TITLE: The war of the rebellion: a compilation of the official records of the Union and Confederate armies. / Series 1 - Volume 16 (Part I)
AUTHOR: United States. War Dept., John Sheldon Moody, Calvin Duvall Cowles, Frederick Caryton Ainsworth, Robert N. Scott, Henry Martyn Lazelle, George Breckenridge Davis, Leslie J. Perry, Joseph William Kirkley
PUBLISHER: Govt. Print. Off., Washington, 1886

Page A
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Page B

Title Page

Page R001

THE





WAR OF THE REBELLION.
A COMPILATION 013 THE



OFFICIAL RECORDS

OF THE





UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES.


PREPARED, UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR,

DY


Lient. Col. ROBERT N. SCOTT, Third U. S. Artillery,
AND

PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO ACT OF CONGRESS APPROVED JUNE 16, 1880.








SERIES IVOLUME XVIIN TWO PARTS.

PART IREPORTS.






WA.,SHINGTOK:
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE.

1886

Page R002

/4. .~!//~8
CO~iNELL~
UN~  7~D TV
~ LI3~ ~RV
	N--	//



























Page R003

PREFACE.

	By an act approved June 23, 1874, Congress made an appropriation
to enable the Secretary of War to begin the publication of the Official
Records of the War of the Rebellion, both of the Union and Confed-
erate Armies, and directed him to have copied for the Public Printer
all reports, letters, telegrams, and general orders not heretofore copied
or printed, and properly arranged in chronological order.
	Appropriations for continuing such preparation have been made from
time to time, and the act approved June 16, 1880, has provid~d for
the printing and binding, under direction of the Secretary of War, of
10,000 copies of a compilation of the Official Records (Union and Con-
federate) of the War of the Rebellion, so far as the same may be ready
for publication, during the fiscal year; and that of said numbe4
7,000 copies shall be for the use of the House of Representatives, 2,00~
copies for the use of the Senate, and 1,000 copies for the use of the
Executive ~~partments.~~ ~
	This compilation will be the first general publication of the military
records of the war, and will embrace all official documents that can be
obtained by the compiler, and that appear to be of any historical value.

	*Volume I to V distributed under act approved June 16, 1880. The a~t approved
August 7, 1882, provides that
The volumes of the official records of the war of the rebellion shall be distributed
as follows: One thousand copies to the executive departments, as now provided by
law. One thousand copies for distribution by the Secretary of War among officers of
the Army and contributors to the work. Eight thousand three hundred copies shall
be sent by the Secretary of War to such libraries, organizations, and individuals aa
may be designated by the Senators, Representatives, and Delegates of the Forty-
seventh Congress. Each Senator shall designate not exceeding twenty-six, and each
Representative and Delegate not exceeding twenty-one of such addresses, and the
vqlumes shall be sent thereto from time to time as they are publlshed, until the pub-
lication is completed. Senators, Representatives, and Delegates shall inform thu
Secretary of War in each case how many volumes of those heretofore published they
have forwarded to such addresses. The remaining copies of the eleven thousand to
be published, and all sets that may not be ordered to be distributed as provided
herein, shall be sold by the Secretary of War for cost of publication with ten per
cent. added thereto, and the proceeds of such sale shall be covered into the Treasury.
If two or more sets of said volumes are ordered to the same address the Secretary of
War shall inform the Senators, Representatives, or Delegates, who have designated
the same, who thereupon may designate other llbraries, organizations, or individuals.
The Secretary of War shall report to the first session of the Forty-eighth Congresa
what volumes of the series heretofore published have not been furnished to such
libraries, organizations, and individuals. He shall also inform distributees at whose
Instance the volumes are sent.
	-	II

Page R004

Iv	PREFACE.

	The publication will present the records in the following order of
arrangement:
	The 1st Series will embrace the formal reports, both Union and Con-
federate, of the first seizures of United States property in the Southern
States, and of all military operations in the field, with the correspond-
ence, orders, and returns relating specially thereto,, and, as proposed,
is to be accompanied by an Atlas.
	In this series the reports will be arranged according to the campaigns
and several theaters of operations (in the chronological order of the
events), and the Union reports of any event will, as a rule, be imme-
diately followed by the Confederate accounts. The correspondence, & c.,
not embraced in the reports proper will follow (first Union and next
Confederate) in chronological order.
	The 2d Series will contain the correspondence; orders, reports, and
returns, Union aud Confederate, relating to prisoners of ~war, and (so
far as the military authorities were concerned) to State or political
prisoners.
	The 3d Series will contain the correspondence, orders, reports, and
returns of the Union authorities (embracing their correspondence with
the Confederate officials) not relating specially to the subjects of the
first and second series, lit will set forth the annual and special reports
of the Secretary of War, of the General-in.Chief, and of the chiefs of
the several staff corps and departments; the calls for troops, and the
correspondence between the National and the several State authorities.
	The 4th Series will exhibit the correspondence, orders, reports, and
returns of the Confederate authorities, similar to that indicated for the
Union officials, as of the third series, but excluding the correspondence
between the Union and confederate authorities given in that series.
ROBERT N. SCOTT,
Major, Third Art., and Bvt. Ijeut. 67o1.
WAR DEPARTMENT, August 23, 1880.

	Approved:
ALEX. RAMSEY,
Secretary of War
Table of Contents

Page R005

CONTENTS.


CHAPTER XXYIIL
	Page.
Operations in Kentucky, Middle and East Tennessee, North Alabama, and
	Southwest Virginia	11168
(v

Page R006

Additions and Corrections

Page A001

THE




WAR OF THE REBELLION:
A. COMPILATiON OF THE


OFFICIAL IRECOIRDS

OF THE




UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES.

AI)DITIONS AND CORRECTIONS
TO


SERIES IVOLUME XVI.

(To he ir~serted in the volnme. For explanation see General
Index vohTrne, Serial ~o. 130, page XXVlII.)





PUBLISHED UNI)EII rIlE I)IRECTION OF

The Hon. ELIHU ROOT, Secretary of War,

BY


BRIG. GEN. FRED C. AINSWORTII,
CHIEF OF TIlE RECORD ANI) PENSION OFFICE, WAR DEPARTMENT,


A NI)


MI{. JOSEPH W. KIRKI~EY.



Mr. JOHN S. MOODEY, indexer.





WASHINGTON:
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE.

1902

Page A002

	2	ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS.


TEXT.

PART i.
Page	12.	Second line, bottom, for when they had, etc., read where they had, etc.
Page	67.	Twelfth line, bottoni, for Rosecrans read Rousseaus.
Page	707.	Fifth and twenty-first lines, bottom, for soth read 12th.
Page	710.	Harris to Ewing, fifth line, for Maurys read Maneys.
Page	731.	Sunimary, etc., fifth event, for i~, (?) read 2/.
Page	852.	Tenth line, top, insert [Tenn.] after Lebanon. Seventeenth line, top,
		 for camps read companies.
Page	56i.	Morgans report, twenty-fourth line, strike out the period after victory
		 and insert a comma; in next line, insert a period after attach, so
		 that it will read, andfeel confident of victory, should the enemy attach.
Page	886.	Fourth line, bottom, for Geo;ge MeDuflie read Governor Magoftin.
Page	942.	Third line, top, erase ? following Thirty-second.
Page	1049.	First foot-note should read, The report of Pope not found. For Starh-
		 weathers report, seep. 1155.
Page	1092.	Erase foot-note and iiisert Not found.
Page	1164.	For Garnetts read Garretts.
Page	1192.	Seventeenth line, bottom, for (See also report of Sidell, p. 8~t) read
		 (See also reports of Buell, p. 36, and Sidell, p. 4i).

PART 2.
Page	20.	General Orders, No. 33, second line, insert a comma after Donelson.
Page	123.	Twentieth line, top, for gratifying read gainsaid.
Page	191.	Wood to Fry, fourth line, for Munfordville read Murfreesborough.
Page	301.	Halleck to Buell, date, for August zo read August ii.
Page	305.	Strike out signature Janies D. Morgan and insert G. D. Wagner.
Page	325.	Insert ~, first line, top, after Gallatin, Tenn., and add foot-note, * Coin-
		 panics C, G, H, and I were not captured. At that date (August 52,
		 5862) they were stationed, respectively, at West Point, Ky., Bowling
		 Green, Ky., Colesburg, Ky., and Clarhsville, Tenn.
Page	336.	Buell to Boyle, first communication, third line, for captains read
		 captives.
Page	345.	Buell to Nelson, second communication, second line, for Hartsville
		 read Huntsville.
Page	405.	Wright to Wallace, first communication, first line, for the brzg-adier-
		 generals read three brzg-adier-generals.
Page	452.	Fifteenth line, top, for brzgade read bridge.
Page	487.	Wright to Tod, first line, for arrived read unarmed.
Page	5oo.	McLean to Burbank, third line, for arrived read unarmed.
Page	502.	Sixth line, top, for have read hurry.
Page	~i6.	Thomas to Buell, first line, for Tuesday read yesterday.
Page	640.	Strike out the brachets in date line.
Page	66o.	For ist East Tennessee read ist [~th] East Tennessee.
Page	716.	Organization table, for Leutzs cavalry, Capt. B. W Leutz, read Lentys
		 cavalry, Capt. B. Lenty.
Page	725.	Third communication, address, for General Braxton Bragg, Command-
		 ing, Tupelo, Miss., read S. Cooper, Adjutant and Inspector General.
Page	754.	Strike out signature mo. M. Otey and insert Geo. G. Garner.
Page	859.	Bragg to Polk, fifth line, for wants read camp.
Page	895.	Erase foot-note and insert See Series I, Vol. 52, Pqrt 2, /,. 368.
Page	ioo~.	For Arnetts read Arnotts.
Page	iooS.	Seventeenth line, top, for ist Regiment read ~tth Regiment.
Page	ion.	For Leutzs (B. W.) read Lentys (B.)

Page A003

ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS.
3
INDEX.

Insert all words and figures in italics and strike out all in [brackets]. An asterisk (*) following
a correction indicates that Additions and Corrections to the text should be consulted. Refer-
ences are to parts of volume.

	Part.
Adjt. and Insp. Gens Office, C. S. A.
Correspondence with
  Smith, E. Kirby, 725*		2
Alabama Troops.
 Artillery, LightBatteries:
   [Burtwells, 764]		2
 InfantryRegiments:
  26th (Coltart)		2
Allen Collier [Collyer], U. S. S         
Anderson, John [ ], 233, 242, 252, 261		2
Anderson, Paul F. [ ]             
Arkansas Troops.
 InfantryRegiments:
  30th (Turnbull)		2
   31st (Mc Cray)		2
Arnoti [Arnett], R. M. j		2
Barr, Charles, Mrs                   
Beck, Arnold [Captain]               
Beebe, Gaylord D. [0. B.]              
Beggs,J. G. [Mr.]		2
Biddle, James (zgth U. S. Inf.), 915		I
Biddle, James (z6th U.S. Inf), [915]      
Bragg, Braxton.
 Correspondence with
  Smith, E. Kirby, [725]*		2
Brent, Hugh 7. [Brunt [?], Captain]     
Bromback, George W [Brombach, ]..
Bnllitt, Cuthbert [Bullett, Cuthburt]		2
Carter, William B. [Mr.]		2
Claihorne, Thomas, zoo4! [p~8]		2
Clark, George [Private]             
Coffey [Coffee], William A            
Coleman, Jame~ L. [Mr.]		2
Collier [Collyer], Allen, U. S. S         
Cooper, Duncan B. [ ]		2
Corput, Max Van Den [Van Den	Corput,
    Mnx]		2
Cosby, Nicholas [Mr.]                
Crews, James M. [Lieutenant-Colonel]		I
Devol, George H                   
Dunlap, George W                  
East Tennessee.
Advance, etc. Coniniunications from
  Morgan, James D., [3o5]*	2
  Wagner, George D., 305*	2
Ehrman [Ebrman], F. H             
Eifert, Sebastian [Erfut, Colonel]	2
Emerie, Damas [Emory, Damns]        
Fleming [Flemming], Eli G            
Foster, William 7. [ ]           
Fry, David [Frye, Captain]	2
Garrett, W L. [Garnett, Captain]        
Georgia Troops.
 Artillery, LightBatteries:
  Burtwells-Girardeys, 764	2
Gilliss [Gillis], John R	2
Goodrich, Hiram P. [S.]	2
Goodspeed, Wilbur [Wilber] F	2
Hamilton, Henry H                  
Haydn [Hayden], T. L               
Hollopeter,Jehn [John] I.            
Houston [Huston [Houston]], Russell    
Indiana, Governor of.
Correspondence with
	Spooner, B. F. [Ben]	
Johnson, Abda [Abdah]              
Johnson [Johussen], Lewis            
Kentucky.
Re-enforcements. Communications from
Bullitt, Cnthbert [Bullett, Cuthburt]   
Kentucky Troops (C.).
Cavalry  Companies:
Buckner Guards (Garrett) [(Garnett)]..
CavalryRegiments:
2d (Morgan), [956]	
sd ( Woodward), 956              
IlifantryRegiments:
2d, 999 [~~]                     
Kimberly, R. L., 1139 [1138]	
Kuhn, John H. [Lieutenant]           
Langdon. [E.] Bassett              
Lewellyn, David H., 88z               
Lincoln, Abraham.
Correspondence with
Bullitt, Cnthbert [Bullett, Cuthburt]   
Littlejohn [Littlejoin], W. H           
Lodor, Richard [Loder, R.]	
Lodor [Loder], Richard               
Mackville, Ky.
	Skirmish near, July 24 [ia]	
Magoffin, Beriah, 886 [McDuffie, George,
886]*                        
Magoffin, Beriah [H.]               
Makimson [Makinson], A. H           
Maney, George, 710 [Maury, D. H., 7io] *. ...
Marshall, Blame [Marshal, Mr.]	
May, A ndrewJ. [Jack)               
Meeker, Edwin I. [j.]                
Menifee, N. McC. [ ]	
Meriwether, C F. [Captain], 748 [Mery-
wether, C., 748]               
Military Commissions.
Buell, Don Carlos, 6726              
Mitchell, Robert B., 423; Mitchel, 0. M.,
[423]                         

Morgan, James D.
Correspondence with
	Thomas, George H., [3o5]*	
Morgan, John H.
Correspondence with
	Dunlap, George W..	
Morgans Raid, July 4-28, 1862. SeeKentucky.
Myers [Meyers], Vincent	
Nocquet, James, 999 [pp~]              
Owsley,John Q. [Major]              
Prentice, W. C. [Cor~land]            
Richards, A. Keene                
Rickert [Rickerts], Thomas H          
Part.
2







2

2





2










2









2



2






2


I

2

2

I

2


I


I






2





I


2

2


I


Page A004

ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS.

Part.
Robins [Robbins], W. H. H	
Rodgers [Rogers], Henry C	i, 2
Ronsseau, I,ovell H., 67, Rosecrans, Wil-
liam 5., [6~] *                 
Ryon [Ryan], George	
Smith, E. Kirby.
Correspondence with
Adjntant and Inspector Generals Office,
    CS. A., 725*	2
  Bragg, Braxton, [725]*	2
Smith, Joseph A. [lieutenant-Colonel]    
Spooner, BengarninJ. [Ben]	2
Stager, A.
 Correspondence with
  Stevens, F. [ ]	2
Stevens, F. [ ]	2
Tennessee Troops (C.).
 CavalryCompanies:
  Fergusons, 75~                   
 InfantryRegiments:
   31st (Bradford, A. H.), [715, 719, 985]	2
  gist (Bradford, W. M.), 71$, 719, 985	2
Tennessee Troops (U.).
 CavalryRegiments:
  4/h [ist]	2
Part.
Texas Troops.
CavalryRegiments:
	15th (gsd)	
Thomas, George H.
Correspondence with
Morgan, James D., [3o5]*           
Wagner, George D., 305*          
Thomson [Thompson], J. M            
Tidd, W. L. [Captain]                
Vale, Joseph G	
Wadsworth, William H.
Mentioned, 1013                    
Wagner, George D.
Correspondence with
	Thomas, George H., 305*          
We/hen, E. H. [Waltham (?), Captain]    
Wharton, John A., Sos [Wharton, Colonel [?],
	802]                          
Williams, Joseph [John] D             
Wise, George D. [henry A.]            
4
2



2

2










2





Special Index

Page R007

CONTENTS. OF PRECEDING VOLUMES.


VOLUME I.
	CHAPTER L	Page.
Operations In Charleston Harbor, South
Carolina. December 20, 1860-April 14~
	1881	1817
CHAPTER II.
The secession of Georgia. January 8-28,
	1881	318-425
CHAPTER III.
The secession of Alabama and Mississippi.
January 4-20,1861.	326-330
CHAPTER IV.
Operations in Florida. January 6-August
	31, 1861	331473
	CHAPTER V	Page.
The secession of North Carolina. Janu.
ary 9-May 20,1881	...~. 474488

CHAPTER VI.
The secession of LouIsiana. January 10-
February 19,1861	489-501

CHAPTER VII.
Operations in Texas end New Mexico.
February 1-June 11, 1861	502-036
CHAPTER VIII.
Operations in Arki~nsas, the Indian Terri-
tory, and Missouri. February 7-May 9,
	1861	.	. 637691

VOLUME II.
	CHAPTER IX.	Page.

Operations in Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and West Virginia. April 18-July 81, 1861. 1-1012


VOLUME III.
CHAPTER X.
Page.
Operatlons.in Missouri, Arkansas, Kansas, and Indian Territory. May 10-November 19, 1881. 1-749

VOLUME IV.
	CHAPTER XI.	Page.	CHAPTER XIII.	Page.
Operations La Texas, New Mexico, and	Operations in North Carolina and South.
Arizona. June11, 1861-February 1,1862. 1-174 easteru VirgInia. August 1, 1861-Janu-
	CHAPTER XII.	ary 11,1862...	506-7~~
Operations in Kentucky and Tennessee.
July 1-November 19,1861 ...:	175-585


VOLUME V.
CHAPTER XIV.
Page.
Operations in Maryland, Northern Virginia, and West Virginia. August 1,1861-March 17,1862. 1-1106

VOLUME VI.
CHAPTER XV.
Operations on the coasts of South Carolina,
Georgia, and Middle and East Florida.
August 21, 1861April 11, 1862.....   
	Page.	CHAPTER XVL	Page.
Operations in West Florida, Southern Al.
		abama, Southern Mississippi, and Lou.
	1435	isiana. September 1,1861-May 12,1882. 436-894
VOLUME VII.
CHAPTER XVII.
Page.
Operations in Kentucky. Tennessee, N. Alabama, and S. W. VirginIa. Nov. 19,1861-Mar. 4~ 1862. 1446
(VI

Page R008

VIII	CONTENTS OF PRECEDING VOLUMES.

VOLUME Viii.
	CHAPTER XVIII.	Page.

Operations In Missouri, Arkansas, Kansas, and Indian Territory. Nov. 19,1881.-April 10, 1862. 1834


VOLUME IX.
	CHAPTER XIX	Page.	CHAPTER XXI.	Page.
Operations in Southeastern Virginia. Jan.		Operations in Texas, New Mexico, and
 nary 11March 17, 1862	171	 Arizona. February 1September 20,
	CHAPTER XX	1862	481786
Operations in North Carolina. January
11August 20, 1862	72480


VOLUME XIN TWO PARTS.

CHAPTER XXIL

Operations in Kentucky, Tennessee, North Missiasippi, North Alabama, and Southwest Virginia.
March 4June 10, 1862.
	Page.
Part 1Reports	1-927
Part lICorrespondence, etc	1642

VOLUME XIIN THREE PARTS.

CHAPTER XXIII.

The Peninsular Campaign, Virginia. March 17-September 2, 1862.
	Page.
Part IReports, March 17June 24	11073
Part lIReports, June 25-September 2	1-994
Part IllCorrespondence, etc	1-691

VOLUME XIIIN THREE PARTS.

CHAPTER XXIV.

Operations in Northern Virginia, West Virginia, and Maryland.
	Page.
Part IReports, March 17-June 25	1818
Part lIReports, June 26-September 2	1-820
Part IllCorrespondence, etc	1968

VOLUME XIII.

CHAPTER XXV.
				Page.
Operations in Missouri, Arkansas, Kansas, the Indian Territory, and the Department of the
Northwest. April 10-November 20, 1862	1-981

VOLUME XIV.

CHAPTER XXVI.
				Page.
Operations on the coasts of South Carolina, Georgia, and Middle and East Florida. April 12,
1862June 11, 1863	11025

VOLUME XV.

CHAPTER XXVII.
				Page.
OperatlonsinWest Florida, SouthernAlabama, Southern Mississippi (egibracingailoperations
against Vicksburg, May 18-July 27, 1862), and Louisiana	1-113

Page 1

CHAPTER XXVIII.


OPERATIONS IN KENTUCKY, MIDDLE AND EAST
TENNESSEE, NORTH ALABAMA, AND SOUTHWEST
VIRGINIA.

June 10October 31, 1862.


SUMMARY OF TE[E PRINCIPAL EVENTS.*

June 10, 1862.Maj. Gens. U. S. Grant, D. C. Buell, and John Pope, U. S. Army,
ordered to resume command of their separate army corps.t
Skirmish at Winchester, Tenn.
Skirmishes at Wilsonb and Rogers Gaps, Tenn.
11, 1862.Skiripish near Monterey, Ky.
1113,	1862.Skirmishes at Big Creek Gap, Ky. t
16, 1862.Skirmish at Winchester, Tenn.
17, 1862.General Braxton Bragg, C. S. Army, supersedes General G. T.
Beauregard in command of Department No. 2, or the Western
Department.
18, 1862.Skirmish at Wilsons Gap and occupation of Cumberland Gap by
the Union forces. ~
20-23,	1862.Affairs in Owen County, Ky., and skirmish near Lusbys Mill.
21, 1862.Skirmish at Rankins Ferry, near Jasper, Tenn.
Skirmish at Battle Creek, Tenn.
26, 1862.Maj. Gen. John Pope, U. S. Army, assigned to command of the
Army of Virginia.
28, 1862.Skirmish at Sparta, Tenn.
30, 1862.Affair at Powell River, Tenn.
Skirmish at Henderson, Ky.
July 2, 1862.Skirmish at Huntsville, Ala.
Department No. 2 extended.
3, 1862.Skirmish near Russeliville, Ala.
428,	1862.Morgans first Kentucky raid.
5, 1862.Maj. Gen. William J. Hardee, C. S. Army, temporarily command-
ing Army of the Mississippi.
Skirmish at Battle Creek, Tena.
711,	1862.Operations about Cumberlaud Gap, Teun.
11, 1862.Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck assigned to command of the Armies
of the United States.
1216,	1862.Expedition from Decatur, Ala., and skirmish near Davis Gap.
13, 1862.Action at and surrender of Murfreesborough, Tenn.
15, 1862.Skirmish at Wallaces Cross-Roads, Teun.





1 R HVOL XVI
	* Of some of the minor conflicts noted in this Snihmary no circumstantial reports
are on file.
	t See Series I, Vol. X, Part II, p. 288.
	~ For reports, see Cumberland Gap Campaign, ~erjes I~ Vol. X, ~~t I, p. 51

Page 2

2
KY., M. AND E. PENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAP. XXVIII.
	JuJy 17, 186~2.Skirmish between Mount Pleasant and Columbia, Tenn.
18, 1862.Raid on Hender~ou, Ky., and Newburg, md.
Department of East Teunessee (Confederate) extended.
21, l862.Skirmishesaround Nashville, Tenn.
25, 1862.Skirmish at Courtland, Ala.
Skirmish at and near Trinity, Ala.
Skirmish at Clinton Ferry, Tenn.
26, 1862.Action near Spanglers Mill, near Jonesborough, Ala.
Skirmish at Tazewell, Tenn.
2730,	l862.Expedition from Woodville to Guntersyille, Ala., and skirmishes
(July 28) at Gunteraville and Laws Landing, and (July 29) at
Old Deposit Ferry.
28, 1862.Skirmish at Stevenson, Ala.
29, 1862.Skirmish at Russeliville, Ky.
Aug. 2 6, l862.Operations at Cumberland Gap and skirmish (August 6) near Taze-
well, Tenn.
3, 1862.Skirmish near Morganfield, Ky.
4	7, 1862.Attack on Union pickets near Woodville, Ala. (August 4), and re-
connaissance from Woodville to Guntersville, Ala. (August 57).
5, l862.Skirmish at Sparta, Tenn.
Skirmish near New Market, Ala.
7, 1862.Attack on convalescent train near Decatur, Ala.
11, 1862.Affair near Kinderhook, Tenn.
Skirmish near Williamsport, Teun.
1213,	l862.Capture of Gallatin, Tenn., and destruction of bridges in that
vicinity (August 12) and skirmish (August 13).
13, 1862.Skirmish at Huntsville, Scott County, Teun.
14, 1862.Skirmish near Mount Pleasant, Tenn.
15, l862.General Braxton Bragg, CS. Army, rsumes command of the
Army of the Mississippi.
16, 1862.The Army of Kentucky (Confederate), under Maj. Gen. E. Kirby
Smith, crosses the Cumberland Mountains into Kentucky.
1622,	l862.Operations about Cumberland Gap, Tenn., including action at
London, Ky., and skirmishes at Flat Lick, Ky., and Pine
Mountain, Tenn. (August 17).
17, 1862.Skirmish near Mammoth Cave, Ky.
18, l862.~Snrrender of Clarksville, Tenn.
19, 1862.The Department of the Ohio re-established.
1920,	1862.Scout from Woodville to Guntersville, Ala., and vicihity.
1921,	1862.Raid on Louisville and Nashville Railroad, skirmishes at Pilot
Knob, Drakes Creek, and Manscoe Creek, near Bdgefield Junc-
tion (August 20), and action (August 21) on the Hartsville Road,
near Gallatin, Tenn.
20, 1862.Skirmish at Pilot Knob, Tenn.
22, 1862.Skirmish at Trinity, Ala.
23, 1862.Maj. Gen. Horatio G. Wright, U. S. Army, assumes command of
the Department of the Ohio.
Action at Big Hill, Ky.
24, 1862~Maj. Gen. .J. P. McCown, C. S. Army, assigned temporarily to
command of the Department of East Tennessee.
25, 1862.Skirmish at Red Bird Creek, Ky.
Skirmish at Madisonville, Ky.
26, 1862.Skirmish at Cumberland Gap, Tenn.
 27, 1862.Skirmish at Round Mountain, near Woodhury, Tenn.
Skirmish at Bridgeport, Ala., and attack on Fort McCook, Battle
Creek, Wen

Page 3

3
dRAP. xxvm.j SUMMARY OF THE PRiNCIPAL EVENTS.
Aug. 27, 1862.Skirmish near Cumberland Gap, Teun.
Skirmish near Murfreesborough, Tenn.
Skirmish on Richiand Creek, near Pulaski, Teun.
Skirmish near Reynolds Station, Nashville and Decatur Rail-
road.
2728,	1862.Army of the Mississippi, under GeneraiBraxton Bragg, C. S. Army,
crosses the Tennessee River.
27Oct. 22, 1862.Operations of Wheelers Cavalry in Tennessee and Ken-
tucky.
29, 1862.Skirmish between Big Hill and Richmond, Ky.
2930,	1862.Skirmishes at Short Mountain Cross-Roads (August 29), and Little
Pond (August 30), near McMinnville, Teun.
30, 1862.Battle of Richmond, Ky., or engagements at Mount Zion Church,
Whites Farm, and Richmond.
Skirmish near Larkinsville, Ala.
31, 1862.Skirmish at Stevenson, Ala.
Skirmish on the Kentucky River, Ky.
Skirmish at Rogers Gap, Tenn.
Sept. 1, 1862.Maj. Gen. J. P. MeCown, C. S. Army, assumes command of the
Department of East Tennessee.
	Skirmish at Uniontown, Ky.
	Skirmish at Taits Ferry, Kentucky River, Ky.
	Skirmish at Morganfield, Ky.
	Skirmish at Huntsville, Ala.
2, 1862.Skirmish near Nashville, Tenn.
	Lexington, Ky., occupied by the Confederate forces.
3, 1862.Skirmish at Geigers Lake, Ky.
4, 1862.Skirmish at Shelbyville, Ky.
5, 1862.Skirmish near Madisonville, Ky.
510,	1862.Expedition from Fort Donelson to Clarksville, Tenn., and skir-
mishes (September 6) at New Providence and (September 7) at
Riggins lUll.
7, 1862.Skirmish at Pine Mountain Gap, Tenn.
	Skirmish near Murfreesborough, Tenn.
	Surrender of outpost at Shepherdsville, Ky.
8, 1862.Skirmish at Barboursville, Ky.
9, 1862.Skirmishes on the Franklin and Scottsville Roads, Ky.
Skirmish at Columbia, Tenn.
10, 1862.Operations at Rogers and Big Creek Gaps, Term.
	Skirmish at Columbia, Tenn.
	Skirmish at Fort Mitchel, near Covington, Ky.
	Skirmish at Woodburn, Ky.
12, 1862.Skirmish at Brandenburg, Ky.
	Glasgow, Ky., occupied by the Confederate forces.
14,1862.Skirmish at Henderson, Ky.
1417,	1862.Siege of Munfordville and Woodsonville, Ky.
17, 1862.Skirmish near Falmouth, Ky.
17Oct. 3, 1862.Evacuation of Cumberlaud Gap, Tenn., and march of its
garrison to Greenupsburg, Ky.
18, 1862.Affair at Glasgow, Ky.
	Skirmish near Florence, Ky.
	Skirmish at Oweusborough, Ky.
19, 1862.West Virginia embraced in Department of the Ohio.
Skirmish at Southerlands Farm, Ky.
1920,	1862. Skirmishes at Brentwood, Term

Page 4

4	KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAP. XXVIII.

Sept. 23, 1862.Department of the Tennessee constituted, under command of Maj.
Gen. George H. Thomas, U. S. Army. (Inoperative.)
25, l862.Skirmish near Snows Pond, Ky.
Skirmish at Ashbysburg, Ky.
26, 1862.Action at West Liberty, Ky.
27, 1862.Maj. Gen. J. P. McCown, C. S. Army, assigned to command of the
Department of East Tennessee, and Maj. Gen. Samuel Jones,
C. S. Army, to command of the District of Middle Tennessee.
2728,	1862.Skirmishes at Augusta and Brookville, Ky.
29, l862.Capture of the Third Georgia Cavalry near New Haven, Ky.
30, l862.Skirmishes at Russeilville and Glasgow, Ky.
Skirmish near Louisville, Ky.
Skirmish at Goodlettsville, Tenn.
Oct. 1, l862.Skirmish on the Bardatown Pike, near Mount Washington, Ky.
Skirmish on Fern Creek, Louisville and Frankfort Road, Ky.
Skirmish near Nashville, Tenn.
Skirmish at Davis Bridge, Tenn.
3, 1862.Skirmish at Cedar Church, near Shepherdsville, Ky.
4, .l862.Skirmish near Bardstown, Ky.
Skirmish near Clay Village, Ky.
5, l862.Skirmish at Neelys Bend, Cumberland River, Tenn.
Skirmish at Fort Riley, near Nashville, Tenn.
7, 1862.Maj. Gen. Gordon Granger, U. S. Army, assigned to command of
the Army of Kentucky.
Skirmish near La Vergne, Teun.
8, 1862.Battle of Perryvifle, or Chaplin Hills, Ky.
Skirmish at Lawrencebnrg, Ky.
9, 1862..Action at Dry Ridge, Dog Walk, or Chessers Store, near Salt
River, Ky.
1022,	1862.Pursuit of Confederate forces from Perryville to London, Ky.
11, l862.Skirmish at Lawrenceburg, Ky.
13, l862.Skirmish on the Lebanon Road, near Nashville, Tenn.
14, l862.Skirmish at Manchester, Ky.
15, 1862.Skirmish at Neelys Bend, Cumberland River, Tenn.
1520,	l862.Opezations against guerrillas in the counties of Henry, Owen, and
Gallatin, Ky..
1625,	l862.Operations in Bath, Powell, Estill, Clark, Montgomery, and
Bourbon Counties, Ky.
18, l862.Skirmish at Bloomfield, Ky.
Action at Lexington, Ky.
19, l862.Skirmish at Bardstown, Ky.
20, l662.Skirmish on the Gallatin Pike, near Nashville, Tenn.
Skirmish at Hermitage Ford, Tenn.
23, lS62.Skirmishes near Waverly and Richland Creek, Teun.
2324,	l862.Destrnction of Goose Creek Salt-Works, near Manchester, Ky.
24, 1862.The Department of the Cumberland re-established.
Maj. Gen. Leonidas Polk, C. S. Army, temporarily in command of
Department No. 2.
25, l862.Skirmish at Lawrenceburg, Ky.
27, 1862.Maj. Gen. William S. Rosecrans, U. S. Army, assumes command
of the Fourteenth Army Corps.
28, 1862.Maj. Gen. John C. Breckinridge, C. S. Army, assumes command
of the Army of Middle Tennessee.
Skirmish near Waverly, Tenn.
30, l862.Major-General Rosecrans assumes command of the Depart~Q~t Qf
the Cumberland, superseding Major-General Buell

Page 5

CHAr. xxvm.~	5
0-EN ERAL REPORTS.

No. 1.Extracts from Annual Report of Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck, General-in-
Chief U. S. Army.
No. 2.Findings of the Buell Commission and accompanying docnments.

No. 1.

Extracts from AnnuaZ Report of Maj. (len. Henry W. Hatleck, General-

in-Chief iT A~. Army.
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
Washington, November 25, 1862.
	SIR: In compliance with your orders I have the honor to submit the
following report of military operations since the 23d of July last, when,
in compliance with the Presidents order of July 11, I assumed com-
mand of the Army as General-in-Chief:
	*	*	*	*	*	*	*

	When I left the Department of the Mississippi, in. July last, the iViain
body of the army under Major-General Buell was between Huntsville
and Stevenson, moving toward Chattanooga, for which place they had
left Corinth about the 10th of June.
	Major-General Curtis forces were at Helena, Ark., and those under
Brigadier-General Schofield in Southwestern Missouri. The central
army, under Major-General Grant, occupying the line of West Tennes-
see and Northern Mississippi, extended from Memphis to Inka, and
protected the railroads from Columbus Ky., south, which were then
our only channels of supply..
	These several armies, spread along a line of some 600 miles from the
western borders of Arkansas to~Gumberland Gap, and occupying a
strip of country more than 150 miles in width, from which the enemys
forces had recently been expelled, were rapidly decreasing in strength
from the large numbers of soldiers sent home on account of real or pre-
tended disability. On the other hand, the enemys armies were greatly
increased by an arbitrary and rigidly enforced conscription. With
their superiority in numbers and discipline they boldly determined to
reoccupy Arkansas, Missouri, Tennessee, and Kentucky, and, if possi-
ble,to iiivade the States of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, while our at-
tention was distracted by the invasion of Maryland and Pennsylvania
and an extended Indian insurrection on the western frontiers.
	This plan had very many chances of success, but the timely order of
the President of August 4, calling for additional forces, and the patri-
otic response of thepeople of the Northwest, thwarted the enemys well-
formed calculations.
	General Bragg suddenly transferred a large part of his army from
Tupelo, Miss., through the States of Alabama and Georgia, reached
Chattanooga iu advance of General Buell, turned his left, and rapidly
crossing the State of Tennessee entered Kentucky by Munfordville
and Lebanon.
	General Buell fell back upon Nashville without giving the enemy
battle; then followed or rather moved parallel with Bragg, who, after
capturing our garrison at Munfordville, turned off from the main road
to Louisville, along which General Buell passed, the latter reachiug
Louisville without any engagement. Another column of the enemy
GENERAL REPORTS

Page 6

6	KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. (CHAP. XXVIII.

had moved from East Tennessee, after blockading Cumberland Gap,
upon Lexington and threatened Cincinnati.
	A small forc1e of our raw troops, which had been pushed forward to
Richmond, Ky., under Major-General Nelson, were met by the enemy
and completely routed.
	In the mean time every effort had been made to collect n~w troops at
Cincinnati and Louisville and to fortify these places against a coup de
main. To give confidence to the new levies a portion of General Grants
army was withdrawn from Mississippi and sent to Kentucky and Cin-
cinnati. No attack was attempted by the enemy.
	Major-General Buell left Louisville on the 1st of October with an
army of about 100,000 men in pursuit of General Bragg. The latter
engaged a part of General Buells army at Perryville about 10 oclock
on the 8th of October. A general battle ensued and was continued till
dark. It was mainly fought by Major-General McCooks division. The
enemy retreated during the night. The losses were heavy on both
sides, but no official reports of the numbers engaged or the losses on
either side have been received.
	After this battle the main army of the rebels retreated to East Ten-
iI~s~ee. General Buell pursued it as far as Mount Vernon or London,
then fell back to the line from Louisville to Nashville. Here Major-
General IRosecrans superseded him in the command by order of the
President.
	As the Secretary of War has ordered a military commission to inves-
tigate the operations of General Buell in this campaign it would be
obviously improper for me to express any opinion unless specially
directed to 1o so.
	*	*	*	*	*	*	*

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
	H. W. HALLECK,
General-in- Chief.
	Hon. E. M. STANTON,
& cretary of War.



No. 2.

Findings of the Buell (Jommission and accompanying documents.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington City, November 4, 1862.
General HALLECK:
	GENERAL: You will please organize a Military Commission to in-
quire into and report upon the operations of the forces under command
of Major-General Buell in the States of Tennessee and Kentucky, and
particularly in reference to General Buell suffering the State of Ken-
tucky to be invaded by the rebel forces under General Bragg, and in
his failing to relieve Munfordville and suffering it to be captured; also
in reference to the battle of Perryville and General Buells conduct
during that battle, and afterward suffering the rebel forces to escape
from Kentucky without loss or capture; and also to inquire and report
upon such other matters touching the military Qperations aforesaid as
in the judgment of the Commission shall be beneficial to the service.
The Commission will sit at the city of Cincinnati. General Buell wil

Page 7

CHAP. XXVIII.]	GENERAL REPORTS.	7


be ordered there and have permission toappear and produce and exam-
ine witnesses before the Commission.
	Yours, truly,	EDWIN M. STANTON,
	Secretary of War.
SPECIAL ORDERS,	HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
	No. 356.	fAdjt. Gen.s Office, Washington, November 20, 1862.
	I. A Military Commission will convene at Cincinnati, Ohio, on the
27th instant to investigate and report upon the operations of the army
under the command of Maj. Gen. ID. C. Illuell, U. S. Volunteers, in Ken-
tucky and Tennessee.
Detail for the Gommission.Maj. Gen. Lewis Wallace, U. S. Volun~
teers; Maj. Gen. Edward 0. C. Ord, U. S. Volunteers; Brig. Gen.
Albin Schoepf, U. S. Volunteers; Brig Gen. N. J. T. Dana, U. S.
Volunteers; Brig. Gcn~ Daniel Tyler, U. S. Volunteers; Maj. Donn
Piatt, aide-de.camp, judge-advocate and recorder.
	The Commission will adjourn from place to place as may be deemed
advisable for the convenience of taking testimony and~ will report an
opinion in the case.
	*	*	*	*	*	*	*

	By command of Major-General Halleck:
	E. D. TOWNSEND,
Assistant Adjutant- General.



WAR DEPARTMENT, April 13, 1872.
	The Secretary of War has the honor to report to the House of Rep-
resentatives, in reply to a resolution of the 1st of March, calling for a
copy of the proceedings of the Military Commission instituted by the
War Department in the year 1862 to inquire into the military opera-
tions and conduct of Maj. Gen. Don Carlos Buell, including all letters,
dispatches, opinions, and orders on file in that Department relative
thereto, that a careful and exhaustive search among all the records
and files in this Department fails to discover what disposition was made
of the proceedings of the Commission and the papers annexed thereto,
and that no record indicative of the nature of the report of the Board
or the conclusions reached by it can be found, other than what is con-
tained in the accompanying papers, which are as follows:
	Copy of the original opinion of the Commission ca]led to investigate
the operations of the Army of the Ohio in Tennessee and Kentucky,
under command of Major-General Buell, U. S. Volunteers, with the
views of the General-in-Chief thereupon. [Inclosure No. 2.]
	Copy of a communieation from General Buell of April 10, 1864, ad-
dressed to the Adjutant-General of the Army, commenting upon the
report of the Board. [Inclosure No. ~-1
	Copy of an unsigned communication reviewing the proceedings of
the Commission, which was referred to the Secretary of War by the
Judge-Advocate-General, at the request of Lieutenant-Colonel Piatt, on
the 23d of May; 1863. [Inclosure No.. 3.]
	Copy of a communication submitted by General Buell to the Coin-
mission May 2, 1863, a copy of which was furnished the War Depart-
ment by him April 11, 1864. [Sub-inclosure No. 1.

Page 8

KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAP. xxvm.
8

	Copy of a communication from General Buell April 11, 1864, trans-
mitting copy last above named, and also a copy of a statement pre-
pared by him for submission to the Commission, reviewing the evidence
taken before it wh
No. 2.]	,	ich is herewith. [inclosure No. 4 and sub-inclosure
	Copy of General Orders, No. 29a, Headquarters Army of the Ohio,
July 11, 1862. [Inclosure No. 6.]
	WM. W. BELKNAP,
	& cretary of War.
[Inclosure No. 1.]
	ADJUTANT-GENERALS OFFICE,
General JOSEPH HOLT,	Washington, December 11, 1871.
Judge-Advocate- General, Washington, D. C.:
	Sin: I have respectfully to inform you that the proceedings of the
Military Commission convened by Special Orders, No. 36~, War IDe-
partment; Adjutant-Generals Office, November 20, 1862, which inves-
tigated Maj. Gen. B. C. Buells operations in Kentucky and Tennessee,
have been submitted to the Secretary of War April 15, 1863.
	The accompanying correspondence of General Buell in review of the
evidence before the Military Commission is all that
the files in this office.	could be fonnd on
I am, sir~ very respectfully, your obedient servant,
E.	B. TOWNSEND,
	Adjutant- General.
[Inclosure No. 2.]

Opinion of the Commission.

	The order convening the Commission requires it to investigate and
report upon the operations of the army under the command of Maj.
Gen. B. C. Buell in Kentucky and ~ It further requires the
Commission to report an opinion in the case.
	Very early in its sessions the Commission resolved to direct its in-
vestigations to the following points:
	1st. The operations of Major-General Buell in Tennessee and Ken-
tLlcky.
	2d. Suffering Kentucky to be invaded by rebels nnder General
Bragg.
	3d. The failure to relieve Munfordville.
	4th. The battle of Perryville and conduct there.
	5th. Permitting the rebels to escape without loss from Kentucky.
	6th. Inquire and report upon such other matters touching military
operations above specified as in the judgment of the Commission shall
be beneficial to the service.
	The first point really comprehends all the rest~ but convenience re-
quired such a division of the subject.
	The sixth point, it will be perceived, is general, and was made to
cover such subjects as
1st. ()eneral Buells loyalty, against which there is no evidence worthy
of consideration.
	2d. General Buells policy toward the inhabitants of disaffected dis-
tricts into which his operations extended. This We find to have been
what is familiarly known as the conciliatory policy. Whether good o

Page 9

CHAP. XXVIII.]	GENERAL REPORTS.	9


bad in its effects, General Buell deserves neither, blame nor applause
for it, because it was at that time understood to be the policy of the
Government. At least he could violate no orders on the subject, be-
cause there were none.

2.	SUFFERING KENTUCKY TO BE INVADED BY REBELS UNDER BRAGG.

	We find that the rebels under Bragg concentrated at Chattanooga
about the 22d of July, 1862, for the purpose of invading Kentucky.
Prior to that, on the 11th day of June, General Buell, with his Army
of the Ohio was ordered by General ilalleck to march against Chatta-
nooga, and take it, with the ulterior object of dislodging Kirby Smith
and his rebel force from East Tennessee. We are of opinion that Geii-
eral Buell had force sufilcient to accomplish the object if he could have
marched promptly to Chattanooga. The plan of operation, however,
prescribed by General ilalleck compelled General Buell to repair the
Memphis and Charleston Railroad from Corinth to Decatur and put it
in running order, as a line of supply during the advance. Whjle that
road proved of comparatively little service, the work forced such delays
that a prompt march upon Chattanooga was impossible. The delays
thus occasioned gave Bragg time to send a numerous cavalry force to
operate against General Buells lines of supply, which were unneces
sarily long. So successful were the incursions of the cavalry that no
opportunity was found, after the Memphis and Charleston Railroad was
completed to Decatur, to concentrate enough of the Army of the Ohio
to capture Chattanooga and execute the ulterior purposes of the expe-
dition.
	The massing of the rebel force at Chattanooga compelled a relinquish-
ment of the design against that place; after which General Buell was
required to exert all his energies to prevent the recapture of Nashville
and the invasion of Keutneky. This he could have done, in our opinion,
by an early concentration of his army at Sparta, McMinuville, or Mur-
freesborough, with a view to active offensive operations against Bragg
the moment he debouched from the Sequatchie Yalley. Instead of that,
he waited until the 5th of September before concentrating at Murfrees-
borough, from which he retired to Nashville, thereby allowing Bragg
to cross the Cumberland River without interruption. The Commission
cannot justify the falling back from Murfreesborough to Nashville, but
is of opinion that it was General Buells duty from that point to have
attacked the rebel army before it crossed the Cumberland, and it is
the belief that had that course been pursued Bragg would havebeen
defeated.

3.THE FAILURE TO RELIEVE MUNFORDYILLE.

	In the relative movements of the armies of Generals Buell and Bragg
Munfordville was important on account of its railroad bridge over
Green River and its natural strength as a position for battle. Bragg
moved upon it by way of Glasgow, and not anticipating great resistance,
he dispatched a column in advance of his main body to take it. The
column was repulsed by the garrison on the 14th of September. Bragg
then moved his whole army against the post. On the 17th of Septem-
ber it was justifiably surrendered. The order to hold Munfordville pro-
ceeded from General Wright, commanding the Department of the Ohio,
of which Kentucky formed a part. It was given iti expectation that
General Bu~ll would reach the place in time to save it. General Wrigh

Page 10

10	KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA, AND SW. VA. [CHAP. XXVTTh

seems to have had no certain information upon which to base his expecta-
tion; at the time the order was given he only knew that both Bragg
and General Buell were advancing toward it. Nor was there any under-
taking on General Buells part to relieve the garrison or any preconcert
of action whatever respecting it. We are of opinion therefore that the
orders given the commander of the post should have left him discretion
to fight or retire according to circumstances. As it was, the order was
to hold it to the last. Had not Bragg moved so quickly on Munford-
ville he would have been attacked at Glasgow by General Buell, who
was moving to the attack when the surrender took place. Defeat of the
rebels at Glasgow would of course have saved Munfordville. While
General Buell was on the march to Mufordville he heard of its sur-
render. Relief was then too late.
	It is our opinion, therefore, that General Buell is not responsible for
the capture of the town, except so far as his failure to attack Bragg
south of the Cumberland River made hi
quences of that failure.	m responsible for the conse

4.BATTLE OF PERRYVILLE AND CONDUCT THERE.

	General Buell left Louisville about the 1st of October with a force
superior, in our judgment, not only to Braggs army, but to the armies
of Bragg and Kirby Smith united. His routes were well chosen and
the advance of his columns admirably regulated. His immediate object
was to attack the rebels and destroy them; failing in that he
drive them out of Kentucky.	was to
	Engagement was expected at Bardstown, but Bragg sullenly retired
toward Perryville, at which place it would seem from his orders and in-
structions to corps commanders General Buell next intended to attack
him on the 9th September [October]. Positions for the formation of
the line of battle were defined in those orders..
	Accordingly, on the morning of the 8th, Gilbert, with his corps, was
in position in the center; McCook, with his corps (less Sills division),
arrived on the left about 9 oclock, and Thomas, in command of the
right wing (Crittendens corps), reached his position and reported his
arrival to General Buell about noon.
	About 2 oclock in the afternoon the enemy poured a heavy column
of attack upon McCook, effecting, in our opinion, a partial surprise.
The contest, however, was obstinate and bloody and ended by night-fall,
at which time MeCooks right had been turned and driven back with
serious loss. The duration of the battle was about five hours.
	There can be no question about its being the duty of somebody to
assist McCook. As his right had been posted not exceeding 300 yards
from Gilberts left and as the severest fighting was on MeCooks right
we cannot see why Gilbert did not re-enforce huin when so requested.
He should have done it, it for no other reason than because McCooks
discomfiture exposed his own flank. Nothing but positive orders fixing
and holding him in his position can justify his failure. If such there
were, they have not been heard of in the testimony. Moreover, it is clear
that all General Buells orders were in preparation for attacking the next
morning, not in anticipation of being attacked that day. In this latter
event therefore the exercise of discretion could not have been improper if
the action taken had been promptly reported to headquarters, particu-
larly as General Buell was not on the field for instant consultation. As
it was, assistance did not reach McCook until aboht dark.
	General Buell established his headquarters about 2~ miles from th

Page 11

CHAP. XXVIII.).
11
GENERAL REPORTS.

front on the Springfield road. He was not on the field or along the
line during the day, and had no intelligence of the attack on McCook.
until 4 oclock in the evening. About 2 oclock a heavy and furious
cannonading was heard at his headquarters, and coming out of his
tent he said, There was a great waste of powder over there, and
directed General Gilbert, who was with him at the time, to send an order
to the front to stop that useless waste of powder. It is clear to us
that General Buell did not believe a battle was in progress, and that
he supposed the firing heard was from some reconnaissance. On this
point it is our opinion that he should either have been on the field in
person ready for emergencies and advantages, or have taken and re-
quired to be taken every precaution for the instant transmission of in-
telli gence to his headquarters. As he had an organized signal corps
with his army, this failure was all the more culpable. And in this con-
nection we are of opinion~hat General McCooks failure to send up in-
stant notice of the attack Ul)O~ him in force was equally culpable.
	We find that during the greater part of the attack on McCook Gil-
berts corps was unengaged, while Thomas wing had not so much as a
demonstration made against it. We have reason to believe also that
all Braggs army at Perryville at the time was flung upon McCook,
and that his lines of retreat by way of llarrodsburg and Danville were
so exposed that after 4 oclock they could have been to a great degree,
if not entirely, cut off if Crittendens corps had been vigorously pushed
forward for the purpose. In our judgment the opportunity slipped
through General Buells absence from the field or on account of his
ignorance of the condition of the battle. We are very sure that if he
could have ordered supports to MeCook at an earlier hour than he did
order them the attack would have been repulsed with less loss to him-
self and greater to the enemy.

5.PERMITTING- THE REBELS TO ESCAPE WITHOUT LOSS FROM KEN-
TUCKY.

	It ~annot be said that the rebels escaped without loss from Ken7
tucky. Besides their killed and wounded at Perryville they were com-
pelled to destroy a large quantity of stores which had been collected
at Camp Dick Robinson.
	The morning after the battle it was very early discovered that Bragg
had retreated from his positions near Perryville and that his army had
for the most part gone in the direction of llarrodsburg. Leaving all
his sick and wounded and some material at llarrodsburg, and being
joined by Kirby Smith, he hastened across Dicks River to Cam.p Dick
Robinson. There he destroyed and abandoned the stores mentioned
and resumed his retreat. In these movements the march of his columns
was hurried; that part of it from Perryville to the river was confused
and disordered. Our opinion is that if General Buell had taken up a
vigorous pursuit as soon in the morning of the 9th as the retreat was
discovered the check received by the rebels at Perryville would have
been turned into rout, with all its consequences. But the manner in
which they were followed to llarrodsburg can hardly be called a pur-
suit. General Buell should have endeavored, by energetic movement
of his whole army, to crush them somewhere between Perryville and
Dicks River.
	From Camp Dick Robinson Bragg had but two roads left him by
which he could hope to escape from Kentucky. Dividing his forces at
Crab Orchard, one portion of them could go out by way of Cumberlan

Page 12

12	KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CRAP. XXVIII.

Gap, the other by way of Somerset. Had General Buell intercepted
him ou these lines, as we think he could have done, from either Perry-
ville or Danville, Bragg would ham beeu compelled to give battle,
with the same results, we doubt not, as if he had been defeated before
crossing Dicks River.
	Tfie evidence establishes that General Buell received information on
the night of the 11th that Bragg had crossed the river to Camp Dick
Robinson; yet he made no determined movement with the main body
of his army until 12 oclock in the night of the 13th. From the morn-
ing of the 9th to the night of the 11th he waited to learn whether his
enemy would cross the river~	,	lost two
days before taking any	that being definitely known he
decisive action. Finally, on the night of the
13th, as stated, he started Crittendens corps through Danville toward
Crab Orchard. It was then too late; Bragg, with his column and all
his train, had passed the point of interception. To this delay we are
compelled to attribute the escape of the rebels from Kentucky.
LEWIS WALLACE,
Major- General and President of Co~nmission.
DONN PTATT,
Lieutenant- Colonel, U. ~. Volunteers, Judge-Advocate.

[Indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
Washington, D. C., May 29, 1863.
	As the Commission has reported no charges against Maj. Gen. D. C.
Buell nor recommended any further proceedings I respectfully recom-
mend that the Commission be dissolved, and its officers, as well as Gen-
eral Buell, be ordered ou other duty.
	So much of the report as states that General Buells march on Chat.
tanooga was delayed by the repairs of the Memphis and Charleston
Railroad and that General Buells lines of supply were unnecessarily
long is incorrect. General Buell had no other line of supply, than
this road till he reached Decatur and connected with Nashville. Gen-
eral Buell was not delayed an hour beyond what he himself deemed
necessary to secure his supplies. Moreover, his lines of supply were
those which he himself selected. Indeed there were no others from
which to select.
	The fault here, as elsewhere, was having too large supply trains and
in not living more upon the country. He was frequently urged to sub-
sist his troops in this manner. Whether or not he could have done so
is not reported by the Commission.
II.	W. HALLECK,
General-in. Chief.

[Inciosure No. 3.]

	The Commission called to investigate the operations of the Army of
the Ohio in Kentucky and Tennessee has seen fit to include the march
from Corinth toward Chattanooga of that army within its limit of in-
vestigation, although such inquiry is evidently not included in the
letter of instructions from the War Department. The operations of
the Army of the Ohio commenced with that march, and therefore it is
considered properly the correct commencement.
	When the rebels vacated Corinth in 1862, when they had accumu-
lated large stores and an efficient force, there appeared no place upo

Page 13

CHAP. xxvm.]	GENERAL REPORTS.	13

which they could rally in time to oppose successfully the army under
Major-General Halleck in the attempt to open the Mississippi and
possess ourselves of East Tennessee. To accomplish the latter pur-
pose, General Buell, in command of what has since been known as the
Army of the Ohio, was sent in the direction of Chattanooga, with in-
structions to seize that place and through it East Tennessee. It has
been proved on the part of the Government and not denied by the
defense that the rebels were not in force at that time in either place,
and had General Buell pushed on he would have taken the more im-
portant strategic points almost without resistance. Why this was not
done General Buell assures us, as I gather from the character of evi-
dence introduced and the direction of the examination, was owing to a
lack of supplies and the attempt to repair and keep open long lines of
railway through a hostile population, which lines it seems were con-
tinually being cut by rebel cavalry and by the inhabitants, organized
into guerrilla bands for that purpose.
	This explanation or defense the Government claims is not satisfac-
tory. The lack of supplies cannot justify a delay of a month or six
weeks for repairs when that time would have enabled the army ~o seize
and occupy a country tich as wa~s East Tennessee, and inhabited by a
friendly, loyal population. Raids on lines of communication with out-
rages of a disloyal people would have ceased with the necessity that
caused them. They were inaugurated and continued for the purpose
of embarrassing the expedition into East Tennessee. They would have
ended with its occupancy.
	But the most extraordinary fact pressing in this connection upon the
Commission is that the commander of the Army of the Ohio knew at
the time that these lines would be useless for the lack of rolling stock,
and although an attempt is made evidently to shield himself under the
orders of Major-General ilalleck, we find no earnest remonstrance that
would justify this Commission in regarding such a defense as sufficient.
The brief oral instructions claimed to have been received, followed by
the yet briefer telegrams, evince a confidence in and a discretionary
power given to Major-General Buell which should now bar any attempt
at shifting the responsibility. The fact that he knew at the time the
hopelessness and absurdity of these efforts is conclusive. If the army
had supplies enough to justify the long delay for the purpose of recon-
structing lines, which were cut almost as rapidly as they were con-
nected, I hold that he had sufficient to seize and hold East Tennessee,
and the better way to get Morgan and Forrest from his rear was to
keep them busy at his front. The defenseless state of Chattanooga
and East Tennessee would have called for every available rebel soldier,
and General Buells regiment of engineers could have repaired the
roads uminolested.
	While Major-General Buell was thus engaged the enemy had not
only time to strengthen their exposed points but to elaborate the inva-
sion, which changed our operations from offensive to defensive, and
eventually forced the army from Battle Creek back to its base at Louis-
ville.
	Some time in the first part of August General Bragg crossed the
Tennessee at Chattanooga with about 30,000 men. At that time Gen-
eral Buell had his lines extended some 40 miles. The returns found at
headquarters (Nashville) give us effective men present for duty 50,000
as the Army of the Ohio, and of these 47,500 were south of the Cum-
berland, and, the Government claims, could have been massed so as to
have forced Bragg to a fight before he left Tennessee

Page 14

14	KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAP. XXVIII

	The case then as claimed by the Government is this: General Buell,
in command of a largely superior force of veteran soldiers, well disci-
plined and equipped, was forced to fall back in long, rapid marches,
under great privations, suffering shameful disasters, and with every
mark of defeat, from its advance on Battle Creek, in Tennessee, to its
base of supplies on the Ohio River.

ARMY OF THE OHIO.

	As to the efficient force under Major.General Buell at the time of the
invasion I call the attention of the Commission to the testimony of
Major Wright and Lieutenant-Colonel Darr, both of Major-General
Buells staff, and the returns found at headquarters in Nashville. From
an examination of this evidence it will be found that of the Army of the
Ohio General Buell had 47,500 men south of the Cumberland River
at the time Bragg crossed the Tennessee. The returns and other evi-
dence introduced by the Government make the force at least 10,000
men [more ?j. But I prefer taking the testimony offered by The defenMe.

BRAGG~S FORCE.

	Bragg crossed the Tennessee with about 30,000 men of all arms.
For evidence of this fact I refer in the first place to the testimony of
the spy Pratt. He was in the employ of General Buell, and had excel-
lent opportunities of observation in the enemys lines. He informs us
that Bragg had of infantry from 22,000 to 24,000. No attempt is made
to impeach this man. On the contrary, General Buell in his cross-ex-
amination makes him his own witness, and the Commission will find
that in his statement he is fully sustained by circumstances and the tes-
timony of other witnesses. Col. M. Shoemaker, a prisoner at the time,
saw Braggs forces cross the -Cumberland on the 9th of September, and
states that he had about 30,000 men. Colonel Wilder, the gallant com-
rnander at Munfordville, refused to surrender until he had seen the
forces opposed to him, with liberty to report the number. He esti-
mates Braggs army at not over 36,000. Mr. G. R. Taylor, a Union
citizen of Munfordville, who was within the enemys lines, gives 30,000
as the outside of Braggs army. Mr. F. A. Smith learned from one of
Braggs staff at Munfordville that they had sixty regiments, confirm-
ing what the spy Pratt had sworn to. I have called attention here to
evidence of actual observation. The fact is known to the witnesses of
their own knowledge and is free of doubt or speculation. It will be
observed that these witnesses are unknown to each other, widely sepa-
rate, and yet concur in the same statement. To this we may add the
Forsyth letter, one of Braggs staff, introduced by General Buell through
the testimony of General Rousseau, that states the entire army in Ken-
tucky, including of course Kirby Smiths, to be 40,000 men, and we may
now add General Braggs report of his operations in Tennessee and
Ken~tucky, which gives his army that crossed as not exceeding 30,000.
	Circumstantial evidence comes in to sustain this already well-estab-
lished fact. Ge~uieral Bragg, after capturing Munfordville a naturally
strong position, which, held by him, would have forced Buell to a fight
at great odds or ~a surrender of Bowling Green and Nashville, snddenly
evacuated and fell back to Bardstown. It will not do to say that this
resulted from a lack of supplies. Braggs stores, collected by Kirby
Smith, were at Bardstown, and available with their possession of the
country at Munfordville. He retreated because he saw the approac

Page 15

CHAP. XXVIII.]	GENERAL REPORTS.	15


of an army nearly double his own. The opinion of officers of intelli-
gence and position in the Army of the Ohio are introduced by the Gov-
ernment, not for the purpose of proving the force under Bragg, but to
show that something near his actual strength was known at the time,
and it is somewhat remarkable that General Buell was ignorant of a
fact patent to his army. General Thomas, for example, said that he
could never make out the strength of Braggs army above 45,000, and
of this 10000 were left to take care of the flank and rear and to threaten
Nashville. This force he says was not within supporting distance had
Bragg been compelled to fight between the Cumberland River and
Munfordville. General Thomas, although introduced by the Govern-
ment, is made General Buells witness, and his statements are to be re-
garded as beyond dispute. General Rousseau, a witness summoned by
the defense, says:
	My impreasion is that the strength of General Braggs army was overrated. I put
Bragg at from 35,000 to 45,000 at Munfordville.
	Major-General McCook states:

On Monday at Bowling Green I understood the enemy was at Glasgow, his force
etimated at abont 30,000 men. It was simply the talk among my brother generals.

	Brigadier-General Wood:

	I am satisfied by information received from various sources that Braggs army led
into Kentucky did nbt exceed 35,000 men. -
	Brigadier-General Steedman says:

The opinion is firmly fixed in my mind by frequent conversation with officers at
various points on the. march that the strength ofthe Confederate Army was in the
neighborhood of 35,000.

	General Fry:

	From all sources of information Braggs army was estimated at 36,000. There were
rumors that he had 50,000 or 60,000. The most intelligent officers placed it at not
exceeding 36,000.

	Colonel Streight states:

From facts I could gather they (the rebels) had from 30,000 to 35,000. At Gallatin
I learned from General Wood that he had placed them at about 33,000.
	I could multiply these  evidences of knowledge on the part of subordi-
nate officers, but do not consider it necessary. True, other officers make
the estimate greater, but they are men whose opportunities would not
justify a positive opinion, such as Generals Grauger and Boyle.
	It ia true that a man by the name of Rapier is introduced, who claims
to have counted the forces under General Bragg, and makes them over
100,000. But his story is so improbable and contradictory that it can-
not claim reasonable credence. He flies in fear from his dwelling on the
approach of the rebels, and yet places himself in full view of their col-
umn on the road-side, when for two days from early in the morning until
late at night, without rest and without refreshment, he calmly counts and
notches upon a stick the regiments as they hurry past upon the double-
quick. He makes the force over 100,000 and marches them upon one
road. He has no motive for this other than idle curiosity; and, again,
Captain Jones produces certain tables, showing that prisoners repre-
senting one hundred and sixty regiments had been taken during Braggs
occupation of Kentucky. It would be quite impossible to ascertain
through such testimony the number of Braggs army. It is certainly
worthless when brought forward to contradict that of witnesses who
speak from positive knowledge. However, General Buell himself save

Page 16

16	KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA ,. AND SW. VA. [CHAP. XXVIII.

us further doubt upon the subject. In his telegram from Louisville to
General Halleck, shortly before moving out against the enemy, he states
their force to be 60,000. This estimate is subsequently asserted by wit-
nesses both on the part of the Government and the defense. General
Buell has proven that of this Kirby Smiths, Stevensons, and Mar-
shalls forces make 30,000, leaving to Bragg the 30,000 with which he
drove the Army of Ohio from North Alabama to Louisville.
	The Government considers this a subject of careful investigation on
the part of the Commiiission. That an army of veterans, numbering, with
the divisions added from General Grant, some 65,000that, as claimed
by the defense, no defeat could dishearten and no marches in retreat
could demoralizethat such an army should fall back through shame-
ful disasters, with long fatiguing marches and great privation, bearing
every mark of defeat, before half its numbers, makes a new page in our
history of shame, and calls for explanation or severest punishment.
SPARTA.

	Bragg seems from the evidence to have anticipated that his cross-
ing the Tennessee River would be disputed. Upon what his anticipa-
tion was based is difficult to determine. Long after his design, if not
his plan, of invasion had been developed the Army of the Ohio was
stationed along an extended line, devoted to guarding and repairing
railways, in a manner that made it impossible to concentrate for the
pnrpose of opposing his crossing. When, however, this crossing was
effected the ablest military minds in the army, other than its commander,
suggested a concentration where the rebels could be met as they passed
from the Sequatchie Valley to the plains of Middle Tennessee.
	Sparta or McMinnville is suggeste~zl, but especially Sparta, where they
could have been fought with every prospect of success. That Bragg
must pass by Sparta was reasonable to suppose at the time, and with
the light before the Commission a necessity. Had he retained Chatta-
nooga as his base he could not have passed to the right or the left of
our army in position without having his line of communication cut and
his army turned upon a line of country where General Buell has been at
~orne pains to prove an army could not subsist. If, on the other hand,
he burdened himself with little transportation and only carried subsist-
ence for eight or ten days, thereby cutting loose from his base, which
proved to be the fact, his road lay through the Sequatchie Valley out
by Sparta, and on the almost direct line to Bardstown, along which
route his supplies had been provided. The position at Sparta is, we
are assured, naturally a strong one, and offers such advantages that
15,000 might have been intrusted to its defense against the 30,000 of
the enemy; but while all seems doubtful on the part of our army, with
hesitation in its movements and uncertainty in its future, Bragg acts
as if his way were assured to him and success the certain result of his
efforts. History of military campaigns affords no parallel to this of an
army throwing aside its transportation, paying no regard to its sup-
plies, but cutting loose from its base, marching 200 miles in the face of
and really victorious over an army double its size.

SUBSISTENCE.

	Why the Army of the Ohio was not massed at Sparta, or indeed at
any other point in Tennessee, for the purpose of disputing the further
progress of this confident enemy was owing, the defense assures us, t

Page 17

CHAP. XXVIII.]	GENERAL REPORTS.	17


the fact that while our lines were successfully cut our supplies would
not j~istify extended operations. The defense is not tenable. The
defense shows us that the Army of the Ohio had twenty days ra-
tions; this, ou half rations, made forty days, and iu less than forty
days the campaign in Kentucky and Tennessee was at an end. But in
addition to this we learn that the line of railway from Nashville to Mc-
Minnville was iu operation, and that from Louisville to Nashville could
have been opened in two weeks, with the exception of that through the
burnt tunnels, which left a wagon road of about 20 miles.

THE INTENT.

	Geueral Buell made no effort to mass his army and meet Bragg, but
fell back to iNashville. It is believed on the part of the Governineut
that a key to this extraordinary conduct may be found in the fact that,
threatened as he was in front by Bragg and in rear by Kirby Smith,
with his supplies limited and his communications cut, General Buell
deemed it necessary to abandon both Tennessee aiid Kentucky and
continue or rather renew the contest on the banks of the Ohio. He
certainly did not fall back upon Nashville for the purpose of defending
that place. Had he believed Nashville threatened from its front Mc-
Miunville or Sparta would have been the point to concentrate for its de-
fense. But the Government has shown that this could not have been
Braggs intent, and that General Buell had every reason to know it at
the time. Braggs objective when he crossed at Chattanooga must
have been Bowling Green. The possession of Bowling Green gave him
Nashville, while at the same time he was marching in the direction of
his supplies. General Buell by massing his forces at some point on the
Cumberland, Lebanon for example, could have disputed the crossing of
the river and at the same time have carried Nashville. Had Bragg at-
tempted to avoid him by crossing farther up he wonid have been thrown
upon a country so destitute of subsistence that his march must have
proved disastrous.
	As to General Buells intention, however, we are not left in doubt.
That he fell back to Nashville to gather up his supplies and then evac-
uate his acts prove. But in addition to this we have the testimony
of Governor Andrew Johnson as to what General Buell actually said.
	Before calling attention to this deposition it is well to consider, how-
ever, the significance of the defense in relation to it. Long before such
a charge was ever dreamed of General Buell had strengthened his case
in response to it. As if conscious of something that might come up,
he has indicated the charge by a defense in advance. But Governor
Johnson says positively that General Buell informed hini that he con-
sidered Nashville of no importance in a military point of view, and it
would have been evacuated three months before had his advice been
followed. That lie became alarmed evidently at the attitude of Gov-
ernor Johnson, and said subsequently to Generals Thomas and McCook
that Nashville must be held at all hazard, is true; but he never changed
his intention. And it will be observed that he takes and uses up Gov-
ernor Johnsons opinion when he says that.the place should be preserved
on account of its political importance.
	This evidence of Governor Johnsons is further sustained by a tele-
gram from General Halleck, which was found lying loose and unrecorded
at the Department Headquarters, General Buell informing me in open
court at the time I presented it to him that he knew nothing of it, while

2 R UVOL XV

Page 18

18	KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAr. XXVIII.

the dispatch to which it is an answer cannot be found at all. The aii-
swer, however, carries the query that produced it. It reads:

WASHINGTON, September 7, 1862.

Major-General BUELL:
	March where YOU please, provided you will find the enemy and fight him.

H.	W. HALLECK.

	There was little intent of this sort at a time when, as Colonel Fry
testifies, there was a sense of relief or rQjoicing when it was found that
Bragg had really crossed the Cumberland, froni the fact, I suppose,
that Bragg had not directly sought his enemy and fought him. Had
not the telegram read that was sent, Where shall I march? And
does such telegram indicate a settled purpose of any sort? But, again,
on the 14th of September, two days before the surrender of Munford.
ville, we find him telegraphing to General ilalleck, It has been ap-
parent to me for some time that on purely military grounds the force in
Middle Tennessee should fall back on its base; that is, Louisville.
The political effect of such a move, however, seemed to me so serious
that I hesitated to execute it. He was hesitating then when Governor
Johnson called and pressed this political view on him. This important
dispatch closed with a prayer for instructions. Instructions for
what? Had not his course been determined upon? Or was not the
general seeking to shield his abandonment of these States under in-
structions from Washington?
	He fell back upon Nashville for it~ defense, and yet left open the
only road by which Nashville could be assailed. He left Nashville on
the 7th to get between the enemy and Louisville and keep open his
line of communication, yet he delays his march so as to permit an infe-
rior force to get between him and Louisville, and, by seizing Munford-
ville, make the discomfiture of our army complete by compelling the
surrender or evacuation of all the important posts in its rear. Had
Bragg have seen fit to make a stand at Munfordville, Buell would
have been forced to abandon Bowling Green and Nashville and steal
off the best route he could find to the Ohio.
	Bragg, with his inferior force and lack of supplies, dared not to re-
main in Munfordville, and fell back to Bardstown, and six days after
General Buell writes to General Nelson at Louisville. This extraordi-
nary letter is so important as proving the real intent of General Buell
that I quote it at length. It must be remembered that Munfordville
had surrendered, and the paroled officers had sought General Buell and
informed him of the exact strength of P~caggs army as being but 36,000
strong and suffering terribly for lack of food, and yet he fled with his
brave army of 50,000 from this force, while a like iu~inber awaited his
coming at Louisville. Under these circumstances this is the advice he
gives General Nelson:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE OHIO,
September 22, 1862.
Major-General NELSON:
	I dispatched to you last evening from Horse Cave, but the courier did iiot leave
until after I arrived here last night. I learn since, with tolerable eertaint.y, that the
enemy m~ched in force toward Elizabethtown. He may go rapidly through to attack
Louisville, or if he thinks you too strong to be easily beaten he may go to Bardstown
to effect a junction with Smith, or he may halt at Elizabethtown to complete the
junction and fight me there. The latter I consider the mpre probable, considering I
am so close at hand. If he marches on Louisville he will probably go by Shepherds-
y~,lle, and it might be possible for hin~ to ye~ch there Thursday.. ~n any evpnt ~yoi

Page 19

CHAP. XXVIII.]	GENERAL REPORTS.	19


should be re-enforced to the last man without a moments delay. My own movements
depend so much on the movements of the enemy that I can hardly tell you what to do.
If you have only the force you speak of it would not, I should say, be advisable for
you to attempt a defense of Louisville, unless you are strongly intrenched. Under no
circumstances should you make a fight with his whole or main force. The alternative
would he to cross the river or march on this side to the mouth of Salt River and
bridge it, so as to form a junction with me. But, as I tell you, so much depends upon
circumstances that I must leave this question to your discretion. I only offer you my
suggestions in regard to it. This much do at any rate: Send a million of rations
down the river, say opposite Brandenburg, to make them safe, to be subject to my
order, and have a boat bridge made to be thrown rapidly across the mouth of the
Salt River for my use, if I requireit. Lose no time. Steamers should be opposite Salt
River subject to my orders.
	Bear in mind in these arrangements that the enemy will probably have a small
cavalry force at the mouth of Salt River. All steamers nsed for the service referred
to should be kept constantly under steam and ready to escape if threatened. Coin-
municate with me daily. I shall probably continue on the Louisville pike at least
as far as Elizabethtown. I shall be at Bacon Creek to-night or beyond there if the
enemy should be determined to stand at Elizabethtown. Your advance on the Louis-
ville pike, with the means of crossing Salt River, would undoubtedly have an impor-
tant effect and perhaps give you an opportunity of acting an important part.
	I received your dispatch in answer to mine from Dripping Spring.
D.	C. BUELL,
Major- General, Commanding.

