPKINS. Maine Light, 4th Battery (D) Maine Light, 5th Battery (F) Massachusetts Light, 1st Battery (A) 1st New Jersey Light, Battery A New York Light, 1st Battery New York Light, 3d Battery 9th New York Heavy, 24 ilattalion 1st Ohio Light, Battery H 1st Rhode Island Light, Battery C 1st Rhode Island Light, ilattery F 1st Rhode Island Light, illItte ryG 5th United States, Battery F 5th United States, Battery M Total Artillery Brigade Total Sixth Aruly Corps NINTH ARMY CORPS. Maj. Gen. AMBROSE F. BURNSIDE. Staff PROVOST GUARD. Capt. MILTON COOSWELL. 8th United States FIRST DIVISIONt Brig. Gen. JAMES H. LEDLIE. Staff First Brigade. Col. JAcon P. GOULD. 56th Massachusetts 57th Massachusetts 59th Massachusetts Total First Brigade 2 I 7 4 1 5. 7 4 1 2 1 1 2 15 2 19 19 61 1 68 151 1 1 5 5 5 2 1 10 2 13 1 80 7 218 29 476 893 1 1 1 9 51 16 77 1 12 4 21: 9 47 11 2 56 5 74 2 32 128 30 1 1 198 * Detached tenlporarily from Third Cavalry Division. ReorganiEed June 15, the regiments of the Second Brigade (except the 29th Mas- sachusetts) being transferred to the First Brigade, and the Third Brigade (with the 29th Ma8~achueett8 added) wa~ designated as the second. (CHAP. LII Page 229 THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. Return of Casualties in the Union Forees-Continued. Killed. S 0 Wounded. S 0 Captured or missing. S 0 3d Maryland 21st Massachusetts 29th Massachusetts 179th New York 100th Pennsylvania Total Second Brigade Third Brigade. Col. ELISHA G. MAESHALI.I Lient. Col. BENJAMIN G. BAENEY. 14th New York Heavy Artillery 2d Pennsylvania Provisional licavy Artillery.. Total Third Brigade Engineers. 35th Massachusetts Artillery. Capt. JOHN B. EATON. Maine Light, 2d Battery (B) Massachusetts Light, 14th Battery New York Light, 27th Battery Total Artillery Total First Division SECOND DIVISION. Brig. Gen. ROaREr B. POTTER. Staff First Brigade. Col. JOHN I. CUETIN 4 Licul. Col. HENEv PLEASANTS. Staff 36th Massachusetts 58th Massachusetts 2d New York Mounted Rifles (dismounted). 45th Pennsylvania 48th Pennsylvania 7th Rhode Island Total First Brigade Second Brigade. Brig. Gen. SIJEON G. GRIFFIN. 2d Maryland.. 31st Maine 32d Maine 6th New Hampshire 9th New Hampshire 11th New Hampshire 17th Vermont Total Second Brigade 1 I 7 3 6 I) 3 2 2 2 15 25 22 e7 42 4 10 24 35 91 49 4 28 12 171 14 229 2 36 4 148 7 53 250 1 39 6 187 13 246 3 75 10 335 7~ 66 496 S 1 2 3 2 1 3 3. 3 3 6 9 9 138 29 645 7 110 938 1 1 1 1 1 5 1~ 27 34 1 7 2; 33 1 44 2 16 ~ 80 2 102 7 3~ 28 ii: 1 39 15 3 54 3 75 4 2~ 15 21 4 54 14~ 237 7 316 2 2 36 ji 42 1 11 4 42 ......K...... 58 6 1 35......j........ 42 3 32 . .. ...j1 36 7 ~ 40 1 12 1 32... 46 5 1 32 .J.ii....l. 40 46 In command June 17. Wounded Jnne 17. 9 242 2 3 Wounded June 18. 304 5 CHAP. LII.] 229 Command. Second Brigade. Col. EBENEZER XV. PEIRCE. Lieut. Col. JOSEPH H. BAENES. Page 230 230 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. Return of Casualties in the Union ForcesContinued. Killed. Wounded. Captured or missing. 53 Command. ~i ci be a a . be a ~ a a ie 0 ~ 0 ~ 0 ~ Acting Engineers. 51st New York Artillery. Massachusetts Light, 11th Battery New York Light, 19th Battery Total Artillery Total Second Division THIRD DIVISION. Brig. (len. ORLANDO B. WILLcox. Staff First Brigade. Col. JOHN. F. HARTRANFT. 8th Michigan 27th Michigan* 109th New York 13th Ohio Cavalry (dismounted)t 51st Peunsylvama 37th Wisconsin 38th Wisconsin (four compaDics) Total First Brig, do Second Brigade. Col. BENJAMIN C. CHRI5T4 Col. WILLIAM C. RAULSTON. Lient. Col. GEORGE W. TRAVERS. Lieue. Col. WALTER C. NEWBERRY. Col. WILLIAM HunsnaRv.II 1st Michigan Sharpshooters 2d Michiganil . 20th MIchigan 24th New York Cavalry (dismounted) 46th New York 60th Ohio IT 50th Pennsylvania Total Second Brigade Acting Engineers. 17th Michigan Artillery. 6 2 3 3 5 3 2 6 8 6 102, 24 491 2 10 635 2 2 1 6~ 4 35 46 1 16~ 1 105 5 128 1 25 2 79 20 127 12 3 44 59 3 30 6 116 2 157 4 4 41 1 50 6 93 20 420 28 567 3 2 1 1 1 1 19 21 12 37 8 19 15 4 5 1 9 7 1 2 49 165 54 147 27 68 43 50 13 3 5 3 156 204 69 197 43 94 64 1 9 131 29 553 1 104 827 . 1 2 3 2 1 6 1 __8 1,408 2 7 9 Maine Light, 7th Battery (G) New York Light, 34th Battery Total Artillery ___________ _____ Total Third Division 15 224 53 983 1 132 1st and 2d Companies Michigan Sharpshooters attached. t Assigned June 29. ~Wouuded June 17. ~ Wounded June 18. II Assigned from First Brigade June 19 9th and. 10th Companies Ohio Sharpshooters attached. (CHAP. LU Page 231 THE RICLIMONI) CAMPAIGN. Return of Casualties in the Union ForcesContinued. Killed. Wounded. Captured or missing. a ___ Command. . H ,Ii a a . a . a . a a a a ~ a a H Q ~ Q ~ ~ .11 FOURTH DIVISION. Brig. Gen. EDWARD FERRERO. First Brigade~ Col. JOSHUA K. SIOFRIED. 27th U. S. Colored Troops 30th U. S. Colored Troops 19th U. S. Colored Troops 43d U. S. Colored Troops Total First Brigade Seeend Brigade. Col. HENRY G. THOMAS. 19th U. S. Colored Troops 2A U. S. Colored Troops 28th U. S. Colored Troops* 29th U. S. Colored Troops list U. S. Colored Troops Total Second Brigade Artillery. Pennsylvania Light, Battery D Vermont Light, 3d Battery Total Artillery Total Fourth Division Total Ninth Army Corps CAVALRY CORPS.0 Maj. (len. PHILIP H. SHERIDAN. ESCORT. Capt. IRA W. CLAFLIN. 6th United States FIRST DIVISION. Brig. Gen. ALFRED T. A. TORHERT. First Brigade. Brig. Gen. GEORGE A. CUSTER. 1st Michigan 5th Micli~~an 6th Michigan 7th Michigan Secend Brigade. Col. THOMAS C. DEVIN. 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 4 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 I 2 7 9 31 466 106 2,126 - 10 252 2,991 4th New York 6th New York 9th New York 17th Pennsylvania Joined June 28. The First and Second Divisions crossed to the south side of the James June 27 and 28, and moved on the 29th to Reams Station. For losses from June 15 to 24, see Vol. XXXVI, Part I, p. 187. No casualties are reported for the period from June 25 to 30, inclusive. The Third Division started June 22 on d raid to the South Side and Dan- ville Railroads, and was engaged at Nottoway Creek June 23, Staunton River bridge, or Roanoke Station June 25, Stony Creek June 28, and Reams Station June 29. C~. LII] 23 Page 232 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. Return of Casualties in the Union ForcesContinued. Killed. Wounded. Captured or missing~. a __ Command. be a a . a . a . a ~ a ~ a ~ bI ~ a a ~ a bI 0 0 ~ Reserve Brigade. Brig. Gen. WESLEY MERRITT. 19th New York (1st Dragoons) 6th Pennsylvania 1st Rhode Island*. 1st United States 2(1 United States 5th United States SECOND DIVISION. Brig. Gen. DAvIn McM. GREGG. First Brigade. Brig. Gen. HENRY E. DAVIES, Jr. 1st Massachusetts 1st 1~ew Jersey 10th New York 6th Ohio 1st Pennsylvania Second Brigade. Col. J. IRVIN GREGG. 1st Maine 2d Pennsylvania 4th Pennsylvania 8th Pennsylvania 13th Pennsylvania 16th Pennsylvania THIRD DIVISION. Brig. Gen. JAMES H. WILSoN. Escort. 8th Illinois (detachment) Provost Guard. 3d New Jersey (detachment) First Brigade. Col. JOHN B. MCINTOSH. 1st Connecticut 3d New Jerseyt 2d New York 5th New York 2d Ohio 18th Pennsylvania~ Total First Brigade ~S:eeoad Brigade. 1 5 6 9 9 I 8 2 43 56 3 3 9 1 31 47 . 3 3 91 97 4 3 25 2 68 102 10 6 45 8 233 302 Col. GEORGE H. CHAPMAN. 3d Indiana 1st New Hampsliire 8th New York 2 22d New York 1 1st Vermont 1 Total Second Brigade 4 Total Third Division 4 5Joined June 23. 1 2 3 3 9 19 1 1 4 6 12 8 9 7 7 18 49 95 2 2 3 4 12 48 102 122 71 11 355 19i 602 I Temporarily aitached to Sixth Army Corps. 232 [CHAP. III. 24 59 117 113 101 414 75 Page 233 THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. Return of Casualties in the Union ForcesContinued. Killed. Wounded. Captured or missing. Command. ii ,ii ~i H I., ;.~ a a . a . a . u a 9 a 9 a BJ a a a u 0 ~ 0 ~ 0 ~ ~ HORSE ARTILLERY IIEIGADE. Capt. JAMES M. ROBERTSON. 1st United States, Batteries H and I 1st United States, Battery iK* 2d United States, Battery A 2d United States, Batteries B and L 2d United States, Battery ID 2d United States, Battery MI 3d United States, Battery C 4th United States, Batteries C and E* Total Horse Artillery Brigade Total Cavalry Corpst Total Army of the Potom, c ARMY OF THE JAMES4 Maj. Gen. BENJAMIN F. BUTLEJI. TENTH ARMY CORPS. Brig. Gen. ALFRED H. TERRY. Brig. Gen. WILLIAM T. H. BIIOOKS. FIRST DIVISION. Brig. Gen. ROBERT S. FOSTER.) Brig. Gen. ALFRED H. TERRY. First Brigade. Col. JOSHUA B. HOWELL. 39th flhlnois 62d Ohio 67th Ohio 85th Pennsylvania Total First Brigade Second Brigade. Col. JOSEPH R. HAWLEY. 6th Connecticut 7th Connecticut 3d New Hampshire 7th New Hampshire Total Second Brigade Third Brigade. Col. HARRIS M. PLAISTED. 10th Connecticut 11th Maine 1st Maryland Cavalry (dismounted) 24th Massachusetts 100th New York 1 1 2 36 31 2 2 67 4 19 12 97 21 069 93 1,577 423 7,630 157 3,773 39 32 71 822 13,657 5 .2 23 1 31 13 1 14 5 2 11 4 22 10 4 47 6 67 5 1 15 1 17 39 5 2 9 15 31 7 4 23 1 35 8 1 20 1 30 25 8 67 1 34 135 1 1 2 4 10 4 14 1 1 2 8 8 1 2 3 6 Total Third Brigade 2 22 I 10 34 * Attached to Third Division. I On the south side of the James up to June 30, inclusive. 4 Roster of organiNations given as it stood June 30. Changes in brigade and superior commanders between June 15 and 30 are noted. ~ Assigned June 18. I Assigned to Third Brigade June 23. CHAP. LII.] 23 Page 234 234 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. Return of Casualties in the Union ForcesContinued. Killed. Wounded. Captured or missing. Command. - a II a a a Q ~ Q ~ 44 Artillery Brigade. Capt. Loonis L. LANGDON. Connecticut Light, 1st Battery New Jersey Light, 5th Battery 3d Rhode Island Light, Battery C 1st United States, Battery M Total First Division SECOND DIVISION. Brig. Gen. ADELBERT AMEs.* Brig. Gen. JOHN W. TURNER. First Brigade. Col. N. MARTIN CURTIS. 3d New York 112th New York 117th New York 142d New York Total First Brigade Second Brigade. Col. WILLIAM B. BARTON. 47th New York 48th New York 115th New York 76th Pennsylvania Total Second Brigade Third Brigade. Col. LoUIS BELL. 13th Indiana 9th Maine 4th New Hampshire 169th New York 97th Pennsylvania Total Third Brigade 17 12 116 1 50 2.36 -4- -_ 3 19~ 22 1 5 7 5 3 37 3 49 2 29 31 2 11 3 90 3 109 1 9 10 3 1 13 17 1 14 15 7 7 4 2 43 49 3 ....~. 9 12 9 4 42 1 56 3 1 23 4 31 8 163 3 75 5 1 30 36 28 7 167 8 210 Artillery Brigade. New Jersey Light, 4th Battery 1st United States, Battery D 3d United States, Battery E 4th United States, Battery D Total Second Division 2 43; 12 300 111 368 TRIED DIvISION.f Brig. GOII. ORRIS S. FERRY. First Brigade. 133d Ohio 2 2 Ohio 163d Ohio New York Light Artillery, lId Battery Total First Brigade I 2 2 4Assigned to Eighteentli Army Corps June 19. t Organized June 19. Brig. Gen. OILMAN MARSTON. ~CuAP. LII Page 235 235 THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. Return of Casualties in the Union ForcesContinued. Killed. Wounded. or 13 Command. a ~ a 5 61 0 ~ 0 ~ 0 ~ Second I3rigede. Col. JAMES B. ARMSTRONG. 130th Ohio 132d Ohio 134th Ohio 138th Ohio 142(1 Ohio Total Second Brigade 37th U. S. Colored TrOOps* Total Third Division CAVALRY. Maj. ATHERTON 11. STEVENS, Jr. 4th MassachuSetts (1St Battalion) Total Tenth Army Corps EIGHTEENTH ARMY CORPS. Maj. Gen. WILLIAM F. SMITH. PROVOST GUARD. 2d New Hampshire 79th New York (one company) FIRST DIVISION. Brig. Gen. WILLIAM T. H. BaooIcs.t Brig. Gen. GILMAN MARSTON. Staff Brig. Gen. GEORGE J. STANNARD4 First Brigade. Brig. Gen. GILMAN MARSTON. Col. EDGAR M. OtILLEN. Staff 81st New York 96th New York 98thI New York 139th New York Total First Brigade Second Brigade. Brig. Gen. HIRAM BUENHAM. 8th Connecticut 10th New Hampshire 13th New Hampshire 118th New York Total Second Brigade Third Brigade. Col. GUY V. HENRY. 21st Connecticut 40th Massachusetts 92(1 New York 58th Pennsylvania 188th Pennsylvania Total Third Brigade Total First Division 1 2 4 1 1 2 5 1 7 1 9 10 2 81 24 445 1 61 614 6 6 1 1 1 1 5 6 1 1 8 10 6 14 30 50 2 1 6 9 10 3 33 30 76 2 1 24 27 3 15 19 4 40 3 52 1 1 18 21 2 11.6 97 3 119 9. 9 3 1 7 11 1 1 10 12 1 2 3 2 2 4 7 2 30~ 39 2 8 1 28[ 12 1601 I 33 235 5Attaclied. Assigned to command Tenth Army Corps June 18. t Assigned June 20. ~ Assumed command of First Division June 18, and assigned to Tenth Army Corps June 20. CHAP. LII. Page 236 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. Return of Casualties in the Union ForcesContinued. Killed. Command. 0 SECOND DIVISION. Brig. Gen. JOIIN H. MARTINDALE. Firgt Brigade. Brig. Gen. GEORGE J. STANNARD.* Col. ALE~ANDER PIPER. 23d Massachusetts 25th Massachusetts 27th Massachusetts 9th New Jersey 10th New York Heavy Artilleryt 55th Pennsylvania Total First Brigade Secend Brigade. Col. GIuFNIN A. STEDMAN, Jr. 11th Connecticut 8th Maine 12th New Hampshire 148th New York 19th Wisconsin Total Second Brigade Third Brigade. Col. AuGusTus A. GIasoN. Brig. Gen. ADELBERT AMES4 5th Maryland 89th New York 2d Penusylvallia Heavy Artillery Total Third Brigade Total Second Division THIRD DIvISION. Brig. Gen. EDWARD W. HINES. Cavalry. Capt. ALHERT F. RAY. 4th Massachusetts, Companies E and H First Brigade. Brig. Gen. EDWARD A. WILD. Col. JOHN H. HOLMAN.jj 5th Massachusetts ColoredCavalry(dismounted)~ 1st U. S. Colored Cavalry (dismonnted)** 1st U. S. Colored Troops 10th U. S. Colored Troops 11 13 1 6 24 3 3 6 2 41 27 9 38 118 2 55 43 14 44 156 4 8 55 12 235 12 314 1 5 3 49 5 63 9 3 13 9 54 1 11 12 16 2 72 1 25 116 I 2 3 1 32 8 167 1 39 248 2 9 11 1 9 4 78 2 94 16 2 92 1 15 126 1 27 6 179 1 17 231 2 114 ~6 581 2 68 793 * 3 3 16 22 17 10 104 ~5 1 5 6 Total First Brigade 21~ 13 125 * Assigned to First Division, Eighteenth Army Corps, June 20. Transferred from Fourth Brigade, First Division, June 24. ~ Assigned June 20. ~ Transferred from First Brigade June 24. II Assigned J~une 23. Transferred to Point Lookout, Md., June29. ~ Joined June 20. 236 [CHAP. LII. Wounded. Captured or missing. Q 0 a 0 25 18 Page 237 THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. Return of Casualties in the Union PorcesContinued. 0 Killed. Wounded. Captured or missing. ______ Is I Command. ,,~ Fl a . a . a . Cl a ~ a a ~ a a ~ 0 ~ 0 ~ 0 ~ 2d U. S. Colored Cavalry (dismounted) 4th U. S. Colored Troops 5th U. S. Colored Troops 6th U. S. Colored Troops 22d U. S. Colored Troops Total Second Brigade Total Third Division AE~ILLEEY HEIGADE Col. HENRY S. BURTON. 3d New York Light, Battery E 3d New York Light, Battery K 3d New York Light, Battery iVI New York Light, 7th Battery New York Light, 16th Battery 1st Rhode Island Light, Battery F Wisconsin Light, 4th Battery 1st United States, Battery B 4th United States, Battery L 5th United States, Battery A 2d U. S. Colored, Battery B Total Artillery Brigade Total Eighteenth Army Corps NAVAL BRIGADE. Brig. Gen. CHARLES K. GRAHAM. ENGINEERS. Maj. JOSEPH WALKER. 1st New York (eight companies) SIEGE ARTILLERY. Col. HENRY L. Anuor. 1st Connecticut Heavy Artillery 12th New York Heavy Artillery, Companies A and H 3d Pennsylvania Heavy Artillery, Company M. Total Siege Artillery CAVALRY DIVISION.* Brig. Gen. Aueusr V. KAUTE. First Brigade. Col. SIMoN H. Mix.t Col. ROBERT M. WEST. 3d New York 5th Pennsylvania Total First Brigade 2 1 1 13 3 8 13 4 1 3 6 1 106 30 45 110 10 6 20 8 1 135 41 76 138 4 17 14 292 44 391 4 58 27 417 69 575 1 1 1 1 2 5 5 3 3 4 28 32 1 1 1 6 7 2 1 20 28 51 8 202 66 1,184 2 198 1,660 8 8 1 3 18 2 78 102 9 3 29 5 161 2(~ ii 12 3 47 7 239 8 8 309 Participate4 in the Wilson raid June 22 to 30. Killed Jirue 15. Cii.& p. LH.] 237 Secenci Bri~pade. Col. SAMUEL A. DUNCAN Page 238 238 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. Return of Casualtie8 in the Union Force8Continned. 0 Command. Killed. II ~ Second Brigade. Col. SAMUEL P. SPEAR. 1st District of Columbia 11th Pennsylvania Total Second Brigade Total Cavalry Division UNASSIGNED CAVALRY. 4th Massachusetts, Companies F and G 1st New York Mounted Rifles PONTONIERS. Capt. JohN PICKERING, Jr. Massachusetts Heavy Artillery, 13th Company - - Total Army of the James 16 13 17 1 4 Wounded. 3 4 a I Captured or missing. a on a bO 55 41 1 66 116 138 183 5 30 7 96 1 182 321 6 42 10 143 8 421 630 325 100 1, 780 11 680 2,912 RECAPITULATION. Army of the Potomac Affoy of the James Total armies operating against Richmond.. 95 1,577 425 7,630 157 3,773 13,657 16 325 100 1,780 11 680 2,912 111 1,902 525 9,410 168 4,453 16,569 OFFICERS KILLED OR MORTALLY WOUNDED. CONNECTICUT. Lient. George B. Hempstead, 2d Heavy Lieut. Clovis E. Hammond, 6th Infantry. Artillery. Lient. Orrin H. Knight, 2d Heavy Artil- Capt. William H. Sackett, 11th Infantry. lery. DELAWARE. Matn, 3d Infantry. Lent. Col. William B. Dorrell, 3d Infan- ~ Reynolds, 4th Infantry. DISTRICT OP COLUMBIA. Lient. Eli W. Parkman, 1st Cavalry. ILLINOIS. Capt. Oscar F. Rndd, 39th Infantry. INDIANA. Lient, David Holmes, 7th Infantry. I Lient. Orville D. Williams, 7th Infantry. [CHAP. LII Page 239 cN& P. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. Return of Casualties in the Union ForcesContinued. MAINE. Capt. Samuel W. Daggett, 1st Heavy Ar- tillery. Capt. Frederick C. Howes, 1st Heavy Ar- tillery. Capt. Andrew J. Jaquith, 1st Heavy Ar- tillery. Lieut. Albert G. Abbott, 1st Heavy Ar- tillery. Lieut. AllenE. Barry, 1st Heavy Artillery. Lieut. James W. Clark, 1st Heavy Ar- tillery. Lient. Samuel W. Crowell 1st tillery. , Heavy Ar Lieut. Thomas S. Drunimond Artillery. 1st Heavy Lieut. Edward S. Foster, 1st Heavy Ar- tillery. Lient. James E. Hall, 1st Heavy Artillery. Lient. William H. Newenham, 1st Heavy Artillery. Lieut. Gardner H. Ruggles, 1st Heavy Ar- tillery. Lieut. Horatio N. P. Spooner, 1st Heavy Artillery. Lieut. John Stevens, 8th Infantry. Capt. William A. Stevens, 16th Infantry. Capt. Benjamin C. Pennell, 17th InfautFy. Lient. Lafayette Carver, 19th Infantry. Capt. Samuel T. Keene, 20th Infantry. Capt. William H. Currier, 31st Infantry. Capt. William H. Shoppee, 31st Infantry. Lient. Calvin Boston, 31st Infantry. Lient. Hiram C. Gage, 31st Infantry. MASSACHUSETTS. Capt. Joseph W. Kimball, 1st Heavy Ar- Col. William Blaisdell, 11th Infantry. tillery. Capt. Charles Goss, 21st Infantry. Lient. Nathaniel H. Blaney, 1st Heavy Ar- Lient. George W. Pope, 29th Infantry. tillery. Col. George L. Prescott, 324 Infantry. Lient. Lewis P. Caldwell, 1st Heavy Ar- Capt. Amos Buffum, 36th Infantry. tillery. Capt. Otis W. Holmes, 36th Infantry. Lieut. Orrin L. Farnham, 1st Heavy Ar- Lient. John II. Crowley, 56th Infantry. tillery. Lieut. Edwin I. Coe, 57th Infantry. Lient. Peleg W. Blake, 5th Battery. Lient. Franklin D. Hammond, 58th Infan- Lieut. Samuel G. Gilbreth, 1st Company try. Sharpshooters. i Capt. Samuel A. Bean, 59th Infantry. MICHiGAN. Capt. Thomas H. Gaffney, 1st Sharp- Capt. James Bradley, 24 Infantry. shooters. Lient. Edward A. Sherman, 2d Infantry. Capt. Levant C. Rhines, 1st Sharp- Lieut. Thomas Campbell, 8th Infantry. shooters. Maj. George C. Barnes, 20th Infantry. Lient. Garrett A. Graveraet, 1st Sharp- Capt. William A. Dewey, 20th Infantry. shooters. Lieut. George B. Hicks, 20th Infantry. Lient. George C. Knight, 1st Sharp- Lieut. Seril Chilson,.24th Infantry. shooters. Capt. James A. Lothian, 26th Infantry. Lient. Martin Wagor, 1st Sharpshooters. Lient. John W. Brennan, 27th Infantry. Lient. William S. Woodruff, 1st Infantry. NEW HAMPSHIRE. Lient. John H. Tredick, 3d Infantry. Lient. Hiram K. Little, lith Infantry. Lieut. George H. Shapleigh, 5th Infantry. Capt. Elisha E. Dodge, 13th Infantry. Capt. James Madden, 10th Infantry. NEW JERSEY. Capt. Henry H. Woolsey, 5th Infantry. Capt. Sidney M. Layton, 11th Infantry. Capt. Michael Mullery, 7th Infantry. Lient. Murt Cunningham, 24 Cavalry. Col. Simon H. Mix, 3d Cavalry. Capt. James McNair, 8th Cavalry. Capt. James A. Sayles, 8th Cavalry. Lient. Patrick H. Glennon, 22d Cavalry. Capt. Calvin Burch, 24th Cavalry. Capt. William F. Williams, 24 Mounted Rifles. Lient. James L. Atwood, 24 Mounted Rifles. Lient. John V. Bedell, 24 Mounted Rifles. Lient. James B. N. DeLong, 24 Mounted Rifles. NEW YORK. Capt. William A. Berry, 24 Heavy Artil- lery. Capt. George S Dawson 2 lery. , 4 Heavy Artil Capt. D. K. Smith Jones, 4th Heavy Artil- lery. Capt. Charles Maguire, 7th Heavy Artil- lery. Lieut. Charles L. Yearsley, 7th HeavyAr- tillery. Lient. Col. Willard W. Bates, 8th Heavy Artillery. Maj. Edwin L. Blake, 8th HeavyArtillery. 23 Page 240 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. Return of Casualties in the Union ForcesContinued. NEW YOnKcontinued. Capt. George A. Hoyt, 8th Heavy Artil- lery. Lieut. Robert Glass, 8th Heavy Artillery. Lieut. Walter P. Wright, 8th heavy Ar- tillery. Maj. Job C. Hedges, 14th Heavy Artillery. Capt. Nimrod Underhill, jr., 14th Heavy Artillery. Capt. Franz Steckner, 15th Heavy Artil- lery. Lient. James Shuter, 40th Infantry. Capt. Henry W. Ohmes, 46th Inf~tntry. Capt. John A. Fee, 48th Infantry. Maj. William A. Kirk, 57th Infantry. Capt. Augustus M. Wright, 57th Infantry. Lient. Miles McDonald, 63d Infantry. Capt. Burton H. Davis, 66th Infantry. Licut. James E. Bnllis, 66th Infantry. Capt. Bernard S. ONeil, 69th Infantry. Lient. John Kiener, 72d Infantry. Lieut. Anios B. Stanton, 86th Infantry. Col. Patrick Kelly, 88th Infantry. Lient. Col. Theophilns L. England, 89th Infantry. Capt. Seymour L. Judd, 89th Infantry. Lient. William F. Dutton, 108th Infantry. Capt. William Warwick, 109th Infantry. Lient. Edward C. Jones, 109th Infantry. Capt. Jerome M. Lattin, 111th Infantry. Lieut. Samuel G. Sherwin, 112th Infan- try. Capt. William H. Ulrey, 2d Cavalry. Capt. William J. hunt, 117th Infantry. Capt. J. Parsons Stone, 117th Infantry. Maj. Charles E. Prayn, 118th Infantry. Lient. Henry H. Hoyt, 122d Infantry. Capt. William A. Jackson, 124th Infantry Lient. Edward N. Barnes, 125th Infantry. Lient. George A. Bryan, 125th Infantry. Lieut. Isaac DeWitt Coleman, 125th In- fantry. Lieut. Egbert B. Hull, 125th Infantry. Lient. Merritt B. Miller, 125th Infantry. Lieut. Col. William H Baird fantry. Brown, 126th In Capt. jr., 126th Infantry. Lient. SpencerE. Lincoln, 126th Infantry. Lieut. John A. McDonald, 126th Infantry. Lieut. Martin V. Stanton, 126th Infantry. Lieut. Sidney C. Gaylord, 147th Infantry. Capt. Thomas Hart, 155th Infantry. Lieut. Albert H. Dwight, 155th Infantry. Lieut. John Nolan, 155th Infantry. Lient. Michael OConnell, 155th Infantry. Lieut. Michael J. Eagan, 170th Infantry. Lieut. Francis H. Seely, 170 Infantry. Maj. John B. Sloan, 179th Infantry. Capt. Daniel Blachford, 179th Infantry. Maj. William Butler, 182d Infantry. Lient. Michael W. Redmond, 182d Infan- try. OHIO. Capt. Albert G. Quintrell, 60th Infantry. PENNSYLVANIA. Capt. William Bailey, 11th Cavalry. Capt. John B. Loomis, 11th Cavalry. Capt. W. Dewees Roberts, 11th Cavalry. Capt. Gerard Reynolds, 11th Cavalry. Lient. David 0. Tears, 11th Cavalry. Lient. Henry G. Lott, 21st Cavalry. Lient. Daniel S. Dubbs, 2d Provisional Heavy Artillery. Lieut. Thomas C. Sharpe, 2d Provisional Heavy Artillery. Capt. Benjamin B. Shuck, 48th Infantry. Lient. Joseph Edwards, 48th Infantry. Lient. Curtis C. Pollock, 48th Infantry. Capt. Henr~r A. Lantz, 50th Infantry. Capt. Oliver Mumford, 56th Infantry. Lient. Henry M. Adams, 57th Infantry. Lient. Clark M. Lyons, 57th Infantry. Capt. Isaac Moorhead, 63d Infantry. Lient. Jacob Glenn, 72d Infantry. Capt. David H. Ginder, 81st Infantry. Lieut. James R. Wingate, 84th Infantry. U. 5. ARMY. Maj. James St. C. Morton, Corps of Engi- Lient. Richard Skinner, 10th Infantry. neers. U. S. COLORED TROOPS. Capt. William V. King, 4th Infantry. Licut. Robert F. Johnston, 5th Infantry. Lient. Alfred M. Brigham, 4th Infantry. Lieut. Emery Fisher, 22d Infantry. Capt. Orlando P. Brockway, 5th Infantry. j Lient. Atwoo(l G. Sinn, 88th Infantry. Capt. Jacob P. Embich, 93d Infantry. Lieut. Matthew N. Heiskell, 99th Infan- try. Lient. Isidor Hirsch, 99th infantry. Lient. Col. Matthew M. Dawson, 100th In- fantry. Capt. Leander C. Morrow, 100th Infantry. Capt. William A. Norton, 110th Infantry. Capt. Robert M. Jeifries, 115th Infantry. Lient. Andrew M. Purdy, 140th Infantry. Lieut. Col. Guy H. Watkins, 141st Infan- try. Lient. Ezra S. Griffin, 143d Infantry. Capt. Jacob B. Edmonds, 148th Infantry. Lient. Wesley W. Beirly, 148th Infantry. Capt. Samuel A. McKee, 155th Infantry. Lient. Robert G. Christnot, 190th Infan- try. Lieut. Edward Greenfield, 190th Infantry. 24& [CHAP. LII Page 241 CB~. LII.l THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 241 Return of Casualties in the Uaion ForcesContinued. VERMONT. Lient. Hirani H. HaIl, 1st Cavalry. I Capt. William C. Tracy, 4th Infantry. Lient. Gilbert Steward, 1st Cavalry. Lient. Guy H. Guyer, 17th Infantry. Lieut. Merrit H. Sherman, 1st Heavy Artillery. WISCONSIN. Lient. Samuel H. Phillips, 7th Infanl ry. Capt. Samuel Stevens, 37th Infantry. Lient. Tanner Thomas, 7th Infantry. Lieut. William H. Earl, 37th Infantry. Lient. Col. John A. Savage, jr., 36th In- Lient. David Prutsman, 37th Infantry. fantry. Lient. Freeman B Riddle Lient. Elias A. Galloway, 36th Infantry. . 37th Infantry. DEEP BOTTOR~ (OR DARBYTOWN, STRAWBERRY PLAINS, AND NEW MARKET ROAD), VA., JULY 2729, 1864. [All organizations participating in the operations are included in this table.] Command. SECOND ARMY CORPS. Maj. Gen. WINFIELn S. HANCOCK. ESCORT. Killed. Wounded. Captnred or missing. li ~ N N 613 613 613 1st Vermont Cavalry, Company M ENGINEERS. 50th New York, 1st Battalion FIRST nIVISION. Brig. Gen. FRANCIS C. BARLOW. Staff First Brigcsde. Brig. Gen. NELSON A. MILES. 28th Massachusetts 26th Michigan 5th New Hampshire 2d New York Heavy Artillery 61st New York 81st Pennsylvania 140th Pennsylvania 183d Pennsylvania Total First Brigade Consolidated Briyade. Col. LEVIN CRANDELL. 7th New York (four companies) 39th New York 52d New York 57th New York 63d New York (six companies) 69th New York (six companies) 88th New York (four companies) 111th New York 125th New York 126th New York Total Consolidated Brigade 16 R HVOL XL, PT I 1 1 2 2 4 1 1 2 1 5 1 12 13 1 7 8 16 1 1 2 4 S 12 9 1 32 10 52 2 2 2 1 1 1 Page 242 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. Return of Casualtie8 in the Union ForcesContinued. (CHAP. LII. DEEP BOTTOM (OR DARBYTOWN, STRAWBERRY PLATNS, AND NEW MARKET ROAD), VA., JULY 27-29, 1864Continued. Killed. Wounded. Captured or missing. ____ Command. - . . ~ ~ 5) be 0 ~ 0 ~ 0 ~ Feurth Brigade. Lient. Col. K. OSCAR BROADY. 7th New York Heavy Artillery 64th New York 66th New York 53d Pennsylvania 116th Pennsylvania 145th Pennsylvania 148th Pennsylvania Total Fourth Brigade Total First Division SECOND DIVISION. Maj. Gen. JOHN GIHHoN. Prevest Guard. 2d Company Minnesota Sharpshooters First Brigade. Lieut. Col. FRANCIS E. PIERCE. 19th Maine 19th Massachusetts 20th Massachusetts (seven companies) 1st Company Massachusetts Sharpshooters.... 7th Michigan 1st Minnesota (two companies) 59th New York 152d New York 184th Pennsylvnnia (seven companies) 16th Wisconsin Total First Brigade Second Brigade. Col. MATHEw MURPHY. 8th New York Heavy Artillery 155th New York 164th New York 170th New York 182d New York (69th New York National Guard Artillery). Total Second Brigade Third Brigade. Col. THOMAS A. SHYTH. 14th Connecticut 1st Delaware 2d Delaware (three companies) 12th New Jersey 10th Ijew York (six companies) 108th New York 4th Ohio (four companies) 69th Pennsylvania 106th Pennsylvania (three companies) 7th West Virginia (four companies) Total Third Brigade Total Second Division 2 4 4 4 2 1 2 8 9 2 6 8 5 19 15 1 42 1 16 75 - 1 1 1 1 15 17 1 1 8 12 20 3 3 14 1 27 42 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 17 1 27 45 THIRD DIVISION. Brig. Gen. GERSHOH MOTT. Staff 1 1 24 Page 243 THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 243 Ret~ern of Casualties in, the Union ForcesContinued. DEEP BOTTOM (OR DARBYTOWN, STRAWBERRY PLAINS, AND NEW MARKET ROAD), VA., JULY 27-29, 1864Continued. Command. First Brigade. Brig. Gen. P. REGIS DE TROBRIAND. 20th Indiana 1st Maine Heavy Artillery 17th Maine 40th New York (six companies) 73d New York (eight companies) 74th New York (five companies) 86th New York 124th New York 99th Pennsylvania 110th Pennsylvania 141st Pennsylvania 2d U. S. Sharpshooters (eight companies) Total First Brigade Second Brigade Col. DANIEL CHAPLIN. Gol. HENRY J. MADILL * 5th Michigan 93d New York 57th Pennsylvania (eight companies) Old Pennsylvania 84th Pennsylvania 105th Pennsylvania 1st U. S. Sharpshooters Total Second Briga~1e Third Brigade. Col. ROBERT MCALLISTER. 1st Massachusetts Heavy Artillery 11th Massachnsetts (seven companies) 5th New Jersey 6th New Jersey 7th New Jersey 8th New Jersey 11th New Jersey 72d New York (one company) 120th New York Total Third Brigade Total Third Division ARTILLERY BRIGADE. Maj. JOHN U. HAZARD. Maine Light, 6th Battery (F) Massachusetts Light, 10th Battery New Hampshire Light, 1st Battery 1st New Jersey Light, Battery B New Jerse Li ht, 3d Battery 4th New or eavy, Company D 4th New York Heavy, Company L 1st New York Light. Battery U New York Light, 11th Battery New York Light, 12th Battery 1st Pennsylvania Light, Battery F 1st Rhode Island Light, Battery A 1st Rhode Island Light, Battery B 4th United States, Battery K 5th United States, Batteries C and I Killed. Wounded. a 0 Q 1 1 3 1 1 7 1 1 7 21 Captnred or missing. 1 6 55 ~i4. 2 3 31 9 5 30 1 6 51 2 2 1 . 1 2 . 2 1 2 4 7 1 2 9 12 I 1 1 1 1 i 2 1 3 11 7 42 2 6 68 Total Second Army Corps 26 8 101 ~ Assumed command July 28. 4 49 188 Page 244 OPERATIONS IN SE. YA. AND N. C. Rehern of Casualties in the Union ForcesContinued. (CHAP. LIL DEEP BOTTOM (OR PARBYTOWN, STRAWBERRY PLAINS, AND NEW MARKET ROAD), VA., JULY 27-29, 1864Continued. Command. TENTH ARMY CORPS. FIRST DIVISION. Third Brigade.. Brig. Ge~ii. ROBERT S. FOSTER. 10th Connecticut 11th Maine 1st Maryland Cavalry (dismounted) 24th Massachusetts 100th New York Connecticut Light Artillery, 1st Battery Total*. NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. SECOND DIVISION. First Brigade. Brig. Gen. HENRY W. BIRGE. 9th Connecticut 12th Maine 14th Maine 26th Massachusetts 14th New Hampshire 75th New York Total CAVALRY CORPS. Maj. Gen. PHILIP H. SHERIDAN. ESCORT. Capt. IRA W. CLAFLIN. 6th United States FIRST DIVISION. Brig. Gen. ALFRED T. A. TORBERT. First Brigade. Brig. Gen. GROEG A. CUSTER. 1st Michigan 5th Michigan 6th Michigan 7th Michigan 3d U. S. Artillery, Battery C Seeend Brigade. Col. THOMAS C. PEVIN. 4th New York 6th New York 9th New York 17th Pennsylvania 2d U. S. Artillery, Batteries B and L ~Kiiled. Q I 1 3 1 Wounded. Captured or mi8sing. 1 2 1 4 8 27 5 2 47 cI be be 2 93 7 2 6 i 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 8 1 3 4 1 2 Total Second Brigade 3 I ~ Includes losseS Oii .inly 26. 11 4 15 24 Page 245 Ciw. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 245 Return of Casualties in the Union ForcesContinued. DEEP BOTTOM (OR DARBYTOWN, STRAWBERRY PLAINS, AND NEW MARKET ROAD) VA., JULY 27-29, 1864Continued. Killed. Wounded. Captured or missing. Command. ,,3 ,,3 be a . a . a a u o a a i~ a a be Q ~ 0 ~ 0 ~ Reserve Brigade. Brig. Gen. WESLEY MERRITT. 19th New York (1st Dragoons) 6th Pennsylvania 1st Rhode island (eight companies) 1st United States 2d United States 5th United States ~ 2d U. S. Artillery, B~ttery D Total Reserve Brigade Total First Division SECOND DIVISION. Brig. Gen. DAVID McM. GREGG. First Brigade. Brig. Gen. HENRY E. DAVIES, Jr. 1st Massachusetts 1st New Jersey 10th New York 6th Ohio 1st Pennsylvania 2d U. S. Artillery, Battery A Total First Brigade Second Brigade. Col. J. IRVIN GREGG. 1st Maine 2d Pennsylvania 4th Pennsylvania 8th Pennsylvania 13th Pennsylvania 16th Pennsylvania Total Second Brigade Total Second Division RAUTES DIVISION.* Brig. Gen. AUGUST V. KAUTE. First Brigade. Col. ROnERT M. WEST. 3d New York 5th Pennsylvania Total First Brigade Second Brigade. Col. SAMUEL P. SPEAR. 1st District of Columhia lltliPennsylvania ArtiUery. Wisconsin Light, 4th Battery Total Cavalry Corps 1 4 3 2 6 6 9 16 8 5 7 3 45 5 60 10 4 56 5 75 3 14 2 19 3 20 9 32 1 10 1 12 1 3 10 2 16 4 3 15 2 24 1 I 12 6 70 1 15 104 7 7 2 5 10 17 1 .1 2 5 2 27 2 36 8 2 40 12 20 8 110 1 27 166 1 1 2 30 12 168 1 32 From Army of the James. 