	Braxton Bragg defeated the design. He did not march on Louisville
nor dare he risk an engagement with the superior Army of the Ohio.
He marched off toward Bardstown, where his subsistence was accumu-
lated, and thereby lost the conquest he set out to accomplish. General
Buell marched into Louisville, incorporated into his army the raw
recruits that had been gathered there, and set out vigorously in search
of the enemy. His army from Tennessee, numbering over 45,000, was
joined by an army of 48,000, while the enemy he went out to fight had
not over 60,000 men. The doubt and hesitation which seemed to par-
alvze his movements on the retreat from North Alabama to Louisville
vanished, and what the clear-headed, energetic general could do was
done. Sending Sills division to hold Kirby Smith in check near Frank-
fort, General Buell divided the Army of the Ohio on three different
roads converging on Bardstown and set out in a vigorous pursuit of
Bragg. Bragg retired from Bardstown to Perryville, closely pressed
by Buell. At Perryville the rebel leader evidently expected to fall in
with Kirby Smith. Kirby Smith was not there, and Bragg found it
necessary to check the farther advance of our army until Kirby Smith
could come to his assistance. Of this fact General Bnell was evidently
well acquainted. He warned his subordinate generals of the approach-
ing struggle, and on the morning of the 8th we find the immense army
in line of battle, prepared to advance upon the enemy.
	And here he fell into the same state of doubt and confusion that
marked the retreat from Nashville, and this continued until the rebel
invaders were safe out of Kentucky. After getting his force into line
by noon on the 8th why he delayed the attack until the 9th we have
been unable to understand; nor has the Commission been favored with
a reasonable explanation. It was evidently the policy to overwhelm
Bragg before he could form his junction with Smith. This junction
General Buell had feared from the first moment he began his retreat
from Nashville. Here was the long-wished-for opportunity, and yet
his army was to be kept in line, suffering for the water which the enemy
held possession of, from noon of the 8th till morning of the 9th. What
else could Bragg desire? The rebel general evidently misunderstood
the design, for observing that MeCook, in command of the left wing,
had broken his line and was moving in column to the water the soldier

Page 20

20	KY., M. AND E. TEWN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA [CHAP. XXVIII.

were suffering for, he suddenly threw the weight of half his army upon
the one corps, drove it back a mile, killing 918 men and wounding some
5,000.
	There are circumstances attending this brief but bloody engagement
which baffle comprehension. General Buell, who had approached Per-
ryville conscious of the presence there of the enemy in force, retired
to headquarters, 2~- miles in the rear of his left wing, and, surrounded
by a large and well-organized staff; was ignorant of the struggle until
too late to render aid, although he heard the furious cannonade that
gave token of a combat about 2oclock, pronouncing it a waste of am-
munition and demandii4g that it should stop, took no steps, either
through the signal corps then in operation or by his staff, to investigate
the cause, or, if necessary, to apply a remedy.
	What a golden opportunity to annihilate the rebel army then pre-
sented itself we now learn. Had the right wing of our army been
swung around, the rebel force would have been captured or destroyed.
General Mitchell, without orders, marched his brigade through Perry-
ville, and, coming in the rear of the rebels, then attacking MeCooks
corps, actually took prisoners and captured the ammunition train of
the battery playing upon the left wing. All this while Gilberts corps
remained idle spectators of the unequal contest, and not only failed to
tender re-enforcements, but when such aid was solicited by subordinate
officers and men positively refused.
	At 4.30 General Buell learned of the battle and sent an aide to Geii-
eral Thomas oixlering the forces under his command to re-enforce Mc-
Cook. The aide lost two hours in the search of General Thomas, who
was found at the front after night when the battle had ceased.
	This blow seems to have paralyzed the Army of the Ohio. No fur-
ther effort was made to find and attack the enemy from the 8th till the
12th. No advance was eveii ordered, for aii army of 70,000 men that is
confined in its maneuvers to a space of 10 miles cannot be said to ad-
vance. in the mean time the rebels retreated through Harrodsburg
past our forces to Camp Dick Robinson. This was a third time a
march of this kind was successful. A pursuit was then ordered that
resulted in nothing.
	After the fight before Perryville had our army been pushed throngh
Danville to Camp Dick Robinson the retreat of Bragg and Smith would
have been intercepted. The defense claims that other roads were open
to them on which to escape. It is a singular fact that in the opinion of
the defense a road is always open to the rebels, who need no trans-
portation and are not dependent upon the or(hiuary laws of subsist-
ence; while to us there seems to be but one road an
disaster to our base.	, d that is through
	The fact is the route through Camp Dick Robinson to Cumberland
Gap was the only available one to Bragg. On this their supplies were
collected, and from the nature of the conutry at Crab Orchard the
pursuit would have to cease. Had Bragg have been forced back to the
center of Kentucky, depending as he would have to on the country for
supplies, the move must have been fatal to him. Already disheartened
by the reception given them by the people of the State, had he been
forced to opeu plunder of that people for support the effect in 1)0th a
political and military point of view must have been disastrous. Bat as
the road into Kentucky had beeii strangely left open to him, so was
the road out of Kentucky made easy

Page 21

CHAP. xxvm.]	GENERAL REPORTS.	21
	     [Indorsement.]
	JUDGE-ADVOCATE-GENERALS OFFICE,
May 23, 1863.
	Respectfully referred to the Secretary of War by the request of
Lieutenant-Colonel Piatt.
J.	HOLT,
Judge-Advocate- General.

[Inclosure No. 4.]

BALTIMORE, MD., April 11, 1864.
General LORENZO THOMAS,
Adjutant-General U. S. Army:
	SIR: I have the honor to inclose herewith a copy of the communica-
tion which I addressed to the Commission which investigated my mili-
tary operations in Kentucky and Tennessee. As I received no informa-
tion in regard to the action taken on the original, or the disposition
made of it, I request that this copy may be filed with the record.
	1 inclose also a printed copy of the statement in review of the, evi-
dence which I prepared to submit to the Commission. 1 request that
it also may be filed with the record.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
D.	C. BUELL,
Major- General.

[Nub4nolosiire No. 1.]

BTJRNET HOUSE, Cincinnati, May 2, 1863.
To THE COMMISSION:
	On examination I have found the record of the Commission to be
deficient and inaccurate iu several particulars of greater or less impor-
tance.
	It will be remembered that at an early stage of the proceedings I pro-
posed an examination of the record for the purpose of correcting such
errors, but the Commission deemed it best to defer the examination
until the investigation should be closed. I desire now to call attention
to the most important of them.
	While the first witness, Colonel Lytle, I think, was giving his evi-
deuce the Commission was cleared, at the motion of one of the mem-
bers, for some purpose not stated at the time. After the Commission
had been in secret session some time I was invited in, and the presi-
dent directed or intimated to the judge-advocate to swear me to secrecy
in regard to the proceedings of the Commission. I declined to be sworn,
and the Commission was again cleared. The judge-advocate subse-
quently came out and informed me that it had been determined that the
investigation should be continued without my presence. 1 objected to
this decision, and the judge-advocate returned to the Commission, and I
presume stated my objection. He subsequently returned to me again,
and informed me that it had been concluded to admit me to the sessions
of the Commissiom, but that it had been decided that 1 should not cross-
examine witnesses, though I could introduce witnesses in the defense.
I objected to this also. 1 returned to the Commission and stated in per-
son my objections to its decisions. I was asked by the president whether
I based my claim to be present and cross-examine witnesses on the privi-
leges belonging to a party accused. I answered that undoubtedly th

Page 22

22	KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAP. XXVIU.

pending investigation implied some sort of accusation or imputation
against me, but that I did not think it necessary to say whether I con-
sidered myself in the light of a party accused or not; that for the present
I based my claim upon the instructions of the Secretary of War under
which they were acting, which stated that I would be permitted to
appear and produce and examine witnesses before the Commission.
	Without coming to any final decision on these questions the Commis-
sion adjourned.
	The following morning I submitted a written statement of what I con-
sidered to be my right with reference to these several points, and that
statement was sustained by the Commission. It is proper that these
facts should appear on the record, and I request that they may be placed
there.
	It will be remembered that some discussion took place at the time
with reference to the rights which I claimed. It is impossible for me
now to repeat the precise words in which I presented them. If there
should be any question in regard to these several points then I desire
to establish them by evidence, in order that the record may b& ~ corrected.
	The other errors, as far as I have observed them, I have noted in my
copy, and they can be pointed out more conveniently by referring to
the record.
D.	C. BUELL,
Major- General.

BALTIMORE, Mn., April 11, 1864.
	The above is a true copy of a communication submitted to the Corn.
mission which investigated my military operations in Kentucky and
Tennessee. I request that it may be filed with the record, because I
have not been informed what action was taken upon or what disposition
was made of the original.
D.	C. BUELL,
Major- General.

[Sub4nclosure ITo. 2.]

S~atement of Major-General Buell in review of the evidence before the
Military Commission.
	The investigations of this Commission have not gone further back
than shortly after the evacuation of Corinth by the rebel army in May
last, and it might perhaps be expected that this review of my com-
mand in Kentucky and Tennessee would not go beyond that period; but
I have for more than a year remained silent under misrepresentations
which have misled the public mind with reference to the administration
of my command. Ideem it proper, therefore, to sketch briefly the history
of the army I recently commanded and of my connection with it for
the period anterior to the time to which this investigation has extended.
It is proper also as bearing on subjects that have been investigated,
because many circumstances connected with it shaped or affected the
subsequent operations under my command.
	In the early part of November, 1861, the condition of affairs in Ken-
tucky became the subject of the most anxious solicitude to the Govern-
ment and throughout the country. One-third of the State was in the
possession of the rebel forces, under whose protection a provisional gov-
ernment was inaugurated at Russellville. It was supposed that the
Union element was confined for the most part to the old men; tha

Page 23

CHAP. XXVIII.1
23
GENERAL REPORTS.

the mass of the young men were on the eve of joining the rebel cause7
and that nothing but extraordinary exertion and judicious management
could rescue the State from the vortex toward which the excitement of
revolution was rapidly carrying her. This was certainly an unjust re~
flection on the loyalty of the State1 but there is no doubt that the pres-
ence of a large rebel force rendered the occasion critical.
	It was unexpectedly announced to me about the 9th of November
that I was to be charged with this weighty responsibility. I received
general instructions from the general-in-chief, Major-General McClellan,
on the night of the 12th, and on the 15th of November I assumed corn-
mand at Louisville of the new Department of the Ohio, embracing the
States of Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, that portion of Kentucky east of the
Cumberland River, and the State of Tennessee.
	The enemy, under the command of General Sidney Johnston, was hi
possession of Bowling Green, with, according to the best information1
about 25,000 men, his advance guard extending to Munfordville. In-
cluding Hopkinsville and other points his force north of the Cuinber-
land amounted probably to 35,000 men. He had a small force at Fort
Henry, on the Tennessee IRiver, and Fort Donelson, on the Cumbe~rland;
and he had railroad communication with Columbus, on the Mississippi,
where he had a large force, and with Nashville and all points south and
east. These facilities enabled him to concentrate at any poin t in a very
short time all the force in the Coinedera~y not required for defense
elsewhere. At that time he could hardly be said to be threatened in
any quarter except in front of Washington. The coast expeditions had
not been inaugurated, and our force in Missouri was not yet pre-
pared to operate beyond the limits of that State. He had also a small
force, not pxobably exceeding 2,500 men, under Humphrey Marshall,
threatening the northeastern part of Kentucky through Pound Gap,
and a considerable force, under General Zollicoffer, at Cumberland Gap
and on the road north of it. These last had recently been compelled to
fall back from an attempt to invade the central part of the State, but
they were still in a position to renew the effort. In addition to this the
population was in a state of great~ disquiet. Bands were constantly or-
ganizing to join the rebel ranks and intimidate the loyal people, and in
some parts of the State the Union element scarcely dared to express
itself.
	Kentucky at this time was the point which offered to the enemy the
best prospect of advantage. His intention to have possession of Louis-
ville within a limited period was constantly avowed. The disloyal ele-
ment confidently expected it, and if the Government force had not been
speedily increased the attempt would no doubt have beeii made. As
soon, however, as the i~e-enforcements began to arrive he commenced
fortifying strongly at Bowliiig Green and other points.
	In reality the effective Government force which I found in Kentucky
consisted of two divisions, about 23,000 men, on the Cumberland Gap
road and the Nashville road, and about 4,000 men on the Big Sandy,
in the northeast part of the State; but there were besides some forty or
more Kentucky regiments or fractions of regiments scattered over the
State in recruiting districts that were more or less available for local
service. Very many, in fact nearly all, of them were not yet mustered
in; many without arms, equipments, or proper organization; some of
them embracing various arms of serviceartillery, cavalry, and infantry.
In the whole force were included about eight field batteries and four
regiments of cavalry. The latter were all without any suitable armn~
some had pistols only and some muskets. There was not, I believe, 

Page 24

24	KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAP. XXVIII.

carbine in the hands of the troops. In the infantry arms of two or
three different calibers could frequently be found in the same regiment,
and many of these were of foreign make, and unfit for service from
various defects which rendered them unsafe or unreliable. The troops
were but little instructed some of them not at all, and four or five gen.
eral and perhaps as many staff officers embraced the whole military ex-
perience in the department. Officers having no rank whatever were
acting as generals and staff officers under conditioned promises of ap-
pointment, and the supplies and equipment were in many respects de-
ficient and defective. There was not transportation enough not already
employed to serve 20,000 men two days march from a depot or line of
railroad.
	The first thing to be done was to organize, arm, equip, and mobilize
this heterogeneous mass, and this was both a difficult amid tedious work.
The Kentucky troops had to be collected from remote quarters and the
fractions consolidated and organized; a work which the Military Board
of the State had commenced before my arrival. Supplies of every kind
had to be procured; a difficult matter, owing to the quantity suddenly
required to supply the enormous force the Government was callinginto
service. In a word, I)retty much everything necessary to make an army
of soldiers had to be done. But little assistance could be obtained from
abroad. Experienced staff officers could not be obtained. I expected
two regular batteries from Missouri. About the 1st of January two
companies of artillery, without batteries, making together about 70
men, with one officer, reported to me. The expectation of a regiment
of regular cavalry resulted even worse than that. After my arrival at
Nashville two companies reported, with about 70 men. New regiments
begaii to report occasionally very soon after my arrival, and from the
26th of November to the 1st of January several regiments that had
seen some service joined from W~stern Virginia. About the last of
December some fourteen raw regiments were received from Ohio and
Indiana. The force was afterward further increased from time to time.
In the mean time the enemy had also received considerable accessions
to his strength.
	The organization of the troops into brigades and divisions was effected
without delay as fast as they arrived. It was made a rule in the or-
ganization not to group the regiments by States, but to represent as
many States as possible in each brigade; an arrangement which was
attended with the happiesg results in the discipline and tone of the
armay.
	The instructions which I received on leaviiig Washington pressed
upon me the importance of sending a column into East Tennessee.
While the organization of my army and the preparation of transporta-
tion to enable it to move were going on I studied the subject very
carefully, and also suggested a plan of campaign against Nashville, and
expressed my views very hilly to the general-in-chief with reference
to both. I said that the campaign to East Tennessee would give occu-
pation to 30,000 men20,000 to enter the State, with a reserve of 10,000
on the line of communications; and I stated what means would be re-
quired to supply the force at such a distance200 miles by wagon
transportation, a good part of the way through a barren, mountainous
region. For a campaign against Nashville I proposed to march rapidly
against that city, passing to the left of Bowling Green through Glas
gow and Gallatin, while a force from Missouri should ascend the Cum-
berland River nuder the protection of gunboats. This was essential,
-	because to make the movement successful it would be necessary t

Page 25

CHAP. XXVIII.]	GENERAL REPORTS.	25


move very light and depend on receiving supplies by the Cumberland
River after getting through. In organizing my troops I disposed them
so that they could be directed upon either orboth of these objects. By
the last of December I had collected troops enough to organize four
divisionsabout 40,000 men. I had thrown one division forward to
Munfordville, one to Bacon Creek, on the same road, one near Green
River, on the New Haven turnpike, and had one at Lebanon~ Many
of the Kentucky troops were yet scattered and not mustered in, but
in some cases two or more regiments had been brought together for
local service, with as many regiments added from other States, as at
Caihoni, where there were perhaps 6,000 men for the protection of
the Green River country, and at Columbia perhaps 3,000. Other
new regiments were rendezvousing at Bardstown for organization and
preparation for service. As yet the most strenuous efforts had not
succeeded in obtaining the necessary means of transportation for an
advance.
	About the middle of December Humphrey Marshall again invaded
the State through Piketon with about 2,500 men, though his force
was represented at 6,000 or 7,000. On the 17th I sent Colonel ~arfield
to take charge of a force of five regiments of infantry and about a regi-
ment of cavalry and operate against him. Marshall was defeated in
two sharp engagements on the Big Sandy, near Prestonburg, and. by
about the middle of February was driven out of the State.
	Simultaneously with the advance of Marshall into Northeastern Ken-
tucky General Zollicoffer made his appearance on the Cumberland
River near Somerset. His force was represented at 12,000 men, but
probably did not exceed 8,000. The force sent for that purpose and to
observe his movements failed to prevent him from crossing. I had
previously kept a regiment at Somerset, and ordered the erection of a
small work, both to watch that route into the State and to prevent the
shipment of coal to Nashville. Zollicoffer crossed at Mill Springs and
intrenched himself on the north bank of the river. On the 27th of De-
cember I ordered General Thomas to march from Lebanon and attack
him, in conjunction with the force already at Somerset, and at the same
time sent two regiments of infantry and a battery of artillery to James-
town to blockade the river, a steamer having already passed up with
supplies for the enemy at Mill Springs.
	Want of transportation delayed General Thomas departure until the
1st of January. The weather had previously been tolerably good, but
that very day the rainy season set in, and from that time until near the
end of March the earth was thoroughly saturated and every stream was
flooded. The season in that respect was remarkable. The difficulties
of the march were so great that General Thomas only arrived at a posi-
tion 12 miles from Mill Springs and about 75 miles from Lebanon on the
18th. The enemy came out and attacked him at daylight on the morn-
ing of the 19th. The result was a signal victory to our arms. The
enemy was pursued to his intrenchments and during the night crossed
the river. He lost a considerable number of men in killed, wounded,
and prisoners, fourteen pieces of artillery, some 1,400 animals, and a
large amount of other property and stores. General Zollicoffer was
among the killed.
	The battle of Mill Springs was at that time one of the most important
that had occurred during the war, and the victory was, I believe, the
first the Union arms achieved where the forces engaged were so large;
but the lack of transportation and the condition of the roads rendered
it impossible to follow it up

Page 26

26	KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAP. XXVIII.

	Owing to the delay in procuring sufficient transportation for the ex-
pedition to East Tennessee I had regarded the campaign against Nash-
vile as the one which it would be necessary to enter upon first in order
to save time. I was waiting for the arrangement of the necessary con-
cert between the forces on the Mississippi and my own to commence it,
when, owing to the illness of the general.in-chief, and at the request of
the President, I wrote on the 3d of January to Major~Genera1 Halleck,
who was in command in Missouri, and proposed substantially the same
plan I had submitted to the general-in-chief, and substantially the same
as that which afterwards resulted in the capture of Fort Henry, Fort
Donelson, and Nashville. It contemplated an advance upon Nashville
through Kentucky, a strong demonstration, which might be converted
into a real attack, against Columbus, if the enemy should weaken that
point to strengthen others that were threatened, and an advance of
2O,Of~O men up the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers under the pro-
tection of gunboats. Such a force I deemed sufficient at that time, for
the works at Forts Henry and iDonelson had as yet no great strength
and were but feebly armed and garrisoned. If the expeditions should
be threatened by a superior force they were to unite, under the pro-
tection of the gunboats, and make themselves secure until released by
my advance upon Nashville. At that time I expected that the expedi-
tion already commenced against the enemy at Mill Springs would be
fully accomplished in ten days and General Th6mas troops in a posi-
tion to be available for other service.
	General Halleck replied to my proposition that he had not spare force
enough to undertake it, and suggested the objection that the proposed
operation was one upon outer lines, but he offered to make a demon-
stration from Paducah toward Columbus. These facts explain in part
why I was not prepared to act as promptly as I could otherwise have
done when General Halleck subsequently commenced his advance up
the Tennessee River. He stated also that he hoped in a few weeks to
be able to render me material assistance. A mere demonstration, not
in sufficient force to take a decided part in the campaign, would have
been of no avail, because either my advance must be rapid directly
against Nashville by flanking Bowling Greenan essential conditioii
of which would be that I should meet supplies transported up the Cum-
berlandor else it must be deliberate, and with heavy artillery, against
Bowling Green, strengthened as that position was by fortifications on
both sides of Barren River, and I had not then the means necessar for
such an operation. Besides, I received about the same time communi-
cations from the President and the general-in-chief urging the expedi-
tion to East Tennessee as of primary importance. I therefore gave my
attention to it, intending to start that expedition from Somerset with
the troops that were moving against the enemy at Mill Springs. The
preparation of transportation was urged forward, and a strong force
was set to work to corduroy the road to render it practicable. Never-
theless it was barely possible to subsist the 10,000 men at Somerset.
The experiment demonstrated the impracticability of sending an ex-
pedition to East Tennessee in such force as fo insure success in the pres-
ent condition of the roads, and on the 1st of February 1 so advised the
general-in-chief in a letter, with full explanations, and expressed my
purpose to proceed against Bowling Green.
	I had had no communication with General Halleck since his reply to my
letter of the 3d of January, but on the 30th I received a dispatch from
him, saying, without giving particulars, that he had ordered anex-
pedition against Fort Henry. The same day 1 had suggested to hi

Page 27

CHAP. XXVflI.]	GENERAL REPORTS.	27

by letter a rapid gunboat expedition up the Tennessee and Cumberland
Rivers to destroy bridges over those streams. Although Forts Henry
and Donelson had been considerably strengthened., I believed the gun-
boats could pass them without any great risk. On the 6th I ordered
one brigade from the mouth of Green River and eight new regiments
to re-enforce General Hallecks expedition. They did not, however,
arrive until after the capture of that place, which occurred on the 6th,
but took part in the subsequent operations against Fort Donelson.
	General Halleck found great difficulty in the movement against Fort
Donelson, although the distance from Fort Henry was only about 12
miles. The enemy had greatly strengthened the works and increased the
garrison. Protected as Bowling Green was by fortifications, the for-
midable river in front, and by the condition of the roads, I apprehended
that my operations against that place could not be rapid enough to
prevent the enemy from re-enforcing Fort Donelson so strongly as to
endanger the success of General Hallecks operations. Upon consulta-
tion with him, therefore, I commenced on the 13th the movement of
three divisions to re-enforce him by water, which would not only~make
the reduction of the place certain, but give force enough to operate
against Nashville on that line, while the rest of my force was threat-
ening Bowling Green in front. The advance of General Mitchels divis-
ion arrived opposite Bowling Green on the morning of the 14th, and
found the bridge in flames and the enemy evacuating the place. That
officer was directed to cross rapidly and throw a force forward toward
Nashville, and the advance on that line was strengthened by a division
which was to have gone to the Cumberland.
	The operation of passing the river at Bowling Green in its swollen
condition was difficult and tedious. The advanced division, General
Mitchels, did not get entirely over for ten days, notwithstanding the
energy of that officer. While this was going on the troops in rear were
employed in repairing the railroad. On the 24th the river was so high
that small steamers were taken over the broken dams and reached
Bowling Green with supplies and to assist in ferrying. About the same
time a pontoon-bridge was laid, and although the overflow of the banks
seriously interfered, yet the troops were able to pass with comparative
rapidity.
	In the mean time I was informed about the 17th of the surrender of
Fort Donelson. I arrived at Bowling Green on the 20th, and on the
21st learned that the enemy had evacuated Clarksville and fallen back
on Nashville, and that he had burned the bridges at Nashville. On
the morning of the 22d the troops that had crossed the river at Bowl-
ing Green, two brigades and a half, started for Nashville, without ~vag-
ons, very few having yet been got across. With about 1,000 men on
cars, which the enemy had not succeeded in carrying off or destroying,
I expected to reach within 9 miles of Nashville that night; but a heavy
rain destroyed the road in advance of us and I did not reach the river
opposite Nashville until the night of the 24th. The remainder of the
troops arrived at the same time by marching. I had telegraph~d Gen-
eral Halleck, and sent a courier through to Clarksville giving informa-
tion of my movements, and requesting that the gunboats should pro-
ceed at once up the river. I apprended that they would meet one bat-
tery on the way, but they arrived without molestation on the night of
the 24th, convoying the transports with the troops of General Nelson
and General Crittenden, three brigades; and on the morning of the
25th the trool)s entered Nashville, and took position beyond the city
toward Murfreesborough, the enemy having retired to that place

Page 28

28	KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAP. XXVIII.

	The river was out of its banks and the work of crossingwas tedious.
General Mitchels division passed over on the 25th and 26th and the
other divisions as rapidly as possible, but the whole had not crossed
until about the 5th of March. General Thomas division arrived by
water on ~the 2d. The troops moved by forced marches, without bag-
gage, owing to the difficulty of getting their wagons over the streams.
The trains did not, therefore, arrive for several days after. Those that
could arrive more rapidly that way were transported by water up the
Cumberland.
	The strength of the enemy at Murfreesborouglzi, after the evacuation
of Nashville, was estimated at the time, and has since been stated by
persons who had means of judging at about 30,000 men. This force
inchided what was collected of the ,troops that were defeated at Mill
Springs and the force that had been at Bowling Green and other I)Oints,
north of the Cumberland River, excepting what was captured at Fort
Donelson. it commenced moving south from Murfreesborough in a
very few days after my arrival at Nashville, and, as is well known,
eventually formed a junction with the forces of General ~Beauregard
at Corinth. A pursuit with the hope of overtaking it on its line of
march would have been futile for that object even if the force had been
up to commence it at once, for every stream was tlooded and every
bridge was destroyed as the enemy retired. The only alternative was
to operate deliberately against some line or point which it was his ob-
ject to defend, and the Memphis and Charleston Railroad presented
such an object. It was the same for the forces that were operating up
the Tennessee River, under the orders of Major-General ilalleck, more
particularly against the enemys forces that by the recent operations
had been compelled to evacuate the principal part of West Tennessee.
It was necessary that our forces should act in concert agaiiist that ob-
ject; better still that they should act under one direction ;and the
order of the War Department, which I received on the 12th of March,
placing the whole force under General flallecks command, was there-
fore eminently proper. On the 15th I commenced the movement to-
ward the Tennessee River, in pursuance of the understanding which
had voluntarily taken place between us before the orders of the War
Department were receive(l. General ilallecks dispatch of the 16th
designated Savannah as the point where I was to form a junction with
the force already assembling on the Tennessee River.
	Before leaving Nashville I sent Brig. Gen. G. W. Morgan to take
command of a column I had left on the Cumberland Gap road, which
was increased to a division by scattered regiments that remained in
Kenfucky. He was instructed to pursue with energy and discretion
the object of taking Cumberland Gap, and for his further progress to
be governed by circumstances in East Tennessee or to hold the enemy
in check in that quarter if his force should prove insufficient to advance.
The operations of this column have been investigated partially by the
Commission, and I shall allnde to them again in that connection. T also
moved General Mitchels division forward to Fayetteville, 26 miles from
Huntsville, for the purpose of seizing the Memphis and Charleston road.
The enemy withdrew his troops from that line, excepting small guards,
and General Mitchel, on the 12th of April, five days after the battle of
Shiloh, entered Huntsville. Various other dispositions and instructions
were made with reference to the troops that were to occupy Middle Ten-
nessee during my absence with the main army. The latter numbered
about 37,00b men, the former about 18,000.
	The march toward the Tennessee River on the 15th of March co

Page 29

CRAP. XXVIII.]	GENERAL REPORTS.	29


menced with one division, preceded by a rapid movement of cavalry, to
get possession of the bridges as far as Columbia before the enemy could
destroy them. It succeeded with all of the bridges excepting the one
over Duck River at Columbia and one 4 miles north of that place.
The work of preparing the means of crossing Duck River was urged
forward by all possible means and was under the charge of zealous and
energetic officers, but it was not completed until the 31st of March.
The river, which, at first 40 feet deep, had been gradually receding, was
watched day by day,, and finally became fordable for cavalry the very
day the bridges were completed. The army then moved forward stead-
ily, the advance and myself reaching Savannah, about 90 milesfroni
Columbia, on the evening of the 5th of April. The other divisions fol-
lowed, with intervals of 6 miles from the head of one division to the
head of the next.
	The battle of Shiloli, which otcnrred on the 6th and 7th of April, has
been justly considered one of the most remarkable of the war, in regard
to the numbers engaged, the reverses of the first day, and the success
of the second. The particulars, so far as my command was concerned,
have been given in my official report of that battle, hereunto appelided,*
and it is not necessary to repeat them. I believe that report states
in very moderate terms the part which my command took in the inci-
dents of that field. It has been conceded that my army rescued our
forces on the west bank of the Tennessee from certain destruction or
capture, and the movement which precedcd the battle was prompt and
even rapid. I marched froni Nashville not to rescue those forces, but
to form a jnnction with them to operate against the enemys position at
Corinth; and it was desirable, and General ilallecks instructions re-
quired me, to effect the junction as promptly as possible. I was informed
that I should find General Grants army at Savannah, on the east side
of the river, and I was surprised, and even c,ncerned, when I heard
during the march that it was on the west bank; but I was relieved from
anxiety by the information that it was so protected by high water in the
streams which interposed between it and the enemy, and nearly suir-
rounded it, as to be perfectly secure.
	It is not necessary to go into the particulars of the campaign against
Corinth~ My command formed the center in the advance on that place.
By General ilallecks order one of my divisionsGeneral Thomas
served with General Grants command in that advance, mmd did not
again come under my supervision, or actually under my control, until
about the last of July. The enemys works were entered about daylight
on the morning of the 30th of May, having been evacuated the previous
imight.
	I come now to the period embraced in the investigations of the Coin-
mission, and proceed to a general review of the more material facts
wimich have been developed in the evidence. I shall do this without
pretending to offer at present a nice analysis of the testimony, or, as a
general rule, even citing that which bears on the points which I claima
to be established by it. No other course could well be pursued, be -
cause otherwise much time would be consumed iii illustrating facts to
which no importance might attach, as no specific charges or allegations
have been submitted for trial. Such an analysis could only be made
by me after knowing what points the Commission may give importance
to. That I have no means of knowing now, a vast amount of evidence,
oral and documentary, having been submitted without any explained

* See Series I, Vol. X, Part I, pp. 291296

Page 30

30	KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAP. XXVIII.

purpose, and which may be important or not, according to the interpre.
tation or bearing given to it. Nor shall I remark upon any of the in.
cidents of this investigation.
	The subjects submitted to the Commi8sion by the War Department
are as follows:
	First. In reference to General Buell suffering the State of Kentucky to be invaded
by the rebel forces under General Bragg.
	Second. In his failing to relieve Munfordyille and suffering it to be captured.
	Third. In reference to the battle of Perryville and General Buells conduct during
that battle and afterward suffering the rebel forces to escape from Kentucky without
loss or capture.
	Fourth. Such other matters touching the military operations aforesaid as in the
judgment of the Commission shall be beneficial to the service.


	On the 30th of May, after the evacuation of Corinth by the rebel
forces, I received a communication from Major-General Halleck, in-
forming me that his first object was to open the- lines of railroad cen-
tering at that point from our rear and flanks, and directing me to put
one of my divisions on that duty on the Memphis and Ch~rleston road
east of Corinth. I accordingly detached the division of General Wood
on that service. The army of General Pope was following up the
retiring enemy in the direction of Baldwyn. On the 4th of June I re-
ceived instructions to re.enforce General Pope, near Booneville, with.
two divisions, in anticipation of an attack from the enemy. I accom-
panied those divisions myself. The enemy, however, continued his
retreat toward Okalona; and on the 9th I received intimation that a
part of the force under my command would return to Tennessee, and
that I could make my arrangements accordingly. At my request I was
authorized to start the tw~ divisions (Nelsons and Crittendens) that
were with me in that direction. General McCooks division, then at
Corinth~, was to remain there until relieved by General Thomas divis-
ion, which had also been sent to re-enforce General Pope. General
Thomas division originally formed part of my army, but had been
detached from my command since the commencement of the advance
upon Corinth. I was informed that it would probably rejoin me at a
future day for the movement toward Tennessee.
	I stopped at General Hallecks headquarters on my return from
Booneville on the 10th, and visited them again on the 11th, and during
those visits received his oral instructions with reference to the cam-
paign I was to enter upon. Its object was the occupation of East
Tennessee and certain important points on the railroad through that
region of country; Chattanooga, Dalton, and Knoxville were points
which it was considered important to occupy. I requested that I might
be allowed to choose my own route, and at that interview General
Halleck assented, though he had been in favor of moving directly on
Chattanooga through North Alabama; but on the 12th I received a
dispatch from him saying that, on further reflection, he deemed it best
that the route he had suggested should be pursued. My own idea had
been to strike a little farther north, through Middle Tennessee and
McMinnville.
	General Halleck desfred that the movement should be made as
promptly as possible, but it was a condition that the railroad from
Corinth east shouJd be repaired, and it was his idea that I should draw
my supplies by that route. I did not concur in his views in regard to
the advantages of that route, and I immediately gave orders for repair-
ing the roads from Nashville through Tennessee and for procuring
supplies in that way, but I placed the superintendence of the Memphi

Page 31

CHAP. XXVIII.]	GENERAL REPORTS.	31


and Charleston road under an energetic and experienced engineer,
Brigadier-General Smith, put troops on the route, and gave orders for
pushing the repairs as rapidly as possible. Subsequently I suggested
the inexpediency of repairing the road. It was for 80 miles parallel
with the enemys front and peculiarly exposed to attack. This objec-
tion was realized in the end, and, in addition, it was found impossible
to get stock enough on the road to make it of material use even while
it was kept open, so that substantially we derived no advantage from
it.	It however occupied the troops until about the last of June in
opening it and detained General Thomas division a month longer in
guarding it, so that that division did not reach Athens and Huntsville
nntil the last of July.
	As soon as my destination was pointed out to me instructions were
given to my engineer officer, Captain Morton, to prepare the means of
crossing the river at Florence, and similar instructions were given to
General Mitchel, then commanding at Huntsville, for crossing a portion
of my force at Decatur, so as to have the advantage of two roads and
two crossings. A very efficient ferry was prepared at Florence and
a very inefficient one at Decatur.
	General McCooks division marched from Corinth on the 11th and
reached Florence on the 15th of June. It was followed closely by Crit.
tendens division, which had come into the road at luka from Boone-
ville. General Woods was advanced to and beyond Tuscumbia to re-
pair ~id guard the road, while General Nelsons took its place between
luka and Tuscumbia. The few boats that were of light enough draught
were employed in forwarding supplies by water to Florence, and in order
to make up for the deficiency wagon trains were put on the road from
Eastport to luka to connect with the single half serviceable locomotive
and the few cars that were available on the railroad. The boats were
only able to cdrry from 30 to 40 tons over the shoals, and after a few
trips could not run at all; after which wagon trains were started on
the north side of the river between Florence and Waterloo, nearly
opposite Eastport. The ferry at Florence was ready for use on the 22d
of June and the crossing was commenced, but rumors of a movement
of the enemy toward luka suspended the forward movement from the
opposite side until the 25th. Wagon trains were first pi t across and
dispatched to Reynolds Station, where they connected with the rail-
road trains from Nashville, to convey supplies over the gap in the road
to Athens. General Mitchel had previously been instructed to have
supplies for a certain number of days, until the trains should be estab-
lished, to meet the troops on their arrival at Athens and Decatur. The
divisions moved forward in close succession by marches of about 14
miles a dayNelsons and Woods as soon as they were relieved from
the road by other troops. Woods division finished crossing at Decatur
on the 0th of July. The other three divisions, crossing at Florence,
commenced arriving at Athens on the 27th of June. The troops halted
at these points momentarily, and their trains were thrown into the gap
on the railroad to push forward supplies.
	The problem of advancing into East Tennessee was now fairly before
me. The force which I brought along numbered between 24,000 and
25,000 effective men, and there were besides about 16,000 more scattered
through Middle Tennessee and North Alabama~that I had left behind
for service in that region when I mi~rched to form the junction with
General Grants army on the Tennessee River in April. That force,
mainly under the command of General Mitchel, has been generally
awarded praise for the s~ryice it performed and very justly, yet no

Page 32

32	KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAP. XXVIII.

more than 2,000 men ever appeared on the field of its operations to op-
pose it. It was not the numbers of the enemy fhat made its service
difficult and creditable, but it was the large extent of country it occu-
pied, the length of the lines it had to guard, and the (liffidulty of sup-
plying it. Those lines had still to be held in a further advance and
with no less force to make them secure, for the force which endangered
them had been largely increased by the transfer of a large part of the
enemys cavalry to the north side of the Tennessee River after the evac-
uation of Corinth and by the organization of an additional force of
guerrillas throughout Middle Tennessee and North Alabama and in,
the southwestern portion of Kentucky.
	The limited force available for a further advance into the enemys
country was not, however, at the time of my arrival, the difficulty, for
undoubtedly it was superior to the force which the enemy at that mo-
ment had in East Tennessee. Experience has shown what might have
been deduced from reason, that if the movement could have been made
without serious resistance while the enemy was yet inferior in force, it
could have had no permanent result with no more troops than I had.
The advance of 60,000 veteran rebel troops through a friendly popula-
tion into Kentucky, where they undoubtedly met many friends, has
been considered bold, and must have proved fatally disastrous to them
but for their precipitate retreat. I know no reason why 25,000 or 30,000
men should be sufficient to advance with any greater prospect of a per-
ruanent advantage into an exhausted and comparatively barren c~ntry
and in as close proximity to- the whole power of the em~emy. It was my
error to believe at that time that the thing was practicable, and I did
not represent it otherwise when I was assigned to the execution of it;
but I must say also, in extenuation, that I did not anticipate that the
enemy was to be left so unemployed at other points that he could de-
vote his greatest effort against my enterprise. Besides, I regarded it
as in the highest degree important and I supposed that no larger force
could be spared for it.
	However, at the time of my arrival with my army in NorthAlabama
the immediate obstacle to the execution of the first step, the capture
of Chattanooga, was that of supplies and the means of crossing the
Tennessee River. The means to overcome these difficulties had to be
created, for they did not exist. The lumber had to be sawed and a
bridge built, and supplies for the troops had to be brought, for the
country. was destitute of them. The country between Decatur and
Huntsville and extending up into Middle Tennessee is a cultivated
and productive one; but as far north as the Tennessee line, and even
including the southern tier of the counties of Tennessee, it is eultivated
mainly in cotton. The planters never produce more than an ample
supply of meat and corn for their own use and not always that. Far-
ther north Tennessee produces considerable quantities of surplus pro-
visions, but not enough to supply the demand farther south, as is shown
by the fact that large quantities of produce from the Northwestern
States have annually found a market at Nashville. The demand upon
the surplus provisions of Tennessee had been increased by the rebellion,
which cut off the supply from the Northwest, and by the armies, rebel and
Union, which during the winter and spring of 1862 fed upon the country
to a considerable extent. North Alabama particularly was left in a
condition to need the necessaries of life, instead of affording subsistence
for an army. East of Huntsville the spurs of the Cuniberland Mount-
ains run down nearly to the river, leaving only here and there a narrow
valley or cove of arable land. The whole country is rough and almos

Page 33

CHAP. XXVIII.]	GENERAL REPORTS.	33

barren, producing no more than is necessary for the support of a poor
and sparse population. East of Stevenson, as far as Chattanooga, it
may be said to be destitute both of population and supplies. Beyond
Chattanooga the productive region of East Tennessee commences;
but dtiring last summer it was exhausted of supplies, and the people
themselves were, as they are now, notwithstanding the new crop they
have since gathered, suffering for food. These facts go to the- extent
of rendering it iml)ossible for my army to have advanced and depend
on the resources of the country. The alternative of drawing its sup.
plies from its principal base, the Ohio River, was imperative, and my
wagon transportation was not sufficient to cover breaks in the railroads
north of Huntsville and to advance beyond Bridgeport at the same
time.
	The first essential, therefore, was the opening of the railroads from
Nashville; and to that end the force which General Mitchel had been
ordered to put at that work was increased by engineer and other troops
to the whole force that could be employed. Hired mechanics, nuder
the military superintendent of railroads, an able and efficient man at
such work, were also employed, and orders were given to push forward
the repairs with all possible dispatch. But the work was much more
formidable than had been supposed, and the work which I had expected
to see completed in ten or fifteen days was not finished until the 31st
of July on the Nashville and Decatur road. The Nashville and Chat-
tanooga road was completed on the 12th of July; the trains started
throngh on the 13th, and were stopped by the attack and surrender at
Murfreesborough, by which and by subsequent successful attacks the
completion of that road was delayed until the 28th of July.
	In order to conceal the object, or at least the progress, of my cam-
paign as much as possible it was desirable not to concentrate my force
at a point which immediately threatened the enemys position until I
was prepared to move against him. This was also expedient from the
necessity of placing the troops in positions where they could be most
conveniently subsisted, and where they could give the necessary assist-
ance in repairing the roads and in guarding them until they should be
securely established, and protected at the more Vulnerable points by
stockades or other defenses which would enable a small force to main-
tain itself against a larger one. Prior to my arrival in North Alabama,
however, General Mitchel had entertained serious apprehensions of an
attack on the positions which l~ie occupied in that region, particularly
at Battle Creek and along the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad,
and repeated dispatches from him urged the pressing importance of re-
enforcements to guard against the supposed danger. These reports of
a probable attack at Battle Creek were repeated just after my arrival,
and rendered it proper to increase the force at that point. McCooks
arid Crittendens divisions were accordingly ordered there. They
marched from Athens about the 4th and arrived at Battle Creek about
the 14th of July. One brigade from the former was put at work on the
road from Stevenson to Decherd. Nelsons division still remained at
Athens, furnishing a strong working party on that road. Woods divis.
ion was stopped near Decatur, where it protected the ferry and the
small garrison on the opposite side of the river, the idea not having
been yet abandoned of making the Memphis and Chattanooga road
west of that point available for supplying my troops and communicat-
ing with the forces about Corinth. With these dispositions, orders
were given for establishing the regular road guards and for getting to-

1~ I~YOL xv

Page 34

34	KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAP. XXVIII.

gether again the fragments of brigades and regiments previously there,
which were found scattered in very great confusion; a brigade was or-
ganized to move from Murfreesborough and Tullahoma and occupy
MeMinuville; intelligent and energetic officers were put in charge of
the road guards and road repairs; mills were set to work to get out
lumber for a pontoon bridge; horses were ordered for. the cavalry, which
had been left in Middle Tennessee, and was in bad condition; and vari-
ous other preparations ordered to enable the troops to move promptly
and effectively as soon as the roads were completed so that supplies
could be provided.
	The first raid of Morgan into Kentucky took place early in July. He
threatened Bowling Green and Munfordville about the 8th of July,
defeated three companies of cavalry at Bnrkesville about the same time,
and then went to Lebanon, where he destroyed the depot and hospital
buildings. Thence he proceeded north through Lexington as far as
Paris. He was engaged at Paris and o.ther points during his expedi-
tion, but with no important result. He finally recrossed the Cumber.
land River at or near Mill Springs about the 23d of July and made his
way to Knoxville.
	The force which made this incursion has been said not to have ex-
ceeded 1,000 men, though at the time it was estimated as high as 2,500
or 3,000. it produced a good deal of alarm in the State, and inanyap-
prehended that the force would receive large accessions to its ranks
and that the sympathizing part of the population would become trouble-
some, but those apprehensions were not realized. The injury ~vas con-
fined mainly to the inconvenience and sufferino- indicted on individuals,
and I have no doubt that the effect on the population was to strengthen
its adhesion to the Union.
	A good deal of censure was cast on the troops and the military offi-
cers in the State that Morgan should have escaped without capture or
greater loss, but not with much justice, when the circumstances are con-
sidered. The objects to be aimed at by my army, after the occupation
of Nashville in February, made it necessary to carry forward, for further
operations, nearly the x~ hole of the force at my disposal; and, indeed,
the high stage of water in the Cumberland River afforded security at
that time against such invasions, even if the rebel force had not left
that region of country to concentrate for the struggle on the south side
of the Tennessee. For these reasons, except the column which was
operating against Cumberlaud Gap, not more than about 4,000 troops,
mostly infantry, were left behind, and these were scattered over the
principal part of the State, in ore as a police force and to guard railroads
than to prevent iuvasioii.
	The probable result of our operations against Corinth developed to
my mind the advantage the enemy could derive from the employment
of a large cavalry force in Middle Tennessee and Kentucky, and on the
12th of May I advised the Secretary of War of the necessity of having
at least five more cavalry regiments in those two States. I wa.s an-
swered that there was not at the time any cavalry to spare for that
service, but that an additional force was to be raised, and that a part
of it would be sent to me. None came, though authority was given to
the officer commanding in Kentucky to raise some cavalry regiments.
These, however, were in no condition to render much service at the
time of Morgans first raid. Subsequent events have shown, what
might have been evident enough without the experiment, that to pre-
vent such incursions and carry on the operations in front which the
progress of our arms had rendered necessary was physically impossi

Page 35

CRAP. XXVIII.]	GENERAL REPORTS.	35


ble with the force that was available. I had a front extending from
Corinth to Cumberland Gap, through a hostile population, a distance
of 300 miles; in fact it extended to Piketon, in the northeast corner of
Kentucky, 100 miles farther, with lines of communication varying from
200 to 300 miles in depth. To press successfully against the rebel ar-
mies along the line of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad it had
been necessary to denude the lines and the whole country in my rear
almost entirely of troops. The front from Battle Creek to Cumberland
Gap it was not possible to occupy at all. Is it astonishing that 1,000
cavalry, faniiliar with every path, should be able to penetrate this vast
extent of country and escape without capture ~
	Morgan had not yet disappeared from Kentucky, after his first in-
road, when Forrest, with a large force, suddenly appeared at Murfrees-
borough on the 13th of July, surprised and captured the garrison, con-
	1,400 mencavalry artillery and infantryforming
sistino of some
~part of the force which was about to march from that place and Thlla-
homa to occupy MeMiunville, and did serious damage to the railroad.
Two other regiments which had been designed as a permanent garrison
for Murfreesborough had been detached and seut into Kentucky on the
occasion of Morgans incursion. The consequence of this disaster was
serious. The use of the railroad from Nashville, which had been com-
pleted the very day before and which I was depending on to throw
supplies into Stevenson for a forward movenient, was set back two
weeks the force of Forrest threatened Nashville itself and the whole
line of railroad through Tennessee, and the occupation of McMinn-
yule was delayed two weeks. It became necessary to move north-
ward some of the troops in North Alabama to drive out the rebel force
and guard against further embarrassment. Nelsons division was or-
dered by rapid marches to Murfreesborough, one brigade going by rail-
road through Nashville; two brigades of Woods division were ordered
from Decatur to Shelbyville by forced marches and subsequently to
Decherd, to give greater security to Elk River Bridge and guard the
important route from the mountains into North Alabama through Win-
chester. A little later the remaining brigade of Woods division was
ordered to Stevenson to erect defensive works for the depot which was
to be established at that point for the movement against Chattanooga.
The excitement caused by Morgans raid into Kentucky had been so
great and the call for troops so urgent that I apprehended I should be
compelled to send a division there; but to do that was to put an ad-
vance into East Tennessee out of the question, and I determined to
trust Kentucky to the few troops already there rather than abandon
the object for which I had started.
	The movement of General Nelson toward Nashville was delayed some-
what by injury to the Duck River Bridge by high water. He arrived
at Murfreesborough on the 18th. The enemy left as he advanced,
threw himself on the road between that place and Nashville, and cap-
tured a guard of about 80 men and destroyed two more bridges. The
efforts of General Nelson to intercept him were unsuccessful. After
throwing up some lield works for a small force at Murfreesborough to
protect the depot which it was necessary to establish there, General
Nelson started on the 2d of August with two brigades and arrived at
MeMiunville on the 3d of August. One brigade remained at Murfrees-
borough, but on the arrival of the force which had been designated to
occupy the place that brigade joined him at McMinnville.
	The railroad from Nashville to Stevenson was completed on the 28th
of July, that from Nashville to Decatur on the 31st, and preparation

Page 36

36	KY., M. A~D E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAP. XXVTT1.

commenced for an advance. Supplies were pushed forward to the depot
at Stevenson, the pontoon bridge was gotten ready to be laid, the wagon
trains which had been in use on the Decatur road were thrown across
to Decherd, from which point they could be moved rapidly to Steven-
son, and the troops, including General Thomas division, which arrived
at Athens and Huntsville about the 31st of July. were moved so as to
be in convenient positions for the same object. In the mean time the
enemy continued his operations with large bodies of cavalry against
our long lines of communication through Tennessee and Kentucky,
seconded in Tennessee by the organization of guerrilla bands, which
swarmed in every part of the country. These latter were frequently
encountered and defeated by detachments of our small cavalry force;
but the former, moving in superior force and striking at vulnerable
points, were generally successful, and finally on the 10th of August
severed effectually our communications between Nashville and Louis-
ville. In addition to the destruction of our lines of communication
the effect of these operations and of the formidable preparations which
were reported and believed to be in progress for the invasion of Middle
Tennessee and the capture of Nashville was to intimidate our friends
and emboldeu our enemies among the people, who not only woild not
bring in supplies voluntarily, but used every means to prevent us from
finding them, so that nothing could be obtained from the country. ex-
cept by means of our own trains under the protection of strong escorts.
On the 6th of August I gave orders for fortifying Nashville, to make it
secure with a small garrison against any attack from cavalry.
On the 10th of August Morgan again made his appearance at Galla
 tin, surprised and captured the garrisou, amounting to 150 infantry;
then moved toward Nashville, destroying several bridges aud captur-
ing the guards; then toward Bowling Green, destroying the tunnel 7
miles north of Gallatin and several trestle-works and small bridges in
that region. He was, however, handsomely repulsed in some instances
by the small force opposed to him in these attacks. Simultaneously
with this Forrest, with a large force, moved toward the Cumberland
River, to be in a position to support Morgan or threaten Nashville if it
should diminish its garrison, which consisted of about 2,000 men. Im-
mediately after the occurrence of the first raid I determined to with-
draw my cavalry as much as possible from its service in detachmeuts
against the bands of guerrillas which infested the r6ads and concen-
trate it in large bodies. By supporting them with infantry, eqnipped
to move lightly, I hoped to be able to drive the enemys heavy cavalry
force from the lines. One of these commands I designed should operate
from Murfreesborough and another from MeMinuville. An experienced
cavalry officer was assigned to the command of the former, with geii-
eral instructions which allowed him a good deal of discretion. The
zeal of this officer caused him to move in pursuit of the enemy with
about 700 men before the whole of his command had joined. On hear-
ing of this, and knowing that he was outnumbered by the enemy, I dis-
patched instructions for re-enforcing him with infantry from MeMiun-
ville if he could be reached and to restrain him until he had sufficient
strength. The instructions did not, however, reach him, nor could his
whereabouts be ascertained so as to re-enforce him. Hearing that
Morgan had again appeared in the neighborhood of Gallatin he crossed
the river at Hartsville in pursuit, engaged Morgan~s force not far from
that place about the middle of August, was defeated, and himself and
some 150 of his men taken prisoners. The remainder made their escape

Page 37

CHAP. XXVIII.]	GENERAL REPORTS.	37

in stragglers and small bodies, to Nashville. The strength of Morgans
band at this time was estimated at from 1,500 to 3,000.
	Work was immediately commenced to repair again the road north of
Nashville, but the continued presence of Morgans force in that quarter
made it impossible to carry it beyond Gallatin, except by withdrawing
from the front so large a force as to preclude the idea of an advance,
and I therefore determined to defer it until it could be protected by a
force which I hoped might come from Louisville of the new troops that
were being called out. On the 16th of August I ordered Major-General
Nelson to Kentucky to command, and sent with him three generals and
some othei* officers of experience and two batteries of artillery. The
position required an officer of his rank, and I had great confidence in
his energy and ability.
	While the enemy was producing this serious embarrassment by the
operations of his large cavalry force, regular and irregular, on our long
lines of communication, he was collecting a large army at various points
in Tennessee from Chattanooga eastward. For a considerable time the
main point of concentration was doubtful and the railroad facilities which
the enemy possessed enabled him to concentrate speedily at any j$oint.
General Bragg arrived in person at Chattanooga on the 28th of July,
by which time his whole force was within easy reach of that point, and
from that time reports were current of his intention to assume the
offensive. Sometimes they were quite positive that he was already
crossing the river at Chattanooga, Kingston, and other points.
	The lowest estimate that could, be made of the force with which the
enemy was prepared to advance, according to the best sources of infor-
mation, was 60,000 men. That has, I think, been more than confirmed
by the evidence before the Commission. Eye-witnesses estimated the
force as high as 100,000. My d.ispatch of the 7th of August to the Gen-
eral-in-Chief, Major-General Halleck, gave information on this subject
somewhat in detail and not in a discouraging tone; for I was continu-
ing my preparation to advance, and was, in my own mind, disposed to
make perhaps more than due allowance for exaggeration in the information
that reached me. I was the more confident when, on the 10th of August,
General Halleck authorized me to call on Geneial Grant for two divis-
ions if I should find it absolutely necessary. On the 12th 1 requested
General Grant to send the divisions, intending to use one of them to
protect my con~mnnications with Louisville and bring the other to the
front: but their movements were at first involved in some uncertainty.
At a later period I could get no information of them at all, and feared
that General Grant had not been able to spare them, as he was himself
threatened. One of them reached Murfreesborough on the 1st and the
other Nashville about the 12th of September.
	Very soon the information of the enemys intention took snch shape as
to leave no doubt that he was about to invade Middle Tennessee with a
superior force, and to make it proper to suspend the accumulation of sup-
plies at Stevenson and establish a depot at IDecherd, as being most suit-
able for that disposition of my troops which the designs of the enemy,
as far as they could be divined, rendered proper to oppose him. The
information pointed to Nashville as his principal aim, and justified the
conclusion that at least he believed he had force enough to accomplish
his object. It was ascertained that the number of my troops was quite
accurately known to him. The route which he would take was altogether
a matter of conjecture, to be founded on probabilities. McMin~ville
was mentioned very often, in the information which reached me, as the
first point of attack, and they were so frequent that I deemed it prope

Page 38

38	ic~r., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAP. XXVItt

to strengthen the force in that quarter; but the difficulty of crossing
the mountain weakened the probability of an advance in that direction,
while an advance into North Alabama was not only spoken of in coii-
nection with the enemys plans, but offered many advantages. By
crossing Waldens Ridge into the Sequatchie Valley he had a good,
level road down that valley to Battle Creek, which was an indefensible
position for us while he occupied the opposite side of the Tennessee
River with his artillery. This would keep him in constant communica-
tion with his supplies at Chattanooga by means of the railroad on the
opposite bank and the steamers which he had; his large cavalry force
operating against Nashville and on my lines of communication would
compel me to employ at least 20,000 men to protect them even that far,
leaving about 25,000 men to oppose his advance in front. If the column
from Kingston should advance on Nashville I should be compelled to
fall back inthe face of even an inferior force for the protection of that
place; and thus both Alabama and the principal part of Middle Ten-
nessee could be reclaimed by the enemy without necessarily risking a
battle. It is not too much to say that 50,000 men thus employed on
this theater of operations, with the superior cavalry force which the
enemy had, would be an overmatch for 60,000 operating upon lines of
such depth in the midst of an unfriendly population.
	Sucli were the inducements which an advance upon Battle Creek
offered to the enemy, even supposing that I was entirely on the north side
of the Cumberland ridge, say at Decherd; but in fact he was well
aware that I still occupied North Alabama, with some 12,000 men at
Battle Creek, while the rest of my force extended as far north and east
as MeMiunville. If he could reach Battle Creek before the force at that
place should extricate itself by moving to the east it would have to go
around by the way of Huntsville, and thus make a march of 120 miles
to reach Decherd, the nearest point at which it could possibly form a
junction with the forces north of the mountain, while he, by a march of
25 miles from Jasper, could reach the same point, and thus throw his
whole force between my scattered troops. The position at Battle
Creek is, for a force whose communications are on the north side of the
mountain, one of the worst that can be imagiued against an enemy
coming from the Sequatchie Valley and holding the opposite bank of
the Tennessee River. A spur of the Cumberland ridge comes to within
200 yards of the river; Battle Creek runs at the foot ~f this spur on
the east side, emptying into the river near the point; the only position
for troops is west of the spur; the road to IDecherd, a distance of 25
miles, passes around the point of this spur and along its side up Battle
Creek in full view from the opposite side of the river and the creek;
and there is no other road to the north side of the mountain practicable
for loaded wagons short of Huntsville, distant 75 miles.
	For the double purpose of guarding against an attack in this faulty
position and of observing the movements and checking the advance of
the enemy in the Sequatchie Valley I issued the instructions of the 19th
of August to Major-General McCook, my pnrpose then being to attack
the enemy in the Sequatchie Valley if possible or to give him battle at
the first point on his route where I could concentrate my troops. Those
orders required General MeCook, upon the first intelligence of an ad-
vance of the enemy toward the Sequatchie Valley, to move -promptly
up the valley to the Anderson and Therman road with the two bri
-	gades. of his division which were with him, to check the progress of the
enemy and observe his movements. If pressed, he was to fall back on
the Therman road deliberately until he should form a junction wit

Page 39

CHAP. IXYUI.]	GENERAL REPORTS.	39


the main force coming from the side of McMinnville. The other divis-
ion which was with him at Battle Creek, General Crittendens, was also
to move up the valley to the Tracy City and Altamont road. which en-
ters the valley 10 miles below the Therman road. He was to support
General McCook in the valley, watching the old Nashville and Chatta-
nooga stage road, which enters it from the Tennessee IRiverat the point
designated, and under like circumstances he was to fall back for a
similar purpose on t~he Higginbottom road toward Tracy City and Alta-
mont, where the junction would be formed.
	On the 20th 1 learned that the enemy was certainly crossing at Chat-
tanooga and other points, and I immediately directed General McCook
to execute the orders already described. On the same day 1 left Hunts-
ville, visited the posts at Stevenson and Battle Creek, and the follow-
ing day went to Decherd to direct the movements for tho proposed
junction. I deemed it of the highest importance, for political as well
as military reasons, to maintain my position in North Alabama, if pos-
sible, in connection with those movements, for which the instructions
of the 19th of August, given to General -IRoussean, the officer in com-
mand in North Alabama, in anticipation of my advance upon Cl~atta-
nooga, were equally applicable; but I reduced the force in that quarter
somewhat, leaving a regiment in fortifications at Battle Creek, one at
Stevenson, and two at Huntsville, besides the road guards and the
force on the Nashville and Decatur line. The orders for the concen-
tration at Altamont (see the instructions of the 23d of August to Gen-
eral Thomas) had reference to the plan of operations above referred to
for opposing the movements of the enemy, except that the information
rendered it apparently certain that the enemy would advance on the
Therman road, and that Altamont was the point farthest to the front
at which he could be met. On the first supposition I had expected to
intercept him in the Sequatchie Valley.
	In moving up the valley on the 20th General McCook received infor-
mation from his spies and sconts which made him believe that the
enemy wonld be in the Sequatchie Valley, and therefore in a position
to intercept him before he could march to the Therman road, and he
therefore returned down the valley to the Higginbottom road. That
road was found to be impractible for his artillery, and he moved still
nearer to Battle Creek, and put himself on the road which follows up
Battle Creek apd then crosses the mountain. I there sent him orders
on the 23d to move to Pelham for the purpose of effecting the concen-
tration at Altamont. The difficulties of the route prevented the con-
centration at the time appointed, and in the mean time information in
regard to the movements of the enemy made it a matter of very great
doubt whether it could be effected at that point at all before the enemy
would anticipate it. The only alternative seemed to be to concentrate
there or at Murfreesborough. I determined to attempt the former, and
gave the orders accordingly. Those orders anticipated that, from the
greater difficulties General McCook had to overcome, the troops mov-
ing from McMinnville under Major-General Thomas would reach Alta-
mont first. The latter was instructed to attack the enemys advance,
if it should have reached there, and hold his position, if possible, until
the other troops came up; and in the event of being unable to do that the
various cGlumns were instructed as to the roads by which they should
fall back to form a junction in rear. General Thomas marched to Alta-
mont with a portion of his force at the time appointed. He found no
enemy, and believing that he could not remain there for want of water,
returned immediately to MclVjlinnville. On his report and in cons

Page 40

40	KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. V.~. [CRAP. XXVIII.

quence of his action I stopped the movement of all except General
MeCooks division, which remained at Altamont iii observation until
the final concentration at Murfreesborough.
	The information which I received still pointed clearly to the Therman
road as the one by which the enemy would advance, if at all. It is the
best road across the mountain, and has the advantage of branching at
Altamont into no less than four roads, which descend the mountain to
an arc 40 miles long, from McMinnville on one flank to iDecherd on the
other. Still the movements of the enemy were less rapid than was ex-
pected, and placed him in a position to use that road or those farther
east. Many officers doubted that he meant to cross out of the Sequat-
chie Valley at all, but snpposed that his movements were only intended
as demonstrations to cover the advance of his columns into Kentucky
from Knoxville.
	In the mean time o~r supplies were diminishing rapidly, with no pros.
pect of renewal until a sufficient force was detached to restore our
broken communications. This pressing necessity left no time either to
advance or to await the arrival of an enemy who could choose his time
and route, with the certainty that the necessity of subsistence would
very soon compel me to fall back, in whole or in part, whether there
was an enemy in front or not, as long as his cavalry continued its ope-
rations in rear. The news from Kentucky was unsatisfactory. The
rebel force under Kirby Smith was coming into the State, there was
nothing but new levies to oppose him, and it was not known what num-
ber of them had been collected. So far from being able to open the
communication between Nashville and Louisville and from Cumberland
Gap to Lexington, it was not improbable that those places themselves
might soon be seized by the rebel forces. Under these circumstances
I determined to concentrate my army at Murfreesborough and set to
work to open the railroad north of Nashville. That object had already
been delayed too long upon the hope of having it done by a force
from Louisville. Orders were accordingly given on the 30th of August
to the various commands and guards, distributed over an area of about
150 by 100 miles of territory and some 300 miles of railroad, so as to
concentrate on the 5th of September. The routes and marches were
prescribed, and the movement was executed simultaneously and with
perfect precision. With the exception of the force on the Decatur road,
which was ordered to Nashville, the whole army, coming from various
quarters and different distances on four roads, concentrated at Mur-
freesborough on the 5th of September, bringing with it whatever sup-
plies could be collected from the country. A small remnant of provis-
ions, for which there was insufficient transportation, was destroyed at
Huntsville, and with that exception not a pound of supplies was lost
by the movement. After it was ordered I learned that a considerable
quantity of cotton, belonging to persons who had purchased it in the
country, was at Athens, awaitingtransportation. In orderto give them
an opportunity to remove it I delayed the evacuation of that place
perhaps a day or so.
	On the 1st of September 1 learned that a large rebel force, under
General Kirby Smith, had actnally appeared in Central Kentucky,
having defeated and routed the force under Genera] Nelson at Rich-
mond. This effectually cut off the division at Cumberland Gap from
its base. I was anxious to rescue that force, and the shortest route by
which it could be done was to direct a column from McMinnville. by
the way of Somerset, upon the rear of Kirby Smiths army. I supposed
that that might be done and still keep a front about McMinnville to

Page 41

CHAP. XXVIII.]	GENERAL REPORTS.	41


ward the army of General Bragg in the Sequatchie Valley, while the
 two divisions, one of which had arrived that day from Corinth, should
open the communications between Nashville and Louisville. The forces
at McMinnville and in that vicinity had not yet withdrawn from their
position, and I accordingly suspended. their movement, leaving its exe-
cution, however, to General Thomas, who was at McMinnville, and had
the best opportunity to know any movements of the enemy in the
Sequatchie Yalley that would affect it. He answered, stating the ad-
vantages of a concentration at Mnrfreesborough, and advising me that
lie would march the following day, and so the concentration was exe-
cuted as originally ordered.
	I proceed now to notice certain theories and opinions that have been
advanced concerning a plan of operations to oppose the movement of
the rebel army across the mountain. As evidence they are of no more
value than though they had been expressed in idle discnssion around a
camp-fire, and are only entitled to credit according as they are correct
in their premises and rational in their conclusions. They were new to
me until this investigation had made some progress, and it appe~rs that
one of them in particular was promulgated after the arrival of my army
in Louisville, where it was used as a text for criticism by officers who
have not appeared as friendly witnesses before this Commission.
	Neither my own feelings nor any fact that I am aware of would jus-
tify me in assuming that General Thomas has entertained any other than
the most friendly disposition toward me~ but I was surprised at the
opinion expressed by him before the Commission that Braggs army
might have been attacked at Sparta, and more astonished at the state-
ment that lie had urged upon me to concentrate at that place. My in-
quiries elicited the information that this proposition was communicated
to me by telegraph on the 28th of August. At my request the dispatch
was subsequently presented. It proved to have been written on the
22d instead of the 28th. It will be better understood after a brief re-
view of the circumstances that gave rise to it.
	General Thomas took command at McMinnville on the 19th of August.
About that time I received very positive intelligence that the rebel forces
were crossing the Tennessee River at three l)oints at leastabout 10,000
at Kingston, at least 10,000 at Harrison, and a force variously estimated
at from 40,000 to 60,000 at Chattanooga. I telegraphed General Thomas
and other officers on the 19th and 20th in regard to this information,
and prepared them for the further movements the enemy might be ex-
pected to make. I told him to look to Sparta and Smithville, anticipat-
ing that the column from Kingston might advance on that route against
MeMinuville while we were threatened by a larger force elsewhere, or
else toward Nashville to threaten our communications. This column he
evidently kept in his mind, and it seemed to me that it was the only one
he seriously regarded. The Chattanooga force proper, as he called it,
he appeared either to doubt the existence of, or at least its purpose to
cross the mountain. On the contrary I had reasons, which he probably
did not know, to believe that it would advance by the Therman road.
I therefore telegraphed General Thomas on the 22d of August as fol-
lows:
	From MeCooks information this morning it seems almost certain that Bragg is
marching on McMinnville. His advance was at the top of Waldens Ridge last night.
McCown is said to he crossing at Kingston and Withers at Harrison. Of course they
will expect to unite. What sort of ground can we take hy concentrating at McMinn-
yule? How would it do at Altamont? Is the ground such as to give us the advantage
of our artillery? How many days rations have you? Are you provided with ammu-
nition? Be ready to march in the morning. Answer immediately

Page 42

42	mr., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [OTTAP. xxvrit

	And again as follows:

	Of course you will instantly recall your absent troops. I will probably bring the
Second Kentucky by rail to march from here. We will advance to attack in the
Sequatchie Valley. I can hardly think the enemy will attempt the march across to
McMinnvilLeat least not immediately. It appears to me that he will rather endea-
vor to get into North Alabama, and perhaps strike across to Decherd. If we advance
to Altamont we may thwart him in both and preserve our communications with
Decherd and Nashville. If we concentrate at McMiunville we lose North Alabama
and Decherd. What think you 0? The great difficulty is in moving in the mountains
with our trains. Of course we must cut loose from everything but our ammunition
trains and subsistence for about six days, most of it in haversacks.

	His answer to the first is the dispatch dated the 22d, at MeMiunville,
referred to in his testimony, and is in these words:

	By all means concentrate here. The enemy cannot reach Nashville by any other
route across the mountains unless by Spar~ta. At Altamont I am positively informed
the enemy would have an equal advantage with ourselves. Here we will have a most
decided advantage; and by being here, should he march by Sparta, we can meet him
either there or at Allens Ford, across Caney Fork. He is obliged to pass this place or
Sparta to reach Nashville. I have six days rations and plenty of ammunition. Did
you get my dispatch of to-day 0? I cannot think that Bragg is coming here either by
the Hill or Therman road. My reconnoitering party went into Dunlap yesterday.

	His answer, of the same date, to the second is as follows:

	We can get neither forage nor water at Altamont. It will be as difficult for us to
march across the mountains as the eneifiy to come either to Altamont or this place. I
would not advise concentrating here except for battle or for an advance into East
Tennessee. I think our communications with Nashville will, be better preserved by
holding Decherd with a division, to enable us to concentrate either there, if threat-
ened, or at this place. I have also information that Tupelo has been abandoned, and
the most of the enemy at that place have been sent to Chattanooga. I therefore do
not apprehend an attempt to regain North Alabama.