6 7 9 25 13 62 I 1 2 24 Page 246 24~ OIERATIONS TN ~ VA. AND N. 0. Return of Casualties in the Union ForcesContinued. DEEP BOTTOM (OR DAR~YTOWN, STRAWBERRY PLAINS. AND NEW MARKET ROAD), VA., JULY 2729, 1864Continued. RECAPITULATION. Command. Second Army Corps Tenth Army Corps (detachment) Nineteenth Army Corps (detachment) Cavalry Corps Grand total Killed. j 0 26 1 4 30 Wounded. Captured or missing. 0 8 4 12 101 47 168 a 0 ~ 4 49 61 24 316 5 81 a B be be 188 56 1 243 488 Officers killed or mortally wounded.J.Aent. Thomas Clark, 40th New York; Capt. William Richardson, 100th New York; and Ljeut. Lockwood Cang~ey, 16th Pennsyl- vania Cavalry. ASSAULT AT THE CRATER, NEAR PETERSBURG, VA., JULY 30, 1864. Killed. Wounded. Captured or missing. Command. a 0 NINTH ARMY CORPS. Maj. Gen AMBROsE E. BURNSIDE. ESCORT. 3d New Jersey Cavalry, Companies A and E PROVOST GUARn. 8th U. S. Infantry FIR5T nIvISION. Brig. Gen. JAMES H. LEDLIE. First Brigade. Brig. Gen. WILLIAM F. BATLETT.* Lient. Col. JOSEPH H. BARNES. Staff 21st Massachusetts 29th Massachusetts 56th Massachusetts 57th Massachusetts 59th Massachusetts 100th Pennsylvania . . Total First Brigade Second Brigade. Col. ELISHA G. MXaSImu~.* Limit. Col. GILBERT P. Romnson. 3d Maryland (battalion) 14th New York Heavy Artillery 179th New York 2d Pennsylvania Provisional Heavy Artillery. Total Second Brigade Acting Engineers. 35th Massachusetts Total First Division 12 Captured. 2 2 2 4 10 7 23 2 1 6 6 15 4 3 18 2 23 50 3 1 2 14 1 30 51 2 4 2 ~l7 3 46 74 3 7 3 25 1 29 68 8 20 15 90 9 141 283 3 7 16 26 1 9 2 42 3 75 132 2 3 2 18 31 56 9 2 33 6 66 116 3 24, 6 100 9 188 330 1 9 3 25 1 2 41 53j 24 215 191 331 654 B b Page 247 ~HE I~ICItMONb CAMPAIGN. ]?e/tirn of Ca8ilrlfie8 i~ Ike li/neTois ForcesContinued. ASSAULT AT THE CRATER, NEAR PETERSBURG, VA., JULY 30, 1864Continued. Killed. Wounded. Captured or missing. 0. 1 3 10 9 5 5 1 2 2 4 0 1 23 29 21 20 1 47 3 5 5 83 .7 2 34 20 1 1 2 4 33 9 142 13 146 347 2 3 4 16 1 37 63 4 5 1 25 7 44 86 9 5 24 8 54 100 1 5 5 30 1 42 1 8 4 31 1 29 74 9 2 10 22 63 5 3 1 21 2 21 53 13 42 22 177 19 208 481 4. . 4 17 75 11 323 32 354 832 1 1 1 15 16 11 4 47 1 22 85 1 10 2 22 18 53 2 15 1 58 7 83 1 1 2 21 3 30 34 4 55 1 51 145 1 8 1 11 8 29 5 83 14 229 2 109 442 2 4 10 3 26 45 2 4 4 11 1 37 59 5 1 21 1 19 47 2 7 9 3 2 19 24 1 9 10 1 1 19 1 22 16 14 96 6 82 1 1 191 659 Command. 0 SECOND DIVISION. Brig. Gen. ROBRRT B. POTTER. First Brigade. Col. ZENAS R. BLISS. 36th Massachusetts 58th Massachusetts 2d New York Mounted Rifles (dismounted). 51st New York 45th Pennsylvania 48th Pennsylvania 4th Rhode Island Total First Brigade Second Brigade. Brig. Gen. SIMoN G. GRIFFIN. 2d Maryland 31st Maine 32d Maine 6th New Hampshire 9th New Hampshire 11th New Hampshire 17th Vermont Total Second Brigade Acting Engineers. 7th Rhode Island Total Second Division THIRD DIVISION. Brig. Gen. ORLANDo B. WILLCOX. First Brigade. Brig. Gen. JOHN F. HARTRANFT. Staff 8th Michigan 27th Michigan* 109th New York 13th Ohio Cavalry (dismounted) 51st Pennsylvania 37th Wisconsin 38th Wisconsin (five companies) Total First Brigade Second Brigade. Col. WILLIAM HUMPHREY. 1st Michigan Sharpshooters 2d Michigan 20th Michigan 24th New York Cavalry (dismounted) 46th New York 60thOhiot 50th Pennsylvania Total Second Brigade 2 Acting Engineers. 17th Michigan Total Third Division I 7 99 28 126 8 5lst and 2d Companies Michigan Sharpshooters attached. 9th and 10th Companies Ohio Sharpshooters attached. CHAP. tIi.J 2 114 48 33 66 1 83 21 Page 248 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. CHAP. LII. Return of Casualties in the Union Force8Continued. ASSAULT AT THE CRATER, NEAR PETERSBURG, VA., JULY 30, 1864Continued. Killed. Wounded. Command. 0 Captured or missing. 0 ~ a be FOURTH DIVISION. Brig. Gen. EDWARD FERRERO. First IA gade. Col. JOSHUA K. SIOFRIED. 27th U. S. Colored Troops 30th U. S. Colored Troops 39th U. S. Colored Troops 43d U. S. Colored Troops Total First Brigade Second Brigade. Col. HENRY G. THOMAS. 19th U. S. Colomed Troops 23d U. S. Colored Troops 28tli U. S. Colored Ti oops 29th U. S. Colored Troops 31st U. S. Colored Troops Total Second Brigade Total Fourth Division ARTILLERY BRIGADE. Lieut. Col. J. ALBERT MONROE. Maine Light, 2d Battery (B) Maine Light, 3d Battery (C) Maine Light, 7th Battery (G) Massachusetts Light, 11th Battery Massachusetts Light, 14th Battery New York Light, 19th Battery New York Light, 27th Battery New York Light, 34th Battery Pennsylvania Light, Battery 113 Vennont Light, 3d BBttery Mortar battery (Smileys) Total Artillery Brigade Total Ninth Army Corps TENTH ARMY CORPS. SECOND DIVISION. Brig. Gen. JOHN W. TURNER. Staff First Brigade. Col. N. MARTIN CURTIS. 3d New York 112th New York 117th New York 142d New York ... .. Total First Brigade Second Brigade. Lieut. Col. WILLIAM B. COAN. a 47th New York 48th New York 76th Pennsylvania 97th PenusylvBnia 3 1 6 18 13 13 2 5 5 4 44 99 82 2 20 73 47 21 75 200 157 123 4 50 16 317 7 161 555 2 20 1 86 3 3 115 3 71 7 108 6 115 310 2 9 2 62 2 11 88 2 19 9 47 47 124 1 26 6 36 2 64 135 10 145 25 339 13 240 772 14 195 41 656 20 401 1,327 I 1 1 1 1 ~1 1 2 3 50 423 124 1,522 79 ~ 3,475 1 1 2 2 1 1 12 14 2 2 1 1 1 11 14 1 2 4 25 32 1 13 2 16 2 4 21 3 30 3 3 37 9 52 4 3 26 5 38 Total Second Brigade 2 121 6 971 19 24 Page 249 THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 249 Return of Casualties in the Union ForcesContinued. ASSAULT AT THE CRATER, NEAR PETERSBURG, VA., JULY 30, 1864Continued. Killed. Wounded. Cap~u~~d or missing. 4? . . C5 Command. I, be o . u . . 4? o ~ ~ 9 ~ ii) 4? 4? 4? be Q ~ ~ -1 Third Brigade. Col. Louis BELL. 13th Indiana (three companies) 11 6 17 9thlMiaine 1 3 2 28 13 47 4th New Hampshire 6 2 33 5 46 115th New York 2 3 15 5 25 l69thNewYork 1 1 8 9 19 Total Third Brigade 2 12 7 95 38 154 Total Second Division 5 26 18 217- 57 323 RECAPITULATION. Ninth Army Corps 50 423 124 1, 522 79 1, 277 3, 475 Tenth Army Corps (Second Division) 5 26 38 217 57 323 Grand total 55 449 142 1, 739 79 1, 334 3, 798 OFFICERS KILLED OR MORTALLY WOUNDED. MAINE. Lient. Edwin T. Clifford, 9th Infantry. I Lietit. GeorgeW.Thompson, 31st Infantry. Capt. Almon H. Gushee, 31st Infantry. Lient. John G. Whitten, 31st Infantry. Lieut. Byron C. Gilmore, 31st Infantry. i Lient. William B. Allyn, 31st Infantry. MARYLAND. Lieut.Col. HenryHoward, jr., 2dlnfantry. Lieut. R. Wilson Register, 2d Infantry. MASSACHUSETTS. Capt. William H. Clark, 21st Infantry. Lieut. Clement C. Granett, 58th Infantry. Lieut. Samuel G. Berry, 35th Infantry. Col. J. Parker Gould, 59th Infantry. Maj. Albert Prescott, 57th Infantry. Lieut. Col. John Ilodges, jr., 59th Infan- Capt. Edson T. Dresser, 57th Infantry. try. Capt. George H. Howe, 57th Infantry. Capt. Lewis E. Munroe, 59th Infantry. MICHIGAN. Capt. John L. Young, 2d Infantry. I Lient. John G. Busch, 2d Infantry. NEW HAMPSHIRE. Capt. William K. Crossfleld, 6th InfaRtry. Lient. John C. Sampson, 9th Infantry. Lieut. George E. Upton, 6th Infantry. NEW YORK. Lient. Anstin Gibbons, 24th Cavalry. Capt. William P. Johnson, jr., 142d Infan- Lient. Ezra T. Hartley, 14th Heavy Artil- try. lery. Capt. Augustns D. Vaughn, 169th Infan- Maj. SamuelM. Swartwout, 48th Infantry, try. Lient. Jeremiah OBrien, 48th Infantry. Maj. Jobn Barton, 179th Infantry. Capt. Samuel H. Sims, 51st Infantry. Capt. Allen T. Farwell, 179th Infantry. Lient. Nathan J.Griswold, lO9tb Infantry. Lieut. Baker L. Saxton, 179th Infantry. CHAI~. LII. Page 250 OPERAPIONS IN ~E. VA. AND N. C. (CHAP. LIL Return of Ca8ualtie8 in the Union Foree8Continued. OHIO. Lient. Clayton G. Jewell, 13th Cavalry. [ Lient. Isaac W. Short, 13th Cavalry. PENNSYLVANIA. Lient. Allen H. Filman, 51st Infantry. Lieut. Daniel MeVey, 76th Infantry. Lient. Levi L. Marsh, 97th Infantry. Maj. Thomas J. Hamilton, 100th Infantry. Capt. Walter C. Oliver, 100th Infantry. Lient. Richard P. Craven, 100th Infantry. Lient. Samuel G. Leasure, 100th Infantry. RHODE ISLAND. Lient. John K. Knowles, 4th Infantry. I Lient. George W. Field, 4th Infantry. U. S. COLORED TROOPS. Maj. Theodore H. Rockwood, 19th Infan- Capt. John C. Hackhiser, 28th Infantry. try. Lieut. James C. Grant, 28th Infantry. Lient. Christopher Pennell, 19th Infantry. Lient. Col. John A. Bross, 29th Infantry. Capt. Adam C. Liscomb, 23d Infantry. Capt. William H. Flint, 29th Infantry. Capt. Zelotes Fessenden, 23d Infantry. Capt. Hector H. Aiken, 29th Infantry. Liout. Charles W. Perigree, 23d Infantry. Maj. James C. Leeke, 30th Infantry. Capt. John Cartwright, 27th Infantry. Capt. Richard K.Woodruff, 31st Infantry. Capt. Alfred W. Pinney, 27th Infantry. Lient.William H. Ayers, 31st Infantry. Lient. Amos Richardson, 27th Infantry. Lieut. James T. Hayman, 43d Infantry. Lient. Seymour A. Cornell, 27th Infantry. VERMONT. Maj. William B. Reynolds, 17th Infantry. Lient. George Hicks, 17th Infantry. Lieut.LeonardP. Biugham, 17th Infantry. Capt. Allen A. Burnett, 37th Infantry. Capt. Frank A. Cole, 37th Infantry. Lient.William B. Martin, 17th Infantry. Lient. Henry B. Needham, 17th Infantry. Lieut. John R. Converse, 17th Infantry. WISCONSIN. Capt. Newton S. Ferris, 38th Infantry. General summary of Casualties inthe Union Forces operating against Richmond, Va., July 131, 1864, including Deep Bottom (l7th39th), The Crater (30th), aad along the line8. Killed. Wounded. Captured or missing. Command. ill 0 0 0 0 65 0 ~ 0 ~ 0 ~ GENERAL HEADQUARTERS. Lient. Gen. ULYSSES S. GRANT. ESCORT. 5th U. S. Cavalry, Companies B, F, and K 4th U. S. Infantry ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. Maj. Gen. GEORGE G. MEADE. PROVOST GUARD. Brig. Gen. MARSENA R. PATRICE. 1st Indiana Cavalry, Company K 1st Massachusetts Cavalry, Companies C andD. 25th New York Cavalry (dismounted)* 80th New York (20th Militia)- 3d Pennsylvania Cavalry 68th Pennsylvania 114th Pennsylvania Transferred to Camp Stoneman, D. C., July 7. 25 Page 251 ~H~ RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. General summary of Casualties in the Union Forces, ~c.Continned. Killed. Wounded. Captured or missing. Command. I) 0 0 ENGINEER BRIGADE. Brig. Gen. HENRY W. BENRAM. 15th New York (five companies) 50th New York (nine companies) BATTALION ti. S. ENGINEERS. Capt. GEORGE H. MENDELL. GIJARDS AND ORDERLIES. Independent Company Oneida (NewYork) Cavalry ARTILLERY. Brig. Gen. HENRY J. HUNT.* 15th New York Heavy, Company F 4th New York Heavyt Maine Light, 4th Battery (D 1st New Jerse Li ht, Battery Al New York Lig7ht,3i1 Battery~ 1st Ohio Light, Battery HI 1st Rhode Island Light, Battery El 5th United States, Battery El Total Artillery SIGNAL CORPS. Capt. BENJAMIN F. FISHER. SECOND ARMY CORPS. Maj. Gen. WINFIELD 5. HANCOCK. ESCORT. 1st Vermont Cavalry, Company M ENGINEERS. Maj. WESLEY BRAINERD. 50th New York, 1st Battalion FIRST TDIvIsION. 2 1 1 3 3 4 I Brig. Gen. FRANCIS C. BARLOW. Brig. Gen. NELSON A. MILES. First Brigede. Brig. Qen. NELSON A. MILES. Col. J ES . LYNCB. 28th Massachusetts 26th Michigan 5th New H ampshire 2d New York Heavy Artillery Gist New York 81st Pennsylvania 140th Pennsylvania 183d Pennsylvania Chief of artillery. t Assigned from Second Army Corps Jnly 13. ~ Assigned from the Sixth Army Corps Jnly 10. ~ In command of First Division from Jnly 29. t~HAP. tIL) 251 a be be b Page 252 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. LIT. General summary of Casualties in the Union. Forces, cjc.Continued. Killed. Wounded. Captured or missing. a Command. bO a a . a . a . n a ~ a a a bI 0 ~ 0 ~ 0 ~ Fourth Brigade. Lient. Col. JOHN HASTINGS. Lient. Col. K. OSCAR BRoAnv.* 7th New York Heavy Artillery 64th New York 66th New York 53d Pennsylvania 116th Pennsylvania 145th Pennsylvania 148th Pennsylvania Consolidated Brigade. Col. CLINTON P. MACPOUGALL. Col. LEVIN CRANDELL.t 7th New York (four companies) 39th New York 52d New York 57th New York 63d New York (six companies). 69th New York (six companies) 88th New York (four companies) 111th New York 125th New York 126th New Yolk Total First IDivision~ 2d Company Minnesota Sharpshooters First Brigade. heat. Col. FRANCIS F. PIERCE. 19th Maine 15th M4ssachusettsll 19th M~ssachnsetts 20th Massachnsetts 1st Company Massachusetts Sharpshooters.... 7th Michigan 1st Minnesota (two companies) 59th New York 152d New York 184th Pennsylvania 36th Wisconsin SECOND DIvISION. Maj. Gen. JOHN GIHHoN. Col. THOMAS A. SMYTH. Provost Guard. Second Brigade. Col. JAMES P. McIvoR. Col. MATHEw MUEPHYIT 16 1 42 1 17 77 e 8th New York Heavy Artillery . 155th New York 164th New York l7OthNew York 182d New York (69thNew York National Guard Artillery). 5Assnmed command July 25. tAssumed command July 3. tLosses for the enlAre month are not of record by regiments and brigades. ~Assumed command July 31. II Veterans and recruits transferred to 20th Massachusetts July 27. Assumed command July 14. 25 Page 253 THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 253 General summary of Casualties in the Union Forces, ~c.Continued. Killed. Wounded. Captured or missing. a Command. II 0 ~ 0 ~ 0 ~ Third Brigede. Col. THOMAS A. SMYTH. Lieut. Col. HENRY A. CooK.* Col. THOMAS A. SMYTH. Licut. Col. SAMUEL A. MooRE.t 14th Connecticut 1st Delaware 2d Delaware (three companies) 12th New Jersey 10th New York (hattalion) 108th New York 4th Ohio (four companies) 69th Pennsylvania 72d Pennsylvansa~ 106th Pennsylvania (three companies) 7th ~~~est~irginia (four companies) Total Second Division THIRD DIVISION. Maj. (len. DAVID B. BIRNEY. Brig. (len. GERSHOM MOTTIl First Brigede. Col. HENRY J. MADILL. Brig. (len. P. REGIS DR TROBEIAND. 20th Indiana 17th Maine 40th New York (hattalion) 73d New York (eight companies) 74th New York (live companies) 86th New ~ork 124th New york 99th Pennsylvania 110th Tennsylvania J~1st Pennsylvania** 2d U. S. Sharpshooters Second Brigade. 18 1 27 46 Brig. Gen. BYRON H. PIERCE. Col. DANIEL CHAPLINtI Col. HENRY J. MADILL4I 1st Massachusetts Heavy Artillery 5th Michigan 91d New York 57th Pennsylvania Old Pennsylvania 84th Pennsylvania 105th Pennsy~lvania 1st U. S. Sharpshooters In command July 19 to 22. Assumed command July 31. I Veterans and rccruits trysnsferred to 183d Pennsylvania July 19. ~ Losses for the entire month are not of record by regiments and brigades. II Assumed command July 23. Assumed command July 12. *sAssigned to Second Brigade July 28. It Assumed command July 26. tt Assumed command July 28. CHAP. LII. Page 254 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. Lii. General sernnwry of Casualties in the Union Forces, ~c.Continued. Killed. Command. 0 Third Brigade. Brig. Gen. GERSHOR MoTT. Col. RoBERT MCALLISTER. 1st Maine Heavy Artillery* 11th Massachusetts 16th Massachusettst 5th New Jersey 6th New Jersey 7th New Jersey 8th New Jersey 11th New Jersey 72d New York (one company) 120th New York Total Third Division~ ARTILLERY BRIGADE. Maj. JOHN G. HAZARD. Maine Light, 6th Battery (F) Massachusetts Light, 10th Battery New Hampshire Light, 1st Battery New Jersey Light, 2d Battery (B) New Jersey Light, 3d Battery. 4tlI New York Heavy, Company ID 4th New York Heavy, Company L 1st New York Light. Battery G New York Light, 11th Battery New York Light, 12th Battery 1st Pennsylvania Light, Battery F 1st Rhode Island Light, Battery A 1st Rhode Island Light, Battery B 4th United States, Battery K 5th United States, Batteries C and I Total Second Army Corps FIFTH ARMY CORPS. Maj. Gen. GOUVERNEUR K. WARREN. ESCORT. Lieut. WILLIAM H. WHEELER. 1st Michigan Cavalry (detachment) PROVOST GUARD. Maj. HENRY W. RIDER. 5th New York (hattalion) FIRST DIVISION. Brig. Gen. CHARLES GRIFFIN. Brig. GCD. JOSEPH J. BARTLETT. First Brigade. Col. WILLIAM S. TILTON. 121st Pennsylvania 142d Pennsylvania 143d Pennsylvania 149th Pennsylvania 150th Pennsylvania 187th Pennsylvania Wounded. 0 Captured or duissiIlg. 13 7 54 2 7 83 29 8 114 4 51 206 1 4 . 3 . 1 3 . 1 3 2 6 5 3 4 4 2 6 Total First Brigade 3 21 24 ~ Ti~ansferred to Second Brigade July 25. Veterans and recruits transferred to 11th Massachusetts July 11. t The Fourth Brigade was disban(led July 3 and its regiments distributed to the other three brigades. Losses by regiments and brigades not of record. ~S Assumed command July 21. 25 Page 255 THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 255 General summary of Casualties in the Union Forces, ~c.Continued. Killed. Wounded. Captured or missing. Command. ui a . a . a u o ~ a a bI~ Second Brige Col. JAcon B. SWEITEER. Col. EDGAR M. GREGORY. 22d Massachusetts 32d Massachusetts 62d Pennsylvania t 91st Pennsylvania 155th Pennsylvania 21st Pennsylvania Cavalry (dismounted) Total Second Brigade Third Brigade. Brig. Gen. JOSEPH J. BARTLETT. Col. NORYAL E. WELCH 4 20th Maine 18th Massachusetts 1st Michigan 16th Michigan 44th New York 83d Penuslivania 118th Pennsylvania Total Third Brigade Total First Division SECOND DIYISION. Brig. Gen. IIOMEYN B. AYEES. First Brigade. Brig. Gen. JOSEPH HAYES. 5th New York 140th New York 146th New York 10th U. S. Infantry (three companies) 11th U. S. Infantry (six companies) 12th U. S. Infantry 14th U. S. Infantry 17th U. S. Infantry Total First Brigade Second Brigade. Col. NATHAN T. DUSHANE. 1st Maryland 4th Maryland 7th Maryland 8th Maryland Purnell (Maryland) Legion Total Second Brigade Third Brigade. Col. J. HOWARD KITCHING. 6th New York Heavy Artillery 15th New York Heavy Artillery Total Third Brigade 2 .2 1 1 1 4 2 1 7 10 5 3 4 2 2 2 2 25 27 7 1 53 61 1 1 1 .1 1 1 8 10 . 1 1 2 3 1 4 2 2 2 1 3 6 3 3 17 1 24 3 2 20 25 1 12 13 3 3 32 38 Total Second Division 6 6 50 * Assumed command July 3. t Veterans and recruits transferred to 155th Pennsylvania July 2. ~ Assumed command July 21. ~ Bradys company Michigan Sharpshooters attached. ii 63 5 3 3 7 3 2 4 CHAP. LII. Page 256 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHAr. ML General summary of Casualties in the Union Forces, 4~c.Continued. Killed. Wounded. Captured or missing. Command. a . a . a a a ~ a u a ~ a a 0 0 0 ~ THIRD DIVISION. Brig.Gen. SAMUEL W. CRAWFORD. First Brigade. Col. PETER LYLE. 16th Maine 13th Massachusetts* 39th Massachusetts 104th New York 90th Pennsylvania 107th Penn8ylvaiia Total First Brigade Second Briqade. Brig. Gen. HENRY BAXTER. Col. CHARLES WREELOCK. 94th New York 97th New York 11th Pennsylvania 88th Pennsylvania Total Second Brigade Third Brigade. Col. JAMES ~ARLE. Col. WILLIAM R. HARTSRORNE.I 190th Pennsylvania (1st Veteran Reserves) 191st Pennsylvania (2d Veteran Reserves) Total Third Brigade Total Third Division FOURTH DIVISION. Brig. Gen. LYSANDER CUTLER. PROVOST GUARD. Lieut. ALBERT T. MORGAN. Independent Battalion, Wisconsin First Briga Brig. Gen. EDWARD S. BRAGG. 7th Indiana 19th Indiana 24th Michigan..... 1st Battalion New York Sharpshooters 6th Wisconsin 7th Wisconsin Total First Brigade Second Brigade. CoL J. WILLIAR HOFHANN. 3d Delaware 4th Delaware 76th New York 95th New York 147th New York 56th Pennsylvania 157th Pennsylvania Total Second Brigade 1 1 2 2 5 2 4 3 2 2 18 1 1 5 2 5 2 4 23 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 3 2 1 22 1 1 28 3 lo 1 14 1 2 3 1 4 5 1 2 3 1 3 4 6 6 5 23 7 35 1 1 3 1 4 3 3 1 2 3 3 3 1 I 1 1 12 1 15 2 2 1 3 Total Fourth Division 6 I . 1 35 I Veterans and recruits transferred to 39th Massachusetts July 13. tAssumed command July 26. 256 8 5 Page 257 CHAJ?. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. Generat summary of Casualties in the Union Force8, ~c.Contirtued. Killed. Wounded. Captured or missing. Command. 0 ARTILLERY BRIGADE. Col. CHARLES S. WAINWEIGHT. Staff Mas8achusetts Light, 3d Battery (C) Massachusetts Light, 5th Battery (E) Massachusetts Light, 9th Battery 1st New York Light, Battery B 1st Naw York Light, Battery C 1st New York Light, Battery D 1st New York Light, Battery E* 1st New York Light, Battery H 1st New York Light, Battery L New York Light, 15th Battery 1st Pennsylvania Light, Battery B 4th United States, Battery B 5th United States, Battery D Total Artillery Brigade Total Fifth Army Corps SIXTH ARMY CORPS.t Maj. Gen. HoRATIo G. WRIGHT. ESCORT. Capt. CHARLES F. FELLOwS. 8th Pennsylvania Cavalry, Company A FIRST DIVISION. Brig. Gen. DAVID A. 1IVSSELL. First Brigade. Col. WILLIA1~I H. PENROSE. 1st Delaware Cavalry (dismounted) 4th New Jersey 10th Nei9 Jersey 15th New Jersey 2d Connecticutileavy Artillery 65th New York 121st New York 95th Pennsylvania 96th Pennsylvania Total Second Brigade Second Brigade. Brig. Gen. EMORY UPTON. Third Brigede. Lieut. Col. GIDEON CLARK. Col. OLIVER EDWARDS4 0 ~ 1 I B 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 5 8 1 23 10 165 1 10 210 1 1 . 1 1 6th Maine 37th Massachusetts 23d Pennsylvania 49th Pennsylvania 82d Pennsylvania 119th Pennsylvania 5th Wlsconsm Total First Division 1 I Mortar battery. t The Third Division left the front of Petersburg July 6 and the First and Second Divisions July 10. t Assumed command July 7. ~ The Fourth Brigade was disbanded July 6 and its regiments assigned elsewhere. 17 R RYOL XL~PT I 25 Page 258 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. LII. General summary of Casualties in the Union Forces, ~c.Continued. Killed. Wounded. Captured or missing. ______ 0 Command. . . -~ a a II p., p., a ~ a a . ~ II a ic 0 0 0 ~ SECOND nivisio Brig. Gen. GEORGE W. GErrY. First Brigade. Brig. Gen. FRANK WHEATON. 62d New York 93d Pennsylvania 98th Pennsylvania 102d Pennsylvania 139th Pennsylvania Second Brigade. Brig. Gen. LEWIS A. GRANT. 2d Vermont 3d Vermont 4th Vermont 5th Vermont 6th Vermont 11th Vermont (1st Heavy Artillery) Total Second Brigade [third Brigade. Col. DANIEL D. BIDWELL. 7th Maine 43d New York 49th New York 77th New York 122d New York 61st Pennsylvania Total Second iDivision* THIRD DIVISION. Brig. Gen. JAMES B. RICKETTS. First Brigade. Col. WILLIAM S. TRUEX. 14th New Jersey 106th New York 151st New York 87th Pennsylvania 10th Vermont Second Brigade. Col. BENJAMIN F. SMITH. 6th Maryland 9th New York Heavy Artillery, 1st and 3d Battalions 110th Ohio 122d Ohio 126th Ohio 67th Pennsylvania 138th Pennsylvania ARTILLERY HEICADE. Maine Light, 5th Battery (E)t Massachu~setts Light, 1st Battery (A)! New York Light, 1st Batteryf . 9th New York Heavy, 2d Battaliont 1st Rhode Island Light, Battery CI 1st Rhode Island Light, Battery GI . 5th United States, Battery Mt 2 2 1 1 3 3 3 3 S Total Sixth Army Corps I 4 4 The Fourth Brigade was disbanded July 6 and its regiments assigned elsewhere. Left the front of Petersburg July 10. For batteries remaining with Army of the Potomac, see p. 251. 25 Page 259 THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. General Summary of Casualties in the Union Forces, ~c.Continued. Killed. Wounded. Captured or mlssing. Command. NINTH ARMY CORPS. Maj. Gen. AMBROSE E. BURNSIDE. ESCORT. Lieut. JOHN S. ROUGH. 3d New Jersey Cavalry (detachment) PROVOST GUARD. Capt. MILTON COGSWELL. 8th U. S. Infantry FIRST DIVISION. Brig. Gen. JAMES H. LEDLIE. First Brigade. Col. JACOB P. GOULD. Brig. Gen. WILLIAM F. BARTLETT.* Lieut. Col. JOSEPH H. BARNES. Staff Massachusetts 29th Massachusetts I 56th Massachusetts 57th Massachusetts 59th Massachusetts 100th Pennsylvania Total First Brigade Second Brigade. Col. EBENEZER W. PEIRCE. Col. ELISHA G. MAHSHALL.~ Lient. Col. GILBERT P. RO~INSON. 3d Maryland (battalion) 14th New York Heavy Artillery 179th New York 2d Pennsylvania Provisional Heavy Artil. lery. Total Second Brigade Acting Engineers. 35th Massachusetts Total First Division SECOND DIVISION. Brig. Gen. ROBERT B. POTTER. First Brigade. Lient. Col. HENRY PLEASANTS. CoL ZENAS R. BLIss. Col. WILLIAM H. P. STEERE. Col. ZENAS R. Buss4 36th Massachusetts 58th Massachusetts 2d New York Mounted Rifles (dismounted).... 51st New YorkII 45th Pennsylvania 48th Pennsylvania 4th Rhode Island 1 1 2 2 5 4 20 7 36 2 1 7 6 16 7 7 30 2 23 69 4 5 7 26 1 32 75 2 7 2 20 3 46 80 4 10 4 37 1 29 85 10 36 25 140 9 143 363 3 10 16 29 1 15 4 77 3 80 180 2 4 2 24 31 63 11 2 51 6 112 182 3 33 8 162 9 239 454 1 11 4 28 1 2 47 14 80 37 330 19 384 864 4 5 9 1 4 1 30 3 83 122 17 3 45 7 72 1 14 32 2 49 1 6 3 43 5 34 92 1 6 7 2 9 5 52 5 20 93 Total First Brigade 5 55 12 213 1 13 ~ Assumed command July 21 and Captured July 30. t Transferred from Second Brigade July 23. ~ Captured July 30. ~ In command from July 4 to 11 and 25 to 31. II Relieved as engineers July 2. Joined July 3. CHALP. LII.] 269 146 44 Page 260 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. LII. General summary of Casualties in the Union Forces, 4~c.Continued. Killed. Wounded. Captured or missing. _____ iS Command. ii iS Q n . u H n s ~ is 0 ~ 0 ~ 0 ~ Second Brigade. Brig. Gen. SIMON G. GRIFFIN. 2d Maryland 31st Maine 32d Maine 6th New Hampshire 9th New Hampshire 11th New Hampshire 17th Vermont Total Second Brigade . Acting Engineers. 7th Rhode Island~ Total Second Division THIRD DIVISION. Brig. Gen. ORLANDO B. WILLCOX. First Brigade. Brig. Gen. JOHN ~. HAMTRANFT. Staff 8th Michigan 27th Michigant 109th New York.. 13th Ohio Cavalry (dismounted) 51st Pennsylvania 37th Wisconsin 38th Wisconsin (five companies). Total First Brigade Second Brigade. Col. WILLIAM HUMPHREY. 1st Michigan Sharpshooters 2d Michigan 20th Michigan 24th New York Cavalry (dismounted) 46th New York 00th Ohio~ 50th Pennsylvania Total Second Brigade Acting Engineers. 17th Michigan Total Third Division FOURTH DIVISION. Brig. Gen EDWARD FERRERO. Brig. Gen. JULIUS WHITR. Brig. Gen. EDWARD FERRERO. First Brigade. Col. JOSHUA K. SIOFRIRD. 27th IT. S. Colored Troops 30th IT. S. Colored Troops 39th U. S. Colored Troops 43d U. S. Colored Troops Total ~First Brigade 4 2 4 1 1 5 6 8 13 12 11 13 6 4 1 S 7 5 2 1 24 37 40 68 40 40 31 1 7 8 1 2 37 44 54 1 29 22 21 13 69 25 280 19 208 12 12 18 124 37 505 32 354 1070 1 2 1 1 1 3 15 11 17 7 38 8 5 4 1 2 4 1 25 73 42 68 32 71 13 1 22 18 7 3 51 8 5 100 17 324 2 109 557 3 5 13 3 26 50 30 1 37 81 8 1 26 1 19 55 4 4 15 23 6 3 27 36 1 22 23 1 1 23 1 26 2 27 21 156 6 82 294 1 7 127 38 481 8 191 852 3 6 2 49 21 81 19 5 101 5 73 203 15 5 92 47 159 1 13 4 84 2 21 125 53 16 326 7 162 I 568 Assigned as engineers July 2. t 1st and 2d Companies Michigan Sharpshooters attached. ~ 9th and 10th Companies Ohio Sharpshooters attached. ~ In command from July 21 to 29. 260 74 101 120 89 87 77 66 614 1 28 116 76 95 45 165 3 Page 261 THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. General summary of Casualties in the Union Forces, ~c.Continued. Killed. Wounded. Command. I 0 261 Captured or missing. I H 0 H H Second Brigade. Col. hENRY G. THOMAS. 19th U. S. Colored Troops 23d U. S. Colored Troops 28th U. S. Colored Troops 29th U. S. Colored Troops 31st U. S. Colored Troops Total Second Brigade Total Fourth Division ARTILLERY BRIGADE. Lieut. Col. J. ALBERT MONROE. Maine Light, 2d Battery (B) Maine Light, 3d Battery (C)* Maine Light, 7th Battery (G) Massachusetts Light, 11th Battery Massachusetts Light, 14th Battery New York Light, 19th Battery New York Light, 27th Battery New York Light, 34th Battery Pennsylvania Light, Battery D Vermont Light, 3d Battery Mortar hattery (Smileys) Total Artillery Brigade Total Ninth Army Corps CAVALRY CORPS. Mu. Gen. PHILIP H. SHERIDAN. ESCORT. Capt. IRA W. CLAFLIN. 0th United States FIRST DIVISION. Brig. Gen. ALFRED T. A. TORBERT. First Brigade. Brig. Gen. GEORGE A. CUSTER. Col. RUSSELL A. ALGER. 1st Michigan 5th Michigan 0th Michigan 7th Michigan Second Brigade. Col. THOMAS C. IDEVIN. 4th New York 6th New York 9th New York 17th Pennsylvania Beserve Brigade. Brig. Gen. WESLEY MERRITT. 19th New York (1st Dragoons) 6th Pennsylvania 1st Rhode Island 1st United States 2d United States 5th United States 2d U. S. Artillery, Battery ID Total First Divisiouf 2 3 2 2 1 20 71 9 19 26 1 7 2 9 6 87 109 62 47 36 3 6 2 2 3 115 11 47 64 116 311 88 124 135 10 145 25 341 13 240 774 14 198 41 667 20 402 1,342 1 1 3 3 2 2 1 4 2 2 1 6 7 1 1 1 1 2 1 17 2 22 53 531 154 2,000 79 1,334 4,151 . 11. 4 58 * Joined July 9. t Losses by regiments and brigades not of record. 7 80 CHAP. LII. Page 262 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. tOHAP, LII. General summary of Casualties in the Union Forces, ~c.Continued. Killed. Wounded. Captured or missing. _____ 0 Command. C C 0 0 . 0 . 0 ~ G C) C) ~ 0 a a 0 ~ 0 ~ 0 ~ SECOND DIVISION. Brig. Gen. DAVID McM. GREGG. First Brigade. Brig. Gen. HENRY E. DAVIEs, Jr. Col. WILLIAM STEDMAN.* 1st Massachusetts 1st New Jersey 10th New York 6th Ohio 1st Pennsylvania Sece d Brigade. Col.. 5. IRVIN GREGG. 1st Maine 2d Pennsylvania 4th Pennsylvania 8th Pennsylvania 13th Pennsylvania 16th Pennsylvania Total Second Divisiont THIRD DIVISION. Brig. Gen. JAMES H. WILSON. First Brigade. Col. JOHN B. McINTosH. 1st Connecticut 3d New Jersey 2d New York 5th New York 2d Ohio 18th Pennsylvania Secend Brigade. Brig. Gen. GEORGE H. ChAPMAN. 8th fllinois 3d Indiana 1st New Hampshire 8th New York 22d New York 1st Vermont Total Third Division MORSE ARTILLERV BRIGADE. Capt. JAMES IMI. ROBERTSON.. 1st United States, Batteries H and I 1st United States, Battery X~ 2d United States, Battery A 2d United States, Batteries B and L 2d United States, Battery ID 2d United States, Battery M 3d United States, Battery C 4th United States, Batteries C and B Total Cavalry Corps Total Army of the Potomac 51n command from July 30. t See foot-note to First Division. 22 9 144 4 61 240 2 3 21 1 25 52 2 36 13 223 5 93 372 56 619 185 2,509 89 1,488 t Ordered to Wasliington July 9. 4,946 26 Page 263 THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. General summary of Casualties in the Union Forces, ~c.Continued. Killed. Wounded. Captured or missing. Command. a a a . 0 Ii a ~ 0 0 0 ~ ARMY OF THE JAMES. Maj. Gen. BENJAMIN F. ]3LTTLER. ESCORT. 1st New York Mounted Rifles (detachment) TENTH ARMY CORPS. Brig. Gen. WILLIAM T. H. BROOKS. Bri~i. Gen. ALFRED H. TERRY.* Maj. Gen. IDAYm B. -BIRNEY.( FIRST DIVISION. Brig. Gen. ALFRED H. TERRY~ Brig. Gen. ROHERT S. FOSTER4 Brig. Gen. ALFRED H. TERRY. First Brigade. Col. JOSHUA B. HOWELL. Col. FRANCIS B. PONn.~ 39th Illinois 62d Ohio 67th Ohio 85th Pennsylvania Second Brigade. Col. JOSEPH R. HAWLEY. 6th Connecticut 7th Connecticut 3d New Hampshire 7th New Hampshire Third Brigade. Brig. Gen. ROBERT S. FOSTER. Col. HARRIS M. PLAISTED4 Brig. Gen. ROBERT S. FOSTER. 10th Connecticut 11th Maine 1st Maryland Cavalry (dismounted) 24th Massachusetts 1st New York MountG4 Rifles 100th New York Artillery Brigade. Capt. LOOMIS L. LANODON. Capt. ZENAS C. WARREN~II Connecticut Light, 1st Battery New Jersey Light, 5th Battery 3d Rhode island Light, Battery C 1st United States, Battery M Total First Division 4 48 5Assunsed command July 19. t Assumed command July 23. ~ In command from July 19 to 23. ~ Assumed command July 29. II Assumed command July 28. 1 Losses by regiments and brigades not of record. CHAP. LII.] 4 5 Page 264 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CRAP. LII. General summary of Casualties in the Union Force8, ~c.Continued. Killed. Wounded. Command. SECOND DIVISION. Brig. Gen. JOHN W. TURNER. First Brigade. Col. N. MARTIN CURTIS. 3d New York ll2thNewYork... 117th New York 142d New York Second Brigade. Maj. EDWARD EDDY, .Tr. Lift. Col. WILLIAM B. COAN. 47th New York 48th New York . . 76th Pennsylvania 97th Penasylvaniat . - ... . Third Brigade. Col. LoUIS BELL. 13th Indiana (three companies) 9th Maine ... . . 4th New Hampshire.. 113th New Yorkt 169th New York . Artillery Brigade. Capt. FREDERICK M. FOLLETT. New Jersey Light~ 4th Battery 1st United States, Battery ID 3d United States, Battery E 4th United States, Battery ID Total Second Division: THIRD DIVISION. Brig. Gen. Osuels S. FERRY. First Brigade. Brig. Gen. GILMAN MARSTON. Captured or missing. H be bD be 6 90 20 411 24 551 lIld Ohio 143d Ohio 148th Ohio 163d Ohio 1st New York Engineers, Company L 16th New York Heavy Artillery, Companies E and H. 3d Pennsylvania Heavy Artillery (detachment) 1st U. S. Colored Cavalry, Company B 1st U. S. Colored Cavalry, Company I Second Brigade. Col. JAMES B. ARMSTRONG. 130th Ohio 132d Ohio 134th Ohio 138th Ohio~ 142d Ohio 5Assumed command July 2. Interchanged brigades July 26. See Loot-note to First Division. ~ Detached to Eastern Shore of Virginia July 14. 26 Page 265 THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 265 General summary of Casualties in the Union Forces, ~5-c.Continued. Killed. Wounded. Captured or missing. a Command. 0 o3 - ,ji -~ be a a . a a n a a ~ ~ Unattached. 37th New Jersey Artillery. New York Light, 33d Battery CAVALRY. Lieut. Col. FRANCIS WASHBURN. 