	Upon further information that the enemy was advancing rapidly on
the Therman road I answered him on the 23d as follows:

	There is no possibility of our concentrating at McM inuville. We must concentrate
in advance and assume the offensive or fall back at last to Mnrfreesborough. I deem
the former the wisest, and we will act accordingly. I wish you therefore to move by
a forced march to Altamont, there to form a junction with McCook, Crittenden, and
Schoepf. McCook and ~rittenden started for Tracy City from Jasper yesterday. I
presume they are now at Tracy City, though possibly not. Schoepf will march at
once. The junction must be formed to-morrow, and any division meeting the head of
the enemys column first must at least hold it in check until a larger force arrives.
	One battery to a division will, I think, be ample in the mountains. McCook and
Crittenden have with them six batteries. Leave all of yours, therefore; at least dont
take more than two. It will be necessary to leave some force with them, at least
two regiments, and they should be covered with breastworks to-nisrht without fail.
	I shall order Schoepfs batteries here to be similarly disposed of. There must
be no delay or failure. The enemys advance was at the top of Waldens Ridge, 10
miles from Chattanooga, night before last, and talked of being at McMinnville to-
morrow. That is hardly possible, but they must be met at the earliest possible mo-
ment. Communicate with McCook to-night by a trusty scout. The distance is 32
miles. He may possibly not be at Tracy City. If not, look for him on the road to
Battle Creek. If youthink best you may send your artillery to this place, which will
release the force that would be required to protect them there; though if they will be
safe there is some advantage in having a force at McMinnville. Take no wagons ex-
cept what will be necessary to carry rations and cooking utensils. I shall probably
leave here with Sills brigade to-morrow for Tracy City to join you. Communicate
always in cipher by telegraph to this place and by courier through Tracy City.
Schoepf sends a report that Hardee is advancing on the Dunlap road. Answer, so
that I may know exactly what you do. Your staff officers make mistakes in the use
of the cipher.

	I apprehend that further comment on this subject is unnecessary.
The dispatch in question was in answer to wy own inquiry, and had
reference to the relative merits of McMinnville and Altamont as battl

Page 43

CHAP. XXVIIX.J	Of~NERAL REPORTS.	43


grounds. It is certain that General Thomas has not consciously laid
claim to an idea which did not possess him; but I apprehend that de-
veloped facts have been so mingled in his mind with impressions coinci-
dent in some particulars, though essentially different in the material
points, that his memory has failed to draw the exact distinction between
them. It is, however, due to him to say that the idea may have been
in his mind that Bragg might cross the mountain to Sparta, and that
he did not distinctly express it to me, imagining that I also entertained
it myself.
	But I do not propose to draw any advantage from the question
whether or not a proposition was made to me to concentrate at Sparta.
If it had been made, I should have judged it according to its merits
with the lights before me at the time, and I do not doubt that I should
have rejected it on grounds which I will state.
	Besides the road which crosses from Jasper to Decherd and the one
which ascends the valley and thence goes to Crossville there are no
less than three roads by which the enemy could ascend the mountain
to debouch from the Sequatchie Valley: First, the Therman road, which
passes through or near Altamont, and then branches into at lehst four
roads that descend the mountain into the plains of Middle Tennessee
between Decherd and McMinnville, a distance of about 40 miles; second,
a road which ascends the mountain at Dunlap and passes to McMinn-
ville; third, a road which ascends the mountain a short distance below
Pikeville and branches on the mountain, the left-hand branch going to
MeMinuville and the right hand forking again some 20 miles from Mc7
Minuville, one fork going to the latter place and the other to 8parta.
There is also a road on the top of the mountain connecting all these
roads. These geographical features would enable the enemy to arrive
within 20 miles of McMinnville by not less than two roads before
determining whether he would move on that point or Sparta, and by
covering his movements with his superior cavalry force he could easily
arrive within 6 or 8 miles of either of those points before his destina-
tion could be known at all, and it is 22 miles at least from McMinnville
to Sparta. If I had been at Sparta he could have been at McMinn-
ville and in possession of my line of supplies before I could have known
it.	If I awaited at McMinnville the development of his plan he could
have gone to Sparta and pursued his course as he did. If lihad divided
my force between McMinnville and Sparta, to anticipate him at both
points, he could have advanced with reasonable probability of success
against either of them; and if the fractions should have been so strongly
fortified as not to warrant an attack, he could have avoided them, thrown
himself between the two, and thus have forced them to retreat sepa-
rately, or attempt the offensive against a concentrated force. General
Thomas own experience at McMinnville in obtaining information on
which success would have depended confirms my answer to one phase
of this proposition and is applicable to all of them.
	On the 31st he reports:
	The general impression is Ihat the enemy is advancing, biit I have yet to see the
person who has seen any of the Chattanooga forces proper.
	And on the 2d of September, in reply to the discretional instruc-
tions heretofore alluded to, he says:
	I will start to-morrow. I have heard again that the enemy intends advancing on
this place by the Therman, Dunlap, and Sparta roads. By concentrating at Mur-
freesborough we shall be within striking distance of this place. By convenient
roads our main force can be thrown upon the enemy between this and Decherd or Hills-
borough, overcome him, and drive him toward Sparta, his longest line of retreat. 

Page 44

44	KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. (CHAP. XXVflT.

large force of cavalry and light infantry can be pushed across the mountains by the
Dunlap and Therman roads, attack him in rear, and completely rout his whole force.
I have studied the roads, and am now convinced that this is our best plan of attack.

	it was afterward ascertained that the rebel forces under General
Bragg actually commenced to arrive at Sparta the day after the date
of this dispatch.
	The reasons which made the concentration at Murfreesborough neces-
sary and proper may now be briefly summed up:
	It had been supposed that for the lack of supplies on the route the
enemy would make his march across the mountains rapidly. Several
days had already elapsed since, from the best information that could
be obtained of his movements, it was supposed he would have arrived
within striking distance, and he was still not nearer than the Sequat-
chic Valley.
	My supplies had been cut off for twenty days, and the expectation
that the force in Kentucky would reopen the railroad, on which they
were dependent, was frustrated by the invasion of the State by Kirby
Smith, which, as the result proved, gave more than ample occupation
to the raw troops that were there. I did not even know what force of
that kind could be expected, for its organization had only very recently
been commenced and the State had recently been organized into a
separate department not under my command. I was already reduced
to about ten days supplya little more than that of breadstuff and
some minor articles and a good deal less of meat and other articles
scarcely less essential. The quantity was increased at Nashville a little
by the collection of flour and meat in the country. General Thomas
reported on the 28th from McMinnville that no provisions could be pro-
cured in that region, and that for forage he could get fodder, but no
corn; and his statement in regard to the scarcity in the country is con-
firmed by testimony before the Commission. Such straits did not admit
of any further delay to await an enemy who could choose his own time
for the meeting and who had already been eight days behind the time
at which I had reason to expect him. An immediate concentration at
a point nearer the source of supply, from which I was separated 260
miles, was clearly necessary. It promised the only means of opening
the railroad ~nd still holding Nashville, the possession of which was
believed to be the enemys first object.
	But the concentration at Murfreesborough was expedient on other
grounds. I could not have concentrated at any point as far in advance
as McMinnville more than about 31,000 men, and that force was not
sufficient to attack Braggs army united at any point. If I could have
taken any position in which I could force or induce him to attack with-
out delay it would have been well, but such was not the case. In this
uncertainty as to the time he might delay and as to the route on which
he would strike in force, while perhaps threatening by other routes,
screened as he was by a rauge of mountains, with our communica-
tions with Louisville completely severed, and our supplies already re-
duced to a narrow margin, perhaps to be entirely exhausted when the
advance of the enemy would make rapid operations necessary, it was
plainly necessary to concentrate at some point nearer our base, by
which means my effective force would be increased so as to be sufficient
to meet the enemy whenever he should come and still have enough to
open our communications.
	The plan of operations presented in the evidence of another witness
of rank before the Commission was to concentratd the army at Mur-
freesborough as soon as the rebel army commenced its advance fro

Page 45

CHAr. XXVIII.]
45
GENERAL REPORTS.

Chattanooga. This, except as to the time of the concentration, is the
plan that was actually executed. The earlier execution of it would not
have affected the result, but the distribution of my small cavalry force
to guard the various passes across the mountains, from 40 to 60 miles
distantwhich was one feature of the plancould only have resulted
in the capture or dispersion of the whole of them whenever the enemy
chose to effect it. As for the idea of first concentrating at Murfrees-
borough and then advancing to attack the enemy at Sparta, it must
suppose that the enemy would wait seven or eight days at that place to
be attacked, which he did not do. I do not, therefore, see any advan-
tage in this variation of the plan that was adopted; and if it had been
submitted to my judgment 1 should have rejected it.
	Two witnesses of high rank, in answer to a question as to points north
of the Camberland River at which Braggs army could have been at-
tacked with a prospect of success, expressed the opinion that it might
have been done at Glasgow. This opinion was undoubtedly expressed
without reflection, unless it referred to the advantage which the locality
of Glasgow would have afforded for the attacking army in~ case of a
collision there, and not to the possibility of intercepting Braggs army
at that point; for the testimony of these two witnesses shows and the
map shows that until Braggs army crossed the Cumberland River and
took up its march northward it was impossible to know from its move-
ments whether its plan was to go into Kentucky or turn to the west
against Nashville; that it is 50 miles from the Cumberland River
where Bragg crossed it to Glasgow, while it is 95 miles from Nashville,
where my army was, to Glasgow; and from these facts the witnesses
admit that it was not possible to have intercepted Braggs army at that
point unless he had tarried there. In point of fact the evidence shows
that on the 7th of September I learned that a portion of Braggs army
had crossed the Cumberland River at Carthage and was moving north-
ward, probably toward Bowling Green, where I had caused some sup-
plies to be accumulated by the way of Green River, and that I mm me-
diately ordered a portion of my army to march for that point; that
on the 10th I learned, what was before unknown, if not improbable,
that another portion had crossed at Gainesborough, and had probably
marched in the same direction, and that I ordered other divisions,
making six, for the same point, accompanying them myself; that this
movement was made rapidly, the last of the six divisions arriving at
Bowling Green Monday morning, the 15th, which was the time at which
the rear of Braggs army passed Glasgow. Thus, after gaining intelli-
gence of his passage over the Cumberland River, I moved my army 65
miles while he was moving 50, with the advantage of two roads, and I
was still 30 miles in rear of him.
	The same process of demonstration will show that even if I had known
he was going by Munfordville, and if there had been nothing to delay
me an hour at Bowling Green, I could not have intercepted him at Mun-
fordville, because I had 105 miles to march, while he had but 68, the
distance from Glasgow to Munfordville being 18 miles. In fact his
advance actually attacked the latter place the day before my sixth
division reached Bowling Green. But, furthermore, it was not yet to
be assumed that his destination was Central Kentucky; on the con-
trary, Glasgow was an important position for him. It effectually com-
muanded my line of communication with my base of supplies, while he
had two lines openone with the East Tennessee Railroad, which was
his permanent base, and also with the valley of the Cumberland, an

Page 46

46	KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAP. XXVIII.

the other with Central Kentucky, where the occupation of Kirby Smith
had established for him a second base.
	Munfordville did not offer the same advantages, for, although a much
stronger natural position, yet in taking it he gave up his communica-
tions with Tennessee, and rendered those with Kirby Smith less secure
against a force operating from the Ohio River, supposing Louisville to
be secure to us. At Munfordville his communication with Kirby Smith
must have been along the Louisville turnpike and tuence across to
Bardstown, while at Glasgow it would be along the old Lexington road
through Summersville and Lebanon, or through Columbia and Lebanon
or Liberty, by all of which roads I have moved large bodies of troops.
Besides, at Munfordville he would have been in a much less productive
region than at Glasgow. These considerations, taken in connection with
the risk he would run by advancing farther into Kentucky, made it at
least reasonably doubtful whether he would not halt at Glasgow. The
fact that his purpose was to penetrate still farther into Kentucky and
that he had designs on Louisville was only known when it was ascer-
tained that he had left Glasgow and through correspondence which
was captured subsequent to that time. But supposing it had been
reasonably certain that Bardstown was his destination, it was not to be
assumed that he would go by the way of Munfordville; on the con-
trary, it is undoubtedly true that but for the bait which was offered to
him in the garrison at that place he would not have gone there at all,
for the simple reason that without any object whatever it would have
taken him off the direct and excellent turnpike from Glasgow to Bards-
town and thrown him ou another road not so good and 12 miles longer.
This brings me naturally to the question of the relief of Munfordville.
	The foregoing explanations show that I could not have reached Mun.
fordville in advance of the rebel force even if it had been desirable to
leave it between me and Nashville. The first information received at
Bowling Green that Munfordville was attacked or threatened was on
the 14th, and the report was that it had been captured, though that
was not certain. On the same day the last of five of my divisions ar-
rived at Bowling Green, an~d on the same day, as was afterward as-
certained, the main body of the rebel army marched from Glasgow, 18
miles from Munfordville, with the advantage of two roads. If I had
moved forward at once I could not have reached Munfordville in less
than four days, for, c~nsidering that II must march on one road, it
would, for the rear of my column, have been equivalent in time to a
march of 60 miles; and in the presence of an enemy whose position was
not known the march could not well have been made more rapidly.
As for re-enforcing the garrison by the first of my divisions which ar-
rived at Bowling Green, even if the necessity of it could have been
known it would have been out of the question, for those divisions
would have been thrown into the midst of the whole rebel force; a folly
which it appears the enemy actually anticipated, and prepared to reap
the fruit of.
	But I propose to inquire also what necessity there was for such re-
lief, and on what grounds it could reasonably have been expected that
I would furnish it. It is apparent from a study of the map, and the
evidence shows, that the possession of Munfordville was not essential
to Braggs army in a strategical point of view. At least three other
preferable routes were open to him, whether his object was to attack
Louisville directly or to advance into Central Ker~tucky for other pur-
poses: First, the shorter and better road from Glasgow to Bardstown
and thence on to Louisville; second, the old Lexington road to Le

Page 47

47
CHAP. XXVIII.]	GENERAL REPORTS.

anon; third, the road through Columbia, Liberty, and Danville. He
would not in any event take the road to the mouth of Salt River; be-
cause it threw him more away from the base of supplies which Kirby
Smiths presence had established in Central Kentucky, because it made
his jnnction with Kirby Smith more difficult and uncertain, and be-
cause it placed him-in the angle between the Ohio and Salt Rivers,
neither of which could he cross without ferrying or bridging. The
same facts made the possession of Munfordville a matter of no strate-
gical value to us. Its importance, therefore, ~as determined by the
value of the bridge, which alone it was intended to protect as a link in
the chain of communication between the troops farther south and
Louisville, their base of supplies. The bridge, if destroyed, could be
rebuilt in a weekwas actually rebuilt in about ten days; and as the
principal part of the force which drew supplies across the bridge was
coming north, its preservation was not of immediate importance. I
have been disposed to say, therefore, that the determination to hold
the bridge was an error of judgment; but I will not now assert that it
was so, seeing that doubt existed as to the probability of Braggs com-
ing that way and that the commander considered himself able to hold
his position against the force which at first threatened him. If it was
evident that Bragg would come against the place with his whole or any
considerable part of his army, then it is certain that to attempt to hold
it was an error, for no position could be less tenable for a small force
against a very large one. It must be apparent that the possession of
Munfordville was of no importance that would justify the jeopardizing
any considerable force to hold it, and the evidence shows that for two
days and a half after the first attack the way was open for the with -
drawal of the garrison. Its relief from the direction of Bowling Green
was therefore unnecessary, if it had been possible. Let us see now
how far the place was considered to be in jeopardy and on what
ground it was reasonable to expect relief from Bowling Green.
It appears that on Saturday, the 13th, the commanding officer learned
that a force, represented to be 7,000 strong, was advancing upon his
post from the direction of Glasgow; that he reported the fact to his
superiors at Louisville, saying:
	If I had one more good regiment and a few more pieces of artillery that force could
not take me. As it is I shall do my best to prevent it. Can you send me re-enforce-
ments to-night? I shall send train to Salt River for them.

To which he received in reply, I send you what you ask. The
same day he also reports, Some indications that the main rebel force
are going toward ~ and that his intrenchments would be fin-
ished that night. These reports were certainly not alarming, and did
not indicate that he expected or required assistance from Bowling Green,
however desirous he might be to see a force coming from that quarter.
On the same day he sent scouts to Bowling Green with verbal messages.
These scouts could not have carried word that he was in jeopardy and
required help from there, for his superiors had given him all he thought
necessary at that time and as yet no force had appeared in front of
him. I now remember that the scout Miller came to me, but so little
was there in his communications to me different from the information
I derived from unauthorized persons, that I had forgotten, nor do I
now remember, that he came as a messenger. He knew less about
the enemy and scarcely if any more about the garrison than others,
especially one who came from the vicinity of the fort the morning of
the attack and reported quite confidently that the garrison had surre

Page 48

48	KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAP. XXVIIL

dered. Those persons reported first to the commanding officer at Bow.
ling Green, and he had no better recollection of the special object and
importance of their mission than myself. Nor could it at any rate have
altered the case. I must of necessity have operated against the rebel
army which was already virtually between me and Munfordville.
There was no communication between me and the commander in Ken-
tucky, and, knowing th~tt the rebel army was between me and Munford.
yule, he had no reasonable assurance that I could succor that place. It
was not under my command, I really knew nothing of its condition, and
I could not suppose that it would be needlessly exposed to so large a
force.
	All the information I had led to the supposition that Braggs army
was probably yet at Glasgow, and on Tuesday afternoon, the 16th, I
marched with six divisions (one being still in the rear), in three columns,
to attack the enemy if he should be at that place. The facts shown
in evidence that the last of those six divisions had only arrived after a
march of 15 miles the day before, with very rapid and fatiguing ones
on previous days; that some time was necessarily requiVed to make
arrangements with reference to the garrison and trains that were to
remain; that supplies had to be distributed, and that the supply of
provisions was imperfect, making it necessary to collect breadstuffs
from the country to supply the troops, will amply justify this short de-
lay. The troops in three columns had to start upon the main turnpike
road from Bowling Green to Munfordville, but successively turned
upon roads which converge on Glasgow. The cavalry thrown in ad.
vance reported on Tuesday night that the enemy had left Glasgow, and
the following day my army marched to Cave City and Horse Well, within
10 miles of Munfordville. During that day I heard of the surrender of
Munfordville, and on the night of that day the commanding officer of
the post reported to me at Prewitts Knob with his troops on parole.
	The position at Munfordville is one of great natural strength for a
large force. I understand that it was the subject of dissatisfaction
that the rebel army was not attacked in that position; but I have never
heard that the feeling was concurred in by the officers of higher rank,
several of whom, distinguish~d before and since for gallant conduct,
have testified that such an attack would not have been judicious under
the circumstances. The advantage of position in favor of the enemy
must have made the result at least doubtful; and even a very serious
check, in the exhausted condition of our supplies, would. have been
disastrous. I could have avoided the enemy by passing to either side
of him, but I deemed it all-important to force him farther into the State,
instead of allowing him to fall back upon Bowling Green and Nashville,
and I matured a plan and determined to attack there rather than
allow him that course. I believed that the condition of his supplies
would compel him to abandon his position; and I was very well satis-
fied when that proved to be the case. He commenced to withdraw on
the night of the 20th, and my advance drove out his rear guard, after
some skirmishing, on the 21st. The march was continued, and skirmish-
ing was kept up with his rear guard until he turned off toward Bards-
town.
	Many considerations rendered it proper to direct my march on Louis-
ville instead of following his route. The want of supplies made it nec-
essary, many of the troops being out by the time they reached the
mouth of Salt River. This reason would have been insuperable if as
was not improbable, the enemy should concentrate his force and thro

Page 49

CHAP. XXVIII.]	GENERAL REPORTS.
49
himself rapidly between me and Louisville. The junction of Bragg and
Kirby Smith was not only possible but probable. It would have made
their combined force greatly superior to me in strength, and such a dis-
position would have placed him between two inferior forces, which, from
their positions, could not have acted in concert against him, and which,
therefore, were liable to be beaten in detail. One of these forces, that
occupying Louisville, was composed of perfectly raw, undisciplined, and
in a measure unarmed troops, with but very little artillery and very
few officers of rank or experience. It could not have withstood the
veteran rebel army two hours, and the consequence of its defeat and the
capture of Louisville would have been disastrous in the extreme. That
force, however, mixed judiciously with my old troops, could be made to
render good service, as the result proved.
	These considerations determined me to concentrate rapidly at Louis-
ville. The last diVision reached that point on the 29th of September.
On the same day the incorporation of the new troops with the old, and
other preparations which a long and fatiguing march of the old troops
and the inefficiency of the new rendered necessary, werecompleted, and
on the morning of the 30th the consolidated army was prepared to
march against the rebel forces which occupied the principal part of
Kentucky. The campaign which ensued, and which resulted in the ex-
pulsion of the enemy from the State, has been sketched in my official
report of the 4th of November, herewith appended.* As far as the
facts are concerned the investigations of this Commission have shown,
l)erhaps, that I did not make allowance enough for the diminut.ion of
my force by absentees and stragglers from the new regiments, and that
therefore I probably overestimated my own strength at and after the
battle of Perryville, if I did not also underestimate the combined
strength of the enemy. These investigations also give reason to be-
lieve that the aggregate loss of the enemy during the campaign was
greater than 1 represented, and they have developed additional in-
teresting incidents; but they point to no statement which I could now
desire to alter. I shall limit myself, therefore, to the elucidation of cer-
tain particulars in which the wisdom of my acts would seem to have
been called into question by the course of the investigation.
	The battle of Perryville, although but a partial and by no means as
fruitful a contest as I had expected, was not without important and
gratifying results. I shall notice very briefly the causes which pre-
vented it from being more so.
	When, on the 5th of October, Braggs awny proper retired from
Bardstown it was uncertain where it would unite with the force of
Kirby Smith, though Banville was the point where I most expected to
find them, and my corps were accordingly directed on Perryville and
llarrodsburg. When, on the night of the 6th, I ascertained that Kirby
Smith had crossed the Kentucky River at Salvisa, liarrodsburg or
Perryville became the most probable point of concentration, and the
destination of the corps which were marching on llarrodsburg had to
be changed to Perryville. Information during the 7th that the enemy
were turning toward flarrodsburg inclined me to suppose, though not
confidently, that Harrodsburg, and not Perryville, would be the point.
In the movement on that place the center corps, with which I was,
marched by a shorter and better road, and therefore arrived within
about 3 miles of Perryville on the evening of the 7th, while the other
* See battl,e of Perryvile, or Chaplin Hil1~.

4 U UVoL xv

Page 50

50	KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAP. XXVIII.

corps were expected to be still about 7 miles in rear, on their respective
roads to the right and left.
	Finding a sufficient force at Perryville on the evening of the 7th to
stop our progress without a general engagement of the corps it was
presumed that the enemy had determined to make his stand tliere, and
the following instructions were sent to General McCook:

OCTOBER 7~ p. m.
	GENERAL:	The Third Corps (Gilberts) is within 3j miles of Perryville, the cavalry
being nearer, probably within 2~ miles. From all the information gained to-day it
seems probable that the enemy will resist our advance into the town. They are said
to have a strong force in and near the place. There is no water here, and we will
get bnt little, if any, until we get it at Perryville. We expect to attack and carry
the place to-morrow. March at 3 oclock precisely to-morrow morning without fail,
and move up till the bead of your column gets to within about 3 or 3i- miles of Perry-
yule; that is to say, until you are abreast of the Third Corps. The left of this corps
rests near Bottoms place. Perhaps Captain Williams, Jacksons cavalry, will know
where it is. From the point of the road Gilbert is now on across direct to vonr road
is about 2j or 3 miles. When the head of your column gets to the vicinity designated
(3 or 31 miles from town) halt and form it in order of battle, and let the rear close
well up; then let the men rest in position and be made as comfortable as possible,
but do not permit them to scatter. Have the country on your front examined, a re-
connaissance made, and collect all the information possible in regard to the enemy
and the country and roads in your vicinity, and then report in person as quickly as
practicable to these headquarters. If your men have an opportunity to get water of
any kind they must fill their canteens, and the officers must caution them particu-
larly to use it in the most sparing manner. Send to the rear every wagon an4 animal
which is not required with your column. All the usual precautions must be taken
and preparations made for action. Keep all teams back exc~pt ammunition and am-
bulauces. Nothing has been heard from you to-day. Send orderlies by bearer to
learn the locality of these headquarters. The general desires to see Captain Will-
iauis, Jacks ons cavalry, by 7 oclock in the morning at these headquarters.
Respectfully, & c.,
JAMES B. FRY,
Colonel and Chief of Staff.

	Similar instructions, but suited to the locality on which he was to
form for the attack, were given to General Thomas, who, as second in
command, was with the right corps.
	It was expected that these instructions would get these two corps
into position for the attack by 7 or 8 oclock in the morning; whereas,
in consequence of delays which were more or less unavoidable, the heads
of the columns did not come up until between 10 and 11 oclock and
the rear division of the right corps did not get into position until about
4 oclock. This rendered it improbable that the attack could be made
until next morning and was one of the causes which marred-the suc-
cess I confidently expected. Afterward the lateness of the hour at
which I received intelligence of the condition of affairs on the left
rendered it impossible to reap the fruit that would otherwise still have
remained.
	It has been a matter of surprise that so severe an engagement could
have taken place within 2~ miles of my headquarters without my knowl-
edge. The commander of an army covering a line 6 or 7 miles long,
interspersed with woods and hills, must of necessity depend on the re-
ports of his generals for information of what is transpiring on different
parts of the field. After the failure to get into position as soon as I
had expected I no longer anticipated a battle that day; but a good (leal
of artillery firing had been going on between the advance guards of the
two armies since our arrival the evening before, excepting at night.
The cause of this was well understood, and th~ greater or less rapidity
of the firing at intervals was not a matter to attract particular atte

Page 51

CHAP. XXVIII.]	GENERAL REPORTS.	51


tion, especially as it was to be exl!ected that information of anything
of serious import would be promptly conveyed to me. For that reason
1 received with astonishment the intelligence of the severe fighting that
commenced at 2 oclock. Not a musket-shot had been heard nor did
the sound of artillery indicate anything like a battle. This was prob-
ably caused by the configuration of the ground, which broke the sound,
and by the heavy wind, which it appears blew from the right to the left
during the day, though the latter I had not thought of until it was es-
tablished in evidence before the Commission. Be that as it may, many
witnesses, without exception, have testified to the absence of all reason
to suppose at my headquarters that a battle was raging, and the testi-
mony of hundreds more could have been adduced to the same effect.
	It has been asked why, after the battle of Perryville, I did not imme-
diately follow the enemy to llarrodsburg, without waiting for Sills
division to come up. That the entire rebel army could have been brought
to battle there I have no doubt. The forces were nearly equal on both
sideson one side nearly all veteran troops, under perfect discipline;
omi the other, a portion, the old Army of the Ohio, equally go~od, but
more than one-third of the whole raw and undisciplined.* The enemy
would have had the advantage of the strong position which he selected.
The result of a conflict under such circumstances is not to be predicted.
I am not willing to admit that I mfght have failed, and yet no luau can
assert that the result ought certainly to have been otherwise under the
circumstances. It was sufficient for me that I could make it reasonably
certain by waiting for my troops to come up.
	My studies have taught me that battles are only to be fought for some
important object; that success must be rendered reason~ibly certain if
possiblethe more certain the better; that if the result is reasonably
uncertain, battle is only to be sought when very serious disadvantage
must result from a failure to fight or when the advantages of a possible
victory far outweigh the consequences of probable defeat. These rules
suppose that war has a higher object than that of mere bloodshed, and
military history points for study and commendation to campaigns which
have been conducted over a large field of operations with important re-
sults and without a single general engagement. In my-judgment the
commander merits condemnation who, from ambition or ignorance or
a weak submission to the dictation of popular clamor and without
necessity or profit, has squandered the lives of his soldiei~s. In this
connection it is proper to review the circumstances which should have
weight upon the question of hastening a battle at the particular juncture
referred to.
	There is not, I venture to say, a particle of evidence upon the records
of this Commission which does not lead to the conclusion that the ob-
jects and intention of the rebel Government in the invhsion of Kentucky
last summer were to hold possession of the State by force of arms and
secure it to the cause of the rebellion. The circumstances of the invasion
and the forn~idable force employed in it, the advance of the smaller
force under Kirby Smith, which established depots and collected sup-
l)lies, that made comparatively easy and safe the subsequent advance
of the main force under General Bragg to a point so remote from its
original base; the further re-enforcement of this large force by the
column nuder Breckinridge at the very time when. if a temporary raid
	* To quotation from this paragraph in his letter of April 10, 1S64, there omitted to
avoid duplicaton, General Buell adds the following note:
	The evidence places the rebel army in Kentucky at not less than 60,000. It places
my force at Perryville at less than 58,000 before the battle

Page 52

52	KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAP. Xxviii.

had been the object, the main force should have been rapidly withdraw-
ing instead of re-enforcing; the deliberation and permanency with which
the invading army maintained its position in the face of the force which
was preparing to drive it ont; the inauguration of a provisional State
government under the authority of the Confederate Government; the
enforcement of the conscription and other Confederate laws; the avowal
of the Confederate authorities; the plan of campaign sketched in the
letter of General Beauregard to his Government; the convictions of the
people of Kentucky from what they saw and the assurance of the rebel
authorities; the constant and confident declarations of all persons con-
nected with the invading force; the disappointment and disapprobation
which the whole Southern press expressed at the resultall go to show
that the object of the invasion was permanent occupation. That object
could only be secured by giving battle to and destroying or driving from
the field the army which was opposed to it.
	Such a plan and determination were also clearly indicated by the
movements of the enemy after the commencement of my n~arch from
Louisville. If his object had been to retreat without a struggle as soon
as I moved against him, the force of Kirby Smith, which was then at
various points north of the Kentucky River, would at once have moved
by the roads concentrating at Richmond and thence on to Cumberland
Gap. It was for that force the shortest and best road and a better
route for supplies than the one it pursued. The main force, under
Bragg, would have moved on one or more of the roads which converge
upon Glasgow, through New Haven, Lebai~n, and other points. This
line would have given him the advantage of marching by several of the
best roads in the State, converging at convenient distances. It would
have taken him through a region of country where supplies were com-
paratively abundant~ it would have enabled him to concentrate his
army at Bowling Green and perhaps capture that place before he could
be overtaken; or, if not, to move upon Murfree~borough, where he
would have railroad communication with Chattanooga and good lines
of retreat to the other side of the Tennessee River if necessary, or the
opportunity of capturing Nashville if he should deem that feasible;
or,if he desired to retreat through Cumberland Gap, he would go on
through iDanville and Stanford. Instead, however, of starting upon
these natural lines of retreat toward Tennessee, Kirby Smith moved
west, entirely off his line of retreat, and crossed the Kentucky River
near Salvisa; and Bragg, after turning the angle at Perryville, moved
northward, the very opposite of his direction of retreat. That the
original object of this movement was to concentrate the whole rebel
force at Harrodsburg instead of Camp Dick Robinson is evident from
the fact that if the latter had been the object Kirby Smith would have
moved directly to that point over the Hickman bridge, instead of ford-
ing the river lower down to go out of his way, and Bragg would have
marched through IDauville to the same point. Thus the circumstances
of the invasion indicated that there would be a formidable struggle for
the possession of the State, and the movements of the rebcl forces to
meet the operations that were in progress against them pointed to a
great battle at or near Harrodsburg.
	The battle of Perryville, by every reasonable explanation, increased
instead of weakening the probability of a great battle at Harrodsburg.
It has been asserted that General Bragg fought the battle of Perryville
with portions of three divisions, only about 15,000 men. It is certain
that he fought it with only a part of his whole force. His motive there-
fore may be supposed to have been either to check my advance to giv

Page 53

CHAP. XXVIII.]
GENERAL REPORTS.
53
time to take up a position with his main force beyond, or else because
he hoped to gain some advantage by striking the head of my column,
supposing I was moving on only one road, before I couldget a snperior
force up to oppose him. In either case he could not have expected to
accomplish much more than he did in this partial engagement. He was
repulsed, it is true, but not until night protected him from very serious
consequences, and there was nothing in the result that should have de-
cided the fate of so important a campaign. His loss was probably much
less than mine, from the fact that the attack was made when my troops
were in column and to that extent unprepared.
	That General Bragg moved to Camp Dick Robinson instead of await-
ing an attack by my whole force at Harrodsburg is no evidence that he
would not have been willing to give battle to the part of it which I had
at Perryville. With an equal force he could safely risk a battle in the
strong position he could have taken, and in fact did select, when the
result would by no means be as certain there, against a superior force,
as it would be in the still stronger position of Camp Dick Robinson,
which had the further advantage of being a depot for his supplies. For
these reasons, and on account of its inaccessibility and superior strength,
neither did his withdrawal to Camp Dick Robinson indicate an inten-
tion to abandon the object of his campaign and retreat precipitately
from the State. These reasons justified the conclusion that the rebel
army was to be encountered in battle, notwithstanding critics after the
fact may answer that the result contradicts the conclusion, and they
justify every reasonable precaution to have made the success of such
a struggle certain. They afford an interpretation to the movements
of the army nuder my command subsequently to the battle of Perry-
ville.
Pending the arrival of General Sills division the left corps, General
McCooks, laid near Dicksville, from which a road extends to ilarrods-
burg; the center, General Gilberts, was abreast of the left, on the direct
road from Perryville to llarrodsburg; and the right, General Critten-
was on Salt River, about 4 miles from Danville. Cavalry was iii
front on the Harrodsburg and Danville roads. A good deal of the
ammunition of McCooks corps and some in the center corps had been
expended in the battle of the 8th, and so much of the means of trans-
portation had been required for provisions that wagons could not be
spared for a sufficient supply of reserve ammunition on starting from
Louisville. This was hurried forward and other matters attended to
in the condition of the army which had resulted from the battle. These
of themselves would not have delayed my movements, though they
were important.
	General Sills division arrived on the evening of the 11th and the
army was ordered to move on the 12th. Strong cavalry reconnaissances
had been kept out every day, but on the evening of the 10th I ordered
out three brigades of infantry with cavalry to move on the 11th to dis-
cover more of the position or movements of the enemy. One moved
beyond Danville toward Camp Dick Robinson; one on the Danville and
llarrodsburg road toward the latter point; and the third toward the
same point on the Perryville and llarrodsburg road. About daylight
an officer, just in from llarrodsburg, came to my tent and reported to
me with great earnestness that the enemy was moving against us in
force from llarrodsburg, distant about 8 miles. The troops were put in
position to be prepared, if the report should prove true, and in the
mean time the several reconnaissances proceeded as ordered. The one
on the left discovered and reported the enemy apparently in force abou

Page 54

54	KY., M. AND E. TENN~, N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAP. XXVIII.

2 miles south of llarrodsburg early in the morning; but he withdrew
during the day, and the two reconnaissances which were o~dered toward
llarrodsbnrg entered that J)lace in the evening, capturing some prop-
erty and a large number of sick, wouuded, and some other prisoners.
	It was probable that the enemy had retired to Camp Dick Robinson,
but it was reported that some at least had gone in the direction of the
Kentucky River, and it was necessary to ascertain the fact. It would
require a day to do that by reconnaissance. If the reconnaissance were
supported in force, we should be prepared to take advantage of the
contingency of the enemy still being this side of Dicks River; and, in
any event, no time would be lost in the movement to turn the position
at Camp Dick Robinson, if it should be found that the enemy had
actually retired to that place. On the 12th, therefore, the whole army
swung around on Danville as a pivot, the right and center on the Daii-
yule and Harrodsburg road and the left near llarrodsburg on the
Perryville and flarrQdsbnrg road while a reconnaissance was pushed
forward to gain the desired information. It ascertained that the en-
emy had crossed Dicks River.
	If it should be said that these dispositions proved to have been un-
necessary by the withdrawal of the enemy, it may be answered that
such may be the case with nine out of ten of the dispositions that are
made in every campaign; that battles occur only occasionally in the
movements of opposing armies, but that preparation for battle may be
necessary every day. Without such preparation battles may be multi-
plied, and so iii most cases are defeats to the careless.
	The enemys position in rear of Dicks River being, from the charac-
ter of that stream, impregnable in front, I moved on the 13th to turu
it by the south. On the night of that day I heard that the enemy was
retreating from Camp Dick Robinson toward the south and I immedi-
ately or(lere(l pursuit. The leadino- division marched at 12 oclock that
night and the others following in rapid succession. Crittendens and
McCooks corps, the former leading, took the road to Stanford and
Crab Orchard, while Gilberts took the road to Lancaster and Crab
Orchard. On both roads the enemys rear guards were overtaken the
next day and were pressed continually as far as London. No general
battle occurred between the two armies, though the enemy was foiled
in his object and driven from the State.
	Anticipating a movement of the rebel army into Middle Tennessee,
the Army of the Ohio moved promptly in that direction, and omi the
31st of October had, under my orders, advanced as far as Bowling Green
and Glasgow. It was my intention to have reached Murfreesborough
by the 10th of November. On the 30th of October I turned over the
command to Major-General Ros~crans, in obedience to orders from the
general-in-chief.
	A careful study of the topography of Central Kentucky shows it to
be a region possessing remarkable strategical features for defensive
operations, especially for a force whose line of retreat is toward the
State of Tennessee. The Kentucky River, running across the State
from east to west, with its cliffy banks, makes a strong line of defense,
while its somewhat frequent fords, opposing but slight obstacles to the
movements of an army when the river is low, yet easily defended from
the opposite bank, make it an admirable line for a retreating army to
take shelter behind, and a perfect curtain to cover ulterior movements.
Its advantages in this respect are very greatly increased by the charac-
ter and position of Dicks River, which, coming frOm the south, empties
into the Kentucky River where the latter makes a strong bend to th

Page 55

CHAP. XXVIITT.]	GENERAL REPORTS.	55


north. Dicks River has the same characteristics of cliffy banks, and
its fewer crossings make it a much stronger line of defense than the
Kentucky River.
	Together these streams make the position of Camp Dick Robinson, in
the fork, almost impregnable for a large army, except from the south-
east. In that case the defensive army, with its right flank protected
by Dicks River and its left by the broken ground to the east, may fall
back easily and securely to the north side of the Kentucky, and by a short
mar~h either to the east or the west recross to the south side and fall
npoii good lines of retreat; and these movements can only be counter-
acted by considerable detours or by previous detachments, which would
weaken the opposing army so much as to endanger the main attack,
unless the army is very greatly superior in strength. On the north side
of the Kentucky River the country is traversable by good roads between
the Lexington and Richmond road and any of the roads crossing the
river lower down; but on the south side the country bordering the
river between the mouth of Dicks River and the Lexington and Rich-
mond road is destitute of practicable roads parallel with the rix~er. - Be-
sides the advantages already alluded to, the whole of that region of
country abounds in strong positions commanding the only water for an
army within several miles, so that the attacking force is forced to fight
under all the disadvantage of exhauston for the want of it. as was the
case at Perryville.
	These details make it easy to answer the theories that have been ad-
vanced for the annihilation or capture of the entire rebel army under
General Bragg. One of those theories assumes that that army might
have beeii destroyed in crossing ~ River.
	A defile, if it does not retard the march materially, is always a bene-
fit to a retreating army, and the line of Dicks River is admirably
adapted to such an object. It is only necessary for the retreating army
to make demonstrations of battLe with a strong rear guard, which will
require corresponding preparations and delay on the part of the pur-
suer. In the mean time it throws its artillery across rapidly to take
positions to sweep the opposite bank, aiid under such protectioti the
remainder of the retiring army crosses with safety.
	Great stress has been laid on the importance of Danville tQ cut off the
retreat of the rebel army from Perryville. My right rested after the
battle within 4 or 5 miles of Danville and my cavalry watched and went
beyond that place. Danville controlled no line of retreat for the enemy
except through that point and thence on toward Somerset or Columbia.
That was as well covered by being 4 or 5 miles from Danville with a
perfectly open and unobstruCted country between as it would have
been at Dituville itself and the enemy did not attempt to use it at
all. Danville is 8 miles at the nearest point from the road going from
Camp Dick Robinson to Cumberland Gap, and the strong line of Dicks
River between prevents Danville from having any command of that
road.
	The first point at which the enemys retreat on the Cumberland Gap
road could be intercepted is Lancaster, 10 miles from Danville. If the
Army of the Ohio moved to Lancaster in force in advance of the rebel
army, it threw its communications into the hands of the enemy. If,
before being assured that the enemy had crossed Dicks River, it di-
vided its force over the 20 miles from Perryville to Lancaster to protect
its communications and intercept the retreat of the enemy through
Lancaster, it rendered itself liable to be beaten in detail; and if, after
being assured that the enemy had crossed Dicks River, it left smal

Page 56

56	KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAP. xxvm.

detachments sufficient to guard the passes over that river and then
moved with the main body on Lancaster, there is no reason why the
enemy should not have been able to hold it in check on the line of
Dicks River long enough to secure his line through Lancaster if he
was determined to retreat.
	Au army on ordinary marches, continued for many days, will average
about 2 miles an hour; but in a forced march for 20, and at least for
10 miles, it can average 3 miles an hour. If the rebel army had 60,000
men, with artillery, and 1,500 wagons for baggage, supplies, & c., it
would in marching occupy 39 miles along the road in one column or
l9~ miles each in two columns. It would therefore require six hours
and a half to clear its camp on two roads; the whole of it will have
arrived at or .passed a point 20 miles distant in fourteen hours or a
point 10 miles distant in ten hours. Thus the rebel army, moving from
Camp Dick Robinson in two columns, would clear its camp in six hours
and a half, and arrive at Lancaster, 10 miles distant, in ten hours; or,
if it continued on without stopping, would arrive at Crab Qrchard, 20
miles distant, in fourteen hours.
	It appears that the retreating army actually marched in three col-
umns from its camp at Dick Robinson, the country along its route
being open and practicable. From Lancaster it took two roads, the
one to the left going by the way of Lowell and~ coming into the Cum-
berland G~p road at Big Hill; and the other going through Crab Or-
chard, Mount Vernon, and London. The latter is intersected at Crab
Orchard, 20 miles from Danville. by the road from Danville through Stan-
ford. The reasons which would render it injudicious to expose my com-
munications and leave open a better line of retreat to the enemy, by
anticipating his possible retreat through Lancaster, apply with greater
force to Crab Orchard. If the rebel army would retreat without ac-
cepting battle, the topography of the country made it entirely possible
for it to do so. Being once established on its line of retreat beyond
any point where it could by any possibility be intercepted the rebel
army made good its retreat, as other armies have done in this and other
wars under less favorable circumstances.
	There are few circumstances under which a disciplined and well-man-
aged army can be forced to a general battle against its will, thongh the
occasions are multiplied if the opposing army has a greatly superior
force of good cavalry or is so greatly superior in strength that it can
divide its force with reasonable prospects of success to each fraction.
A disciplined army, moving on its line of communication, can always
retreat more rapidly than it can be pursued. It meets or overtakes its
supplies on the road, or finds them at temporary depots previously
established, or it collects them from the country as much as possible on
its line of march. The pursuing army, on the other hand, finds the
country stripped; it has nothing in advance to rely on; it must carry
everything along, with the hinderance of enormous trains, and the diffi-
culties are increased with every days march. The retreating army pre-
pares a front of resistance more rapidly than the pursuer can prepare a
front for attack. The strong positions are reconnoitered in advance, on
which the requisite force forms as rapidly as on a drill ground; while
the pursuer, ignorant of the ground and of the force that awaits him,
must inform himself of both in order to develop a corresponding force,
or else find the head of his column beaten back. In the mean time the
main body of the retiring army has gained some hours march; the rear
guard watches the enemys preparation, awaits his attack, and repulses
it if it is made injudiciously or with insufficient force, or else at dar

Page 57

CHAP. XXVIII.]	GENERAL REPORTS.	- 57


resumes its march, to repeat the same operation whenever it is necessary
and the occasion is favorable. A single tree felled judiciously across
the rdad will delay the pursuer perhaps fifteen minutes, four of them
at intervals will delay him an hour, and thus the distance between him
and his adversary is increased.
	These advantages to defensive operations do not exist in the same
degree in all descriptions of country. They are particularly marked in
a broken and wooded country, where the movements and position and
strength of an enemy are only to be ascertained by feeling him, and
especially wheN there are no parallel roads by whi4~h the retreating
army can be attacked in flank. The advantages alluded to make it
wise frequently for a commander to fall back to a chosen ground when
his adversary advances, and the battle of Perryville affords an illustra-
tion of this principle. The rebel army was moving for concentration at
some point which could not be known to its adversary. A portion of
it took advantage of the strong l)OsitiOn at Perryville, commanding the
only water within a distance of several miles, over which the Army of
the Ohio must march to attack. That position afforded also the ~dvan-
tage of several lines of retreat. With these combined advantages, when
it was discovered that a part of the rebel army was making a stand, it
was as reasonable to expect to find its combined force there as at any
other point, and dispositions had to be made accordingly. I believe
that a sound and unprejudiced criticismwill show that the movement
of the Army of the Ohio was executed promptly and j udiciously; that it
arrived more simultaneously and in better order than the enemy could
have expected, considering that the point which he would choose for
battle could not be foreseen; and that but for the lack of timely infor-
ination of the condition of things on the afternoon of the 8th the main
l)ortioll of the enemys force at Perryville would have been captured.
	Contests between uneQual forces result sometimes, but very rarely,
from the fact that the inferior has no alternative but to fight or sur-
render. In by far the greatest number of cases, however, the conflict
results from a rack of ability on the part of the inferior to avail himself
of the means of extricating his army; or from a contempt for or igno-
rance of the strength of his adversary; or from an advantage of posi-
tion which in his opinion will outweigh that of superiority of numbers
and a corresponding ignorance of that advantage or faulty dispositions
on the part of the superior army; and these last are the cases in which
most frequently the inferior army is victorious. When the armies are
about equal, they maneuver so as to deceive and cause etch other to
make detachments or force each other to battle on ground unfavorable
to the adversary. In all these cases the object is not merely to give
battle for the sake of fighting, but to fight for victory, or at least safety,
and with such advantages as will make success reasonably certain; and
the more serious the consequences of defeat the greater the caution to
be observed. Ignorance and error multiply battles far more than valor
and generally with the penalty of disaster. If precaution and the ob-
servance of rule diminish the number of battles, and sometimes miss
the accidental success which folly and recklessness might have gained,
it is nevertheless true that in the end they usually triumph.
	The operations of the column under the command of General G. W.
Morgan at Cumberland Gap have been brought before the Commission.
The depositionof Colonel Dc Courcy, an officer under General Morgans
com mand, introduced as evidence for the Government,, alleges that after
General Morgan commenced his advance upon Cumberland Gap in May
last he was suddenly arrested by a telegraphic dispatch from me, order

Page 58

58	KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CflAP. XXVIII.

ing a retrograde movement and stopping all further proceedings on the
Tennessee side against the Gap.
General Morgan commenced his advance against Cumberland.Gap in
pnrsnance of the orders which I gave him in March preceding about the
22d of May. He had repeatedly represented that he was operating
against a superior force of the enemy, and on the 8th of June he tele-
graphed that the enemy had
Over 5,000 at Cumberland Gap, 8,000 at Big Creek Gap, with troops at Clinton and
Knoxville. Should their force concentrate the enemy will outnumber ns nearly three
to one. What is General Negley doing?

	Seeing no reason why I should expect him to advance by difficult
mountain roads and defeat three to one of the enemy, and supposing
that he may have regarded my orders for him to advance as more mi-
perative than I meant them to be, without regard to the force opposed
to him, I telegraphed him on the 9th as follows:
	General Negley is fully employed in Tennessee and can give you no direct assistance.
The force now in Tennessee is so small that no operations against East Tennessee can
be attempted. You must therefore depend mainly on your own resources.

And on the 10th I telegraphed him as follows:
	Considering your force and that opposed to you, it will probably not be safe for
you to undertake any extended operations. Other operations will soon have an in-
fluence on your designs, and it is therefore better for you to run no risk at present.

	These are the dispatches which caused the retrograde movement re-
ferred to. I leave them to speak for themselves in
dispatches which elicited them.	connection with the
	But, furthermore, on the same day, the 10th, I received a dispatch
from General Morgan, giving a rumor that the Gap was evacuated, to
which I replied the same day:
	If Cumberland Gap is evacuated you should seize and hold it, and take any other
advantage that may present itself
have to fall back.	, but not advance to a point from which you would

	About this time General Mitchel, considering himself in danger from
an anticipated advance upon him, was nrging the necessity of a stronger
force in Middle Tennessee and I was about commencing my march from
Corinth in that direction.
	Cumberland Gap was occnpied on the 18th of June. General Mor-
gan had about 7,500 men. His dispatches report the strength of the
enemy opp~sed to him at not less than 10,000 or 12,000, and I have no
reason to doubt that he reported correctly. At no time did he repre-
sent that he was able to hold East Tennessee with the force he had or
the wish to attempt it, nor do I believe that he could have done it. It
is true that on the 20th he telegraphed:
	My telegraph orders from Major-General Buell of the 10th instant do not permit
me to advance npon Knoxville, and I will not, until further instructions, advance
farther than Tazewell.

	And he also stated the preparation he had made to destroy bridges,
but had countermanded in consequence of that dispatch. He was an-
swered on the 22d, four days after his arrival at the Gap, as follows:
	It is impossible at present to send you any cavalry. The general has not intended
his orders to prevent such expeditions for special purposes as you refer to in your dis-
patch of the 20th; on the contrary, he approves them. his wish is for you to make
yourself secure in the Gap and accomplish all the results you can by rapid expedi-
tions, but not to attempt a deliberate advance on Knoxville as long as it seems prob-
able that you would not be able to maintain your position there. The general wishe

Page 59

CHAP. xxvm.j	GENERAL REPORTS.	59

to make no actual advance which he cannot maintain. It brings our friends among
the people into trouble and is injurious otherwise to our interests.
JAMES B. FRY,
Chief of Staff.

	I have no doubt that General Morgan acted wisely, and that he had
not force enough to attack the enemy in force. He certaiivly was not
restrained from doing anything that duty and honor demanded.
	The policy which I observed toward the people of the territory oc-
cupied by my army has been vehemently and bitterly assailed by a
portion of the press, but I believe that reason and justice will sustain
it on every score, whether of expediency or humanity. In entering on
my command it was with an earnest willingness to devote my life to
the object of restoring the Union, and I never doubted as to the course
my duty required me to pursue. It was to defeat the rebels in arms
whenever I could and to respect the Constitution and laws and the
rights of the people under them as far as was possible. consistently
with a state of things which rendered military success a matter of pri-
mary importance for the restoration of the authority of the Govern -
ment. This has been my rule of action from first to last. I did not un-
dertake to punish men for opinion~s sake or even for past acts, fbr
Congress has prescribed the penalty for their offenses and the mode of
proceeding against them. Men in arms I treated as enemies; persons
not in arms I treated as citizens of the United States; but I allowed no
man to preach or act treason after the progress of my army had brought
him again under the protection as well as the authority of the Govern-
ment.
	1 have, when necessary, given protection to the persons and property
of peaceable citizens; and this I have done both to preserve the disci-
pline of my troops and out of respect for the just rights of the people
under the laws of war, if not under the civil law. When the public in-
terest has required the use of private property for public purposes I
have so used it, allowing just compensation for it as far as practicable;
and this I did not only on the ground of justice, but as a measure of
military expediency, for it enabled me to secure for my army necessa-
ries which otherwise would have been concealed or destroyed.
	The bearing of this question on the success of my military operations
is something which I was bound to weigh well. It is recognized as one
of great importance to the success of an invading army. Wars of inva-
sion, always difficult, become tenfold so when the people of the invaded
territory take an active part against the invading army. A system of
plunder and outrage in such cases will produce the same effect of hatred
and revenge that such treatment does under other circumstances among
men, and the embarrassments resulting from them to the im~vadin g
army become of the most serious nature.
	These considerations are of such importance to success that there is
no exception to the rule of securing the neutrality if not the friendship
of the population as much as possible by just and mild treatment, and
then, having given no good cause for hostility, to treat with kindness
those who behave well and with severity those who misbehave.
	Some months ago a statement appeared in the newspapers, on the
reported authority of Gov. Andrew Johnson, that I had only becim pre-
vented by his resolute expostulations from abandoning Nashville when
I moved north with my army in September last. He has since made
the same assertion in a deposition. Whenever I have spoken on this
subject I have denounced the statement as false and 1 now repeat
that denunciation. I am very willing to bear the responsibility of m

Page 60

60	KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAP. XXVIII.

own acts or intentions, and it gives me sincere pleasure at all times to
acknowledge any assistance I may receive from others either in coun-
sel or action. If I had determined to abandon Nashville it would have
been upon my best judgment, and I should cheerfully have submitted
to a verdict on the wisdom of my course. I assert that I never inti-
mated to Governor Johnson an intention or wish to leave Nashville
without a garrison; that there was no discussion between us pro and
con on the subject, and that the determination to hold the place was
my own, uninfluenced by him in any manner. I had not that coimfi-
dence in his judgment or that distrust of my own which would have
induced me to seek his counsel. On account of his official position
I called on him first to inform him what [meant to do, and last to tell
him what garrison I had concluded to leave. On both occasions, as
far as my plans were concerned, I was the speaker and he the listener.
My officers were far more likely to know my views than he, and they
have stated that I said always that the political importance of the oc-
cnpation far outweighed any purely military bearing of the question,
and that I should hold the city.*
B C. BUELL,
Major- General.
BURNET HousE, May 5, 1863.

[Inclosure No. 5.]

BALTIMORE, MD., April 10, 1864.
General LoRENzo THOMAS,
Adjutant- General U. ~ Army:
	SIR:	I have heard that the Secretary of War intends to publish in
general orders the result of the investigation of my military opera-
tions in Kentucky and Tennessee dnring the summer of 1862 by the
Military Commission organized by Major-General ilalleck. Supposing
that the pressure of official business may thus far have prevented the
Secretary from making a careful examination of the record, which is
very voluminous, and believing that such an examination will essen-
tially modify the effect of the manner in which the Commission has
stated facts and refute many of its opinions, my object is to ask atten-
tion to some of the features of the report and to request that its publi-
cation may be accompanied by the official decision of the Department.
	The report premises by saying that very early in its sessions the
Commission resolved to direct its investigations to the following points,
and it specifies six points. It would appear from this as though the

	* The documents appended to the foregoing statement appear in this series as fol-
lows:
Major-General Buells report of the battle of Shiloh, VoL X, Part I, p.291.
Major. General Buells report of the battle of Perryville, Vol. XVJ, Part I, p. 1O22.
General Orders, Department of the Ohio:
No. 23, December 27, 1~61, Vol. VII, p. 15.
No. 4a, January 20, 1862, Vol VLI, p. 24.
No. 4b, January 23, 1862, Vol. VII, p. 78.
No. 13a, February 26, 1862, Vol. VII, p.669.

General Orders, Army of the Ohio:
No.6, April 8,1862, Vol. X, Part I, p.297.
No. 29a, July 11, 1862, Vol. XVI, Part I, p.65.
No. 47b, October 12,1862, Vol. XVI, Part I, p. 1032.
No.50, October 30, 1862, Vol. XVI, Part II, p. 654

Page 61

CHAP. XXVIII.]	GENERAL REPORTS.	61

first steps in the inquiry had developed ground for these six grave
questions; the truth is that they had been submitted in the instructions
under which the Commission acted. I do not consider this discrepancy
unimportant.
	The report then takes up in their order the several subjects referred
to; the first, however, The operations of General Buell in Kentucky
and Tennessee, being disposed of as being included in the other five.

SUFFERING KENTUCKY TO BE INVADED BY THE REBELS UNDER
BRAGG~

	But few facts are given on this subject, and those are vague and in-
definite. What is meant by saying that my lines of supplies were un-
necessarily long? It is true that I was more than 300 miles from my
base, the Ohio River, with only a thread of railroad for communication;
but how could the line be said to be unnecessarily long when it was
impossible to make it shorter. On the more material points the report
is silent. Nothing is said of the strength of the enemy, nor of some of
the most important of his movements, nor of the strength of my army,
nor of the state of my supplies; but the Commission contents itself with
expressing the belief that
By an early concentration of my army at Sparta, McMinnville, or Murfreesborough,
with a view to active offensive operations against Bragg tlie moment lie debonclied
from the Sequatchie Valley, he woul& liave been defeated.

	Subsequent events have confirmed what the evidence abundantly
shows, that the force under my command was inadequate for the mis-
sion it had undertaken. The statement in which I reviewed the evi-
dence before the Commission preseni3s this subject more circumstan-
tially and I extract from it here. After explaining the embarrassment
under which I had labored in consequence of the enemys large cavalry
force operating on my communications the statement continues: *
	*	*	*	*	*	*	*

	I am conscious of having carried my statement into tedious details out
of much anxiety to explain my acts and the reasons that dictated them.
I will not extend it to show ~why it was that although the concentration
of my army at MurfreesbOrOugh was necessary in consequence of the
state of my supplies, and although it was suitable to meet any direct
advanQe against Nashville, yet it was no longer suitable after it
became probable, though uncertain, that Bragg, instead of moving di-
rectly on Nashville, was moving toward, in fact was probably already
at, the Cumberland River by the time my army was concentrated. As
it was, my movement~from Murfreesborough to Nashville did not allow
Bragg to cross the Cumberlaud, which he had already nearly reached,
but it enabled me the easier to take measures against his subsequent
movements.
	Undoubtedly a much earlier concentration of my army at Murfrees-
borough would have had certain advantages. It would have enabled
me to re-establish my communications and made them much shorter,
but I have explained that I hoped until the last that they would be re-
opened by the troops in Kentucky, and that I was unwilling to aban-
don the object with which I had started out and give up the advanced
positions I occupied.

*General Buell here quotes from the railroad from Nashville to Stevenson, & c.,
p. 35, to should have rejected it, on p. 45

Page 62

62 KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAP. XXVIIL

THE FAILURE TO RELIEVE MUNFORDVILLE.

	The Comiuissiou is of opinion that General Buell is not responsi.
ble for the capture of the town, except so far as his failure to attack
Bragg south of the Cumberland River ma(le him responsible for that
failure.
	This implies that Bragg could have been and should have been at-
tacked south of the Cumberland. I have discussed that point in the
preceding pages of this communication.

BATTLE OF PERRYVILLE AND CONDUCT THERE.~


	The facts under this head are imperfectly and inaccurately stated,
and the opinions, to my mind, show a misconception of the subject. The
strength, positions, and to a great exteut the movements of the oppos-
ing armies, with many other facts esseiitial for a proper understanding
of the subject, are omitted.
	The rebel forces occupied a line extending from I*xington to Bards-
town, Kirby Smiths force being on the right and Braggs army proper
on the left. It was to be presumed that those forces would concentrate
when I moved against them, and it was ~ to attack them when-
ever they could be properly brought to battle. It cannot be said that
~banen~agement was expected at Bardstown, though it was thought
to be possible. The statement that f next intended to attack him
(Bragg) on the 9th of October conveys no correct explanation of my
plaims and movements. The evidence shows that after, reaching Perry-
ville, where the enemy appeai~ed to have concentrated, my instructions,
given on the night of the 7th, contemplated an attack on his position
on the morning of the 8th. That purpose was frustrated by the late-
ness of the arrival of the right and left corps, and it was (leemed neces-
sary to defer the attack until the next morning. The evidence is not
that McCooks corps arrived at 9 oclock on the 8th; the head of it
arived between 10 and 11. The evidence shows that General Thomas
staff officer about 1.30 oclock reported the arrival of the head of the
right corps; the rear division of it was not yet up. The staff bfficer
took back to General Thomas more detailed instructions in regard to
the disposition of that corps.
	The camp of my headquarters was located the evening of the 7th at
a proper distance in rear of the center corps, the disposition of -which
I personally directed, and it was not necessary or convenient to change
my camp. The -signal station for headquarters was somewhat in ad-
vance, on a high elevation, commanding a more extended view of the
ground than any other.
The assertion that I
should either have been on the field in person ready for emergencies and advantages,
or have taken and required to he taken every precaution for the instant transmission
of intelligence to my headquarters
and that
as I had an organized signal corps with my army, this failure was all the more cnl-
pable
discloses a want of knowledge on the part of the commission of what
was necessary to be done and misrepresentation of what was actually
done. Had I considered my presence along the lines necessary I might
as properly have been required on the right as on the left, in which case
I should have been 5 miles from the left instead of 2~ miles. The ev

Page 63

CHAP. XXVIII.]	GENERAL REPORTS.	63


dence shows that the signal corps was in-operation, and that signal sta-
tions had been established to communicate intelligence from different
parts of the line to my headquarters. What further precautions could
be required except the presence of commanders, whose duty to com-
municate with me was as well understood as though it had been pre-
scribed in their commissions ~
	The evidence shows that Gilberts corps was not iinen gaged. It
lost nearly 1,000 men that day, which proves that the whole force of
the en~emy~~ was not flung upon McCook. It is not a very ingenuous
representation of the matter to assert what could have been accom-
plished if Crittendens corps had been vigorously pushed forward,
when all mention of the fact is omitted that orders to that effect were
given as soon as I was advised of the attack on McCook and that they
could not be executed because of the lateness of the hour.

PERMITTING THE REBELS TO ESCAPE WITHOUT LOSS FROM KEN-
TUCKY.~~

	The same misconception and errors of statement run through the
report of the Commission under this head as under the preceding one.
It is right in one admission- that
it cannot be said that the rebels escaped without loss from Kcntucky.

	The evidence does not justify the statement in any proper sense
that
the morning after the battle it was very early discovered that Bragg had retreated
from the position near Perryville.
	On the contrary, the fact was not ascertained until about 10.30 oclock,
between which time and the early morning my army was moving to
attack; the opinion being general that the enemy would be found near
Perryville and the battle renewed that morning. The evidence shows
this conclusively, though it also shows that some of the most advanced
troops discovered very early that ~he portion ~f the enemy which they
could see was moving from the position which it held the previous
night; but even that did not come to the knowledge of the corps com-
manders nor to my knowledge. There is no evidence to justify the
broad statement nor is it substantially true that Bragg
left all his sick and wounded and some artillery at Harrodsburg, and being joined
by Kirby Smith, hastened across Dicks River
and that that part of the movement
from Perryville to the river was confused and disordered.
	Still less is it proven or true that any portion of the statement was
known by me ~r by my army at the time. On the contrary, it is shown
that the advance of my cavalry toward llarrodsburg on the 9th was
effectually resisted, and that on time mornimig of the 10th Kirby Smiths
forces, and probably a large portion of Braggs army proper, were ac-
tually in line of battle 2 miles south of the town. This fact justified
the presumption that his whole force was there, and I have now no
doubt that the whole of it would have been there in case of battle.
	I have never called my movement to llarrodsburg nor from there to
Danville a pursuit. I meant and have described it as a movement
to find and give battle to the rebel army. The pursuit I have described
as commencing at Danville on the 13th, when the retreat from Camp
Dick Robinson was first discovered.
	The comments of the Commission on the retreat of the enemy woul

Page 64

64	KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. tonir. XXVIII.

seem to indicate ignorance of the topography of the country and of
the facts concerning the retreat. There is ground in the evidence
for the belief that Braggs retreat was decided upon on the 12th of Oc-
tober in opposition to the views of a majority of his commanders and
the sentiment of his army. There is a mass of facts in evidence and of
public notoriety to show that his determination to avoid battle and
retire from the State was suddenly adopted. The failure of the Com-
mission to give place to this material fact has the effect of giving a
wrong impression as to the dispositions the circumstances required me
to make. The subject is treated as though Braggs army was a disor-
ganized rabble, which it was only necessary to surround with a line of
skirmishers to capture. The evidence does not
establish that General Buell received information on the night of the 11th that Bragg
had croshed the river at Camp Dick Robinson
nor that he made no determined movement with the main body of his
army until the night of the 13th. The statement that from the morn-
ing of the 9th until the night of the 11th I waited to learn whether my
enemy would cross the river is unfit to appear in an official report; and
the further statement that, that fact being definitely known, I lost two
days before taking any decisive action, is contrary to the evidence, as
is also the statement that finally, on the night of the 13th, I started
Crittendens corps through Danvillefor it was there already. This
statement, taken in connection with other remarks, would convey the
false impression that that corps, in fact the main body of my army, was
still at Perryville.
	It is thus that the Commission explains the escape of the rebels
from Kentucky.~~
	in the review which I prepared of the evidence taken by the Com-
mission I made a different statement and explanation of the incidents
of that campaign. I hope it is a more intelligent one. I know it is
more in accordance with the facts, and it may not be inappropriate to
insert it here. After describing the operations about Munfordville
and the close movement after Braggs army until it turned off toward
Bardstown the statement proceeds :*
	*	*	*	*	*	*	*

	The Commission states that it made its sixth point to cover the
question of my loyalty. -J certainly made no defense of my loyalty,
nor did I know that it was under investigation, though I did not fail
to observe that evidence was elicited of the scandalous remarks that
had been made concerning it by some persons, one of them a member
of the Commission. I shall not cavil at the brief announcement that
against my loyalty there is no evidence worthy consideration.
	My policy toward the inhabitants of disaffected districts was also
brought under the sixth point, and the Commission concludes that
Whether good or bad in its effects, General Buell deserves neither blame nor up-
plause for it, because it was at that time supposed to be the policy of the Governuient.
At least he could violate no orders upon the subject, because there were none.

	I am not disposed to take exception to this opinion, though I dissent
from it. If an officer faithfully does what the policy of his Government
makes a duty, in my opinion he deserves approbation; and if, without
any such obligation, he elects to do what he is at liberty to do or omit,
then he deserves approbation or blame accordingly as his acts are good

	General Buell here quotes from many considerations rendered it proper, & c.,
p. 48, to they usually triumph, on p. 57

Page 65

CHAr. XXVIII.1	GENERAL REPORTS.	65

or bad in their effects. It might, I think, very properly be asked why
the Commission introduced the subject at all.
	I will not use this occasion, though I cannot think that it would be in-
appropriate, to comment on the irregularities which marked the proceed-
ings of the Commission and the spirit manifested by a portion of its
members. Just and thinking men will hesitate to declare in a judicial
verdict with reference to the conduct of operations of such magnitude,
more particularly when an important result has been obtained, that the
commander ought to have acted differently: First, because, under cir-
cumstances which make it frequently impossible to know exactly the
true state of affairs, he must act on appearances and probabilities more
than on positive knowledge; and, second, because it is seldom possible
to say what would have been the consequences of a different action.
In this case no such hesitation is apparent.
	For want of time I was not able to present my review of the evidence
until the Commission had prepared their report and adjourned. How
far that review might have modified the report if it had been before
them it is impossible for me to say.
	I submit these remarks with the confident belief that the justice of
the Secretary will see ample ground for them.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
D.	C. BUELL,
	Major-General.

(Inolosnre No. 6.]

GENERAL ORDERS, ~ HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE OHIO,
	No. 29a.	5	In Camp, Huntsville, Ala., July 11, 186~.
	The general commanding the Army of the Ohio takes pleasure in an-
nouncing the success of an arduous and hazardous campaign by the
Seventh Division, Brig. Gen. G. W. Morgan commanding, by which
the enemys fortified position at Cumberland Gap was turned and his
force compelled to retreat as our troops advanced to attack.
	The general thanks Brigadier-General Morgan and the troops of the
Seventh Division for the ability displayed in the operations against this
important stronghold, and for the energy, fortitude, and cheerfulness
which they exhibited in their struggle with difficulties of the most formi-
dable magnitude for an army.
	By command of Major-General Buell:
	JAMES B. FRY,
Colonel and Chief of Staff.


GENERAL ORDERS, WAR DEPT., ADJT. GEN.S OFFICE,
	No. 45.	5	Washington, June 14, 1872.
	The following act of Congress is published for the information and

government of all concerned:
AN ACT to provide for the restoration of the records of the proceedings of the court of inquiry con-
cerning the operations of the army under the command of General Don Carlos Buell, in Kentucky
and Tennessee.

	Whereas it appears in the matter of investigation made by the court of inquiry, in
the years eighteen hnndred and sixty-two and eighteen hundred and sixty-three, into
the operations of the army under the command of General Don Carlos Buell, in Ken-
tucky and Tennessee, that the records of the proceedings of said court are not to he
found on the proper files in the War Department; and whereas it further appears tha~

5 R RYOL XV

Page 66

66	KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAP. XXVIII.

there is now in the posses~lon of Beun Pitman, the phonographic reporter of said
court, a full and complete report of the proceedings of said court of inquiry: Therefore,
	Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Bepre8entatives of the United States of America
in Gongre8n assembled, That the Secretary of War be directed to employ at once Benn
Pitruan, the reporter for the court of inquiry in the said matter, to make a full and
complete transcript of the phonographic notes taken by him during the said investi-
gation, and to put the same on file among the records of the War Department, and to
furnish a copy of the same to Congress.
	Approved ~ne 5, 1872.

By order of the Secretary of War:
E.	D. TOWNSEND,
Adjutant-Geueral.


4IRDREE, KY., February 12, 1873.
Hon. WILLIAM W. BELKNAP
& oretar~y of War, Washingtou, D. 0.:
	Sn~: Among the papers sent to the Military Committee from the War
Department on the 13th of April last, in answer to the call of the House
for the record of The Buell Commission, as it is sometimes called, is
one which comes to my knowledge in that way for the first time, and is
described as an unsigned communication, reviewing the proceedings
of the ~ & c.~ The paper is, in fact, without date, address,
or signature, but bears the following indorsement:

JUDGE-ADVOCATE-GENERALS OFFICE,
May 23, 1863.
	Respectfully referred to the Secretary of War by request of Lieutenant-Colonel
Piatt.
J.	HOLT,
Judge-Advocate-General.

	On the last day of the open session of the Military Commission the
President inprired Does the judge-advocate propose to submit any
paper? To which the judge-advocate (Lieutenant-Colonel Piatt) replied:

From the nature of the Commission, or Board of Officers, as I understand it, called to
investigate the operations of the Army of the Ohio, I am not required to sum up the
evidence. Indeed so voluminous i~ the evidence that it would not be possible to do
so within any reasonable time. Most of the questions under consideration are mat-
ters of opinion and as military men the Board is better able to treat of them than Jam.
There is very little conflict of testimony coming within my peculiar province, and I
therefore ask to be excused.

	It is not necessary to remark here that by the rules governing the pro-
ceedings of military tribunals, as well as upon general principles of law,
any argument of the case by the judge-advocate before the Commission
should have been submitted in the hearing of the accused and the lat-
terwould have been entitled to answer. The paper referred to did not
follow that rule. Indeed it seems only to have made its appearance
after the Commission had concluded its labors and while its voluminous
record awaited the action of the reviewing authority.
	I do not ascribe this circumstance to a preconcerted plan; on the con-
trary, I believe that such a course had not entered the thoughts of the
judge-advocate, and that, however suggested, the execution was the
offspring of the moment. To my mind, nevertheless, the proceeding has
the charaeter of a surreptitious attempt to warp the ordinary course of
	* See Inclosure No.3 (p. 12) to Secretary of Wars report to House of Repremuta-
tives, April 17, 1872

Page 67

CHAP. XXVIII.]	GENERAL REPORTS.	67


justice and is deserving of rebuke. It is for this reason mainly that I
make this mention of it.
	It is not my purpose to comment pn the paper itself. I will not correct
its representation of facts nor weigh its criticisms, though they are for
the most part in conflict with themselves and with my review of the
subject. its most prominent feature is an effort to sustain a statemeut
made by Gov. Andrew Johnson, which I had denounced, t~ the effect
that I was prevented by his expostulations from abandoning Nashville
in the fall of 1862. I shall leave that question where the evidence places
it, without going into further personal statements.
	I request that you will be good enough to let this communication ac-
company the records of the Commission, and I am, x ery respectfully,
your obedient servant,
D.	C. BUELL.

TRANSCRIPT FROM PHONOGRAPHIC NOTES OF THE BUELL COURT OF

INQUIRY.

CINCINNATI, December 1, 1862.

	Col. W. H. LYTLE (a witness for the Government), being duly sworn
by the judge-advocate, testified as follows:

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:
	Question. What is your position in the service of the United States,
colonel?

	I have been in the three-months service, but was commissioned in the three-years
service on or about June 6, 1861.
in	Question. Will you state to the court what part of that tinie you were
service nuder command of Major-General Buell in Tennessee and
Kentucky?

	I reported for duty in the Department of the Ohio on or about January 2, 1862.

	Question. You will please state to the court what you know of the
operations of General Buell at the time of the invasion of the State of
Kentucky by General Bragg.

	I can only give tbe movemen~s of that portion of the army with which I was con-
nected. On the 31st of August, 1862, I was in command at Huntsville, Ala., and un-
der orders from General Buell cotiducted on that day the evacuation of the town.
My orders were to make Shelbyville inside of four days. I made the march inside of
two days and a half. I camped 4 miles from Nashville on the evening of Septem-
ber 5, having halted nearly a day at Murfreesborough for orders. From thence we
marched to Perryville via Louisville.

	Question. During that time what division were you attached to?

	I commanded the Seventeenth Brigade of General Rosecrans division.

	Question. State to the Commission what you know of General Braggs
position during the march of the rebels.

	I was not specially informed as to his movements, my attention being directed gen-
erally to my own command. I had the general idea that Bragg was marching in a
direction parallel, or nearly so, to that of our own army.

	Question. Could you point out the parallel movement of General
Bragg?

	I am not able to do so; I had no opportunity at the time to observe.

	Question. Do you know anything, colonel, about the surrender and
failure at Munfordville?

	I know nothing of it; I know only of the movements of my own comn~and

Page 68

68
KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. (ChAr. XXVIII.
	Question. You know of the surrender of that place?

	Yes, Sir.

	Question. Can you state to the Commission as t
its being relieved	o the probability of
	I do not know; I do not recollect the date of the surrender of Munfordville. My
comman4 re~lied Bowling Green September 11. We halted there several days, and
di~1 not arriv~ at Munfordville until after its surrender.

	Question. What was the cause of your delay at Bowling Green?
	I do not know.

	Question. Do you recollect how many days you were there?
	My impression is we were there three or four days. Of course I have no opportu-
nity now to refer to any official document, but my recollection is that we were there
three or four days.

	Question. I understand you to say that Munfordville was surren-
dered before you arrived there?
	The town, I think, was surrendered either during our halt at B& wling Green or
during our march thence to Munfordville. The march from Bowling Green to Mun-
fordville consumed (including the halt at Horse Well) six or seven days. We were
at Horse Well about two days.

	Question. What was the cause of the slow march you made between
Bowling Green and Munfordville?
	I do not know.

	Question. Could you produce any reason for your delay?
	At Horse Well we were drawn up in line of battle, fronting toward Munfordville.

	Question. Had you any evidence of a large force in the neighborhood
at the time?
	I saw none. There was more or less skirmishing reported during our halt there.
As general officer of the day I rode to the extreme outposts; the enemys pickets
could be seen.

	Question. What position had General McCooks corps in the army?

	It had at that time, I think, the advance on that road. My impression is that it
was the first to arrive in Louisville.

	Question. You stated that you do not know the reason of the delay
at Bowling Green or why the march was so slow from Bowling Green
to Munfordville.
	I do not know.

	Question. What was the rate of marching previous to arriving in
Bowling Green?

	I made rapid marches to Nashville with the command left at Huntsville. The
march thence to Bowling Green, as was also the march from Munfordville to Louis-
ville, was ~s rapid as possible.

	Question. Were you engaged at the battle of Perryville?

	I was.

	Question. Will you state, as near as you can, the circumstances of
the affair?

CINCINNATI, December 2, 1862.

	Col. W. H. LYTLES examination continued.
	(Map produced by the judge-advocate, that the movements and pos

Page 69

CHAP. XXVIII.1
c4F~NE1~ATJ ftEPO1~TS.
f3~9
tions of the Union and rebel armies might be pointed out by the wit-
ness.)
	The witness then proceeded and said:
	Our column (McCooks army corps) moved by the way of Taylorsville, Fairfield,
Bloomfield, and Chaplin, encamping the night before the fight at Mackyille. There
were but two divisions of the army corps at that point~ousseaus and Jacksons.
The Third Division (Sills) was not with us. My original orders at Mackville were
to move at 6 a. m. Before daylight, however, I received orders to move immediately.
My own command was in motion in twenty minutes. I had no tents. My brigade
had the right of Rousseaus division, which had the advance of the corps.
	We arrived on the field of battle about 10.30 a. in., to the best of my recollection.
As we reached the ground I saw a column of our troops on the Springfield road, which
I ascertained subsequently was a portion of Gilberts corps. [Witness points out
Springfield road on map.]
	Having been directed by General Rousseau to place a good skirmishing regiment in
advance, the Tenth Ohio occupied that position, and on our arrival on the field was
at.once deployed as skirmishers.
	General Rousseaus original line of battle was considerably in the rear of the line he
actually occupied during the fight. Our march had been accelerated when we heard
cannonading.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

	Question. Where was that cannonading?
	I do not know exactly; think it was from a battery on the right of my position
during the fight. General Rousseaus original line was nearly at right angles with
the road, his right resting near Russells house.
	I will remark here that my recollection of the topography of the field may not be
accurate, as I saw it only during the fight and afterwards from an ambulance on my
return from the enemys lines.
	On our arrival on the field at 10.30 a. m. a seetion or more of artillery was thrown
forward and opened fire. No response having been elicited, General Rousseau di-
rected me to move with my brigade toward Perryville. At this time the Tenth Ohio
Infantry, thrown forward as skirmishers, had not returned, though I had sent a staff
officer and several orderlies to recall it. My orders being imperative, however, to
march, I sent an order to Lieutenant-Colonel Burke, commanding, to fall in in the rear
of my brigade, and directed Colonel Beatty, with his regiment (Third Ohio Infantry),
to take the advance.

	Question. How far was your right from the next corps on your right?

	I saw no line of battle on my right at all. My own command was composed of the
Third and Tenth Ohio Infantry, Fifteenth Kentucky Infantry, Forty-second and
Eighty-eighth Indiana Infantry, and Loomis battery.
	In compliance with orders about 12 oclock I resumed the march, the Third Ohio
having the right. The impression at this time seemed to be that the enemy had re-
tired. My column was in motion, as directed, when my attention was directed to a
scattering fire on the left of the road. It immediately struck me that it proceeded
from the skirmishers of the Tenth Ohio, which, as I have said, had not yet reported.
Riding up to the eminence where our artillery had been posted in the morning, com-
manding a ravine, an officer of my staff approached me and said he discovered
the enemy on the opposite side of the ravine. With my glass I saw heavy masses of
rebels apparently deploying into line of battle. The morning was bright and clear.
General Rousseau directed me to form line of battle immediately. My column, thea
in motion and descending the hill into the ravine, was marched by the ri ght-ahout,
and the order was complied with. Cannot state the precise distance from the enemy.
	My brigade had the right of Rousseaus division in line of battle. Harris hrigade
was on my left. Jackson was on the left of Rousseau. We bad then an artillery duel,
which lasted perhaps two hours.

	Question. Could you see the enemys line at the time from that emi~
nence?
	They were screened by the timber. In the ravine which separated us from the
enemy was the rocky bed of a creek. The men had suffered much from thirst. One
of my regiments (the Forty-second Indiana) had heen ordered to, the ravine in the
morning by General Rousseau to supply the men with Water, but there was little or
none there.
	After the fire of the artillery had been prolonged some time Captain Loomis re

Page 70

70	KY., M. AND E. PENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. (OHAP. XXVIII.

ported that his long-range ammunition was nearly expended. I accompanied him
and reported to General Rousseau. The general and Loomis rode off together, as I
supposed either to have Loomis ammunition replenished or another battery sent
forward to take its place. I retnrned immediately to the front.

	Question. During this time did you receive any orders from any
other officer? Had General Rousseau received any orders from Gen-
eral McCook from 12 to 2 oclock?

	I received no orders during that time from any other officer. As to whether Gen-
eral Rousseau received any orders from General McCook or not during the time men-
tioned I cannot state. The position of my regiments was reported to General Rous-
seau when the fight opened, and my general instructions were to hold my ground
there as long as practicable, and in case it became impracticable to hold it to retire
in good order. shortly after my return to the front I saw Loomis battery being
retired. I dispatched a staff ofAcer or orderly to inquire whether, my artillery being
withdrawn, the general desired any change in the position of my line. To this mes-
sage I got no answer, nor can I say whether or not it ever reached the general.
Shortly after 2 oclock p. m. the fire of the rebel artillery slackened and his infantry
advanced. The Third Ohio was immediately ordered from the slight depression of
ground that partially screened it from the artillery fire to the crest of the hill. The
Fifteenth Kentucky was ordered to support it. The Tenth Ohio was oh the left of the
Third Ohio, from which I had not felt at liberty to withdraw it. The Eighty-eighth
Indiana was held in reserve.
	We held our position for two hours or more after Loomis was retired, and finally,
being without our battery and exposed to a severe fire of artillery as well as that of
an infantry force greatly superior in nnmber, the brigade fell back in good order and
reformed, as I am informed, in the neighborhood of the original line selected in the
morning near Russells house.

	Question. Did it appear from the sound of the cannon that the enemy
was on the left?

	The rattle of small-arms was so deafening that it would have been hard to tell. I
could see only two regiments on my left, such was the conformation of the ground.
While the fight was progressing I became satisfied, between 2 and 3 oclo~k, that we
were outnumbered.
	My battery had been withdrawn, and the brigade was exposed not only to a severe
fire from the enemys infanl~ry posted in the ravine, but from a heavy fire of his artil-
lery, which swept the crest of the ridge. I accordingly sent back a staff officer for re-
enforcements. He returned with the message that I should hold the position as long
as I could, and if it became impracticable, should retire; that Jackson was very
hard pressed, and no re-enforcements could be spared. Between 3 and 4 p. m. I
renewed my application for re-enforcernents, but to this second application received
no response.
	Meanwhile my whole line, after a most obstinate and resolute struggle and severe
loss, had been retired, with the exception of one regiment, the Tenth Ohio.

	Question. How many rounds of ammunition had you?

	Forty rounds. The ammunition train was, I think, in the woods near the Russell
house, though of this I am not certain. Our line was so suddenly formed that I had
no time to ascertain its location. I had finally sent back for the Eighty-eighth In
	diana, being determined to hold our position if possible until re-en forcements came
up. I could not believe but what they would finally arrive from some other corps,
having seen the column on the Springfield road In the morning. Before the Eighty-
eighth got up, however, the Tenth was nearly enveloped by the enemy and was
obliged to fall back. A most destructive fire was poured on the regiments front and
from the flanks, and while endeavoring to cover its movement to the rear with skir-
wishers I was wounded and captured. These are the material points that came under
my observation up to the time that I was taken prisoner.
	It is my impression that after Harris was obliged to retire for want of ammuni-
tion the attack of eight or ten regiments of the enemy was concentrated on my bri-
gade, or rather on the three regimentsthe Third Ohio, Fifteenth Kentucky, and
Tenth Ohiowhich were the last to retire.

	Question. Did you know the headquarters of General Buell?

	I did not. I saw General McCook and General Rouss~an. After the battle began
General Rousseaus attention, as I gathered from his official report, was mainly directed
to the left of the line. My loss was very heavy. The orders to the brigade were ex

Page 71

CHAP. XXVIII.]	GENERAL REPORTS.	71

outed to the letter as I understood them. I am informed the loss of the brigade was
between 700 and 800 killed and wounded. Have not yet seen official report.

	Question. How far to the right was the army?

	General Gilberts corps, on the Springfield road, could be readily seen with the
naked eye. I do not think the Springfield road was more than a mile from my posi-
tion. There was a battery on my right, on a wooded eminence, probably a quarter
of a mile distant, but there was no infa4ry between my right and the battery.

	Question. Which way was the wind blowing?

	I remember that when a barn near the right of the Third Ohio was fired by the
enemys shells the whole line was almost enveloped in smoke. The wind must have
been, I think, a southerly wind; it blew from right to left of my line.

	Question. Was it known that the enemy was in force at Perryville?

	That I do not know. I remember meeting General MoCook in the morning, and
that the General remarked there would be fun before night or some remark to that
effect.

	Question. With the exception of Gilberts column were you not
aware of the positions of the other corps?

	I was not.

	Question. You had no knowledge of the force of the enemy?

	Nothing definite.

	Question. When you were- taken prisoner could you form any esti-
mate of the numbers of the enemy?

	I could not.

	Question. Did you know their line of retreat, what roads they went
by, where their force lay, and where they arrived that night?

	I have some delicacy in testifying to these points under the terms of my parole. I
can state that I was very much surprised that we were not re-enforced that day, and
also that no advance was made the next morning.

	Question. What reason can you give that prevents you answering
these questions?

	My impression is that there is a provision in the terms of the parole that I shall
not reveal anything that I might have discovered within the line of the enemy. I
therefore decline to testify on these points.

	Question. How many days were you in the hands of the enemy?

	The battle was fought on Wednesday, the first week of October. I was paroled the
next day, and retnrned to our lines on Friday night and immediately reported at
General Buells headquarters.

	Question. Where were General Buells headquarters?

	They were on the Harrodsburg pike, beyond the position we occupied, near the
road. When I returned I was in a buggy; I returned by way of Dauville.

	Question~ Where were you at the time you received your parole?

	1 was at Harrodsbnrg.

	Question. For how long were the men provided with provisions?

	They had provisions for three days.

	Question. During the battle the men threw away their haversacks,
sometimes their knapsacks. Had you noticed anything of the kind in
your corps?

	I did not observe that they did so; I noticed that they were very cool.

	Question. When you were at headquarters did you see Gen. Bragg?

	I was not at the headqnarters of the enemy

Page 72

72
KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. YA [CHAP. XXVIII.
	Here the court desired the witness to produce the parole, to which
the witness assented.
	The day following the colonel produced the parole.

Copy of the parole.

HDQRS. ARMY OF THE Miss., Harrodsburg, Oct. 9, 1562.
I, Win. H. Lytle, Army of the United States, having been taken prisoner by the
Confederate States Army and this day paroled, whereof this is witness, do swear that
I will not bear arms against the Confederate States, nor will I in any way aid or
abet its enemies, until I am regularly exchanged, under the penalty of death; nor will
I disclose anything that I have seen or heard in said Confederate States Army to its
prejudice.
WM. H. LYTLE,
Colonel, Gommanding Seventeenth Brigade, Third Division.
Sworn to and subscribed before me October 9, 1562.
SAML K. HAYS,
Major, C. S. Army.

	The Commission adjourned to meet December 4, at 10 oclock a. m.

CINCINNATI, December 4, 186210 a. m.
Examination of Col. W. II. JJYTLE continued.
Cross.examination by General BUELL:
	Question. On leaving Huntsville did you receive orders to proceed
directly to Nashville?
	I did not. I received orders to proceed to Murfreesborough by way of Fayetteville
and Shelbyville, my orders being to reach in four days.
	Question. When did your division leave Nashville on the march to.
ward Kentucky?

My brigade left its camp near Edgefield and joined the main column.
September 7, 1862, halted at Gees Tavern.
September 8, marched to Tyree Springs.
September 9, marched to Sharps Branch, near Franklin.
September 10, marched to Cave or Sinking Springs, near Bowling Green.
September 11, marched to Bowling Green.
September 16, march late; camp 3 miles from Barren River.
September 17, bivouac near Dripping Springs, 9 miles from Glasgow.
September 15, to Prewitts Knob.
September 19, to Horse Well.
September 21, to point 3 miles from Munfordville.
September 22, march late; camp at Mnnfordville.
September 23, to Nolin.
September 24, Bnrlington (or Bloomington).
September 25, cross Salt River; halt; at 2 march resumed.
September 26, marched to Lonisville.

	Question. Do you know what the orders were under which your
division marched?

I do not.

	Question. Do you know what its immediate destination was?

I do not

	Question. Did you know any circumstance which made it necessary
for it to reach any particular place at any given time?

I was not personally informed of any.

	Question. Did any division leave Nashville in advance of it?

I do not recollect

Page 73

CHAP. xxvm.j	GENERAL REPORTS.	73

	Question. On what road did it march?

	We marched on the Bowling Green road by way of Tyree Springs.

	Question. Was your march continued from the time you left Nash-
ville until you arrived at Bowling Green?

	The march was continuous, making only the necessary halts.

	Question. When did you arrive at Bowling Green?

	On the 11th September.

	Question; Was your division first to arrive at Bowling Green?

	My impression is that our division was not the first to arrive. I think there were
several before us.

	[NOTE BY GENERAL BuELL.It was the first division that ar-
rived.~~]

	Question. When did you march from Bowling Green?

	We marched from Bowling Green on the 16th, in the afternoon.

	Question. How far did you march that afternoon and on what road?

	We marched on the Dripping Springs road, and camped 3 miles from the Barren
River.

	Question. What time in the afternoon did you encamp?

	I cannot remember.

	Question. Before or after dark?

	I cannot remember.

	Question. On what road did you march the following day?

	We marched to Dripping Springs; that was the termination of the second days
march from Bowling Green.

	Question. Where did you encamp the second day?

	Upon a high hill at Dripping Springs.

	Question. Where did you encamp the third day?

	At Prewitts Knob.

	Question. Where did you encamp the fourth day?

	At Horse Well.

	Question. Did you that day make the march you expected to make?

	I have no reason to think we did not.

	Question. Where did you arrive at the end of the fifth days march?

	At Bear Wallow, quite early in the forenoon.

	Question. When did you leave Bear Wallow?

	On the afternoon of the seventh day out from Bowling Green.

	[NOTE BY GENERAL BUELL.Marched from Bowling Green late on
ihe 16th, and arrived at Munfordville on the 21stjive days instead
of seven.~~]

	Question. Did you know the immediate destination of the army when
leaving Bowling Green?

	I did not.

	Question. Where did you suppose Braggs army was

Page 74

74
ICY., M. AND B. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. (CHAP. XXVIIL
	My impression was that it was moving in a line parallel with onrs, but know noth-
ing of his position.

	Question. Who was in command of your column?

	General Rousseau.

	Question. Of what troops was it composed?

	His own old division and General Smiths.

	Question. Were there any detachments from your column at Bear
Wallow?

	There was a detachment moved in the direction of Glaegow to cut off a train, as I
supposed.

	Question. Did it return before the column left there?

	It did not.

	Question. For what point did you march?

	We marched on the pike, turned to the left, and halted within 3 miles of Munford-
ville.

	Question. On what day of the week and month?

	I cannot give the day of the week; it was on the 21st of September.

	Question. When did you reach Louisville?

	On the 26th September.

	QuestiQn. What is the distance between Louisville and Munford-
ville?

	Between 70 and 80 miles.

	Question. How many encampments did you make between Munford-
yule and Louisville?

	I remember but four.

	Question. Was there any unnecessary loss of time?

	The marches were made promptly. We had good marches up to the time of arriv-
ing at Bowling Green.

	Question. Do you know anything of the amount of supplies on hand
at the time of leaving Bowling Green?

	I do not.

	Question. At what hour on the morning of the 8th of October did
McCooks column leave Mackville?

I moved about 5 oclock.

	Question. Was the line of battle formed by McCooks corps a con-
tinuous line or did it consist of detached positions taken up at the mo-
ment?

	I can make no statement except as to that portion attached to my command.

	Question. Could you judge of the position of the line by the firing?

	I could not.

	Question. Was the engagement throughout the entire line during t~he
principal part of the action?

	I inferred It was a general one.

	Question. Did you know where the headquarters of General McCook
were during the engagement?

 I did not

Page 75

CHAP. XXVttt.]
75
G1~NERAL R1~PORTS.

	Question. Did you know~wIiere the headquarters of General iRons-
sean were during the battle?

	I had no express information wliere they were.

	Question. In your evidence you express surprise at the enemys not
being pursued next day; did that surprise arise from the knowledge
you obtained while a captive or from other circumstances I

	Among other reasons, I had supposed no other division but ours had been engaged.
I was surprised no attack was made the next day because I understood the enemys
attack had been repulsed by our corps. I decline to state anything I saw within the
lines of the enemy.

	Question. Was that attack made by the whole of the rebel army upon
this one corps?

	That I cannot state.

	Question. Is it true that no other part of the lines was attacked ex-
cept General McCooks corps?

	I believe other portions of the army were engaged before the battle was over.

	Question. Did you know that any division of the army was in the
rear and on the march to join its corps?

	I did not; I supposed there was a general concentration of the army at that point.

	Question. Did you know what the strength of the army at Perryville
was on the 8th?

I did not.

	Question. What did you suppose it to be?

	I supposed we had 60,000 or 70,000 men.

	Question. Did you know what the condition of our army was?

	I did not know its condition.

	Question. Did you know what loss it sustained in the battle of the
8th?

	I had no means of ascertaining.

	Question. Had you formed any estimate of the loss.

	No; it would have been impossible.

	Question. What did you suppose to be the strength of the rebel army,
independent of Kirby Smiths force?

	I supposed General Bragg had 40,000 or 50,000.

	Question. Was that the general estimate among persons who had
opportunity of knowing?

	I cannot say what opinion others had; estimates differ.

	Question. What did you suppose to be the force under Kirby Smiths
command; by that I mean the whole rebel force in Kentucky, not in-
cluding Braggs army, and including that of Humphrey Marshall I

I had no knowledge of any other corps except of that portion under command of
Kirby Smith. I estimated that at from 15,000 to 20,000.
	Question. DQes that include the force under Humphrey Marshall?

It does not. Any force under him I know nothing of

Page 76

76
KY., M. AND E TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. (CHAP. XXVIII.
CINCINNATI, December 4, 1862.
	Col. LEWIS D. CAMPBELL, having been duly sworn by the judge-
advocate, testified as follows:

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:
	Question. What is your position in the Army ~?

	I am not in the service now.

	Question. State what was your positiou while in the Army during
service in Tennessee and Kentucky.

	I was colonel of the Sixty-ninth Ohio Volunteer Infantry. I organized the regi-
nient, and was ordered in April last, after it w~s mustered in the service, to report to
General Buell in Nashville. It was in the later part of April that we marched to
Nashville. I arrived there, and not finding his assistant adjutant [general] there I
reported to General Dumont, who was in Nashville at the time. I was ordered by him
to go into camp, and in the course of two or three days I received an order directing
me to distribute my regiment on the line from Nashville to the Duck River near
Columbia, extending over some 40 miles, at five different posts, sub~equently six posts,
and make my headquarters at Franklin, Teun. I had distributed my regiment in
accordance with the order. Subsequently General Negley ordered a ~ompany to be
taken and stationed at Duck River. General Dumont approved of it.

	Question. Where were you at the time General Bragg invaded Ken-
tucky and how long did you remain with the army after that ~
	I was with the army after the 9th of August. I was in Nashville on the 8th, when
I resigned, intending to return within a week, but the railroad communications were
cut off by the guerrillas in the neighborhood of Gallatin, and I was not able to go
home without the risk of being captured. I remained in Nashville until the army
caine north. This was on the 7th of September.

	Question. Can you state the position east of Kasliville which Braggs
army occupied when he invaded Kentucky?

	I cannot state it definitely. On Sunday, the 7th of September, General Crittenden
and other officers came to my room, and in the course of conversation I expressed
great anxiety to come home, but at the same time would like to have some oppor-
tunity of participating in what was then an expected battle. General Crittenden
invited me to go with him, and I made arrangements with him on the march to act
as his volunteer aide in the event of a battle. On that evening (Snuday, September
9), in company with General Crittenden and staft we crossed the Cumberland at
Nashville and came out within 4 or 5 miles on the Gallatin road, and remained there
all night. I came through with Crittenden all the way until we came to Salt River,
about 15 miles south of Louisville. As it was then, the general thought that there
would be no engagement.
	With the permission of General Crittenden I came with his brother to Louisville,
and left the divisions of Generals Crittenden and Wood at West Point. I was not
with the army after that.

	Question. What time was it understood that Bragg had advanced
into Kentucky east of Nashville?
	I think the first I heard of it was about from the 1st to the 5th of September. I am
not quite positive, but I think it was about that time. I cannot name the day within
any certainty.
	We heard that Bragg was crossing the Cumberland River and was up in the neigh-
borhood of Hartsville or in that direction. That place had been regarded as the
headquarters of the guerrillas at the time Colonel Boone was captured and at the
time General Johnson had snrrendered. Lieutenant Holliday was captured at Tyree
Springs and taken to headquarters and then paroled. He represented that there was
a formidable force of rebels at that point. My inducement to go with General Crit-
tenden was the assurance which I had from him privately that to go with the army
would be the safest way to return home. He expressed the Opinion very s~ongly that
there would be an engagement between the contending forces before many days. As
I had gone into Tennessee with a view of assisting there I was anxious before I went
home to particil)ate in a fight.

	Question. Did the subsequent informatioii confirm you in the fact
that the Confederate army had approached 0

Page 77

CHAr. XXVIII.]
GENERAL REPORTS.

	We heard of them on our march of their being on our right. I never heard of any
considerable force being on our left. All the information I received was to the effect
that they were to our right, perhaps a little farther advanced.

	Question. Could you not trace out on the map the march of the rebel
army at Hartsville?

	I could not. I had not the means at the time. I felt a delicacy of exhihiting any
improper inquisitivenesss. I was with General Critteuden almost constantly.

	Question. What position did General Crittendens army hold on that
march?

	I understood the divisions of Generals Wood and Rousseau were in advance of Gen-
eral Crittenden when we left Nashville and that they were to take the Gallatin road.

	The COURT. You must speak of your own knowledge.

	The WIv~Ess. I saw on Monday, after we left Nashville, that we overtook a part
of General Ronsseaus forces. I saw his staff officers and conversed with them and
snbseqnently joined them. We frequently halted on the march to Bowling Green.
Near the city we were encamped a few days. We arrived at Bowling Green on Sat-
urday, the 13th. It was the Saturday before the attack on Mnnfordville. Sunday
we understood that Wilder had been attacked and had repulsed the enemy. On Tues-
day following Wilder surrendered; that was on the 16th, 1 think. At that time we
were in Bowling Green. . We arrived there on Saturday, the afternoon, and remained
until Tuesday evening. General Crittenden was encamped, and General MeCook was
down about 2 miles beyond Bowling Green, at the Cave. I dont exactly recollect the
naiue of the place. General Crittenden marched on Tuesday evening and crossed the
river and there remained over night. We heard on Sunday night or Monday morning
that Munfordville had been attacked.

	Question. At what rate had you been n~arching from Nashville to
Bowling Green?

	I should state here that I am not a soldier by education and profession and know
little about what should be regarded a proper march. From Nashville to Bowling
Green we were halted four times before we arrived at Bowling Green. We were eight
days on the road. I think one day we did not march more than 2 or 3~niles. We
left Bowling Green, as already stated, on Tuesday evening. On that day Colonel
XVilder surrendered. I think the next day we made a pretty heavy march, that is, on
Wednesday. On Tuesday evening we marched through Bowling Green across the
river. We arrived at Cave City in the afternoon on Thursday. It was from there 10
to 12 miles to Munfordville. We crossed the Barren River at Bowlisg Green on the
bridge, but the train, I think, forded it.

	Question. What was the object of the delay at Bowling Green?

	There was a baggage train sent in advance to Bowling Green. It was a heavy
train.

	Question: Did General Crittenden give you any reason for remaining
so long in Bowling Green?

	I think General Crittenden was very anxious to move. He had information that
Frankfort was taken and he seemed rather impatient to move. The troops were also
very anxious to move, particularly the Ohio and Indiana troops, of which our forces
were principally composed.

	Question. Do you know the reasons why Munfordyille was not re-
lieved?

	I never heard of any reason why it was not relieved and no re-enforcements selit.

	(General Buell objected to the question on the ground that the ques-
tion assumes that Muufordville ought to have been relieved and that
it should have been relieved by his army.)

	Question. You left the army near Louisville and of course know
nothing of its subsequent operations?

	I do not.

	Question. How long did you remain in Cave City?
7

Page 78

78
KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAP. XXVHL
	We remained there from Thursday afternoon until Sunday afternoon and then came
on to Munfordville. General Woods corps was in advance of General Crittendens
that afternoon. I left Crittenden soon after we left Cave City. He said then that he
was going to see General Buell. Being upon a hill at that time, I heard cannonading.
I supposed the action had commenced. When I came to Munfordville I found Gen-
eral Wood on the other side of the river near Munfordville with his division. I
learned that he had encountered the rear guai~d of the rebel army and had some light
firing and shelling promiscuously. General Buell came up about dusk. We remained
until about 10 oclock the next day. All the information we could get was that the
enemy had proceeded in the direction of Bardstown to the right, and had commenced
leaving on Saturday morning and continued on Saturday night and Sunday. Gen-
eral Wood drove the last of them out.

	Question. Do you know the direction by which Bragg retired?

	I understood to the right, in the direction of Bardetown, On Monday, 22d, the fol-
lowing day, the advance guard of our army had some skirmishing north of Munford-
ville. We received some information in i~arm.houses where we found some citizens
of secession proclivities and some others of Union sentiments. All confifmed the in-
formation that the enemy had gone to the right. I recollect I was much disappointed,
ns others were, when we received information that the march was directed to the
Elizabethtown road, a different road from that which the enemy took. We went on
to Elizabethtown and from there to West Point; it was a tolerably~ rapid march.
The rate of our march increased when we were made to understand that the enemy
was more to the right than before. At Elizabethtown we halted part of the day and
marched 12 or 13 miles this side. There we remained all night, and the next day we
struck the Salt River, and then I left General Crittenden.

	Question. You left the army at Salt River?

	Yes, sir. I would have remained with General Crittenden, but I supposed there
would be no fighting, and as I had been & long time from b~ome and sick I desired to
go home.

	Question. Do you know anything as to the operations of the army
while you were with the army?

	I do not know anything that would be pertinent to the subject of investigation.

	The CcftIRT. Confine yourself entirely to the invasion of Kentucky.
Where were you when Munfordville was surrendered?

	We were lying at Bowling Green, that is, within 2 miles south of Bowling Green,
from Saturday until Tuesday morning, which covered that Sunday when Colonel
Wilder repulsed the enemy at Munfordville. Wilder surrendered on the following
Tuesday.

	Question. Did you know on Tuesday that he surrendered?

	We did not know that until perhaps we learned it on the march of Wednesday
night. After we got to Cave City Colonel Wilder came in our camp ou parole.
The following morning I heard the circumstances under which he surrendered, and
particularly the fact that a part of the terms were that he should be allowed to go
around the lines of the enemy to see that their representations with regard to their
strength were correct. He gave as his own opinion that Braggs force there was
from 22,000 to 25,000 men and that he had seventy pieces of artillery. I think it was
on Wednesday afternoon when we heard the rumor. We did not know the facts,
however, until Thursday night or Friday morning. Wilder came on Thursday night
to Cave City, and, I believe, remained with us.

By the COURT:

	Question. What is the distance from Cave City to Bowling Green?

	I should judge 25 miles.

	Question. How long did it take to march it?

	It was five days from the time we left Bowling Green until we arrived in Cave
City, two of which days only we were marching.

	Question. Were there any other Federal troops on that march in
advance of Critt~nden?

	I understood he had been sent to the right

Page 79

CHAP. XXVIH.J
GENERAL REPORTS.
79
	Question. State as near as you can.

	There were troops in advance of General Crittenden when we crossed the river at
Bowling Green.
	Question. Do you know whose troops tliey were and their strength?

	I had no information.

	Question. Do you know where they went to?

	I do not know, except from rumor.

	Question. You know whose troops they were. Was it a heavy col-
umn of troops or a few?

	It was a heavy column. I know that General Rousseaus force was there. After
we left Bowling Green we were not delayed long. It was in the evening when we
crossed the river and the next morning our orders were to march. It was about 3
oclock a. m.

	Question. What was the strength of General Crittendens force at
that time?

	I could not give that with precision. There were some changes made in the march.
My information would not be very reliable. I understood there were changes made
in regard perhaps to his artillery. The whole artillery which we had at Cave City,
according to the opinion I heard expressed by Generals Wood and Crittenden, was
one hundred and twenty-six pieces. Colonel Wilder reported the enemys at seventy
pieces. I think General Thomas division did not get up until Saturday night.
General Crittendens headquarters were right in the city, within a stones throw of
the railroad, near the reservoir. I understood General Buell was in the neighbor-
hood at some place within a proper distance of communication. I was not personally
conversant of the fact as to the precise point where General Buell had his headquar-
ters.

Cross-examination by General BUELL:
	Question. Your subsequent information confirmed your impression
that the Confederate army was at llartsville or that Bragg was there?

	I did not understand that he had crossed at that point. That point I understood to
be the headquarters of the rebel forces.

	Question. Did your subsequent information confirm you in your
opinion that he had crossed at that point?

	Somewhere in that region. I do not know whether I had any information as to the
precise point.

	Question. Was the information positive?

	No; it was like any other rumor. It was a rumor obtained in Hartsville.

	Question. Do you know what force the enemy had at that point?

	Only by rumor~ but Inever did put much reliance upon rumor.

	Question. Do you know what the enemys immediate destination
was?

	I do not. I understood that there had been some change. I did not know any-
thing personally of their movements except what I gathered from common conversa-
tion.

	Question. You have stated that there was a general impatience in
the army as to its movement. Did the impatience proceed from a
knowledge of the movements of the enemy or was it mere impulse?

	I did not hear much of the impatience until after we had the information of the
attack upon Colonel Wilder at Munfordville. We were at Bowling Green and halted
three or fonr days. A spirit of impatience began to develop itself in Cave City when
we came in striking distance of the enemy.

	Question. Was the position of the enemy known at that time

Page 80

80
KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAP. XXVIII.
	The information of Colonel Wilders surrender was communicated by the colonel
himself and all we know was through him.

	Question. Had Colonel Wilder surrendered?
	Yes, sir.

	Question. Did you know the strength of the enemy at that time?

	All I know, as I said before, came from Colonel Wilder.

	Question. Did you know the strength of my army?

	From what I had seen I supposed you had probably in the neighborhood of 40,000
or 45,000 men and one hundred and twenty-six pieces of artillery.

	Question. Did you know the precise position of the enemy at Mun.
fordville?

	I did not know.

	Question. Did you know anything of the circumstances that con-
trolled the movement of my army?
	I knew nothing. I was informed that you had a full supply of provisions.

	Question. For how long a time?

	I understood sufficient to take you through to Louisville.

	Question. In what time?

	In the time that it would ordinarily take for a march. 1 do not know that I heard
any one say as to the precise amount of rations. Besides I could not make the proper
estimate as to what should be the necessary supply of the army.

	Question. How many days supply did you think I had?

	I do not recollect the exact amount. I understood from the officers that there was
a sufficient supply.

	Question. Would the date of the arrival of Crittendens army indi-
cate the arrival of the whole army or only a portion?

	I do not think that the whole army arrived at one or the same time.

	Question. What do you consider to be a good days march for a body
of troops?
	As I stated before, I have very little experience in these matters. I should state,
from the little experience I have had, that in order to have men in good fighting
condition they might. make on the average frorri 12 to 15 miles per day and be in good
condition. The march of which I spoke, which General Dumont made, was 45 miles
in twenty-five hours, but was too exhaustive for the men.

	Question. Did you know when the army left Bowling Green what its
immediate destination was?
4

	I did not know. I think it was to overtake or catch Bragg. I had no information,
direct or indirect, and to General Crittenden I propounded no question. It was pre-
sumed the intention was to find The enemy.

	Question. Did you know to what point the army was marching?
	I supposed it marched upon Munfordville, and if the enemy could be found to en-
gage them.

	Question. Did you know that Braggs army had left Glasgow at that
time?
	I did not. I knew nothing of the movement of Bragg except what I learned upon
the march. All I heard was from Colonel Wilder, from Thursday night to Friday
morning.

	Question. Was the army obliged to march to any one point or could
it march upon various roads ~

	I suppose it could have marched upon various roads

Page 81

CHAP. XXVflI.]
GENERAL REPORTS.
81
	Question. I want to know whether it was necessary for the army, in
prosecuting its march, to pass through one point or could it move from
the beginning upon different routes?

	I never had an opportunity to examine the maps which had the routes marked on
them. I understood that a portion of your army had marched off in the direction of
Glasgowto the right in that direction.

	Question. I understand you to say after leaving Bowling Green a
portion of the army had diverged from the main road?

I understood so.

	Question. Upon how many roads?

	They all started upon one route; the road to the right, which a portion took, lay
in the direction of Glasgow. They united again at Cave City. It was said that the
enemy was in Glasgow, but I did not hear anything as to the exact force which Bragg
had there.

	Question. You stated that you were disappointed that instead of
pursuing Braggs army on the road, they turned out in the opposite
direction toward Elizabethtown; what was the immediate advantage
you expected to gain by following that army on its march toward Bards-
town?

	I supposed we had forces enough to achieve a victory over them wherever they might
be found; and as they made toward the Ohio River, I thought we could catch them
in the same direction.

	Question. Was that impression based upon the knowledge you had
of Braggs forces?

	My impression was founded on the belief of the fact that ours was a superior force,
better equipped, & c., and upon my general information which I received from the
specimens of rebel soldiers I had seen. There were some taken upon the road by
skirmishing; they were mounted soldiers.

	Question. Do mounted men constitute the bulk of the rebel army?

	Not exactly.

	Question. What knowledge had you of the circumstances of the
rebel army, respecting their efficiency; as compared with ours?

	I had no opportunity but such as was common to everybody. It is the general im-
pression that the troops of the rebels are inferior to ours. I think the general im-
pression, as far as I had been able to ascertain from those who had the means to obtain
information, is that they are better disciplined than ours, but not as well armed and
equipped. That is the impression to my mind.

	Question. Did you know of the existence or presence of any other
rebel forces besides the army of Bragg in Kentucky?

	I had no information except the representations that were made in regard to Kirby
Smiths force.

	Question. What force was General Smith supposed to have?

	I do not know. My supposition was that Kirby Smith had 20,000 men.

	Question. Did you know the position of Kirby Smiths forces at the
time our army was following General Braggs?

	I noticed perhaps in a paper which we picked up on the road, which stated that
the pickets did come within a few miles of Cincinnati, and this was perhaps in fact
the cause of the impatience which seemed to prevail to engage Bragg and push on to
the Ohio. I understood that General Dumont was off in that direction in Kentucky
between the points of General Smiths and Braggs forces, but that was only rumor
again.

	Question. You stated that General Dumonts force was interposed

6 R RVOL XV

Page 82

82
KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAr. XXVIIL
between them; did you know the strength or efficiency of General
2Dnmonts forces?

I did not know his strength or efficiency.

	Question. Was the force with which I marched from Bowling Green
sufficient to meet the rebels after the junction of Bragg and Smith?

	I should have supposed that you would have sufficient assistance from the direction
of Louisville in the event of the junction of the rebel army.

	Question. Did you know of any such assistance?

	I know there had been a very large force in Louisville of Ohio and Indiana troops

	Question. Did you know the position of the enemys forces?

	I did not.

	Question. Did you know their strength?

	I did not.

	Question. Did you know their movements?

	I did not.

	The commission adjourned to meet December 5, 10 a. m.

LOUISvILLE, December 5, 186210 a. in.
	Commission met pursuant to adjournment. All the members pres-
ent; ako the judge-advocate and General Buell.

J.	T. PRATT, being duly sworn, testified as follows:
By the JTJDGE.ADVOCATE:
	Question. State your name and occupation.

J.	T. Pratt is my name. I am a school teacher by profession, in La Grange, Tenn.

	Question. Have you been in the service of the Unit4~d States; if so,
when, where, & c.?
	I came to Nashville and repoi~ted to General Schoepf; he gave me an introduction
to General Thomas, also an introduction to General Fry, who had two sisters residing
at La Grange. I had left General Braggs army in the Sequatchie Valley. I made
the following report to General Schoepf and General Buell, that I estimated the force
of Braggs army to be from 22,000 to 25,000 men. I drew my statement from this,
that they had moved in the warmest of the weather from Tupelo, Miss., and had left
many sick there. I would also state that after having laid there inactive some
time they left a number of sick at Chattanooga. I said I had counted several regi-
ments and taken an average from these. In stating now the average I must rely
wholly upon my memory. I averaged them at between 200 and 300. I stated there
were three and sometimes four regiments to a brigade. In my first statement I said
there were three brigades to a division and six divisions in the army. I then stated
the respective commanders. There were two corps, or wings, commanded respectively
by Generals Polk and Hardee. That I think is the extent of my report to him.

	Question. State, if you know, what course the rebels would take in
invading Kentucky.
	General Buell asked me if I thought they were directing their course to Nashville
I stated I thought they were not.

	Question. What opportunity had you of knowing their strength?
	By observation and inquiry.

	Question. Were you inside the enemys lines?
	I was.

	Question. Where was General Buell when you made this report?

	At Nashville, in a house on High street

Page 83

CHAP. XXVIII.]	GENERAL REPORTS:	83


	Question. Did you make any subsequent report to General Buell?

	General Sohoepf requested General Thomas to have me return to General Braggs
lines. I did so, finding him at Glasgow. I arrived at Glasgow on Sunday; I do not
remember the day of the month. I there saw General Braggs army strike their tents
on that Sabbath, and then had an opportunity of counting several regiments and made
several inquiries. I saw also the pike which they took in leaving Glasgow. I re-
turned and reported in the first place to General Schoepf; he sent me to General
Thomas and I reported to him. He sent me to General Buell in the morning. I con-
firmed my former statement as to the numerical strength of the enemy. I recollect
in my second statement to General Buell I said I had found out that some divisions
had four brigades. I stated to him the pike they tookthe pike that runs due north,

	Question. How many days elapsed between your time of leaving
Glasgow and your report to General Buell?

	I should think four or five days.

	Question. In either of your reports did General Buell inquire regard-
ing artillery?

	As to that I should not like to say upon oath what the question or the answer was.
I think I told him a battery to a brigade.

	Question. Did General Buell question you as to the general condi-
tion of the army, as to supplies and transportation, & c.?

	I think there were some questions asked in regard to a wagon train. I think I
made the statement they were well armed. As to supplies, if I made a statement I
do not recollect what it was. I think I said they had a small wagon train.

	Question. At the time you made your second statement, at Prewitts
Knob, was it known generally that Munfordville was surrendered?

	I think I heard of it at Bowling Green before I made the report.

Cross-examination by General BUELL:
	Question. What did you estimate the strength of the rebel army at
Tupelo to be?

	I dont think I made an estimate, but they left a number of sick.

	Question. Can you answer how many?

	I think I made the statement they had buried several thousand, but not as to num-
ber of sick who were left there. It would be very difficult to form an estimate of the
number of sick General Bragg left in Mississippi. I made no estimate. I think
	many~~ was the adjective I used.	-

	Question. How long were you at Tupelo?

	I merely passed through there, perhaps remaining ten or twenty hours. In speaking
of the graves, I would say I came to Tupelo from Holly Springs; that in entering
Tupelo by the road I came I passed through several camping grounds, or, more prop-
erly, by several camping grounds, from which the army had been withdrawn, - and
upon each camp ground I saw the graves where each several brigade had buried their
dead. In most cases these were marked by a few rails piled up; in some cases a piece
of board with an inscription. I rode to several of these plats and counted the graves,
and in that way I arrived at the estimate of the dead (several thousand).

	Question. Was the army with which General Bragg invaded Ken-
tucky identically the same as that you saw at Tupelo?

	As to that question I cannot make a distinct reply, as I arrived at Tupelo after a
part of the army had left.
	Question. When were you at Tupelo?

	In the month of July, the latter part.

	Question. Had the principal part of the army left at that time?

	All had left, I think, excepting Prices division and the divisior~ of which General
Walker is a brigadier-general

Page 84

84
KY., M. ANt~ B. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAP. XXVJIL
	Question. When did you arrive at Chattanooga?
	I arrived in Chattanooga just as the rear of the army was passing the river. Saw
General Bragg on the south side of the river. Cannot positively fix the date.
	Question. Did you see the whole of the army at Chattanooga or
near there?

	I saw what I considered all the army after I crossed the river on the march.

	Question. Had any portion of the army left the river when you ar-
rived; and, if so, what portion of it?

	A portion of it had, but what portion of it I could not state. A portion of it had
marched 4 or 5 miles from the river and camped.

	Question. Did the army cross Waldens Ridge by one or more than
one road?

	I should think they nearly all crossed by the old Anderson road.

	Question. Did you accompany the army on the march; and, if so,
what portion of it, how long, and up to what point?

	When the army camped on the north side of the river, that night after dark I rode
to General Wheelers cavalry brigade; this was the advance of the army, I think, at
that time, that went on the road I mentioned before, the old Anderson road. I think
it passed over the next day. I passed with it. It went as far as a Mr. Bennetts
house, about 3 or 4 miles from Dunlap, at the point where the road entered the
Sequatchie Valley. It was there I saw the army cross the next day and there made
my estimate of its strength. I arrived at my conclusion in regard to the strength by
conversation with officers on the road from Tupelo to Chattanooga and by observa-
tion while with the army. I counted one or two regiments in Cheathams division;
most of his men are Teunesseeans. One or two in General Withers division; General
Withers division I supposed to be chiefly Alabamians.

	Question. Did the whole of the army cross at Chattanooga?

	The portion I saw crossed at Chattanooga.

	Question. Did it halt in Sequatchie Valley while you were there or
continue its march?

	I cannot state as to that; I left.

	Question. Did you count the divisions as they came into the valley?

	No, sir; I did not.

	Question. What reasoli, have you to believe that you saw the whole
of the army at that time?

	I heard it stated that the whole army was there. I also saw a great number of
soldiers.

	Question. Did the artillery cross by the same road? Did it cross
with the troops or separately?

	There was artillery that followed the cavaky and also infantry that was with the
artillery.

	Question. Can you state how much artillery crossed with the cav-
alry?

	No, sir; I dont know how many pieces; a good many. I saw some infantry cross
with the artillery, but that all the infantry crossed by that road I cant say.

	Question. Did you see any artillery besides that that accompanied
the cavalry?

	I saw other artillery in the valley; I mean to say I saw more artillery in the val-
ley than I thought I had seen cross the mountains.

	Question. Did you count the number of pieces then?

I never~counted the artiflery, no more titan that. As I said before, I saw in sor~

Page 85

CHAP. XXVIII.]
GENERAL REPORTS.
85
cases four and some cases six guns to a battery. As to a general estimate of gnus, I
(lid not make that.

	Question. Did your estimate of the strength of Braggs army, which
you say you reported to me, include cavalry?

	I think I made a separate report of cavalry. My estimate of 25,000 includes every.
thing.

	Question. Did you know what route the army proposed to take and
what destination it had in view?

	I heard Pikeville and Sparta mentioned as places of destination, and judged from
that they were going to Nashville.

	Question. By what route did you reach Nashville after you left
Braggs army?

	I struck from where we were through Dunlap. I was some time in goii~g. I fol-
lowed no particular road, but passed near Pikeville, leaving it to my right; then
near a little town called Bunker Hill, leaving Sparta to my left; thence to Rome, a
little place on the Cumberland River, leaving Carthage on the right; from Rome di-
rectly to Nashville, entering Nashville on the Lebanon pike. I arrived two or three
weeks after leaving Chattanooga. This I state from recollection.

	Question. Did you leave Dunlap in advance of the -rebel army?

	I left before the bulk of the army had arrived. A little cavalry was there when I
reached there.

	Question. How long was it after you left Nashville until you arrived
at Glasgow?

	Nearly two days.

	Question. Did you see the whole army at Glasgow?

	I saw what I considered the bulk of it.

	Question. How many divisions did you see?

	I did not see the army division by division, but I saw a large portion of General
Buckners division; I counted several regiments in this, as I have before stated. 1
also saw four brigades in one division .1 saw Generals Cheathams and Buckners
divisions, and counted the strengtli of some of the regiments; found them to be
from 225 to 325, and drew an average of 280 to 290.

	Question. Did you count the number of regiments in a brigade?

	I counted the number in two brigades; in one three, in another four regiments.

	Question. Did you count the number of brigades in a division?

	In one instance I didGeneral Buckners division; I found it to be four brigades.

	Question. Under what circumstances did you leave the rebel army?
Were you privileged to leave or did you leave without permission?

I left without a pass or permission. I had no conversation with any one about it.

	Question. Had you any reasonable apprehension of being prevented
from leaving; and, if so, what means did you resort to to avoid appre-
hension?

	I was not regularly in the army; was not connected with it in any way; and I
wasnt in any department; therefore I supposed that I would be conscripted if I re-
mained or forced to take np arms in some way. I rode up out through Dunlap be-
fore they established pickets. I rode the same horse I rode around Tupelo.

	Question. Did you have any intercourse with high officers in the
rebel army?
	No, sir; I did not. I conversed with Captain Alexander, from Lpuisville, Ky.; he
nras General Walkers assistant adjutant-general. I had conversation with him at
Tupelo. Occasion ally on the road from Tupelo I had conversation with others, but
not lengthy on the road from Tupelo

Page 86

KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. ECHAP. XXVIII.

	Question. How did you make your escape from the rebel army the
second time 01
	As I stated before, I staid at Glasgow until General Braggs army had left; then I
left.

	Question. Who were you staying with when you were in the army?

	I was with a brother, in First Alabama, Allen commanding.

	Question. IDid you have to make any explanation upon your return?

	I did not see any person that recognized me. I was arrested by a citizen where I
staid alinight for expressions that Imade. He had a pistol and saw that I wasunarmed;
said that be was going to carry me back to the lines. Bnt at last he relented, after
he fonnd tbe army had moved. That is all the interference I met with.

	Question. Did you return to the rebel army after your interview with
General it3uell at Prewitts Knob?

	Yes, sir.

	Question. State where you found it, how long you remi~ined with it,
and where you left it.

	I found it at Bardstown, two days after I left General Buell. Remained there one
day before I was arrested by a Captain Burton, from La Grange, as a Union man, and
was placed in the guard-house with United States soldiers, among others Lieutenant
Scott, Fourth Indiana Cavalry. After I had been there two days I was sent south of
the lines with General Forrest, who left at this time with an escort to take charge, as
I supposed, of the Army of the Tennessee. I came down with him through Spring-
field, Lebanon, Tompkinsville, from thence to Dixons Springs. All this time I was
under arrest. When I got at Dixons Springs it was in the afternoon, 5 oclock.
General Forrest went to a private honse and took me with him. ~J2be next morning
he left early, as he said, for Lebanon~ Tenn. He left three or four men with me to
follow on after him. They were all privates. I went with them nearly to the river,
where they crossed from Dixons Springs to Lebanon road. Here I dismounted in
a lane. The privates with whom I was left had all procured liquor and at this time
were quite intoxicated. I dismounted~ as I said before, and I made my escape and
went to Nashville.

	Question. Where have you been since?

	I have been at Nashville, at Murfreesborough, and at Chattanooga.

	Question. Did you go to Chattanooga on any duty for the Govern-
ment?

	Yes, sir; I went there for General Negley and arrived at this place yesterday.

	Question. What did you come here for?

	I was going to New York to see my father.

	Question. How happened it that you were summoned before this
Commission?

	I recognized General Scboepf in the office and spoke to him. He asked me where I
was going. I told him. He requested me to remain here, and I received an order to
appear here at 12 oclock.

	Question. Have you received compensation from the Government for
your secret service?

	I received from you $150, and $30 from General Negley; that is all I received.

	The Commission adjourned to meet December 8, at 10 a. m.


NASHVILLE, December 8,186210 a. m.
	Commission met pursuant to adjournment. All the members present;
also the judge-advocate and General Buell

Page 87

ChAP. XXVIII.]
GENERAL REPORTS.

	Maj. Gen. A. McD. MCCOOK (a witness for the Government), being
duly sworn, testified as follows:

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

	Question. State, if you please, your position in the Army of the
United States.

	I am a major-general of volunteers since the 17th of July, 1862.

	Question. You will state, if you please, what part of that time you
were under the command of Major-General Buell, and especially during
the invasion of Kentucky by Bragg, and all you know about the expe-
dition following.

	I organized and commanded the Second Division of the Army of the Ohio at Camp
Nevin; that was my command when General Buell assumed command of the Army of
the Ohio. I marched with that division to Nashville with short delays on the road
at different camps, and from Nashville to the battle-field of Shiloh; from thence to
Corinth; thence to Battle Creek, Tenn., and there was placed in command of the
Fifth Division in addition to my own. The Fifth was commanded by General Qritten-
den. I commanded these two divisions in front of Chattanooga, where the rebel
army, under General Bragg, was snpposed to be concentrating. I remained at Battle
Creek until General Buell planned an advance against the enemy, part of which I
was to carry out. My orders were to march up the Sequatchie Valley. I will state one
brigade (the Fourth) was here detached and stationed along the Nashville and Chatta-
nooga Railroad as far as Cowan. My instructions were on marching up Sequatchie Val-
ley to leave Crittendens division at the place where the Higginhottom pike leaves the
Sequatchie Valley to ascend the Cumberland Mountains. With the rest of my com-
mand I was to move up to Andersons house, and there preyent the enemy from cross-
ing Sequatchie Valley and guard the Anderson road. When I reached to within 10
miles of the Anderson road I was on the march, and was met by two of my spies, whom I
considered trusty men. One was a corporal in the Forty-ninth Ohio, the other a
refugee from Chattanooga I had sent out. They presented me with a synopsis of
wbat they had seen around Chattanooga. Theyapproached me in different dircctions
and had not seen each other. They informed me that Bragg was crossing at Chatta-
nooga with seventy regiments and a great deal of artillery; that Withers was
crossing at Harrison, 12 miles above, had already crossed eleven reolmeuts; Mc-
that
Cown was crossing at Kingston (this was about the 10th of August), supposed to
have 10,000 men. General Heth commai~ded a division under him. The most reli-
able of these spies, Corporal Kennedy, informed me that the army that crossed at
Chattanooga were advancing rapidly toward Anderson road. That same niorning I
received information that 600 of the enemys cavalry had reached Dunlap. I then
had but two brigades and three batteries of artillery with me. Had been informed
by a citizen of that vicinity, whom I considered loyal, that the enemys pickets and
advance were on the top of Waldens Ridge, 7 miles from where I was to go to take
position. Knowing there were several roads crossing Waldens Ridge practicable
for infantry and cavalry, I did not consider it safe for me to go to that place with a
command of that size. My instructions from General Buell were to take position upon
the Anderson road; to hold it if I could; if not, to retreat by a road to Tracy City; in
case I could not reach Anderson road to ascend the mountain by Higginbottom turu-
pike to Tracy City, where I would be met by General Schoepf. I did not know what
command General Schoepf had, but was merely informed that he would meet me
there. I did not know he commanded the First Division.
	I then returned to Higginbottom pike with my command; went to top of mountain
myself; tried to carry a battery up, and found the road impracticable for military
carriages. I then marched from that point with my own and Crittendens division
back to Battle Creek, and camped 6 miles from the month of the stream. From this
point I could have marched by Sweedens Cove road, which led to Tullahoma; by
Battle Creek road to Pelham, or by Fiery Gizzard road.
	While in this camp I received an order from General Buell (I would here add, the
part of General Buells plan on the Anderson road I alone am responsible for; I did
not carry out his instructions) to march with my two divisions to Peiham; to reach
Pelham by one days march; to march from Pelham to Altamont, and then form a
junction with General Thomas, and attack the enemy on Therman road in case he
advanced that way.
	On my march from Battle Creek to Pelham night overtook me 7 miles from Pelham.
I there bivouacked with my two divisions and descended the mountain the next
morning, and reached Pelham at 10 oclock (5th of September). There found Gen-
eral Schoepf encamped with First Division of the army, and was joined by the other
8

Page 88

88	~, ~. AND B. TENN.; N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAP. xxvm.

brigade of my division, which marched from Tullahoma. I sent couriers when on
top of the mountain to Altamont. They returned and reported General Thomas had
been there with about 600 cavalry, but had left. An order reached me at Peihani
from General Buell that in case I had not descended the mountain to encamp at a
place where Battle Creek road intersected the road which led from Tracy City down
to Cowan.
	I went into camp at Pelham and assumed command of all the troops there. Was
there visited by General Buell in person, who ordered me to move with my own (Sec-
ond) division up to Altamout. I remained there until I exhausted all forage and
water, and then descended the mountain by Hickory Creek road and encamped at
Hubbards Cove. Our army had been on one-half rations for a month, except what the
men had provided for themselves, such as green corn and fresh meat. Our supply of
salt was very smalL I will state General Buell sent me a synopsis of his plan of
campaign while at Battle Creek, which was to attack the enemy as they debouched
into the Sequatchie Valley and as he descended into the plains of Tennessee from the
Cumberland Mountains, which was as perfectly planned as could be. This plan
could not be carried out for want of supplies. The railroad was constantly kept cut,
and my impression then was that we had but twenty days rations for our army in
Tennessee.
	After reaching my camp in Hubbards Cove, on Hickory Creek, I there received
General Buells plan of concentrating his army at Murfreesborough and my instruc-
tion what to do. This plan of concentration, in my opinion, was as~ perfect as it
possibly could be. I then marched on Murfreesborough; had entire control of the
rear of the army until I reached the city of Nashville.
	The enemy in their movements could have but two objectivesNashville and Ken-
tueky. I considered a march to Kentucky a hazardous one for them, and, in case we
were to fight in Tennessee, Murfreesborough or Nashville were the points we could
concentrate at. By coming to Nashville, by assistance of troops from the Army of the
Mississippi, we could place about 15,000 more men in line to fight than we could at
Murfreesborough.
	I was never satisfied with the manner in which General Buells army was scattered
along the Memphis and Charleston Railroad. But I believe others, higher in au-
thority, are responsible for that altogether. I was never told so by General Buell,
but still that was my impression.
	General Buell has been censured by the public press for not arriving at the battle
of Shiloh sooner. I commanded his advance, and had communication with General
Grant, who was at Savannah. I built the bridges over Duck River. I dont believe
be could have gotten his troops to the battle of Shiloh sooner without abandoning
his transportation. Duck River was not fordable for 50 miles either way, there being
40 feet of water in it. A notification was also received from General Nelson stating
we would not be needed before Tuesday. There was no information that warranted
any rapid marches. I supposed General Buells army was to co-operate in an offen-
sive cump*ign, and that Savannah was the point to concentrate upon.
	I do not remember the day I arrived in Nashville, with rear of General Buells
army, from Murfreesborough. I arrived at Mill Creek, 2~ miles from Nashville, with
750 wagons, about 3,000 cavalry, and my own division, at 11 oclock at night; made
the march in one day, 30 miles. I reported in person to General Buell that night
about 12 oclock. I returned to my camp that night; received an order early next
morning to be ready to march. I was on the march and received an order, counter-
manding the former, to encamp at McEwings house, about 11 miles from here, with
niy own old division. I remained here that day and until 5 oclock on the evening
of the next day.
	During my stay that time near Nashville I visited General Buell some two or three
times. On one occasion he asked me about how many men it would take to defend
Nashville. I replied about 20,000 men. I believe he asked me if I thought 20,000
men would hold it. I told him I did not consider it a very defensible place. At that
lime I thought Prices army was marching into Middle Tennessee. I advised General
Buell to adandon the place and to allow me to burn it. He replied Nashville must
be held at all hazards, and was very glad he did not select me to defend it. My rea-
s@iis for advising General Buell to burn Nashville, I believe it to be the most trea-
~eiialde place in the Southern country, except the little place of Murfreesborongh.
I was in General Buells quarters on the evening of the second day I arrived here,
when he received a dispatch from Genea~l Jacob Aminen that his outpost at Edge-
tidd Junction was in the presence of the advance of the enemy. General Buell then
ordered me to proceed immediately to his assistance with my division. I reached
Edgefield Junction about 2 oclock in the morning. Ammens division was ordered
to move forward that morning on the road to Bowling Green. I was there joined
that morning by General Bueli and staff. General Buell then marched that morning
with my division toward Bowling Green. We left that cairip at 12 oclock the same
day we arrived and marched to Tyree Springs. The next march we made was withi

Page 89

CHAP. XXVIII.]
GENERAL UEPORTS.
89
14 miles of Bowling Green, at a creek which made its appearance there, and next
morning my division reached a place, Cave Mills, 4 miles this side of Bowling Green.
There we found General Crittenden encamped with his division. We encamped there
that night. Next day I marched to a camp lj miles below Bowling Green, near Bar-
ren River. At Bowling Green the army was reorganized, as far as command was con-
cerned. These divisions were called columns, consisting of two divisions each. We
remained at Bowling Green two days. My command consisted of my own division and
the division of General Robert [B.] Mitchell, of the Army of the Mississippi. I then
received an order to march next morrdng. The rest of the army, Crittenden and
Rousseau. I marched that day to Dripping Springs, 16 miles from Bowling Green,
with my two divisions. We remained at Dripping Springs until next day, 1 oclock.
I then moved on and camped at Prewitts Knob, a distance of 13 miles. Remained at
Prewitts Knob two days; then marched to a point near Mnnfordville, on Green River,
a distance of about 14 miles; made the march at night. Next day I marched from
Munfordville and camped at Bacon Creek, having to cross Green River. Next day
I was marched from Bacon Creek to Elizabethtown, a distance of 24 miles. Next
days mar~h was from Elizabethtown to mouth of Salt River, 23 miles. Next days
march was within 7 miles of Louisville, at a place called Greenwood, on the Ohio
River, at 10 oclock p. m. On reaching Greenwood, as the rear of my division was
marching into camp, I received an order to march upon Louisville. The roads being
very dusty and great scarcity of water and hard marching upon pike roads, my men
were worn-out. I sent for my brigade commanders and inquired particularly as to
the condition of my men. I then postponed marching until 3 oclock a. m. At 3
oclock a. m. I received a note from General Buell by hands of Lieutenant Anderson,
ordering my division to halt where I was, General Buell supposing I had been on
the march. I also received a note from General Crittenden, who had obeyed the order
and marched on Louisville, not to hurry my command, as his men were standing in
the streets and not assigned to any camp. I left my camp at Greenwood at 8 oclock
and marched to Louisville and camped near the Jeffersonville Ferry, where I remained
until an advance was made against Bragg and Kirby Smith, then in Kentucky.
	At Louisville the army was organized into corps, consisting of three divisions. I
was placed in command of the First Corps, consisting of my own (Second) division,
General Rousseaus division (Third), and General Jacksons division (Eleventh), con-
sisting of raw levies. I dont exactly remember the number of days we were at Louis-
ville in reorganizing, but we moved at the earliest possible moment supplies could be
obtained, and as it was I marched with a deficiency of canteens and haversacks. We
marched without baggage. I think one wagon to a regiment was allowed to carry
officers blankets and a few rations. Soldiers had mess-pans made and carried them
on their persons. Regiments that were supplied with cooking utensils one wagon
was allowed to carry them.
	When we marched from Louisville my corps was divided. Sills division was
ordered to march on Shelbyville pike toward Frankfort. My other division marched
6 miles on Bardstown pike, then turned to the left on Taylorsville pike, and camped
that night beyond Jeffersontown. I was ordered next day to march to a point, the
junction of Shelbyville and Taylorsville and Louisville and Taylorsville pikes. It
was absolutely impossible for me to encamp there, as the streams were dry. I marched
that night 5 mlles farther, to Taylorsville, on Salt Rivor. I remained at Taylors-
vile next day; the day after marched to Bloomfield. I was kept in communication
with General Buell, and he prescribed the days march for each corps from day to day.
The orders were for each corps to have four orderlies at his headquarters, so as to
enable him to communicate with the different corps from day to day.
	I remained at Bloomfield with my two divisions from Saturday until Monday morn-
ing. While at Bloomfield I received instructions from General Buell to be ready to
march to the support of Sill in case he should fail at Frankfort or to be ready to
march to the support of Sill to operate with the main body in an attack on Bragg. I
then received an order to march from Bloomfield to Harrodsburg, there to form a
junction with Sill at or near Harrodsbnrg. I sent that order to General Sill and told
him to meet me on a certain day. This order was countermanded. Sill was ordered
to march by way of Lawrenceburg and Chaplintown, and then follow my route, by
way of Chaplintown, Wiliisburg, and Mackville, to the position assigned me at Perry-
ville. General Buell sent me a guide, Capt. Beverly [D.] Williams, who bore a~ order.
The order was an optional one to march by way of Willisburg and Mackville to
Perryville, and if that was impracticable to march by way of Springfield. Captain
Williams informed me he could carry me through by way of Willisburg and Mack-
ville. I left Bloomfield Monday and marched to Chaplin River, l~ miles beyond
Chaplintown. On Tuesday I marched to Mackvilleon the 7th uf October. At 2
oclock on the morning of the 84h I received a letter of instructions relating to my
position in line at Perryville, ordering me to march at 3 oclock a. m. I marched at
5 ocThck a. in., my division being separated about a mile on account of water. I
reached a point designated for my line about 9 oclock a. m. near Perryvilie. Was
ordered to take position about 3 miles from Perryville

Page 90

90
ItY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [ChAr. XXVIII.
	When I arrived at the point designated General Rousseau went forward and recon-
noitered the ground. I saw General Gilberts line, his left skirmishing with the
enemy, although no enemy were visible except a few in the woods and along the fence.
The enemy were driven from the front. I sent my aide, Lieutenant Hosca, to see whose
troops they were. He returned and reported they were Colonel Greusels. I called
General Rousseaus attention to the left of General Gilberts line, and also Captain
Loomis, who was Rousseaus chief of artillery, and marked the line of battle for them.
I was a total stranger to the country. Captain B. D. Williams, who was my guide,
was called off to General Buells headquarter& at 7 oclock that a. m. I marked the
line of battle of General Rousseau, and Captain Loomis replied they understood it
perfectly. I commenced forming it, and selected the position for Loomis battery
myself. The right of my line was not over 350 yards from General Gilberts left. The
line was then being formedRousseaus divisionthe line being marked out for it.
General Jacksons division had not yet arrived on the ground. On the march I pick-
eted all the roads leading from Mackville leading to my rear. General Gay in the
mean time was making a reconnaissance with cavalry.
	Our march that day to Mackville had to be done carefully. I had fiai~kers and
skirmishers thrown out. Jacksons division, being composed of raw troops, understood
their duties imperfectly, and consequently could not niarch rapidly. I ordered General
Rousseau to reconnoiter my front with skirmishers. He ordered the Tenth Ohio, coin-
manded by Lieutenant-Colonel Burke. I gave orders to Major Campbell, my assist-
ant adjutant-general, to post General Jacksons division on a high pilce of gronud
to the right of the Mackville road with regiments doubled on time center, with a view
to move them in any direction. I then informed General Rousseau that my order was
to report to General Buell in person and that I was about to leave the field (11 a. in.),
but would return in a short time. I would state that previously I had a conversation
with Captain Long, who was stationed in that part of the field as a picket. He told
me he had been there and had only seen a little force of the enemys cavalry; that
General Gilberts troops had been engaged with the enemy, but not in any force.
General Buells written instructions led me to believe he was going to attack the enemy
at Perryville.
	I left the field and reported to General Buell in person, whose headquarters were
2~ miles from my line. I reached his headquarters about 12.30 oclock; reported that
my line was formed; my right was about 350 yards from Gilberts left; also reported
my men wanted water badly, the water the night before being scarce and bad at
that. He ordered me to return to my line and make a reconnaissance down to the
Chaplin River and obtain water for my men. I left his tent in company with his
chief of staff Colonel Fry. I asked Colonel Fry whowas down in Perr:ville. He
replied Hardee was there with two divisions. I then bade them good-by, and said I
was going down to drink at the river and asked him to go. I returned to my line,
and found that General Rousseau had placed a couple of batteries in position and
replied to three batteries that had opened on him at long range. I rode up to where
the batteries were, and not seeing a~ny of the enemys infantry, I ordered no more
ammunition to be wasted. I was then informed by my guide, Captain Williams, and
Colonel Harris, commanding Ninth Brigade, that if I would ride off to the left a few
hundred yards on the Mackville road I would get a position that would command
Chaplin River and could see the water. I went forward in person, examined the
ground, and saw the water. Sent for GenerMs Jackson and Terrill, told theni what I
was ordered to do, showed them the water, marked out a line for them, which was a
continuation of the left of Harris brigade, Rousseaus division, right resting on a wood
and line running ahing a high commanding ridge, and at the left of the line was
a crochet to the rear, in order to hold the high ground. General Jackson replied to me,
as did also General Terrill, that they understood the line, They had l)reviously sent
for the troops to place in that position, and were then on the march to this position.
I also ordered General Terrill, as soon as his line was formed, to advance a line of skir-
mishers down to the water. He replied to me, Ill do it, and thats my water. The
only enemy in sight at that time was about 400 or 500 cavalry on the other side of
Chaplin River (1 oclock). Water was about 600 yards in front of my line. This
cavalry was drmven away by Stones battery, Starkweathers brigade, that was put in
position on a high ridge to the left of my line. I had previously ordered two compa-
nies Thirty-third Ohio into the woods as skirmishers to reconnoiter the woods. I
ordered General Jackson to superintend this reconnaissance, and he replied that he
would. I told him I would then ride down into these woods and see what they were
about, as I heard nothing from them. General Jackson requested me not to go, say-
ing that Providence had been kind to me, and that some lurking scoundrel might shoot
me. I told him I would not go, and rode to the right in the rear of the skirmishers,
and in a few minutes the firing commenced hetweerf the Second a
skirmishers and the enemy.	nd Thirty-tb ird Ohio
	About 2 oclock an assault was made uponmy entire line, the heaviest being on my
left and center. In about half an hour after I left Jackson Williams reported to m

Page 91

CHAP. XXVIII]
GENEI~AL REPO1~1?S.
91
Jackson was killed. As soon as I found the assault was going to be a general one I
dispatched an aide to General Sheridan to see to my right that it was not turned.
About 3 oclock, when I found the enemy were outnumbering me, I sent an aide to
the nearest commander for assistance (Captain Fisher). He met General Schoepf on
the road marching to the battle-field. Captain Fisher was referred to General Gil-
bert, who was with General Schoepfs command, and was referred by General Gilbert
to General BuelL At 3.30 oclock I dispatched another aide, Captain Hoblitzell, to
General Schoepf, to tell 1dm my condition. The same time I dispatched Major Bates,
of my staff, to report to General Buell my condition. In the mean time Terrills bri-
gade, of Jacksons division, which consisted of all raw troops, had given way, but
Starkweathers brigade, being so admirably posted, drove the enemy back on the left.
I remained in the left center of my line until the enemy were driven in confusion from
the left center and center of my line and then galloped to the right, and arrived just
in time to see my right turned by a heavy force of the enemy. It was then and there
most of my casnalties occurred that day. I ordered two regiments of Websters bri-
gade, which had been posted in the rear of the right center of Rousseaus line, to move
to the right and repel the assault. I galloped to Russells house, where myheadquar-
ters had been during the morning, and ordered my chief of artillery to bring up a
section of artillery and repel this advance of the enemy. The section was opened,
but they opened a battery about 600 yards from us and opened such a heavy fire upon
that point that the battery was brought away. Loomis battery bad exhapsted all
its long-range ammunition and had been retired 100 yards in rear of Russell ~ house.
I rode to the battery, and ordered Captain Loomis, as soon as the enemy came close
enough, to open upon them with canister. He double-charged his Parrott guns and
did it handsomely. I then rode back to where the Mackville and Perryville and
Springfield-Dicksville roads cross.