4th Massachusetts, 1st and 3d Battalions* UNATTACHED. 37th U. S. Colored Troops Total Tenth Army Corps EIGHTEENTH ARMY CORPS. Ma~j. Gen. WILLIAM F. SMITH. Brig. Gen. JOHN H. MARTINDALE.f Maj. Gen. EDWARD 0. C. 0Rn4 PROVOST GUARD. Lieut. Col. JOAB N. PATTRRSON. 2d New Hampshire -, 79th New York (one company) FIRST DivisioN. Brig. Gen. GROROR J. STANNARD.I Brig. Gen. HIRAM BURNHAM. First Brigade. Col. EDGAR M. CULLEN. Col. AARON F. STEVENS. 18th New Hampshire( Hist New York . 98th New York . .. 139th ISlew York Second Brigade. Brig. Gen. HIRAM BURNHAM. Col. EDGAR M.CULLEN.f 8th Connecticut 10th New Hampshire 96th New York** 118th New YDrk Third Brigade. Col. GUY V. HENRY. 21st Connecticut 40th Massachusetts 92d New York 58th Pennsylvania 188th PennsylVania 6 94 20 459 28 607 4 4 Total First Divisionti 2 24 9 108 I Companies E and H in Eighteenth Army Corps. tAssumed command July 10. t Assumed Command July 21. ~ On leaVe from July 31. II Transferred from Second Brigade Jnly 25. In command July 31. ~ from First Brigade July 25. It Losses by regiments and brigades not of record. CHAP. Lii.] 4 14 Page 266 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CRAP. LII. General summary of Casualties in the Union Forces, 4~c.Continued. Command. SECOND DIVISION. Brig. Gen. JOHN H. MARTINDALE. Brig. Gen. ADE1.~BERT AMEs.* First Brigade. Col. ALEXANDER PIPER. Col. JAMES STEWART, Jr.t 23d Massachusetts 25th Massachusetts 27th Massachusetts 9th New Jersey 10th New York Heavy Artillery 55th Pennsylvania Second Brigade. Col. GRIFFIN A. STEDMAN, Jr. 11th Connecticut . 8th Maine 12th New Hampshire 148th New York 19th Wisconsin Third Br ede. Brig. Gen. ADELBERT AMES. Col. HARRISON S. FAIRCHILD4 Killed. Q 5th Maryland 89th New York 2d Pennsylvania Heavy Artillery Total Second Division TRIED DIVISION. Brig. Gen. EDWARD W. HINKs. Col. JOHN H. HOLMANJI Brig. Gen. JOSEPH B. CARR4[ First Brigade. Col. JOHN H. HOLHAN. Col. JEPTHA GARRAHD.** 1st U. S. Colored Cavalry (dismounted) 1st U. S. Colored Troops Second Brigade. Col. SAMUEL A. DUNCAN. 2d U. S. Colored Cavalry(dismounted) 4th U. S. Colored Troops 5th U. S. Colored Troops 6th U. S. Colored Troops 22d U. S. Colored Troops Total Third Division~ 6 Wounded. Captured or missing. 1 99 5 445 2 10 562 27 Assumed command July 10. tAssumed Command July 24. ~ Assumed command July 11. ~ See foot-note to First Division. II Assumed command July 1. Assumed command July 29. ~ Assumed command July 2. 266 ii a be ii, 1 3 Page 267 THE RICHMOND CAMPAWN. 267 General summary of Casualties in the Union Forces1 ~cContihued. Killed. Wounded. Captured or missing. Q Command. ,,~ a . a . a . a u Q~ a n a a 0 ~ 0 ~ 0 ~ ARTILLERY HRIGADE. Col. HENRY S. BURTON. Col. ALEXANDER.PIPEE.* 3d New York Light, Battery E 3d New York Light, Battery H 3d New York Light, Battery K 3d New York Light, Battery NI New York Light, 7th Battery New York Light, 16th Batteryq New York Light, 17th Battery 1st PeunsylYania Light, Battery Ii 1st Rhode Island Light, Battery F 1st United States, Battery B 4th United States, Battery L 5th United States, Battery A 5th United States, Battery F Total Artillery Brigadet UNATTACHED. 4th Massachusetts CaYalry, Companies E and H. 1st NewYorkEngineers, t~ompaniesB, K, andM. 1st New YorkMounted Rifles, Companies Band H. 5th Pennsylvania CaYalry, Companies H and I.. 11th Pennsylvania Cavalry, C~npany H Total nnattached Total Eighteenth Army Corps NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS4 SECOND DIVISION. First Brigade. Brig. Gen. HENRY W. BIEGE. 9th Connecticut 12th Maine 14th Maine 26th Massachusetts 14th New Hampshire 75th New York Total First Brigade Second Brigade. Col. EDWARD L. MOLINEUX. 22d Iowa 131st New York, 159th New York Total Second Division NAVAL BRIGADE. Brig. Gen. CHARLES K. GRAHAM. 3 17 I 21 41 1 3 132 14 598 2 36 785 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3d Pennsylvania Heavy Artillery, Company A. 3d Pennsylvania Heavy Artillery, Company B. 3d Pennsylvania Heavy Artillery, Company F. 3d Pennsylvania Heavy Artillery, Company G. 13th New York Heavy Artillery, Company I 13th New York Heavy Artillery, Company K .... 13th New York Heavy Artillery, Company L .... _____ Total Naval Brigade 1 1 ~ AsSumed command Jury 24. t Losses dnring the month are not of record by batteries. ~ The detachment of this corps temporarily with the Army of the James was at- tached to the Tenth Army Corps July 21 to 31. 1 OuA~. tEL Page 268 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. ANP N. C. General summary of Casualties in the Union Force8, 4c.Continued. [CHAP. LII. Killed. Wounded. Captured or missing. Command. 7,3 7,3 7,3 Cs a o . a . a . c ~ u a a a b~ o ~ 0 ~ 0 ~ ENGINEERS. Maj. FREDERICK E. GRAEF. 1st New York (eight companies) SIEGE ARTILLERY. Col. HENRY L. .A~BBOT. 1st Connecticut Heavy 13th New York Heavy, Companies A and H 3d Pennsylvania Heavy, Company~ Total Siege Artillery CAVALRY. Brig. Gen. AUGUST V. KAUTE. First Brigade. Col. ROBERT MI. WEST. 3d New York 5th Pennsylvania Total First Brigade Second Brigade. Col. SAMUEL P. SPEAR. 1st District of Columbia 11th Pennsylvania Total Second Brigade Artillery. Wisconsin Light, 4th Battery Total Cavalry PONTONIERS. Capt. JOHN PICKERING, Jr. Massachusetts Heavy Artillery, 13th Company.. UNATTACHED. 1st Pennsylvania Light Artillery, Battery A.... 10th U. S. Colored Troops 36th U. S. Colored Troops 38th U. S. Colored Troops Total Army of the James 1 3 1 18 23 I 3 1 18 23 3 3 1 1 . 1 3 4 10 230 36 1, 078 2 65 1, 421 RECAPITULATION. Army of the Potomac 56 619 185 2,509 89 1,488 4,946 Army of the James 10 230 36 1,078 2 65 1,421 Grand total 66 849 221 3,587 91 1,553 6,367 26 Page 269 Cw& r. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 269 No. 8. Report of Surg. Edward B. Dalton, U. S. Army, Chief ]Jliedical Officer of Depot Field Hospital, including operations June 14December 31, 1864. DEPOT FIELD HOSPITAL, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, SIR City Point, Va., December [31], 1864. On the morning of the 14th [June] a large proportion of the medical officers, the commissary, and the quartermaster, together with the purveying department and most of the hospital property, started down the Pamunkey en route for Jamestown Island, in the James River, which had been designated in your letter of the 12th as the probable rendezvous until further orders. A temporary delay was occasioned at Yorktown by the great reluctance of the captains of the purveying steamers Planter, Farmer, and Hugh Jenkins to proceed. Their ob- jections were, however, overruled and we reached Jamestown Island on the afternoon of the 15th. Here orders were received through you to proceed to City Point and there establish the hospital depot. On the 16th, upon reaching the pontoon bridge near Fort Powhatan, we were delayed by the crossing of cavalry and the cattle. Surgeon Phelps, however, succeeded in getting above the bridge by means of a small boat and thence by tug to City Point, where he selected a site for the hospital. We finally reached City Point on the 18th, just as a train of ambulances arrived, loaded with wounded from the assault upon Petersburg. These were at once attended to, and transportation to Washington procured for them, hospital transports being loaned for the purpose by Surgeon McCormick, U. S. Army, medical director of the Department of Virginia and North Carolina. The hospital property was at once unloaded and conveyed to the site selected and there put in readiness as rapidly as possible for the reception of wounded who still continued to come in in large numbers. This site, which is the one still occnpied, is located to the south of the James River, one mile from City Poiiit toward Petersburg. It is situated upon a broad plain extending from the Petersburg pike to the high bluffs overlooking the basin of the Appomattox, just at the junction of the latter river with the James. The plan of the encampment, which still remains essentially unaltered, was mainly devised by Doctor Phelps. Some irregularities occurred in its execution, in consequence of the embarrassment of lay- ing out the camp and erecting tents at the same time that the presence of wounded called constantly for professional labor. By means of pon- toons two temporary wharves were soon constructed at a convenient point a short distance up the Appomattox. These were for the exclu- sive use of the hospital, and were used respectively for the landing and issuing of supplies and for transferring wounded to the hospital transports. The services of the transports were immediately, and for a time, constantly in demand. Two of these, the Connecticut and State of Maine, were of suffideutly light dranght to be able to come alongside the wharf. The De Molay could reach the mouth of th~ Appomnattox amid was there loaded by means of lighters. The Atlantic, Baltic, and Western Metropolis came no farther than Fort Monroe or Newport News and were there loaded by transfer from the Connecticut and State * For portion of report (h~re omitted) covering operatiomjs from May 7 to June 13, 1864, see Yol. XXXVI, Part I, p. 269 Page 270 270 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. LII. of Maine. All rendered most efficient service, especially the Connecti- cut, which has been throughout the campaign remarkable for the promptness and energy displayed in her management. The purveying department met all necessary demands with prompt- ness and liberality. Nothing really essential to the care of the wounded was wailting. Bedsacks and blankets were supplied without stint, although for a time bedsteads were dispensed with, excepting in the severer cases, a large proportion of the patients being placed upon sacks amply filled with straw and arranged upon the ground beneath the tents. None were without shelter. Drugs and dressings in abun- dance, hospital stores, ice, and even delicacies were constantly issued; cooking stoves, caldrons, and portable ovens were on hand in suffi- cient quantity for any emergency. Requisitions received prompt and fall attention at all times. But a short time elapsed before the arrival of an abundant supply of bedsteads, when sheets and pillow-cases were at once made use of in all cases where they could essentially add to the comfort of the patient. The capacity of the hospital was rapidly in- creased until it became capable of accommodating 10,000 patients. At first these were mainly wounded, but as the season advanced and the prolonged duty in the trenches told upon the men, the proportion of sick became greater. Each successive engagement would fill the beds with wounded, but these, especially the severely hurt, were sent north as rapidly as possible, while the sick, as a general rule, were removed only when the character of the case rendered a change of climate es- sential to recovery. The entire encampment now covers an area of some 200 acres and is composed of 1,200 hospital tents. The latter were originally pitched in groups composed of two tents and an intervening fly, and placed end to end. These groups are arranged in rows, side by side, divided by lateral interspaces of fifteen feet in width between the individual gronps. The ends of the groups abut upon streets sixty feet wide running parallel with the river and meeting at right angles a main avenue 180 feet in width, which extends from the verge of the bluff directly through the center of the camp to the Petersburg pike. Since the approach of cool weather an entire tent has been substituted for the intervening fly in each group. Shortly after the establishment of the hospital at this point, works were constructed by the quartermaster for supplying the encampment with water. Two steam-engines of four horse-power each were placed at the foot of the bluff at the edge of the river, whence they force water into a tank capable of containing 0,000 gallons, which is raised thirty feet above the level of the bluff and supported upon a strong wooden trestle-work. From this tank a conducting pipe of two inches diame- ter descends to the ground and is then conducted at a depth of eight- een inches below the surface along the main avenue. At right angles to this main pipe smaller ones diverge at intervals and enter the vari- ous divisions of the hospital, where at the extremity of each pipe is a hydrant. These works, which were completed oi~ the 0th of July, have proved entirely satisfactory. An abundance of river water was thus supplied for laundry, bathing, and other coarser purposes. Wells were dug in various parts of the hospital, and these, with numerous springs in the vicinity, afforded a plentiful supply for drinking and cooking. For several weeks subsequent to the arrival at City Point no rain fell and the accumulation of dust became a source of the greatest dis- comfort. Bodies of troops and wagons were constantly passing along the main road, and the dust thus disturbed was borne in dense cloud Page 271 CHAP. LII.J THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 271 over and through the camp, filling the tents and penetrating even the bedclothes. This matter was represented at the Surgeon-Generals Office and sprinkling carts applied for. Eight of these were promptly sent down from Washington and were immediately and constantly made use of. They afforded great relief not only in subduing the dust but also in moderating the intense heat of the atmosphere. As an ad- ditional means high, broad bowers were built continuously along the ends of the tents on each side of the streets. For purposes of drain- age each group of tents was surrounded by a trench eight inches in depth. From these trenches the water is conducted into ditches which run parallel to and on each side of the streets, and terminate by means of still larger ones in various irregular ravines with which the ground is broken and which descends rapidly to the river. This system has proved entirely effectual. It is impossible, by merely quoting the register, to convey an ac- curate idea of the number of sick and wounded who have received attention in this hospital. At Fredericksburg, at White House, and still later at City Point, hundreds passed through under circumstances which rendered it impracticable to register their names or even to ac- curately estimate their number. These instances occurred during or immediately subsequent to an engagement, when the accumulation of wounded and the constant calls for professional labor sometimes made it necessary to transfer at once from the ambulances to the hospital transports. In fact, as I have already stated, so unremitting were the professional duties of the medical officers during the first fortnight at Fredericksburg, that it was impossible even to prepare morning re- ports, and it was not until the 16th of May that even a numerical report was attempted. From that date to the present daily reports have been forwarded, and they show that from the 16th of May, 1864, to October 31, 1864, there have been received into this hospital and retained here nuder treatment for at least forty-eight hours, 68,540 sick and wounded officers and men. Of these 51,313 have been trans- ferred to the various U. S. general hospitals at the Korth, and 11,706 have been returned direct from this hospital to duty with their com- mands. One thousand five hundred and sixteen have died. A large number of the wounded had when received here already suffered am- putation or other capital operations at the immediate front, while in a great many other cases similar interference was still necessary. The experience here has given the most convincing evidence in favor of primary operations in gunshot wounds. The majority of the sick received duringthe summer have suffered from dysentery, diarrhea, and malarial fevers. A small proportion of eases of typhoid fever have occurred and a very few, comparatively, of pneumonia and milder diseases of the chest. The manifestations of malarial influences have, as a general rule, been of a mild character, and evidently owing in great measure to the prolonged exposure and hard service to which the men have been subjected in the trenches. In fact, very many of these do not properly come under the head of either of the recognized classes of malarious fever, but were rather cases of a depressed condition not inaptly expressed by the term malarial malaise. A large proportion of these recovered rapidly and entirely under the influence of rest, cleanliness, and good nourishment, together with moderate administration of quinine and iron. A number of cases have arisen within the limits of the encampment, but not in sufficient number or of sufficient severity to impair the efficiency of the hospital or to throw any doubt upon the propriety of its establishmen Page 272 272 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. LII. and continuance. Ou the contrary, the numbers who have recovered and been returned to duty withiu a few weeks after their admission, and without their removal to a distance from the seat of war, have proved this site a most eligible one. I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, ED. B. DALTON, Surgeon, U. S. Volunteers, Chief Medical Officer. IJ3vt. Licut. Col. T. A. MCPARLIN, U. S. Army, iJiliedical Director, Army of the Potom~te. No. 9. Report of Brig. Gen. ]Iifarsena B. Patrick, U. S. Army, Provost-Marshal- General, Army of the Potomac. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, OFFICE OF PROVOST-MARSHAL-GENERAL, August 10, 1864. GENERAL: FIFTH EPOCH. Marching 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, 18th, 23d, 26th, and 29th of June, left Parsleys Corners, passing by Tunstalls Station, to near White House, to Ropers Church, cross the Chickahominy and James Rivers, Knoxs Cross-Roads, and City Point. The regiment,t by orders of General Grant, was sent by transport to Wilcoxs Landing; marched toward Charles City Court-House to report to General Sheri- dan; returned on the 29th of June, and from that date to the 30th of July has been engaged in doing provost and guard duty at City Point and on the lines of communication to the Army of the Potomac. The Third Pennsylvania Cavalry (Lieutenant-Colonel Jones com- manding), the Sixty-eighth Pennsylvania Volunteers (commanded to nearly the end of the Fifth Epoch by Lieutenant-Colonel Winslow, after that by Col. A. II. Tippin), and the One hundred and fourteenth Pennsylvania Volunteers (Colonel Collis commanding) have moved with the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac daily. On the 21st of May these three regiments took part in the skirmish at Guineys Bridge, clearing that passage (the accompanying list of casualties will show with what lossj~. - The Third Pennsylvania Cavalry has been on several occasions called upon to act upon the flanks of the army, and in the advance, besides detachments of it being frequently sent out as scouting parties, on all of which occasions it has behaved with great coolness and judgment. The Sixty-eighth Pennsylvania Volun- teers has been employed as prison guard at these headquarters, by no means a light duty, and has given very general satisfaction in their performance of it. 1n the skirmish on the 21st of May they acted with a great deal of dash and bravery. This regiment has also acted at times on the flanks of the army. The One hundred and fourteenth Pennsylvania Volunteers has been doing exclusively guard duty for headquarters camp and train. In the skirmish of the 21st of May it * For portion of report (here omitted) covering operations from May 4 to June 12, 1864, see Vol. XXXVI, Part I, p. 279. tTwentietli New York State Militia. ~ Shows 3 men wounded in the 68th Pennsylvania Page 273 CHAP. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 273 took its part promptly, and the colonel of the regiment showed a great deal of promptness in the manenvering the troops under his commaud on that occasion. This regiment has also at times acted upon the flanks of the army. I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant, M. R. PATRICK, Provost-Marshal- General. Brig. Gen. S. WILLIAMS, Assistant Adjutant- General. No. 10. Reports of ]Jfaj. Benjamin F. Fisher, Signal Gorps, U. S. Army, Chief Signal Officer, Army of the Potomac. HDQRS. ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, SIGNAL DEPARTMENT, October [22], 1864. GENERAL:* Upon the 12th of June the army commenced moving in the direction of the James River, and I~his commences the fifth epoch of the campaign. Upon the 13th of June the advance reached the vicinity of Wilcoxs Landing and signal comnmnnication was immediately opened with Fort Powhatan and Wilsons Wharf. The general commanding was then placed in immediate commnnication with General Butlers command and enabled to call for the necessary means to transport the Army of the Potomac to the sonth bank of the James. Upon the 14th of Jnne I established a line of stations toward City Point and on the 15th had communication established from Donthats Wharf to Point of Rocks, General Butlers headquarters. During the passage of the troops from Wilcoxs Wharf to Wind-Mill Point commu- nication was kept open between the opposite sides of the river, enabling corps commanders to issue their instructions conveniently and speedily, thus facilitating and expediting the crossing of that portion of the army. Upon the 15th of June, by direction of the commanding general, Capt. T. R. Clark reported for temporary duty to the naval officer in command of the gunboat Mackinaw, stationed in the river to cover the crossing of the army and the taking up of the pontoon bridge. Upon June 16 the advance of the army arrived in front of Peters- burg, and upon the 17th stations of observation were established at General Hancocks headquarters near the Prince George road, the head- quarters of General Smith near the Friend house, and those of General Warren upon the left near the Avery house. From these stations the position of the enemy and the arrival of additional troops could be seen. As the lines of the army were extended to the westward stations were added in such numbers and positions as to command a view of all that was transpiring along the front. Upon the 22d of June we occupied five stations, affording the follow- ing advantages: No. 1, at the Walthall house upon the extreme right of our lines, commanding a view of the city of Petersburg, a section of the Weldon railroad near the depot, a broken view of the country For portion of report (here omitted) covering operations from May 4 to June 12, 1864, see vol. XXXVI, Part I, p. 282. - 18 R RYOL XL, PT Page 274 274 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. LII. extending from Cemetery ilill southwestwar(i to the lead-works, and thence around several miles westward of the city to the line of the Ap- pomattox; also a view of the left bank of the Appomattox from the hills back of Pocahontas to Fort Clifton, with all the batteries or works between these two points. In addition, the officer upon this station intercepted the daily report of observations made by the enemys signal officer from the Chesterfield Heights. Xo. 2, npon the Jordan house, which commanded a point on the street in Petersburg leading to the bridge crossing the Appomattox River from Petersburg to Pocahontas. It likewise had a sweeping view of the left bank of the river, and the officer upon the station was frequently employed by the artillery offi- cers in the vicinity to note the effect of shots fired at the enemys bai- teries at Archers and other points, thus aiding in directing the firing. No. 3 was located upon a hickory tree near the Prince George Court- House road at an elevation of eighty-five~feet. This afforded a view of the lines from the Appomattox to the vicinity of the plank road, of Cem- etery Hill, the city, the country for several miles west of the city, amid a small section of the Richmond pike, about one mile from Pocahontas. No. 4 was established upon the Avery house, giving a close view of the works east of Cemetery Hill, and thence southwestward; also a section of a road northwest of the city running toward Richmond. No. 5, near the Jerusalem plank road (now in Fort Davis), commanding a good view of the enemys line of works (first and second) from the east side of Cemetery Hill to west of Weldon railroad; also of the roads leading out of the city in the vicinity of the lead-works, such as the Weldon railroad, the Boydton plank road, and the Squirrel Level road. To give a detailed statement of all the reports made daily would per- haps extend this report to too great a length, and I shall, therefore, confine myself to two or three particular instances in the latter part of June and during July. Upon the 23d of June our lines, having been extended west of the Jerusalem plank road, were drawn out toward the Weldon railroad, and the enemy detached a portion of their army to operate against that flank. This movement was made by about 10,000 infantry, and several batteries of artillery were discovered from the plank road station and reported to the general commanding, thus affording himu timely infor- mation to take the necessary precaution to thwart any design the enemy might have. Upon the 27th of June the enemy concentrated in the vicinity of Reams Station a force of cavalry and infantry in order to intercept, as eveiits proved, the returning expedition under the command of General Wilson. The movements of these forces from the vicinity of Peters- burg, by the way of the Squirrel Level road, were discovered and re- ported. Upon July 1 the main portion of the troops that had been operating against General Wilson were reported returning toward Petersburg. Upon the 27th of July. the information was forwarded to the coin- manding general of the withdrawal of a portion of the emmemys troops from the vicinity of Petersburg. The knowledge of these movements gave the commanding general positive information of the success of his feint upon the north bank of the James River, and promised success in the assault upon the enemys lines upon the mormming of the 30th of July. From dawn until dark of each (lay a careful watch was kept from the several stations, and each new work, every additional change in the enemys line considered of any importance, and all movements of troop Page 275 CHAP. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 275 were immediately reported. These references to the few of the many daily reports made will enable an estimate to be formed of the character and value of the services rendered by the corps in addition to its ready means of opening communication between distant and sometimes almost inaccessible places. During the campaign we occnpied over seventy stations ~f observatioii aiid established eleven lines of signal communi- cation. It is my duty as well as pleasure to bear full testimony to the energy and zeal displayed by Capt. P. A. Taylor, serving with General Han- cock; Capt. D. E. Castle actino- Warren; Capt. ~. C. A signal officer, serving with Geiieral Paine, serving with General Burnside, and Capt. C. L. Davis, in command of the reserve detachment. Through the efforts of the latter officer few means were untried by which service might be rendered. In addition I would mention the names of Lieuts. C-. J. Clarke, Will- iamn H. It. Keel andJ B Duff f ~, I gal lantry. the . , or their energy, faithfulness an Among non-commissioned officers who have shown themselves especially attentive, faithful, and intelligent in performing their duties I would record Sergts. H. W. Fulton and Van Buren Sleeper. While thus specially pointing to individuals, I must attest the energy and zeal of the officers and men of the corps generally. All require- ments usually met with a ready and willing response. If, owing to the character of the country and the natural difficulties to be overcome, we. as a corps have not accomplished what we desired, permit me to record that we tried to do our duty. I have the honor to be, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant, B. F. FISHER, iVfajor and Chief & gnal Officer, Army of the Potomac. Brig. C-en. S. WILLIAMS, Assistant Adjutant- General. HDQRS. ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, SIGNAL DEPARTMENT, October 25, 1864. SIR: Your communication of the 20th of September, 1804, withdraw- ing the release granted in October, 1863, relieving this office from the duty of making certain monthly reports called for by a circular issued from the office of the Signal Bureau, dated August 24, 1863, has been received. In compliance with said communication I ~mave the honor to submit the following combined monthly reports of operations for the months of July, August, and September, 1864: At time opening of the month of July the Army of the Potomac was lying in front of Petersburg, Va., being actively engaged in regular siege operations. At this time the officers and men of my detachment were stationed at such points along our lines as would enable them to observe carefully the movements and operations of the enemy. The more important of these stations were located as follows: No. 1, at the Walthall house, upon the extreme right of our lines, commanding a view of the city of Petersburg, a section of the Weldon railroad near the depot, a broken view of the country extending from Cemetery Hill southwestward to the lead-works, amid thence around several miles west- ward of the city to the line of the Appomattox, also a view of the left bank of the Appomattox from the hills back of Pocahontas to For Page 276 276 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. LII. Clifton, with all the batteries or works between these two points. In addition, the officers upon this station intercepted the daily reports of observations made by the enemys signal officers from the Chesterfield Heights. No. 2, npon the Jordan house, which commanded a point on the street in Petersburg leading to the bridge crossing the Appomattox River from Petersburg to Pocahontas. It likewise had a sweeping view of the left bank of the river, and the officer upon the station was fre- quently employed by the artillery officers in that vicinity to note the effects of shots fired at the enemys batteries at Archers and other points, thus aiding in directing the firing. No. 3 was located upon a hickory tree, at an elevation of eighty-five feet, near the Prince George Court- House road. This afforded a view of the lines from the Appomattox to the vicinity of the plank road, of Cemetery Hill, the city, the country for several miles west of the city, and a small section of the Richmond pike about one mile from Pocahontas. No. 4 was established upon the Avery house, giving a close view of the works east of Cemetery Hill, and thence southwaxd; also a section of a road northwest of the city running toward Richmond. No.5, near the Jerusalem plank road (now in Fort Davis), commanding a good view of the enemys lines of works (first and second) from the east side of Cemetery Hill to the west of the Weldon railroad; also of the roads leading out of the city in the vicinity of the lead-works, such as the Weldon railroad, the Boydton plank road, and the Squirrel Level road. These comprise as before stated, the most important stations in operation at the commencement of the month of July, 1864. Many others were established at different times, but only occupied temporarily as occasion required. These sta- tions were almost exclusively stations of observation, no communication by flags being necessary on account of the facilities afforded to transmit all messages by the military telegraph. The majority of them were also located in such close proximity to the enemys lines as to be under the command of their sharpshooters if discovered, rendering it neces- sary to prevent their existence being made known. In addition to these stations under the charge of the reserve party, and reporting directly through the chief signal officer to the commanding general of the army, two officers were assigned to each corps hea4quarters, who rendered such immediate signal service as they were able to the several corps commanders. It is to be understood in the following report that all movements or changes mentioned or stated to have been discovered were reported to the commanding general. In order to connect the operations and re- ports made up on July 1 with those preceding, I will refer briefly to the movements discovered upon June 27, upon which date the enemy concentrated in the vicinity of Reams Station a force of cavalry and infantry in order to intercept, as events proved, the returning expedi- tion under the command of General Wilson. The movement of these forces from the vicinity of Petersburg, by way of the Squirrel Level road, were seen from one of our stations and reported accordingly. Upon July 1 the main portion of the troops that had been operatiiig against General Wilson were discovered returning toward Petersburg, which at once put an end to the apprehension arising from the presence of such a large force upon the flank and rear of our army. Upon July 2 a heavy train of wagons passed into Petersburg, via Il3oydton plank road. A new camp discovered south of the lead-works. July 3. Several minor movements of trains and troops west of the Weldon railroad. Indications of a in~x-~ late in the evening, but nothing positive discovered Page 277 eItAP. LII.~ THE HICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 277 July 4. Six regiments of infantry and several pieces of artillery passed from Petersburg toward Richmond to-day. July 5 and 0. Enemy throwing up a second line and working with large details upon main line. July 7. A train of eighty-one wagons passed southward upon road west of Weldon railroad. The enemy working upon new line between the Jerusalem plank road aiid the lead-works. July 8. A new redoubt reported being constructed in rear of Gregory~s house. A small body of infantry and cavalry, with a battery of five pieces of artillery, passed southward west of the Weldon railroad. Construction trains on Weldon railroad. July 9 and 10. Working parties were seen at various parts of their line. Traiiis upon the Weldon railroad, and a battery of artillery moved southward on the Halifax road. From July 11th to the 28th various minor movements of the enemys troops were discovered, and detailed reports of the enemys working parties with the changes in their lines made. July 27, the disappearance of camps and the movements of troops from the vicinity of Petersburg toward Richmond reported. These movements were made in connection with General Grants feint up omi the north bank of the James and assured its success. July 30, the Burnside mine was exploded and an assault made upon the enemys works. Signal officers occupied all possible points along the lines and reported each charge.* I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant, B. F. FISHER, Major and Chief Signal Officer, Army of the Potomac. Lient. Col. W. J. L. NICODEMUS, Comdg. & gnai Corps, U. S. Army, Washington, D. C. No. 11. Report of Brig. Gem Henry J. Hunt, U. S. Army, Chief of Artillery, Army of the Potomac, including operations June 16October 31. ARTILLERY HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, October 31, 1864. GENERAL: I June 16, these headqaarters crossed the James and arrived in front of Petersburg. June 17, soon after General Burnside had driven the enemy from his line north of the Avery house, I examined the position and placed bat- teries to hold them, and to prepare the farther advance of the Ninth Corps; I also gave the necessary instructions to close the gorges of the captured redoubts and place them in condition to be used against the enemy. June 18, I proceeded by direction of Major.General Meade to the ex- treme right, where it was reported the enemnys batteries across the Ap- pomattox were delaying General Martindales movements, and placed * For continuation of report, see Vol. XLII, Part I. t For portion of report (here omitted) covering operations from May 4 to June 12, 1864, see VoL XXXVI, Part I, p. 284. So much of this report as relates to the operntions on July 30 was also embodied in a report, dated August 13, 1864, and which, to avoid repetition, is omitted Page 278 278 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. Lfl. batteries of the Sixth Corps to prepare and follow up the contemplated attack by General Martindale. I took part in the advance, and imme- di~utely on the enemys being driven from his position brought up bat- teries to secure our possession of the position taken. I also planted bat- teries on the bank of the river near the Page house, in the position which commanded the railroad bridge crossing over the Appomattox at Peters- burg. This position, now forming the extreme right of our lines, has been since greatly strengthened, and constitutes a strong battery with an armament of three siege guns and four 8-inch niortars. I have thus far reported such operations of the artillery as would not be included in the reports of the chiefs of artillery serving with the corps, to which I beg leave respectfully to refer for the operations of their batteries. They have doubtless rendered reports to the generals with whom they respectively served. I have received but two such reports, those of Col- onels Tidball and Wainwright, commanding the artillery of the Second and Fifth Corps respectively. In the battle of the Wilderness, and in- deed in time greater portion of the battles of this campaign, the ground and the nature of the operations have been unfavorable to the use of field artillery, yet hardly a day has passed from the crossing of the Rapi- dan that one or more batteries have not been engaged. On some occa- sions, as on the Po, and at Spotsylvania Court-House many batteries have been called into requisition, and always officers and men have per- formed the duties devolved upon them with gallantry and skill. The excellent condition in which the batteries have been kept, the prompti- tude with which their supplies, on which so much depended, were fur- nished under unusually unfavorable circumstances, and the efficient con- dition which the batteries have maintained down to the present time, give proof of the excellence of the battery officers, and of the system of organization adopted for the arm. SIEGE TRAIN. On the 16th of April, in obedience to the instructions of the major-gen- eral commanding, I submit~d a project for the organization of a siege train, to consist as a minimum of forty siege guns, ten 10-inch, twenty 8- inch and twenty Coehorn mortars, recommending that the preparation of the train be intrusted to Col. II. L. AbbQt, First Connecticut Artillery. This project (a copy of which is appended, marked A) was approved and Colonel Abbot proceeded at once to the organization of the train, to which by subsequent orders were added six 100-pounder Parrotts and ten 8-inch siege howitzers. Colonel Abbot was ordered to the James River in advance of this army and served under the orders of Major-General Butler, commanding the Army of the James in its oper- ations near Richmond, and on the arrival of this army before Petersburg reported to me. The siege train has since been employed in the siege operations of both armies. For a detailed report of its organization, labors and services, I respectfully refer to the excellent reports of Colonel Abbot, appended and marked I and K.* June 27 I was placed by Lieutenant-General Grant in charge of all siege operations against Petersburg south of the Appomattox(see Special Orders, Ko. 42, headquarters Armies of the United States, appended and marked B). This order brought the artillery operations in front of the Eighteenth Corps, extending from the Appomattox to near the Hare house, as well as those of this army, nuder my direction. Colonel Burton, Fifth U. S. Artillery, was assigned temporarily to the Eighteenth Corps, * Embodied in No. 244, p. 671 Page 279 CHAP. LIII THE I~ICIIMOND CAMPAIGN. 279 and in addition to the charge of the siege batteries on that front took that of the batteries of the corps, the artillery of which he reorganized. My aide-de-canip, Lient. C. T. Bissell, Fifth Michigan Infantry, was assigned to the personal staff of Colonel Burton. June 29, having received orders from Major-general Meade to fur- nish to Major-General Bnrnside the powder, & c., required for a mine General Burnside was running under one of the enerny~s works, I pro- cured the necessary material and selected the positions for the guns to cover the operations. As rapidly as the works could be prepared the guns were placed in position. Those not needed at the time were held ready to be so placed as soon as the necessity should arise. July 6 to 9, the Sixth Corps, ordered to Washington, left its trains and six batteries at City Point, whence they were soon after ordered to the Artillery Reserve and placed in position on the lines. The batteries thus left were: Parsons (A), First New Jersey, four 3-inch; Rhodes (E), First Rhode Island, four Napoleous; IDorseys (II), First Ohio, four 3-inch; Brinekles (E), Fifth United States, four Napoleons; Whites, Fourth Maine, four 3-inch; MeLains, Third New York, four Kapoleons. July 3, received orders from Major-General Meade to examine, with Major Duane, chief engineer, the enemys works in front of Petersburg to ascertain whether offensive operations at any point were practicable (see Appendix C). July 6, after a careful examination of the enemy~s position, a joint report from the chief engineer and myself was made, pronouncing an assault impracticable and recommending regular approaches (see Ap- pendix D). On the 9th of July orders were given front general headquarters to commence operations by regular approaches against Petersburg (see Appendix E). In pursuance of these instructions I designated the positions of the batteries to be constructed for the operations then ordered. The posi- tions were selected in accordance with a plan submitted by Major Duane and myself on the 10th, and approved and ordered to be exe- cuted on the 11th of July (Appendix F, G). The direct object of these proposed operations was the possession of the crest of the ridge behind the enemys line which dominates Petersburg and the possession of which it was believed would involve the fate of the town. The operations in view were: First, to destroy the obstructions to an assault on the enemys line, such as abatis, palisades, & c. Second, to silence his guns and especially those bearing on the point of assault. Third, to sweep the ground over which his troops must pass to attack our assaulting columns and to. hold his troops in check and cover the retreat should the assault fail. To accomplish the first object the bat- teries were so placed as to bring all the abatis, palisades, & c., under an artillery fire, which could reach them either by a direct slant or enfilade fire; for this field guns were sufficient. The second purpose required that the batteries should be so placed as to give so far as possible a direct fire upon the ene~y~s enmbrasures, and especially upon those which flanked the point of attack. These embrasures were placed principally on the face and flank of the enemys redoubt and works which formed the salient in front of the Fifth Corps, and in sunken batteries near this redoubt. For this purpose siege gnus were best suited. For the third requisite, the field of hre, for all the guns, siege and field, was so arranged that all the visible ground between the enemys line and the crest behind it should be swept by as many of the guns as a compliance with the first two conditions would permit Page 280 280 OPERATIONS IN SE. YA. AND N. C. [CHAP. LII From the position of the batteries of the enemy which flanked the mine work, it was evident that there would be great difficulty in bring- ing a direct fire of sufficient power to silence them so promptly as to protect our assaulting columns. The redoubt is well placed, in a coin- manding position, aud well provided with traverses. It was, therefore, considered as indispensable that we should bring, in addition to the horizoni;al, a powerful vertical fire to bear upon the redoubt and sunken batteries near it. All the siege mortars remaining in the train (viz, ten 10-inch and six 8-inch) were, therefore, set apart for this serv- ice. The Coehorns were distributed along the line, so that all points of the enemys position should be more or less under a vertical fire. The location of the different batteries will be seen by a reference to the drawing submitted herewith.* They were constructed by details from the different corps under the general direction of Major Duane, c~ief engineer. On June 30 Brookers battery (B), First Connecticut, six 4k-inch siege guns, was placed in Battery No. 19, which commands the ene- mys crest behind the mine. July 6, four 8-inch mortars were placed in Battery NQ. 29. They were served by a platoon of Battery A, First Connecticut, Captain Gillet~t. July 8, two 8-inch mortars and July 9 four Coehorns were placed in battery near the Hare house umi Battery G. , der command of Lieutenant Sargeant, July 14, the Fourth New York Artillery, Lieutenant-Colonel Alleock commanding, reported for duty with the siege train. July 25, Pratts battery (M), First Connecticut, six 44-inch siege guns, was placed in position in Battery No. 24. A few field batteries were also in position on the line. July 28, orders were given to prepare for an assault, and on that night ten 10-inch mortars and six 8-inch were placed in position, the 10-inch in Battery No. 8, the 8-inch in Battery No. 9; the first served by Captain Pierces battery (C), First Connecticut, the latter by part of Battery A, Lieutenant Patterson. On the night of the 29th Captain Browns battery (II), First Con- nectieut4 six 44-inch siege guns, Battery No. 4, and the field batteries of the Fifth and Eighteenth Corps, not heretofore on the lines, were placed in position. On the 28th I visited the different batteries and gave detailed in- structions for the employment of each gun under the different probable circumstances that might arise. These orders were impressed on the battery officers by their commanders, and on the morning of the 29th circular instructions were furnished to all artillery commanders (see Appendix II) for their government. The following pieces were placed in battery in front of the Fifth and Ninth Corps: ten 10-inch mortars, ten 8-inch mortars, 17 Coehorn mortars 1 total, 141; and near the Hare house, to , 8 siege guns, 86 field guns; bear upon the enemys batteries and lines on the right of Burusides corps, six 8-inch mortars, 11 Coe- horns, 6 field guns; total, 23. The total number of guns and mortars was, therefore, 110 guns and 54 mortars. On the morning of the 30th, as soon as the mine exploded, our fire opened along the whole line. The firing was from each piece slow, deliberate, and careful, partaking of the nature of target practice, and was very effective, the amount of fire required being provided for by the large number of pieces brought into action. The enemys guns in To appear in the Atlas. Browns battery belonged to the Fourth New York Artillery Page 281 CHAP. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 281 front of the Fifth Corps were soon silenced and his fire in front of the Ninth confined to a battery on the hill behind the mine A (see sketch) and to one gnn from his work B, next sonth of the mine, which conid not be effectually reached by the gnns in front of it, and which was sheltered from the fire of Batteries Kos. 20 to 24 by the trees in front of the latter, which had not been felled by the troops as required~ This work having been delayed by the Ninth Corps until the night of the 29th, it was then objected by General Burnside that the noise of chopping would alarm the enemy, and that it could be done after the mine was sprung. The battery in which this one gnn was placed was expected to be in our possession within a few minntes after the explo- sion, but was not taken possession of by our infantry. The Battery A on the crest behiiid the mine and near a place known as the Chimneys, opened from time to time, bnt was always silenced by a few rounds from Brookers battery and the field guns which could be turned upon it. As a whole the practice was excellent, keeping down the enemys fire, destroying the embrasures, especially of the enemys redoubt and works at the angle, exploding one of his magazines and several cais- sons, and preventing troops passing by the direct line from his right to the point of attack. At 110 a. m. orders were given for the withdrawal of the troops, which was covered as far as possible by the artillery. Our works were so well constructed and the fire ot the enemys bat- teries so effectually kept down that the casualties were few. Major Fitzhugh, First New York Artillery, is included in the list of wounded. I have to acknowledge my indebtedness in these operations to Col. II. L. Abbot, First Connecticut Artillery and captain Engineers, U. S. Army, commanding siege train; Col. C. S. Wainwright, First New York Artillery, chief of artillery, Fifth Corps; Lient. Col. J. A. Monroe, First Rhode Island Artillery, chief of artillery, Ninth Corps; Col. A. Piper, Tenth New York Foot Artillery and captain Third U. S. Artillery, chief of artillery, Eighteenth Corps; and Lieut. Col. E. li. Warner, First New York Artillery and first lieutenant Third U. S. Artillery, inspec- tor of artillery on my staff. Colonel Abbot was indefatigable in his labors. When the order was received by him to send the siege guns and material to the lines, it was on board ship at Broadway Landing, seven miles distant, but the same night he had the sixteen heavy mortars, with all the ammunition and material in their batteries, ready for service at the required moment, and Colonel Abbot took immediate command of the 10-inch mortar battery during the bombardment. Colonels Wainwright and Piper and hieutenant-eolonel Monroe were also prompt an~ effective in getting their batteries in position and superintending their respective lines during the action. At 11 p. m. July 30 orders were received by me to withdraw so much of the siege train as was in front of the Fifth and Ninth Corps and part of that in front of the Eighteenth and move it to City Point. The order was tel- egraphed to Colonel Abbot immediately, and in thirty-six hours fifty- two heavy siege guns and mortars,, with their ammnnition, platforms, equipments, and other material, were secretly and safely withdrawn, moved by land seven miles to Broadway Landing, and loaded on barges. A few siege guns amid mortars were left on the Eighteenth Corps front to control the enemys batteries on the opposite side of the river. Since July 31 various changes have taken place as necessity required in the position of the battbries on the lines and in the armament of the works; but no operations of importance have been undertaken, the batteries being employed principally to keep down the enemys fire Page 282 282 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. rCHAP. LII. At times, however, by order of corps commanders, they have opened fire on the town of Petersburg. A number of the works having been inclosed and garrisons with artillery ordered to be left iu them in case the army should move, the magazines in the forts designated were sup- plied with ammunition so that each gun shonld have 150 rouiids, in- cluding that iu the linibers, which in most cases were left in the forts. The ammunition for this purpose was taken from the wagons of the brigade ammunition train, and from those of the artillery park, the wagons being left empty so as to withdraw the ammunition at the short- est notice. The caissons of the batteries in the works were thus ren-. dered disposable to take the place of these empty wagons in the bri- gade, and so complete the supply of ammunition for the batteries that should move. When the army was moved on 26th of October these works had their armaments left in them, so that the amount of artillery which accompanied the army was but small. For the services of the field artiflery in the affairs on the Weldon railroad, l9th22d August, at IReams Station m Augnst 25, on Hatch- ers iRun October 26-28, and in the various operations of the cavalry, I respectfully refer you to the reports of the commanders of the troops to which the batteries were attached. For want of complete returns I am unable to state the losses of the artillery in killed and wounded. The captures and losses of guns re- ported are as follows: Captured, 32 guns; lost, 25 guns; showing an excess of 7 guns captured over the number lost from May 4 to October 31, 1864. Number of guns. Bate. Corps. ~ where. Remarks. 3 3~ ~i2 a 0 0 ~ May 5 Fifth 2 wilde~ess winslows battery (B), 1st New York, Napoleons. May 10 Second 1 5outh of Po River Browns Battery (B), 1st Rhode Island, Napoleon. May 11 Cavalry 2 Yellow Tavern May 12 Second 20 Spotsylvania Court-Rouse. Juno 17 Ninth 4 Petersburg June 22 Second 4 do McXnights, 12th New York Bat. tery, four 3-inch rifles. June 29 Cavalry 8 Reams Station Maynadiers (K), 1st United States, four guns. Fitzhnghs (C and E), 4th United States, four guns. Four Napoleons, four 3-inch. July 28 Second.. 4 Jones Neck July 28 Cavalry 1 Beep Bottom . Bennisons (A), Second Artillery, one 3-inch. August iSa Second.. 1 August 25 Second 9 Reams Station Sleepers, 10th Massachusetts, four guns McKnights, 12th New %rk, one gun. Browns (A and B), 1st Rhode Island, four guns. Septbr 30. Fifth ... 1 Poplar Grove Church Total ... 32 25 a August 15, one 8-inch howitzer captured by Secon4 Corps at Beep Bottom, reported since this report was made out, I have respectfully to call aftention to the services in this campaign of the commanding - officer of the Artillery Reserve, Col. H. S. Burton, Fifth U. S. Artillery; of Col. J. C. Tidball, Fourth New York Foot Ar- tillery and captain Second U. S. Artillery; Col. C. S. Wainwright, First New York Light Artillery; Col. C. II. Tompkins, First Rhode Island Light Artillery, chiefs of artillery of the Second, Fifth, and Sixth Corps Page 283 CHAP. Lii.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 283 respectively; of Col. II. L. Abbot, First Connecticut Foot Artillery and captain U. S. Engineers, commanding siege train; of Lient. Col. J. A. Monroe and Maj. J. G. Hazard and Maj. J. A. Tompkins, First Rhode Island Light Artillery; Lient. Col. E. R. Warner and Maj. R. H. Fitzhugh, First New York Light Artillery. These offi- cers have alWays and everywhere discharged the duties devolving 1z~pon them with skill, gallantry, and zeal, and the most of them have served long and faithfully with this army, have often been recommended for reward, and have established their claims to the higher rank, the duties of which they have been performing. Colonel Tidball (distin- guished for his gallantry and former services in the Horse Artillery), Colonels Tompkins, ~~ain~~right, and Major Hazard have long com- manded, and in our principal battles have fought artillery brigades with gallantry and skill. The organization, management, and service of the siege train entitle its commander, Colonel Abbot, to whom its efficiency is due, to promotion. Lieutenant-Colonel Warner has served as my assistant in the organization of the Artillery Reserve and of the artil- lery of this army, has commanded brigades and batteries in battle, and as inspector of artillery for this army has proyed a valuable and efficient officer. The services of the other officers named have been varied and important. Colonel Wainwright and Major Hazard have been recently brevetted, and I respectfully recommend that the same honor be con- ferred upon the others. This acknowledgment of its services is due as much to the artillery as to the officers who commanded it. My staff; Capt. J. N. Craig, assistant adjutant-general; Lients. W. S. Worth, Eighth LU. S.] Thfantry,C. T. Bissell, First Michigan Cavalry, and Carl L. Berlin, Eighth New York Cavalry, aides-dc-camp, have performed their duties with efficiency and gallantry. Respectfully, your obedient servant, HENRY ~. HUNT, Brigadier-General, Chief of Artillery, Army of the Potomac. Brig. Gen. S. WILLIAMS, Assistant Adjutant- General, Army of the Potomac. APPENDIX.. A. ARTILLERY HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Major-General HUMPHREYS, April 16, 1864. Chief of Staff: GENERAL: I have respectfully to submit the following proposition for the organization of a siege train, should one be required for service with this army near Richmond: The train should be prepared in Washington, aud as a minimum com- posed of forty 4~--inch siege guns, six spare carriages; ten 10-inch mor- tars, two spare carriages; twenty 8-inch mortars, four spare carriages; twenty Coehorn mortars, with the proper implememits and equipments, tool-wagons, sling carts, battery wagons and forges, mortar wagons, & c., the eight 44-inch siege guns of Abbots regiment (First Connecticut Heavy Artillery), lately sent to Washington, to constitute a part of the train. If the material can he brought by water or rail to within a reason- able distance of the point at which the train is to be used, the horse teams of the two siege batteries and those of the Artillery Reserve would be available for transporting the guns, and such additional mule teams as are required to bring them up can, it is supposed, be furnished fron. th Page 284 284 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. rCHAP. LII. quartermaster trains. The ammunition trains of the Artillery Reserve and artillery brigades attached to corps can be employed for the trans- port of the ammunition. There should be provided for each siege gun 1,000 rounds of ammunition; for each sjege mortar 000 shells;, for each Coehorn mortar 200. Of this ammunition 200 rounds per piece shomid be brought up before opening fire; the remainder to be near enough to enable the supply to be kept up6 At least 500 sand-bags should be supplied for each gnu and mortar of the train, with an equal number in reserve. I would propose that the organization of the train be intrusted to Colonel Abbot, First Connecticut Artillery, whose regi- ment served with the siege train at the siege of Yorktown. That the work may proceed with the utmost rapidity, another regiment of foot artillery (Kelloggs, Warners, or Pipers) might be added to Colonel Abbots command. Colonel Kellogg served with credit in the First Con- necticut Artillery at Yorktown, and is familiar with the duties. The two regiments of foot artillery in the reserve will be available as re- liefs, guards for working parties, fabrication of gabions and fascines, filling sand-bags, & c. The instruction of the regiments with the train in the mechanical maneuvers, laying of platforms, & c., should com- mence at once. A thorough knowledge of these duties will save much time when every hour is valuable. The material and working direc- tions for constructing magazines, one for every four guns, should also be prepared in advance, that workmen drawn from the foot artillery regiments with the army may assist the engineers or construct them themselves. It is understood that there are rifled 32-pounders, 4-inch caliber, in the works at Richmond. Should it be considered necessary to oppose to them guns of corresponding power (100-poanders) the ord- nance officer should be instructed to prepare them and their material. This would be a timely precaution. In case it should be thought neces- sary to move the train by water up the Pamunkey to the neighborhood of Hanover Court-House, instructions should be given to load the ma- terial on barges, double-decked ones if possible, such as are used on the Hudson River for transportation of flour, and do not draw more than five feet. This depth I understand is found as far up as the bridge at Widow Lumpkins, near Crump Creek, and within five miles by land of the railroad. The depth of water and the nature of the road from the bridge to the railway should be ascertained positively before pro- curing the barges.. A decked scow or two and 100 or 200 feet of tres- tle bridging, similar to that prepared by Major Duane for the pontoon train, buf of stronger dimensions, should be provided to enable landings to be effected at any point. Respectfully, your obedient servant, HENRY J. HUNT, Brigadier- general and Chief of Artillery. B. SPECIAL ORDERS, HDQRS. ARMiES OF THE UNITED STATES, No. 43. City Point, June 27, 18G4. In all siege operations about Petersburg, south of the Appomattox, Brig. Gen. H. J. Hunt, chief of artillery, Army of the Potomac, will have general charge and will be obeyed and respected accordingly. Col. H. L. Abbot, in charge of siege train, will report to General Hunt for orders. - By command of Lieutenant-General Grant: T. S. BOWERS, Assistant Adjutant- General Page 285 CHAP. LU.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 285 C. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 3, 1864. Brig. Geii. H. J. HUNT, Uhief of Artillery: Major DUANE, Chief Engineer: The lieutenant-general commanding is desirous of knowing whether any offensive operations from the lilies now held by this army are prac- ticable. * * * * * * * Major-General Buriiside, who is now running a gallery for a mine, is of the opinion that if successful in this operation an assault could be made to advantage. I desire you to carefully examine the proposed point of attack, after conferring with General Burnside, and furnish me with your views. * * * * * * * You will please give me your views at the earliest possible moment, that the necessary orders may be issued and requisitions made. Both Generals Warren and Burnside have been notified of your instructions and directed to confer with you and facilitate your operations. Respectfully, yours, GEG. G. MEADE, Major- General, Commanding. D. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Major-General HUMPHREYS, July 6, 1864. Chief of Staff: SIR: We have the honor to make the following report of an examination of the enemys lines in front of the Fifth and Ninth Corps in compliance with instructions of the commanding general given in a letter dated July 3: The general direction of the enemys line from the front of the Hare house to the plank road is north and south. The line is indented and apparently well flanked. From the plank road the line runs ina south- westerly direction. The salient thus formed is on a commanding ridge, which overlooks and flanks, by the artillery fire, the work in front of the Ninth Corps. It would, therefore, appear that the first attack should be made from the front of the Fifth Corps. When the first line of the enemy~s works at this point has been taken or their fire silenced, the attack by the Ninth Corps may be commenced. The enemys front has been very much strengthened. It consists of a system of redoubts con- nected by infantry parapets; the ground in front obstructed by abatis, stakes, and entanglements, rendering an assault impracticable; regular approaches must, therefore, be resorted to. It is probable that the siege will be a long one, inasmuch as soon as omme line of works is carried an- other equally strong will be found behind it, and this will continue un- til the ridge is attained which looks into the town. HENRY J. HUNT, Brigadier-General, Chief of Artillery. J. C. DUANE, Major of Engineers Page 286 286 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. LII. F. ORDERS.] HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July .9, 1864. 1. The operations of this army against the intrenched position of the enemy defending Petersburg will be by regular approaches on the fronts oppo~ed to General Burnsides and General Warrens corps. 2. The siege-works will be constructed under the direction of the acting chief engineer of the army (Maj. J. C. Duane, Corps of Engi- neers), upon plans prepared by him and approved by the commanding general. Those plans that relate to the employment of the artillery will be prepared jointly by the acting chief engineer and the chief of artil-. lery of the army, General H. J. Hunt, U. S. Volunteers. * * *. * * * * By command of Major-Gencral Meade: S. WILLIAMS, Assi8tant Adjutant- General. F. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 10, 1864. In conformity with instructions contained in paragraph 2 of orders dated July 9, we submit the following plan for the operations against the enemys works iu front of the line occupied by this army: First. The lines of the enemy being in front of the crest that over- looks Petersburg, the object to be attained is the possession of this crest, which will probably decide the fate of Petersburg. Second. The general direction of the enemys line from opposite the right of the Ninth Corps to the left of the Fifth Corps is north and south; opposite the left of the Fifth Corps, near the plank or Jerusalem road, the line turns to the west, forming an angle with the first, some- what greater than a right angle. Third. The line is indented, and thus affords to a certain extent flank defenses. At intervals batteries are placed, which may be in- creased in number almost at will. At certain points, and notably at the angle and to the west of and near the plank road, there are strong redoubts prepared for guns, and beyond the line the ground is favor- able for the construction by the enemy of interior retrenchments. Fourth. The salient, formed by the redoubt at the angle of the en- emys line, flanks that part of the line in front of the Ninth Corps. Its distance from the lines of the Fifth Corps varies from 400 to 800 yards. From this salient to the redoubt southwest of it, some 500 yards, the works face a space of apparently smooth open plain. Between the Fifth Corps and the salient a ravine commences, which, rapidly deepening, becomes quite deep in front of the Ninth Corps, which has passed it at one point and effected a lodgment within about 150 yards of the enemys line and immediately in front of one of his batteries. Toward this Gen- eral Buruside is running a mine, with the intention of destroying the battery and immediately assaulting the works, and if possible gaining the crest overlooking Petersburg. Fifth. To render an assault successful, it is necessary to destroy the obstructions, abatis, palisades, & c., in front of this line, to silence, if practicable, the guns, and especially to capture or effectually silence the redoubt at the salient 6f the enemys line, which not only flanks that line, but swee~~ the ground on which the supports to the assault- ing columns must pass Page 287 CHAP. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 287 Sixth. To destroy or to occupy the salient regular approaches are the proper means. The ground in front is favorable as a whole, and in our report of the 6th instant this plan was proposed. The recent reduction of the force of the army will not, it is understood, permit the occupation of any ground in front of the south line of the enemys defenses, and we are therefore limited to such operations as we can effect on a line parallel to that of the enemy facing east. Seventh. To effect this, the lines now occupied by the Fifth~ Corps should be advanced as far as practicable, if possible to the edge of the ravine before mentioned, and as much artillery as can be safely and advantageously used placed in battery. Artillery should also be placed in position in Burnsides front, not oiily for its direct fire, but to bear upon the salient and batteries in front of the Fifth and Eighteenth Corps. Eighth. The enemys fire being silenced approaches should be made if practicable across the ravine and possession so gained of the angle, and the way cleared at the same time for the assault of the Ninth Corps. The mine should not be sprung until all the preparations for an assault are made. Ninth. The crest above the enemys present line may be crowned with batteries by him. Its possession gives the defense great advan- tages over the attack. If the assault is successful an immediate and vigorous attempt should be made to get possession of the crest. Shonld it fail, the assaulting troops should make good a lodgment as far in ad- vance as practicable, and operations be continued from the salient to get possession of the crest behind it. To do this it will probably be necessary to occupy more ground to our left. Tenth. Should these operations offer to the enemy in front of the Eighteenth Corps means of annoyance, which are not at present very apparent, the necessary measures must be taken to overcome them as they develop thentselves. Eleventh. The advantages of position on the part of the enemy, with the restricted number which will prevent our making use of the ground which would envelop him, will make the success of our operations diffi- cult and probably costly both in time and men. HENIIY J. HUNT, Brigadier. General and Chief of Artillery. J. C. DUANE, Major and Chief Engineer. G. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAQ, Brig. Gen. H. J. HUNT, Chief of Artillery: July 11, 1864. Maj. J. C. DUANE, Acting Chief of Engineers: SIR: Your report of the 10th instant, submitting a plan for oper- ations against the enemys works in front of the line occupied by this army, has been laid before the commanding general, and by him in- dorsed as follows: The above project, being in conformity with my views, is approved and adopted. The operations against the salient on the plank road and the battery in front of the Ninth Corps will be at once commenced. GEO. G. MEADE, Major-General, Commanding. I a~n, very respectfully, your obedient servant, S. WILLIAMS, Assistant Adjutant- General Page 288 288 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. LII. H. CIRCULAR.] ARTILLERY HDQRS., ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 29, 1864. 1. The batteries are not to open to-morrow morning until the signal is giveii. This signal will be the explosion of the mine under the bat- tery in front of the advanced position of Burnsides Corps. 2. Immediately on the mine being sprung the batteries will all open. The greatest possible pains will be taken to avoid interfering with the storming party, which will advance as soon as the mine is sprung, and over the ruins of the explosion. So soon as an entrance is effected here, strong bodies of troops will move to the right and left behind the enemys line to clear out his troops, and to the front to gain the crest, and, if possible, enter the town of Petersburg. A careful watch must be kept on these movements so as to avoid the possibility of interfering with the advance. 3. The fire will in preference be tdrned on those batteries which com- mand the point of assault and the~ ground on which our troops will move. These batteries will probably be found on the crests near the salient, or on the flank of the salient looking toward the Ninth Corps. 4. The batteries in the small redan, and the work known as Fort Hell, will not fire on the advanced poir~t of the salient, as there is danger of such shot striking our attacking troops. They will be directed against the face of the salient, so that the shot that pass over may strike the work on .the crest above it, and after time has elapsed suffi- cient for an assaulting party to pass ~rell over the crest, the guns will be directed still more to the left so as not to strike the town. 5. Commanders on the line will watch the fire closely and take all possible precautions against injuring our own troops, whilst bringing their guns to bear on the batteries of the enemy. They will also watch for the movements of the enemys troops toward our attacking columns, and use every effort to drive them back or retard their movements. 6. The artillery on the line of the Eighteenth Corps will open at the same time as that of the Fifth and Ninth so as to fully employ the enemy in its front. The fire of the guns and mortars on the left of the line of the Eighteenth Corps will especially be brought to bear on such batteries in front of them as have a fire on Burnsides front. 7. When the enemys fire has been silenced, the firing on his batteries will cease and a strict watch be kept on the movements of his troops, and any attempt to reopen the fire of his batteries will be at once met. HENRY J. HUNT, Brig. Gen., Chief of Artillery, Army of the Potomac. No. 12. Report of kliaj. Nathaniel ]Ifichler, Corps of Engineers, U. S. Army. HDQRS. ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, ENGINEER DEPARTMENT, GENERAL:* October 20, 1864. FIFTH EPOCH. The march across the C hickahominy and the James and the operations in front of Petersburg up to the assault on the enemys position, July 30, 1864. On the night of the 12th, in accordance with orders dated the pre- vious day, all necessary preparations having been completed, the with- For portion of report (nere omitted) eoverin~ operations from May 4 to June 12~ 1864, see Vol. XXXVI, Part I, p. 291 Page 289 CHAP. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 289 drawal of the troops from the hotly contest~(1 held so long occupied by them was effected and the several columns set in motion, headquarters camp moved during the evening from the neighborhood of Learys to Moodys house, striking York River railroad, near Dispatch Station. On the 13th the major-general commanding moved from Moodys to Charles City Court-House, crossing the Chickahominy at Long Bridge. The Second Corps marched by the same route, taking the road to Edna Mills, Saint Marys Church, Ladd s Store, Wares, Walkers, and Wad- dills, and striking the James River road from Charles City Court-House to Richmond at Mrs. Clarks. By direction of the commanding general I l)roceeded, the Sixth Pennsylvania Regiment of Cavalry acting as es- cort, in advance of the Army of the Potomac to the James River to re- connoiter the ground from Swynyards, overlooking Herring Creek and Harrisons Lauding, and thence over Gauns or Hills Run and Queens Creek toward the mouth of Kelliwan Creek. The examination had iu view the selection of a line of battle to be taken up for the protection of the passage of the army over the James River. The line selected cov- ered Swynyards and Wilcoxs Landings, the left resting on Herring Creek, and crossed the upper part of Wyanoke Neck, or Peninsula, at the southern point of which it had been ordered that a pontoon bridge should be thrown. The Second Corps, the advance of the army, reached the position by dark, and commenced to intrench. The work was subsequently suspended. Headquarters camp was established near the Conrt-House. On time morning of the 14th steamers commenced ferrying the Second Corps across the James from Wilcoxs Landing to Wind-Mill Point. At an early hour the Fifth and Sixth Corps arrived, a portion of the fornier taking up the positions of the Second, as they were respectively abandoned, and later in the day the Ninth came up. The engineering oflicers and assistants were all engaged in endeavoring to find direct roads leading from the Court-House across Queens Creek down Wya- noke Neck, but soon discovered that it was oumly fordable on the main road. It was ascertained that approaches were being constructed at time lauding niuder the direction of General Weitzel, chief engineer of time Arimmy of the James, prepam~atory to building the pontoon bridge. Not sufticiemit material for completing the bridge had yet been received at the ponit, time officer in charge of time engineer depot at Washington imaving been directed to furnish it. Upon Major Duanes arrival the former turned over the eumtire charge of time matter, and the bridge was thrown under time direction of time latter. At daybreak of the morning of the l5tlm I was directed to select a short line to b~ imeld by the Sixth Corps to cover the crossing of the re- maiimder of time army and time supply train. In order to leave sufficient sl)ace to park the latter I cluose a very commanding ridge running west- wardly Iroun Tylers Mill, the right to rest on Tylers Creek (imupassa- ble below time mill), and time left on the James below time mouth of Queens Creek. Time battalion of U. S. Emugineers was ordered in the morning to Wyanoke Landing to construct time pontoon bridge. The latter was commenced at 4 p. in., and was finished at 11 p. in., coumsisting of 101 woodeum pontoons. At 9.30 p. m. of this date orders were issued for time Ninth Corps to umove down and immediately commence crossing. Headquarters eamnp muoved from the Court-House to Douthats, on the James River. The first attack on Petersburg was made on this day, when the outer line of the enemys works was captured by the Eight- eenth Corps. The latter had been trauisported by steamers from the White House to City Point. 19 R RYOL XL, PT I Page 290 290 OPEJ~ATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. LIL On the morning of the 16th the general staff of the commanding gen- eral (the latter with one or two of his personal staff having taken a steamer to City Point) crossed the pontoon bridge andfollowed the road to the front of Petersburg by way of Cockes Mill, Merchants-Hope Chapel, and Old Court-House. Camp was established in the course of the day at Baylors. A few moments before dark a general assault was made along the whole line of troops then in position against the enemys second intreuched position md sight. to the looker-oii proved a most brilliant Both on the 17th and 18th the attacking columns of the Eighteenth, Second, and Ninth Corps renewed their desperate efforts agaiust the enemys front, at times reaching and monnting his very parapets, and would then be compelled to retire after niost desperate fighting and heavy loss. On the right Ilank the Eighteenth gained possession of the ground at Pages, near the .Appomattox, and to thi~ day that local- ity is one of the advanced positions occupied by our troops. The line is there within a few hundred yards of Petersburg. At this time the reconnaissances and surveys of our lines in front of that city and of its environs commenced under my direction. Major Weyss, of the En- gineer Department, had inmmediate. charge of the principal field party. The Engineer Corps was called upon, on the 17th, to mourn the loss of one of its most accomplished officers. While reconnoitering the posi- tion in front of the Ninth Corps for the purpose of selecting the ground upon which a division [sic] in line of battle preparatory to the assault on that day, Major ~l7orton exposed himself to the unerring shot of one of the enemys sharpshooters. He was killed instantly, the ball penetrating his left breast. Major Morton had served with the Army of the Potomac but a short time, having joined on the banks of the North Anna. He was immediately on his arrival assigned to the Ninth Corps and remained with it until his death, performing excellent service. His great desire to excel in his profession, added to an ener- getic and impulsive nature, had led hium on several previous occasions to greatly expose hinmselt He laid down on the battle-field a useful, active, and brave life in the cause of his country, and deeply has the arumy (especially the corps to which he had been so long and ably at- tached) been called to grieve his sudden death. Captain Harwood, U. S. Engineers, having reported for duty on the 27th ~ after temporarily assigned to the Ninth Corps. vas a~ day or two On the 19th and 20th the two opposing armies remained comparatively quiet, each willing to rest after their late exhausting labors. During these four days Lieutenants Howell and Benyaurd were en- gaged on the right of the line, aimd Captain Gillespie 5n the left. l)uring the three following ones (the 21st, 22d, and 23d) the army re- sumed, after the brief suspension referred to, active operations tending - toward outfianking the enemy on Imis right and of severing his lines of communication toward the south. The Second and Sixth Corps were the active participalits in time several severe fights which took place in the endeavors to reach the Weldon railroad. The several officers of engineers accompanied these movements. Aim intrenched line was finally taken up and held, running nearly south from the Appomattox along the front of l~etersburg to tIme Jerusalem plank road, and then almost parallel to that road, with the left refused and again crossing it near the Williams house. The headquarters of the major-general com- mandimmg were moved on the 23d to the neighborhood of the Jones house, and remained encamped there for nearly three weeks Page 291 CHAP. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN 291 Oft the 24th, accompanied by Captain Mendell and LiCutenant Howell, I utade a reconnaissance of the country between the Avery house and the Blackwater Swamp, for the purpose of selecting a line to fall back upon in the event of withdrawing a part of the army for other purposes. The crossings of the swamp were also carefully searched, and its char- acter examined in regard to forming an obstacle to the passage of artil- lery and infantry. On the 29th the Appomattox was also examined in reference to the facilities for bridging it. General Sheridans expedition toward Gordonsville returned on the 30th, and the assistants who accompanied it brought back most valua- ble topographical information, among other interesting matter a sur- vey of the lines of the enemys works at Spotsylvania Court-House. This latter enables me to furnish in full, and with accuracy, the battle- field map of that locality. Surveys were daily being made of the different lines taken up, and reconnaissances were extended over the adjacent country. The extreme heat and dust greatly interfered with their advancement. Lieutenant Howell was temporarily, during the 28th, 29th, and 30th, on duty with the Sixth Corps, and Lieutenant Benyaurd, for the last few days of June, with the Ninth Corps. Captain Gillespie was engaged also at this time with the differeimt corps in examining and rectifying their lines. During the month of July the officers of engineers were principally occupied in superintending the various operations of their profession, such as the preparation of siege material, the construction of redoubts, batteries, parallels, and boyeaux, together with conducting the neces- sary surveys, and preparing complete plans and maps of the environs of the city and its approaches incident to offensive movements against the fortified position taken up by the enemy in front of Petersburg. No regular siege was intended, as it would be impossible, with the small army brought before it, to invest it completely. The lineal con- tour is too great to attempt to cut off all communications with the town. or to preveiit re-enforcements being thrown into it. To take the plac~ some favorable position must be selected at which to assault the works and burst through and occupy the interior, and to accomplish this a preponderance of metal umust be brought to bear against the inimedi- ate point of attack to silence the enemys guns, amid to open the way for an attacking column specially chosen for the occasion. The new era in field-works has so changed their character as in fact to render them almost as strong as permanent ones, and the facility with ~yhich new and successive lines of works ~an be constructed (so well proven throughout the whole campaign just terminated) renders it almost use- less to attempt a regular siege. The open assault of works is attended with immense loss of life, but at the same time during the slow oper- ations of the siege the sharpshooter so effectually does his work as to produce a large bill of mortality. On the 3d of July the major-general commanding addressed a com- munication to the chief of artillery and chief engineer to know whether any offensive operations from the lines now held by this army are practicable. The commandimig general of the Ninth Corps had authorized Lieutenant-Colonel Pleasants, commanding the Forty- eighth Regiment PennsyJvania Volunteers, to drive a gallery for a mine to blow up one of the enemys batteries in his front, and the above officers were also directed to examine the place an(l ascertain whether an assault could be advantageously made, should the operation prov Page 292 [CHAP. LII. 292 OPERATIONS IN SE. vX. AND N. c. successful. The result of their investigation i~ set forth in the follow- ing extract from the reply made on the 6th, ill compliance with the in- structions received by them: - The enemys front has been very much strengthened. It consists of a system of redoubts connected by infantry parapets. The ground in front is obstrncted by abatis, stakes, and entanglements, rendering an assault impracticabic. Regular ap- proaches must therefore be resorted to. It is probable the siege will bc a very long one, inasmnch as soon as one line of works is carried another eqnally strong will be found behind it, and this will continue until the ridge is attained which looks iato the town. The front of attack decided upon was a salient of the enemys line on or near the Jerusalem plank road. On the 9th of ~July orders were issued by the commanding general that the operations of this army against the intrenched position of the enemy defending Petersburg will be by regular approaches on the fronts opposed to General Burnsides and General Warrens corps, and on the following day a plan of conducting the siege was snbinitted. On the 11th, the project, being in conformity with his views, was ap- proved and adopted, and it was ordered that the work be commenced at once. Copies of the respective papers above referred to will be ap- pended to this report. The interesting reports of Captain Mendell, commanding the Engi- neer Battalion, and of Lieutenant-Colonel Spauilding, commanding de- tachment Fiftieth New York Volunteer Engineers, furnish summaries of the engineering work performed under the direction of the different officers of their respective commands in accordance with the plan of attack adopted. Lieutenant Lydecker, who r~ported late in June, was retained on duty at general headquarters; also took an active part in the construc- tion of the works referred to. Captain Farquhar had charge of those in front of the Eighteenth Corps. Descriptions of the several re- donbts and batteries constrncted are also therein given, an(l draw- ings of them will be submitted in the appendix to this report; the latter were made by Corporal Thompson, assisted by some non-coinnus- sioned officers and privates of the EngineerBattalion, under the direction of its commanding officer. On learning the plan adopted I directed my l)riiicipal assistant, Maj. John E. Weyss, to commence on the 9th an exact triangulation of the front of Petersburg, locating our OwIl line of work as well as that of the enemy, and to take the immediate charge of the surveying party. My assistants, Messrs. Theilkuhl, Schumann, and Jacobsen aided him. The work was extended from the south of the J erusalern plank road as far north as City Point. By this triangulation, performed under the fire of the enemys batteries and sharpshooters, the different spires and certain prominent buildings in Petersburg were accurately located, and having been kiudly furnished by Professor Bache, Superintendent of the United States Coast Survey, with a copy of the beautiful map of that city and the Appomattox River prepared a few years ago in his department, I was able to combiiie the two, and thereby obtain an exact and connected map of the locality of our siege operations, covering the whole ground occupied by both armies. On the 9th the troops of the Sixth Corps were withdrawn from tJme line so long occupied by them and ordered to Washington ~Dity. On the following day I was directed to select a line, refused from the posi- tion occupied by that corps, extending from the redoubt (now called Fort Prescott, then in course of construction) on the Jerusalem plan Page 293 CHAP. LII.] THE ItICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 293 road toward the Blaekwater Swamp. Lieutenant Lyd.ecker accom- panied inc during the reconnaissance, and was subsequently directed to trace the line and place in position the troops ordered to hold it. The site for a new redoubt was chosen between the Norfolk railroad and the swamp, and its construction placed nuder the direction of Captain ilarwood, who had been relieved from duty with the Ninth Corps the same day. On the 12th the camp of general headquarters was moved from Jones to a more central position near Rnrchetts and in rear of the center of the Ninth Corps. On the 14th orders were issued to have the old works of the enemy demolished. This had been his advanced position, and the first to be taken by assault. The redoubts and batteries, in fact the whole in- trenched line, had been beautifully planned and constructed at a munch earlier period, in view of the probability of a demonstration being made against Peters burg. The site selected was a most magnificent and commanding one, the natural lay of the open fields in front forming a most perfect glacis. Fortunately surveys were made of this line, and maps of the works preserved, a set of which will be appended. Toward the close of the month everything was in readiness to explode the mine which had been in course of construction in front of the Ninth Corps. In company with Colonel Spaulding and Lieutenant Benyaurd I had the great gratification of penetrating the gallery and its lateral branches, and of examining in detail its construction, the mode of ventila- tion, and the arrangement ot the chambers. Lieutenant-Colonel Pleas- ants, who kindly offered to accompany the party and explain the nature of his labors, and to whom all are highly indebted for his politeness, has prepared a highly interesting report, giving a succinct account of the manner of driving the gallery and its lateral branches, the nature of the soil encountered, the construction and dimensions of the chambers, the charging and tamuping, with other interesting facts connected with the history of the mine from its first inception to its completion. Ac- curate drawings have also been prepared by him to accompany the re- port. From it I extract the length of the main gallery to be 510.8 feet and each of the lateral galleries 37.5 feet~ radius of crater 25 feet~ work commenced June 25 and finished July 23. The different engineering operations, which had been pushed forward night and day, were fast progressing toward completion. The several batteries, constructed with the utmost care and in the highest order of professional skill, had received their armaments of guns and mortars, and only waited the moment to pilay a conspicuous part in whatever steps might be taken, either offensive or defensive. On the 26th the Second Corps received marching orders and crossed the Appomattox and James to Deep Bottom, to co-operate with the Army of the James. Lieutenant Howell was directed to accompany the movement, and remained with the command until it returned on the night of the 29th to participate in the arrangements fo~ the grand as- sault upon the enemys works. instructions were issued on that day by the commanding general for the guidance of all in the contemplated attack, and in accordance with these engineer officers were assigned to duty with each corps. On the morning of the 30th the mine was exploded, although, in con- sequence of some disarrangement of the fuse (Bickfords), not at the appointed hour. The result proved it a decided success, for in its crater were swallowed up several guns, a large number of menan emitire regimentbesides destroying a considerable part of the enemys line Page 294 294 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. LII. The dimensions of the crater proved to be 200 feet long and 50 feet wide, the explosive charge being 8,000 pounds. The grand assault was made, and the attacking column reached the enemys line; it failed, though, to accomplish its purpose. Orders were issued to discoutiuue operations during the day. Acconzipanyiug this report are those of Colonel Spaulding and Cap- tain Mendell, both already referred to, together with the several papers* ordering and planning the siege operations in front of Petersburg. Appended to it is also a portfolio of maps,t with a table of distance4 between the separate camps of the major-general commanding. The following list comprises the several numbers of each of the series, namely: A. Six sheets (16 inclusive), campaign maps showing in colors the lines of operations of the several corps of the Army of the Potomac, from the neighborhood of Culpeper to the front of Petersburg. B. Eleven sheets (1li inclusive), copies of photograph maps as is- sued to the army during the entire campaign. C. Four sheets (14 inclusive), battle-field maps, Wilderness, Spot- sylvania, Cold Harbor, siege of Petersburg. D. Seven sheets (17 inclusive), drawings, plans, and sections of redoubts and batteries, constructed during the month of July in front of Petersburg. E. Eleven sheets (ili inclusive), drawings showing the first and advanced line of the enemy in front of Petersburg, with I)lans and sec- tions of batteries along it. F. Six sheets (16 inclusive), copies of the original campaign maps compiled from the best anthorities for the use of the Army of the Potomac previous to the commnencenment of the move across the Rapidan. This report does not intend to furimish more than a general outline of the various duties perforumed by the different officers of the Engimmeer Corps who were during the campaign connected with the Army of the Potomac. As far as it has been in umy power I have endeavored to portray faithfully the extent of their labors. Many omissions may have been made in enumerating them, but these nmay be rectified in a subse- quent and more detailed account of that most interesting period, when time and circumstances allow an exact description to be furnished of the country through which the lines of march extemided, and of the nature of the operations performed. I have not deemed it proper or right to dwell upon the exact char- acter of the duties performed by the acting chief engineer, Maj. James C. Duane, only casually having mentioned themn in a few cases when we accompanied each other on different reconnaissances. It is to be hoped that his health will soon permit him to prepare an accurate statement of the engineering operations performed by himn and under his direc- tions. Until then I trust that what has now beeni presented will prove acceptable. Believin~g it would afford him great pleasure, in his name I respectfully request the favorable attention of the major-general com- manding to the important services rendered by the officers of both the regular and volunteer engineers. They labored faithfully and earnestly to attend to the respective dn.mties assigned them, and I believe with great credit and honor to themselves amid to that arm of service to See Meade to Hunt and Duane, July 3, Part II; Rant and Duane to Humphreys, July 6, p. 285, ante; same July 10, p. 286, ante; Orders, July 9, p. 159, ante; and Williams to Hunt and Duane, July 11, P. 287, ante. Such of these maps s umay be found will appear in the Atlas. t See Vol. XXXVI, Part I, p. 303 Page 295 CHAP. 111.] l~HE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 295 which they belong. I trust a proper acknowledgment will be made them for the active part taken by them during that most trying period from the crossing of the Ilapidan to the assault on Petersbnrg. I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant. N. MJCHLET~, General ~. WILLIAMS, Major of Engineers, U. H. Army. Assistant Adjutant- General, Army of the Potomac. No. 13. Report of ]J/liaj. James C. Duane, Corps of Engineers, U. S. Army, Chief Engineer, Army of the Potomac, of operations July 30. [See p. 158.] No. 14. Report of Brig. (len. henry W. Benham, U. H. Army, commanding Engi neer Brigade, of operations June 12July 30. HEADQUARTERS ENGINEER BRIGADE, Camp at City Point, Va., August 6, 1864.* FIFTH EPOCH. Bridged the James at Fort Powhatan, the Appomattox at Broadway Landing, and two bridges across the James at Jones Neck. The above reportdoes not include the operations of the battalions of the Fiftieth New York Engineers, serving with the corps or headquar- ters of the Army of the Potomac, the reports of which have not been made to these headquarters, and it. is presumed they will be sent direct. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, H. W. BENITAM, General ~. WILLIAMS, Brigadier-General, Commanding. Assistant Adjutant- General, Army of the Potomac. No. 15. Report of Licut. Col. Ira Spaulding, Fiftieth New York Engineers. HDQRS. DETACH. 50TH NEW YORK VOL. ENGINEERS, Near Petersburg, Va., August 30, 1864. MAJOR :t FIFTH EPOCH. The march across the Chickahominy and the James River, a the oper- ations in front of Petersburq up to the assault on the enemys position July 30, 1864. June 12, camped near Cold Harbor. Major Brainerd moved with two compauies of his battalion to repair the roads and bridges in the direc- For portion of report (here omitted) see Vol. XXXVI, Part I, p. 303. I For portiou of report (here omitted) e.overiug operations from May 4 to Julie 12, 1564, see Vol. XXXVI, Part I, p. 304 Page 296 296 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. ~. tCITAP. LIT. tion of Bottoms Bridge, preparatory to the movement of the Second Corps. He arrived near Bottoms Bridge at 11 p. in., having put the road and bridges on the route in good order, and there awaited the ar- rival of the corps. Major Beers marched with Company L to join his train near Parsleys Mill, then in charge of Captain Palmer, leaving Company E (Captain line) in charge of the corps intrenching tools to march with the Sixth Corps. Major Beers joined me at Tunstalls Sta- tion in the afternoon with two companies and his bridge train, where I had also a part of the reserve battalion, with one-third each of canvas trains Kos. 4 and 5, commanded by First Lient. M. B. Folwell. During the night these troops and trains marched to Emninaus Church. Major Ford, being at Fifth Corps headquarters, near Baltimore Cross-Roads, sent Captains McDonald and Van Brocklin and Lieutenant Van Rens- selaer to examine the roads and approaches to the Long Bridge crossing of the Chickahominy. At 4 p. m. he started with his trains; moved about four miles, and halted within half a niile of the river, having been joined on the way by the above-named officers. Reports as to the nature of the crossing were conflicting, and the enemys sharpshooters being in possession of the south bank, it was difficult to ascertain the facts. Members of General Warrens staff assured Major Ford that there was but one stream of about 100 feet in width, while the officers sent by Major Ford were confident that there were two streams, with an island between. The latter opinion proved to be correct. The nature of the crossing was such that Major Ford deemed it inexpedient to use the canvas bridge, and he therefore directed Captain McDonaldto move his company and wooden train to the river about dark, taking also Company D (Captain Pettes) as a guard. Arriving at the river Major Ford immediately put one of his boats in the water, and crossed the river, taking over at the same time a squad of Colonel Chapmans dismounted cavalry. He found the stream proper about 100 feet wide, an island of about 250 feet, and a branch of the river on the sonth side of the island of about 60 feet in width. While crossing the second boat-load of cavalry the enemys pickets opened a brisk fire upon the troops and pontoniers. Captain McDonald at once put his boats in the water and commenced his bridge. The cavalry suc- ceeded in crossing the south branch on some fallen trees, and after a contest of about twenty minntes the enemy were driven off One mnan of Captaimi McDonalds company (K) was wounded while at work on the bridge, and has since died. Captain Van Brocklin, having volunteered his services, crossed the river, and, assisted by Captain Pettes with a portion of his company (D), dragged three pontoons across the island and built the bridge across the south branch and the approaches. Ma- jor Ford reports that extensive swamps bordered the approaches, the river was filled with sunken piles and timber, the available passage was very narrow, the debris of the old bridge had to be cleared away, and the abutments cut down. Such was the nature of these obstacles that it required two and a-half hours hard work to complete the bridges. The remaining cavalry of Colonel Chapmans command crossed at once, followed by the Fifth and Second Corps. On the morning of this day Captain Personius was at Tunstalls Station with his company (G) and the pontoon train of tIme First Battaliomi, and Captain Middleton at White House with his company (M) and the extra pontoon train of twenty boats. I directed Captain Personius to proceed to Saint Peters Church, near New Kent Court-House, with his train, and Captain Mid- dleton to report to Captain Personius at the same place with his train. From this point both these trains, under command of Captain Personius, were to accompany the supply trains of the army, and bridge th Page 297 297 CHAP. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. Chickahominy at such point as might be designated for the crossing of the supply trains. The point then contemplated for this crossing was Windsor Shades. Subsequent examination by myself proved that a crossing at this point was not practicable in the face of an enemy, and exceedingly ~Iiffleult if unopposed. The ground upon the northeast bank was favorable, but the deep marshes and swamps on the south- west side of the river were extensive, and could only be crossed by crib bridges and corduroy roads, requiring a vast amount of labor. June 13, Major Brainerd marched with his command at 1 a. m. in rear of the artillery of the Second Corps. About noon he advanced to the front of the column to repair the roads, crQssed the Chickahomimmy at Long Bridge, and, accompanying the Second Corps, arrived at ~Wil- coxs Landing, on the James River, at 8.30 p. in. Major Beers, with his command and trains~ remained at Emnmans Church until noon awaiting the arrival of the Sixth Corps. The head of the column having theii arrived within supporting distance, the trains were moved to Jones Bridge, on the Chickahominy. Here it was found that there were also two branches of the stream to be bridged, the island being about 800 feet wide. Lieutenant Folwell immediately built a canvas pontoon bridge over each branch of the river, and Captain Palmer also bridged both branches with wooden pontoons. The bridges over the north branch were each sixty feet in length, and those over the south branch forty feet in length each. Considerable difficulty was encoun- tered here in removing flood wood and timber of the old permanent bridge, but the four bridges were completed in about one hour and a quarter, and the Sixth Corps commenced crossing. Major Fords bridges were detained in the water at Long Bridge crossing until 5.30 l~ m. for the rear guard of cavalry to cross, when they were dismantled and loaded in forty-five minutes. He then marched with his command and trains with General Cutlers division, of the Fifth Corps, arriving at Charles City Court-House soon after midnight. Captain Personius moved his command and trains to Diascond bridge and proceeded in person to examine the Chickahominy at Coles Ferry, the point finally selected for the crossing of the supply trains. He found the river at that point much wider than it had been supposed to be, and reported to Captain Peirce, assistant chief quartermaster~ Army of the Potomac, in charge of the trains, that he had not sufficient pontoon material to bridge the river. During the afternoon his company (0-) built two permanent bridges over the I)iascond Creek at points where they had been destroyed. June 14, Major Brainerd moved his command at 9 a. in. to Second Corps headquarters, and soon after was ordered to the James River, where the two companies were employed all day in repairing the wharves for the use of the Second Corps, then crossing in transports. At 11 p. m. Major Brainerd was ordered across the river to constrnct an additional wharf for the use of the corps, and a detail of 800 men was furnished by General Biriiey, but the timely arrival of six pontoon boats and bridge material from General Benhams command, with a detachment of the Fifteenth New York Volunteer Engineers, rendered the services of the infantry unnecessary. Major Beers built a pernia- nent bridge over each branch of the Chickahominy at Jones, near his pontoon bridges. About 10 a. iii. the troops of the Sixth Corps and Ninth Corps had crossed the river, and I had just given the orders to dismantle the bridges and proceed to Charles City Court-House, when I received your note inclosing Captain Personius letter to Captain Peirce, directing me to proceed on the north side of the river to Cole Page 298 298 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. MI. Ferry with the pontoon trains and collect sufficient material to bridge the river. I immediately sent orders for all the pontoon trains to con- centrate at Coles Ferry, and proceeded at once to the latter place in persom There I fonnd that Captain Personins had arrived about 8 a. m. with his pontoou train, and had built a wharf of boats oim each side of the river and a large pontoon raft, on which he was passing bearers of dispatches, small squads of cavalry, and occasionally wagons. I found also that the width of the river was sneh that with all onr pon- toon material we could not span the river without extensive timber and corduroy approaches. Captain Peirce was ~lien making preparations to build this timber approach of about 250 feet in length on the north shore with the aid of several hnndred colored troops. Major Beers arrived with his comnniand abont 1 p. in., and immediately commenced unloading his bridge material. In the mean time, and while waiting the completion of the timber approach, Captain Personius was engage(I with his men in making np rafts of four boats each, with material on each for making the connection. Major Ford started from Charles City Court-House about noon, having beeN detained about an hour after lie received the order to proceed to the Chickahominy for the purpose of repairing a couple of boats damaged -at the last bridge. He had then about twelve miles to march, and reported to inc at the south bank of the river at 5 p. in. This brought all the land pontoons of the army to this point, except the train of eight canvas boats, which Captain Fol- well had with General Sheridan. While Captain McDonald was pre- paring the south abutment and building his portion of bridge by succes- sive pontoons, Major Ford, with Company D (Captain Pettes) and a detail of 300 colored troops, laid the approach across the marsh, a heavy piece of raised corduroy about 200 feet in length. After Captain McDonald had built in all his wooden pontoons, Captain Van Brocklin followed with his eight canvas boats. About dark Captain Personius commenced putting in the bridge the rafts made from the trains on the north shore. After these had been all built in, Lieutenant Folwell fol- lowed with his train of eight canvas boats. When all the boats had been built in from each shore the bridge did not meet in the center by about thirty feet. The bridge was then detached from the north shore, connected in the center, and the approach on time north shore extended by the construction of additional cribs and corduroy. This caused con- siderable delay in the completion of the bridge, but it was tinally ready for use about three hours after midnight. On account of the scarcity of material for the width of time river, the canvas portion of the bridge was~built in long spans with a few additional balks, and though a bridge built in this way is apparently very frail, all the supply trains of time army, 2,800 head of cattle, and a division of troops crossed this bridge with- out delay and without accident to tlme bridge. The total length of the bridge was 1,240 feet, and of the timber and corduroy approaches about 450. June 15, leaving Major Beers in command at Coles Ferry, I proceeded to headquarters of the army at Charles City Court-House, and thence accompanied headquarters to Fort Powhatan on the James River. Thence I sent directions to Major Beers to send all the wagons and transportation by land to the soutlm side of the James River at Fort Powhatan in charge of Captain Dexter, with Company L aimd part of I as a guard, make preparations to arrange his bridge in rafts as soon as the rear guard in charge of the supply trains should have crossed the river, and bring all his bridge material around by water in tow of a steamer that would be ordered to report to him. At daylight on th Page 299 CHAP. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. ~299 morning of this day Major Brainerd had his wharf completed on the south side of the James River at Wilcoxs Landing arid transports coin- inenced lauding troops, ambulances, & c., of the Second Corps. During the day Major Brainerd was occupied in getting the wagons of his baf talion across the river and at night bivouacked on the south side of the James. June 16, Major l3rainerd marched his command toward Petersburg. At II p. m. he received orders to join Second Corps headquarters as soon as possible. At 5 p. in., after a forced march, he reported to G-en- eral 1-Jancock while the assault was in progress on the enemys works in front of Petersburg. That night he bivouacked with his command near the Dunn house. Captain Dexter started from Coles Ferry at 3 a. in. with all the land transportation, arrived at the James River about noon, and at 5 p. m. all the wagons had crossed the river and were parked along the south bank below General Benhains pontoon bridge, ready for loading as soon as the rafts should arrive. After the rear guard, with the supply trains, had crossed the river at Coles Ferry, Major Beers had the bridge dismantled, nmde up into rafts, placed his command, including Major Fords battalion, on the rafts, and t 0.30 p. in. started down the Chickahomniny in tow of the James A. Stevens. After running down about three miles the captain of the steamer deemed it unsafe to run farther during the night, not having a pilot acquainted with the river, and therefore anchored for the night. June 17, at 6.30 a. in., tIm e fog having cleared away, the pontoon rafts in charge of Major Beers were towed (lown the Chickahonminy and up the James to Fort Powhatan, arriving at the latter place at 4p. m. The trooI)5 were immediately disembarked, the rafts dismantled, boats and materials loaded on the wagons parked on the top of the hill, and about 9 p. in., all the material having been loaded, the troops and trains were moved about four miles toward City Point and bivouacked for the night. Major Ford had for some weeks been too ill to walk or sit on his horse and had received a leave of absence for twenty days, when at Long Bridge, on the Chickahomniny, but he did not feel disposed to leave his command until it arrived at the James River, when lie turned over the command of his battalion to Captain McDonald and left for the Nortlm. June 18, I divided the extra train of twenty boats among time First, Secommd, and Third Battalions, mnakin g the whole number of boats in each as follows: First battalion, fifteen boats; second battalion, fifteen boats; third battalion, fourteen boats. Dunn g the day time troops and trains moved to a point near Old Church, about two miles from City Point, where all the traius were parked and a camp established. From the 19th of June until the 29th of July most of the pontoon trains were in camp near City Point, and all the available officers and mcmi of this commnand not required for repairing and guarding the trains were occupied in front of Petersburg, making gabions and fascines, work- ing upon forts, covered ways, roads, and bridges,~about 1,200 fascines and 10,000. gabions have during that time been mnade by the men of this command. 0mm the 22d of June Major Brain erd moved his battalion into the rifle- pits in front of the Jones honse and continued with his command to act as infammtry with the Second Corps until time 30th of June. About the 10th of July 1 sent Captain Folwell, with his company and a canvas train of eighteen boats, to report to General Sheridaim, near Light-House Point, and additional boats were ordered dowmm from Washington to replace those sent to the Cavalry Corps. Captain Fol- Page 300 300 OPERATfONS IN SE. VA. ANT) N. C. [CHAP. MI. well remained with the Cavalry Corps until General Sheridan left for Washington after the close of this epoch, but he has since returned to this command with his company and train. On the 10th of July all the battalions of this regiment then in the field were consolidated under my command as one detachment for en- gineering operations in front of Petersburg. The itew canvas trains sent from Washington have been fitted np in accordance to J)lans heretofore adopted for field trains and all the traiiis thoroughly repaired and refitted. This has involved a very large amount of labor, but the trains were never in better order for active service. The following tabular statement shows the number and size of the pontoon trains now in my charge: No. 1. No. 2. No.3. No.4. No.5. No.6. French pontoons number 15 15 14 Canvaspontoons do 19 12 13 wing trestles do 2 2 2 feet - 320 320 300 212 212 308 with trestles do 252 252 :148 Length of bridge with trains consolidated Feet. ~anvas bridge, short spans: without trestles 1, 572 with trestles 1, 692 Canvas bridge, long spans: without trestles 1, 782 with trestles 1, 902 The above trains are completely furnished with toobwagoiis, forges, supply wagons, and transportation. On the morning of tile 30th of July, at 4 a. in., my camp equipage was packed, the men under arms, and the pontoon trains all parked near general headquarters. The assault on the enemys works having failed, the pontoon trains were returned to their old camp near City Point, and the men went intd camp. For collvenience of reference and to show the length of bridges re- quired at the several points in any future military operation, I have prepare(1 the following tabular statement of all the pontoon brid~e~ built by this command during the present campaign up to July 30, ~1864.* Very respectfully, . ~. SPA~U~LDJNG, Lieutenant- Colonel, Commanding. Maj. J. C. DUANE, Chief Engineer, Army of the Potomac. No. 16. Report of Capt. George lii. iVfendeil, Corps of Engineers, U. S. Army, commanding Engineer Battalion. HEADQUARTERS U. S. ENGINEER BATTALION, Camp near Petersburg, Va., August 5, 1864. MAJOR: t Captain Gillespie joined front recruiting service 28th of May. The battalion was engaged in and did a great part of the work of throwing For statement (here omitted) see Vol. XXXVI, Part I, p. 316. For portion of report (here omitted) covering operations from May 1 to June 12, 1864, see Vol. XXXVI, Part 1, p. 317 Page 301 CHAP. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 301 the bridge over the James, containing 101 wooden pontoons. In the channel the depth of water was twelve to fifteen fathoms, the tidal cur- rent strong, rising and falling about four feet. In the channel pontoons were anchored to vessels above and below moored for that purpose. The bridge was commenced from each end, and built by successive pontoons and by rafts. It was comnlleIlce(l about 4 p. in. ou 15th of June, two companies at each end, under the direction of Major Duane, chief engi- neer. Later in the afternoon and after considerable progress had been made, General Beuham took command. The bridge was completed except a passage-way of 100 feet left for vessels ,and the raft constructed to fill this gap by 11 p. in. The greater part of the infantry and artil- lery, all the wagon trains, and (lroves of beef cattle of the army passed this bridge safely and without interruption, except such as resulted from a vessel moored above slipping her anchor, thereby carrying away a part of the bridge, which, however, was promptly restored. On 6th of June Captain Turubull was, by direction of the chief en- gineer, assigned to the Cavalry Corps and did no further duty with the battalion, and abont the same time Lieutenant Mackenzie took corn- mnand of the Second Connecticnt Volunteer Artillery, and was relieved from duty with the battalion. During the eaTher active operations about Petersburg the officers were employed in reconnaissances under the direction of the chief engineer. Lieutenant Benyanrd, with Company A, reported for duty to General Burnside, commanding Ninth Corps, on the 25th of June and remained four weeks. O~ the 23d two batteries were constrncted on the Second Corps line by Sergeant Grant and 100 men of the battalion, under the direction of Col. J. C. Tidball, Fourth New York Artillery. In the early part of July a line extending from the left of the Fifth Corps front where it crosses the Jerusalem plank road to the southeast for about a mile, then to the east for about one mile and a half, termi- nating near Wells, on the Blackwater Swamp, was put in a cbndition for defense. The following is the arrangement: First. A redoubt, nearly square, 400 feet side, parapet 12 feet thick and 7 feet high, with iniplacements for temi guns, situated near the plank road and sontl of it900 yards from the point where the line crosses the l)lank rcA. Second. A redon t 200 feet square, north of the plank road and east of the Chieves house, 600 yards from the first parapet, of same height and thickness, and places for six guns in embrasure, six in barbette~. Third. A battery and rifle-pit for.support near Chieves house. Fourth. A redoubt 200 feet square, near Wells, on the extreme left, for six guns in barbette, fourteen in embrasure. Fifth. The timbe in front of this line for several hundred yards cut down, making the front almost impenetrable for an attack in organized masses. This work was done under the direction of engineer officers and super- intendence of enlisted men of this command by details from Fifth, Sec- ond, and Ninth Corps. Capt. F. Harwood reported for duty on July 9, and was assigned to the conimand of Company D. The following is a summary of the work done under the direction of engineer officers (betWeen July 11 to 30) of this command in obedience to the instructions of the chief engineer, dated July 9, which assigne Page 302 302 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. IlL to me the charge of the siege operations on the Fifth Corps front, by details from the Fifth arid Second Corps, and Fiftieth New York Vol- unteer Engineers, and Fourth New York Heavy Artillery: First. Batteries constructed for forty-four guns, parapets generally fifteen feet thick at top, and not less than ten in any ease; four maga- zines. Second. The large battery on the left of the Fifth Corps was turned over to me with the parapet up alone. It was thoroughly traversed, two large bomb-proof magazines built, eight platforms constructed arid laid by Fourth New York Heavy Artillery, embrasures for seventeen guns cut and revetted. Third. Two mortar batteries, one for ten 10-inch mortars and one for six 8-inch mortars were corfstructed, three magazines built, the plat- forums laid. Fourth. Seventeen thousand two hundred feet of boyan constructed, averaging nine feet in width and three feet and a half in depth. In addition to the above the following has been done under Lieutenant l3enyaurds direction on the Ninth Corps front, viz: A fourteen-gun siege battery, with two magazines and the necessary platforms, with an ap- proach 600 yards long; a magazine and platform were placed in another siege battery, and platforms placed in the six-gun battery near the Taylor house. Lieutenant I3enyaurd also repaired abont 300 yards of the approach to the mining gallery, and kept his company employed in instructing in making gabions and fascines. The officers of the battalion at the opening of the campaign were the following: Capt. C. N. Turubull, commanding Company D; First Lient. It. S. Mackenzie, commanding Company A; First Lient. W. II. Ii. Ben- yaurd, commanding Company C; First Lient. C. W. Howell. Since that time Captain Turubull and Lieutenant Mackenzie have been re- lieved, and Capts. F. Harwood arid George L. Gillespie, and Lieutenants Ctryier arid Heap, have joined the battalion. A large portion of the services of these officers in this campaign have been performed while detached on the staff of corps commanders and elsewhere, under direc- tion of the chief engineer, of which no reports have been made to inc. It is hoped that, their services will be recognized in other reports. It is scarcely necessary for me to say that all the officers of time corn- mand have manifested the utmost willingness, energy, and efficiency in time performance of the arduous duties that have fallen upon them, and the value and importance of their services deserve recognition. The enlisted men of the battalion have always done credit to themselves aLmd to their officers by the earnestness, rapidity, and thoroughness of their labor, and I take pleasure iii stating my hehef that no better body of enlisted men can be found in any army. The accompanying (Irawings represent the character of some of the works constructed on the Fifth Corps front. I am, major, very respectfully, your obedient servant, G. II. MENDELL, Captain of Engineers, Commanding U. S. Engineer Battalion. Maj. J. C. DUANE Chief Engineer, Army of the Potomac. Not found Page 303 (Jnn~. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 303 No. 17. Reports of ]Ifaj. Gem. Utnfteld S. Hancock, U. S. Army, commanding Seco~d Army Corps. IIIEADQUARTEIIS MIDDLE MILITARY I)EPARTMENT, Baltimore, 314., & ptember2l,1865. GENERAL: I have the honor to forward my rei)ort of the operations of the Second Army Corps from June 13 until July 26, 1864, which is the time designated by Major-General Meade as the fifth epoch of the campaign. The troops reached Wilcoxs Landing, on the James River, at 5.30 p. m. on the 13th. Myself and the officera of my staff were busily en- gaged during that night and the following day and night in conduct- ing the embarkation of the troops and material of my corps, which were all safely landed on the south bank of the James, at Wind-Mill Point, near upper landing, at an early hour on the morning of the 15th. My headquarters remained on the north bank of the river until the troops had crossed, communication being kept up by the signal telegraph. I had been directed by General Meade on the evening of the 14th to hold my troops in readiness to move, and informed that it was probable I would be instructed to march toward Petersburg, and that rations for my command would be sent me from City Point. Later in the evening the following instructions reached me from General Meade: General Butler has been ordered to send to you at Wind-Mill Point 60,000 rations; so soon as they are received and issued you will move your command by thc most direct ronte to Petersburg, taking np a position where the City Polat railroad crosses Harrisons Creek, where we now have a work. On receipt of the above instructions I at once sent my chief commis- sary to the south bank of the James to receive and issue the expected rations. About 4 a. m. on the 15th I wrote to General Williams, assistant adjutant-general of the Army of the Potomac, that all of my troops, save one reginient of infantry and four batteries, were disenibarked on the southside of the James, but that the rations which I had been informed I would receive from City Point had not arrived, and that I feared that a good deal of time would be required to issn6 them when they came. About 6.30 a. in. I again reported to General Williams that no rations had arrived. 1 delayed the order for my troops to march until 9 a. in., waiting to receive the rations from City Point, but as they did not arrive I gave the order~by signal telegraph for the head of the column to move. I also sent Lieutenant-Colonel Morgan, my chief of staff to General Birney (who was to take the advance) with the same order, but the boat in which he crossed to the south bank grounded and he was de- layed half an hour, to find on landimmg that the order which I had sent by signal telegraph had miscarried. In consequence the colummi did not get in motion until 10.30 a. m. I notified the commanding general that the expected rations had imot arrived, and that I had given orders for my troops to move at once; this order was approved, and I was in- structed to push forward to time position desigmiated for my command behind Harrisons Creek. Lieutenant-Colonel Morgan, my chief of staff was directed to remain with General Birney to conduct the march of the column. He was furilished with a map from lmeadqnarters of the army, on which our position behind Harrisons Creek was mnarkedbythe map about four miles from Petersburg, and between that place and City Page 304 304 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. LII. Point. It is proper to say in this coni~ection that it afterward apI)Cared my orders were based on incorrect information, and the position I was ordered to take did not exist as it was described on my instructions; Harrisons Creek proved to be inside the enemys lines and not within miles of where it was laid down on the map xvith which I was furnished to gviide me. The map was found to be utterly worthless, the only roads laid down on it being widely out of the way. Colonel Morgan succeeded in obtaining sonic negro guides, and on his con7llnunicating to me the information he had obtained from them, I decided that the spee(liest way to get to the position I was directed to occupy would be to turn the head of the column from the Prince George Court-Ilouse road toward Old Court-House, and then by a cross-road get behind Harrisons Creek as laid down on the map. None of the inhabitants could or would give any information concerning the location of this creek. Accordingly Birneys and Gibbons divisions were turned to the right, leaving the Prince George Court-House road, within. six miles of Petersburg, before 3p.m. Barlows division with the train marched by the Old Court-House on a shorter road, which the head of his column had barely passed. At 5.30 p. in., as the column neared Old Court- House, Birney being about one mile (listant, a dispatch from General Grant, addressed to General Gibbon or any division commander of the Second Corps, reached me. This dispatch directed all haste to be made in getting up to the assistance of General Smith, who it stated had at- tacked Petersburg amid carried the outer works iii front of that city. A few moments later a note from General Smith was delivered to me by one of his staff which informed me that he (General Smith) was authorized by Lieutenant General Grant to call upon me for assistance and requesting me to come up as rapidly as possible. Fortunately these dispatches were received just when the head of Birneys division was passing a country road leading directly toward Petersburg, and the column (Birneys and Gibbons troops) was turned in that direction. No time had been l6st on the march during the day although it was excessively hot. The road was covered with clouds of dust, and lSut little water was found on the route, causing severe suffering among the men. I desire to say here that the messages from Lieutenant-General Grant amid from General Smith, which I received between 5 and 6 p. inn. on the 15th, were the ~rst and only intimations I had that Petersburg was to be attacked that day. Up to that hour I had not been notifie(l from any source that I was expected to assist General Smith in assanltiiig that city. Some artillery firing had been heard for many hours in the direction of Petersburg, and careful imiquiry was made during the day of the inhabitants as to its cause, but the omily information I could get on the subject was that General Kautzs cavalry, with somne artillery, had passed toward Petersburg; I attributed the firing to some recomi- naissance or raid by that officer. I have been particular in describing the incidents of the march of my command on the 15th, because I conceive that undue importance has been i~ttached to the fact that my troops did not arrive imi front of Peters- burg at an earlier hour on that evening, which has been given as a reason that the city was not taken that evening, and because I belmeve that the circumstances attending the movements of mny troops on that day have never ~et been fully explained. I informed the major-general commanding the~Army of the Potomac on the morning of the 15th that I was supplied with rations for one day, and had I then been notified that Petersburg was to be assaulted on the 15th the delay occasione Page 305 Crn~i~. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 305 l)y waiting for rations at Wind-Mill Point would have been immaterial; but notwithstanding that delay I could have joined General Smith by marching directly toward him at Petersburg by 4p. m. I was even, as I have before mentioned, at a point six miles from that city on the Prince George Court-House road at 34). m. My troops received no rations until the 16th, when they occul)ied the works in front of Petersburg, the rations having been sent to City Point. I spent the best hours of the day on the 15th in marching by. an incor- rect map in search of a designated l)osition, which, as described, was not in existence oi~ could not be found. When Birney and Gibbon turned oft toward Petersburg, ordJrs were sent to General Barlow to march toward the same point by the nearest route from Old Court-House, but by some misapprehension his division took the City Point road and was not brought up to Petersburg until. daylight the next morning. As soon as Lieutenant-General Grants note, directing me to hasten to the assistance of General Smith, reached me, I sent my chief of staff~ to inform General Smith of the whereabouts of my edlumun, and to assure hint that I was marching to his support with all dispatch. At 6.30 p. m. the head of Birneys division had arrived at the Bryant house, on Baileys Creek, about one mile in rear of the position of Hunks division, of the Eighteenth Corps. Leaving Birney and Gibbon instructions to move forward as soon as they could ascertain at what point their assistance was required, I rode forward to the field, where I met General Smith, who described to me the oper- ations of the day, and l)ointed out as well as he could in the dusk of the evening the position of the enemys lines he had carried. I now in- formed him that two divisions of my troops were close at hand and ready for any further muovements which in his judgment and knowl- edge of the field should be made. General Smith requested me to re- lieve his troops in the front line of works which he had carried, so that the enemy should encounter fresh troops should they attempt their recapture. He was then of the opinion that the enemy had been re- enforced during the evening. In accordance with this reque~t, I at once directed Birney and Gibbon to move up and occupy the captured earth-works from the Friend house, on the right, to the Dunn house, on the left of the Prince George road. By the time this movement was comupleted it was 11 p. ni., too late and dark for any irumuediate advance. At midnight I instructed Generals Birney and Gibbon that if any com- manding points were held by the enemny between their I)ositiOns and - the Appomnattox they should be attacked and taken at or before day- light. I was extremely anxious that all the groumid between my line and the river should be in our possession before the enemy could get his heavy re-euforcemeuts up. These instructions were not promptly complied with, aud it was not nutil about 6 a.. m. on the 16th that Gen- erals Birney and Gibbon advanced to reconnoiter the ground in their front, by which timne the enemy had moved a considerable body of fresh. troops on the field, had occupied the large redoubt and rifle-pits in front of the Avery house, and had greatly strengthened their positions at all important points. During this first advance on the morning of the 16th, Egans brigade, of Birneys division, made a spirited attack upon the enemy, who held a small redoubt on Birneys left, which was car- ried by Egan in his usual intrepid manner. Barlows division arrived on the field about daylight, and took position on Birneys left, extend- ing toward the Norfolk hnd Petersburg Railroad. Between the hours of 11 and 12 on the night of the 15th, after Birney and Gibbon had relieved the troops of General Smith on his front line, 20 R RvoL XL~ PT Page 306 306 OPERATIONS TN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. LII. I had a dispatch from General Grant directing inc to move up to Smiths division, stating that General Butler understood that I had halted at Baileys Creek instead of at harrisons Creek, where I had been directed to go. It is proper to say here that my troops had only halted at Baileys Creek long enough for me to see General Smith and to inform myself as to the poiiit on the battle-field at which they would be most serviceable; when I had obtained such information the troops were im- mediately marched to the front. The same dispatch from Lieutenant- General Grant stated that the enemy were then throwing re-enforce- ments into Petersburg, and instructed me that should Petersburg not fall on the night of the 15th it would be advisable for General Smith and myself to takenp a defensive position and maintain it until all of our forces came up. These directions of the lieutenant-general were carried out; the earth-works captured by Geimeral Smith were turned against the enemy, artillery was bronght up and placed in them, and all preparations were made to prevent their recapture. During the forenoon of the 16th I was instructed by Lientenant-Gemi- eral Grant, iii the absence of General Meade and himself, to take com- mand of all the troops in front of 1~etersbnrg, and to push forward a reconnoitering force in my front for the purpose of discovering the most favorable point at which to make an attack. I was ordered to be prepared to comumence the attack at 6 p. m. In the mean time General Buruside had been directed to mass his corps upon my left, in readiness to assist in an assault upon the enemy when it should be determined, or to aid me in the event of mny being assailed. The reconnaissance ordered by General Grant was made by General Birney omi the left of the Prince George road, and in front of the hill on which the Ilare house stood, which was then held by the enemy. It was decided by Major-General Meade, who had now ar- rived upon the field, that the attack should be made at that point. Very sharp skirmnishing, accompanied by artillery fire, continued along my front until 6 p. in., whem~,in accordance with instructions from the mnajor-geueral commanding, I directed Generals Birney, Barlow, and Gibboim to advance and assault the enemy in front and to the left of the Hare house. My troops were supported by two brigades of the Ninth Corps and by two of the Eighteenth Corps. The advance was spirited amid forcible and resulted, after a fierce comifiict,in which our troops suffered heavily, in driving the enemy back some distance along our whole line. The severe lighting ceased at drk, although the enemy made several vigorous attempts during the night to retake the ground which he had lost; in this, how ever, he was foiled, as our troops had intrenched themselves at dark and repelled all efforts to dislodge them. Among the many casualties during this engagemnent was the gallant commander of the Irish Brigade, Col. Patrick Kelly, Eighty-eighth New York Volunteers, who was killed at the head of his command while intrepidly leading it to the charge. Col. James A. Beaver, One hundred and forty-eighth Peminsylvania Volunteers, was severely wounded while performing his duty with his accustomed conspicuous bravery. On the morning of the 17th General Barlow advanced against the enemy in conjunction with General Buruside, and succeeded in push- in~ forward his hue considerably after somne sharp fightimug. Birney and Gibbon on the right also moved forward, driving the enemy from the hill on which the Hare house stood and occupied it. (Fort Sted- man was afterward erected on that hill.) The enemy muade frequen Page 307 CHAP. LH.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 307 efforts to retake the Hare house during the day, but were handsomely repelled on each occa~sion. In the evening, about 6 p. in., General Bar- low again participated in an attack with General Burnsides corps, in which Barlows division lost heavily in killed, wounded, and prisoners. The night of the 17th of June I was compelled to turn over my com- mand ou account of disability from my wound, which during the entire campaign had given me great annoyance, and at times had prevented me from taking that active part in the movement of my troops which I desired to do. I relinquished the command to Major-General Birney, the next senior general officer present in my corps, who conducted its operations until the 27th of June, when, having partially recovered, I again assumed the command. From that date until the 26th of July my troops were engaged in the arduous and dangerous duties incident to the siege operations in front of Petersburg; severe and almost con- stant labor (much of it daring the night) was required from the men in erecting the formidable earth-works which were thrown up in front of that town. While performing these exhausting labors, the troops were at all times exposed to a heavy artillery fire and to the enemy~s sharp- shooters, from which a long list of casualties resulted daily. The losses in action in the Second Corps during the period included in this report were over 6, OO(~ men killed, wounded, and missing, as will be shown by the following tabular statement: Killed, wounded. Missing. command. 0 ~ o 0 0 0 0 Artillery Brigade 1 1 10 3 17 First Division 17 249 53 1, 006 29 922 2, 276 Second Division 12 161 44 805 12 907 1, 961 Third Division 26 250 73 1, 256 15 377 1, 997 Total 56 663 170 3, 077 76 2, 269 6, 251 The casualties of the Eighth Ohio and First Delaware Yolunteers are not included in the above table, as no reports of their losses have been furnished corps headquarters. The conspicuous valor and good conduct of the officers and men under my command dur~g the marches, battles, and siege operations embraced in this epoch of the campaign, gave me complete satisfaction and merit the highest commendation. As I have already stated in my reports of this campaign, it is impossible, owing to the fact that I have received so few reports from my subordinate commanders, for me to muention in detail the names of all the officers and men of my command who were specially distinguished for marked bravery and meritorious conduct. The following general officers, commanders of brigades and divisions, are entitled to mny thanks for their distinguished and valuable services: The late Maj. Gen. D. B. Birney, then commanding Third Division, Second Corps; Brigadier-General (now Brevet Major-General) Barlow, commanding First Division; Major-General Gibbon, comumanding Second Division; Brigadier-General Mott, commanding Third Brigade, Third Division; Brigadier-General (now Brevet Major-General) Miles, commanding First Brigade, First Division; Colonel (now Brevet Major Page 308 308 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHA1~. LII. ~eneral) Egan, commanding [First] Brigade, Third Division; Colonel (no~~ General) Pierce, commanding Third [First] Brigade, Second Division. Col. J. C. Tidball, Fonrth I~ew York Heavy Artillery, chief of artillery, conducted himself with marked intrepidity; the artil- lery under his command performed most effective service throughout the can~aign. The batteries attached to the Second Corps were ably and gallantly commanded. The following officers of my staff deserve special mention for bravery and faithful performance of duties: Licut. Col. (now Brig. Gen.) C. H. Morgan, chief of staff; Maj. (now Bvt. Brig. Gen.) W. G. Mitchell, aide-dc-camp; Surg. (now Bvt. Lieut. Col.) A. N. Dougherty, medical director, Second Corps; Lient. Col. (now Bvt. Col.) F. A. Walker, assist- ant adjutant-general, Second Corps; Lient. Col. (now Col.) 11. N. Batchelder, chief quartermaster, Second Corps; Licut. Col. (now Bvt. Brig. Gen.) J. S. Smith, chief commissary of subsistence, Second Corps; Maj. 5. 0. Bull, l)rovost-marshal, Second Corps; Maj. A. W. Angel, acting topographical engineer, Second Corps; Capt. (now Bvt. Lieut. Col.) I. B. Parker Miller, aid aide-dc-camp; Capt. (now Bvt. Maj.) W. 1)e W. e-de-camp; Capt. (now Bvt. Lient. Col.)W. P. Wilson, acting assistant adjutaut-general; the late Capt. B. P. Brownson, commissary of musters, Second Corps; Capt. (now Bvt. Maj.) C. S. MeEntee, assistant quartermaster, and Captain Taylor, chief signal officer Second Corps. I have the honor to transmit herewith all of the reports received by me from subordinates who served nuder my command from May 3 until July 26, 1864. I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant, WINFD S. HANCOCK, Major- 6~eneral of Volunteers. ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. P. S.On the 18th of June General Birney, commanding Second Corps, made a heavy assault upon the enemys position on the right and left of the Prince George road, during which Barlows, Gibbons and Motts divisions lost heavily. I can give no details of this days actiomi, and only mention it for the reason that in consideration of the death of General Birney no reports of the operations of the Second Corps on the 18th of June were ever written, I believe., hEADQUARTERS SECOND ARMY CORPS Near Petersburg, Va., Norernber 11, 1864. GENERAL: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the troops under my command on the north side of the James River from the 26th until the 29th of July, 1864: On the afternoon of the 26th of July, about 4 oclock, the head of my command, consisting of Gibbons, Barlows, and Motts divisions, left its camp near the Deserted House for Point of Rocks the column inov- ing well to the rear to avoid being seen by the enemy. Just after dark we crossed the Appomattox by the pontoon bridge at Point of Rocks and proceeded to Deep Bottom, taking a rather difficult road to the left in order that the cavalry, which was crossing at Broadway Landing, might have an unobstructed road to Deep Bottom. Through the kind- ness of General Butler the road had been picketed, and small fires buil Page 309 CHAP. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 309 to facilitate our march. I arrived at Deep Bottom a short time in ad- vance of my command and met General Sheridan, commanding the cavalry, at the headquarters of Brigadier-General Foster, Tenth Corps, whose command held the bridge-heads on the north side of the James. My instructionswere to move rapidly from Deep Bottom toward Chaf- fins Bluff and take up a position to prevent the enemy from crossing troops to the north side, and to hold the position while General Sher- idan moved to the Virginia Central Railroad with two divisions of cav- alry. Further thaii this my movements were to be contingent upon General Sheridans success in o1)erating toward Richmond. The suc- cess of this movement depended npon the contingency that the enemy~s works would be thinly occupied, and the movement a surprise. The information I derived from conversation with General Foster was briefly as follows: The upper and lower pontoon bridges were above and below Four-Mile Rumm, impassable near its month. The enemy held, apparently in considerable force, a strong l)osition near the upper bridge, while their line apl)eared to termnitiate nearly opposite the lower bridge. The original plan was that the Second Corps should cross the upper bridge while the cavalry was crossiig the lower. After consulthg with General Sheridan, however, and referring the matter to time major-general comumanding for his approval, I deter mined to cross the infantry at the lower bridge and turn the enemys position, while General Foster with his force threatened the enemy in his front. The cavalry was directed to cross the river imnmnediately after the Second Corps; the infantry comnmemiced crossing about 2 a~ m. on the 27th, and was massed behind a belt of oak timber near the bridge. As soon as possible after daylight an advance was ordered, the First Division, Brigadier-General Barlow commanding, leading. At the same time a strong skirmuish line from the Third Division was thrown out to our right to feel the woods bordering the New Market and Malvern Hill road, and one from General Gibbons division iu the timber along the bank of Four-Mile Run. The skirmnish line of the Third Division from De Trobriands brigade, consisting of the Ninety-ninth and One hun- dred and tenth Pennsylvania Volunteers, became sharply engaged and was re-enforced by the Seventy-third New York Volunteers. Mean- while the skirmish line of Miles brigade, of Barlows division (composed of the One hundred and eighty-third Pennsylvania, Twenty-eighth Massachusetts, and Twenty-sixth Michigan Volunteers), nuder com- mand of Col. J. C. Lynch, One humidred and eighty-third Pennsylvania Volunteers, engaged the enemny farther to the left, driving him into the rifle-pits along the New Market amid Malvern Hill road, and by a well executed movement captured four 20-pounder Parrott guns, with their caissons, and drove the enemy from their works. The skirmishers of General Fosters force at the bridge had joined in this advance. The enemny held this line weakly, and when broken retreated in such haste that frw prisoners wer~i taken. As rapidly as the troops could be brought forward iu the country, about which we then knew nothing, they were pushed up the New Market and Malvern Hill road in pursuit of the enemny, the Second Division in advance. The enenmy brought a battery out opposite General Mott on our extremne rio-h t, but it was soon driven off by the fire of our artillery and General Motts skirmish line, and retreated by a cross-road to the New Market and Long Bridge road. Whemi we arrived at Bailey~s Creek the enemy were foumid posted on the opposite bank in ivell-constructed works, in a position offering great advantages for defense. Baileys Creek is so munch of an obstacl Page 310 OPE1~ATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. 310 (CHAP. LII. that a line of battle could not well cross it under fire, and the distance from the creek to the works was about 1,000 yards, the intervening ground being perfectly open. The works appeared to be filled with men, and a number of pieces of artillery were in position. After a careful examination of the position it was decided that the chances of successful assault were unfavorable, and it was determined to maneu- ver to the right, with the view of turning the position. Meanwhile the cavalry had moved to the right toward Malvern Hill and to the front on the New Market and Long Bridge road. Gibbons division held the advance position on the New Market and Malvern Hill road while ~ and Motts divisions were pushed forward to the New Market and Long Bridge road, connecting with the cavalry near the fork of the Central road. General Barlow, commanding First Division, made a close reconnaissance of the enemys line, but was unable to find the flank. The cavalry, by one or two spirited charges on my right, gained possession of ~ome high open ground, which it was hoped might enable them to get in rear of the enemys line, but, as subse- quently ascertained, the enemys line was refused on this flank, turning sharply to their left near Fussells Mill. About 3.30 p. m. Lieutenant- General Grant visited the line, but I did not see him. Having examined the position, he left me a note stating that he did not see that much could be done, but that if it was possible for me to roll up the enemys left toward Chaffins Bluff; and thus release our cavalry, he desired it done. He stated that according to his information the enemy had in my front seven brigades of infantry and a small force of cavalry. Night coming on put a stop to further operations. During the night of the 27th I received intelligence that the enemy were re-enforcing from the south side of the James. Birges brigade of tIme Tenth [Nineteenth] Corps (a little over 2,500 strong), reported to me early on the morning of the 28th and relieved Gibbons division from its advanced position on the New Market and Malvern lull road. General Sheridan was also placed under my orders and it was decided that he should advance up the Central or Charles City road, if either could be opened. Brigadier-General Foster was directed by General Butler to make a vigorous demonstration in his immediate front to attract as many of the enemy as possible to that point. By a telegram from General Grant to General Meade (a copy of which reached me at 10 oclock on the morn- ing of the 27th), I was informed that General Grant did not desire me to attack the enemys works, but to turn their position. The dispatch expressed the opinion of General Grant that the cavalry by going well out might turn the enemys flank. Preparations were made to carry out the views of Gerkeral Grant, but it become evident at an early hour that the enemy having been largely re-enforced would assume the offen- sive, and they were discovered moving to my right in strong force about 8 a. m. The fire of the gun-boats in the river was directed on the enemy by means of signals, and was effective in changing the direc- tion of their march. About 10 a. in. the cavalry skirmish line was driven in on the New Market and Long Bridge road and on the cross- road leading over the Charles City road by ~ house, and a vigor- ous attack was made by the enemy upon our cavalry at both points, which compelled it to retire some distance. Gibbons division was hurried up to the support of the cavalry, but before it arrived the attacking force of the enemy had been disposed of by a gallant ad- vance of our cavalry (dismounted), driving the enemy over a mile, cap- turing nearly 200 prisoners and several colors. The prisoners belonge Page 311 eHAP. tII.~ THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 311 to Kershaws division of infantry. Greggs division of cavalry effected its withdrawal from the Charles City road after a sharp fight with the enemys infantry, losing one gun. Anticipating a more determined attack, I changed the disposition of my lines. Gibbons division held the approaches to the New Market and Long Bridge road, while the cavalry was withdrawn to cover the New Market and Malvern Hill road. The enemy having been reported as passing toward Malvern Hill, a garrison was placed in the bridge-head at the lower bridge by General Foster, and artillery placed in position under my direction to prevent the enemy from cntting me off from the river. As soon as this was accomplished the infantry was withdrawn to a line following the general direction of the New Market and Malvern Hill road. Repeated dispatches showing that the enemy were concentrating against me were furnished me, and I made every preparation to receive them. They made no further demonstration during the day, however, other than to crowd the cavalry skirmishers a little. On the afternoon of the 28th Generals Grant and Meade visited my line, and I was instructed to send General Motts division that night to Petersburg to report to Major- General Ord, for the purpose of relieving the Eighteenth Corps from the hue of iutrenchments. I continued holding the line during the 29th with the remaining divisions of my corps, Birges brigade, of the Tenth. [Nineteenth] Corps, and Sheridans cavalry. Having attracted to my front so large a portion of Lees army, Lieutenant-General Grant thought it a favorable time to assault at Petersburg, and I was there- fore instructed to proceed to that place with the remainder of my com- mand. Soon after dark on the 29th, in accordance with instructions, I with- drew the entire commuand froni Deep Bottom and repom~ted with the two divisions of my corps at Petersburg on the morning of the 30th in time to witness the explosion of the mine. General Birge was directed to report to his proper command, and General Sheridan crossed the Ap- pomattox at Broadway Landing and proceeded to carry out the special instructions given him by the major-general commanding. Having received no reports from Generals Sheridan and Birge I am not able to give muore than a general statement of their operations. General ~ command deserves particular commendation for its successful affair with the enemys infantry on the 28th. In my own command special mention is made by subordinate com- mnanders of the Ninety-ninth and One hundred and tenth Pennsylvania Volunteers, nuder Colonel Biles, for good conduct in the skirmish on the 27th, in which they suffered severely. Also of the Twenty-eighth Massa- chusetts, Twenty-sixth Michigan, and One hundred and eighty-third Pennsylvania Volunteers, utider command of Colonel Lynch, of the One hundred and eighty-third Pennsylvania Volunteers. The last- named regiments captnred the enemys battery of four 20-pounder Par- rotts as heretofore mentioned. I append herewith a statement of casualties in my own corps during the foregoing operations. I regret that the absence of reports from Generals Sheridan and Birge makes it impossible for nine to include a statement of the casualties in their respective commands. I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, WINFD S. HANCOCK, Major- General of Volunteers. Brig. Gen. S. WILLIAMs, Adjutant- General, Army of the Potomac Page 312 312 OPEEATLONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. LIL List of casualties in Second Army Corps on north side of James River July 26, 27, and 28 1864. Killed. Wounded. Missing. Command. ~JJ 0 ~ 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 ~ First Division 1 15 1 43 1 18 79 Second Division 17 1 27 45 Third Division 10 6 39 2 8 65 Artillery Brigade 3 Total 25 7~ 102 4 53 192 hEADQUARTERS SECOND ARMY CORPS, August 3, 18G4. GENERAL: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of this corps on the 30th nitimo: On the evening of the 29th an order was received directing the corps to recross the James and take np a position in rear of the intrenched line of the Eighteenth Corps in readiness to move as might be directed. General Motts division had moved the night before to the vicinity of Petersburg, for the purpose of relieving the Eight~enth Corps. This corps was then in line of battle on the north side of the James, along the New Market and Malvern Hill road, its left near Baileys Creek, connecting on the right with the cavalry under General Sheridan, which extended to Malvern Hill. The necessary orders were given for the withdrawal of both commands. It was hoped that two bridges might be available for the command, but this not being the case the command crossed on one bridge, the infantry commencing at 8.30 p. m. and occu- pying the bridge till nearly 11, two brigades of cavalry crossing mean- while. The head of column reached the Appomattox a few minutes be- fore 1 on the morning of the 30th, and by daylight the rear of column had passed Spring Hill. The leading division (General Gibbons) coni- menced moving in rear of the Eighteenth Corps line, then held by General Motts division of this corps, about 3.45 a. m. On arriving at General Motts headquarters I was informed by General Mott that General Ord had desired him to report to me in his name that himself and division commanders had concluded that it was not practicable to attack in front of the Eighteenth Corps, owing to the nature of the obstructions the enemy had placed in front of their works, and that he had so reported to the major ,eneral commanding the Army of the Po- tomac. Abont 6 a. m. I received - the following dispatch by telegraph from Burusides: Major-General HANCOCK, JULY 30, 15646 a. in. Commanding Second Army Corps: The major-general commanding directs me to say that General Burnside reports the enemys line in his front abandoned, and the prisoners taken say that there is no second line. The commanding general may call on yon to move forward any moment, and wishes you to have your troops well up to the front, prepared to move. Do the enemys lines in front of Motts division appear to be thinly occnpied, and is there any chance to pnsh forward there? A. A. HUMPHREYS, Major-General and Chief of StalT A demonstration was made along the whole line occupied by General Mott and it was found the enemy had not apparently weakened thi Page 313 CHAP. LII.] 313 THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. line. Colonel Madill, commanding the center brigade, reported that not a man had moved to our left since daylight. The picket-firing was at all times very sharp at this point, and it was doubtless to examine the enemys line closely. At 7 a. m. I received the following dispatch by telegraph from Burusides headquarters: JULY 30, 18647 a. m. Major-General HANCOCK: The reports from prisoners would indicate a weakness in the enemys line, and that a considerable portion of it has be& n vacated. If Burnside and Ord gain the crest, the enemy cannot hold in your front, for they will be open to attack from front and rear. It as to take advantage of this contingency that I wanted to have your troops in hand. The orders to Mott are all right. If the enemy are in force and prepared you will have to wait developments, but if you have reason to believe their condition is such that an effort to dislodge them would be successful I would like to have it made. Buruside now occupies their line, but has not pushed up to the crest, though he reports he is about doing so. GEO. G. MEADE, Major- General, Commanding. I had a careful watch on the whole line that I might take advantage of aiiy attempt of the enemy to re-enforce from my part, but no change was apparent and every demonstration from my line was met with such vigor and show of strength that I saw no opportunity of an advance promising success. At 9.40 a. m. I received a dispatch stating that of- feiisive operations were suspended and requiring me to hold the line of the Eighteenth Corps in force. Preparations were made for placing the whole corps in the line at dusk, but the above order being changed, the corps resumed during the night its position in the vicinity of the De- serted House General Mott being relieved by the Eighteenth Corps. The casualties on the 30th were: Command. Second Division Third Division Total Killed, wounded. 