	(Continued December 9, 1862.)

NASHVILLE, December 8, 1862.

	Lient. FRANK [J.] JONES (a witness for the Government), being duly
sworn by the judge-advocate, testified as follows:

By JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

	Question. What position have you in the service?

First lieutenant, Thirteenth Regiment Ohio Infantry, and acting assistant adjutant-
general of Third Division.

	Question. State whether or not you were in the battle of Perryville,
whether you were taken prisoner there, and what you know of the num-
ber of the enemy.
I was in the battle of Perryville; was taken prisoner there just at night-fall, 8 or
9 oclock, after the battle. As regards the number of the enemy, I know nothing ex-
cept what I heard from Captain Spence, assistant inspector-general Polks staff, ~who
stated they were 30,000 or 35,000 strong.

	(Objected to by General Buell on account of its being hearsay evi-
dence. The room was cleared and the objection was sustained.)
	Question. State what you know of the subsequent movements of the
enemy.
Of that I know nothing, being taken to Harrodsburg by a circuitous route, avoid-
ing their army. I saw nothing except detached bodies near Harrodsbnrg; besides, I
made no inquiries.

	Question. How long were you at llarrodsburg after the battle when
paroled?
Was paroled day after the battle, in provost-marshals office in Harrodsburg,

	Could you judge from the bodies you saw which way the enemy were
moving?
No, sir; I could not.

Cross-examination by General BUELL:
	Question. What time did you arrive at Harrodsburg?

Next day after the battle, 12 or 1 oclock

Page 92

92
itY., M. AND E. TI~NN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. ~CHAP. XXVIII.
	Question. State, if you please, what route you took in going there.

	After leaving General Polks headquarters we went by a circuitous route, over a
dirt road, until we met the main body of the rebels, which wa~ on the march to Har-
rodsburg. At this point we left the road upon which they wer
through the woods to Harrodsburg.	e marching and went

	Question. On what road is the residence of Mr. Bowman, at which
you staid

	At the junction of two roads, one leading to Danville the
right-hand side as you went near Harrodsburg.	other came in on the

	Question. You are positive the left-hand road was the Danville road ~

	I am not positive it is the main road to Danville, but the road we went.

	Question. Did you see any large bodies of rebel troops marching past
Mr. Bowmans house while you were there?

	No, sir; I did not.

	Question. What do you mean by detached bodies of tr9ops which
you say you saw?

	Smaller bodies of men than the whole column~
the column.	, a brigade or regiment away from

	Question. Where did you see them and in what way were they
marching?

	As far as the troops in the town are concerned, they appeared to have no apparent
object; those leaving the town marched from the town on the opposite side from that
where Mr. Bowmans house was situated.

	Commission adjourned to meet December 9, at 10 a. m.


NASHVILLE-, December 9, 186210 a. m.
	Commission met pursuant to adjournment. All the members present;
also the judge-advocate and General Buell.

	General ROBERT B. MITCHELL (a witness for the Government), being
duly sworn, testified as follows:
By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

	Question. What is your position in the Army of the United States ~
	Brigadier-general.

	Question. State,. if you please, what service you have seen under
General Buell in Tennessee and Kentucky as to time.
	I marched from Inka to Tennessee on the 28th July 1862, in command of the Fourth
Division in the Army of the Mississippi, for the put~pose of joining General Buells
command at this point. I do not think it possible that I can recall the dates. I
marched to Columbia, Tenn., under my written orders, and there I received orders
by telegraph to join General Buells army at Murfreesborongh, Tenn., which Idid,
and reported to General Buell in person. From there I marched to this point, Nash-
ville. Mter mmaininghere a few days, in the rear of General Buells army, I marched
in the direction ofLouisville, under his directions. I do not remember where lover-
took the main army. The army was at Bowling Green, Ky., marching to Louisville
and from Louisville to Crab Orchard. At Louisville the army was reorganized. In
consequence of the arrest of General Davis I was placed in command of the Ninth
Division of the Army of the Ohio, and commanded it from Louisville to Crab Orchard.

	Question. Do you know at what place the rebels under General Bragg
invaded or crossed the Cumberland in their invasion of Kentucky?

I do not.

	Question. Do you know anything of their line of march to Bardstown

Page 93

CHAP. xxvm.j
GENERAL REPORTS.
93
	Only from report. From Bardstown I followed close intheir wake to Perryville. I
commanded the advance of the central army corps from Bardstown to Perryville.

	Question. Do you not know now, as you know any other historical
fact, what was the course taken by the rebels?

	I have an impression from observation and from hearsay.

	Question. Will the knowledge which you have justify you in stating
to the Commission at what points, previous to the capture of Munford-
ville, that army might have been attacked with the prospect of success?

	Well, it wonld. I commanded a division, without any knowledge, except from
common report, where the enemy were. You are well aware that all kinds of reports
are flying along the line from morning to night. We believed the enemy were march-
ing very near us, but had no positive knowledge of the fact.

	Question. What do you know of our failure to relieve Munfordville?

	I have no personal knowledge. I had no means of knowing about the distribution
of troops or the necessities until two days before we arrived at Munfordville. I was
detached from the main army at this point; but I find it impossible to recollect the
names of localities.

	General BUELL. There is a map which shows exactly the movements
of the column. It would be very useful to the Commission. It is a
map I used myself, and on which the roads are traced.
	(Judge.advocate directs the map to be obtained for the use of the
Commission.)
	Question. Where were you, general, at the time of the surrender of
Munfordville?
	My impression is that we were near Bowling Green.

	Question. How long had you been there previous to the capture?
	I lay there about a day and a half. I was in the rear, and joined the main com-
mand, I think the last division before General Thomas.
	General BUELL. It was the last but one.
	General MITCHELL. I cannot remember the day of the capture, but I lay at Bow-
ling Green a day and a half after the capture, and the first knowledge I had of Mun-
fordville being in the hands of the enemy was two days before our arrival there.
The knowledge I had was at the time we met the troops that had been paroled there.

	Question. Your recollection of the date of that event is not sufficient
to enable you to fix the day? You cannot tell how long you were at
Bowling Green before that place was captured?
	I cannot; I can only give my impression.

	Question. You proceeded with the army from Louisville to Crab Or-
chard and were present at the battle of Perryville? What was your
position there?
	I occupied the right of General Gilberts corps.

	Question. State, if you please, if you took any part in that fight.
	I did. About 10 oclock in the morning of the 8th of October I was ordered to the
front. Had been occupied for three previous days in front. During the night
General Sheridan, with a portion of his division, was ordered to pass me. It was the
night of the 7th. He passed me some time in the night. I was ordered about 10
o clock to move forward with my entire division, and after marching probably 2
miles General Gilbert rode up to my line and directed me to take position with two
brigades to the right of the road leading from Springfield to Perryville. I was di-
rected to place two brigades in position on that hill. leaving one brigade in the val-
ley to the left of the road as a reserve. I went up and formed my two brigades, which
were in the advance on the hill, and was directed there to wait orders by General
Gilbert. I had no orders directly from General Buell, but after 7 in the evening I
bad orders to form two of my brigades in line of battle, and encamped in front of Ge

Page 94

94
KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. (CHAP. XXVIIL
eral Buells headquarters, and received orders from him personally to advance one bri-
gade as outpost and lay there that night. I placed my men in position about 12
oclock on the right of the road in sight of the town of Perryville. This was on the
8th. I remained there for orders until Sheridans line was attacked by the enemy.
It was a pretty severe skirmish. An effort was made to take a battery that was in
an advanced position and was repulsed by Sheridan, and a few moments after that
time to Sheridans right and my front there was a large force of the enemy, a full
division, if not more, concentrated, and had commenced a movement on Sheridans
right. In the mean time Sheridan had sent a messenger saying that unless he was
supported or re-enforced he would have to fall back. I directed the messenger to re-
tnrn and to say to Sheridan that I was watching the movements of the enemy and
wonid strike them before they reached his right. In ten minntes I ordered Colonel
Carlin, colonel Thirty-eighth Illinois, then in command of the Thirty-first Brigade,
to advance under cover of the timber as far as possible, and directed him to break the
enemys lines there withont firing a gun. He proceeded under the order until he had
arrived within 150 yards of this concentration nuder cover of tho timber and a kind
of half-hedge fence. There were thorn bushes innumerable along the fence after he
left the timber that covered his movements. In consequence of the timber and the
brnsh he got to within 150 yards without being discovered, and nuder my direction
ordered a double~qnick at the charge of the bayonet and drove the enemy without
firing a gun. As soon as they were repulsed they were driven into the town of Perry-
yule, 1~ or 2 miles. That must have been about 3 oclock or probably ~1ater, perhaps
nearly 4. There is an elevation on the side of the town. On our arrival at that ele-
vation there was a battery opened upon us, shooting across the town. I ordered up
four pieces of Carlins battery, two pieces having been detached for ~npporting General
McCook, and two or three pieces of another battery in my division opened fire upon this
battery, in the mean time throwing onr skirmishers into Perryville. In twenty minutes
we silenced the battery on the other side of the town and had driven the enemy out
of the town of Perryville. I sent my aide-de-camp to direct the commanding officer
of that regiment to change his direction to the left of the town and rather to the rear
of the enemy and directed Colonel Carlin to support him. I rode back to the brigade
that was following up for the purpose of supporting Carlins brigade about 600 yards;
it may have been more, but not exceeding 700 yards. This regiment that had changed
their direction to the left of the town had captured thirteen wagon loads of ammuni-
tion, two ambulances, and two caissons, said to be of the Washington Battery, and
brought them off the field.
	Before I had changed my direction I was visited by General Gilberts aide-de-camp
and directed to hold back; that I was acting rashly and would not be sustained.
I had not followed General Gilberts aide-de-camps directions, but preferred my own,
and took possession of the hill, and I said if General Gilbert desires to give me orders
I wanted them in writing; that I had received a great many orders from his staff
officers that were not sustained by him, and if he desired me to fall back he must
bring me a writ.ten order from General Gilbert. At the time of the capture of these
wagonsperhaps a little beforeI received an order in pencil, directing me to fall
back on a line with General Sheridan, who commanded the left of our army corps, in
that fight. I told him I would obey the order, and fell back with one brigade in line
with General Sheridan. With the other brigade I exercised my own discretion, and
so far as Carlins brigade was concerned I directed him to remain till we got further
orders.
	After falling back I occupied a commanding position, with artillery covering the town
of Perryville aud the Danville road. I directed him to remain until we had specific
orders from headquarters. The other brigade fell back in line with General Sheri-
dans and within supporting distance, knowing that General Woods advanced bri-
gade was within striking distance. He had notified me through my aide-de.camp
that he was there. I occupied that position all night.
	I never saw anything of General Gilbert from the time the fight commenced till 3
the next morning, on the field. He came to where 1 was lying under a tree between
2 and 3 oclock next morning. In the mean time I had visited General Buell and ad-
vised him of my position, and soon General Gilbert came, and that was the first time
I saw him after he ordered me to take my position on the heights to the right of the
road.
	In justice to General Buell I should state that when I came in he said I had the
only face that looked like victory since the commencement of the fight.

Question. What explanation did General Gilbert give of his conduct?
	He never gave me any.

Question. Did he ever give you any?
	Not of his conduct there. After the time I followed in pursuit of the rebel army

Page 95

CHAP. XXVIII.]
GENERAL REPORTS.
95
 under the directiou of General Gilbert he undertook to explain why he was not in
the front to direct personally.

	Question. What reason did he give0
	He said I might think it strange his not coming some time to the front. His staff
annoyed me from the time I went into the corps till I left it. They would come and
order a brigmide to do a certain thing as direct from General Gilbert, as they said,
and when I talkeff to General Gilbert he denied authorizing such an order.
	Alter I ha4 engaged the enemy for al)ont three hours in front of ~he town of Lan-
caster we advanced slowly and steadily, and he came up to me aft~r lie had ordered
me to fall back within a mile of Latocaster. He came up, and I told himuwe had com-
mitted a great error by nom taking possession of that road; that I had discovered a
large number of wagons passing there, and I was satisfied the enemy were getting
away in the rear with their transporr ation trains. Had he permitted me to advance
to that road I could have cut off a large number of wagons. He said there was no
water and that we could not make an eneaml)ment. Our men, I told him, had been
without water, and could have stood it for one night. Said he, You may think it
strange that I was not in the front, but I remained in the rear for the purpose of sup-
porting you. I replied that I preferred he would just let me alone and permit me
to exercise my own judgment. I had lost all confidence in General Gilbert. I did
not know whether he was captain or general. I only knew him from the fact that
he wore two stars. He was commanding an army corps as a major-general.

	Question by General TYLER. How was he placed there?
	I dont know. I was ordered to report to Major-General Gilbert.

	Question by the PRESIDENT. Was he not major-general?
	I saw him subsequently at Louisville and he had only one star.

	Question. Was he a brigadier-general?
	I dont know. I saw in the papers that he was appointed brigadier.

	Question by JUDGE-ADVOCATE. How long did the army remain at
Perryville after the action there and what course did it take?

	Two whole days. I marched the third day.

	Question. In what direction did you march?

	I started out and struck the Harrodsburg pike, marched on about three miles, and
went on the road between the road to Harrodsbnrg and the road to Danville; there
is a road between the two.

	Question. You were there in pnrsuit of the rebels~ the
	ing in the direction of Harrodsburg?	y were march
	I understood they had marched from Harrodsburg to Danville on the pike. We
marched half way in the direction of Perryville to Harrodsburg and then struck in
a direct [map produced] route to Damiville between the two roads. After leaving
Bowling Green I was ordered to take the Merry Oak road to Glasgow, and was ordered
to proceed cautiously, by General Buell himself, to Wrights Store, to encamp that
night, which I did. I went in pursuance of General Buells direction, and met a bri-
gade of cavalry, which came into camp some three hours after I had arrived there. I
have a men~orandum from you [addressing General Buell] saying unless I met the
enemy I was to proceed the next morning to a certain point, Bells Tavern, a railroad
station, where there was a cavalry force said to be.

	Question. IDid you understand the object of Braggs army in march-
ing toward llarrodsburg after that action at Perryville?
	I know no other reason than that they were cut off in the Dauville road by a por-
tion of my command. We covered with parts of two batteries the Danville road, and
with the force on noy right, had we been supported, we could have held the position
against Braggs whole army. I know another reason: the supposition was they were
to make a junction with Kirby Smith, and I subsequently understood they did.

	Question. How did it come that that position was not maintained?
	It was. 1 have a diagram which will give you an idea of the country there. (Dia-
gram produced.) The town of Perryville and the Danville rdad were covered by
parts of two of my batteries. The road leading from Perryville to Harrodsbnrg was
10 miles, on which the enemy retreated, and I am told tliat from Harrodsburg to Dan

Page 96

96
KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VK [CHAP. XXYIIL
yule is 10 miles. My battery was on an elevation west of the town. That is the posi-
tion my batteries occupied, supported by Carlins brigade, with six or seven guns in
position there.

	(Map produced as furnished by General Buellonthe night of the Sth*.)

	Question. What prevented you from holding Perryville?

	I did hold it. I advanced to Perryville.

	Question. What was there to prevent the army moving forward to
Danville?

	I do not know of anything. Next morning, on the 9th, I was ordered to proceed to
Good-Night Springs, and found on the field 2,000 stand of small-armson the road up
and at Good-Night Springswhich I collected and turned over to General Gilberts
ordnance officer.

	Question. What would have been the effect of the army moving on
to Danville instead of llarrodsbnrg?

	We could have cut off the entire army by moving in that direction at the time I
moved in the direction of GoodNight Springs.

By General TYLER:
	Question. You supposed the enemy were whipped that night and had
reatreated?

	General McCook told me he thought he had been a little worsted, but I thought we
had done all that could be required of us on the right.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

	Question. Where were General Buells headquarters during the ac-
tion of the 8th?

	it was back on this road, perhaps 2j miles from the battle-field. I could not tell
definitely.

	Question. Was there any severe fire of musketry?

	Not very, till we got into Perryville, where we had a brisk skirmish; but the mus-
ketry was on General McCooks front. From half past two for an hour and a half
we heard musketry. It was terrific.

	Question. You marched to Perryville expecting to meet the enemy
in force there?

	I did. I think I reported to General Buell on the night of the 7th that I could have
taken possession of the town that night. I do not recollect the remark he made, but
the next night when I told him I occupied the to ~vn of Perryville he appeared sur-
prised.

	Question. Cannot you recollect the conversation that occurred be-
tween you and General Buell the evening before?

	He said I was rash, intimating that I was exceedingly eager, but I could not recol-
lect the exact words. I recollect very distinctly telling him that we could have en-
tered the town, but h~ laughed and turned it off in some way. We had been skir-
mishing during the evening before the battle.

	Question. Was General Buell at his headquarters during that en-
gagement?

	I do not know. General Buell was thrown from his horse.

	General BUELL. I authorize the witness to state that I was at my
headquarters.

	The WITNESS. General Buell was lame from the fall from his horse.

	Question. To whom did you report the result of your fight?

To General Buell at least as late as 9 oclock at night. The fight was over about

* Not found

Page 97

cHAr. XXVIII.j	tiENERAL REPORTS.

5.	We fell back about 5, 6i perhaps before. I sent an aide-de-~am~ with a rough
diagram, made on horseback, to General Gilbert, showing him the locality, but he
came back and reported that he could not find him. I was unable to get any orders,
except as I told you, through his aide-de-camp, and I refnsed to obey them, because
they had deceived me before. I instrncted the aide-dc-camp to go to General Gilbert
and say to him that we were in the rear of the enemys batteries and I asked for in-
structions. That was after I was ordered back by the aide-dc-camp of General Gil-
bert.

	Question. XVhat would have been the effect of your advancing at the
time you received the order from General Gilbert I

	Had I been supported I could have taken the Washington Battery. I had made a
reconnaissance in person, and there was no infantry supporting the battery except
those that were taken prisonersabout 170. Everything that I did discover was in
advance of the batteries and fighting McCook; the battery was also shelling McCook.

	Question. Were you present at a meeting of officers at Prewitts
Knob, in which the movements of the army were discussed and General
Buells conduct commented on?

	I was at no council. I was never at a council of any kind during the timd I was
in the Army of the Ohio.

	Question. Do you recollect any conversation at General ~
headquarters at Prewitts Knob?

	I cannot call anything to mind.

	Question. Were you present at any conversation at which it was
suggested that General Buell should be put nnder arrest and General
Thomas put in command ~

	I never heard any such talk.

	The PRESIDENT. You have stated that Genera] Gilbert was not in
the front?

	I would not state that he was not at the front, but I did not see him. I dont
know where he was. After he ordered me to the right of the road I never saw Gen-
eral Gilbert till next morning. I frequently asked him for an explanation of the
bject of the movement and what he expected us to do, but he failed to give me any
:eply. General Schoepf was in command of one of the divisions. He was in the re-
serve.

By the PRESIDENT:

	Question. What was the strength of Gilberts corps?

	I cannot come near it. My best impression is about 21,000. On reflection I think
it was larger.

	Question. flow many batteries had he?

	He h~d two full batteries and a four-gun battery, and my impression was that each
of the other divisions in oi~r corps had three batteries. It was reported to me, as Gen-
eral Wood advanced, Bragg was within a mile of Crittendens corps on my right.
That was about 4 oclock in the evening, within sight of the Danville road. My
division was 8,500 when at Louisville. I think Sheridans division was not as strong
as mine. General Schoepf had more regiments, but mine were fuller. I think wehad
that number of men.

	(Diagram produced and the positions of Sheridans and Mitchells
divisions marked.)

	I have not studied the diagram sufficiently to fix the distance with exactness. My
original line was 1~ miles from Perryville. We could not see McCooks from our po-
sition. Sheridan was next on my left and then McCook.

	The PRESIDENT. I would like to have you mark upon this map the
line of your advance and how far you had got.

	The distance was about 600 yards, entirely out of town.

7 R RYOL XV

Page 98

98
KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. LOHAP. XXVHI
	The PRESxnENT. Had you plenty of ammunition?

	An ammnnition wagon to each regiment very close at hand. I had but little use
for small-arms. The brigade that was taken from me by General Gilbert without no-
tifying me was exhausted of their ammunition, and the cartridge-boxes were filled on
the morning of the 9th, when they were supplied with a full complement of ammuni-
tion. They lost something over 400 men, 2 field officers killed and 1 mortally wounded.
I think there were 13 officers killed and wounded. General Gilbert came to me and
asked me to send some officers of influence to reconcile that brigade, saying it was
demoralized. I sent my acting assistant adjutant-general, and marched the regiments
over in as good condition as I ever saw any command and as eager to go into the fight
again, without any show of d~moralization. Four officers were slightly wounded and
the balance very severely.

Cross-examination by General BIJELL:
	Question. General, you stated in your direct testimony that you said
to me that you could have gone into Perryville with your division on
the evening of the 7th?
	Yes, sir.1~

	Qnestion. Did you base that opinion on anything you s~w?

	Well, from the manner of the enemythe manner in which they fell back, not
showing a disposition to make a very stubborn stand. General Buell replied to me
that I could not have done it with twice my number; and furthermore told me that
if I could go in there with my division he would put another star on my shoulder.

	Question. How closely were the enemy pursued in the town that day?

	I think, to the best of my recollectioa now, it was not less than 2~ miles by the
road. Across the hills it might have been nearer, but by the way we went it was
that distance.

	Question. What time did your division advance on the morning of
the 9thl

	It was quite early; I could not tell; it could not have been much after 6 oclock,
probably before. We opened fire by 6 on the cavalry trying to pass the Danville
road. I was in line of battle an hour before I had any orders to advance. General
Gilbert sent an order after we had been in line of battle an hour. The firing was
opened from our advanced brigade by Colonel Carlin.

	Question. Did you see anything 9f the corps on your right as you
were advancing on the morning of the 9th?

	Yes, sir, I did; the advance brigade. It advanced about the same time I did in
the morning to my right across the Danville road. I think the whole corps crossed
there. I know the advance brigade went in the direction of Harrodsburg. I sup-
posed at the time that the cavalry was driven up by that division from their extreme
flank, where they had been the day before, but I could not tell. I know they ap-
peared to be in a great hurry to get out of the way as fast as possible. We got ten or
twelve shots at them from our artillery. This was part of Crittendens corps. I met
General Wood that morning, but cannot state exactly the time. He was comafanding
one of General Crittendens divisions.


DECEMBER 9, 1862.

	Testimony of General.McCook continued (from December 8).

	I then proceeded to the point where the Mackville and Perryville roaJ crosses the
Springfield and Dicksville road. There I met my aide-do-camp, Captain Hoblmtzell.
Colonel Gooding commanded the brigade. He reported to me, and I ordered him to
his position with the regiments and told him what to do. Capt. 0. F. Pinney, Fifth
Wisconsin Battery [also reported], and I posted him in a position near the skirts of the
wood near the crossing to the right of Mackville and Perryville road. The fight still
continued fiercely. This was about 5 oclock in the evening or half past 5; dark
came on about 6. General James [B.] Steedmuan, who commands a brigade, also re-
ported to me tbat he had his brigade ready for duty. I ordered his batteries into
position to the right of pickets and posted his infantry to the right of thesebatteries.
The brigade was formed in two lines, extending nearly to where Colonel McCooks
brigade was in camp. About the time I got this brigade posted it was quite dark
an d the firing had ceased on both sides

Page 99

CHAP. XXVIII]
GENERAL REPORTS.
99
	I remained in front of this line, watching the movements of the enemy, till half
past nine. I established my headquarters about 70 yards in front of this line and
about 150 yards in rea.r of Russells house, where I had been in the morning. I re-
n~a.ined on the right in front of this line because I thought the main attack would
be made in that direction. The moon came up, a bright moon, and they could have
fought as well as by day. Finding there was no motion or drnm movements of the
enemy that I could discover, I rode to the left of my line to see how it had retired.
This was about half past nine at night. I went to the left, conld not find General
Rousseau, but found that he had retired his line from the position they had occupied
in the evening and afternoon. The enemys camp- fires were around the lines, almost
surrounding his position, ana our pickets were 40 yards from each other. They were
talking. I there saw Colonel Starkweather, who commanded a brigade, and Colonel
Harris, and Colonel Hall, One hundred and fifth Ohio. I asked them what kind of a~
position they were in. They said almost surrounded hy the enemy; that the pick-
ets were within 40 yards of each other; that the rehel cavalry threatened them on
the left; that Bushs and Stones batteries were in a position to he taken at any mo-
ment in case the enemy made a heavy assault.
	I determined that the line should be changed, hut from what I saw I did not think
the enemy would attack till daylight. My reason for this was they came from Har-
rodsburg to give us battle. I immediately rode off to select a stronger line, to retire
these hatteries and Rousseaus infantry to a better position. I selected it. General
Rousseau then rode up. He had been at General Buells headquarters. l~ carried
him with me to select the position for his line and marked it, with the left on Mack-
ville road and the right resting on the point where Steedmans was posted on high
ground. This was a good position. During the night I had succeeded in taking off
all my ammunition and ambulances and hospital wagons. I succeeded in the night
in getting off that road.
	General Buell sent me word in the evening late that if I had to retreat to retreat
by the Dicksville and Springfield road, which led to his headquarters; therefore tho
Mackville road was of no importance to me. This was about half past nine. I told
General Rousseau that I considered this change of line was a very hazardous one,
and, if the representations were correct, as soon as they heard the first gun there
would be an attack made on them. I told him not to form the movement yet; that
General Buell had sent for me; he wished to see me. I told him I would go to Gen-
eral Buell and ask for more assistance to keep a certain position to cover this change
of line. Then we started off to General Buells headquarters, aud reached there about
12 oclock at night. I found General Thomas at General Buells headquarters. I re-
ported to him in regard to my fight in the afternoon. I told him what the condition
of affairs was and told him where the line was. He replied that I was cut off from
him. I told him yes, from the Dicksville and Springfield road, where General Rous-
seau had retired the line. I asked him for two brigades for about two hours; that I
wanted them to hold a certain position in order that I could change my line. I then
asked him for one brigade. He positively declined giving me two brigades, and I
then asked him for one. He told me 1 was cut off. When I was just coming off the
ground General Rousseaus aide-dc-camp told me the change had been made. The
line of battle which had been formed by my two divisions was the best possible one
that could have been selected in my opinion. I examined the ground, and I exam-
ined it six days after, when all the facts connected with the battle were known, and
I am conscientiously satisfied that it was the best disposition that could have been
made of those troops in order to have saved my communication on the Mackville
road. The posting of Starkweathers brigade was admirable. He posted the bri-
gade there himself. I did not see the posting of that brigade myself. General Rous-
seau deserved the credit of it.
	The enemy were whipped on the left thoroughly; they were routed on my center,
routed on my right. I was badly whipped. I believe re-enforcements could have
been sent me without prejudice to the cause; and I have since said that had I my
old division that I fought with at Shiloh I would have been responsible for Braggs
escape that night.

	General BUELL. I object to this expression of feeling.

	The WITNESS. I have no feeling in this matter toward General Buell, but have
stood by him throughout his removal from the Army of the Ohio.

	General I3UELL. My objection is that it is an expression of opinion,
or rather an expression of feeling with regard to the matter, based upon
circumstances that developed themselves after the event. I do not
wish it to be understood that it is an expressioti of prejudice or of feel-
ing toward me.
	The court was then cleared fbr deliberation

Page 100

KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAr. XXVIII.
100

	Upon being opened the judge-advocate announced that the objection
was not sustained; opinions~ of corps and division commanders being
considered important to the Commission to enable it to come to a con-
clusion upon the matters before it.

	The WITNESS. I will state in reference to the conversation or report, that 1 believed
the enemy would attack me at daylight, and General Buell disagreed with me in
opinion. He didnt think so. Next morning I received an order to close my line to
the right and ordered Steedmans brigade to return to its command to General
Schoepf.

	General BIJELL. Was that a written order ~

	The WITNESS. Well, sir, I think it was a pencil written order, a note from Colonel
Fry. That order reached me; and I closed my lines to the right, and Steedmans bri-
gade went to join its proper division. I will also state that about the time Steed-
mans brigade was coming to my assistance I met Major Wright, who reported that
his re-enforcements were there, and asked me how I was getting along. I replied to
him that I was doing the best I could with the troops I had, and with these troops I
thought I could hold my position there. That was about 5.30; it was nearly dark.
The next day my corps was ordered to advance and take a position to the right of
Dicksville.
	I wish to state something in addition. At the time that the attack was made upon
me at the battle of Chaplin Hills the co-operation of General Gilberts corps, I be-
lieve, would have secured a complete victory. My right was turned almost within
view of his troops. But what his orders were in regard to these movements I know
nothing. Co-operation there would have secured a victory in my opinion. I dont
think General Gilbert was in front during the battle. I dont know whether he was
or not, but I have inquired of his officers and they say he was not. I thought it was
his duty to co-operate with me on that day. It is the duty of a general to relieve a
brother general, whatever his orders may be.
	The day after the battle of Perryville my line was thrown forward about 1 mile. I
cannot be positive; I think it was the second day after the battle my line was thrown
forward. I think I got the order, a written note, from the chief of staff. Next day we
moved forward to the Harrodsburg pike, about 2~ miles, my command resting on the
Harrodsburg pike. Next day I marched to Harrodsburg; from there to Frys Springs,
3 miles; next day 6 miles beyond Danville, and the next day 4 miles beyond Crab
Orchard, where I halted.

	The JUDGE-ADVOCATE. Have you the orders sent you, the memoran-
dum spoken of in your evidence, and the report of youir proceedings?

	I have a report of the battle of Chaplin Hills. I have a number of memoranda.

	The JUDGE-ADVOCATE. You have given ns a detailed account of the
marching of our forces to Louisville and thence to Perryville. Can you
trace upon the map the march of the rebels under Bragg from the in-
vasion till they reached Bardstown?

	From Dunlap they came over to Sparta; they did not come on the Therman road.
Some came through Spencer and Pikeville. I had information when I was at Mur-
freesborough that General Sam. Jones had come to Sparta. One of General Buells men
told me so. Some of them crossed at Gainesborough and some at Carthage, others at
Scottsville, and concentrated at Glasgow.

	General BUELL. He should be particular; he might mislead you.
	The WrrNxss. That is my impression; I had no charge of the secret service.

	General BUELL. They did not pass through Scottsville.
The WITNESS. Part of the army crossed at Munfordville.

	The JUDGE-ADVOCATE. At what point in that invasion ought the
enemy to have been attacked by General Buells army?
	General BUELL. May I make objection to that ~ It requires General
McCook to give evidence upon the question of duty, in regard to which
he could not know the circumstances that controlled it. He may know
at what point an attack might have been favorable, but he could no

Page 101

CHAr. XXVIII.]	GENERAL REPORTS.	101


know that the attack ought to have been made unless he had all the
information which determines the conduct of the commander of the
army. He may state to the Commission at what point it might have
seemed convenient.
	The JUDGE-ADVOCATE. At what point in that invasion might an at-
tack have been made by General Buells army with a prospect of suc-
cess?
	The WITNESS. I will state that I knew nothing about the position of the enemy till
I arrived at Bowling Green.

	General BUELL. At what date?
	The WITNESS. I dont know the date. On Monday I heard the enemy was at
Glasgow; dont know where the information came from; I think from General Buells
headquarters. I had a conversation with Mr. Hobson; it was at Bowling Green. I
understood the enemy was at Glasgow, about 20 miles from Bowling Green, the force
estimated at about 35,000. It was simply talk among. my brother generals, and I
got from Mr. Hobson my impression that in addition to that troops were coming on
from Nashville. We heard rumors of it. General Buell intended to attack the en-
emy at Glasgow, and if we had pushed on might have attacked him at Munfordville.
But I was not in favor of the Munfordville attack, because I knew the advantage
the enemy would have in position. I had a conversation with General Buell at Drip-
ping Springs, and I knew that we should sacrifice a great many men if we attacked
the enemy there. I think, afPir what has been said, if more haste had been made
from Nashville and a forward movement made at Bowling Green we might possibly
have reached the enemy at Glasgow. But it was a matter of specnlation altogether,
as I believe they were running the day that General Wood arrived at Munford-
yule. I believe the enemy had left it that day, at least the rear guard out of Mun-
fordville, and it was reported they had some infantry. I presume if General Buell
had marched on Bardstown he might have got a fight out of the enemy at Mul-
draughs Hill. My idea was that Louisville was threatened; Cincinnati had also
been threatened. Kirby Smith was in front of it, and the more haste was made in
getting to Louisville the better. That wa~ my impression. I will state that Gen-
eral Buell was traveling with me, and I did not take any means of acquainting myself
wilh the position of the enemy. I considered it his business entirely. When I am
marching alone I do. I would also state that when at Edgefleld Junction I received
a letter from General Wood, who was then encamped at Bowling Green, to make
haste and hurry up, that the enemy were marching on Glasgow; also some dispatches
came down from General Crittenden to Buell, which I turned over.

	The JUDGE-ADVOCATE. Was that your opinion at the time of the
invasion or is it an opinion made up since from circumstances which
have come to your knowledge?

	It is the opinion I had at the time. I built some of the defenses of that place and
knew exactly what it would take to take them.
	The JUDGE-ADVOCATE. Do 1 understand you to say, General Mc-
Cook, that those were the only two points where the enemy might have
been attacked with a prospect of success?
	General BUELL. He has not stated that those points could have been
attacked with a prospect o~ success.
	The WITNESS. Unless General Buell had turned off from his course and marched to
Hodgensville.

	The JUDGE-ADVOCATE. It appears to me that the witness stated
that an attack could have been made with a prospect of success at
points which he has not yet mentioned. I have no anxiety or wish to
make points; on the contrary, I permitted this evidence to take a wide
range, that all the facts in reference to this case might come before the
Commission. I have no prejudice of feeling in the case.
	General BUELL. I beg to express my gratification at the (lisposition
which the judge-advocates remarks indicate and I withdraw my ob-
jection

Page 102

102	KY., M. AND B. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAP. XXVIII.

NASHVILLE, December 10, 1862.

	Commissionmet pursuant to adjournment. All the members present;
also the judge-advocate and General Buell.

	Examination of General MCCooK continued.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:
	Question. In connection with your statement in regard to the Army
of the Ohio being stretched out so much on the railroad, state, if you
please, at what places the several portions were at the time Bragg corn-
inenced moving from Chattanooga.

	At the time General Bragg commenced moving, my own division, and General Crit-
tendens, the Fifth Division, were on the march from Battle Creek to Peiham; Gen -
eral Schoepfs, the First Division of the Army of the Ohio, was stationed at Peiham;
General Thomas, in comipand of the Fourth and Sixth Divisions, and General
Nelson and Wood were at MeMiunville; General Hazen, with one brigade of Nelsons
division, was stationed at Murfreesborough; Rousseaus (Third) division was march-
ing from Huntsville.

	Question. Can you state what forces you had in all ~?

	I think that our army when concentrated would have been abont 45,000 men. The
cavalry were posted at different points through the country and there were de-
tached regiments stationed along the railroads to defend bridges. There were some
few troops at Nashville, the number I do not know, under the command of General
Duruont and Colonel Miller.

	Question. Did you know the destination of our army at the time you
crossed the Cumberland River ~

	I was under the impression I was going to Kentucky, because I was under the im-
pression that Bragg had gone there. I will also state in connection with this that
General Buell is the most uncommunicative general I have ever seen or heard of. I
never knew from time to time where the other divisions of the ariuy were posted, or
when on the march from Louisville to the battle to attack Bragg at Perryville I never
knew where my brother commanders were or could be found at any time.

	Question. In reference to that Perryville fight, what was your force
there.

	My own force, including those guarding trains and everything, was about 13,000
men, but my actual force in battle was not more than about 10,000.

	Questkfti. You said in your narrative that you had a conversation
with General Buell after the Perryville fight; did you give all that con-
versation I

	I gave what I believed to be the substance of the conversation. I went to General
Buell, and, picking up the map, explained the position of mylines. General Thomas
was present, and also Capt. Beverly D. Williams, of my staff, who heard the conver-
sation. I told General Buell I had had a very severe fight. He said he was surprised
to hear of it and that he had not heard of it till 5 oclock. He then talked with me at
intervals. He was engaged in conversation with general Thomas as to whether we
should attack the enemy in the morning or not. I explained to General l3nell the
position of my lines. I told him I had two batteries that had fought gallantly during
the day in a very perilous situation. I told him the manner in which Rousseau had
retired his line on the left; that the enemy had lit fires around him and in front of
him; that the pickets were only about 40 yards apart; that there was a regiment of
cavalry on the left threatening any movements that might be made, and that fl-em
appearances I believed I was surrounded. I asked General Buell for the loan of two
brigades for two hours at furthest, to hold a certain position while I changed my lines
to cover the movements. He told me I could not have them; he positively refused
to give them to me. I then asked him if I could have one brigade. He told me I
should not have another man. I was at that time very much vexed and provoked. I
felt that I should have had the relief. I confidently believed that I should be at-
tacked at daylight and I told General Buell so. It was evident to my mind thai the
enemy had come on to a chosen field to attack our army, and I supl)osed the battle
would be renewed in the morning and attack if they were not attacked themselves.
%leneral Buell replied that he did not think he could be attacked

Page 103

CHAP. xxvm.l	GENERAL REPORTS.	103

	Question. Did he give any reason for that belief?

	He did not.

	Question. Do you know now or did you know at the time the direc-
tion taken by the enemy after that fight? Do you know any reasons
for the enemys taking the route to Harrodsburg in~tead of falling
back on Danville?
	The matter is very simple. They were moving back to form a junction with Kirby
Smiths force.

By General TYLER:
	Question. Did Kirby Smith come to Harrodsburg to join them with
his whole force?
	Yes, sir.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

	Question. Can you give any reason for the delay that occurred after
that fight in pursuing the enemy?
	No reason whatever. I believe they should have been vigorously pursued next
morning at daylight. I will state that my troops, who had fought all day without
water, could have occupied the part of a reserve very well; better soldiers I never
saw.

	Question. Had you pushed across to Danville instead of following the
enemy around by Harrodsburg what would have been the effect?

	That the retreat would have been cut off. It might possibly have driven the enemy
toward Louisville.
By General TYLER:

	Question. They would have had to fight a battle?

	Yes, sir.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

	Question. You stated in your evidence that General Buells plan of
defeating the enemy when they first crossed the Tennessee was de-
feated by a lack of commissary stores?
	That is my impression. The railroad was certainly out.

	Question. Were not the provisions you had on hand sufficient to
justify an attack there, as to following the enemy all the way from
Louisville?

	No, sir; they were not. At Bowling Green we had a million of rations. That
amount of rations would not have been sufficient.

By General TYLER:
	Question. How many days rations had you?

	The amount of provisions, I think, was equal to twenty days.

	Question. Did the country furnish nothing to collect?

	But little; cattle and green corn, but the corn was all quite hard, and our supply
of salt was short.

	Question. You stated in your examination that General Buell sent
you orders that if you had to retreat to retreat on the line toward his
headquarters?

	Yes; to fall back from the Chaplin Hills.

	Question. Did he explain to you any reason for retreating in that
direction?

	No~ sir; it was the only one left. I should have exposed my plan to the enemy by
any other

Page 104

104
KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. (ChAr. XXVIIL
	Question. You stated in some part of your testimony that General
Buell told you his whole plan for the concentration of the Army of the
Ohio I

He gave me a synopsis of that plan.
	Question. What was it?

	Murfreesborough was the point, moving in converging lines, so that every division
was in supporting distance of each other from day to day, which I think was the
most perfect plan that could have been desired.

	Question. You stated that you were not satisfied with the scattering
of General Buells army on the Memphis and Charleston iRailroad?

	Any man of judgment would say it would have taken 50,000 men to keep that rail-
road in running order. I never heard General l3nell express his opinions about these
things, but I never considered him responsible for that nor do I think his army ever
did, and the facts so prove. General Buells written instructions induced me to be-
lieve that he intended to attack the enemy at Perryville. His instructions were that
on account of the want of water the enemy would oppose his entrance into that town.

	The PRESIDENT. Were any special orders given you with respect to
that attack?

	None, except those I presented to the Commission, that I was to take my position
there and ascertain what was in my front and not allow my troops to scatter and to
form my line with my right resting on Gilbert near Bottoms house.

By General TYLER:
	Question. You stated that the assault commenced at 2 oclock?

	Yes, sir; about 2.

	Question. Was there any movement of the enem
to believe the attack would be made?	y that induced you
	I rode to the farthest point and reconnoitered. The enemy were concealed in the
dry channels of Chaplin River and in mass there, and it was difficult to see anything
unless you went down to the bluff and looked over. These facts I learned afterward,
of course, by dear experience.
	Question. You say you reported the attack on your lines at half past
three?
	I sent an aide-de-camp. My aide returned to the field afterward, but brought no
orders. My orders were communicated to me by Major Wright, I think it was, on
General Buells staff, who arrived on the field that evening about half an hour before
dark.

	Question. What were the orders?
	That in case I was compelled to fall back to fall back on the Springfield road, in
anticipation of support. When Major Wright was in conversation these brigades
appeared. Captain Hoblitzell was marching at the head and reported that he had a
brigade marching to my support.

By General DANA:
	Question. What was the. strength and position of the forces with
which you marched toward the Anderson road?
	Two brigades of infantry and three batteries of artillery. General Crittenden
accompanied my command to the point where the Higgiubottom turnpike ascends the
mountain.

	Question. About what strength?
	About 4,000 would cover the entire force.

By the PRESIDENT:

	Question. What was the strength and position of ]3raggs forces
marching toward that road

Page 105

CHA?. XXVIII.]	GENERAL REPORTS.	105

	I found that my spies had misinformed me in reference to the movements of Braggs
forces. The force that was reported was a very heavy one. It was reported that Bragg
had crossed with seventy regiments. Newton, in my employ as a spy, and who had
proved entirely reliable, so informed me. He was a refugee from that place. Citizens
also reported to me that their pickets were on the top of the hills just above my posi-
tion and that their advance had reached the top of Waldens Ridge.

	Question. What force was left at Nashville at the time General Buell
had marched to the north?

	When General Buell and I left Nashville General Thomas was here in command of
the First Division; there had been a detachment of a division under General Negley;
General Robert [B.] Mitchell was also here; Negleys and Paines divisions, about
16,000 men; but there were quite a number of couvalescents who could fight, and it
made the force about 18,000 men that could be put in line to fight.

	Question. What was the strength of the force with which General
Buell marched from Nashville north?

	His army was about 45,000 men after taking out the Nashville garrison; but I will
not be positive.
	Question. While at Bowling Green did you know anything of the
garrison at Munfordville being in danger?

	While there I heard that it had been attacked and had been taken, but the intel-
ligence was uncertain. I was very anxious to know the result of it, because I had
built a portion of the defenses of that place myself and I thought the defenses there
would tell their tale some day yet. I was therefore the more interested in the matter.
On my return in the morning I heard that the attack had been made and Colonel
Wilder had repulsed it.

	General TYLER. Did serious apprehensions exist in the army for the
safety of Munfordville?

	I did not think Bragg would be guilty of sucli imprudence as to go there, but that
his march would be by Columbia. In the face of our army I consider it a piece of
impudence, because if hu went in that direction he hazarded his army. Bowling
Green is 40 miles from Munfordville, an~f I thought he would march toward Columbia,
and by that means endeavor to form a junction with Kirby Smith in Kentucky. I
had no spies in that country, nor had I when General Buell was present ever interested
myself in gaining information on the question. I was a general to obey his orders
without questioning his plans.

By the PRESIDENT:

	Question. Was there any time wasted after marching from Nashville
before marching to Munfordville in halting or marching or any halts
which were needlessly made, not absolutely necessary?

	If I knew my generals plans I would answer without question. I had a conversa-
tion with General Wood, who said we ouglit to march on to Munfordville, but I knew
nothing of the force there.

	Question. Was there a general feeling existing in the army after
leaving Nashville that the march was too slow and time unnecessarily
wasted on the road? Did such a feeling exist among the superior officers?

	I never had any discussion with them. Some of my junior officers had disCussed
the matter, but I always shut them up, and would not allow such conversations in
my presence. But I had no conversations with any general officers upon the subject.
I will state frankly that I had confidence in my works that I had built there, and I
for one was not in favor of giving battle there, because the enemy would have great
ad vantages.

	Question. That was after you knew of the surrender of the garrison
there?

	Yes, sir; General Buell asked me what my opinion was. He said he wanted the
opinion of a man that had faith. He considered me a man no~ afraid to fight when-
ever an opportunity ofti~red. He also knew ihecharacter of the troops I commanded,
and I very frankly told him what I believed would be the result of the attack at







Page 106

106
KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAP. XXVIII.
Munfordville; that I believed we could whip them, but that it would be at a great
sacrifice of life.

	General TYLER. Had you been compelled by an overwhelming force
to retreat toward General Buells headquarters what would have been
the couditioii of your army; would you have been sacrificed or fought
your way back V

	I would never have left with my troops alive. With the changes I had made during
the night I could have retreated on the Springfield road.

	The PRESIDENT. When General Braggs army debouched from the
Sequatchie Valley what was the position of General Buells army in
reference to the advance of his (Braggs ariny); were you in advance
or the rear and what distance from the point where the debouchment
was made V

	By that time I think most of the army was concentrated at or around Murfrees-
borough or on those converging lines marching toward Mnrfreesborongh.

By General TYLER:
	Question. Was our army in the advance or in the rear of Braggs
army V

	I did not know where he was. My idea was that General Buell intended to attack
him at some point near MeMinuville debouching into the ~~alley of the Tennessee,
but his provisions did not admit of it, and had he gone and fought a battle he would
not have had an opportunity of pursuing them and making it a decisive battle.

	Question. Could he have made them retrograde through the valley
an(l take up another line V

	I have never been in that portion: of Tennessee, and I cannot give you an intelli-
gent answer to that question.

	Question. Suppose he had been headed off what would have been his
course V

	Gone hack beyond the Tennessee River or he might have taken a position in the
mountains themselves, but he co!il(l not have advt~aced or got supplies there. Rd
might have got supplies from Chattanooga or Pikeville or that neighborhood of
country. The Sequatchie Valley ~vas a very rich one; any given amount of forage
for an army as large as any general would wish to handle might be obtained there.
I would state that I always had the most implicit confidence in General Buehl as a
(reneral but he was the most uncomumnicative general I have ever seen or read of~
that is, to his brother ge erals. I-Ic kept his own secrets and plans till there was an
absolute necessity for them to be known. I believe that the department of the Army
~f the Ohio was the most important command in the Army, an(l without the army
being greatly increased in strength no general could operate with any hope of sue-
tess in Tennessee. It was my opinion then and it is my opinion now. It is the
largest contract of the war that is on the table now.

By General ORn:
	Question. On the march from Corinth was there much marauding or
~)hrndering V

	No, sir; there was not. I never allowed it. Some time in August or September
there was an order authorizing the appropriation of property for the use of the army
received from Washington.

	Question. Bid lBhat make any difference V

	Yes, sir; it ruined the discipline of our army to a certain extent. It was the worst
order that was ever published for a body of troops. General Popes orders on the
Potonmac was the cause of it. Our soldiers read it and believed it. lt will demoralize
any army in the world. I never failed to give redress to those inhabitants wimo coum-
I)laimmed of depredations, and I arrested every field officer in one entire l)rigade for
snlfrring their soldiers to 1)uru mails to cook with. Of course tlmere were more or less
petty grievances that will occur in the march of an army through ammy country, but
General Buells ordems were opposed to it

Page 107

CHAP. XXVflL]
GENERAL REPORTS.

	Question. Did General Buell use vigorous efforts to correct this ma-
rauding after the publication of this order ~

	He always did. Not only on the marching of my division, bat he has provoked me
on many occasions by reprimanding my command when I thought he should have
required me to do it. I have seen him do it personally and order men to be punislied
for it, and especially for straggling.

	Question. Straggling is a necessary result of marauding, is it not?

	No man did more to repress it than General Buell, and I am sorry to say that there
are frightful causes of complaint now.

	General BUELL. May I iuquire if he has heard it charged against the
Army of the Ohio that it was lawless?

	No, sir.

By General ORD:
	Question. Did this produce any feeling on the part of the officers
toward General Buell?

	I do not know whether it produced any feeling or not. The immediate coilinianders
were responsible for these things and it was on them depended the execution of the
orders; on them the fault-finding would fall. I believe that General BnelPs army was
the best ever put in the field, and I have heard General Rosecrans say it was the best
organized army that ever was, and that is my belief this day. There was never a
more untiring general than General Buell. I never knew when he slept. I have
been at his headquarters at all hours, but never found him asleep. I have spokea
to him many times about it.

	Question. Did you get the newspapers in your camp during the
months of August anl September?

	We did not get them very frequently during that time, for I think the railroad was
cut.

	Question. Was it apprehended among the army that General Buells
conduct would be criticised in the newspapers?

	I was under tue impression that it would be. I have been abused by the Abolition
press North and I hope I shall continue to be.

	Question. Do you think the remarks of the newspapers had any in-
fluence in producing insubordination in the Army?

	In one case I do. There was a pest of a correspondent in my division that I was
after all the time, but could never catch. I think it would have an effect upon
soldiers. I remember once General Buell was called an ass, but I never could find
out who the correspondent was. As a rule I expel ~correspondents; they are not
judges of what to publish and what to suppress. I believe they are the worst enemies
of our Army, for I have seen publications that have given information respecting my
movements known only to my officers high in commandfacts in relation to the organ-
ization of my division and its movements. I kim w that correspondents complained
bitterly because General Buell never encouraged them. The same complaint wa.s
made against me. I had the correspondent of the Cincinnati Gazette arrested and
put out of the army because he published things he had no business to. I will fur-
ther state, in this conntry, above all others, it is a (iiiiiCUlt thing to obtain anything
like satisfactory evidence of the position of the enemy, for their front is always c~v-
ered with cavalry, and it is very difficult to get spies into their lines. I have always
found it so, and there are no citizens on whom you can rely. Those who have in-
formation and are disposed to t& 1l it are afraid to do so.

By General BIJELL:
	Question. Will you please give the partienlars of ~onr march from
Corinth to Battle Creek? Give the date of yonr departure from Corinth
and yonr~ arrival at Florence; ho v you were employed there at the
time of your march from Huntsville to Battle Creek. Give the distances,
i~ you remember them.

	After the evacuation of Corinth there was a portion of General Buells army sent
10

Page 108

108
KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAP. XXVIII.
down in pursuit after Braggs army. My division remained near Corinth, I think,
three days. General Buell then returned and ordered me to march to Inka, which is
a distance of 45 miles. I remained at Inka one day, when Generals Nelson and Crit-
tenden joined the column. General (then Colonel) Jacksons cavalry were also here.
Woods divison was also in that vicinity; a portion of General Woods divison, Has-
calls brigade, was, I think, scattered along the railroad, building bridges and repair-
ii)g that road. I marched with my division, remaining one day at luka. I then
marched to Florence, Ala., a distance, I think, of about 40 miles. General Buell had
previously sent his engineer to prepare boats and means of ferrying the army. The
bridge at Florence had been destroyed by the rebels. At the earliest possible moment
these boats were readyI think the second day after our arrival. General Buell
placed me in charge of ferrying my own division, Crittendens division, and of the
reserve artillery. This took, I think, two days and a half, working as late at night
as we could. I also had to build a road down to Jacksons old ferry. I built it by
General Buells orders. I remained one day at Florence. I then marched on to
within 6 miles of Huntsville, Ala., without interruption, making long marches, a
distance, I think, of 70 miles. I there received an indulgence of ten days leave of
absence and went to Ohio. When I returned my division was at Stevenson. I joined
it on the 17th of July. On the next day I marched to Battle Creek. My average
marches were 16 miles a day. The weather was very dry, warm, and dusty. We
did not lay a day longer than was necessary at Florence, except to repair the ferry
and convey the troops over. I worked night and day, and knew more about this
than even General Buell himself.

	Question. IDo you know of any measures taken while you were at
Florence to have the supplies in readiness at points in North Alabama
for the troops when they arrived?

	I recollect there were trains sent from Eastport and every effort was made on the
river to get supplies up. The water was low.
	Question. To get supplies into North Alabama, Huntsville, and
around there?

	Every possible exertion was made in the repairing of the railroads to get supplies
and every disposable wagon was ferried across as soon as it was prepared, and these
wagons were sent up to Reynolds Station and were hauling supplies to Athens, Ala.
My own supply trains, General Crittendens, and General Woods were all at work,
and every available team was used to throw supplies there.

	Question. With all these trains was it possible to accumulate any
supplies in advance?

	It was not possible by using every means then in the power of the Army of the
Ohio.
	Question. Do you know, whether the work on these railroads was
prosecuted with all possible industry?

A.	Yes, sir; with the utmost vigor.

	Question. In your position of command at Battle Creek did you
exert yourself to obtain information of
Chattanooga?	the strength of the enemy at
	I used every means in my power. There was not a day in which I was not expect.
ing some persons to return to me with information.
	Question. Were there any of your informants that you had confi-
dence in?
	Yes, sir.

	Question. State, if you please, what information they gave you in
regard to the strength of the enemy at Chattanooga; that is, shortly
before you marched or about that time.
	The JUDGE-ADVOCATE. That is precisely what you objected to in my
examination.
-	General BUELL. Precisely; and the objection you did not sustain;
but the case is entirely different. I am eudeiworing to draw out the in

Page 109

CHAP. XXVIII.]
GENBRAL 1d~PORTS.
109
formation which it was necessary to obtain and on which every com-
mander regulates the movements of his army.

	My impression was that the entire army that had been at Corinth was at Chatta-
nooga. When I was in command at Battle Creek some of the enemys camps were in
sight of some of my signal stations. Our pickets were on opposite sides of the Ten-
nessee River. As far as the eye could go the river was picketed and in force. Gen-
eral McCown was in command at Chattanooga when I first ~vent there. He in a short
time was superseded by General Bragg. They had their troops stationed at different
points hack of Chattanooga, near the Lookout Mountain, at the junction of the Wills
Creek Railroad. They had troops stationed also in front of me, a division at Shell
Mound, and scattered down the railroad toward Bridgeport, and carried information
to their officers every hour. Cars went down, and were, busy, particularly at
night, going and coming, and they could have had no reason for running where they
did except for the transportation of troops. They had all the railroad bridges
guarded by brigades.

By General BUELL:
	Question. Will you state what estimate was placed upon the strength
of Bragg~s army in round numbers I

	From the best information, my impression is that he had about 75,000 men. I be-
lieved the entire army of Corinth was there. Soldiers from Alabama were there. I
got this iuformation from deserters.

	Question. Did you report this information to me from time to time
as you received it I

	I had communication with you two or three times a day, sometimes ofteuer. When-
ever I received information it ~vas telegraphed to yon at once.

	Question. Were there any means of crossing the Tennessee River I

	None whatever, except by making bridges. There were no boats, except one small
boat at Battle Creek, which I found sunken, and which had capacity for carrying
about 40 men. I will state, in addition, on the opposite side of the river was a line of
rifle pits occupied by the enemy where it was approachable to ferry.

	Question. Suppose the means of crossing the river provided, were
the means of supplying the army such as to make it possible for the
army to advance to the enemys country I

	No, sir; we were on half rations at the time and just drawing our rations from day
to day. The country in that vicinity offered no supplies whatever, except a few
cattle hid in the Cumberland Mountains, and the country east of us had been very
thoroughly foraged by the enemy.

	Question. Do you know what points in North Alabama and what line
of road from there to Nashville were still occupied when you marched
to Battle Creek?

	I am not positive, but I think the Tennessee and Alabama Railroad was occupied.
I think the bridge over Duck River was completed. The railroad from Stevenson to
Murfreesborough was occupied. I am not certaiu whethem the railroad from Hunts-
ville to Stevenson was occupied or not. There was a small force there when I left
the place.

	Question. IDo you know whether the abandonment of North Ala-
bama and all points on the railroad leading from there were simulta-
neous with your movement; or was your movement independent of
that, having in view .the possession of that country and those lines?

	That question I am not prepared to aus~ver. One thing I will say: it was abso-
lutely necessary to abandon that country, whether the eueniy came to Middle Ten-
nessee or Kentucky.

	Question. Suppose it was my plan to hold Alabama and the line of
road from there to Nashville, say Huntsville, Stevenson, and the road
thence to Nashville, and supposing also I held M~Min~mville, please
to state ~vhat was the importance of Altainont as a point of concentra-
tion or as a point through which the enemy could advance

Page 110

110	KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAP.XXVIIL

	The enemy could have marched down to Murfreesborough or they could have
marched directly on McMinnville. They had their option, if they held that place.

	Question. Do you know anything of the character of Caney Creek, a
stream which passes between MeMinnyille and Sparta ~
	I do not. I believe the country is rough, hut nothing more.

	Qnestion. Did the interruption of the line of communication of the
army with Louisville and the means which the enemy had of continu-
ing that interruption make it necessary to them to throw at least a
portion of the army into Kentucky independent of the presence of an
enemy into Tennessee ~
	Absolutely necessar~r; and I was expecting and feared all the time that General
Buells army would have to abandon that country for supplies, if for nothing else.

NASHVILLE, December 11, 186210 a. m.
	Commission met pursuant to adjonrnment. All the members pres-
ent; also the judge-advocate and General Bnell.
	Examination of General MCCooK continued.

Cross-examination by General BUELL:
	Question. Please state, from your observation, what you know of the
practicability of maintaining the available part of the army at Alta-
mont.
	It was absolutely impossible to do it. I know of no place on the top of the Cnm-
berland Mountains where a division of 10,000 men could have lived a week. 1 was
stationed at Altamont myself till my animals ate up every available stack of fodder
in reach of me on the mountain. When I lelt my position at Altainont all my supply
of stock water was exhausted. We had but one spring, and that was up on a run,
and the soldiers were clamoring about that run to get water for their canteens when
I left there. There was a little water in a stream about 3j miles from Altamout.
The water was standing in pools, but was stagnant and not fit for use nor sufficient
in quantity anywhere near. All supplies that possibly could reach that army would
have had to be hauled from adjacent coves from 10 to 14 miles, and for anything like
a supply you would have to go 20 miles, kud nothing then could have been obtained
but green blade fodder, and that would had to have been wagoned up the monutains
over the worst roads I ever saw. It took my own division train, when I was travel-
ing with reduced baggage, from 8 a. m. to 1~ at night to pull up the mountains, and
then only with the great assistance of my men. I had companies stationed aloug the
road at distances of 100 yards apart to help the wagons up, and I think I had the rep-
utation in the Army of the Ohio of having the best transportation in it, that is, the
animals were in the best condition in it.

	Question. Do you know any point at which an army concentrated
could prevent an enemy from crossing the Cumberland Mountains into
the plains of Tennessee ~
	No, sir; I do not know any point that could prsvent theni from crossing into the
Tennessee Valley.

	Question. What would you think of the plan of distributing the
army which I commanded, say, from Decherd to Sparta, so as to guard
the different passes by which an enemy cOul(l debouch into the plains
of Tennessee ~?
	I think it would have subjected the army to be whipped in detail, because the com-
munication betweeu Sparta and MeMinuville is bad, aufi therefore it would have iso-
lated the troops at Sparta, and therefore subjected them to capture or (leath. The
troops at Peiham or MeMiunville might have been concentrated in the rear somewhere.

	Question. Supposing the stream which passes between McMinnville
and Sparta and the character of the country between those points gen-
erally being such as to afford more than one or two practicable passes,
would it or n6t b& l)racticable for ait cuemy to cross from Pikeville to
Sparta safely ~
	Yes, sir; I think it conlif be concentrated there

Page 111

cheAp. XXVIII.J
GENBI~AL IIEPOI~TS.
111
	(Army report, August 20, introduced by General Buell.)
	Question. Please examine the morning report for 20th August, here
submitted for you, and state from it the actual available force that was
operating against the army of General Bragg at that time.
	The morning report of the divisions that were operating in front number as follows:
	Men.
General Schoepf, First Division	6,000
General McCook. Second Division	7,855
General Nelson, Fourth Division	6,888
General Critteuden, Fifth Division	.3, 377
General Wood, Sixth Division. - 	5,640
MeCook, Cavalry Brigade	 640
	Total	30,400

	Question. With all the information you have obtained from first to
last in regard to the strength of the rebel army under General Bragg,
by information derived from spies and other informatk~zt and by actual
contact with that army, what credence would you attach to the state-
ment that when it crossed the Cumberland Mountains it did not exceed
22,000 infantry and artillery?
	Well, sir, I would not have believed it, and any man who would have come to inc
to give such information as that I would have suspected of treachery and would
have been very apt to have taken charge of him. I knew who the division com-
manders were, and had the organization of the army, which proved to be correct.

	Question. At what point on the march of Braggs army from Sparta
into Kentucky could it certainly have been known that Kentucky in-
stead of Nashville was its destination?
	I think when the enemy had arrived at Tomkinsville, Ky., for I was a little apprehen-
sive that they were going to fall back and go in at Gallatin, Ky.
	Question. What is the distance from Carthage and Gainesborough,
the points at which the enemy crossed the Cumberland IRiver, to
Glasgow?
	The distance from Gainesborough to Glasgow about 45 miles; from Carthage to
Glasgow 50 miles.

	Question. What is the distance from Nashville to Glasgow?

	By Scottsville, about 85 miles; by Bowling Green, which is the best traveled road,
95 miles.

	Question. Was it necessary for the army on the march from Nashville
to go via Bowling Green?

	It was absolutely necessary, because we were without supplies and we had a mill-
ion of rations stored there in anticipation of the railroad being cut.
	Question. Do you know when the rebel army reached Glasgow or
when it marched from there?

	I do not remember the precise date.

	Question. Of what importance was Munfordville as a military post?

	Munfordville was an important military post, because it guarded the bridge over
Green River.

	Question. Did it control the movements of an army from Glasgow
going iuto Kentucky?

	No, sir; because it was a better road to keep to the right.

	Questioii. Its importance was then determined by the, value of the
bridge?

	Yes, sir

Page 112

112	XY., M. AND E. l~ENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAP. XXVIIi.

	Question. How long would it take to rebuild that bridge?

	With natural advantages, I should think it could be rebuilt in twelve days.

	Question. Was it not actually rebuilt in less time?

	I cant say positively as to that; I cannot answer that question.

	Question. Would you have considered the object of the post at Mun-
fordville of sufficient importance for a small garrison to attempt to hold
it against a large army, under the circumstances, at the time?

	Under the present circumstances I would not. No, sir; I would not.

	Question. Supposing that I had had knowledge at the very moment
of the crossing of the Cumberland River by the rebel army, would it
have been possible for my army to have reached Glasgow as soon as
the rebel army?

	No, sir, it would not; not with a force sufficient to fight that army. No, sir, you
could not have reached Glasgow.
	Question. How much time do you suppose would have been lost in
getting information of that movement after the enemy had crossed?

	Well, sir, I could not give an estimate as to that. I can say that the first positive
information that I had was from a note from General Wood at Edgefield Junction,
on the morning General Buell arrived there, and this information was confirmed by a
trusty preacher at Tyree Springs. I cannot fix the dates.

	Question. When did you march for Bowling Green after that informa-
tion was received?

	I was ordered to march on the next morning at daylight, and I got off at 6 oclock
a. m. and made a long march; the delay was caused by General Buell changing my
order of march. He required nine then to place all my troops in front of my bnggage
trains and to be prepared for battle at any moment.

	Question. Was it to be supposed that an army crossing the river at
Carthage and designing to invade Kentucky might aim to strike first
at Bowling Green?

	Bowling Green was the first objective of the enemy when I left Nashville, amid I
had a conversation with General Buell on that subject, either in his quarters or on the
road, in which he expressed a fear that they would get there in advance of him. My
impression was that there was a million of rations stored there for our armny and I
was marching there to get my part of them, and if General Bmiell had not had Woods
and Rousseaus divisions there I believe the enemy would have gone in and taken
possession of the fortifications.

	Question. What was the immediate object when the army marched
from Bowling Green?

	To attack the enemy at Glasgow.

	Question. Were the troops marched by certain roads with a view to
that attack?

	Yes, sir, they were; Rousseaus column was turned off to the right; I was furhished
with a map and my route defined.
	Question. When was it knowmi at headquarters or in the army that
the enemy had left Glasgow?

	I first was satislied of the fact at Dripping Springs, at the end of tIme first days
march.
	Question. XYhere did you march the next day after the march to
Dripping Springs?

	The next day I marched to Prewitts Knob

Page 113

CHAP. XXVIII.	~E1~AIAL IEPO1l~*	I t~3

	Question. When thei~ did ~~ou march from there for Mtiflfird~ille?

	I remained at Prewitts Knob all next day and untll4 oclock,p. m. of the second
day, two days, till I arrived within 1 mile of MunfordVille from Bowling Green.

	Question. Was there any point short of that at Which th~ ttirnpik~
road comes into the Ohio River at the month of Salt River on which
the army could depend for supplies after those which it had with it
were exhausted?

	No, sir; there was not.

	Question. You have stated that the position at Munfordville was t~
very strong one fQr an army; now, taking into consideration all the
circumstances, even with equal cl~ances of success, would it have been
~desirable to attack the enemy at that point without necessity?

	I have answered that qnestion previously, that I was not in favor of attacking the
enemy there. I do not think it would.

	Question. Do you know of any intelligent man in the army who, with
a knowledge of these circumstances, was in favor of attacking 13ragg~s
army at Munfordville?

	Not at that time; Ineverheard the matter discussed; I never talked with my equals
in rank about the matter; I never suffered my juniors to criticise the commanding
generals actions without hushing them up; that is, in my presence.

	Question. Did you have occasion to silence the criticism of intelligent
men on this subject?

	I had occasion once to silence a colonel.

	Question. Will you mention his name?

	I should prefer not doing it unless compelled. It was Colonel Parrott, of the First
Ohio Volunteers; ~dward A. Parrott, I believe, is his name.

	Question. Were you present at an assemblage of officers, or did you
ever hear of an assemblage of officers, at which it was proposed to de-
pose General Buell from the command of the army and to place General
Thomas in command?

	(Question objected to by judge.advocate.)

	I never was present at any such meeting nor have I ever heard of it. It is lnforma~
don to me if it ever occurred.
	Question. Is it a fact sufficiently notorious to be reasonably certain
that the invasion of Kentucky by the force of General Bragg and Kirby
Smith had for its object to seize the principal cities and hold the State?

	I believe that was the intention. Kirby Smiths demonstrations in front of Cincin-
nati was a sufficient cause to make me think so, and with the anxiety expressed by
the late General Nelson I was satisfied that Louisville was in great danger. I was
Th)t. anxious about Louisville as much as Cincinnati, for I believed General Buells
~irny concentrated about Louisville could have whipped any given amount of men
that could have been set up before them.

	Question. In pursuing that object was it reasonable to suppose that
the enemy counted the cost of it; that is, that he estimated the means
of resistance he would have to meet?

	I most certainly believe he did or he would have gone and taken the city.

	Question. Was it to be supposed that he would abandon that object
with a single partial engagement?~

	No. sir; I think it was the presence of General Buells army in Kentucky that pre-
vented him. I do not think that the repulse that the enemy got at Chaplin Hills,
near Perryville, was sufficient to have driven him from the State.

8 R UVOL XV

Page 114

114	KY., ~ E. TENN., N. ALA., AN~~ SW. VA. [CHAP. XXVIII

	Question. By what routes might the enemy have been expected to
retreat from Kentucky if he had determined to retreat without further
resistance?
There were three roads left open for him. He could have gone off by Danville,
Stanford, Mount Vernon, and Cumberland Gap, and could have gene the route through
Stanford and Somerset, or he might have crossed the Kentucky River and escaped by
Mount Sterling into Western Virginia.

	Question. Did the concentration of the enemy at llarrodsburg, either
previously or subsequently to the battle of Perryville indicate an interi-
tion to retreat from the State precipitately ~
	It did not. The march to Harrodsburg did not indicate an abandonment of the
State. My information led me to believe that they would fight at a place near liar-
rodsbnrg, and when they went to Camp. Dick Robinson I confidently expected to
have a fight there, their position being a very strong one.

	Question. Supposing it had been assumed that the enemy designed
to retreat after the battle of Perryville and that he designed to retreat
by way of Cumberland Gap, please state what road or roads he must
have taken from Camp Dick Robinson and what position an army
should have taken to interrupt him.
	Our army would either had to have gone via Crab Orchard to Mount Vernon to have
intercepted him or the Lancaster route and to have cat them off on the Richmond
route. I should have thought the army ought to have been near London.

	Question. Suppose my army to have been directed on different points
you have named, then, on the assumption that the enemy was retreat-
ing finally from the State, in what position woald it have placed my
line of communication, supposing the enemy to have been at Harrods-
burg or in that region?
	It would have placed them in possession of the enemy.
	Question. Did the enemy in moving from Harrodsburg go through
Danville at all?

	No, sir; I dont think they did. I understand that a part of their cavalry did, but
their army did not.
By General BUELL:
	Question. General, will you please describe the character of the couri-
try bordering the Chaplin Itiver, on both sides, north of Perryville, from
there toward llarrodsburg, west of the Harrodsburg road, and of that
region of country within a scope of; say, 10 miles west from the flarrods-
burg road?
	The bed of Chaplin River is a very deep one. it was dry with the exception of
water standing in pools. The country immediately north of Perryville was a rongh
one. All the country between the Mackville and Perryville road and the Harredsburg
and Perryville turnpike was rough. There were winding approaches do~va to the bed
of the Cha~1in River and approaches from the river which led toward the Harrods-
burg pike. Between Perryville and Harrodsburg there was a very strong pssitiou
for the enemy. The country is rugged and rough. I do not know of any good roa(1
that connects the Mackville and Perryville with the Harrodsburg road.

	Question. Is it a country in which an army could operate conven-
iently or from which it could extricate itself if defeated ~

	I do not think it is, because the road I marched on I consider a bad road, and the
same character of country prevails till you get into the valley of the Salt River.

	Question. Supposing an army giving battle in that position which
the enemy occupied at Perryville and driven back on its left and com-
pelled to fall back, what road would it he desirable for it to take;
what would be the natuni line of retreat?
	Their natural line of retreat would be by. the Harrodsburg road

Page 115

CHAP. XXVIII.J	GENERAL REPORIS.
115
	Question. Suppose our army compelled to fall back by an attack on
its left, by what roads could it have retreated?
	By the Springfield road.

	Question. Any other road?
	Yes, sir; it might have fallen back on the Lebanon road.

	Question. I cont~wiid there was no question as to the result of a con-
test between my army and the rebel army; butt supposing the chances
to have been equal, which risked mostthe rebel army, by exposing
itself to be driven from the llarrodsburg pike by an attack on its left,
or my army, by supposing it to be driven from the Mackville road?

	I think the rebel army would be the most exposed.

	Question. Would not the rebel army have been driven into an im-
practicable country, in which it must have been destroyed?

	Yes, sir; I do not think it could have existed there had it been driven into that
rough country; that is, Chaplin Hills. It could not have existed there, I~think.
	Question. But suppose in such an attack the left of the rebel army
had not been turned, by what roads could it then have retreated?

	Harrodsburg and Danville.

	Question. Do you think, then, it was judicious to endeavor to cut
off the enemy from the Danville road by attacking its left strongly?

	I think it would have been a good movement.
	Question. What orders were given on the night of the 8th in refer-
ence to the movements of the enemy on the morning of the 9th-
is, was an attack ordered upon the enemys position? that

	On the night of the 8th of October I was at General Buells headquarters about 12
or 1 oclock. I met General Thomas there. I understood there was to be an attack
in the morning. General Buell asked me the question if I would be ready to attack.
I replied that my men were very weary and exhausted, but that we could go to work,
and I understood that an attack was to be made from an order given to General
Thomas. I did not see General Gilbert there, who commanded the other corps. I
was very tired at the time myself and very sleepy. I had slept but very little the
night beforeabout an hour.

	Question. What part were you to take in the operations of the fol-
lowing day?

	I was to act as a reserve.
	Question. At what hour was the attack to be made?

	At 6 oclock in the morning.
	Question. When the advance the following morning discovered that
the enemy had retired, what position was your corps to tal~c?

	My corps was to take a position, the left resting on the Dicksville road or near it,
to join on to Gilberts left.
	Qnestion. Can you state where that was to have been?

	No, sir. I know nothing about it. I went forwatd and selected my own position
and found out where his left wasthe other side of Chaplin River.
	Question. Did you take that ~position the next day?

	That is a point in my mind which I do not exactly remember. I think it was tho
second day, on the morning of the 9th, General Gay made a reconnaissance in my
front, the order for which I gave the judge-advocate.
	Question. Do you remember anything that prevented you from taking
that position

Page 116

116	RY., M. AND B. TENN., N~ ALA., AND SW. YA. [CHAP. XXVIIL

	Nothing prevented me from moving. I think it was late on that day we moved.
I recollect posting my troops there and of. going to ascertain the locality, bnt could
not find General Gilbert, but I found General Mitchell, who was then on the left of
General Gilberts corps, and my troops and Rousseaus division joined on with
Mitchells.

	Question. You have spoken in your direct evidence of a road which
you call the Dicksville and Springfield road; where does that road
come into the Perryville and Springfield road?
	I do not know the exact point on the road. There are a great many lines leading
back and forth, but my impression is that it comes out near the road where there is
a hospital. A man named Bottom lives there~ but I cannot state the exact point,
because the fences were considerably torn down, and I always rode in a direct direc-
tion.

	Question. Was the country between the Perryville and Mackville
road and the Perryville and Springfield road more practicable than
the country bordering on Chaplin River?

	Yes; it was. It was a country over which we could have moved.

	Question. Did the movement which you proposed to m~ake on the
night of the 8th actually take place while you were at my head-
quafrters?

	It actually took place when I was at your headquarters und while I was on my
way back.

	Question. Did you not think that perhaps what you considered my
refusal to give you an additional force referred to the disposition of the
troops for the following day?

	I did not understand it so.

	Question. If that movement was actually being made while you were
requesting troops, what would have been the necessity for troops or
could they have been on the ground in time?

	Yes, sir. I dispatched an aide-de-camp from your headquarters..

By the PRESIDENT:

	Question. I understand, then, that the movement was executed by
your orders?

	Yes, sir.

By General BUELL:
	Question. Did the result prove that the additional forces were neces
sary?

	No, sir; because the enemy retreated.

	Question. You have stated that I directed you to retreat by a certain
road. Did you understand that I spoke of the retreat of the army or
of your portion of it?

	Only of my corps, if I was compelled to fall back on the Springfield road. I had
no idea that the other portion of the army were going to fall back.

	Question. Were you during the march from Louisville to Perryville
kept in constant communication with the rest of the army and my
headquarters?

	Yes, sir; as constantly as it was possible to be. I dispatched couriers, who usually
found you at your headquarters. On several occasions you wrote to me to have
couriers at your headquarters, but I believe that every available and efficient order
you gave reached me. My orderlies, when I directed them to your headquarters,
would go to where they believed you were. Once they missed your headquarters
when I was at Bloomfield

Page 117

CHAP. XXVIII.J	GENERAL REPORTS.	117


	Question. Do you know on what day of the week or month you ar.
rived at Bowling Green with your division?

	I recollect it was Sunday morning that I arrived within 3 miles of Bowling Green,
but cannot state the day of the month.

	Question. Would it have been possible to march your corps from
Nashville to Glasgow by the time it reached Bowling Green?

	No, sir; we could not have done it.

	Question. If the surrender of Munfordville actually took place on the
Monday following your arrival at Bowling Green, would it have been
possible, if you started from Nashville at the time you did, to reach
Munfordville in time to prevent that surrender?

	Yes, sir; I think it could.

	Question. How many days elapsed from the date of your departure
from Nashville and the Monday on which the surrender of Munfordville
took place?

	We arrived within 4 miles of Bowling Green Sunday morning, 6 oclock. We
marched 12miles that morning.

	Question. Could you have marched from Bowling Green, after hav-
ing marched 12 miles on Sunday morning, and reached Munfordville in
time to prevent the sulTender of that place on Monday?

	The JUDGE-ADVOCATE. Was it not on Wednesday? That ismyrecol-
lection of it.
	(Conversation between judge-advocate and General McCook, in which
it was said that the latter day was correct.)
	Question. Was it supposed that the enemy was at Glasgow when
you arrived at Bowling Green?
	Yes, sir; that was my impression from all I could pick up.

	Question. Supposing you had marched by forced marches to the rescue
of Munfordville with the rebel army at Glasgow, would you have ex-
posed your re-enTorcements to a flank attack from Glasgow?
	Yes, sir; we should have had to march together and be prepared for battle.

	Question. Could you then, under the circumstances, have made that
distance with the rapidity which was necessary in order to reach Mun-
fordville to rescue that place in presence of the rebel army?
	My answer to that question is, no.

	Question. Which would have been the most judicious determination,
supposing it were possible to march by the rebel army at Glasgow, to
make that march and leave the rebel army at liberty to fall in upon
your rear, occupying Bowling Green, and so cutting off communication
eventually between 2Nashville and Louisville, or even to have sacrificed
Munfordville for the purpose of keeping the rebel army in advance and
driving it into a position where it could have been operated against by
greatly superior forces; which would you have selected?
	I would have preferred the latter movement. The former certainly would not have
allowed the army to come in on the rear, because had they got possession of Bowling
Green it would have been a vital point. Nashville would necessarilyhave fallen, an~
they could have done it had we passed them at Glasgow.

	Question. Did the rebel army make any stand after it left Munford-
ville until it arrived at Bardstown?
	Not to my knowledge. I heard they had been drawn up in line of battle at Hodg-
ensville for a fight, but I do not know it from my own knowledge

Page 118

KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAP. ~XVIIL
118

	Question. iDid you understand that the whole army halted at llodg-
ensville?
No, sir; only the rear guard.

	Question. Is it Probable that that rear guard would have withstood
the advance of my army U?
	I am very well satisfied they would not.

	Question. Then would anything have been gained by turning off
from the road which we were pursuing with an object?
	No, sir; I do not see how you could have turned off for want of supplies.
	Question. Was there anything in the nature of the country or the
relative position of the forces that would have prevented the junction
of Braggs forces with those of Kirby Smith at Bardstown had they de-
sired ~
	No, sir.

	Question. Would it have been in the option of Bra~g to give battle
at Bardstown or avoid it for the purpose of forming such a junction l

	Yes, sir.

	Question. Was there anything in the position of our forces and the
rebel forces to have prevented that junction from being formed at an
earlier day had they desired?

	No, sir; my impression was that that was what General Bragg was running for.

Redirect examination by the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:
	Question. General, you stated in your examination in chief that the
number of General Buehls army at the time of Braggs invasion was
45,000?
	I think about that number.
	Question. You now state it to be about 34,500. Will you l)lease
state where the difference is?
	The difference in that estimate existed in Rousseaus army, which waa down in Al~
abama, and the tr6dps In Nashville and adjoining that were guarding the cominuni-
cations of the army.

	Question. At what (late was the entire force of 45,000 available?

	If the army had been concentrated at Nashville.
	Question. You have stated that the army under Bragg numbered
60,000 or 70,000. Upon what did you base your calculations?

	I did not state positively, but it was from the most reliable information that could
be obtained fr& m scouts.
	Question. Can. you give the name of any reliable scout from Whomim
you received information and what that inb)rmatioil was?

	My scouts generally placed it at a higherfigure. I wonid de(lUCt a eert8ni per
cent. from their reports. One of my most reliable scouts was named Kennedy.
	Question. What number of regiments did he give as moving from
Chattanooga under Bragg?

	He reported about seventy regiments. But from Newton, whom I sent to obtain
information on the East Tennessee Railroad and to count every car load of roldVr3
that went up ~nd down that roadand his estimate was that there were seventy-one
regiments.

	Question. How did the number of these regiments run?
	lie could not form any estimate of that. I was under the iuipressioi} that the ol

Page 119

CHAP. XXVIJiI	GENERAL REPORTS.	119

regiments were much reduced in number, but their conscription had gone on, and I
could not form any estimate of their number; they greatly varied.

	Question. Has not experience taught you that if scouts and desert-
ers state the number to be 60,000 or 70,000 it is probably half that
number?

	It is a natural impression; but I was satisfied that Bragg had the Corinth army
with him, with a few detachments under Breckinridge.

	Question. You proposed attacking the enemy at Glasgow. Did you
suppose they had 60,000 or 70,000 n~en?

	I did not suppose they had 60,000 men at Glasgow, but I naturally supposed that
in the face of General Buells army, of which the Confederates knew, they would not
attempt to invade Kentucky except with a very large force.

	Question. Was not your calculation and that of the officers generally
based upon that factthat he would not dare to invade Kentucky with
that number?

	I think not. My impression was that Bragg had crossed with seventy regiments
and that Withers had crossed with larger forces.

	Question. Do you remember saying to Lew. Campbell, of Ohio, at
Bowling Green, that there were only 25,000 ragged rascals, and that
you thought it time to go and whip them?

	I think I never made such a remark.

	Question. Is your recollection of that impression such as would jus-
tify such a remark?

	It is not. With different people coming in with different stories the matter was
discussed, but I never believed their army was as small as that.

	Question. You say that you were impressed with the belief that

Bragg would not invade Kentucky in the face of General Buells army,
and that he would not undertake it with less than 60,000 or 70,000
men ~?
	That is my impression at that time.

	Question. if General Bragg anticipated an uprising in Kentucky
an(l assistance from Kirby Smith in that quarter, would it not have
1)een more available for him to have taken 30,000 rather than 60 000 or
70,000; that is, in reference to his supplies ~
	Of course it would. He could then have moved with more celerity.

	Question. If the enemys number was as your estimate makes it, how
do you account for the evacuation of so strong a place as Muufordville
at youi approach?
	I do not know what the objects of the enemy were at that time. I merely formed
my opinion from information gained since; but at that time I though t certainly that
the enemy had as many men as General Buell bad, and it was want of rations on
their l)art that took theni from Munfordville.

	Question. In that connection can you account for the fact that an
army of that size, after forming a jtinction with Kirby Smith, declined ~
to fight at Harrodsburg or at Dick Robinson?
	That is something I cannot understand why they did not light ihere, where I ex-
iccied them to fight; I cannot account for it; but General Buohls army was much
increasc(l in strength, and they may have known that we outnumbeted them. I he-
lieve that with all the re-enforcements they got in Kentucky our army outnumbered
t hem.

	Question. What is your estimate, from all the information you oh.
tiincd, of Kirby Smiths forces

Page 120

120
KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAP. XXVUL
	Including his entire force I think Kirby Smith had about 20,000 men, including thG
re-enforcements he got iii Kentucky. I got that testimony from people in front of
Cincinnati. I think he got about; a thousand in Kentucky.

	Question. At the time we occupied Munfordville after the enemy left
do you know where Kirby Smith s army was?

	We thought it was in front of Cincinnati or before Lexington or Franklin.

	Question. You stated in your examination that Cincinnati was threat--
ened, and not Lonisville, by Kirby Smith?

	By Smith, but not by the entire force. I do not know what there was in front of.
Cincinnati but raw recruits. I do not see why he did not take it.

	Question. You said in your examination in chief that while encamped
at Hubbards Cove General Buell gave you his plan of operation.

	His plan of concentration.

	Question. What is the date of that, when he gave you a synoposis?

	I think, sir, it was on the last day of August. I recollect I was about to move down
to Altamont on the 1st, and I had already done it on the last day, if I remember, antici-
pating the order.

	Commi~sion adjourned to meet December 12, at 10 a. m.


NASHVILLE, December. 12, 186210 a. m.
	Commission met pursuant to adjournment. All the members present;
also the judge.advocate and General Buell.

	Examination of General McCook continued.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

	Question. General McCook, the plan furnished you at Battle Creek
had reference to the invasion of General Bragg, and that invasion must
therefore have been known to General Buell in the latter part of Au-
gust. Is this so?

	I think the intention of General Bragg was known. We could of course only
approximate to his intention. The army was concentrated at Chattanooga, and I
think they intended to advance upon Nashville and go into Middle Tennessee. There
was a letter found by my pickets, which led me to believe this, written by one
Isham Harris, of this State, which proposed to give a synopsis of the plans of Bragg,
that he intended to have his beloved capital, as he called it.

	Question. Have you possession of it?

	I have not. I gave it to General Buell. The plan proposed was not carried out,
but I know that a portion came true; that is, in the posting of two brigades, which
he said he had succeeded in getting to Chattanooga. In this letter it indicated that
General Bragg would cross the army somewhere in the vicinity of Florence or Tus-
cumbia. The letter might have been a catch, but I think from everything it was
original. As soon as it was found its contents were telegraphed to General Buell. Of
course the army was not intended to remain at Chattanooga, but as soon as their
army would be concentrated an attempt would be made, because at that time General
Buells forces were very much scattered along the road and through the country, and
they proposed to break through the line before he could concentrate. That was
expressed in the letter. I suppose General Buell was aware that they would, if
possible, attempt to come into Tennessee. The letter was found about the 8th or 10th
of August.

	Question. Can you fix the date at which Braggs army crossed the
Tennessee and how long after that event it came to your knowledge?

	I was satisfied that he had crossed the Tennessee River on the day that I halted in
the Sequatchie Valley. It was somewhere between the 10th and 20th.
	Question. At what poixt did General Buells plan contemplate con-
s~e~itratin~ his fogees 19 ~e4s~ ~e J~y~5iQJ~i pf ~n~a1 brag;

Page 121

CRAP. XXVflLJ	GENERAL REPORTS.	121

	The point was not indicated to me. He was either to attack the enemy as he de-
bouched into the valley or as he descended into the valley of Middle Tennessee.
There was a condition in the plan, as I understood it.

	Question. In that connection you s~ay that a lack of supplies prevented
that plan being caned out. Did this alone prevent the plan from being
successful?

	That was my impression. I was daily expecting an order to fall back on account
of supplies. I just fed my men from day to day. I did expect that General Buells
army would be compelled to fall back from the position it occupied there for the pur-
pose of supplies, if for nothing else. Every general knew how his troops had to suf-
fer marching through that country, with little water and half rations.

	Question. Could an army of 60,000 or 70,000 men, marching rapidly
through Tennessee by way of Dunlap, Pikeville, Sparta, Carthage,
and Munfordville, have subsisted upon the country along the route?

	With the supplies they had concentrated at Chattanooga, the amount of transpor-
tation, and the manner they supplied their army I think they could. Every farmer
who had an ounce of bread or bacon to spare hauled it as the army passed by. The
rebels never carried an ounce of provisions, but the people fed them. And the people
gave all they got to the last pound. They had a large train also.
and rapid marches, but suffered a great deal.	. They made forced

	Question. Could you give the Commission any idea of what propor-
tion of supplies could be relied on in that way with that army of 60,000
or 70,000 men?

	That would depend upon the nature of the inhabitants and of the country we
marched through. I think half rations could have been procured for them..
	The PRESIDENT. Am I to understand that Braggs army amounted
to 60,000 or 70,000 men ~

	No, sir; that was the impression I had when they crossed at Chattanooga.

By the JUDGE.ADVoCATE:
	Question. You are acquainted with the works and strength of Mun-
fordville. What force would have been sufficient to hold that place
against Braggs army?

	Munfordville is a position that could not be turned very easily. I should think that
one-half the number could have held the place against Braggs ~trniy. The advan-
tages of defense would have been one-half.

	Question. Had Bragg made a stand at Munfordville could you have
avoided fighting him there?

	Not without his taking Bowling Green. Our ~hope was to fight him there and let
him go. I consider Bowling Green a more important point than Nashville.

	Question. Had he defeated you at Mnnfordville would it not have
been the total destruction of your army and the loss of KenI~uicky?

	Yes, sir; if the army had been pursued with the vigor I thought he would have
shown.

	Question. After th9 hurried retreat would not intelligent officers in
the army have estimated their strength at 60,000 or 70,000?

	I do not think so. When they left Munfordville my estimate was about 35,000 to
40,000. Dr. Gardner said, They have as many troops as you have. He is a man of
good judgment and fine reputation as a surgeon and a man that is not liable to be
stampeded under any circumstances.

	Question. At Munfordville for the first time you came to the knowl-
edge of the fact that you had overestimated .Braggs army?

	Yes, sir; the difficulty, too, of getting information in the country was so great that
if the army had proved to be 10,000 or 15,000 larger or smaller either way it woi44
jot have smprised me

Page 122

122	KY.~ M. AND E. TENN., N.ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAP. XXVIII

	Question. With Munfordville secured and Bowling Green in our pos-
session what would have prevented General Buell throwing his army
into the rear and cutting off supplies?

	He would only have to go and find the enemy and whip them wherever he found
them.
	Qaestion. Then he would not have marched to Louisville?

	I think not. General Buell had an army that could not be whipped.

	Question. With an army under the command of Bragg less in num-
ber than that nuder General Buell, with a large force at Louisville, can
you understand why Bragg was in no hurry to form a junction with
Kirby Smith?

	If I knew exactly the extent of Braggs knowledge about our army and position I
could understand it; not without.
	Question. Was it possible that Bragg threw his army so boldly iflto
Kentucky without knowing the number of the army in his rear?

	That I do not know. Speculations can be made, and when the fadts are known
opinions can be formed; but I think Bragg was pretty well posted. His means of in-
formation were excellent. I think it was a part of his I)lans that Price should come
up to Tennt!ssec, but he ran against Rosecrans at luka. That is what he should have
done, but running against Rosecrans prevented it.

	Question. Are the names of the rebel officers of General Braggs cap.
tured at ~ Knob known to you, and what time after they were
captured were they released?

	I know nothing of that circumstance but what I heard. One of them was named
Forsyth, of Georgia. When they went or upon what conditions they were released
I do not know.

	Question. J understand you now to say that after the Munfordville
affair you came to a better knowledge of the number of Braggs army
and that it numbered 30,000 or 35,000?

	I did not say it was 30,000 or 35,000. I got my impression from Dr. Gardner. My
conciusion was that Bragg had crossed with 35,000 or 40,000.
	Question. You estimated Kirby Smiths army, from all the informa-
tion you could get, at about 20,000?

	I so thought.
	Question. Do you say that Kirby Smith and Bragg formed a junction
at llarrodsburg?

	I think they did. They could have done so and should have done so.

	Question. Did not their refusal to meet you at a strong position at
Harrodsburg and declining to fight you at l)ick T~obinson and making
a hurried retreat from Kentucky satisfy you that you had overestimated
their number there as you had at Munfordville?

	No, sir; I have no reason to change it. I think they had about 60,000 men.

By General TYLER:
	Question. You say there were a million of rations at Bowling Green;
how long would they have lasted your army?

	I say I was so informed, but the fact did not exist. I simply said I believed so;
now I know there was not.

	Question. Has any information come to you since yesterday?

	No, sir; I will simply state facts I know. I wa~ informed there was a million of
rations of bread at Munfordville, but I do not think there was a million there, for
when my commissary went in for bread he could not get it

Page 123

CHAP. xxviii.]	GENERAL REPORTS.	123

	Question. Were there any Union forces except General Buells which
could by any possibility have relieved Munfordville ~
	I do not see why it should not have l)een relieved from Louisville.

	Question. Do you know whether the army was niassed at Bowling
Green on Sunday morning when you arrived there?
	Rousseaus and Woods divisions were there; Colonel MeCook in comma ml of cavalry.
My own division arrived at 6. Crittendens division was~1 here, enCaulpe(l in the same
place. On Monday the Fourth Division was there. Mitchell was 15 mihs in the rear,
got up on Monday; and rrlIonIas~ division, I understood General Bucli to say, had
been ordered from Nashville up to Bowling Green. General Thomas wasa man I had
great confidence in, and in battle I wanted to have him on the same line with mc,
and I was anxious for him to come up.

	Question. How far is Bowling Green from Munfordville?

	Forty miles.

	Question. Had you forces enough massed at Bowling Green Sunday
morning to have relieved Munfordville Wednesday morning l

	On the flank of the enemy we had forces enough, but I do not think in the pr~sence
of the enemy we could have got there. It would have made 20 miles a day, which is
rapid marching even for small detachments; but I do not think we could have got
our army there in time.

By General ORD:
	Question. Could troops have come from Louisville quicker than you
could have sent them from Bowling Green ~
	They could have come from Louisville in five hours. It is about 70 miles from Mun-
fordville to Louisville. Had they come 10 miles an hour, it would take theut about
seven hours. They had the telegraph, too, when we had to send through the enemys
country by courier.

	Question. Did you have any information that Munfordville was be-
leaguered by an overwhelming force?
	I knew on Monday morning and heard it was taken, and got on my horse and rode
to General Buells headquarters, and there heard that the attack on Mnnfordville had
been repulsed, and there I learned that Colonel Wilder was in command. Previously
I do not know who was there.

	Question. You did not know then it required relief?

	I knew Bragg was at Glasgow, 20 miles and 40 miles from there. It was therefore
supposed that if Bragg could not take it with one brigade he would send more.

	Question. Any applications from Munfordville for relief?
	None .that I ever heard of. I was present at General Buells headquarters at Drip-
ping Springs when a man named Miller said Munfordville had surrendered.
By the PRESIDENT:
	Question. Do you know if there was any communication between the
officer in command at Louisville, or General Wright, commanding the
department, and General Buell?
	I knew nothing of it at all if there was. It was beyond my sphere of knowledge,
and it was something which I dont think General Buells division commanders knew
anyflulag about. They had their lines marked out for them, and they generally
marched on them and asked no questions.

	Question. Do you know whether communication of that kind was pos-
sible at that time?
	I think communication was possible. It could have been seat by telegraph to Mun-
fordvillc and from thence worked around through the bushes. It is therefore possible.

	Question. Have you information which will enable you to answer
whether there was any co-ol)eration between General Wright and Gen-
eral }3uell

Page 124

124	KY., M. AND B. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAP. XXVIII.

	I never knew anything at all about it. I used to inquire about my friend Nelson.
I was delighted when I heard he had recovered from his wound; but I knew nothing
but that General Nelson was in command and had 100,000 men. That was the news
we got. General Buell never told me anything about it. I did not have an hours
conversation with General Buell from the time we left Dripping Springs till we got
to Louisville.

By General BUELL:
	Question. The judge.advocate has inquired whether if Munfordville
had been made secure I could not have thrown my army upon the line
of communication of the enemy. I should like you to state if Bragg
had any line of communication on which his safety depended.
I do not think he had. General Buell would then have been free to have marched
after Bragg as long as rations lasted.

	Question. In order that that should have been the case, would it not
have been necessary that Louisville should be secured I
	Yes, sir; I think Louisville was the most important place; it was our base of sup-
plies.

	Question. How many divisions were yet in the rear when you arrived
at Louisville?

	Thomas and Mitchells divisions were in the rear.

	General SCHOEFF. What do you know of the dissatisfaction of the
officers and men and the petition sent with respect to the removal of
General Buell after the battle of Perryville?

	I was informed while on the march from Danville to Lebanon that there was such a
paper in existence in General Gilberts corps. Who was the originator of it I do not
know. I never saw the paper. The first development of this feeling of dissatisfac.
tion I discovered on the march from Nashville to Louisville. They complained of
being marched to death and of being half fed. Another cause of this dissatisfaction
was that General Buell was always very much engaged in his quarters and did not
go around among his soldiers much. I have frequently felt that had he visited his
camps more, reviewed his troops more, and shown himself more to his soldiers a
different state of feeling would have existed. I always had confidence in General
Buell as a general, and, thank God, I have yet.

By General BUELL:
	Question. Do you know the names of the signers of the paper re-
ferred to?

I had a conversation with one of them outside the door here a few moments ago. I
asked him about it, as to whether he ever heard of such a meeting of officers in the
army wishing to depose General Buell and put General Thomas in command, and in
this conversation with General Steedman he said he had signed a paper and had pre-
sided at a meeting of officers requesting the President to remove General Buell. I
think General Steedman has confidence in General Buell, but was influenced by the
junior officers and men in his command.

	Question. Where was that meeting held?

	I did not know, but somewhere on the Rolling Fork. I knew nothing for certain,
but believe it was so. It was subsequent to the battle of Perryville; but their feel-
ing was more particularly directed against General Gilbert.

	Question. Did the paper state any reason?

I never saw the paper. It was merely mentioned on the way down, but it was by
officers I had no control over. I knew of no other officers that signed it. General
Steedman said it was a respectful petition to the President of the United States. He
thought it the most direct road to the President.

	Question. Did you ever hear of any similar proceedings on the part
of officers of General Thomas division, particularly in reference to their
vommariders

Page 125

Cw& p. Xrvm.j	GENERAL REPORTS.	125

	Yes, sir; I did. Once, in front of Corinth, T. W. Sherman was put in command of
General Thomas division, which produced great dissatisfaction in the division, and
the officers of the brigade and the colonels petitioned to have him removed. I know
they were very much dissatisfied. They complained of his manner more than of his
want of ability.

	Question. Did you ever know of any other case ~

	Not that I recollect; that was the only instance.

	Question. Was that division under my command at the time?

	No, sir; it was assigned to the army of General Grant. I was requested by my de-
ceased brother, General Robert EL.] McCook, to see General Buell and see if the change
could be made; that the men were so angry with him that he might meet with vio-
lence from their hands. I spoke to General Buell about it, and it was one of his best
divisions, and I know he as well as myself was much interested in their welfare.

	Question. Do you know whether General Steedmans division was
affected by the assignment of General Gilbert according to his sup-
posed rank at that time?

	Yes, sir; General Steedman ranks General Gilbert.

	General SCHOEFF. Could it be known to General Steedman at the
time that he was not a brigadier-general?

	I believe Gilbert never had a commission as a major-general.

	General BUELL. Has there been anything in the active operation ot
my troops, and in their scattered condition for a considerable time, that
would have interfered with as frequent inspection of them as might
otherwise have been made?

	My answer to that is, yes.

By General BUELL:
	Question. Did you have any doubt that Bragg would concentrate his
forces at Harrodsburg for battle after the battle of the 8th?

	I believed he would concentrate.

	Question. What did you suppose his whole force wouJd amount to?

	At that time I had no positive way of ascertaining what his forces were, but I be-
lieve they would amount to about 55,000 men.

	Question. Did you know the strength of our army after the battle of
the 8th?

	I did not, sir, except as far as my own forces were concerned.

	Question. Did you know that the absent division of your corps was
on the march to join you?

	Yes, sir; I did.

	Question. Was there anything on the retreat of the rebel forces from
Perryville which indicated that the retreat was a disorderly one?

	Not by the indications of their march. There was nothing left upon the road ex-
cept what they could not carry awaygun-carriages and guns that were taken in bat-
tlefor they cut up the carriages and left them.

	Question. Supposing that there was a reasonable probability that the
enemy would give battle at llarrodsburg with a force not much, if any,
inferior to your own and that you were in expectation of re-enforce-
inents in a very short time, would it be considered judicious to wait for
these re-enforcements to join or would you have considered the result
of the battle so absolutely certain as to make it advisable to attack
with what you had

Page 126

126	KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAP. XXVIII.
	Yes, sir; I believe that the army we had there could have whipped them. That
was my impression then and is my impression yet.
	Question. Do you think it would necessarily have been so had the
forces been nearly equal, considering the advantages the enemy would
have in choice of position and the position being strong at Harrods-
burg?
	There would, of course, be a doubt about the matter. We had pursued Bragg a long
distance, and if we could catch up with him I thought it would be the best policy.
	Question. iDid you consider the troops of which our army was com-
posed at Perryville superior to the troops of the rebel army?

	I believe the old troops I had were superior to the troops of the rebel army; my
new troops were vastly inferior.
	Question. What proportiou of the whole army was composed of new
troops?
	There was one regiment of new troops to each brigade, and Jacksons division, con-
sisting of two brigades, were all new troops. I suppose the army marching from
Louisville was about 80,000 men.

	Question. Supposing, then, that the two armies had been nearly
equal and the advantages of position oii the part of the enemy and that
you were expecting re-enforcements, would it have been advisable to
seek a battle under such circumstances?

	If the armies had been nearly equal I would prefer to have waited. I will state
that I never knew what the strength of our forces was on the advance till I saw
General Buells official report to-day, and I will say that they were much less than
I thought they were. I was surprised and amazed to see it.

	Question. Supposing the army after the battle of Perryville had taken
position at Danville, would that necessarily have prevented the escape
of the rebel army?

	No, sir; they would have gone farther up the road; they would go out by Rich
mond.	-~

	Question. How far is Danville from the road which leads from Camp
Dick Robinson to Lancaster?

	Danville is about 8 miles from Camp Dick Robinson, and that is the nearest town
on the road from Camp Dick Robinson to Lancaster; but Dicks River is the obstacle.

	Question. Giye the character of Dicks River.

	Dicks River has precipitous bluffs and can be crossed only in one place.

	Question. Would the occupation of Danville have prevented the en-
emy from retreating from Camp Dick Robinson by that road?

	I think that the occupation of Danville would not, but we would have been in a
position where the enemy could have been cut off from Lancaster. We should have
been marching on his flank all the time had he attempted to move, but the enemy
could not be reached on account of Dicks River till it was crossed, and we might
have arrived simultaneously at Lancaster had we started at the same time.

	Question. With such a stream as Dicks River between the armies
would he have been in great danger?

	Not in great danger till Dicks River was crossed by our army.

	Question. Was it certain that the enemy would take a position at
Camp Dick Robinson?

	I thought so, but the thing was not developed till we left Harrodsburg.

	Question. After it was ascertained that the enemy had gone to Camp
Dick L obinson do yoa say that Danville was a proper position for our
army to take?
	Certainly it was. It was the only position left

Page 127

ChAP. XXVIII.]	GENERAL REPORTS.	127


By General TYLER:
	Question. You do not mean to say, general, that their army, man for
man, was superior to ours?

	The material of our army is as good or superior to that of the rebel.

	Commission adjourned to meet on December 13, 1862, at 10 a. m.


NASHVILLE, December 13, 186210 a. m.
	The Commission met pursuant to adjournment. All the members
present; also the judge-advocate and General Buell.

	Colonel SHOEMAKER (a witness for the Government), having been
duly sworn by the judge-advocate, testified as follows:

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

	Question. What is your position in the service of the United States?

	Colonel, commanding the Thirteenth Michigan Volunteers.

	Question. State, if you please, to the court what you know of General
Bragg crossing the Cumberland River at the point they crossed and
all about it.

	I was at Hartsville, at Dixons Springs, on the night of the 8th of September; left
there on the morning of the 9th; passed through Carthage; crossed the Cumberland
River at that point; saw Generals Bragg and Hardee on the south bank of the Cuta-
berland on the afternoon of the 9th; saw a portion of the army of General Bragg on
the south side of the Cumberland on that day.

	Question. What were they doing, colonel?

	They were mostly bivouacking. I saw some marching. It was toward evening I
saw most of them, and they had apparently just gone into camp; many of them were
moving. I saw many of them next day, many troops and wagons, and I saw scatter-
ing parties through to Sparta, but no body of forces. I also saw at Dixons Sprimigs
some cavalry, said to be the advance of General Cheathani.

	Question. I propose, Mr. President, to ask a question over which we
have had some discussion, and which I presume General Buell will
again object to. What do you know of the size of the invading army
at that point, as gathered from your own observation and what the
rebel officers informed you?
	General BUELL. I object to that portion of the question which pro-
poses to take as evidence the statements of the officers of General
Braggs army in regard to its strength.
	General Buell and Colonel Shoemaker retired, during which the Com-
mission unanimously
Resolved, While the Commission is not disposed to deny the position
of General Buell as to the inadmissibility of purely hear.~ay evidence on
a trial of an accused party it will not sustain the objection now off~red,
but will place the answers of the witness on its record and be gov-
erned in its opinions according to the weight which collateral testimony
may give to such answers.
	Colonel SHOEMAKER. I saw what I ju~ed to be a division of General Braggs army
on the road as we were passing along.
	General TYLER. Can you locate them?
	They were within 6 miles of the river, on the sontli side of the Cnmberland River.
I also saw some cavalry at Dixons Springs on the niorning of the 9th of September,
commanded by General Wheeler, and said to be the advance of General Cheathams
portion of the army

Page 128

128	KY.,M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., ANII~ SW. VA. UI~HAr. XXVIII.


	The JUDGE-ADVOCATE. What is your opinion as to the size of that
army?
	General BUELL. That is, what he heard.
	Colonel SHOEMAKER. I formed the opinion at the time that the army of General
Bragg did not exceed 30,000 men, and what I saw there and at Knoxville confirmed
me in the opinion.

By the PRESIDENT:

	Question. Jnst state what that was from which you formed your
opin~on.
	It was from conversation with officers of the army and what I saw myself. I can
state generally what I heard from the officers. General Cheatham was crossing with
his force in the neighborhood of Hartsville, General Bragg at Carthage, General Polk
at the town of Gainesborough, and from what I could learn I judged there were
about 20,000 men. There was a great expectation among all the officers that there
would be a general rising in Kentucky, and their hopes were based on that supposi-
tion. I saw General MeCown. He stated to me that he had already shipped some
3,000 (I am not positive as to the number) of arms for the recruits raised by Morgan,
and he thought they would be required to raise arms for 20,000.

	Question. I would like to have this question answered if possible:
State what you saw, colonel, that confirmed your opinion, formed from
the statement of those officers, and who the officers were.
	The officer with whom I had the most conversation was Lieutenant Kuhn. He was
of the body guard of Bragg, and commanded the protection that went with me to
Knoxville.

	Question. What other officers do you recollect?
	Major Scott and Lieutenaut.Colouel Anderson. There were a number of officersthat
I talked with whose names I do not know. I saw General Bragg, and he said nothing
to me nor I to him relative to the strength of forces on either side, but he refused to
parole me, giving as his reason that I had seen too muchbut I had seen but little
and he refused to parole me on that account rather than because I had seen more. It
was my desire to be paroled, hut he paroled me to go to Knoxville.

	Question. What were the facts, from your own personal observation,
that you saw to confirm any opinion of that kind?
	I was taken prisoner on Sunday evening, and was till next Monday at noon going
through and at Knoxville, and my opinion was, made up from what I saw and heard
generally. I do not know any more particular points that I could state.

Cross.examination by General BIJELL:
	Question. Did the opinion which you formed then from observation
and hearsay agree with the opinion you had previously formed of the
rebel army?
I think it did.

	Question. Did I understand when you left Nashville you estimated
the rebel army under Bragg to be 3O,OOt~ and no more?
	That was my opinion. I do not know that I placed it particularly at :10,000 and
that that opinion was formed at Nashville, but my opinion of the strength of General
Braggs arniy was not much chamged by what I saw and heard.

	Question. Your opinion of the strength of Braggs army continued
the same?
	Yes.

	Question. Do you know how many divisions there were in Bragg~-
army?
I do not.

	Question. Do you know the organization of the divisions?
	I do not. I know nothing further than what I stated in my direct examination

Page 129

CHAP. XXVIII.]
GENERAL REPORTS.
129
	Question. Did you count the number of men in any regiment?

	I did not.

	Question. Did you by actual observation make an estimate of the
strength of any regiment?

	No, sir; I did not. I saw a body of troops in camp bivouacked, and as we passed
them estimated, as I naturally would, what the number there might be. I supposed
there would be, as I stated before, a division. I passed directly through and took no
particular account of them.

	Question. Either of the number of men or regiments?

	Neither.

	Question. Did you think it a large division or a small one?

	Rather a small one.

	Question. What number of men do you suppose there were in that
body of troops?

	I should estimate them at from 6,000 to 8,000.

	Question. Why do you suppose it to be such a body of troops as we
call a division?

	From the number of men and the extent of ground they occupied.

	Question. Might it not have been more or less?

	I think it might have been less, but I dont think it could have been more.

	Question. State definitely, if you please, colonel, the conversation
you had with those rebel officers which gave you this opinion in regard
to their strength.

	I do not know that I can do so. The opinion I was asked to give was formed from
conversations I had at different times; but without impressing any particular con-
versation upon my mind I can only give the conclusions I arrived at. The partic-
ular conversation held with any particular officer I could not state. But I rode with
that lieutenant to whom I have referred five days. He was the only commissioned
officer of the body guard, but he was a very pleasant gentleman and appeared to be
sociable, and we talked a great deal in relation to the war; but it would be impossi-
ble to give definitely the conversation with him or any other officer. My opinion
was based upon conversations generally and my own observations.

	Question. In any of these conversations was it stated definitely or
approximately that the army of General Bragg was about 30,000 strong?

	I do not know that I could state positively at what figure any particular officer
placed that army. I recollect a conversation in reference to the battle of Shiloh, in
which this question was brought up, that we bad overestimated the strength of their
army in our battles; that we had overestimated their men at Shiloh, at which they
said they had but 28,000 m~i, and that a great many overestimated the number of
men in General Braggs army, but what was the exact number they stated I could
not say. I arrived at that opinion as the general result of the conversations I had
with the different officers, and perhaps without basing it upon any fixed number that
any officer might have stated.

	Question. I understand you to say that the officers from whom you
derived your opinion in regard to the strength of Braggs army repre-
sented the strength of the rebel army at Shiloh at 28,000?

	One officer with whom I conversed made such a statement.

	Question. In making this estimate, then, you had no method of com-
putation as to the number of regiments and divisions and the strength
of regiments in arriving at your conclusion?

	Not at all. I knew nothing of the exact number of regimehts or divisions, but it
was a general conclusion I arrived at from different sources of information.

9 R RVOL XV

Page 130

130	KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAP. XXYIIL

	Question. Is it probable that an officer, an intelligent officer, in the
rebel service would give you a correct impression as to the strength of
the rebel army when that was the subject of conversation?

	Ordinarily I should say not, but I was a prisoner and going south, and they con-
versed with perhaps a little more freedom than they would have done under other
circumstances.

	Question. They might possibly have overestimated or underesti-
mated?

	Yes, sir.

	Question. Upon what data had you previously arrived at the conclu-
sion that the rebel army under General Bragg was not more than 6 ~,OOO
strong?

	I was stationed at Stevenson, Ala., up to, I think, the 30th of August, and of course
it was a subject very much discussed there and upon the march to Nashville. I had
formed that opinion from no particular facts perhaps, but as every officer in the Army
forms an opinion in relation to the movements of his own army or that of the enemy.
But there was no precise knowledge that led me to know what their precise forces
were. It was a mere matter of opinion, and formed from snch geneAi information
as I was likely to obtain from my position in the Army.


NASHVILLE, December 13, 1862.

	General J. B. STEEDMAN (a witness for the Government), having
been duly sworn, testified as follows:

By the JuDGE-ADVOCATE:

	Question. State, if you please, your position in the United States
Army.
	I am brigadier-general.

	Question. State whether you were in the service under General
Buell when tue army moved up in pursuit of Bragg in the invasion of
Kentucky.
	I was.

	Question. Will you state, if you please, to the Commission what esti-
mate the intelligent officers of the army placed upon the number of
Braggs army in the march from Nashville to Munfordville?
	General BUELL. This amounts to nothing more than collecting the
rumors of the camp; it is no evidence whatever. The answer to such
- a question can be of no value as evidence.
	The judge-advocate argued the legality of the question.
	General BUELL. The investigation of rumors was commenced by the
prosecution. I have not in my cross-examination asked for any such
evidence as the question of the judge-advocate tends to elicit from the
~vitness.
	Generals Buell and Steedman retired, when the Commission unani-
mously
Resolved The Commission is disposed to give the investigation the
widest scope. Whether the opinion, estimates, or impressions of a
witness are to be of weight when the Commission make up their opin.
ion will be for future consideration, and the. Commission will be gov-
erned by the laws of evidence and equity.
	The question will be put.
	General BUELL. If it please the Commission, I should like to be in-
formed whether my objections were made matter of argument by the
judge-advocate in secret session

Page 131

CHAP. XXVIII.]
GENERAL REPORTS.
131
	The PRESIDENT. I can assure General Buell that nothing is done to
his prejudice inconsistent with law.
	General BUELL. I (10 not wish to inquire into anything that properly
belongs to the Commission in secret session, but if the prosecution in-
troduces arguments upon my objections 1 claim that I ought to be
privileged to hear them and I think they should be recorded. I wish
to inquire if that rule is being observed.
	The court was then cleared, and the Commission affirmed the reply
and the assurance of the president.
	General STEEDMAN. The opinion of officers of our army who interested themselves
in obtaining information as to the strength of the enemy, so far as I became ac-
quainted with their opinions, fixed Braggs strength at froni 25,000 to 35,000 after his
army emerged from the Sequatchie Valley at or near Pikevilie. The largest estimate
I ever heard made by those who pretended to know about the strength of the enemy
was made here at the quarters of General Schoepf by a young man who professed to
be in the employof the Federal officers; whether he was or not I am unable posi-
tively to state. I know, however, he communicated with my superior officers on the
subject; fixed Braggs strength at between 37,000 and 38,000, exclusive of artillery;
27 brigades9 divisions of 3 brigades each. The strength of their regiments was esti-
mated at 350, making about 37,800. The strength of Braggs army was a matter of
discussion very frequently among the officers of our army at various points on the
march when they had an opportunity to meet to discuss these things. I heard a great
deal of discussion about it near Cave City. The impression was very firmly fixed upon
my mind from opinions expressed by officers generally with whom I talked on the sub-
ject that the strength of the Confederate army was in the neighborhood of 35,000:

	Question. Aside from any reliable information, would not the opin-
ions of intelligent officers be very much influenced as to the number of
Braggs army by the fact that he threw an army from Chattanooga
into Kentucky in the face of General Buells forces whi
undertaking and requiring a large army ~	cli was a bold
	It would make the impression, perhaps, upon the minds of officers and anybody
who thought upon the subject that the army was larger than it really was; at least I
would add that it would make the impression upon the minds of the officers generally
that the army was a very large one.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

	Question. You will ~tate, if you please, whether you accompanied
the march from Nashville to Munfordville, what you know of the sur-
render of that place, and the failure on the part of General Buells
army to relieve it.
	I accompanied the march of the rear division from Nashville to Bowling Green. I
know nothing of the surrender of Munfordville, except what I read in the newspa-
pers and heard from the paroled officers and soldiers on their march from Munford-
ville to Bowling Green. That our army failed t~ reach there in time to prevent the
capture of the garrison I know, but whether General Buell was responsible for it or
not I do not know. The advance of the army was at Bowling Green some time before
my division reached there.

	Question. I would ask you, general, what time the rear division
reached Bowling Green 1
	I think it was on Wednesday, September 17, but I do not undertake to be positive.
I think also that was the day of the surrender of Munfordville.

	Question. Had the enemy made a stand at Munfordville would Gen-
eral Buells army have been forced to fight? Could you have avoided
a battle there?
	General Buells army would have fought had it been permitted to, and my impres-
sion is that we would have had to fight.

	Question. What, in your opinion, would have been the effect of & de-
feat of our army at Munfordville upon our fortunes in Kentucky and
Tennessee?
	I have never thought of that

Page 132

KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA [CHAP. XXVIII.
132

	Question. You can state, if you know, whether Munfordville is a strong
position or not.
	I have never examined the position occupied by the troops there. I never was at
the fortifications and know but little about them. I simply crossed tbe river with
my command.

	Question. Did not the estimate made of Braggs army of 30,000 or
35,000 come to be a certainty after you left Mnnfordville in the opinion
of the officers?

	I think the opinion was so strong that it became a conviction, but I am riot pre-
pared to say it was a certainty.
	Question. Was it not the general opinion among the officers that the
enemy would make a stand at Munfordville?

	There was a diversity of opinion among the officers on that subject. Some were of
the opinion that the enemy were in force at Mnnfordville and intended to stand,
while others thought they were merely checking us with a small force of cavalry and
artillery to enable them to get up into the heart of Kentucky to secure supplies.

	Question. Were you present at the battle of Perryville? If so, with-
ot~t giving us a detailed account of that battle, state where your posi-
tion was.

	I was present on the field at the close of the action and was near the battle with
my command when it commenced. I was onthe Springfield and Perryville road,
encamped within 3 miles of the battle-field the night previous, and was ordered to
move up about the time the firing commenced. I moved up on the Springfield and
Perryvillo road to a point within three-fourths of a mile from the right of Rousseaus
division, where my command was halted for a considerable length of time, within
sound of the artillery and musketry; and at about 4 oclock in the afternoon, but
having no time-piece cannot state positively as to the hour, General Schoepf, who
was in command of the First Division, sent me an order to move up with my brigade,
and while moving he informed me that he had received orders to send two brigades
to the support of General MoCook, and that he had designated the Second and Third
Brigades, commanded by General Fry and myself, and ordered me immediately for-
ward. I moved up under his orders as quickly as possible; found General McCook
st~nding by Loomis battery; reported to him in person; got my brigade into posi-
tion on the right of that battery, which was on the extreme right of Rousseaus divis-
ion; took position between Rousseaus division and General Sheridans. Frys bri-
gade, as I understood subsequently, was ordered back. The officers and men of the
First Division during the firing in front and while they were halted in sound of it
were very anxious to go forward. Why they did not go forward at an earlier hour I
am unable to say. We were perhaps two hours occupying the last position the
division was ordered to occupy9 perhaps longer.

	Question. How far back upon the Springfield pike were you at the
commencement of that fight 

	Perhaps 3 miles. I have a more distinct recollection of the camp than I have of
the distance. It was a hard place to get water. The only water there General Gil-
bert kept for his own use, his staff, and escort, while the soldiers were perishing for
it.	He had a guard over it and would not let them have a drink.

	Question. Could you hear the sound of firing at that point you desig-
nated 3 miles back?

	Very distinctly the sound of artillery, but could not hear the musketry.

	Question. Did the firing indicate a severe engagement?

	I did not suppose there was a severe engagement till we advanced from that camp
up to the position froth which I have already stated my brigade was ordered forward
to the support of General McCooks troops. While we were halted there the officers
of the division generally were satisfied that there was a severe engagement going on
in front.

	Question.. Do you know at what point Kirby Smiths army made a
junction with Braggs after that engagement

Page 133

CHAP. IXYlII.]
GENERAL REPOETh.
133
	I do not know of my own knowledge, but from reports I have an opinion that the
junction was made at or near Harrodsburg.

	Question. How long after that engagement was it that the junction
was made?

	My impression is that, if made at all, it was made the next day.

	Question. You can state, general, whether MajorGeneral Buell en-
joyed the confidence of his officers ana men during the operations of
the army under his command in Tennessee and Kentucky after be took
up the line of march after Bragg?

	That is avery difficult question. I will state, however, that I think until about
the time the army was ordered back to Nashville that no officer ever enjoyed to a
more eminent degree the confidence of his officers and soldiers than General Buell.
I know very well that I was proud to state that I belonged to Buells army; but from
the time the retrograde movement was commenced I am compelled to say I think the
confidence in General Buell began to wane in the army; whether just or unjust, tl~ere
was a great lack of confidence in him during the march from Nashville to Louisville.
I have heard a great deal of murmuring among officers and men. The impression
became general, so far as my opportunities for knowing the sentiments of the army ena-
bled me to judge, that General Buell did not want to fight Bragg; that he was un-
willing to risk an engagement, while the men, the officers, and troops generally were
anxious to fight, conscious of our ability to whip Braggs army at any place at which
we could catch up with it to engage it. I might add that there was a great deal of
dissatisfaction manifested at Cave City. I heard more there than at any other point
on the march. There were more troops there than at any other point. The army
was tolerably well massed there, and we halted there between forty and fifty hours,
I think, while the feeling in the army was very strong that we ought to advance and
attack the enemy. What the halt was for I am unable to state.

	Question. Have you stated, as far as you know, the origin of the lack
of confidence? iDid it not originate from forced marches and half ra-
tions given to the soldiers?

	I have stated that my opinion was that the lack of confidence resulted from a feel-
ing in the army, whether just or unjust, that General Buell did not wish his army to
fight Bragg. I heard no complaint against General Buell on account of the severity
of the marches or the scarcity of rations. The feeling in the army was strong that
our mission to Mississippi and Alabama was a failure; that very little had been ac-
complished; that we were obliged to go back and do the work over again. And I
heard officers higher in position than myself express the opinion that we ought to
check Braggs army between McMinnville and Pikeville; that we ought at once to
advance upon him; that General Buell ought to throw his whole force upon Bragg
and prevent his going to Kentucky at all. My judgment is that the only feeling
against General Buell originated in his failure to bring on an engagement between
Braggs forces and his own at some point in Tennessee.

	Questiou. How far was that feeling affected by General Buells fail-
ing to review and appear frequently among his troops?

	I never heard any complaint of General Buells failing to appear among his troops.
There was a little feeling in the army that he was rather too exclusive; that he did
not avail himself of the judgment and experience of the officers in the field who com-
manded his troops quite as much as he should. I have heard that feeling frequently
expressed, but I never heard a complaint against him for not reviewing his troops.
After the battle of Shiloh, when my command was marching, General Buell passed
it, and, without any officer having anythitug to do with it, the men recognized him
and raised a shout as he passed. It was very difficult then to suppress cheers as Gen-
eral Buell passed the men. I know he was very popular at that time in my command.

	Question. What were the manifestations, after the army was with-
drawn toward Nashville, when General Buell made his appearance
among troops.

	I cannot state beyond my command. I never saw any manifestations in my com-
mand of enthusiasm when General Buell appeared. After the commencement of the
retrograde movement I will state in plain terms that he was decidedly unpopular.

	Question. You have mentioned, general, that several superior officer

Page 134

134
KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAP. XXVIII
expressed the opinion that the enemy ought to have been attacked at
certain 1)OifltS as they invaded Kentucky. Can you give us the names
of these officers?

	Maj. Gen. Alexander McDowell McCook, General Schoepf, General Mitchell, and
General Fry. From the colonels with whom I talked I never heard a dissenting
voice.

	Question. State to the Commission, if you please, what expression of
opinion you heard from Ma.jor-General McCook upon the movements of
General Buells army and General Buells capacity as a commander.

	While the troops were at Peiham I had a conversation with General Mccook in rela-
tion to the movements then going on. I remember his words. He was sitting beside
me in General Schoepfs quarters, and he brought his hand (lown with considerable
force on myknee. Don Carlos wont do, saidhe; he wontdo. Said I, General,
there is considerable feeling in the army on the subject. 0, said he, George
Thomas is the man, and we must have him. I think General Buell was in the same
building at the time, in the other part of the house, having a conversation with Gen-
eral Crittenden. I remember that conversation with more distinctness from the
peculiarity of the language used by General McCook.

By General TYLER:
	Question. You say General Braggs army passed out of the Cumber-
land Mountains at Pikeville; was it in General Buells power to have
concentrated forces enough at or near that point to have resisted suc-
cessfully Braggs advance or to have whipped him?

	From what I have heard of the topography of the country and the scarcity of
water I do not think that General Buell could have massed his troops near that point
and given Bragg battle without a great deal of suffering on account of the scarcity of
water. My impression is that he could have concentrated all the forces under his
command between that point and Mc.Minnville or Sparta and given General Bragg
battle.

	Question. Did not Bragg with his whole army pass over that ground
and find a supply of water ~

	I have no doubt but what he did, though his army was stretched out very much.
The understanding in our army was that there was a great scarcity of water; in fact
I was informed by some gene~al officer who once made a little campaign up there
that it was almost impossible to subsist troops there and to keep them there for any
length of time on account of the scarcity of water. There was no water to be had.
A portion of our troops who attenipted to go up there were withdrawn on account of
the scarcity of water.

By General DANA:
	Question. What was the name of the young man who gave the in-
formation at General Sehoepfs quarters in KasLville as to the strength
of the rebel army when they debouched from the Sequatchie Yalley at
or near Pikeville and who fixed it at 37,0(30 or 38,000?

His name was Pratt.

	Question. What was snpposed in the army to be the reason why
General Buell did not wish his army to fight that of the rebel Bragg?

	Various reasons were assigned. Some ascribed it to timidity, some to prudence.
There were all sorts of reasons; some went so far as to impn~n the loyalty of General
Buell. For myself I never doubted his loyalty, though I have heard considerable said
on that point-that General Buehl did not desiLe to whip Bragg.

	Question. On accountof his disloyalty?

	Yes; I have heard charges ~f disloyalty against him.

	Question. Were these charges of disloyalty made against General
Buell by officers in high rank?

	I have heard officers of the rank of brigadier-general, colonela, and lieutenant-
colonels charge General Buell with disloyalty

Page 135

CHAP. XXVIH.]
GENERAL REPORTS.
135
	Question. Did you ever hear these officers make such charges in the
presence or hearing of their inferiors in rank?

	I have.

	Question. State the names of the officers making these charges and
in whose presence they were made.

	I decline to do that unless positively required so to do.

	Question. You are not required to give any testimony which would
implicate yourself.

	The reason I decline was under th~ rule which shields the court, the jury, and the
witnesses. If I am required to state I will, with the declaration in advance that I
have heard a member of the court say so.

	The court decided That the question be put.

	I have heard General Schoepf, in my presence, declare General Buells disloyalty;
I have heard the colonel of the Fourteenth Ohio, George P. Este, in the presence of
several officers of his regiment, doubt the loyalty of General Buell; I have h~ard the
lieutenant-colonel commanding (I think) the Eighth Kansas Regimeut charge General
Buell with disloyalty in the presence of superiors There were quite a number of
officers present, but I tliink no inferiors. I am unable to recollect all the officers by
name. I frequently heard officers express doubts of General Buells loyalty.

By General DANA:
	Question. Did you ever hear these declarations made by officers of
any rank in the presence or hearing of enlisted men?

	No, sir; I do not think I did. I have no recollection of having so heard.

	Question. Who were the superior officers before whom the lieutenant-
colonel of the Eighth Kansas Volunteers made allegations against the
commanding general as to his loyalty?
	(General Steedman declined to answer the question unless so ordered
by the Commission.)
	The PRESIDENT. Was it at a public meeting?

	It was a meeting held in the camp at Rolling Fork, 6 or 7 miles from Lebanon, Ky.,
at the house of a citizen, and it was generally understood among the officers of the
several commands that they were to assemble at that time and place. It was held
with closed doors, to exclude its proceedings from the enlisted men of the army.

	The PRESIDENT. It is the opinion of the court that, without criminat-
ing yourself, you can answer the question.

	I do not feel that it would be criminating myself to state all I know about it. I
did nbt think there was anything crimipal in the iiweting at the time nor do I now.
We were present for the purpose of conferring with each other as to the condition of
the army, and interchange of opinions as to the feeling toward the commander-in-
chief of the Army of the Ohio; and after it assembled there was a great deal of dis-
cussion as to the best manner of expressing our opinions in relation to General Buell.
The result was a dispatch to the President was agreed upon, asking him to relieve
General Buell from the command of the army, for the reason that, in the opinion of the
signers, he had lost its confidence. That di~patch was signed by all the officers who
were present. It was during the discussion upon the several propositions in~de before
the meeting that that officer, in the course of his remarks, expressed his doubt as to
the loyalty of General Buell. I do not remember his name, but my understanding
was that he was the lieutenant-colonel comnianding the Eighth Kansas Regiment. I
never saw him betore and have never seen him since. I think all the colonels com-
manding regiments in the First Division were present at that meeting. There may
have been one or two absent, but my recollection is that they were all there. The
brigade commanders of the First Division were all there, and one division com-
mander, General Fry. There were a number of colonels from either General Mitchells
or General Sheridans (livision, I am not positive which, but the officers commanding
regiments in col. Daniel MeCooks brigade were present. Colonel Post, commandin

Page 136

136	KY., M. AND E. TENK., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. LCITAP. XXVIII.

a brigade, was present; I think he was of General Mitchells division. The inst time
I saw that dispatch to the President it was in the hauds of Col. John M. Harlan, com-
manding the Second Brigade in the First Division, and my recollection now is that
there were either twenty-one or thirty-one, I am not positive which, commanders of
regiments names to it. I am positive there were twenty-one.

By General DANA:
	Question. State what you know of General Gilberts rank at the
battle of Perryville.

	lie wore shoulder-straps, indicating he was a major-general. My understanding
since then is that he was not a major-general, but that he was an unconfirmed brig-
adier-general.

	Question. Do you know whether he ~as appointed brigadier-general
prior to or since the battle of Perryville?

	I do not know.

	Question. By what authority was he placed ~s a major-general in
command of an army corps?

	My understanding was that he was assigned the command by General Bueli.

	Question. Were the division an(l brigade commanders in the corps to
which General Gilbert was assigned as commander impressed with the
idea tuat he was their junior or their senior?

	The division and brigade commanders of the rank of brigadier-general were of opin-
ion that General Gilbert was their jnnior after the battle of Perryville; at least I
never heard any question abont General Gilberts rank till my command reached
Crab Orchard. I was there told by General Robert [B. 1 Mitchell that General Gilbert
was an uncommissioned brigadier-general, and that all the brigadiers in the corps
ranked him.

	Question. Was there any dissatisfaction felt or expressed in the army
about the assignment of this officer to a command when he had not the
right to exercise it?

	There was a great deal of dissatisfaction in the First Division with General Gilbert
prior to the battle of Perryville, and a great deal of feeling among all the officers of
the corps that I ever heard say anything about it, after it was ascertai~ ed that he had
not the right to exercise that command. There was a feeling that he was somebodys
pet, and put where he had no right and for which he was not qualified. He quar-
reled with nearly all the officers of the First Division abont very unimportant an(l
trifling things, and there was a general opinion that he gave his attention entirely
to small things instead of atteud~ng to the important duties of his position.

	Question. Where was General Gilbert during the progress of the bat-
tle at Perryville and what do you know of his behavior at that battle~

	He was with the Reserve, as it was called. He was not on the battle-field, I think,
at all; if he was I had no kuowledge of it. He reriiained with the troops that were in
reserve awaiting orders. I saw very little -of him, merely notice(l him passing once
or twice, but did not hear him say anything, and therefore 1 cannot speak as to his
conduct.

	Question. Was any portion of his command, and, if so, what portion,
in front, in the immediate presence of the enemy, during the battle, and
was he at any time with that portion of his command?

	I am only enabled to speak of my brigade except from official report. My brigade
l)elon~ed to General Gilberts command, and was in front, iii presence of the enemy;
General Gilbert was not with us. I did not hear dering the battle nor since, from any
person, that General Gilbert was on the battle-field at all; that he.was any nearerto
it than I described in my testiniony this morning, that is, within half to three-qnar-
ters of a mile from our lines, while we were engaged. General Gilbert may have been
there, but I did not hear of his being in front.

	Question. If General Gilbert bad ordered a support to General Mc-
Cook at the time you took your last position what would have been the
probable result

Page 137

CHAP. XXVm.]
GENERAL REPORTS.

	In my opinion if General Gilbert had ordered the First Division to support General
MeCook at 3 oclock in the afternoon, while we were halted within half to three-quar-
ters of a mile of the engaghment, the enemy would have been routed and driven from
his position. He would have been utterly defeated had a single division been added
to the strength already engaged. At the time my brigade was ordered forward and
took its position on the right of Loomis battery it was too late to~render any irupor-
tant aid. It was nearly night. There were but a few rounds tired after I was in posi-
tion. The battery of my brigade opened fire and continued to fire probably for twenty-
five minutes, when the firing ceased all along the lines. My infantry were not engaged
at all.

	Question. How long was the Reserve Division halted at the last
position it took near the battle-field, from which you were ordered to
support General MeCook?

	I think about two hours and a half.

	Question. What orders did you receive from General MeCook on your
arrival to his support?

	I rode forward in advance of my brigade and found General McCook near Loomis
battery. He recognized me at once, and approaching me remarked that he h4d never
been so glad to see me in his life; asked me where my brigade was, and I told him it
was immediately in my rear. I asked him to assign me a position. He lefr me hur-
riedly, with the remark, You remain here for a short time amA watch the front, and
if you see anything goinr wrong take care of it. I think he said, Give any order
you think necessary in my name. He was retiring from me at the time, and said he,
I will return in a few minutes and give you orders. That was about twenty min-
utes past four; perhaps near half-past four. I never saw General McCook ao~ain until
the fight was over. I remained there for some time. A very severe engagement was
going on in front of the battery to the left, where I understood subsequently Lytles
brigade was engaged. I witnessed that, and saw the enemy advancing from the
right. They had advanced near a deep ravine in front of the battery near to where
a barn had been burned by onr shells, and I remarked to our commissary, who was
with me, that I could not wait any longer for General McCook; that the enemy vere
advancing and I must get my troops into position, as the battery was entirely ex-
posed. It was not supported at all. There was no infantry on either side. When
returning where I expected to find my brigade, as I had ordered it to halt in the rear
of the battery at the school-house, I met the troops of my command in motion pass-
ing through a corn field. I rode rapidly up and inquired of Major Townsend, coma-
manding the Eighteenth Infantry, who had ordered him to move; he said General
MeCook had passed the brigade, and ordered him to take a position with his regiment
on the right of Loomis battery. I moved the whole brigade on to the right of Loomis
battery, and got my artillery into position on the right of that battery and opened on
the enemys lines. I saw no more of General McCook until after dark. I heard his
voice on the right of the Eighteenth Infantry, conversing with some officers there of
the Eighteenth Regulars and the Ninth Volunteers. He asked me to send one of my
aides to find General Rousseau and ascertain for him the result of his command, as far
as he was able to get it. I sent one of my aides, in accordance with his request, and
he was captured by the enemy within their lines.

	Question. State, if you know, who was the commander of the divis-
ion of cavalry during the campaign which ended with the battle of
Perryville and what number of regiments or squadrons composed the
command.

	I understood during the advance from Louisville that Captain Gay had command
of alltlie cavalry attached to our corps; that is, the Third Corps, commanded by General
Gilbert, ~ut what regiments or the number comprising the command I do not know.
I know little about the cavalry. I heard the colonel of one of the cavalry regiments
which was assigned to the command of Captain Gay complaining of the course taken
in assigning Captain Gay to the command, and heard him remark that he would de-
cline to receive commands from Captain Gay.

	Question. Will you state that officers name?

	It was Colonel Milliken, of the First Ohio Cavalry.

	Question. Did aiiy irregularities arise from his exercising command
over his superiors in rank?

	I am not aware @f any arising from that reason.
13

Page 138

138	KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ADA., AND SW. VA. [CHAP. XXVIII.

	The JUDGE-ADVOCATE. You have, General Steedman, spoken of a
member of the court having expressed his opinion that Major- General
Buell was not a loyal man. Please state the circumstances under which
it was said and all the conversation you recollect.

	It was in a private conversation between General Schoepf and myself, during which
a great deal of what had transpired from the time General Buell assumed the corn-
inand of the army up to the time at which we were talking was discussed. I remem-
ber relating a conversation that I had with a-citizen near this place in March last to
General Schoept; the substance of which was that the citizens here bad expressed a
great deal of admiration for General Buell. I was on picket with my regiment some
4 miles from this place, when a citizen came to me and engaged in conversation about
our officers and their disposition relative to the feelings of the Southern people. He
asked me if I knew General Buell personally. I told him I did not; I only knew him
as the commander of the army. He said if all our officers were like General Buell
we would not have any trouble with the people. He proceeded to tell me a story,
which was new to me, that General Buell had an aunt living near Nashville with
whom he said lie was acquainted, and I think he said, too, with whom General Buell
hab lived in early life. He said he was intimately acquainted with the lady and
had seen her since General Buell had been at Nashville, and she had assared him
that everything was right; that special protection would be given to the peculiar
institution, and that he had no apprehension on that score, while he landed the gen-
era] very highly. It was all news to me that General Buell had relations here. I
did not know then nor do I know now whether he has relations here or not. Gen-
eral Schoepf also told me something about a story he beard of the feelings of the
rebels at Huntsville; that the rebels about that place were very much attached to
General Buell, and understood they regarded him with great favor. General Schoepf
remarked, This cant be so, that General Buell sympathizes with the rebels. He
cannot been both sides. If they admire him so much he must sympathize with them
some at any rate. Said he, If all these stories are true I would not like to trust
him a great deal, and I have not the utmost confidence in him anyhow. That was
the substance of the conversation, without pretending to recollect and repeat all the
conversation that took place between us.

Cross-examination by General BUELL:
	Question. You have stated, general, that the general estimated
strength of Braggs army when it crossed the Tennessee River was
from 25,000 to 35,000. Was that estimate based upon any method of
computation or was it surmised as to the aggregate force?

	The estimate as to the strength of Braggs army was based upon inforniation such as
one army g-nera ly gets of the strength of anotherupon the statements that were made
as to the number of regiments and the number of effective men in each regiment; the
aggregate was arrived at by coumputiug the number of regiments reported and the
average strength of the regimnents reported, and, I may add, from the statements made
by persons who said they had seen portions of Braggs army and some of theni who
said they had seen all. It was from all these sources of information that the esti-
mate of the strength of Braggs army was made up among our own people generally.

	Question. Can you name any iersons from whom this. information
was derived as to the number and strength of the regiments? -

	Yes, sir; I named a person in my direct examination. I can describe another, state
where I saw hini and when, and also who saw him and heard his stateimients. I do
not know whether he can be found. It was at Manchester that a citizen came to Gen-
eral Selioepf and myself and reported himself as, I think, Gei~eral MeCooks spy. He
said that three of them had gomie out for the pmmrpose of getting inforniation for some
one of our generalsI think Gemieral McCook; that he thought the other two who went
oat with him had been captured; and he went on to tell his whole story, which wa*
very clear and plausible. He appeared satisfied he was telling the truth. He had the
p~ of one of our officers, whom he said he had secreted, and his representation as to
the strength of Braggs army was very nearly the same as the young man Pratt gave.
He represented that he had been in the Sequatchie Valley and had seen the whole
army, and he stated it at rather less than the young man Pratt (lid, namely, at about
eighty regiments, as near as my recollection serves me; but of the aggregate strength
of the army I am not umistaken. He said it was from 3O,O~iO to 35,000, exclusive of the
artillery. This man came with our troops from Manchester, and my recollection is
that he rode a horse with General Schoepfs escort a part of the tinie. This estimato
includes the cavalry, everything but the artillery, at the time they emerged from th

Page 139

CHAr. XXVIII.]	GENERAL REPORTS.	139

Sequatchie Valley. He represented that the main body of the army was on this side
of the mountain. They were going, he thought, in the direction of McMinnville, and
represented them to be on the plain, about 8 or 10 miles from what be called the foot
of the ridge.

	Question. You say he was one of General MeCooks scouts?

	He so represented himself; I stated; and we were satisfied from his statements and
the papers he had on his person that his representations were correct.

	Question. Do you know if he reported his information to General Mc.
Cook?

	I do not.

	Question. Do you suppose that the imj)ression which prevailed in
the army as to the strength of Braggs army may have been influenced
by a knowledge of our own strength and by the natural desire of troops
to engage an enemy, and thence convincing themselves that the enemy
did not much, if any, exceed them in strength?

	It is possible that the general disposition of the troops to underrate the stre~ngth of
an enemy may have influenced the opinion of our army as to the strength of the enemy,
thongh I do not know that it did.

	Question. Do you not think that men anxious to meet an enemy
would be more likely to underrate than overrate their strength?

	I think it is the general disposition of men to underrate an adversary.

	Question. I will speak now of your own opinion in regard to the pro-
priety or expediency of moving upon Nashville. You have stated in
your testimony that you thought the enemy mi~ht have been met and
driven back at some point beyond MelVijunville. Are you well enough
acquainted with the country and the roads now to be able to pronounce
a deliberate judgment in regard to the expediency of such operations
against the enemy?

	I stated in my direct examination that I knew very little about tho topography of
the country between MeMiunville and the mountains or the facilities for getting water
~t that time, but that my understanding was that it was very difficult to get water
for any considerable number of troops. I also stated that it was the opinion of the
officers of the army that the enemy ought to have been met at or near MeMiunville.
I know but little about the character of the roads, nothing except of those I saw and
of which I heard representations from such scouts as I conversed With; but, with the
limited experience I have in the matter of war, I think our army was able to whip
Braggs at any place between the mountains and Kentucky. That was my belief at
the time and nothing has occurred since to change that opinion. I thou~ht then and
think now that General Buells forces were equal, if not superior, to Braggs. With-
out pretending to give any opinion as to strategy, I believe our army was able to whip
the rebel army any day after it crossed the mountains. The army felt so, and the
confidence of the army in its ability to meet Bragg would have given it success.

	Question. Do you know what available forces could have been concen-
trated about MeMinuville ~?

	I suppose that General Buell could have concentrated 40,000 m~um at MeMiunville.

	Question. Do you know anything of the circumstances which would
necessarily have controlled the movements of my army in that country
at that time, such as the amount of supplies particularly?

	Of course I have no official information as to the number of rations at the disposal
of General Buell at points between Nashville an(l Huntsville or Nashville and Dech-
erd, along the line of the road, that were availa de; but I am confident that, for the
short time that it would have been necessary to subsist the army anywhere in Ten-
nessee to have whipped Bragg the army could have lived on the country.

	Question. In what way could you manage to subsist an army from
that country while it was engaged in actual operations?

	I would draw the supplies for the support of the army through the same officer

Page 140

140	KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CuAr. XXVIII.

through whom we draw them from the Government, and precisely as we did it then,
while we were supplied with half rations when marching from Decherd to Nashville.

	Question. In what condition did those supplies exist in the country;
that is, were they scattered over the conutry in the hands of the pro-
ducers or were they collected in large bodies?

	Generally on the farms of the producers.

	Question. Can a large army operate actively in the presence of an
enemy and depend npon supplies to be procured in that way?

	Braggs army, supplied in that way, generally kept us at bay through Tennessee.

	Question. That does not answer the question.

	That is my answer, general. I do not think that an army engaged in an important
campaign could be subsisted for any very great length of tims by drawing supplies in
that irregular manner from the country; but the rebel army did go to Kentucky and
back to Tennessee, making quite a successful campaign, and drawing their supplies
from the country in the manner I have suggested.

	Question. In procuring its supplies in that way from ~the country
through which it marched did the rebel aruiy have the assistance of
the population? Did they bring in supplies freely to the army on its
line of march?

	The rebels undoubtedly had the sympathy of the population, but to what extent
the people engaged in transporting supplies for them I have no means of knowing.
I have heard, however, that in a portion of Tennessee the people did haul supplies
in very considerable quantities to the rebel camps.

	Question. Could we receive any such assistance?

	Not without compelling.

	Question. In what manner would you do that?