0 ~ 0 ~ 1 2 1 24 2 1 25 I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant, ~ WINFD S. hANCOCK, Brig. Gen. ~. WILLIAMS, Major-General, Commanding. Assistant Adjutant- General. ADDENDA. NEAR PETERSBURG, VA., June 26, 1864. CS at 1 27 28 Brig. Gen. S. WILLIAMS, Assistant Adjutant- General, Ar my of the Potomac: GENERAL: Having seen one of the late published telegrams of the Secretary of War in reference to the advance of tIme army on Peters- burg, which stated that the Second Corps arrived in front of that town at 3 a. in. on the 16th, I felt aggrieved from its official nature, because such statement did not agree with the facts in the case, and I knew that it must have been derived from official sources of in formation. The inference was, that the reason why Petersbum~g was not taken o Page 314 (CHAP. LII. 314 OPE1IATION~ IN SE. VA. AND N. C. the 15th was that the Second Corps did not arrive upon the field at the proper time. I concluded, however, to let the matter rest, hoping that Petersburg would be taken subsequently by the vehement efforts of ~he Second and other corps, and not desiring to agitate the question as to whether it should have been carried on the 15th or not. To-day I have ~een an article taken from the New York Times, dated June 21, 1864, in reference to the same subject, in which it would appear that the operation was to have been a joint effort between the Second and Eighteenth Corps, and that the reason that the town was not carried was that the Second Corps did not arrive in time. There are errone- ous statements in this article prejudicial to my command and to my- self, and although there were faults committed that day which would fall upon my subordinates, I claim that, if Petersburg was garrisoned at that time only as is now believed, that it should have been captured by the Eighteenth Corps, which was directed to assault th~ town, with, I believe, 15,000 men, and certainly with the assistance of the two divis- ions of the Second Corps which I offered to General Smith just after dark on the 15th, these two divisions being then massed at Bryants house on the left and rear of General Hunks division, about one mile from General Smiths front line. Had I arrived before dark, and been able to have seen the ground myself, I shonld have taken decisive ac- tion; bitt not knowing anything of the locality, nor what portion of the works General Smith had carried (for at the time of my arrival he did not know precisely himself what portion of the enemys, works were occupied by his troops), and relying upon his judgment, and desiring not to interfere with his honors, as he was directed to take the place, I offered my advance troops to him, to use according to his knowledge and discretion, he having seen the position in daylight. General Smith requested me to relieve the greater portion of his line in order to pre- vent an attempt to retake the works by the enemy. He state~tto me at the time of my interview with him that he believed the enemy to hayc been re-enforced during the evening. My troops completely es- tablished themselves in position on the front line, relieving General Smiths troops, before midnight. At 12.25 a. m. on the 16th, understanding the necessity of driying th& enemy across the Appomattox before mnornin~, I issued ~n or-der with that intent. This order was not exeented for reasons which may be ex- plained by an investigation. Had I been iii perfects health, and able to -endure all the fatigues incident to the march, I might have corrected many errors that were committed; but as I know that every effort was made to carry out the views of the conimanding general of the Army of the Potomac, and of the lieutenant-general commanding the Armies of the United States, by the Second Corps, so far as I was concerned, and as there appears to be an improper attempt to l)lace the failure to cap- ture Petersburg on the 15th on my command, I respectfully ask for an imivestigation on this subject. I received more than one communication from Lientenant-General Grant on that day which were erroneously based, but I did not reply to them, as I was directing all my efforts to get umy command to the desired point. These facts can be shown at any inomnent by orders and telegramsinmypossession,butaftertheoccurrenceshadpassedldid not think it necessary to reply to them in detail. I am preparing gopies of the orders and instructions received by me on time 15th, with a statement of the action taken, which I will forward. I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, WINFD S. HANCOCK, Major- General, U. ~ Yolunteers Page 315 Cti& p. LII.] ~j?HE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 315 [Indorsement] HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, June 27, 1864. iRespeetfully forwarded for the action of the lieutenant-general com- manding, in~smnch as the occurrences to which Major-General Hancock refers took place on the evening of the 15th and morning of the 16th before my arrival on the field and assumption of the command of the lEighteenth Corps agreeably to the instructions of the lieutenant-gen- eral commanding. had Major-General Hancock and myself been apprised in time of the contemplated movement against Petersburg, and the necessity of his co-operation, I am of the opinion he conld have been pushed much earlier to the scene of operations, but as matters occurred and with our knowledge of them I do not see how any censure can be attached to General Hancock and his corps. GEG. G. MEADE, Major- General, Commanding. HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES, City Point, Va., June 28, 1864. Major-General MEADE: GENERAL: The communication of General Hancock [June 261, in- closing a newspaper article and asking for a.i investigation of the con- duct of the Second Corps and its commander, in the affair of the 15th instant, with your indorsement, is received. No investigation can now be had without great prejudice to the service, nor do I think an investi- gation necessary at any time. The reputation of the Second Corps and its commander is so high, both with the public and in the army, that an investigation could not add to it. It cannot be tarnished by news- paper articles or scribblers. No official dispatch has ever been sent from these headquarters which, by any construction, could cast blame on the Second Corps or its commander for the part they have played in this campaign. i am very much mistaken if you were not informed of the contemplated movement against Petersburg as soon as I returimed to Wilcoxs Landing from Bermuda Hundred, and that the object of get- ting the Second Corps up without waiting for the supply train to come up to issue rations to them, was that they might be on hand if required. I arranged to have rations sent down from Bermuda Hundred to issue as the troops crossed. Finding they did not arrive I then directed that the corps should march without them, and arranged that the rations should be sent imm wagons from Bermuda Hundred to meet them on the road. This is not said- in any spirit of fault-finding for any delay, for there was no fault to be found in what was done either by the Second Corps, its commander, or the commander of the Army of the Potomac. The only delay that I know of was an hour or two arising fromu the report that the provisions which had been ordered down by water had arrived, and details from the different divisions that had already crossed had come to the river to draw them. This was after the order had been given to mnarch without them, but I believe before the troops had ic- ceived the order.* Original is in General Grants handwriting unsigned, and filed with General Han- cocks letter of June 26, 1864. It does not appear in Letters Sent Books, headquar- ters Armies of the United States, or in the Letters Received Books, headquarters Army of the Potomac Page 316 313 OPERATIONS iN SE. VA. AND N. 0. ~CHAP. LII. Copy of daily memorauda* taken at headquarters of the SecQild Army Corps, Army of the Potomac, during the campaign commencing May 3, 1864, with copies of messages, dispatches, & c. The Army of the Poto- mac commanded by Lieut. Gen. U. S. Grant in person, Major-General Meade second in command. 1AT. G. MITCHELL, Major and Aide-de- Camp to Major- General Hancock. FIFTH EPOCH. June 12, 1864.Orders received this p. m. to be ready to march to- night, which is very agreeable to all of us, as there seems to be no hope of breakiiig the enemys lines here, they are so strong and powerfully garrisoned. 11 p. in., the movement of Second Corps commenced, First Division taking the lead, moving in direction of Long Bridge, over the Chickahoininy. Withdrawal from our lines effected very quietly and promptly. The pickets to remain on our lines, under command of Col- onel Hammell, Sixty-sixth New York Volunteers, officer of the day, until the line of battle is completely withdrawii, then to follow the corps. Major Nelson, aide-de-camp, directed by the general to remain with Colonel Hammell. Marched all nightmen and officers very weary. June 13, 1864.Head of column reached pontoon bridge over Chicka. hominy at Long Bridge at 9.30 a. in., and immediately commenced crossing, General Birney in advance, having been directed to pass First and Second Divisions to p~rinit them to cook breakfast. 11 a. in., wrote note, by direction of General Hancock, to General Gibbon to protect pontoon bridge over Chickahominy until it was taken up. Marched rapidly all day. Head of column reached James River, near Wilcoxs Landing, at 5.30 p. in. Corps formed line of battle for the night. Prepa- rations making for transporting the troops over the James to-morrow. June 14, 1864.11.i0 a. in., Birneys troops commenced moving on board the transports and crossing James River, disembarkiiig at Wind- Mill Point and at upper landing. Crossing of troops (infantry and artillery) continued all day and night, Gibbons division following, Birneys and Barlows following Gibbons. Considering the facilities at hand the troops have been transported across the stream with remark- able promptitude and success. June 15, 1864. ---5 a. in., the last regimuent of the corps has just been landed on the south side of the James. The whole corps now ready to move when ordered. We remained from 5 a. in. until 10.30 a. m. wait- ing for the arrival of 60,000 rations of time corps which General Butler was to send from City Point. Orders received in the mean time to march toward Petersburg after we had received rations. As imo rations arrived the head of the colunm (General Birneys division) moved out in direc- tion of Petersburg at 10.30 a. mm, or rather in th~ direction of Harrisons Creek, near Petersburg. A map which was furnished General Hancock to march by found to be execedimigly defective. Day intensely hot amid roads dusty; the men suffering terribly for water during the march, many of theum gi~i1mg out along the road. Had a row with a straggler from one of the heavy artillery regiments, whom I found in a deserted house deliberately engaged in a library (upstairs) tearing up the books and throwing them on the floor. 1 struck hini with my saber and or- dered him to his regiment, when he seized his musket from a corner of the room, bayonet fixed, and plunged right at me. I knocked his For portion of memoranda (here omitted) covering operations from May 3 to Jnne 11, 1864, see Vol. XXXVI, Part I, p. 350 Page 317 ChAP. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAM~A1GN. 317 iuusket to one side and gave him a slash over the head with my saber, opening his head and knocking him clear down a flight of stairs, musket and all, and before I could get down to him he scrambled up and made off toward the column, and I could not overtake him. These straggling scoundrels, murderers, and pillagers should all be shot or hung by the provost-marshal; 5.25 p. in., General Hancock received dispatch from General Grant addressed to him (General Hancock) or to General Gib- bon, commanding SecQnd Division, stating that General Smith had carried the outer works of the enemy in front of Petersburg, and directed General Hancock to proceed to assistance of General Smith as rapidly as possible. 5.50 p. in., General Hancock received dispatch from Geim- eral Smith (William F.), by the hands of Captain Livermore, saying that lie (General Smith) was authorized by General Grant to call upon the Second Corps for assistance, and requesting General Hancock to move up as rapidly as possible. We were already marching with the utmuost expedition. We could now hear the artillery at Petersburg and the men stepped out briskly. 6.30. p. in., General Birneys division ar- rived at Bryants house, on Baileys Creek, in front of Petersburg, near Hinks division, Eighteenth Corps, Gibbons division immediately in rear of Birneys. Rode forward with General Hancock to where Generals Smith and Brooks were; found they had captured a portion of the enemys line of works with 17 pieces of artillery. None of Lees army in the works yet (so it is said); they were defended by citizens and local troops around Petersburg. As soon as General Haiicock meI~ General Smith lie told him that Birneys and Gibbons divisions, of the Second Corps, were at his service for any place he wi~hed them stating at the same time that he made the offer of the troops in question for the reason that it was now getting dark and he could not well see the position of the lines, and that General Smith having been on the ground all day knew just what was required to be done. General Smith replied that all he wish~d General Hancock to do was to relieve his troops of the Eighteenth Corps from their position in the captured works. General Hancock, General Smith, and Ge~neral Brooks theii rode out to the cap- tured works with their staff officers. On the way General Hancock directed me to return to Bryants house and bring up Gibbons division to the works; a staff officer also sent to General Birney with same in- structions. Returned immediately to General Gibboii with General Hancocks orders, who at once put his troops in motion and moved up to the designated point, occupying the works, his right resting in the captured redoubt on the crest, on left of the Friend house; his left con- necting with General Birneys division, which also came up at the Dunn house. Both divisions in position in works at 11.30 p. ni. 12midnight, Barlows division not yet up. Evidently has taken the wrong road and got lost. June 16, 1861.12.25 a. in., by direction of General Hancoek I wrote the following instructions to Generals Birney and Gibbon: HEADQUARTERS SECOND Conrs, June 16, 186412.25 a. m. General GIBBON and General BIRNEY: GENERAL: If there are any points in your front commanding your position now occupied by the enemy the major-general commanding directs that they be takea at or before daylight, preferably before, as it is desirable to prevent the enemy from holding any points between us and the Appomattox. It is thought there are one or two such points. General Barlow will soon be up, and will mass in rear of General Gibbons left. I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant, W. G. MITCHELL, Major and Aide-d#-Garnr Page 318 318 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. tdHAP. LII. Delivered the above to General Gibbon about 1 a. in. General Birney also received a copy by the han(Is of a staff officer. Night cold. At daybreak rode around the lines with the general. Met Captain Marlin, of General Barlows staff who reported that General Barlows division had arrived on the field. General Barlow took the wrong road yester- day, and marched nearly to City Point before the mistake was discov- ered. Barlows division placed on left of Birney, extending out in di- reclion of Norfolk road. About 8 a. in. Birney advanced a brigade and drove the enemy back some distance in front and~ to left of Dunns house. Lees army coming up rapidly and occupying the works in our front. Sharp skirmishing all day. 6 p. in., Generals Barlow and Birney ~s- saulted enemys lines, but did not succeed in breaking through. Bar. low and Birney, supported by portions of Ninth and Eighteenth Corps, two brigades of each. Two brigades of Eighteenth Corps and one bri- gade of Ninth Corps sent to General Birney one brigade of Ninth Corps sent to General Barlow. Fighting continued at intervals all night. Our loss heavy in killed and wounded. General Burnsides corps (Ninth), fighting on our left. Enemy threw an immense number ot shot and shell during the night. June 17, 1864.General Burnside attacked at daybreak on General Barlows left, capturing some artillery and prisoners. No assaults made by Second Corps to-day. Enemy made several attacks on General Bir- neys line, not in great force, however, and were always repulsed. About 3 p. m. General Burnside again attacked on our left, but was compelled to retire. Barlow also engaged in this attack. June 18, 1864.General Birney in command of Second Corps, General Hancock being compelled to relinquish command on account of his wound which he received at Gettysburg. His wound has been suppu- rating all summer, and giving him great pain, and now conipels him to remain in his tent. 4 a. in., an attack ordered by Second, Ninth, and Fifth Corps. Shortly after 4 a. in. General Birney advanced, and at 5 a. in. sent word to General Hancock that he had entered the enemys first line of works and found it evacuated. 12.15, General Gibbon as- saulted in two lines, but did not succeed in carrying the works. 4 p. in., another assault by nin~ brigades, which did not succeed. Our loss v~ry hea4 in killed and wounded to-day. June 19, 1864.General Birney in command of the corps. No oper- ations of importance on the line of Second Corps to-day. Both armies busily engaged intrenching. The enemy already have very powerful redoubts and rifle-pits (curtains) encircling Petersburg on this side of the river, either flank of those resting on the Appomattox, which appear to have been constructed some time since, in anticipation of an ad- vance of our army in that direction. June 20, 1864.The musketry and artillery quite brisk in the trenches, but no assaults on th~e Second Corps line. Orders received for corps to move in direction of Norfolk and Petersburg road. Relieved in the trenches by other troops, and then moved to rear of Ninth Corps, where the corps was massed. General Hancock still unable to resume com- mand. June 21, 1864.Corps moved to-day toward Norfolk and Petersburg Railroad, crossing that railroad near Deserted House, and striking Jerusalem plank road flear Williams house, then took position on left of Fifth Corps, about two miles from Weldon railroad. Corps head- quarters established just in front of Jones house, near Jerusalem plank road. General Birney in command of corps Page 319 CHAP. 111.1 THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 319 June 22, 18G4.Geiieral Birney commanding corps. Major-General Mea(le, commanding Army of the Potomac, at corps lLea(lquarters in ibrenoon. Comparatively little firing until about 3 oclock this p. in., when left of Second Corps was thrown forward, intending to connect with right of Sixth Corps, bat such connection was not made; after hy- ing advanced some distance toward NVeldon railroad, Barlows division (left of corps5 was attacked on its left dank by the enemy, who had pushed in between it and Sixth Corps, the country being jensely wooded, and thrown into great confusion, losing considerable in pris- oners captured by the enemy. Barlows troops retired to the line held by them before advancing. The enemy then caine forward on Gibbons and Motts fronts (Second and Third Divisions), and captured 4 guns, McKnights battery. Enemy finally repulsed and line re-established; skirmishing continued until (lark. During the attack the enemy was at one tinie very close to corps headquarters, and their bullets struck among our tents. They also sent a great many round shot through our~ camp, one of them catting a canteen from the side of a mounted or- derly of Doctor Dougherty, medical director of the corps. General Meade present during the attack. Skirmishing continued until dark. June 23, 18G4.General Birney still in command on account of Gen- eral Hancocks wounds unfitting him for duty. Second Corps line connected with Sixth Corps line on our left. Headquarters established at Jones house near Jerusalem plank road; some skirmishing and artillery. Troops engaged in throwing up rifle-pits. June 24, 186-4.No movement of importance by Second Corps. Some skirmishing on our front and enemy threw a number of shot in our direction, but did no damage. General Birney still in command. June 25, 1864.Samne as yesterday; no movements. June 26, l8G4.Same as yesterday. June 27, 1864.No movements of moment on Second Corps line to- day. General Hancock sufficiently recovered to resume conunand of the corps at 7 p. m. June 28, 1864.No movement by the corps to-day. Our hue now connects with left of Crawfords division, Fifth Corps. General Meade visited corps headquarters to-day. June 29, 1864.Sixth Corps moved from left of Second toward Reams Station, on Norfolk and Petersburg Railroad.* General Gibbon occupied intrenchinents vacated by Sixth Corps toward the Williams house. Lieutenant-Colonel Jones reported to General Hancock from army headquarters with detachment of cavalry 1,000 strong; took position in intrenchmuents between Williams house and Jerusalem plank road. June 30, 1864.Sixth Corps at Reams Station; General Ferrero re- ported to General Hancock with division of colored troops (Ninth Corps), and took position in intrenchments from General Gibbons left near Williams house, to Jerusalem plank road. General Gibbon moved to-night and increased the strength of his line. July 1, 1864.Nothing of importance. The usual picket and artil- lery firing making some casualties. - July 2, 1864.Sixth Corps returned from lieims Station and took post again on left of Gibbons division in front of Williamus house, cov- ering Jerusalem plank road. July 3, 1864.No movements of any importance. All at work in the trenches. July 4, 1864.This is our National anniversary and we are having a more deadly struggle to-day for our national existence than our fore- Reams Station is oi tlie Petersburg and Weldon Railroad Page 320 320 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. LIT. fathers had during t1~ Revolution. Alas, that our present enemies should be our brothers, descendants of the men who resisted nobly the tyranny of England. July 5, 6, 7, and 8, 1864.Con~paratively quiet, and very hot and dusty. The customary picket and artillery firing still goes oii, with mortav shelling as an acc@rnpannnent. The shells from the mortars look very bcautifnl at night as they describe long arcs with burning fuses, passing from our lines to the enemys and from their positiomi into our works, each one leaving a streaming tail of fire behind it. Sometimes we count as many as thirty of them in the air at the same time. Our men are protected from them and from other heavy missiles by strong bomb-proofs, so that we do not lose many killed or wounded by them. We have now immense earth-works with bomb-proofs., coy- CrC(l ways, & c extending for many miles, crossing the Appomattox and ,Iames Rivers ~n our right and stretching away toward the South Side Railroad on our left. The enemy~s works are equally extended and frumnidable, and we now appear to have settled doWn to a siege of each others positions. The redoubts are immemise on our line and all con- nected by curtaimis for infantry. There is a vast armament of artillery on both sides, which thanders away with noise enough to frighten the world, but does very little execution among the men. The fatigue is terrible to the men who are digging in the works, making new redonbts, curtains, covered ways, & c. Whole divisions of 10,000 men are de- tailed for fatigue duty at the same time. The works will soon Thrm such a labyrinth that none but those who are in them daily will be able to find the way to front or when there to get out again. July 9, 1864.First and Second Divisions, Sixth Corps, moved from our left toward City Point. Second Corps occupied the line vacated by them, our line extending on the left nearly to Williams house. Motts brigade, Third Division, on left of General Gibbon, Second Division. General Ferreros division (colored troops) taking position on left of Motts brigade, extending over Jerusalem plank road. July 10, 1864.No important movements this day by the Second Corps. Firing go1~ng on as usual along our line. July 11, 1864.Orders received to move out of our rifle-pits to-night, to destroy the works in vicinity of Williams house, and to mass corps in vicinity of said house. July 12, 1864.Corps moved out at 3 oclock this a. in. and massed in neighborhood of Williams house. l)estroyed works in compliance with orders. 5.15 a in General Barlow ordered to move his division to cross-roads, four miles dpwn Jerusalem plank road, in supI)ort of Greggs cavalry, which is farther out. Gemmeral Gregg (1). MeM.) placed nuder General 1-lancocks orders temporarily. General Barlow afterward withdrawn to same position he held in the morning. 9.45 p. in., General Hancock received telegram from army headquarters directing him to move into position in rear of Fifth Corps, which is in front line of intrenchments; Second Corps took np positiomi accord- ingly on right and lef~ of Norfolk road, near Deserted House, amid also near Southall house. July 13, 1864.Corps in reserve, having taken position in rear of Fifth Corps; headquarters established at Deserted House, which is literally riddled with shot and shell from the enemys lines. July 14, 1864.About the usual firing in front to-day. Two divis- ions of the corps detailed for fatigue duty on the line of the Fifth Corps making covered ways Page 321 CHAP. LII.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 321 July 15, 1864.Quiet save the customary artillery and musketry in the trenches. First and Second Divisions, Second Corps, on fatigue duty destroying old works of the rebels near the Avery house. July 16, 1864.Quiet as usual this day. No movements. Hot and dusty. July 17, 1864.No movements by Second Corps this day. Deserters from the enemy report that the enemy intend attacking us to-morrow morning. Corps consequently ordered under arms, to be ready at 3 a. m. to-morrow. Headquarters to be packed at same hour. July 18, 1864.No movements this day. No attack from enemy as deserters reported there would be. July 19, 1864.Quiet on our line save customary artillery and mus- ketry in the trenches. July 20, 1864.Same as yesterday; no movements. July 21, 1864.Accompanied General Hancock, with other members of his staff; to headquarters of General Grant, at City Point; also to General Butlers headquarters, at Bermuda Hundred. Back same even- ing to our own headquarters; a long ride; hot and dusty. July 22, 1864.Gibbons division relieved Ferreros division of col- ored troops in front line of works, Gibbons left resting on Norfolk and Petersburg Railroad. General Birney relinquished command of the Third Division, Second Corps, to-day and took command of the Tenth Army Corps. July 23, 1864.Pierces brigade, Third Division, Second Corps, took post on left of Gibbons division in front line of works. General Birney gave up Third Division to-day to take command of Tenth Corps. July 24, 1864.No movement by Second Corps to-day. Usual firing in intrenchments. Hot. July 25, 1864.Same as yesterday. Hot. July 26, 1864.Early this a. m. I was directed by General Hancock to proceed across the Appomattox at Bermuda Hundred visit General Butlers headquarters, and thence go on to pontoon bridg~ across James River at Jones Neck, so as to be familiar with the road from headquar- ters Second Corps to that point, then to return in the evening and guide the column on its march to-night to the bridge across the James at Jones Neck. Returned to corps headquarters early in the afternoon, and at 4 p. in. corps marched in direction of bridge across Appomattox at Point of Rocks, keeping well back of our lines, so as to prevent the column being observed by the enemy from their position. 9.30 p. in., head of column arrived at pontoon bridge over Appomattox; crossed immediately and continued the march on Bermuda Hundred in direc- tion of pontoon bridge on the James River at Jones Neck; Barlows division in advance. Midnight, the troops on the march between Gen- eral Butlers headquarters and Jones Neck. July 27, 1864.2. 45 a. in., head of column, Barlows division, reached lower pontoon bridge at ~ Neck. The whole corps immediately crossed, the last regiment getting over at 6.30 a. in., General Sheridans cavalry following close in rear Qf Second Corps. Strewed the bridge thickly with hay to prevent the enemy from hearing the tramp of the horses feet. Infantry at once took position, and throwing skirmishers in direction of Baileys Creek, advanced upon the enemys first line of works over an open field. The works ran along the edge of a wooded crest covering New Market and Malvern Hill road. Mott had the right of our line, Barlow the center, Gibbon the left. 6.15 a. in., skirmishers dashing up the slope sharply engaged with the enemy; line of battle following them closely. 6.30 a. in., our whole line dashed into the work~ 21 R R~OI~ XL, PT Page 322 322 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. [CHAP. LIL and scattered the enemy in all ditections, Miles brigade, Barlows division, capturing four 20-pounder Parrott guns; but few killed or wounded on either side. 0. 35 a. in., General Hancock wrote to General Humplireys, chief of staff, Army of the Potomac, that we had captured four guns and that he was pressing forward after the enemy. 7.20 a. in., enemy openedbattery on our extreme right, which our guns at once silenced. One brigade of Motts division advanced to attempt capture of that battery and had a sharp fight, but enemy succeeded in getting their guns off. 7.25 a. in., dispatch sent by General Hancock to General Humphreys, chief of staff, Army of the Potomac, stating that enemy had opened battery on our extreme right, and that a brigade of [Motts] division was advancing to assail it. Also stating that as all chances for surprising the enemy had passed it was a question whether General Sheridans cavalry should attempt to break through the enemys lines for the purpose of making a raid as had been contemplated, or whether the cavalry should wait until the infantry advanced farther. 7.30 a. enemy gone at all points from their first line of works, and our troops occupying them. All firing ceased. Our whole line now advanced to Potteries, near Baileys Creek, on New Market and Malvern Hill road, on the left, and to New Market and Long Bridge road on the right. From this position we discovered the enemy in a second line of heavy intrench- ments along the crest of Spring Hill, apparently extending for a great distance to our right and left. Baileys Creek and its valley lying be- tween our lines, some firing in the valley between our skirmishers and the enemys; the cavalry holding the right of our line, nuder General Sheridan. Enemys works in our front covering New Market and Darby or Central roads. Our gun-boats lying in James River shelled enemys works, throwing their immense shot and shell over our heads. We could see them plow up the ground in their works and could also see the rebs flying from them in all directions for shelter. Sharp skirmishing all day. The general, Miller, and myself came near getting hit to-day by enemys skirmishers, who were concealed in a wood near which we rode to enable the general to see more closely the enemys line. We rode into a thicket after they had several deliberate shots at us without hit- ting any of us or either of our horses. 5p.m., General Barlow advanced one regiment, Twenty-sixth Michigan, across New Market and Long Bridge road where Central road leaves it and pushed up toward Jen- nings house on Spring Hill. The regiment became sharply engaged, and having developed the energys positionwaswithdrawn by General Barlow in person. At night-fall the corps held the following position: First IDivision on right following direction of New Market road; Motts division in center facing Baileys Creek; General Gibbon holding Potteries, on our left, to a point where Bailey~s Creek becomes an impassable swamp. The prisoners captured to-day tell us that they belong to Kershaws division. July 28, 1864.S a. in., troops in same position as last night. At this hour Captain Sweet, of General Birneys staff, reported to General Han- cock with Birges brigade, Tenth [Nineteenth] Corps, said to have 2,600 men in it. General H. ordered this brigade to relieve General Gibbon on our front lines at the Potteries, which was accomplished at 6.30 a. m. Gib- bons division then massed in rear of our line in reserve. 10.50 a. in., a staff officer from General Sheridan reported to General Hancock that the enemy were moving on his (Sheridan.s) command near Ruffins house. General Gibbon immediately ordered to the support of General Sheri- dan. Before General Gibbon could get up, however, General Sheridan had defeated the enemy, driven him off the field, captured 3 colors ~u Page 323 CHAP. LU.] THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN. 323 several liundred prisoners, killing and wounding a large number. 11 a. in., wrote a note, by direction of General Hancock, to Brigadier-Gen- eral Foster (Army of the James), whose command was on our left next the river, that the enemy was attacking General Sheridan and advising General Foster to make a demonstration on his front. Motts division ordered to k~ave its present line and form in captnred intrenchinents on right of Birges brigade, Tenth [Nineteenth] Corps, along New Market and Malvern Hill road. General Gibbon also withdrawn from New Market and Long Bridge road and formed on Motts right, extending his line across open plain in rear and throwing up intrenchuments. Barlow with- drawn to same line about dusk. Sp. in., Generals Grant and Meade vis- ited General Hancock. Fire of gun-boat