	I would send a quartermaster out, with all the transportation of his regiment or
of the brigade, to get supplies; direct him to order the negroes of the rebel citizens
to hitch up their wa~onsthe same wagons they hitched tip for the rebels-and haul
such provisions as they had to the camp. I would compel theni to do it if they re-
fused. In other words, I would coerce them to do precisely for us what they had
done voluntarily for the rebels.

	Question. To what extent upon either side of the road do you sup-
pose ~n army of 30,000 would have to go to procure supplies for its
subsistence through such a country as that between MeMinuville and
Nashville?

	Judging from that portion of it I passt-d through, an army of 30,000 could subsist
in marching by going, at the farthest, 3 or 4 miles from the road. We subsisted
half that number with half rations by going a vt ry short distance. We ouly drew
half rations front the Government, aud sapplied the balance from the country with-
out going a mile from the road. The country was well supplied with cattle. There
woul(l have been no difficulty in filtdin6r beef The commissaries ha4 a pretty good
supply of beef when we got het e (irawn from the country. It would depend, of
course, a great deal upon the country, the seasons, and the crops.

	Question. Could that be (lone in the presence of an enemy?

	Unless the enemy lived on the road all the way. You would have to take the risk
of getting a foraging party captured ~cca~ionally, just as they are doing now in front
of Nashville, and we would have had the same opportunity to capture their foraging
parties as they would ours. They were subsisted on the country.

	Question. Is it true that you would have the same facilities in this
country as the enemy has for gaining such advantages?

	It is not true that we have such facilities for getting information. The enemy
have greafly the advantage in that respect.

Question. Suppose both armies living in this manner from the cou

Page 141

CITAP. xxvm.l
GENERAL REPORTS.
141
try, what would the relative success of the two armies depend upon
with such a system of supplying them?

	Energy and pluck.

	Question. In anything else?

	That would be the main dependence, living in that way.

	Question. Would it depend upon the strength and efficiency of their
cavalry force at all?

	It would depend upon the strength and efficiency of all the army, cavalry as well
as infantry; but I would depend mainly upon the infantry if I wdre doing the for-
aging.

	Question. Would it depend upon the disposition of the people?

	I do not think they would have a great deal to say about it.

	Question. Would their disposition have any effect upon the ease with
which supplies could be obtained in that way?

	The disposition of the people to favor the Confederate army would, of contee, em-
barrass sending out f~raging parties by our army, on account~of the rebels getting
information of our movements of that character more readily and frequently than we
could of their movements.

	Question. Do you suppose that such a system of supplying an army
might have been a matter of so much more difficulty for one than for the
other as to determine the success of the campaign, other things being
equal?

	I have already stated that the disposition of the people of the disloyal States would
favor the Confederate cause, would throw obstacles in the way of our foraging, on ac-
count of their giving information to the enemy whenever we attempted to send out
any such parties. Of course, if all other things were equal, that - would ~e an ad-
vantage to the iebels which might, if they were exactly equal in all other respects,
give them success in a campaign. I will add that I am not in favor of subsisting an
army in that way, on account of the demoralizing difect on our own troops. I would
only do it in an emergency. when I think a great advantage would accrue to our
cause from doing it, when I could deal the enemy a deadly b [ow.

	Question. What would be the consequence of defeat to an army de-
pending upon such a system for subsistence?

	Well, I can only speak from what I understood to be the effect upon the Confed-
erate army when they were defeated; they wonld run away and reorganize at some
other point.

	Question. Is it true the rebel army ever has been defeated and driven
from its supplies and thrown from day to day upon what it could gather
upon its line of march?

	Yes, it is true that some portions of the rebel army have been in that situation.
That was especially the case at Mill Springs. They lost everything they had there.

	Question. What was the strength of the army that was defeated at
Mill Springs?

	It was supposed to be about 10,000.

	Question. Would the consequences to that army have been the same
had it been 40,000 defeated under the same cit~umstances?

	There would perhaps have been rather more sufferin~ had the army been larger.
It was at a very inclement season, in the midst of rain and mud. The roads were
almost impassable, and they were certainly in a much worse condition than our army
would have been had it been defeated at McMinnville, where the roads were good.

	Question. In retreating from Mill Springs did not the rebel army
fall back along the rear of its line of supplies

Page 142

142
KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAP. XXVIII.
	My understanding was at the time, and has been since, that it had no supplies on
the road, and that it retreated over about as bad a road as there was at that time in
Tennessee. I traveled over a portion of itin Kentucky, and it was nearly impassable.
A large portion of the supplies received at Mill Springs were transported by water.

	Question. In what condition did that army retreat.

	In rather an irregular manner, I understood.

	Question. Was it not completely disorganized and dispersed, or
nearly so 0?

	It was badly whipped, terribly frightened, and retreated, it was understood, very
rapidly; but moat of the troops that were there escaped and have been engaged with
our army at other points since. Several of the regiments that were there are still in
the Confederate service.

	Question. Did it not retreat as a disorganized mob?

	It is said to have retreated in confusion.

	Question. Was not the condition of the roads a security to that army
instea(L of a hinderance 0?
	Its pursuit was never attempted south of the Cumberland River.~ Its principal
security was the Cumberland River.

	Question. Suppose there had been no such obstacle in the way, would
not the condition of the roads have contributed to the security of that
retreating army?
	The condition of the road~s would have unquestionably embarrassed the pursuit
more than the retreat under such circumstances.

	Question. You say that the roads from McMinnville toward Nash-
ville would have presented no such difficulty either to the retreating
or the pursuing army; is it so, general?

	The roads from MeMinuville would have offered none other obstructions that would
have prevented a rapid pursuit at the time of the defeat of the Confederate army at
Mill Springs. The suffering of an army defeated at the time and under the circum-
stances that the rebels were defeated at Mill Springs was much greater thau if de-
feated at the season of the year and under the circumstances we were placed in when
Bragg was at MeMiunville.

	Question. I meant the suffering of the defeated soldiers from ex-
posure. The suffering iii one case would mainly have been from natural
causes, would it not, such as the ~onditiou of the weather?

	Yes; resulting from the defeat.

	Question. What woula have been the probable cause of suffering in
the other case, supposing the weather to be goo(l, the roads good, and
every facility for rapid pursuit?
	Heat, dust, want of water, apprehension of being captured, and all the difficulty
that would embarrass a retreating ai1my under such circumstances.

	Question. Suppose, in addition to such causes of suffering, the army
should be compelled to retard its march as much as would be necessary
to collect supplies in the manner you suggest, what must have been the
result of the pursuit by au efficient enemy?
I	If I were to judge of the munner in which the rebel army got from us in Kentucky
wesild say not very disastrous; but I think if the army were pursued rapidly, vig-
orously, not to permit itself to be checked by little squads of cavalry and a couple
of pieces of artillery on every road, that it would succeed in cutting it up very badly
and capturing a large portion of the retreating forces that had been in the tight.

	Question. Do you 5U~~O5~ the rebel army, if it had defeated the Army
of the Ohio at McMiunville, would probably have conducted the pursuit
in that way?

	I am unable to say what they would have done

Page 143

ChAr. XXVIII.]	GENERAL REPORTS.	143


	QuesUon. Did the rebel army in retreating from Kentucky have to
delay its march and collect supplies along the road ?

	I think not. I think they had collected from the country a sufficient amount of
supplies to subsist upon while they were retreating
	Question. Are you well enough acquainted with the particulars of
the retreat of the rebel army from Kentucky and of the l)ursuit to be
able to say whether that army suffered as much in its retreat as it ought
to have done?

	Of my own knowledge of course I know but very little about the manner in which
the rebel army conducted its retreat. My opinion was at the time that the pursuit
was not as rapid as I felt it ought to have been, though I am free to say very fre-
quently officers not charged with the responsibility are more willing to take risk than
those who are. I think in the advance on the enemy in Kentucky, both before and
after the battle of Perryville, our forces were frequently held in check when they
ought not to have been.

	Question. I want to know upon what knowledge you have based your
disapprobation?

	I was in command of a brigade in the advance on the road from Springfield to
Perryville, and an attempt was made to check or attempt to check my command with
a small force of cavalry and a couple of pieces of artillery, but I advanced upon them
rapidly and drove them from their position three times. General Gilbert sent word
by an orderly three times that day directing me to halt until he could overtake the
right of the column. General Schoepf, who was with the head of the column and
directing its movements, informed me also that General Gilbert had sent an orderly
to him to halt the command about 2 oclock in the afternoon of that day. General
Gilbert overtook the head of the column the day we marched from Springfield, that
is, the sixth, ordered a halt, and expressing a great deal of dissatisfaction with theT
rapidity of our movements, telling us all we were in dangerof being cut off. I think
if the column on that road in which my brigade lay had been permitted to move as
rapidly as its division and brigade commanders desired it to move that the enemy
would have been punished more than he was. He would have been driven from all
his positions, and I felt at the time that the army he had onthe road and the artil-
lery would have been captured had the pursuit have been made as rapidly as it ought
to have been.

	Question. That was before the battle?

	I am undertaking to show by my testimony that the corps commander placed by
General Buell over three divisions of that army would not allow it to move as rap-
idly as it desired to move npon the enemy, and was very much afraid it would get
cut off if it attempted to cut off a small body of cavalry and a couple of pieces of
artillery that were impeding it on the road.- After the battle the pursuit on one of
the roads was something of the same character; that several times during the pur-
suit our advance was c1m~cked and held back by small bodies of cavalry with artillery.
This inforniation with regard to matters after the battle I got from officers who were
engaged.

	Question. On what road was the pursuit you refer to and what offi-
cer commanded the advance?

	It was on the road to Crab Orchard, by way of Lancaster. There was quite a skir-
mish quite close to the town of Lancaster; on both sides of the town there ~vere
skirmishes, in which small bodies of cavalry were engaged with part of the enemy
with a couple of pieces of artillery.

	Question. Do you know the officer who commanded the advance
and who was responsible for this slow pursuit?

	I do not recollect which division commander it was. I heard a great deal of dis-
cussion about it, and the impression was made upon my mind from the amount of dis-
cussion I heard and the opinions expressed that the pursuit was a very slow one, and
that we allowed the enemy to hold us in check by this system of occupying the roads
in their rear with small bodies of cavalry and with a section of artillery.

	Question. Has General Mitchell the reputation of being a pretty en-
ergetic officer

Page 144

144	KY., M. AND B. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAP. XXVIIL

	Yes, sir; he has such a reputation. It was a portion of the cavalry under Captain
Gay that was in advance. I remember one day after the battle of Perryville Captain
Gays cavalry was in advance on that road, as I understood, and was checked by the
enemy at the crossing of the stream near Lnncaster, and held in check until the
infantry of Mitchells division advanced with some artillery and dislodged them.
From all the circustances which I have related my opinion is that the enemy was not
punished as severely on the retreat from Kentucky as he might have been.

	Question. Have you heard any condemnation of the pursuit expressed
beyond Crab Orchard?

	No, sir. On the contrary, I have heard it spoken of as being vigorously carried on.

	Quesfion. Is it known that Bragg carried supplies with him in his
advance from Chattanooga across the mountains?

	I cannot speak as to the extent of his supplies. It was understood in our army,
however, th~it Braggs army drew upon the country pretty largely for supplies in
their march through Tennessee.

	Question. Had supplies been collected in depots in Kentucky, in ad-
vance of his arrival, by the forces of Kirby Smith?

	It was the understanding in our army that supplies were collected by Kirby Smith
in Kentucky; whether at depots on the route traveled by Braggs army I am unable
to say. I will add that I understand there were supplies collected for Braggs army
in Tennessee by citizens. I heard some one, I cannot tell who now, but it was one of
the scouts employed by officers in our army, say that at some point in Tennessee the
citizens had hauled in a considerable quantity of supplies for Braggs army at the
time the enemy reached the point where the supplies had been collected; I cannot
remember the point, but it was not far from McMinnville; it was on his march some-
where between the mountain and Sparta.

By General TYLER:
	Question. Could you give the court any information as to the time
Braggs army crossed at Chattanooga at or near Pikeville and the
Tennessee River at or near Carthage?

	I have no memorandum to which I can refer to refresh my recollections as to dates,
but my impression is that Braggs army left Chattanooga about the middle of August
and crossed the Cumberland Mountains at or near Pikeville about the 22d of August.
We cro& sed at Carthage about the first week in September, as near as I can recollect.
The command to which L was attached left Decherd on the 18th of August for Pel-
ham, and that is the only date about which I can feel at all certain.

	Question. When Bragg crossed the mountains at Pikeville what
force had we collected at McMinnville, and what is the distance from
McMinnville to Pikeville?

	I understood at that time that two divisions of our army, of about 15,000 men, with
a small body of cavalry, were at or near McMinnville, under the command of General
Thomas. I cannot state the distance.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

	Question. You have been examined in reference to the sympathy of
tile inhabitants for the rebels as facilitating their procuring supplies.
What would have been the effect of a kind, conciliatory policy toward
the negroes in this connection by your army?
	I think nineteen out of twenty of the slaves of the disloyal States are friendly to
the Union y:ause. What would have been the effect in aiding us to procure supplies
from the country if a different policy had been pursued toward them than that en-
forced by the commanding officers of our army I am unable to say; it would be a
mere matter of opinion. I will state, however, in this connection, that most of the
information we received while the army was in Mississippi, Alabama., and Tennessee
came from the negroes. They were always reliable on our side. When I say reli-
able, I do not mean to say that they were always truthful. Very frequently their
anxiety to get with the army induced them to misrepresem~t the position of their inns-.
ters and owners. The information was generally correct as to the locality and move-
meats of the enemy, though I never considered it reliable as to the political status o

Page 145

CHAP. XXVIII.]	GENERAL REPORTS.	145

their masters. They would invariably say their masters were rebels of the strongest
kind. I think, however, the~r might have been made more useful to the Union army
than they have been.

	Question. What has been the policy of Major-General Buell in this
respect?
	His policy has been generally to exclude them from the camp and in favor of re-
turning them to their owners.
	Question. What~ from your observation, is the effect of a kind, con-
ciliatory policy toward the rebel inhabitants?

	I think it has emboldened them and intensified their treason. They have regarded
it as an evidence of our weakness.
By General BUELL:
	Question. You have not given the dates at which the rebel army
passed certain points in its march to Kentucky, particularly the date
at which it passed Pikeville. Is that date fixed in your mind?

	It is not, and I so statedthat I could not pretend to accuracy at all in the state-
ments I made in reference to dates.
	Question. iDid you really know anything of the movements of the
rebel army in crossing the mountains about the time of their marching?

	All I know as to their movements was the receiverl opinion in our army, the gener-
ally understood opinion of the army at the timethe officers of that portion of the
army with which I was connected.

	Question. Was it really the opinion that the rebel army crossed the
mountains or was between Pikeville aud McMinnville before our troops
commenced their concentration at Murfreesborough?

	The opinion was general in that portion of the army that was at Pelham, which
included the divisions of General Schoepf, General Crittenden, and General MeCook,
that the advance of Braggs army was across the mountain before the troops left
Pelbam. When the First Division reached Man6hester on its march to Murfreesbor-
ough information that was regarded as reliable was received that Bragg had crossed
the mountain with nearly his entire force. As I stated in my examination, that in-
formation was received through a scout who was in the employ, I think, of General
McCook, who received it at General Schoepfs quarters, and communicated the in-
formation to General Schoepf and myself: It is proper I should state that the in-
formation received while the troops I have spoken of were at Pelham was not consid-
ered of that certain character upon which an army would base its movements.

	Question. Had the army commenced its concentration when you re-
ceived this information at Manchester?

It had.

	Question. While you were lying at Pelharn was it expected that the
enemy might advance over the Therman road?

	The route that the enemy would take from Pikeville was understood there to be a
matter of very great uncertainty.

	Question. Was the enemy known to be at Pikeville when ~ou were
at Pelham?

	Not positively.

	Question. IDid the rebel army march through McMinnville in invad-
ing Kentucky?

	My understanding is that a part of it did. It is understood that a portion of the
cavalry passed through there. Whether any infantry did or not I am unable to state.
	Question. While you were lying at Pelham were you in expectation
of the enemy at that point or on roads near there?

ItO H HVOL XV

Page 146

146
KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. ECHAP. xxvm.
	It was understood that General Buell anticipated an attack there, but the officers
and troops at that point did nbt, so far as I have heard an opinion expressed.

	Question. Do you mean to express what was your opinion or what
was the understanding of the troops generally?

	I mean the understanding of the troops to which I was attached, especially of my
own brigade, which was in the advance at Peiham until the divisions of General
MeCook and General Crittenden arrived.

	Question. Did the disposition of the army while you were at Peiham
indicate that General Buell expected an attack at that point particu-
larly?

	It indicated that General Buell thought an attack somewhere in that vicinity prob-
able.
	Question. On what ground did you think it improbable?

	Upon the ground that I supposed the rebel army would avoid ours if possible.
	Question. Upon what ground was that belief based?

	Upon the ground that they would never hazard a battle with us unle~s they thought
they outnumbered us and had the advantage.
By General DANA:
	Question. Do you know of any instance where any officer of the Army
of the Ohio, by his official position or acts, has influenced the return of
a slave to servitude since the publication of the enactment of the late
article of war on the subject?

	I have never been officially informed that the amendment to the article of war
alluded to in the question was a part of the Articles of War. My understanding, how-
ever, was that the amendment had been made, and provided that if any officer of the
Army engaged in returning a slave to a rebel owner that officer should be cashiered.
I have never seen an official copy of it, and do not know to this day what it is, and
do not know officially whether any amendment to the Articles of War had been made;
but after I understood that such an amendment had been made I received orders,
while a colonel commanding a regiment, to permit persons whom I was satisfied were
disloyal to search my camp for slaves. I received an order from General Fry, Inka,
to permit citizens who were named in the order to search my camp for runaway
negroes.

	Question. Please state the date.

	It was about the 25th of June. I conversed with the citizen who bore me the
order and to whom the authority was given to search my camp, and I was satisfied
they were disloyal. I took the order and wrote upon the back of it that I declined
to permit any citizen of a disloyal State to search my camp for slaves unless the
officer in command of the department positively ordered the search and signed it
officially. I then handed it back to the citizen. At Pulaski, in Tennessee, somewhere
about the first week in August, I received a verbal order from General Fry himself
to deliver up two negroes from my camp to a citizen of that town, which I declined
to do. I did not know at the time, however, that the negroes were in my camp.
The general rode up to my camp and told me he was informed there were two negroes
belonging to a citizen whose wife he said he knew. She was a Rhodes. I replied
to the general that I did not care what her name was, and that I would not permit a
she rebel to enter my camp to get slaves any quicker than I would a he one, and he
said he would take the responsibility of returning the negroes. I then informed hini
what I understood to be the law and that I should stand on it, and advised him not to
trouble himself any further about negroes, but to leave that question to the colonels
of the regiments and the claimants. Those are the only instances I know of.

	Question. Have you a copy of the written order that was served on
you at Juka?

	I have net. I did not retain the original order.

	Commission adjourned to meet December 14, a. m

Page 147

CHAP. ~
GENERAL REPORTS.
147
NASHVILLE, December 14, 186210 a. m.
	Commission met pursuant to adjournment. All the members present;
also the judge-advocate and General Buell.

	Colonel STREIGHT (a witness for the Government), being duly sworn
by the judge-advocate, testified as follows:

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

	Question. State your name and position iu the service of the United
States.

A.	D. Streight, colonel, commanding the Fifty-first Indiana Volunteers.

	Question. State, if you please, where you were in the service during
the invasion of Bragg from Chattanooga to Kentucky.

	I started from Stevenson on the 20th or 218t of September with the Twentieth Bri-
gade, and joined Crittendens division at Bridgeport; marched with Crittenden to
this point, where we joined with Woods division, and from here we marched with
Woods division.

	Question. What position had Woods divison in the army in the march
from Nashville to Bowling Green and Munfordville?

	We marched in the advance from here to Gallatin; then we crossed to Mitchells-
yule. What force went up the other road I am unable to state. We joined other
troops at Mitchellsville. Who had the advance that day I cannot say, but we arrived
in the advance at Bowling Green. We went in the advance, I am certain, on our
route as far as Mitchellsville, and we arrived in the advance at Bowling Green.
Whether there were not some other troops marching in the advance some other day I
am unable to say.

	Question. What time, colonel, did it take you to march from Nash-
ville to Munfordville; what time did you ]eave Nashville and what
time did you arrive at Munfordville I
	I have no dates; I cannot therefore give the exact days. Our first stay was at Gal-
latin, where we remained one day; we then moved rapidly to Bowling Green. One
day and night we marched, I think, 36 miles.

	Question. What time were you marching from Nashville to Bowling
Green; how many days, and how long did you remain at Bowling
Green I

	We remained at Bowling Green five or six days, but the number of days we were
marching I cannot recollect so well. I remember we were very impatient at lying
idle, but it strikes me that we were on the road but three days from here to Bowling
Green, and from there we did not move so fast, though we marched most of one night,
and next day we moved up to within a few miles of Cave City, then to Cave City,
which would make five days marching. This would include all the marching from
here to Cave City, where we halted. When we moved up it took all day to go to
Munfordville. We were five or six days at Bowling Green and about five days at
Cave City.

	Question. Where were you at the time Munfordville surrendered and
upon what day did it surrender?

	I disremember, but we were on the march from Bowling Green to Cave City. The
day after we arrived at Cave City the prisoners came down, and I think they surren-
dered the day before. It was not far from the time that we left Bowling Green; it
was on the next day. I may be wrong as to the date, but not more than a day.

	Question. What was the estimate placed upon the number of the in-
~rading army by intelligent officers during that march?

	Well, sir, it was variously estimated at from 30,000 to 40,000. I do not think an -
body estimated it above 40,000; some as low as 25,000. From facts I could y
gather
they might have had from 30,000 to 35,000. There were various rumors, but all very
indefinite. We were not in a position to know very definitely facts relative to it. I,
at Gallatin, learned from General Wood that he had sent a party out who reported i

Page 148

KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAP. XXVLIL
148

at 33,000. That is my remembrance of it, which from that time led me to believe that
my estimate was pretty correct.

	Question. State, if you please, whether you were at the battle of
Perryville, and what you know of the movements of the enemy sub-
sequent to that fight.

	Our divisien arrived about 4 oclock on the day of the fight at Porryville. The
evening before we went over what is called Rolling Fork, about 12 miles from Perry-
yule. Although our division had orders early in the morning, we did not move until
about 11; arrived about 4 the day of the Perryville fight. We took position on the
right of Gilberts force. That evening there was some little skirmishing, but very.
unimportant. We advanced about half a mile and bivouacked for the night. We
were on the left of Crittenden, on the right of Gilbert, and about opposite to Perry-
yule, and from appearances on the night of the fight we were at the extreme left of
the enemy. They were trying when we came up to flank General Gilbert, which in-
dicated that that was the extreme left. I saw no other troops farther left than about
opposite Crittendens right. The next morning, however, it appeared that they had
nioved somewhat to the left from where they were the night before.
	At daylight next morning we advanced afew rods, more led by curiosity than by any-
thing else, and, as I understood, without orders, to where we could overlook the town
andsomewhat overlook the position of the enemy. After daylight I saw them putting
a battery into position a little to the right and the rear of Perryville; I also saw a con-
siderable quantity of cavalry and infantry. I saw but one battery of artillery in the
morning belonging to the enemy. When Wagner opened his battery they were driven
from that point. That was the last seen of the artillery. The sun was half an hour
high when we first saw the enemy moving off. They had evidently been moving pre-
viously. They continued to move for an hour and a half or two hours from the time
I first saw them, perhaps longer. The cavalry moved across the field back of the town,
which caused both parties to be moving off at the same time. The cavalry continued
to passtill after the infantry had all gone and were passing when we left. There was a
large body of them; they came out of the ravine and gully and passed over the ridge;
passed down and accompanied another regiment, which hid them from our view. We
could see them for perhaps a mile from the position we occupied on the eminence at the
back of ~erryville. They seemed moving off in the direction of Harrodsburg. They
were moving with baggage trains, infantry, and cavalry. Of artillery I only saw one
battery. I went down in person to where the enemy had previously planted a bat-
tery, ~nd I was within 80 rods of the enemy; could see very distinctly; could distin-
guish countenances with a glass. I think they were passing off by their right till
about 10 or 11 oclock, when we fell back from the position we occupied perhaps l~
or 2 miles to the rear and right, which took us out of sight. When we left the enemy
were still moving off with the majority of their cavalry. I think I saw 3,0?0 infantry
and a large force of cavalry. They were passing off, not rapidly, but moderately; no
disorder about it. We fell hack a little between 10 and 11 oclock by orders of Gen-
eral Wood. Captain Lennard came and gave orders for the whole of Woods division
to fall back and retire to the right and rear of their position. We lay there till about
2, when we passed through Perryville, and went to the spring below and remained
there for the night.

	Question. State whether you reported the information you gained
from observation to your superior officers.

	I reporred immediately to the brigade commander, Colonel Harker, and it is my im-
pression that he sent an orderly to General Wood, but I have no recollection of that
particularly.

Cross.examinatiofl by General BUELL:
	Question. You have spoken about the impatience of the troops of your
division at Bowling Green; what were they impatient to do, colonel ~

	They were very anxious to move on and relieve the Munfordville force. In fact
there had been a general impatience at not being allowed to attack the eneuly. It
amounted almost to indignation, among both officers and men, at that time more
particrilarly. The impatience had extended from the time we moved up with Gen-
eral MeCook toward Chattanooga or about Jasper. We then fell back and came over
the mountain, and from this point there had been more or less impatience expressed
all the way through. But from the time we left Gallatin there was a decided impa-
tience in moving away from the enemy and allowing them to move along on the line
partially of our own mardi without attacking them. From the time we left Galla-
tin to when we arrived at Bowling Green it increased very much. We knew tha

Page 149

ChAP. XXVIII.]
GENERAL REPORTS.
149
Mnnfordville was threatened, and while at Bowling Green we heard that Colonel
Wilder had succeeded in repulsing the enemy. From that time there was clearly
indignation among both officers and men. It was because we were not allowed to
attack the enemy. From the time we fell back that feeling exhibited itself mere
particularly, but whea we left Gallatin and proceeded toward Mitchellsville it in.
creased, and then again at Bowling Green, knowing that Colonel Wilder was threat-
ened, and hearing he was attacked the feeling farther increased.

	Question. Was your division anxious to move alone to the relief of
Munfordville0

	I never heard any remark that I know of relative to it. My remarks relative to
relieving Munfordville applied to the general feeling in camp. There was nothing
said as to whether one division should go or not. It seems to me that that would be
somewhat inconsistent. To send one division would not have been very good judg-
ment. I never heard an officer remark as to whether one division shinid move up
or not. My impression is that the desire was not that one division should move up.

	Question. Was there any judgment at all in this impatience; any
knowledge of the position of the enemy, or of his strength, or of the force
available to operate against him, or of the movements of other divis-
ions of the army, or of the circumstances that controlled those move-
ments?

	I think it had become generally known and satisfactorily understood that the
enemy had a force of about 30,000 to 35,000; that their position was on the north-
ward, nearly opposite our forces; and it was generally known that Colonel Wilder or a
force was at Munfordyille, and also that the route taken by the enemy was in that
direction. As to the movements of other divisions of the army, as to how they should
move, I do not think it was known whether they could be spared or not. I do not
think it was known what was detaining them. For my own part I did not, though I
endeavored to ~keep myself pretty well posted. The facts that would make up the
feeling in camp either for or against certain movements are not generally founded
upon close calculation, though it is impossible for officers in a subordinate position to
know why certain movements are made or why they are not.

	Question. Toward whom was the impatience felt when General Mc-
Cook returned after his expedition up the Sequatchie Valley I

	The conversation and feeling turned upon the party responsible. It is very cus-
tomary for conversations and observations to be made in the army without being
directed against any individual. It was generally remarked and believed that the
enemy were not in sufficient force to warrant our returning without at least an at-
tempt to feel his position. It was not generally believed that the artillery could not
be taken over the mountain, and that was the reason assigned for our not advancing
farther therethat the artillery could not be taken over the mountain.

	Question. Whose opinion was that supposed to be and who was
supposed to be responsible for the attempt not being made?

	The conclusion that I came to from what I heard was that the responsibility was
thrown upon General McCook I heard some remark that he had been ordered back.
The opinion was rather divided and not definitely understood.

	Commission adjourned to meet December 15, at 10 oclock a. m.


NASHVILLE, December 15, 1862.
	Commission met pursuant to adjournment. All the members present;
also the judge-advocate and General Buell.

	General THOMAS J. Woon (a witness for the Government), being
duly sworn, testified as follows:

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

	Question. Please state your name and position in the United States
Army.

	My name is Thomas J. Wood. I am colonel of the Second Regular Artillery and
brigadier-general of volunteer forces

Page 150

150	KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA.; AND SW. VA [CHAP. XXV1II.

	Question. Please state if you were with the army in its pursuit of
Bragg when he invaded Kentucky and what you know of the force of
the rebels previous to your arrival at Munfordville.

	I was with the Army of the Ohio in pursuit of the army led by Bragg when he in-
vaded Kentucky, and all the information which I obtained from various sources sat-
isfied me that the army led by General Bragg into Kentucky did not exceed 35,000
men.

	Question. Previous to your arrival at Nashville, general, tell the Com-
mission where and what was the situation about the time Bragg left
Chattanooga, if you know.

	For some ten or twelve days previous to the date of the commencement of the con-
centratioa of the army at Nashville I was stationed in the vicinity of McMinnville.
I do not know the date of Braggs leaving Chattanooga.

	Question. State, if you please, whether at that time the railway from
McMinnville to Tullahoma and from Tullahoma to Nashville was in
operation.

	It was during the greater part of the time; there were occasional interruptions.

	Question. What is the character of the road and what was its con-
dition at the time from Murfreesborough to Woodbury and from Wood-
bury to MeMinuville I

	I did not travel the usually followed road, but I know from reports that troops
were constantly passing over from McMinnville to Woodbury, and the inference is that
the road was good. There is an ordinary turnpike road from Woodbury to Mnrfrees-
borough, which I traveled over. I have no positive knowledge of the road from
McMinnville to Woodbury.

	Question. Do you know what the character of the road is from Mc-
Minuville to Spencer and from Spencer to Pikeville?

	I do not know; I never marched over that road.

	Question. What is your opinion, as a military man, as to the proposi-
tion to attack Braggs army as he debouched from the Seq utatchie Val-
ley and descended from the Cumberland Mountains with the prospect
of success I

	Had the proposition been left to me I never would have attacked General Bragg in
the Sequatchie Valley.

	Question. Where would the proper place to attack him have been?

	That would turn a great deal upon the condition of supplies. I have always en-
tertained the opinion that if the supplies had warranted it it might have been judi-
cious, bad Bragg crossed the Cumberlaud River at all, in the neighborhood of Sparta;
that would turn, however, upon the extent of supplies, which it is important for a
military man to consider among the elements entering into such a movement. If the
state of supplies had warranted it, after the army was con~entrated at Murfreesbor-
ough, I believe General Braggs army could have been beaten in the neighborhood of
Sparta.

	Question. Did you know, general, whether th~ army of General Buell
was concentrated for a purpose of that sort and why it was not carried
out I

	I do not know that it was so concentrated or that such an arrangement or move-
ment entered into General Buells combinations. I had not seen General Buell from
about the 15th of July, when I separated from him at Huntsville, till I met him in
Nashville on the 6th of September. Had it been his intention he did not communi-
cate it to me, for I b~d no personal, only telegraphic, communications and ordinary
dispatches; even had I been with him I do not know tha,t he would have communi-
cated such a design to me.

	Question. Upon what other points, in marching from MeMiunville to
Nashville and to Munfordville, would your judgment indicate Genera

Page 151

CHAP~ XXV[fl.J	GENERAL REPORTS.	151

Buells army could have attacked Braggs army with a prospect of suc-
cess?

	I think it might have been done after General Bragg crossed the Cumberland River,
by a rapid concentration of the Army of the Ohio on the line that he was pursuing into
Kentucky by the way of Glasgow. As is known, there is a turnpike road leading
from this city to Gallatin and from there into Kentucky by the way of Scottsville
and Glasgow. On the evening of the 6th of September I received an order from
General Buell to commence crossing the Cumberland River with my division at day-
light next morning and after the division had crossed to report to him in person. I
did so. He then instructed me to march my division as far as what is called the
Edgefield Junction, there to leave all the baggage iu charge of the quartermaster, and
take wagons enough to transport six days rations for the troops and cooking utensils
for the men. After making this arrangement to move with my division promptly in
the direction of Gallatin, it was furthermore stated that it would be followed up by
other divisions of the army on the same road; that he would probably be up at
Gallatin the next morning by the time I got there. He also charged me to be very
alert and gain all the information of the movements of the enemy that was possible.
By following out what seemed to be General Buells plan, so far as I could infer it
from his orders to me in the disposition of the troops he was then making, I think it
would have been possible to have concentrated his army at Glasgow before~~ General
Bragg concentrated his army there. It was not known at that time ~ertainly, but
only believed, that Bragg had crossed the Cumberland River. I certainly did not
know anything of it, though I did shortly afterward.

	Question. What was the practicability of General Buells army re-
enforcing Munfordville previous to its being attacked by Bragg?

	I think that while it might have been a hazardous movement to the Army of the
Ohio in some respects, it could have been done.

	Question. What would have been the effect of a stand being made by
the rebel army of 50,000 or 60,000 men at Munfordville upon the Army
of the Ohio?

	It would have been very dangerous for the Army of the Ohio to have attacked
50,000 or 60,000 men at Munfordville. According to the best of my recollection, and
I think I gained my information from entirely reliable sources, I do not think the
Army of the Ohio could have been brought to attack at Munfordville from 42,000 to
45,000 men. The position which an enemy of any intelligence would have occu-
pied for a battle in that vicinity is not at the town of Munfordville, but about 2 miles
south of Green River. The position consists of a very strong, rocky, woody ridge,
stretching nearly at right angles with the line of approach by which the attacking
forces would have been compelled to advance, and my opinion is that that position
would have given the party holding it an advantage of at least 10,000 men. It is
true, in my opinion, that the position might be turned by the right if the forces attack-
ing it form the southern side. It would not have been absolutely necessary to attack
the rebels in this position. There is a road across the country, broken andbad, but;
from my knowledge of the country, barely practicable, from Bowling Green, by the
way of Brownsville, Litchfield, & c., to Elizabethtown and Louisville.

	Question. What would have been the effect of such a movement upon
Bowling Green and Nashville?

	To some extent certainly it would have uncovered both places and left them open
to an attack of the enemy.

	Question. Can you state how far and well the Army of the Ohio was
provided with transportation while at Nashville, beforeit commenced that
march toward Kentucky, when the army was concentrated at Nashville ~

	My own division had an ample supply of transportation, and so far as I know from
contact with other divisions they had sufficient transportation. My answer was based
upon the impression that the question referred to transportation for that movement.
What was sufficient for one movement might not have been sufficient for another.

	Question. State whether you accompanied the army in its march from
Louisville to Perryville; and, if sof what you know of the movements
of the enemy the day subsequent to that battle.

	I did accompany the Army of the Ohio in its march from Louisville to Perryville. In
the morning of the day following the battle of Chaplin Hills, two brigades of m

Page 152

152	KY., M. AND B. TENTh, N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAP. XXVIIt,

division advanced to the edge of the town of Perryville and sent me back a report
that the enemy had evacuated it. We were then ordered to advance to the town and
to encamp at the springs beyond it, nearly on the Harrodsburg road. In this move-
ment we saw nothing of the enemy, but learned from citizens that he had fallen back
toward Harrodsburg. The object of that answer is to intimate that I saw nothing of
the enemy personally that day. After receiving the report from these two brigades
I rode into the town of Perryville myself, preceding the commencement of the move-
ment of the troops toward that town.

	Question. When it became known that the enemy had fallen back
from Harrodsburg, was it understood what was the object of that move-
ment on their part at the time ~

	I do not know that it was nuderstood what wasthe object of the movement. I pre-
sume most of the officers who are acqnainted with the movement had their own opin-
ions about it.

	Question. What was the opinion among intelligent officers as to the
object of the movement ~

	There was some variety of opinions entertained on the subject, so far as I heard
opinions given; but the weight of opinion, so far as I had any inform4tion, was that
the object in falling back to Harrodsbnrg was to form a junction with Kirby Smiths
force and make a stand there, or at the crossing of Dicks River, or at Camp Dick
Robinson; but various opinions were entertained as to where they would make a
stan(l, as would be the case in all circumstances.

	Question. What was Kirby Smiths forces estimated at ~

	I have heard them variously estimated at from 12,000 to 25,000. Among intelligent
officers generally the force was never estimated at over 15,000 men.

	Question. You can state whether the retreat of the enemy from Bards-
town to Perryville and from Perryville to Harrodsburg toward Cum-
berland Gap was conducted in an orderly manner, or did it partake in
any degree of the character of a rout ~

	As I did not see a great deal of the enemys forces while it was in retreat, it is al-
most impossible to say whether it was conducted in an orderly manner, except from
results and inferences, and, so far as I could judge from the indications along the line
of march, my opinion is that it was conducted in an orderlynianner, and did not par-
take jn any degree of the character of a rout. This opinion is based npon the fact that
had there been a general rout we should ,have captured more prisoners, more supplies,
and munitions of war. I think the retreat was arapid one, but well conducted for so
large a force and with such large supplies.

	Question. Can you give the reason for the delay that occurred after
The fight at Perryvillein pursuing the enemy0

	No, sir; I do not know the reason.

Cross-examination:
	Question. Had you any opportunity of gaining information in regard
to the strength of the enemy at Chattanooga or the strength with
which he crossed the mountains to invade Kentucky ~

	I received information from an expedition which I sent to Altamont from the neigh-
borhood of McMinnville about the 22d of August that General Bragg had crossed the
Tennessee River in the neighborhood of Chattanooga between the 16th and 20th of
August with four divisions. The information I received about that time led me to
suppose these divisions comprised some forty-eight or tifty regiments. But the in-
formation was varied. There was some contradiction in regard to the strength of
these regiments. Some reports received said the regiments were weak; others that
they had been tilled up. Some of these statements put the regiments at from 300 to
400; others carried them up to 600.. This information I got from my own operations
in that country. About the 28th or 29th of August, as well as I remember, a person
who reported himself to be a spy in the employ of General Buell came to McMjnnville
and was put in communication with me by General Thomas. Thu person repre-
sented himself as having passed some time in Chattanooga and as having left there
only a short time before. lie stated the enemys force generally to be somewhere in
the neighborhood of 60,000 men. He said that there were four divisions at Chatt

Page 153

CHAP. XXVIII.]
GENERAL REPORTS.
153
riooga, and that they had about 15,000 men in each division. He went into the mi-
nuti~, giving names of commanders of divisions and commanders of corps, strength
of regiments and strength of companies. His name, I believe, was Thatcher.

	Question. According to all the information derived, what estimate
(lid ~OU at that time place upon the strength of Braggs army in cross-
ing the mountains ~

	My opinion at the time General Braggs force was crossing the mountains and mov-
ing up the Sequatchie Valley, by weighing all the information I had been able to re-
ceive, was that it amounted to from 40,000 to 45,000 men. The opinion8 which I re-
ceived from my own openations would not have led me to put so high an estimate as
that upon the force; but the information obtained through the spy referred to led
me to estimate it very much higher than the number I have given; but by compar-
ing all the information, and making allowances and taking the mean between them,
I entertained the opinion at that time that the force was about 45,000 men. This
does not include Kirby Smiths.

	Question. Had you as good an opportunity of acquiring information
as to the strength and movements of the enemy as any colonel in your
command ~

	I should think a great deal better.

	Question. Did you ever hear the strength of the enemy estimated by
any intelligent officer who had peculiar facilities for acquiring informa-
tion as low as 25,000 men ~?

	I never heard an estimate which placed it as low as 25,000 men.

	Question. Do you believe now that Bragg entered Kentucky witli no
more than 25,000 men 0?

	No, sir.

	Question. Have you a pretty good knowledge of the country from
the Nashville and Chattanooga liailroad northwest for a distance, say,
of 50 or 60 miles 0?

	A portion of my division, myself with it, was stationed three weeks at Decherd, on
the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad; subsequently it moved to Manchester; then
to Morrisons Station, on the Tullahoma and McMinnville road; then to within 2
miles of McMinnville. This extended from the 20th of July to the 3d of September.
During that time I was deeply interested in knowing as much as possible of the move-
inents of the enemyby what routes he could approach my own position. This led
me to study the maps of the country as far as I could, and to gain all the information
I could from the ciiizens in regard to the various roads through the mountains, more
especially from Chattanooga to the various positions occupied by my (livision.

	Question. What might be the various objects of an enemy crossing
time Tennessee River near Chattanooga and descending into the Se-
quatchie Valley, having reference to the country we then occupied 0?

	I suppose there might be a variety of objects. At that time the Army of the Ohio
occupie(l a line extending from Nashville by the way of the Colunibia and the Pu -
laski Railroad to Athens; thence eastward by way of Huntsville to Stevenson and
Battle Creek; also troops were posted from Nashville along the line of the Nashville
and Chattanooga Railroad and extending eastward as far as McMinnville. It might
have been an object of the enemy to cross the mountains from the Sequatchie Valley
au(l attack any of these forces in reserve along the line of the railroad to Athens east-
ward and crush them and afterward move rapidly on Nashville, or he might have
crossed the mountains by the way of Altamont down on to MeMiunville and fallen on
the force there. The ultimate object of such a movement, I presume, would have
been to clear the obstacles out of the way as soon as possible and move on Nashville.
The object of such a movement would be Nashville. I cannot see that he would have
crossed the mountains to stop at the foot of them.

	Question. Could he have had it in view to descend the Sequatchie
Valley and attack our forces in North Alabama, supposing that he was
in a con(lition to assume the offensive 0

Page 154

154
KY., M. AND B. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. (CHAP. XXVIII.
	My opinion is that it was in the range of his power. For such a movement as that
I think he would have passed by way of Deckerd, from my knowledge of the routes
and roads. Whether it would have been within the objects proposed to himself or
not is more than I can answer.

	Question. State, if you please, the different routes by which the army
could emerge from the Sequatchie Valley across the mountains.

	Commencing at the most westerly route of the Sequatchie Valley of which I have
any knowledge, it would have been possible to have passed a force by the way of
Pelham, and from Pelliam to Manchester, from Manchester to Woodhury, Murfrees-
borough, and so on. Then there is a road leading from the Sequatchie Valley, south
of Dunlap, direct to Altamont (that is my recollection from the information I got), by
which the enemy could have crossed the mountains. There is also a road leading
from Dunlap to Altamont; a road also leading from Dnnlap directly to McMinnville,
crossing the mountains, and then down the valley of Caney Fork to MeMinuville.
There is also a road leading from Dunlap to Pikeville and from Pikeville to McMinn-
ville, I think passing by way of Spencer. Also by continuing from Pikeville on
toward Sparta the enemy could have turned the spur of the mountains and moved
westward into the plains of Middle Tennessee. There is also a road, entirely west of
any that I have described, leading from Decherd across the mountains to Stevenson.

	Question. What is the nature of the ordinary road from Stevenson
to Jasper and Battle Creek?

	I do not know. I believe I have described all the routes of which I have any recol-
lection, and while I have stated that all these roads were entirely practicable for the
enemy, those portions lying in the mountains are not very good roads.

	Question. Which of those roads is the most practicable?

	Judging from my own knowledge of all the roads across the mountains directly, I
consider the road from Dnnlap to MeMiunville I he most practicable one.
	Question. Do you know anything of what is called the Therman or
Anderson road?

	Not of my own knowledge. My information led me to believe that it is not a good
road; rather a rough road; but a very good one for carriages.
	Question. Does that road pass through Altamont?

	No, sir; I do not think it does; it passes west of Altamont; but I may be mistaken.
From that road it would be practicable to go by way of Altamont.

	Question. Is Altamont in the mountains?

	Yes, sir; it is.

	Question. Describe, if you please, the different roads by which you
can pass from Altamont into the plains northwest of the mountains.

	There is a road leading from Altamont down the mountains into the plains to Win-
chester or Decherd. There is a road from Altamont by way of Tracy City and
Hawkinsville by way of Decherd. There is another route from Altamont by way of
Pelham. which also passes by Hawkinsville. There is a road from Altamont to Hills-
borough, and by that way into the plain. There is also a road from Altamont by the
way of Hickory Creek to Manchester~ a branch leads off from this road to McMinn-
ville; and there is also a road leading from Altamont over into the road leading from
Dunlap direct to McMinnville. 1 would say, general, that there are quite a number
of roads from Altamont by which troops conld be marched down into the plains.

	Question. Is there any one point which would command all those
roads which diverged from the Therman or Anderson road?

	I think a sufficient force occupying Altamont would be able to command the roads
referred to in the question.
	Commission adjourned to meet December 16, at 10 a. m

Page 155

CHAP. xxvm.j	GENERAL REPORTS.	155
	DECEMBER 16, 1862.

	Commission met pursuant to adjournment. All the members present;
also the judge-advocate and General Buell.

	Examination of General T. J. Woon continued:

By General BUELL:
	Question. Did you endeavor to ascend the mountains to Altamont
with any portion of your command while you were in that region?

	I did.

	Question. Please state, then, the practicability of such a movement.

	The road by which the ascent was attempted, and in part effected, i~a~e~ diffic~1t
one. The operation was a slow one, very slow indeed. Two brigades were marched~
up and one battery, I think, to the summit of the mountains, some 5 or 6 miles from
Altamont. The ascent was commenced by another battery, but the operation was not
completed; it was stopped by order of General Thomas, who was present and who was
the ranking officer. It was quite a difficult operation and necessarily a slow one. No
wagons, so far as I can recollect, were taken up the mountains at all. While it is
what would be called a wagon road, it is a very bad one indeed, but could not be
called an entirely impracticable one. The march up the ascent of the two brigades
and part of another occupied pretty much one entire day.

	Question. Did you understand that that movement was ordered in
consequence of the information that the enemy was advancing on Al.
tamont?

	That was my impression at the time.

	Question. Did you understand that it was a movement iu which other
corps of the army participated and to have for its object the concen-
tration of the army at Altamont?

	I had no information but to concentrate. I was informed by General Thomas, who
was in command in that region of country at the time we were making the movement
from MeMinuville and that neighborhood toward Altamont, that General MeCook
and General Schoepfs divisions, according to the best of my recollection, would be
concentrated at Altamont, and would probably reach there shortly after it was ex-
pected that the two divisions with which I was associated would be there.

	Question. Supposing the information in possession of the command-
ing general to indicate that Bragg was in the act of crossing Waldens
Ridge with the purpose of crossing the Cumberland Mountains by the
Therman road, what would you think of the expediency and propriety
of throwing a force of, say, 5,000 men in front of him on that road with
instructions to fall back and unite with the army, forming a junction at
Altamout, supposing such ajunction to be practicable in other respects?

	The judiciousness of such an arrangement would depend somewhat upon the dis-
tance in advance of Altamont a force of 5,000 men would be placed.

	Question. Supposing this force of 5,000 men to be in the Sequatchie
Valley and probably within reach of the Anderson road before the
advance of the enemy could reach the valley ~

	I should consider it a very good arrangement for observing the enemys movements,
its rear being secured and the line of communication for ftvlling back safe, always
understanding, of course, that officers did their duty and never allowed themselves
to be surprised in their communications.

	Question. Can you state, from observation or official report, of the
practicability of maintaining the army at Altamont, considering the
want of water and other necessary supplies ~

	It would have been exceedingly difficult, if not absolutely impossible, to maintain
any considerable force at Altamont for any length of time or even a few days. At
the time I was at Altamont water was exceedingly scarce, and the road by whic

Page 156

156	KY., M. AND B. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [ChAP. XXYIIi.

supplies would have been drawn I have already described. It is a very poor country
indeed; land thin, little cultivation, and almost impossible to obtain any forage for
	animals in that locality for any length of time.

	Question. Do you know anything about the Anderson or Therman
road where it ascends the mountain frbm the Sequatchie Valley-
whether it is good or bad?

	I have no personal knowledge of that road. All I could state would be from in-
formation reported to me at the time. I was never farther than Altarnont on that
road.

	Question. Did you learn while you were in that region that the enemy
had worked upon that road and were the enemys cavalry on that road
about the time of your being there?

	It was reported to me that the enemy was improving that road by parties I sent
as far out as Altamont and scouting parties I sent out who encountered the enemy
on that road. The opinion in regard to the improvenient of the road was derived
from citizens of the country.

	Question. Could an army advance across the mountains by that road
and descend into the plains by any roads you have described without
difficulty?

	I think they could, sir. We found i a great deal easier to get down than to get lip.

	Question. What is the distance from Jasper, the extreme road on one
flank by which an enemy could march from the Sequatchie Valley, and
Sparta, the point on the other extreme by which he could march from
that valley?

	Following the outlines of the mountains from Jasper around by the way of Decherd,
MeMiunville, and Sparta, in regard to guarding all the issues from the mountaius,
would cover a distance of over 100 miles.

	Question. What force in proportion to the force of the enemy do
you think would be necessary to guard such a line as that, the enemy
in the Sequatchie Valley screened by the mountains an(l having the
option of emerging from the valley by any of the various routes you
have described considering all the possibilities of concentration?

	I should think it would require a force from one-third to one-half larger than that
of the enemy to do this effectually and to save the detachments from being over-
whelmed before concentration had taken place.

	Question. State, if you please, general, the disposition of the I)eople
of Middle Tennessee toward the Government and the army of the
whole country in which we were operating.

	The disposition of the people at that time, amounting almost to unanimity, was
exceedingly hostile. The people of the districts I passed through were, with few
exceptions, all rebels. The only locality I have ever been in in Tennessee in which I
met with any evidence of genuine loyalty was Shelbyville. Of course here and there
I met with an isolated individual who was loyal and had maintained his devotion to
the Government, and I made it a point to learn of such persons with a view of get-
ting information from them.

	Question. Do you suppose it possible to conceal the movements of
an army from the enemy in the midst of such a population?

	I do not, sir.

	Question. Is it possible to procure supplies for an army in the midst
of such a population otherwise than by using force, supposing there
are supplies?

	I have always found it necessary to guard all my trains and protect all my opera-
tions for gathering supplies in Tennessee, and I do not think it would be possible to
supply an army witliont covering its foraging parties in such a country with strong
guards

Page 157

CHAP. XXVIII.]	GENERAL REPORTS.	157


	Question. Will you state, if you please, general, what the condition
of the country was at that time in regard to supplies ~ Were the sup-
plies abundant and were they in the hands of producers, or were they
collected in large quantities in different places ~

	The supplies necessary for an army were not at that time very abundant in the
country, and, so far as my observation extended, were in the hands of producers, and
not collectedtogether in large quantities, and I always had to gather them by my
own exertions.

	Question. What were the supplies that the country afforded l

	With rare exceptions only corn and beef; occasionally I succeeded in capturing a
little flour.

	Question. In what 4~onditiou was the corn at that time ~

	For a period of twenty days before the Army of the Ohio commenced to evacuate
Tennessee the corn could be used for the subsistence of animals by being cautious.
Part of the twenty days I do not think it was in a condition for grinding, and could
not therefore have been used as a reliance for breadstuffs for the men. A little of it
was grated, I believe, by the soldiers themselves for making corn bread and mush,
but that would be no dependence for feeding an army.

	Question. Had the supplies of the men not been exhausted by the
rebel forces before their retreat ~

	I think they had, sir, in a very considerable measure. In the country I was in some
corn was left, but not a very great deal, and that was pretty much exhausted by us
before the new crop came in.

	Question. Can you state in a general way what the movements of
the rebels were in the months of July arid August in the organization
of guerrillabands and the use of a cavalry force in the country occupied
by the enemy ~

	In the months of July and August last the rebels were active in organizing guer-
rilla bands to prowl through the country, and their cavalry tbrce ~ras actively em-
ployed in efforts to cut our lines of communication in rear of us, and this was fre-
quently done.

	Question. How did the cavalry of our army and that of the enemy
compare in strength and efficiency, as far as you had an opportunity of
judging.

	I am not able to give an opinion worth anything in regard to the relative strength
of our cavalry and that of the rebels, but I regret to say that I think the rebel cavalry
generally showed much more efficiency and activity than ours did.

	Question. Was there anything in the condition of our service which
made it necessary to disperse our cavalry a great deal in small detach-
ments, such as the occupation of a wide extent of country ~

	Our troops were very niucli scattered at that time, having long lines of commu-
nication and defenses to guard, and as a matter of course, for the protection of
such small garrisons as many of them were, it wa~ generally necessary to disperse the
cavalry or divide it very much, with the view of furnishing all these garrisons the
nicans of obtaining information of the designs and movements of the enemy.

	Question. IDo you know upon what point the army in Tennessee was
dependent as a base of supplies ?

	I always understood Nashville to be the point. I never heard any other mentioned.
The supplies were not furnished by Nashville, but brought to it from other points;
and while it was also a base of our operations, in regard to our supplies it was merely
a depot.

	Question. What I mean to inquire is what was the source of supplies
and the line of communication of the army with that source l

	The supplies, as I always understood, were furnished outside of Tennessee. A
great many, I believe, came from Louisville, by way of the Louisville and Nashville
Railroa~l~ WJ41c the Cumberland River was navigable, my understanding was tha

Page 158

158
Ky., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AN~ SW. VA. [CHAP. XXVIII.
some of the supplies were brought up the Cumberland by boats. Where these sup-
plies came from, whether from Louisville or other points, I do not know, nor can I
say what time the Cumberland River ceased to be navigable for us. But during the
latter period of our occupation of Tennessee we were wholly dependent on the line
of Louisville and Nashville Railroad for our supplies. Occasionally some small sup-
plies were found, as I mentioned, in the country.

	Question. Do you know anything of the interruption of the railroad
between Nashville and Louisville, by which the army was cat off from
its source of supplies?
	It was a matter of notoriety to everybody in the Army of the Ohio that the line of
communication between Louisville and Nashville, as well as between Nashville and
points farther south occupied by the army, was interrupted, by which the army
was cut off from its supplies. We were frequently for a number of days, hut I can-
not state how many, without mail communication, and -the reason always assigned,
and which I believe was true, was the interruption of communication. At one period
while I was at Decherd I found it necessary, on account of the interruption of com-
munication and the importance arising therefrom of getting supplies, to take posses-
sion of all the mills in the neighborhood to obtain breadstnff for the men by grinding
corn; but this was a difficult operation, and could not have been depended upon for a
long period, nor could a large body of men have been subsisted by such means.

	Question. What was the extrenie length of the line of communication
of the army from Louisville to points which it occupied in Alabama?

	I should say that the average extended over :300 miles.

	Question. Considering the scarcity of supplies in the country and
the numbers and efficiency of the rebel cavalry, regular and irregular,
what do you think of the practicability of depending upon the country
for supplies for the army and carrying on at the same time active oper-
ations in a mountainous region, beyond the sphere in which these sup-
plies were to be obtained, if a~tall~

	I do not thiuk~it would be practicable, sir.

	Question. Is it an axiom in military science that the army on the
defensive in mountain warfare has the advantage?

	Yes, sir. I should regard it as a military axiom that the party holding the mount-
ain and living upon it can with a much smaller force maintain their position than
the attacking party. I think the history of all mountain wars will bear out the
statement.

	Question. Was it at the option of General Bragg in invading Middle
Tennessee to assume the offensive or defensive?

	Yes, sir. I have already described a number of routes by which General Bragg
could have crossed the mountains and descended into the plains of Middle Tennessee.
By these routes offensive operations were of course open to him. On the other hand,
he could have occupied a position in the mountains from which he might have threat-
ened different points in Middle Teni~essee. At the same time he could with his cavalry
have carried on active operations, as was done, without oPcupyiug these positions in
the mountains in our rear. Had General Bragg occupied such a position in the
mountains his general war, in reference to any operations against him by the Army of
the Ohio, would necessarily have been a defensive war.

	Question. Supposing it had been certainly known that General Bragg
designed to pa~s through Pikeville for the purpose of taking either the
road to Sparta or MeMiunville at his option, would it have been possi-
ble for my army to occupy a position in the mountains which would
have had more than the effect to delay his movements, considering the
condition of supplies, considering also the circumstances we had in
view, and would it or would it not have been necessary at length to
fall back?

	From my knowledge of the position in the mountains, I do not think there is any
point the occupation of which would have prevented General Bragg from moving by
the route passing through Pikeville, vonei4ering, of course, the state of our supplie

Page 159

CHAP. XXVflI.J	GENERAL REPORTS.	159

and the facilities which would then have existed for occupying such a position for
obtaining supplies for the anny. It is furthermore my opinion that had such a posi-
tion bee-n occupied on the hypothesis that General Bragg would not attempt to cross
the mountains or pass up the Sequatchie Valley around the spur of mountains by
Sparta, it would have been necessary to fall back and concentrate at some point in the
plains of Middle Tennessee. This opinion is based upon my knowledge of the diffi-
ciilty of getting supplies through the mountain, the badness of the roads, and also
my judgment that the occupation of a point in the mountains merely could not have
so seriously threatened the enemys movements up the Sequatchie Valley, and would
have rendered it necessary he should have cleared the position in the mountains.

	Question. Was it generally understood, about the time of the enemys
advance from Chattanooga, that Nashville was the enemys objective
point?

	My recollection of the weight of opinion of officers with whom I conversed about
the time of the advance of General Bragg from Chattanooga is that Nashville was
the objective point. Up to that time no demonstrations had been made which could
lead to entertaining any other opinion.

	Question. If it was improper under the circumstances to oppose the
advance of Braggs army into Middle Tennessee in or near the mount-
ains, what, considering the character of the country and the position
of the roads, was the natural and necessary point for concentrating the
army to oppose his advance upon Nashville?

	I think Murfreesborough was the most eligible point in the case stated, consider-
ing also the position and disposition at the time of our own troops.

	Question. At what point in the line of march from Sparta on toward
Kentucky could it first be certainly assumed that Kentncky was his
destination?

	After the enemy had passed above the spur of the mountains north of Sparta, and
the information of his movements not indicating that he had turned westward with
the bulk of his forces, but was perl~aps continuing his movements northward, it
would leave ground for conjecture that he had another object than Nashville. My
information would go to show that parties were detached from about Sparta in the
direction of Smithfield and Lebanon about the time the enemy was in that region of
country. What was the extent of these parties I do not know. This occurred about
the 5th or 6th of September. I tried myself to gain all the information I could of
the movements of the enemy, and I confess I was not satisfied fully in my own mind
up to that time whether his object was Nashville or Kentucky. I arrived in this city
with my division on the 6th of September. Upon thinking over all the information
I had been able to gain up to that time I began seriously to believe, from the move-
ments of the enemy, that he had another object than Nashville, and of course that was
Kentucky. I do not wish it undersi ood that it was a positively entertained convic-
tion. In consequence of becrinning to entertain this conviction seriously and to be
prepared for either alternative, according to my judgment and the exigencies of the
case, I suggested, in an interview which General Buell did me the honor to have with
me that day, that it would be proper to pass his army or a portion of it to the north
side of the Cumberland river. This arrangement was proposed for a double purpose,
both in reference to the invasion of Kentucky or an advance upon Nashville from the
northern side of the river.

	Question. When was it certainly ascertained that Braggs aimy was
advancing into Kentucky? And state how it was ascertained.

	In a previous answer I have already stated that I crossed the Cumberland River
at Nashville with my division early in the day of the 7th of September. I also gave
in that answer the instructions I had from General Buell in regard to certain niove-
ments indicated in my answer. On reaching Gallatin, on the morning of the 8th, I
received a telegraphic dispatch from General Buell directing me to halt within two
or three miles of Gallatin, on the Nashville side, and to remain there until I received
further orders from him. He furthermore directed me to send out the cavalry at-
tached to my division, and to try by all means to get information of the position, de-
signs, and movements of the enemy. I conformed with these instructions. I sent
out the cavalry during the day and kept them out till a considerable time after night-
fall on Monday, September 8. On the return of the cavalry it, was reported to me
that they had met at various points in various directions a hostile cavalry force, bu

Page 160

160
KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALK, AND SW. VA. [CHAr. XXVIII.
in no instance had they seen any infantry. It was, however, reported to me, from a
pretty reliable source, that Cheatbarns division of the enemy was advancing toward
Gallatin. With the view of arriving at the information that I desired to get in the
most specific and reliable manner I employed a person, of whose loyalty I became
entirely satisfied, to go eastward from Gallatin, following up the course of the Cum-
berland River, till he could obtain accurate and reliable information of the strength,
position, movements, anl designs of the enemy.
	This person left me at sundown Monday, the 8th. During the night of the 8th I
received an order from General Buell to move with my division from Gallatin, by way
of Mitchellsville, to Bowling Green. I marched early Tuesday morning, and encamped
that night in the neighborhood of Mitchellsville; next morning the march was re-
sumed, and I advanced 8 miles beyond Franklin, Ky., when, having made about 22
miles that day, I went into camp. While in camp, about 2 oclock Wednesday, the
spy I had dispatched from the neighborhood of Gallatin joined me. He brought me
information, which I then believed to be reliable and subsequent events have to a
considerable extent verified it, that the enemy had crossed the Cumberland River at
two or three different points, but his information to me was that the bulk of the force
had crossed at Gainesborough. He furthermore informed me that all the information
he could gain induced him to believe that the enemys force was about 35,000 strong.
He was quite an intelligent perso ,showing it by his manners and description of
things. He furthermore informed me that the line of march of the enemy, as he had
learned from soldiers, would be Tompkinsville, Gla~gow, and Munfordville. He ther.
added, Beyond this point, general, I cannot certainly tell you where) they will go;
but it is generally said in their army that Louisville is their destination.
	Believing this information to be very important, although the man represented to
me that he had ridden 150 miles since he had left me at sundown Monday evening,
I told him he must go immediately with the information to General Buell, whom I
supposed was then in Nashville. I gave him a fresh horse and started him off at once,
and told him he must see General Buell by daylight next morning. I was then about
56 miles from Nashville and about 12 from Bowling Green. I sent the messenger hini-
self because I did not wish to trust to writing, but wished him to see General Buell
himself, that he might tell his own narrative. 1 do not know certainly what time the
next day this person reported to him; but that General Buell saw him I know, be-
cause he told me subsequently at Bowling Green that a person had reported to him
and gave him the information (whether it was the first time such infomination was
communicated to General Buell I do not know) that the enemy had crossed the Cum-
berland into Kentucky. It was the first information I had which put the matter be-
yond all question and set at rest the doubts as to what was the object of the euemy.
I wrote a note then to General Rousseau, whose division was ahead of mine in the
direction of Bowling Green, communicating the information I had obtained from the
spy. I furthermore dispatched the information by couriers to the rear to General
Crittenden, who was the next in my rear, to General McCook, and requested him to see
that General Mitchell, who was in command of a division, got it also. I broke up
my camp near night-fall and marched to Bowling Green that night, namely, the 10th
of September.


AFTERNOON SESSION.

	Examination of Brig. Gen. T. J. WooD continued.

By General BUELL:
	Question. Did you, general, know any reason for the movement of
your division toward Bowling Green in advance of your information
that the whole rebel army was moving upon Glasgow ~
	I did not have any positive information; in fact I did not have any. The dispatch
I receiveddirecting that movement did not contain, so far as I recollect, any reason
for it.

	Question. Was it known while you were at Gallatin, with more or less
certainty, that a portion of the rebel army had crossed the Cumberland
River at Carthage and was moving northward ~?
	I cannot say it was known by myself or by any person under my command or
with whom I had coummunicatioli at that time that any portion of the rebel army had
crossed at Carthage and was moving northward. 1 heard a report either Saturday,
the 6th, or Sunday, the 7th, and I think in General Buells quarters, that some portion
of the rebel forces had crossed the Cumberland River at Carthage, but how much r

Page 161

CHAP. XXVIII.]
GENERAL REPORTS.
161
liance was to be placed upon the report I do not know; but I am certain I did not hear
it stated then when I heard this report that any movement had taken place toward
Kentucky; and my understanding of the movement toward Gallatin of my division,
and what I understood was to be followed up by other divisions, was induced in part
by this report. While at Gallatin, as I have already stated, reports came in that the
rebel force that had crossed at Carthage would probably come to Gallatin. It was
understood to be Cheathams division. This information came from a well-known
loyal man, and it was this opinion which induced me to employ the spy I have referred
to in my preceding answer. The information I have referred to above as having
been heard in General Bachs quarters came in directly through some lady who had
been in that part of the country and had, I believe, brought the information to her
husband.

	Question. Supposing it to have been known that the rebel force
which had crossed at Carthage was moving northward, was it probable
that Bowling Green would be its destination, without having any posi-
tive information as to its destination?

	Yes, sir; there is nothing in the topography of the country, nothing in the nature
of the roads or communication, which would preclude the idea that Bowling Green
would he its destination.

	Question. Was there anything to entice the enemy to that potut as a
subordinate or minor operation?	-
	Yes, sir; there was an important l~ridge over Barren River at Bowling Green which
is one of the most important links in the line of railway between Louisville and Nash-
ville. There had been at Bowling Green, at that time, to the best of my recollection,
but a small garrison, which could not have made much resistance against a consider-
able force.

	Question. Were there any supplies at that point which would have
been important to the Army of the Ohio?

	I was informed by General Buell in Nashville on the 6th and 7th of September that
there were about a million of rations at Bowling Green. With the
article, breadstuffs, there was a large quantity of supplies,	exception of one

	Question. What is the distance from Carthage and Gainesborough to
Glasgow?

	I think the distance to be about 50 miles and from Carthage to Glasgow about 50.

	Question. With the information that the whole rebel army was mov-
ing upon Glasgow, would it have been judicious to bring a portion of
the Army of the Ohio upon that point?

	No, sir; I do not think it would have been a safe movement for half of the Army of
the Ohio.
	Question. What is the distance from Nashville to Glasgow by the
way of Bowling Green?

	It is 95 miles, according to my best recollection of the distance.

	Question. After information of the fact that Braggs army had
marched over the Cumberland River toward Glasgow was it possible
to concentrate the Army of the Ohio at that I)Oint in advance of them?

	I do not think it was possible.

	Question. Do you know when the division preceding the rear divis-
ion of the Army of the Ohio arrived at Bowling Green?

	My recollection is that it was on Sunday, the 14th of September, or Monday, the
15th, but on this point I cannot now be positive.

	Question. What was about the strength of the Army of the Ohio at
that time and at that point?

	There were six divisions concentrated at Bowling Green about that time. I have
no positive knowledge of the amount of cavalry force there, but I suppose the in-

11 K RYOL XV

Page 162

KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CnAr. XXVIII.
162

fantry force would have been somewhere in the neighborhood of 35, 000 men. This
estimate might be slightly under or slightly over the actual number.

	Question. With what we know now of the strength of the rebel army,
would it have been judicious or not to attack it without necessity with
a less force than that when an additional force was coming up ~?

	No, sir; it would not.

	Question. IDo you know when the rebel army marched from Glas.
gow ~

	From the inforniation I received at the time of the movement from Bowling Green
to Munfordville, the advance of the main rebel army left Glasgow on Monday, the 15th
of September, and by Wednesday morning, the 17th, there was no rebel force at Glas-
gow. There might have been a few stragglers. Such was the information I received
on the afternoon of the 17th of September from persons who represented themselves
as citizens of Glasgow.

	Question. Where was the rebel army supposed to be when the Army
of the Ohio marched from Bowling Green ~?
	The bulk of it was believed to be at Glasgow, and I think it was knc~vn that there
was a brigade or more at Bells or Glasgow Junction, and perhaps some parties thrown
out on the roads leading from Glasgow to Bowling Green, of which there were two
or three. Such was my impression, and I know niore of the country and its topog-
raphy than any other officer in the Army of the Ohio.

	Question. Do you know whether it was a matter of newspaper in-
formation that a portion of Kirby Smiths force had been at Lebanon,
and was it reported at Bowling Green that that force had moved to-
ward Munfordville ~

	There were reports in the newspapers at that time that a force estimated at about
4,000 had been at Lebanon, and it was intimated that it belonged to a part of Kirby
Smiths force; it was furthermore reported at Bowling Green, when the first attack
was made on Munfordville, on Sunday, the 14th, that a part of Kirby Smiths or the
force that was reported to be at Lebanon was concerned in it. The true facts of the
case did not come out till two or three days afterward, when it became known that
it was Chalmers brigade that made the attack on Sunday.

	Question. Was there even then any contradiction of the report that
this portion of Kirby Smiths force was there ~

	No, sir; there was not.

	Question. Was the report l)robable ~?

	I cannot say it was, but I can say distinctly that there was no impossibility in it,
and perhaps no improbability. There was nothing in the nature of the country or
in the positions that could have prevented it. The country from the Kentucky River
to Glasgow at that time was open to the movements of the rebel troops.

	Question. Do you know with what immediate purpose my army
marched from Bowling Green ~

	I believe I do, sir. I think I got it from the commanding general of the Army of
the Ohio himself. It was with the intention of attacking General Bragg at Glasgow.
Such at least was my understanding of it, and certainly I marched with my division
from Bowling Green with that understanding. I talked with General Buell more
than once upon that subject, and I think I knew his views. I remember distinctly
that I gave it as my opinion that it would be a safe operation for us. I may be mis-
taken, but that is my recollection. The manner in which the army moved and the
roads on which they moved all indicate that independently of any other information.
Of course we all understood that information derived after leaving Bowling Green
might change or modify the plan of operations. The army commenced to niove from
Bowling Green in the afternoon of Tuesday, the 16th of September, and my own divis-
ion moved at 3 oclock.

	Question. How long were you precisely in marching from Bowling
Green to Munfordville ~
My division marched from Bowling Green Tuesday, the 16th of September. M

Page 163

Cuir. XXVIII.]
GENERAL REPORTS.
163
division encamped in Woodsonville, on the south side of Green River, on Sunday, the
21st of September, making five days and a piece.

	Question. Was there variation in the rate of marching during thai.
time?

	During the days that the troops marched, considering the numl)er of the troops
moving, the marches were about as usual. It was necessary to conform our marches
to some extent to the places where water could be found. The country from Bowling
Green to Green River is an exceedingly dry and badly watered one. There are
scarcely any running streams, very few springs, and the dependence is upon ponds
or surface water, and the season previous to and at that time was exceedingly dry.

	Question. What is the distance from Bowling Green to Munfordyille?

	Forty miles.

	Question. iDo you think that movement an extraordinarily slow one
to have been made by an army of 40,090 men almost in the presence
of an enemy whose position had to be ascertained step by step?

	No, sir; I do not consider it an extraordinarily slow one.

	Question. It has been observed by some witness in this investigation
that the marches were long when the enemy was distant and much
shorter when they were near. iDo you think that extraordinary?

	No, sir; I do not. In approaching an enemy whose position and strength are not
fully known, and from whom battle is expected, common prudence would require that
he should be approached cautiously until sufficient informa ion had been obtained to
warrant a change of~ such movements with safety.

	Question. When an army moves upon a single road is not the move-
ment of the head of the column necessarily slackened to. bring the forecs
simultaneously upon the ground when it is expected to meet the enemy?

	It must be doue, unless the commander would run the hazard of attacking with his
force in detail or separately.

	Question. Were there any other routes except that by Munfordyille
by which Braggs army could have marched into Central Kentucky from
Glasgow?

	Yes; there are two or three certainly. He could have avoided Munfordville, pass-
ing entirely to the eastward of it.

	Question. Was it to be supposed that a force of 1,500 men at Munford.
ville, with no other object than to guard the railroad bridge, which could
be replaced in a week, would attempt to oppose the advance of a large
army such as Bragg commanded?

	No, sir; I do not think it would.

	Qtiestion. To leave it there was it not merely offering a bait to the
enemy?

	Yes, sir; I think it was. My opinion is that the force was sacrificed by being or-
dered to remain there, when it could have been withdrawn had the commander been
allowed to use his discretion.

	Question. Do you know whether I had any control over that force or
any communication with it?

	My understanding at the time we were at Bowling Green was that the force at Men-
fordville and the post belonged entirely to the command of General Wright and his,
and so far as I know there was no official communication between that post and Bowl-
ing Green. The only information we got of the position of afii~irs was frem citizens
who came from the country and who brought rumors more or less rchiable. The orders
given to the garrison at that post caine from the authorities I have mentioned. Such
was my understanding.

	Question. Will you state, if you please, the more important particit-
Jars of your movements from Corinth to North Alabama and the caus

Page 164

164	KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAP. XXVIII.

of the delay on that march and the manner in which your command was
employed 

	On Monday, the 1st of June, 1862, my division left Corinth, left under an order to
proceed to Inka, Tuscumbia, and Decatur, the object of the movement being to aid
in repairing and to protect the working parties engaged in the repair of the Mem-
phis and Charleston Railroad. A regiment of mechanics and engineers was sent along
to aid in the work. The engineering department was committed chiefly to General
Smith, while the military conduct of the whole matter was committed to me. My
orders were to put the road in working order from Corinth to Decatur, to repair all the
burnt bridges, and to make good any other destructions that had been committed
on the road. Several important bridges were entirely rebuilt, tracks repaired and
newly laid downa great deal of such work, as would naturally occur to me as neces-
sary to be performed. The most of the labor was performed by the troops of my
division. The work was found to be much heavier than was orginally expected, and
much delay occurred in the completion of it for the want of locomotives and cars,
which could have been usefully employed in transporting material used in repairing
the road. The greatest diligence was exercised on my part and the troops under my
command to get through this work. It was not an agreeable duty, and the great sepa-
ration of my forces necessary to carry on different parts of the work at the same
time made it a very dangerous one, as it exposed us to be attacked by the enemy
when we were very much scattered. For these reasons it was my desii~e to prosecute
the work as rapidly as possible and to complete it at the earliest day. It was not,
however, entirely completed till about the close of June, when I marched with the last
of my [command] from Tuscumbia to Decatur, the bulk of the division having pre-
ceded me to~Dccatur, and r.paired the road between Tuscumbia and Decatur and put
it in working order.

	Question. When did your division cross the river at Decatur ~

	I crossed wi~th the rear of it on Sunday, July 6,1862. The facilities for crossing the
Tennessee were the poorest and of the most inconvenient character.

	Question. Will you give the subsequent movements of your division
np to about the time when the army was being concentrated around
Altaruout?

	About midday, Sunday, July 13, 1 received an order to move with two brigades of
my divkion to Stevenson, Ala. I marched that afternoon in obedience to that order.
On reaching Huntsville, early Monday morning, the 14th, I received information
of the raid on and of the taking of Murfreesborough. I went immediately to Gen-
eral Buell, in advance of my two brigades, to report their approach; was instructed
by him to move as rapidly as possible to Shelbyville by the way of Fayetteville, Middle
Teun. I moved on with my command in the afternoon of the same day, continued
the march the same day to Fayetteville and the day following to Shelbyville, making
the entire distance of t~7 miles in a small fraction over three days.
	I remained two days at Shelbyville, when I received an order from General Buell to
proceed immediately to Winchester, and take position in that vicinity in such a way
as most effectually to protect and cover the railroad in that region, as well as gen-
erally to prevent the irruption of rebel troops into Middle Tennessee and Northern
Alabama. I remained three weeks in the vicinity of Decherd. While stationed there
the troops of my command were employed in guarding the railroad of Middle Tennes-
see from Wartrace to Decherd. Of course a great deal of time was occupied in scout-
ing and exploring the country, getting information as to the position and designs of the
enemy, as well as all information in regard to roads. Also while there, after the ar-
rival of General Thomas, I aided in commencing and carrying out to a certain extent
the fortifications designed to protect Decherd, the intention being at that time to
make it a depot for the supplies of the troops in that part of the country.
	About the 14th of August I left Decherd under orders to aid in putting the railroad
from Tullahoma to MeMiunville in working order. I marched from Decherd on Au-
gust 14, from there to Manchester, from Manchester to Morrison Station, on the rail-
road, and remained there till the road was open entirely to MeMinaville. This
brought us up to about the 22d of August. About this time came in the reports of
the crossing of the rebels at Chattanooga, and then commenced the movements which
subsequently followed with a view of concentrating the troops at Altamout.

	Question. Will you state what you know of the character and extent
of the cavalry operations of the enemy about this time?

	Their operations were very active, and ace rding to all the information I obtained
extended froni Central Kentucky to Middle Tennessee. The rebel cavalry seemed to
be on the alert during the whole of this time and ready to fall on any exposed place

Page 165

Cuip. XXVIII.]
GENERAL REPORTS.
165
Information was derived by our scouting parties of their presence at various points
throughout the country; in fact you could not miss, in going out, hearing of them and
their movements. It was my understanding that Nashville was seriously threatened
by them. It was reported that they bad made their appearance in the vicinity of
Nashville, and I never heard the report discredited. I was informed that the people
were alarmed for the safety of the place.

	Question. Were these movements of the enemy in large or small
bodies or both?
	From the reports I received the movements were sometimes made iu considerable
force; at other times in smaller parties. I heard of them moving in bodies of from
1,500 to 2,000; at other times in bodies from 100 to 300. I think perhaps I heard
forces estimated as high as 2,500, but I think I never heard a higher estimate placed
upon a single body.

	Question. Had your march to Shelbyville any reference to these
movements?
	So I understood it and such were my instructions. It was feared that after taking
Murfreesborough the enemy would move westward rapidly and perhaps cut our com-
munication at Columbia, and it was with a view to be in position to prevent such a
movement as this that I understood I was ordered to Shelbyville. I might a~dd fur-
ther, on receiving my orders to go to Shelbyville General Buell, who gave them to
me in person, thought it might be necessary for me to go on to Murfreesborough;
that, however, was to be reo~ula
Shelbyville.	ted by circumstances, to be determined when I reached
The night I passed at Fayetteville, which was the day before arriving at Shelbyville,
I heard that the enemy was still at Murfreesborough. It was my intention, and I
sent back a report to General Buell that if I should find this report confirmed on
arriving at Shelbyville I would move promptly to M urfreesborough, for the purpose
of attacking and clearing np any enemy that might be there. On arriving at Shelby-
yule I learned that the enemy had retreated to McMinnville after the capture of the
force at Murfreesborough.

	Question. Do you know anything of a simultaneous movement of
another force from the vicinity of Athens toward Nashville with refer-
ence to the same movement of the enemy upon Murfreesborough and
Nashville?
	When General Buell gave me my instructions to go to Shelbyville he told me he
had ordered General Nelson to proceed by rail with a force from Athens by way of
Nashville to Murfreesborough. That General Nelson did go I was assured by the
fact of frequent correspondence and communication with him while I was at Shelby-
ville and Decherd.

	Question. Did the movements of the enemy seem to make these dis-
positions necessary at that time?
	Yes, sir; I think they did. Some such arrangements were necessary to keep open
our communications.
	Question. Did it appear to you during the months of July and a part
of August, before the concentration of the army commenced, that the
troops were idle or that they were uselessly eiiiployed?
	No, sir; it did not occur to me that they were idle or uselessly employed. I speak
from the information I received at that time of the service they were performing. I
know that many marches were made, and that the troops were generally, as far as
my information extended, actively employed.

	Question. Will you state, if you please, if you know anything of the
condition of the railroads and of the difficulties of transporting sup-
plies from Nashville into North Alabama during the months of Ju]y
and August?
	My opinion and observation combined led me to the conclusion that the two lines
of communication by rail by which the troops in Middle Tennessee and Northerii
Alabama was supplied with provisions had been badly injured and torn up by the
rebels in their retreat out of Middle Tennessee in the spring of 18& 2; that it required
much labor to put these roads in working order again, and furthermore it required
great yigilance and attention to keep them so

Page 166

166 KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAP. XXVIII

EVENING SESSION.

	General Woons examination continued.

By General BUELL:
	Question. State, if you please, what you think is likely to be the jus-
tice of criticisms npon the details of complicate military operations after
the facts have all developed themselves, and the many circumstances,
whether real or supposed, which necessarily influence the judgment and
acts of the commander are not at all in view.

	My opinion is that such criticisms are in a large majority of cases unjust and erro-
neous.

	Question. Did you ever hear that it was my purpos& ~ to abandon Nash-
ville in following the rebel army iuto Kentucky, and have you any rca-
sou to believe that the very reverse was my determination and nobody
elses ~
	The day that I arrived in Nashville and prior to meetin~ General Buell, as I de-
scribed in a former answer, I heard a report or rumor, from what s~ource I do not
now remember, that General Buell had entertained some thoughts of abandoning
Nashville. The report went further, to say that there had been some heated conver-
sation and disagreement between General Buell and Governor Johnson on this point.
This was during the morning of the 6th of September, 1862. I met General Buell, by
his order, to report to him, about 1 p. in. of that day. 1 bad a good deal of conversa-
tion with General Buell, at his request, in regard to the campaign probably ahead of
us and in regard to what might possibly be the movements and design of the enemy,
his supposed position from the best information at that time that we could gain of it,
and of what means should be adopted on our part to meet the movements of the en-
emy. As I have said, the conversation was had at the request of General Buell, who
spread out liis maps for my examination. Dnring the whole conversation, in which
General Buell, with more than usual freedom and communicativeness with me, dis-
cussed his plans, there was not the slightest intimation of his intention to abandon
Nashville, but, on the contrary, a statement of his intention to retain Nashville if pos-
sible. On the following day I had another conversation with General Thumas and
General Buell at General Buells headquarters, when the subject of the maintenance
and defense of Nashville was discussed. I was present when General Buell informed
General Thomas that he would leave hini (General Thomas) in command at Nashville,
and heard him give General Thomas various suggestions as to the defenses, & c. There
was no intimation at that time of an intention to abandon Nashville, but every evi-
dence given to induce me to believe that it was General Buells fixed determination
to hold it. I heard General Buell tell General Thomas what forces would be at his
command to help him to defend Nashville, and that in his opinion this force would
be sufficient to hold it against double the number; and it was further my understand-
ing of the conversation in which I participated, as I have said, that General Buell
considered that he was making sufficient provision for the defense of Nashville. I
recollect an instance of that conversation, that General Thomas, after being satisfied
that he wa~ to remain at Nashville, said that he desired his own division to stay with
him, aud General Buell told him he could have it. So far as I know this opinion and
intention of General Buell was not influenced by any other person.

	Question. Do you remember how or from whom you heard this report
of a disagreement between Governor Johnson and myself on this ques-
tion ~

	I do not remember how or from whom I heard it. It caine in so uncertain and
vague a form that I attached no importance to it, and considered it one of the thou-
sand idle rumors that float through camps and cannot be traced to aiiy responsible
scource.

	Question. Was it the opinion in the army on the evening or night of
the 8th of October that the engagement of that. (lay had resulted in the
defeat of the rebel army, or merely the repulse of an attack made upon
a part of the Army of the Ohio 6?

	I cannot state what was the opinion of the army, as I bad very little intercourse on
the night of the 8th with any person that pretended to l)e informed as to the events
that transpired that afternoon, but so far as I heard an expression of opinion there was
no belief entertained that there had been a defeat of the rebel arumy, and an impre

Page 167

CHAP. XXVIII.]
	GflNERAL 1~EPORTS.	167

sion seemed to prevail, so far as I had any means of arriving at a knowledge of it,
that there would be fighting on the following day.

	Question. Was it the expectation that there would be a battle be-
tweeii the two armies ~

	The impression prevailed among all persons with whom I had any conversation on
the night of the 8th that there would be a battle on the following day.

	Question. Do you know whether orders were given for attackin
enemy the next evening [morning] ~	~ the
	I cannot say that I know that orders were given, bnt I received an order myself to
be prepared to advance to attack at daylight in the morning; this order was commu-
nicated to me from General Crittenden, who commanded the corps that I was attached
to, with an intimation that a subsequent order would be given for the movement.
This statement is made to show that I did not get my orders from the general com-
manding the army, and hence do not know what orders he issued himself. I did,
however, receive a message by one of my aids from General Buell to be prepared for
work on the following day, from which I understood that we would have a battle
and severe fighting the following day, and I made all my preparations accordingly.

	Commission adjourned to meet December 17, at 10 oclock a. m.


NASHVILLE, Wednesday, December 17, 1862.
	Commission met pursuant to adjournment. All the members present;
also the judge-advocate and General Buell.

	General Woons examination continued.

Redirect examination by the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:
	Question. Do you know that Braggs army depended for supplies
upon the country through which it passed ~

	I cannot say that I know it of my own knowledge. I always nnderstood that a
considerable part of the supplies used l)y Braggs army was drawn from the country
through which it passed. I also nnderstood that a great ninny supplies were col-
lected at Chattanooga, and the~e we heard were taken along with him. It was
understood that a considerable part of his dependence was upon the country through
which he passed. I cannot say that I have any positive knowledge of this, as I was
not exactly with Braggs army nor behind until after he got into Kentucky some dis-
tance.

	Question. What, in view of his dependence for supplies, would have
been the consequence of a check to Braggs army ~

	In my opinion it would have depended to a considerable extent upon the check he
might have received. It would perhaps have compelled him to hazard everything on
the cost of a battle, with a view of getting us out of his way entirely. On the other
hand, it might have compelled him to change his line of operations very much far-
ther to the eastward, which of course would have delayed his movements to a consid-
erable extent, or possibly it might have compelled him to give up his intention of in-
vading Kentucky and to abandon the enterprise. This of course would depend in a
great measure upon his ability to get supplies independent of the country through
which he passed by carrying them with him.

	Question. Had General Buell made a stand in the mountains which
army would have had the advantage in the matter of supplies, one
drawing from MclVlinnville and Nashville and the other from Chatta-
nooga ~

	Of course niy answer will be entirely a matter of opinion, and as I have already
said in former answers that I had no personal knowledge of the nature of the roads
on the southeastern slope of the mountains across the Sequatchie Valley and over
Waldens Ridge, I cannot give a very positive opinion; nevertheless, I should think
that with the aid of railroad facilities (although we were.much annoyed and threat-
ened) and with the understanding that our army is better equipped in the matter of
transportation than the rebel army, we would have had the advantage in drawing
supplies

Page 168

168	KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAP. XXVIIL

	Question. Had General Buell selected a point in the mountain to
oppose Bragg after Bragg was crossing at Chattanooga which party
would have been acting on the defensive?

	In the case supposed our army, I presume, would have been on the defensive, as we
should have taken that position to resist the advance of General Bragg, and it was
my understanding when the matter of concentration of the troops at Altai~ont was
being considered that it was with a view to resist such an advance across the mount-
ains.

	Question. Had a stand been made by General Buell at any point on
the plains to meet Bragg as he descended from the Cumberland Mount-
aPis, would he (General Buell) have had supplies to carry out his pur.
pose?

	It is difficult for me to give an opinion on this subject, as I am not well informed as
to the question of provisions at General Buells command at that time. It would be
a matter of inference to some extent. Front the quantity of provisions which I think
was issued to the divisions of the Army of the Ohio on their arrival at Nashville I
should think that by putting the troops on half rations there would probably have
been enough for the purpose indicated. My recollection is that we drew six days
rations. My division did when it arrived in Nashville. We had frequ~intly u~r-d half
rations and made them do at the time.

	Question. Did you not and was it not knowii at the time that Bragg
was co-operating with Kirby Smith?

	I cannot say that I knew it or that of my knowledge it was known. I know that it
was discussed as a possible or probable intention of General Bragg that it might he
within the range of his operations. We did not feel perfectly satisfied that his imme-
diate intention wa~ to co-operate with Kirby Smith at all until after his movements
indicated that his object was first Kentucky and not Nashville. Then, of course, it
became evident beyond doubt that his first opetation was with the rebel forces in
Kentucky. It was frequently suggested during the earlier operations that co-opera-
tion with rebel forces in Kentucky might be the immediate object of General Bi agg.
Nashville was equally discussed with other places as being the first l)oint of attack
of Braggs army, which in regard to certainty left the matter very much in (lonbt
with that part of the army with which I had immediate connection at that time.
The troops were very much scattered. Among other reasons suggested among the
troops I served with was that General Braggs army was destined immediately fir
Kentucky, because there was a great deal of political discontent in Kentucky, and it
was to give a chance for this feeling to show itself in a rising.

	Question. Was not an attack upon Nashville a co.operation, in fact,
with Kirby Smith?

	Whether in strict military parlance it would be considered a co-operation with
Kirby Smith would be a matter of opinion among military men; but I shonld un-
doubtedly consider it a powerful auxiliary to General Smiths movements in Ken-
tucky.

	Question. What would have become of Kirby Smith and his army
had General Buell been left free to co-operate with General Wright in
attacking it?

	I do not think there would have been much of it left.

	Question. State at what time you became acquainted with Braggs
crossing the Tennessee and what you did with the information.

	On the 22d of August, 1862, I sent a regiment of infantry from my camp, which was
then at a little lilace called Vervilla, about 9 miles from MeMinuville, to Altamont.
I had learned previously that there were a few reliable loyal men in the micigbhorhood
of Altamont from ~vhom inforniation might probably be obtained as to the move-
ments; designs, and position of the enemy at Chattanooga. I instrncted one of the
officers of the regiment to put himself in communication with those persons. I had
heard that there was frequent communication wiib the rebels themselves between
Altainont and Chattanooga. This officer to whom I had coEmitted the obtaining of
information reported to me on his return, on the 23d, that lie had heard front the loyal
men in question that it had been reported about Altamont, through rebel couriers and
other persons coming from the direction of Chattanooga, that the army of Genera

Page 169

CHAF. XXVIII.]	GENERAL REPORTS.	169

Bragg had commenced crossing the Tennessee River as early as the 16th of August
that is my recollection; that by the ~Oth there were four divisions across. He further-
more reported that it seemed to be the understanding among the eitizens around
Altamont that General Braggs army, or a part of it, would cross the mountains, pass~
ing through that place.
	Having no telegraphic communication myself immediately with General Buell, and
General Thomas being iu immediate command of all the troops in that region of
country, I, on the afternoon of the same day, 23d of August, sent him a distinct report
of this information, and my recollection is that he requested me to send it immediately
to General Buellhe was at the time in telegraphic communication with General
Buellfrom the telegraphic station at McMinnville.

	General BUELL. This testim6ny is unnecessary. I admit that I had
information of General Braggs crossing the river earlier than that
given by General Wood.
	Question. If at the time of General Buells receiving this information
of crossing he had concentrated his forces at Murfreesborough for the
purpose of operating against Bragg what probably would have been
the result?
	It is difficnlt to say what might have been the result. I can suggest what in my
judgment might have been the influence of such~concentration, more particularly if
that concentration had been followed up hy other movements. I think it very likely
that a concentration of the troops immediately at Murfreesborougli would have had
for the first result, if General Bragg had persisted in his designs of invading Kentucky,
to throw his line of march much farther to the eastward than it was; perhaps, turning
off at Pikeville, he would have been compelled, in order to avoid the movement upon
his flank by the army concentrated at Murfreesborough, to avoid Sparta, to go much
farther toward the east than the line of march he pnrsued. This would have thrown
him more into the mountains of Tennessee and perhaps Kentucky, or he would then
have been compelled to turn westward, making a considerable detour. If, on the
other hand, he had continued his line of march through Sparta and toward the point
at which he crossed the Cumberland River, in my opinion the early concentration of
the Army of the Ohio at Murfreesborough would have put us in a condition tQ have
moved eastward and brought the enemy to battle somewhere in that region of country.

	Question. What effect would this change of line to the mountains
have had upon General Bragg as to supplies?
	I think it would have diminished his facilities and means of obtaining supplies.

	Question. Was this your opinion in reference to the concentration at
Mnrfreesborough at the time of the invasion, or is not your opinion
now helped by facts that have come to your knowledge?
	I am sure I entertained the opinion at the time I gained that information that our
troops ought to be concentrated and so expressed that opinion to others. Of course
that opinion has been strengthened by subsequent events. I rather think in the
dispatch I described as having been written by myself to General Thomas I suggested
that there should be an immediate concentration of our troops. I did not of course
mean to design ate any particular point, for I had not the necessary knowledge of
other parts of the army, even had I sufficient rank to warrant giving advice on that
point.

	Question. That not having been done, and it was yet a matter of doubt
whether Bragg had designs upon Nashville or crossing the Cumberland,
what would have been the effect of a concentration of the forces at
Lebanon?
	The general effect would have been the sanme as that produced by the concentra-
tion at Murfreesborough. 1 think it would have made the crossing of the Cumberland
hy the enemy much more dangerous and hazardous to them, and, as a consequence
of that, compelled thera to make their crossing higher up the Cumberlaud. My un-
derstanding of the country farther eastward is that it is more broken, and would have
lessened the facilities for the enemys getting supplies and otherwise have trammeled
his movements; but as to the extent of this I cannot of course give a positive
opinion.

	Question. Is the lack of supplies complained of on our part a suffi-
cient reason for the failure to do anything of this sort

Page 170

170	KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAP. XXVTII.

	I do not know to what extent it is charged that there was a want of supplies. I
have said that on arriving at Nashville my division drew six days subsistence; if the
other divisions of the army obtained a like amount of subsistence on arriving at
Nashville by putting the troops on half rations, as I have said they were frequently,
iii my judgment there would have been supplies enough to have attempted the con-
centration of the troops at Lebanon.

	Question. I understand you to say that while at Nashville it caine
to your knowledge that the enemy was crossing the Cumberland and
that you urged General Buell to advance up the Cumberlaud and dis-
pute their passage?
	No, sir; I did not say that. I have previously described at some length how I o)~-
tamed the first certain information that the enemy had crossed the Caruberland River
and of his movement in Kentucky. I have also in a previous answer said that while
in General Buells quarters at Nashville I heard a report made to him, as coming
through some person who had information from above, that a part of the enemys
fomce had crossed the Cumberland River. I am free to say that, not understanding
the report very distinctly, I could not of course attach any great importance to it,
but that in view of all the circumstances and, as indicated in a former answer, be-
ginniug to be strongly impressed p~yself at that time with the opinion that the object
of the enemy was an invasion of Kentucky, I did not take the liberty~of suggesting
to General Buell that it would be a safe, indeed the best, operation to put the bulk of
his army on the north side of the Cuamberland River. This arrangement would have
put the Army of the Ohio in a position to operate against the enemy in his invasion
of Kentucky, or, if we should be deceived as to that, we should still be in a position to
protect Nashville against a (lecide(l movement by the rebel army under Bragg. I
recollect I said to General Buell on that occasion, although I had made a consider-
able march that day, that if he deemed it desirable that the passage of the river
should be commenced at once my division could go on. This conversation was on
Saturday, September 6.

	General DANA. I think it is the duty of the court to object to such
questions. I make an objection to the question, ioasmuch as there is
danger in asking a witness a question such as that., wherein the ques-
tion states him to have given testimony which (loes not appear on the
record; and in future I shall object to questions being put in that way.
The question started out with the assertion that the witness has given
testimony which he has not given, nor is there anything like it on the
record. The witness might be misled by such questions.
	The JUDGE-ADVOCATE. General I)ana is correct in his objection;
but I was under the impression that such evidence had been given.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

	Question. General, the two armies left the Cumberland and marched
as far as Bowling Greemi and Glasgow nearly parallel. Did you under-
stand at the time what the object of that march was on the part of our
army?
	General BUELL. I object to the question, inasmuch as it assumes as
truth what is not truethat the armies were marching on T)arallel lines;
whereas the fact is that they started from l)oints from 40 to 60 miles
distant and converged upon a point not more than 5() miles from the
point of departure of one of them. In making the ol~jection I do not
consider that there is any question of law involved in it at all, and un-
der ordinary circumstances I should not have thought of making an
objection; but it has been the popular criticism upon the military op-
erations urmder my direction that Braggs army and my army have
moved side by side of each other without an attempt on my part to mo-
lest~ him, whereas in fact they were moving from 60 miles to a less dis-
tance as they approached each other, with a country almost impracti-
cable between them.
	Question. Please state, general, while your army was umoviug from
Nashville to Bowling Green at about the same time that Braggs arm

Page 171

CRAP. XXVIII.]
GENERAL REPORTS.
171
was moving from the Cumberland to Glasgow whether you understood
the object of our march at that time.
	It is with me a matter of inference what might have been the intention of the com-
inanding general of the Army of the Qhio in that movement. My own impression of
the movement itself was that it was to bring about a concentration of the troops at
Bowling Green for the defense and fortification of that place against any efforts of
the enemy to capture its garrison and its supplies, and, the army being concentrated,
subsequently to take such movements as circumstances and events might indicat~ as
proper.

	Question. As we did not attack the enemy at Glasgow, did not Mum
fordville become as important a point to us as Bowling Green ~
	General BUELL. I object to that question, inasmuch as it assumes
that there was a neglect to attack the enemy at Glasgow, whereas the
evidence shows that he could not have been attacked there.
	The court is cleared for secret session.
	The WITNESS. It is somewhat difficnlt to weigh with accuracy the relative impor-
tance of Munfordville and Bowling Green to us. I can say generally that I consider
both places very important; in some respects the elements influencing the question
of importance were about identical; and of course it was much to be desired that the
enemy should not get possession of Munfordville.

	Question. Are not the rules of prudence, caution, and so forth, as
applicable to an enemy invading a country and moving in the same di-
rection as the opposing force of superior numbers; and was not the
success of the inferior invading army to be attributed to the wholesale
disregard of those rules ~
	My answer to the first part of the question is, certainly, that all the rules of cau-
tion, prudence, watchfulness, & c., are equally applicable to the invading force as
to its antagonist. But how far in this particular case the success of the enemy might
have been due to the disregard of these rules I am not prepared to give an opinion.
Of course a certain degree of audacity combined with a pi~udent degree of caution
will generally lead to favorable results.

	Question. I)id General Buell give any reason for defending Nash-
ville at the time he left General Thomas in command ~?
	My recollection is that General Buell remarked in the course of his conversation
to which I have previously referred that by abandoning Nashville we should almost
entirely, if not completely, relinquish our hold on Tennessee; that in case Nashville
should be strongly occupied by the enemy and we should be successfiul in driving the
rebels out of Kentucky, it might and would probably cost us a great deal to retake
Nashville, more particularly if the river should not rise at an early (lay, and espe-
cially if the enemy fortify the river in a way to oppose our ascent in case it did rise.
And he furthermore expressed the opinion that the abandonment of Nashville would
not only have a bad influence on our cause, more particularly in Tennessee, but
throughout the country generally.

	Question. Do you remember what gave rise to tho~se remarks on the
part of General Buell ~
	I do not now remember distinctly how that particular branch of the subject was
introduced, but my best recollection is that the subject came nuder discussion in con-
siderin g the difficulties of keeping Nashville supplied with provisions in case we
should have a long campai~n in Kentucky, and also in regard to leaving a sufficient
garrison in Nashville for maintaining it with any reasonable d~ree of security. This
latter consideration came up in connection with some conversation as to the l)roba-
bility of an advance from Northern Mississippi of a force under Price, Van Doi ii, and
Breckinridge, and other rebel leaders, it being reported in the newspapers and other-
wise circulated at that time that such an invasion would be made.

	Question. Was this conversation subsequent to the report that Gen-
eral Buell and Governor Johnson had words upon the subject ?
	It was subsequent to the tune that I heard the rumor of such a conversation between
General Buell and Oovernor Johnson. I heard this report when I first reached Nash-
ville, on the 6th of September, which was about the middle of the day or before. I
did not meet General Buell till about 1 oclock that day or a little later

Page 172

172	KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. (CHAP. XXVIII

	Question. IDo you know, general, the number of the army that marched
out of Louisville under command of General Buell to attack Bragg at
Bardstown?

	No, sir; I do not know accurately the strength of that army. I made some estimate
in regard to the strength of it myself, based upon iuformatiou that I did possess.

	Question. State what that estimate was.

	I usually considered it, in round numbers, to be somewhere in the nQighborhood of
80,000 men, artillery, cavalry, and infantry, all combined. My estimate was made by
taking the strength of my own and other divisions I bad some knowledge of and by
averaging the Whole numbcr of divisions as nearly as I could consider their number.
It might have fallen a little below or a little above. The approximation could not
necessarily have been a very accurate one.


	NkSHVILLE, Wednesday Afternoon, December 17, 1862.
General T. J. Woons examination continued.
By General DANA:
	Question. Had General Buell taken a defensive position i& the mount-
ains beyond Altamont, with the purpose of resisting Braggs advance
into the plains of Tennessee, was it or was it not possible for him then
and there to have subsisted his army; and, if so, for how long atirne?

	I think this would have been a possible operation, upon the hypothesis, of course,
that the troops in the rear charged with guarding the railway and line of commu
nication had done their duty properly, and kept open our communication with the
source of supply; but I do not think it would have been possible for a greater period
than a few days, for the reason that the monntainous country itself affords vcry little
that is useful in supplying an army and all the supplies for men and animals would
have to be drawn entirely from our rear. course the transportation of forage for
a considerable distance, which would have been a necessary result of this arrange-
ment of troops, would in a short time have become a work of great magnitude and
extent, and to this would have to be added the transportation of supplies from the
line of railroad into the mountains~

	Question. Was or was not the disposable force at General Buells
command at that time sufficient to enable him to place a sufficient force
to defend his position in .the mountains and at the same time place a
sufficient force on his line of communication to guard them against any
probable contingency?

	The answer must be somewhat a matter of opinion, as I do not know the actual
numerical strength of the force at General Buds command at that time, but my
opinion is that he had a sufficient force at his command to meet the case put in the
question.

	Question. At the time you subsisted your troops in Lower Tennessee
on half rations what proportion of the other half .rations was procured
by them in the country to help out the short supply?

	I can answer generally a very considerable portion; and without going into an es-
timate of the quantity, which would perhaps be very inaccurate, I san say generally
that the troops of my command lived vcry well when they were on half rations. Cer-
tainly there was no si4ering.

	Question. What kind of supplies were gathered by the troops at
these times to help out their short rations?

	By my own particular command, which I can take as a test of others, some flour
was found in the country. I caused corn to be ground into meal to be issued to the
troops, collected beef cattle from the conntry, and at that period we were generally
able to get a pretty good supply of fresh vegetables.

	Question. Supposing none of these supplies could have been obtained,
how long could the army have subsisted on half rations brought from
the rear and have continued effective

Page 173

CHAP. XXVIII.J
GENERAL REPORTS.
	I should think, sir, for a long time. I do not think a 9oldier would become wholly
ineffective for the want of provisions so long as he was supplied with half rations.

	Question. At the time the rebel army was marching up the Sequat-
clue Valley were these supplies such as you have stated above procur-
able beyond Altamont or in that vicinity, supposing General Buell had
takeu up the defensive position alluded to ~

	I have already described that region of country as a very poor one. I do not think
that that region of country would have afforded the supplies we drew from the more
fertile and cultivated plains of Middle Tennessee.

	Question. Was there between Altamont and the Sequatchie Valley
any position where au army could post itself and at the same time be
supplied with water ~

	I do not know, sir; I never was farther in the direction than Altatnont; but I can
answer generally, from my own observation and the information I received from others,
that that ~vhole district was at that time very badly watered.

	Question. How many years have you devoted to the study of the mil-
itary profession and what campaigns and tours of active service have
you been engaged in?

	it is now more than twenty-one years since I first went to West Point, and my
studies and reading since that time have been chiefly directed to the military pro-
fession. I joined the Array of Occupation, as it was called, commanded by General
Taylor, at Corpus Christi, in the mouth of September, 1845. I continued to serve with
that army, and participated in all its chief operations, movements, and battles, up to
the time that General Taylor relinquished the command of it, in the month of Novem-
ber, 1847. 1 was thea relieved from duty in that army and ordered to the city of
Mexico. I joined the army in Ihe city of Mexico as soon as I could, aud remained
with that aruly till it evacuated Mexico and returned to the United States, in July,
1848. I was then ordered to Texas, and remained on duty in that department till the
summer of 1854.
	During the time I was in Texas I performed a good deal of staff duty and was en-
gaged in various Indian campaigns and enterprises. In the spring of 1855 I was ap-
pointed a captain of cavalry in one of the regiments, and from early in the autumn
of 1855, after my regiment was organized and when it took the field, I was almost
constantly on duty with it. en~aged in various expeditions on the Western plains, till
the month of September, 1859. I then left my regiment and took advantage of a leave
of absence to travel in Europe. I returned from Europe in April, 1861, and was ordered
to Indiana to muster volunteers into service; remained there till October, when I was
appointed brigadier-general, and ordered to join the troops in Kentucky. 1 have
since that time been almost continuously on duty with what was lately termed the
Army of the Ohio, and is now called the Fourteenth Army Corps and sometimes the
Army of the Cumberland.
	When I first took the field in Kentucky I commanded a brigade for a short time.
After performing some other duties, such as commanding a camp of instruction and
org~nizatioii at B ardstown and performing some other work in the way of road-mak-
ing in the mountains of Eastern Kentucky, the division which I now command was
organized in the month of February, 1862, and I have remained in command of it
ever since. This division has participated in all the material operations, movements,
and campaigns of the late Army of the Ohio.

	Question. Supposing yourself in the position of General Buell while
commanding the Army of the Ohio at the time he received information
of the crossing of the Tennessee River by the rebel forces and being
l)ossessed of such information as he was then probThly possessed of
what would probably have been your plans and dispositions in order
to have performed your duties so as in the best i)Ossible manner to
have subserved the Interests of your Government and to have inflicted
the most damage on the enemy, while at the same time guarding to
the best of your ability the interests of the States of Tennessee and
Kentucky; that is. supposing those States loyal?

	Had 1 been in command of the Army of the Ohio at the tim~ I received satisfac-
tory information that the rebel forces were crossing the Tennessee River at and in
the vicinity of Chattanooga, being satisfied from my knowledge of the mountainous
17

Page 174

174
KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [ChAP. XXVUI.
country that in all probability the enemy would never attempt to lead a strong force
through the monntains into the plains of Middle Tennessee, I should have made my
arrangements for concentrating the troops at an early day at the most eligible point
in Middle Tennessee. I should of conrse have had the mountain passes well watched
and observed by means of cavalry through the agency of spies. I think it important
to remark in this discussion on the utter improbability of the enemys leading a strong
force through the mountains. This is simply my opinion, but I was well satisfied
the first time I ever made an examination of that country that it would never be
done and so stated it to General Thomas, and it was in consequence of this opinion,
which he entertained as well as myself, that the two divisions I have spoken of as
starting from MeMinuville to go to Altamont were withdrawn, that is, by direction
of General Thomas. By concentrating the troops in Middle Tennessee, even if the
opinion that the enemy would not invade the country through the mountains was
not correct, we should still have been in position to fall upon him as soon as he came
out of the mountains, and at the same time be prepared to meet any movement up
the Sequatchie Valley around the spur of the mountains into Middle Tennessee or
to guard against the movement northward along that line into Kentucky. The fact
that the enemy would have got possession of the country between the toot of the
mountains aud MurfrecsborDngh which might have been selected as the point of
concentration I do not consider a matter of material importance. Had we beaten
his army, of course the country would soon again have fallen into onr possession.
	On the other hand, he could not have dared to pass us with a view~of attacking
Nashville, and would have been compelled, of course supposing Nashville to have
been his chief object, to have beaten the concentrated Army of the Ohio in position
tirst. By concentration at Murfreesborough or some such point we should more effec-
nally have protected our communications to the rear than was possible by concen-
tratin g in the mountains. We should have greatly lessened the difficulties of obtain-
ing the supl)lies that were drawn outside the limits of Tennessee, as well as increased
our facilities for obtaining those which we did get in Tennessee. By this arrange.
nient the commander would better have had his forces in hand and been prepared to
meet any exigency that the events of the campaign might develop. As I have already
described in various answers the number of roads by which it was absolutely prac-
ticable, though highly improbable, that the enemy could move across the mountains,
consequently the simple occupation of any single position by our troops would not
have effectually prevented such a passage; hence the necessity of early concentration
at Murfreesborough or some other point in Middle Tennessee.

	Question. Continuing now the hypothesis in the preceding question,
and supposing your forces concentrated, as you have stated, at or near
Murfreesborough, and supposing that you have received reliable informa-
tion that the enemy has passed to the north of Sparta, please to con-
sider that you have the information which General Buell was probably
possessed of from day to day. After that please continue your 1)lan of
campaign up as far as Munfordville, supposing the enemy to have pur-
sued the line of march which he actually did pursue.

	In the first place I will remark, in regard to the operations of the army after being
concentrated at Murfreesborongh, that by an early concentration of the army at Mui-
freesborough, with proper preparations,it is problematical of course,but I enter-
tain the opinion that if this had been done early enough the rebel army under
Bragg might have been prevented passing much farther north than Sparta. But
under the supposition that he had evaded the army concentrated at Mnrfreesbor-
ough and got so far advanced that he could not be stopped before getting across the
Cumberland River, which the question seems to indicate, I should have crossed my
army over the Cumberland River at Nashville as being the most eligible point, and
have tried, by a rapid movement of it along the line of turnpike from Nashville to
Gallatin, Scottsville, Glasgow, and into Kentucky, to have brought the enemy to
battle if he persisted in marching on that road or compelled him to abandon that
line of march and conduct his operations farther to the east.
	Supposing the enemy to have been brought to battle and a victory to have been
attained, of course it would have protected Bowling Green, ~ashville, Munfordville,
Louisville, & c. But if he had avoided battle and had moved farther to the east-
ward, Bowling Green and Munfordville would both have been effectually protected.

	Question. After it was known at Nashville that the enemy had
crossed the Cumberland River was it possible to conduct the Army of
the Ohio to Glasgow by the route you have stated in force before the
arrival of the enemy there 

Page 175

CHAP. XXVIII.]	GENERAL REPORTS.	175

	It is impossible for me to answer that question, because I do not know when it was
known at Nashville that the enemy had crossed the river.

	Question. Please answer the question under the supposition that it
was known at Nashville the following day after the enemy crossed the
river, supposing the Army of the Ohio to be concentrated at ~ashville.

	No, sir; under the supposition given I do not think the Arniy of the Ohio could
have (olicentrated at Glasgow hefore the enemy conSentrated his troops there. The
suppositioa is, as I nnderstand it, that the Arn~yof the Ohio is concentrated at Nash.
ville. The other hypothesis is that the information of the crossing of the enemy is
not received at Nashville till one day after the passage had been effected. According
to my information the bulk of the enemys forces crossed the Cumberland River at
Gaineshorough. The distance from Gainesborough to Glasgow is about 50 miles; the
distance from Nashville to Glasgow is about 85 miles. Of conrse from this data every
one can make up his own opinion.

	Question. Suppose the rebel army to have crossed the Cuinberland
River in its march to the North and the commander of the Army of the
Ohio not to have been able to learn the exact whereabouts of the main
force of the enemy on any particular day prior to his arrival at Glas-
gow, wonid it have been prudent, taking into view the dange~r of a
flank attack and the number of roads by which such an attack might be
made, to have pursued his course from Gallatin to Glasgow ~

	Under the hypothesis of ignorance of the enemys position and the other considera-
I ions suggested in it, the danger of a flank attack, & c., and the hypothesis ~f there
being a nnmber of roads favoring such an operation, it would not have been consid-
ered among military men, ia my jndgment, a prudent movement. I think it would
have been a bold and andacious one. I think, however, that with proper observa-
tion in regard to the movements of the enemy the very audacity might have made it
successful, of conrse supposing it to have been carried out very rapidly and vigorously.
It would not, very clearly, been a prudent one.

By General TYLER:
	Question. For what length of time was your divisioii engaged in the
repairing of railroads after you left Corinth 6?

	For one month, namely, ihe month of Jnn~ 1862, repairing the Charleston and
Memphis roadfrom Corinth to Decatur. Subsequently, that is in the month of August,
1862, it was engaged for about a week in opening and repairing the railroad leading
from Tullahoma to McMinnville.

	Question. Were other divisions of the army engaged in repairing
these roads and to what extent 6?

	So far as I have any information only one other division of the Army of the Ohio
did any work in repairing railroads. This division was commanded by the late Gen-
eral Nelson, whose division relieved mine in the vicinity of luka and finished the
bridge over Bear Creek, which had been about completed ty mydivision, and also the
bridge over Buzzards Creek, in the same neighborhood: It was common notoriety,
and I believe tine, that other troops belonging to the 4rmy of the Ohio were engaged
during the snmmer in opening railroads in Middle Tennessee.

	Qnestion. To what extent and for what military pnrposes were these
railroads used afterward6

	I think the part of the Memphis and Charleston road I have described as being
repaired by my division was used to a very small extent in transporting provisions

and troops. I do not think it ever amounted to a great deal; very few troops and
low provisions were ever carried over that part of it. The roads of Middle Tennessee
were nsed during the summer and early part of autumn in transporting snpplies of
every kind for the nse of the Army of the Ohio and for transporting troops. I mean
the roads of Middle Tennessee; the road leadimig from Nashville by the way of Col-
umbin, Pnlaski, and Athens to Hnnts~ille; also the road leading from Nashville by
way of Murfreesborongh and Decherd to Stevenson. There is mi bran.h from this road
commenciug at Tullahoma and leading to McMinnville.

	Question. Did the repairing of the Memphis and Charlestoll roa

Page 176

176	KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA [CHAP. XXVIIL

delay the movement of General Buells troops to Stevenson or facili-
tate it?

	I think, sir, it delayed it.

	Question. What time did you arrive at Stevenson?

	I never was there.

	Question. What time did the troops arrive there and how near is
that to Chattanooga?

	I do not certainly know when Stevenson was first occupied by our troops. There
were troops there, I am quite sure, about the end of June or the beginning of July.
Inround numbers I think Stevenson to be about 35 or 40 miles from Chattanooga.

	Question. How long a time, general, would the moving of the Army
of the Ohio from Corinth to Stevenson require, ignoring the road en-
tirely, or in what time would you probably have reached there with
the transportation you had when in us~ of th~ road?

	I suppose it might have been done in from twenty to twenty-five days. I give a
margin for difficulties and troubles. The Charleston and Memphis road was of no
advantage in the movements and operations of the Army of the Ohio2 The route I
should have taken in moving from Corinth would be across the Tennessee River at or
near the month of Bear Creek; I should then have moved eastward in the direction
of Athens and Huntsville to Stevenson. That this is certainly the most direct route
my recollection is, without being positively certain.

	Question. Was General Buells army ever within striking distance
of Bragg before the rebel army crossed the Tennessee River?

	I do not think the Army of the Ohio was ever concentrated in a position previous
to the passage of Braggs army across the Tennessee River to strike it.

	Question. Do you thiuk it was practicable to have concentrated the
army at some point to have struck the rebel army at Chattanooga be-
fore it crossed the river?

	In the early part of the month of July, when I got as far as Decatur and Hnnts-
ville, I considered it certainly within the range of the capability and power of the
Army of the Ohio to have taken ChaLtanooga; moreover, I supposed the object of our
movement in that direction ~vas for that purpose. This was simply a deduction of my
own from our movements. I did n.ot obtain information from any one competent to
give me exact information. It might have been possible at a later date, but from
my own particular employment later in the summer I had not an opportunity of giv-
ing such attention to the subject as I previously had.

	Question. Supposing within a week or ten days after the evacuation
of Corinth by the enemy the Army of the Ohio had as rapidly as possi-
ble, considering the necessity of supplies and the transportation fur-
nished that army, pushed on to Chattanooga by the route you have
specified, what in your opinion ~vould have been the result?

	I think we could have taken Chattanooga.

	Question. Have you ever been higher up the Tennessee River than
Chattanooga?

	I have never been quite so high as Chattanooga. Stevenson is the highest point to
which I have been.

	Question. From the information you obtained last summer, if Chatta-
nooga could have been taken do yon snppose it would have been prac-
ticable for the army to have continued on to Knoxville?

	I do not think it would have been a practicable movement without a very con-
siderable addition to the force of the Army of the Ohio. This will become apparent
from the greatly increased line of communication we would have had to keep opea
and of course the greater exposure of our lines of communication to be cut. At the
same time the occupation of Chattanooga itself would have been very much of a
protection to operations in East Tennessee

Page 177

	CHAP. xxvm.j	GENERAL REPORTS.	177

	Question. Did Braggs army after it passed the Tennessee River re-
ceive any reinforcements from Kirby Smith?

	My information led me to the conclusion then, and I now entertain the same con-
viction, that General Bragg did not receive any material re-enforcements to the
army he led across the Tennessee River and into Kentucky by the way of Tompkins-
yule till he formed a junction in Central Kentucky with Marshalls, Smiths, and Ste-
vensons forces.

	Question. I have alluded to your testimony that you stated Braggs
army was at Glasgow on Monday, 15th.
	I stated in answer to the question that the advance of Braggs army left or coin-
menced to leave.
	Question. What proportion of General Buells army was engaged
with the enemy at the battle of Perryville?

	It is difficult to say what proportion was engaged. I know about the force that
was upon the ground and I have some knowledge of how that force was employed.
Two divisions of General McCooks corps, as it was called, were most actively en-
gaged in the battle of Chaplin Hills, and, according to my understanding, did the
principal part of the fighting. As I have always understood, one brigade frox~i General
Gilberts corps was detached to re-enforce General McCook. A considerable part of
General Gilberts corps were engaged in one way and another in the battle, but I do
not think any serious work was done by it. Certainly it could not be said it was
hotly engaged, and its casualties, as compared with the whole number of the division,
would indicate this opinion to be correct. I am quite sure that only one brigade of
~Jrittendens corps, as it was called, fired a shot, and that was a brigade of my own
division.

	Question. Did you know or hear of any movement made by General
Buells army on the night of the battle or the next morning or during
the next day to renew the battle or to find the enemy?

	I cannot say I knew or heard of any movement taking place either that night, next
morning, or the next day that could properly be called an effort to renew the battle
on the part of the Army of the Ohio. Some movements were ordered in the corps to
which my division was attached for an advairce toward Perryville during the morn-
ing of the 9th, but such advance did not take place until after it was known that
the enemy had evacuated the position in and around Perryville, and in fact till I
had been in the suburbs of the place myself. But in all this I wish to be understood
as speaking of what I saw and heard, and could not of course prctend to give evi-
dence of the movements of the whole body of troops assembled in the vicinity of
Perryville.

By General DANA:
	Question. State as nearly as you can the disposal General Buell had
made of his army about the time Bragg crossed the Tennessee to in-
vade Kentucky. What point of occupation marked his left and what
his right and how long prior to the movement of Bragg had his army
held such a position?

	The principal part of the troops of the Army of the Ohio were disposed, according
to my recollection at the time suggested in the question, from Nashville along the
line of railway which leads from ~4ashville to Columbia and south as far as Athens,
from Athens eastward by way of Huntsville and Stevenson to Battle Creek. The
troops of this army were also stationed along the line of railway leading from Nash-
ville to Stevenson; also along the road leading from Tullahoma to McMinnville, and
some of them in the mountains and along the foot of the mountains from Decherd
eastward as far as McMinuville. I think also about this time an expedition was
made from the troops stationed at Battle Creek some distance up the Sequatchie Val-
ley, but how far I never was informed. The troops at McMinnville would be con-
sidered the farthest east, and those at Athens, Northern Alabama, farthest west.

	Question. By whose order did General Buell march from Corinth
toward Chattanooga, what was the object of the movement and do
you know whether the operation was left to his own disc
	retion or pre-
scribed by the order?

12 it HVOL XVI


Page 178

178	KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAP. XXVJIL

I do not know that I was ever informed by any official functionary, but my un4er-
standing was that the movements were made in obedience to an order from General
Halleck; but I never understood what was the specific object set forth in the order
directing the movement, nor have I any knowledge as to whether discretion was
allowed to General Buell in the execution of the order.

	Commission adjourned to meet December 18, at 10 oclock a. m.

NASHVILLE, Thursday Morning, December 18, 1862.
	The Commission met pursnant to adjournment. All the members
present; also the judge-advocate and General Buell.

	General T. J. Woons examination continued.

Recross.examination by General BUELL:
	Question. Do you know any reason why the army could not have ad-
vanced on Chattanooga as soon as it arrived in North Alabama ~
	I have already explained that my division of the Army of the Ohio was engaged for
nearly a month after it came into North Alabama in repairing the Memphis and
Charleston Railroad. After the completion of this work, and when myAivision was
encamped within one days march of Huntsville and a considerable portion of the
army encamped in the neighborhood of Athens and Huntsville there was a consider-
able want of supplies, as I understood. There was a serious break in the railroad
from Nashville by the way of Columbia, & c., which had to be repaired before it could
be depended upon for getting supplies. I cannot now remember whether the road
from Nashville to Stevenson was in working order throughout all its parts or not at
this time. This was about July 7, 1862.
	On 13th July, 1862, according to my best recollection, the garrison at Murfrees-
borough was captured and the road in several places in that vicinity broken up and
bridges destroyed; so I was informed and so believed. It was a matter of common
notoriety from that time, or for a month or more, up to the time we began our march
out of Tennessee. Varl~ous efforts were made by bodies of the enemy to destroy our
communications on this road, and it required great watchfulness and care to prevent
it.	I think, if I am not mistaken, that there were occasional interruptions of com-
munications on the road at the period referred to, but they were of no great duration,
according to my present recollection. I can state that from the time the garrison at
Murfreesborough was captured up to the time the army commenced to concentrate at
Nashville my own division was never supplied with subsistence further ahead than
from five to seven days, and it was during this period, while the communications
were so very much interrupted, that I was compelled at Decherd to resort t6 the means
described in a previous answer to subsist my division. Whether the causes I have
described were the real reasons for not advancing on Chattanooga I cannot say, as I
was not in command of the army and not in very close communication with the com-
mander; but they would seem to constitute difficulties in the way, and may have been
reasons why no advance was made in that direction.

	Question. Of what importance is Chattanooga as a military position
and as a strategic point?
	It is somewhat difficult to say of what strategic importance Chattanooga alone
is, but I should think that a military force occupying Chattanooga, and with sufficient
strength to maintain itself there, and also with its military connections to keep its
communications open to the rear, would be able to command what is called the East
Tennessee Railroad and some of the rail communications farther south. The simple
occupation, if per se, in a strategic point of view, and without the ability to command
the country for a certain distance west and east and south and east, would probably
not be of any great advantage; but as far as I have ever thought of the propriety of
occupying Chattanooga, it would have been with the hope at least that the Govern-
ment might have been able to put there a force that would have been able to exteud
its operations sufficiently far into East Tennessee, and, if not to occupy the country~
to destroy the rail communitions there.

	Question. As a position in itself is it strong or weak?
	I have never been at Chattanooga myself, and cannot give an opinion of its strength.

	Question. Do or do not the railroads converging upon it from th~
east and south make it an exposed point for our troops?
I should say so, unquestionably

Page 179

	CHAP. XXVIII.]	GENERAL REPORTS.
17~

	Question. Would a force that might be sufficient to hold Chattanooga
and cover its communications be sufficient to advance toward Cleve-
land, Dalton also, and especially to advance farther toward the south
and east.

No, sir; I do not think it would.

	Question. From your general knowledge of the force that the rebel
Government could probably bring to bear upon Dalton or Cleveland,
and supposing the communications of our army reasonably secure, what
force do you think would be necessary to hold either of those points so
as to cut the communications between Virginia and Georgia effectually
by that route?
	As I understand the matter, the, occupation of Chattanooga, Cleveland, or Dalton,
or any point in that region of country, would be with a view not only of preventing
communication by what is called the East Tennessee Railroad in Virginia, but also to
extend its operations far enough south and by the position it might occupy to cut off
communication between the eastern part of the territory occupied by the rebel forces
and the southwestern, or at least to impair those communications as much aspossible.
This would require such a force to extend its operations at least as far as Atlanta,
Ga. Considering the importance of such communications to the rebels, and the iso-
lated position which such a force would be in as regards its re-enforcements, I do not
think it would be safe to occupy that region of country with any view to permanency
with certainly less than 40,000 men, and probably 50,000 would be found necessary to
accomplish effectually the purpose I have indicated above. This estimate of force
would depend somewhat upon the vigilance and activity with which the commander
handled his troops.

	Question. Suppose the Army of the Ohio had marched to Chattanooga
without meeting a man last summer, how long do you think it could
have remained there with an enemy not more than 30 0
	ating on its communications	, 00 strong oper
	I should think only a few days; perhaps long enough to have broken up some mi-
portant links in the railroad communications in the way of bridges, and then it
would, in my opinion, with 30,000 men acting on its communications, have been com-
pelled to fall back.

	Question. Do you think in the long run such a result would have
benefited the cause of the Government or have injured it ~

	I do not think it would have improved our cause in the long run. In considering
myself the importance of occnpying Chattanooga and that region of country I always
did it with the expectation and understanding, and certainly that would be necessary
in order that we should gain the full benefit of it, that we should be able to maintain
that occupation; and with a view of making our forces, as far as I could exercise any
influence with it, able to do that work, 1 constantly, during the past summer, in my
correspondence with persons concerned in raising the military forces, insisted that
our regiments should be filled np to the legal organization, they havingfaHen in tho
course of service much below it.

	Question. Is there not, general, a good, level wagon road out of th& 
Sequatchie Valley into North Alabama?
	According to my best recollection there is such a road. I would not undertake to
state positively how good a road it is, but I learned during my operations in Northern
Alabama that there is a wagon road or route of the kind described. My knowledgo
of the road does not extend much farther than the east of Alabama.

	Question. Is there not an old stage road crossing the mountains from
Peiham and going on to Chattanooga called the Nashville and Chat-
tanooga State road?
	Yes, sir, I believe there is.

	Question. Is there not a road from Jasper to Winchester by the way
of Cowan or Decherd

Page 180

KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAP. XXVITL
180

	I was so informed while I was at Decherd during the summer. I never marched
over the road.

	Question. Did iiot oar troops pass over these roads with their trains;
at least two divisions of them?

	I believe they did, sir; such is my understanding at least.

	Question. What would have made you suppose that troops could not
cross the mountains out of the Sequatchie Valley except by the way of
Pikeville and Sparta?

	I have not at any time, according to my recollection of my testimony, said that
they could not have. I have habitually said that the roads through the mountains
were practicable so far as I have any knowledge of them, but that they were not
good, but on the contrary bad; and after learning something of these roads by per-
sonal observation and more of the other roads from information derived from others
it was my opinion that they would not be used by the enemy.

	Question. What makes the road from Pikeville to Sparta better than
what is known as the Therman road? Is there anything in the char-
acter of the country, as you understand it, that would make it better?

	According to my understanding of it there is. It is not so broken a country, and
that part of the road in the mountains from Pikeville to Sparta is not so long as that
in the mountains of what is k~own as the Anderson or Therman road. This opinion
is deriv~d from information which I picked up by inquiring in the country, and there-
fore may be an erroneous one.

	Question. Is not the truth exactly the reverse in regard to the length
of the mountain road? is not the road from Pikeville to Sparta longer
than the road from the Sequatchie Valley to McMinnville?

	According to my understanding, supposing the enemy simply to wish to get over
the mountains, the road from Chattanooga commonly called the Anderson or Ther-
man road is shorter than the whole road by way of Pikeville to Sparta. But my un-
derstanding is that that part of the road by the Pikeville and Sparta route which lies
in the mountains, and which is a great obstacle in either case, is shorter than the
mountainous portion of the Anderson or Therman road. These are matters of opinion
derived from information, and which may possibly be all wrong.

	Question. Do you know of a good stage road from McMinnville to
Altamont?

	There are two or three roadsleading from MeMinuville to Altamout. I have traveled
one such entirely between the two places, which is a practicable road for carriages
and wagons except the ascent of the mountains, which is very difficult and bad.
There is another advantage, I believe, in what is called the stage road from McMinn-
ville to Altamont. I have traveled in part, namely, that part which is in the valley
of Caney Fork, but I never ascended the mountain on that road or went as far as
Altamont; consequently I can only give an opinion of that part of the road I passed
over. I know nothing of the difficulties of the ascent of the mountain on that road.

	On motion of General Tyler the court was cleared.

	Question. You have spokeu in your evidence of passing round the
spur of the mountains by the way of Sparta.

	According to my information the country north of Sparta and northeast for some
distance is not so broken as that south and west of Sparta, and the mountains, as I
believe from the information I gained in that part, make off into table-land in
that direction.

	Question. Are the ascent and descent the same?

	Of course the elevated land would be crossed over, which makes both an ascent and
a descent; but if the idea I have of the country from such inforniation I was able to
gain be correct, the ascent and descent would not be so difficult, and would probably
give a better route for the passage of troops.

	Question. Is it true, general, that the rules of prudence and caution
are necessarily equally applicable to opposing armies or to the sam

Page 181

CHAP. XXVIII.]
GENERAL REPORTS.
181
army under different circumstances? On the contrary, is it not true
that circumstances may force upon one general risks which the other
would not be justified in assuming?

	It is not true that the rules of prudence and caution are necessarily equally appli-
cable to two armies always, and there may be reasons, such as the desperate nature
of the enterprise the army is engaged in, why one such army might vio~late the or-
dinary rules of caution which in a general way are equally applicabl eto all military
bodies, but which the antagonist of the first army might not be justified in disre-
garding.

	Question. What was the strength of your division when you left Louis-
ville on the march to Perryville?

	My recollection now is, without being refreshed by reference to papers, that it was
about 8,000; I think a shade over.

	Question. What was it on the 8th of October, according to your re~
turns?

	I do not recollect what the returns wonld show for that particular day. I bad left,
by order of General Buell, one regiment at Bardstown, which of course would be
subtracted from the strength I have given as marching from Louisville. That was
all the loss of force by detail or order which my division suffered from the time it left
Louisville to its arrival at Perryville; but there had been a great deal of straggling in
the troops from Louisville to Perryville on account of the difficulties of the marches, the
difficulty of obtaining water on the road, and other such causes, and it would be diffi-
cult to show accurately what diminution of strength any division might have suffered
in that way. I do not remember what was about the strength of my division as
shown by returns on or about the 8th of October, 1862, not having occasion to refer
to that information since that time.

	Question. Can ~on get that information by referring to your papers?

	I am not sure that I can. I think it is doubtful. My division has marched a great
deal since that time under circumstances calculated to hazard the safety of baggage
and papers. I have been absent myself for a short period since the return of my
division to Tennessee, during which time the records and papers were in the hands
of other persons. I have not made an examination of them since with a view of de-
termining whether such records have been preserved. By close investigation it might
be determined pretty accurately from other data what it was.

	Question. What time did your division advance on the morning of
the 9th, after the battle of Perryville?

	According to my recollection it was nearly midday. About 9 oclock in the morn-
ing of the 9th I received orders from General Thomas, who was at that time second
in command of the army and who more particularly marched with and supervised
the corps of General Critteuden, to withdraw my division from its position in the
general line of battle and which it had taken up during the afternoon of the 8th on
its arrival in the neighborhood of Perryville, and place it in reserve in the rear of the
divisions of Smith and Van Cleve. I obeyed this order, and subsequently, when the
divisions of Smith and Van Cleve moved forward toward Perryville, my division fol -
fowed them into the town and a little way beyond to the spring, where it encamped
f~r the night.

	Question. Was General Thomas aware that two brigades of your
division were well advanced toward the town at that time?

	I think he was informed of it, sir.

	Question. Was it reported to you on the morning of the 9th that the
enemy was marching off in sight of your advanced brigades?

	Not until later in the morning than 9 oclock, and after I had sent an order by the
aide-de-camp for the two advanced brigades to fall back and take up a position in the
rear of the divisions of Smith and Van Cleve.

	Question. Do you know whether the enemy had retired at that time?

	I cannot state of my own knowledge that I know it, but the reports made to me
subseinently indicated that fact to be true

Page 182

182	KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAP. XXVflI.

	Question. Did you report this information to your immediate com-
manding general?

	I did, immediately. The report was made to me by my aide-dc-camp, who had gone
out to the front to order back the two advanced brigades, and as there seemed some
little uncertainty and doubt as to whether it was so or not I rode forward myself, as
mentioned in a previous answer, toward the town of Perryville, with a view to veri-
fying the niatter, and then returned and met Generals Crittenden and Thomas again
~sud told them that nothing was to be seen of the enemy.

	Question. Do you know any reason why this information of the move-
ments of the enemy did not reach you earlier, if it was sent?

	I do not, sir. I have described the manner in which it came to me and about the
hour. During the whole of the morning of the 9th up to that time I was with my
division and never probably more than 100 yards from it, and in a position to receive
any information that was sent to me, as well as to supervise any movements of the
division that might become necessary.

By General TYLER:
	Question. Is not the Tennessee River navigable from Muscle Shoals
and Knoxville during the summer for light-draught boats ~?

	Without pretending to any very accurate information on the subject, I do not think
it is navigable for most of the season from Muscle Shoals to Knoxville.. I believe it
is navigable during part of the year. I would not say for the greater part of the year.

	Question. Is not Chattanooga the only Southern railroad connection
between these two points; if not, what other Southern connection is
there ~

	Chattanooga is on the line of the most direct railroad communication between Knox
-yule and the head of Muscle Shoals. But there is another way of going from one point
to another without going to Chattanooga, but it is a very circuitous one and passes
very far south.

GEORGE II. THoMAS (a witness for the Government), being duly
sworn by the judge.advocate, testified as follows:
By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

	Question. State, if you please, general, your name and position in the
service.

	George H. Thomas; major-general of the United States Volunteers.

	Quesfion. You will state, if you please, whether there was time be.
tween the 22d of August and the 2d of September to have concentrated
the army under General Buell at Murfreesborongh; and, if so, what
effect that would have had on the invading forces under Bragg.

	As far as I can remember now I think there was sufficient time to have concen-
trated the army at Mnrfreesborough. I do not think that would have prevented Bragg
from taking the road he did take.

	Question. What point, in your judgment,, would have been a better
one to have operated from against the invasion I

	I should have concentrated the army sufficiently to have fought at Sparta and
urged General Buell to do so. His reply to me was that we had not subsistence
enough at Murfreesborough to enable us to do so.

	Question. You can state what your opinion was and is upon the suffi-
ciency of that reason.

	I believe now that the supplies were very limited at Murfreesborough. I did not
know at that time anything about the state of supplies, as I was far away on the
flank of the army.

	Question. You can state whether, depending upon the supplies w

Page 183

	CHAr. xxvm.l	GENERAL REPORTS.	183

had and what we could have gathered from the country, that proposi-
tion of yours was practicable.

	Well, I think it ~yas practicable; I think we liad supplies enough to have enabled
us to have met the enemy, fought, and whipped him; but that is simply my opinion,
for I do not know the state of supplies.

	Question. State to the Commission, general, why you selected Sparta
in preference to Altamont.

	There was an ample supply of water for our troops at Sparta, greater abundance
of forage on the Caney Fork, and the position, in addition to that, was a very strong
one. The enemy could not possibly have passed Sparta without fighting. He would
have arrived in an exhausted condition, both from fatigue and want of supplies, and
in my opinion could not have fought more than one day.

	Question. With the army concentrated at Sparta would it have been
necessary to have watched the passes at Spencer, Altamont, and other
points by which he might have gone into the plains of Tennessee?

	Yes; it would I~ave been necessary until we ascertained positively that the enemy
was on the road to Sparta.

	Question. Had the Army of the Ohio sufficient force to have accom-
plished that I

	That is a difficult question to answer, because we cannot always tell what move-
ments an enemy may make. If the enemy had turned either of the roads in force it
might have compelled us to withdraw from some of those roads to meet him. If he
had not attempted any of those roads in force it would not have been necessary to
use so large an observing force. I cannot say positively whether the army had a
sufficiently strong force to have accomplished that thoroughly.

	Question. After the army was concentrated at Nashville what would

	have been the effect upon the invading force had our army moved to
Lebanon, upon the Cumberland I

	The enemy being at Sparta and having their flank protected by Caney Fork, it
would have been affected but little by the removal of the army to Lebanon, because
they could have thrown out flank guards sufficiently strong to have prevented us
from making any decided attack upon them until they had prepared themselves.

	Question. What point upon the Cumberland would your better judg-
ment suggest as being sufficient to affect the invading force and at the
same time cover Nashville?

	Lebanon would be an excellent place to cover Nashville while the enemy were
marching from Sparta to the Cumberland, and as soon as they arrived at the Cum-
berland it would have been necessary to cross our forces to prevent the enemy from
approaching Nashville from the north side of the river. Therefore if I had been in
command of the forces while the enemy were marching from Sparta and Gainesbor-
ough I should have thought the best plan to throw a portion of the forces into Leba-
non and concentrate the remainder at Gallatin, so as to be as near supporting dis-
tance to the troops at Lebanon as possible.

Question. When General Buell and forces marched out of Nashville
toward Gallatin and Bowling Green did you understand the object of
their march?

	I understood it generally to be to watch the enemy and if possible to get into Bowl-
ing Green before he could arrive, so marching, however, as to prevent him from
striking at the railroad from Nashville to Bowling Green. I do not think that Gen-
eral Buell wished to engage the enemy before reaching Bowling Green himself.

	Question. Having secured Bowling Green, did you understand what
next was the object?
	As far as I know his next object was to offer battle to the enemy, that is. if he
could succeed by reaching Bowling Green in putting his troops between Louisville
and the enemy.

	Question. Having secured Bowling Green, what other point on the
railroad became one of importance to our army

Page 184

184
KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA.~ AND SW. VA. [CHAP. XXVIIL
	Munfordville and the crossing of Salt River. Those were the two most important
points.

	Question. Had the enemy made a stand at Muiifordville what would
have been the effect on our army? Could we have passed that placei
without a battle, and if defeated what would have been the result?

	If the enemy had made a stand at Munfordville it would have been necessary for
ns to have fonght him, and if defeated it would have been disastrous, as it was a dif-
ficult position for us to get out of.

	Question. You can state, general, what effort was made on the part
of General Buell to possess himself of that point before the enemy
came up.

	So far as I know, without ever having conversed with Geaeral Buell on the sub-
ject, I think he made very strenuous efforts to get possession of Munfordville before
the enemy reached there. I was not with the main army at the time and cannot
speak from positive knowledge.

	Question. Can you state to the Commission how General Buell re-
garded Munfordville; whether it was an important point oi~ not?

	In a conversation I had with him at Prewitts Knob, when I arrived, I came to the
conclusion that he regarded it as a very important point, so much so that he believed
the enemy would resist him, they being in Munfordville when I arrived at Prewitts
Knob, and he immediately after my arrival made all necessary preparations for a
battle at Munfordville.

	Question, State if yon know the number of the army that marched
out of Louisville nuder General Buell to attack Bragg at Bardstown.

	I do not know how many, but I should estimate that there were about 54,000.

	Question. What was the object in view when that army left Louis-
ville?

	The object was to overtake the enemy, fight, and destroy him if possible, either by
a disastrous defeat or by cutting off his retreat if he succeeded in getting off in con-
siderable force from the battle-field.

	Question. How was that object affected by Kirby Smiths forces?

	It became necessary for General Buell to divide his main army and leave two divis-
ions watching Smith, marching against Bragg with his remaining divisions.

	Question. Where was Kirby Smith at that time?

	A portion of his force was at Frankfort, but his main force was believed to be at
Lexington.

	Question. Was it known what point Kirby Smith had been threaten-
ing and in what direction he was moving at that time?

	It was generally believed he was threatening Louisville. I do not remember that
his forces moved about that time. They had remained stationary for some days.

	Question. Looking at the positions of the two armies under Bragg
and Kirby Smith, what roads would they follow and at what point
would they form a junction and by what roads was it reasonable t& 
suppose they would leave Kentucky?

	After th& battle of Perryville, when it became necessary for them to leave Ken-
tucky, there were but two roads that offered them any security to get to Tennessee
direct; the one by Somerset and the other by Mount Vernon and London. They
might have retreated through Monnt Sterling and into Western Virginia.

	Question. With what expectation did General BacIls army approach
Perryville in reference to the enemy?

	We expected to be resisted by the enemy at Perryville.

	Question. What reason had you for such expectation

Page 185

CHAP. XXVIII.]	GENERAL REPORTS.	185


	We had met with resistance all the way from Louisville, and the resistance became
stronger and stronger every day. At Bardstowa there was quite a skirmish; there
was also a skirmish between Bardstown and Springfield as our troops advanced; and
there being a very scant supply of water between Springfield and Perryville and ~
good supply at Perryville, I think that all thought the enemy would take and hold
possession of the water and give us battle there.

	Question. What, in your judgment, should have been the course of
our army immediately following that battle I

	I think as soon as we could determine whether the enemy was going to retreat
across Dicks River we ought to have marched upon Danville or Lancaster or Stan-
ford, whichever we could have effected.

	Question. What would have been the effect, in your opinion, of such
a movement I

	I think, sir, we should have had, in all probability, another battle, depending en~
tirely upon the good management of our army whether it would have been a complet& 
disaster to the enemy or not.

	Question. You can state whether that was your opinion at the time~
and what suggestions you made upon it.

	As well as I can remember now I suggested to General Buell on the evening of the~
9th that Crittendens corps should be advanced as far as Danville; that future move-
ments should depend upon what was developed by that movement.

By General DANA:
	Question. Had you posted a portion of your force at Lebanon an~
the renainder of it at Gallatin while Bragg was approaching Gaines~
borough was it not at the option of the enemy to avoid you and march
toward Munfordville I

	Yes, sir.

	Question. Why did not General Buell wish to engage Braggs forces
before reaching Bowling Green I

	He wished to get his army between Louisville and the enemy and secure his sup-
plies; for, his supplies secured, he could then attack him.

	Question. At the time you were at McMinnville what number, froni
your best recollection, did you estimate the aggregate of Braggs forces~
to be I

	I never could make out more than 45,000, but the information I received at McMinn-
yule was not very definite. The people who gave me information were generally
ignorant and did not know how to estimate numbers. I therefore did not know how
to estimate them.

	Question. Taking into consideration all the information you then
possessed, with what force would you then have felt justified to give~
battle to Bragg on his descending into the plains of Tennessee?

	I think if I could have got 45,000 men at Sparta I would have given battle to him.

	Question. Were Braggs forces materially increased or diminishe4
from that time prior to their reaching Munfordville I

	I do not remember to have heard of any additional force joining him. I understood
that he was marching by ~vay of Sparta and concentrating his troops as he passed
along. My estimate of his forces was based upon what I could learnwhat passed
through Sparta by the various roads. A force was left to watch his flank and rear and
threaten Nashville. I do not think, however, that that force was more than 10,000.

	Question. In the event of his having been compelled to accept batt1e~
on his line of march from the (Jumberland to Mnnfordville was this forc& 
within supporting distance I	/
	I think not. I believe that the greater part of it was south of the Cumberland,.
though I am not positive as to where the whole was

Page 186

186
KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. YA. [CHAP. XXVIII.
	Question. After General Buell became aware that Bragg probably
did not intend to take~. Nashville, but would cross or had crossed the
Cumberland, could General Buell then have safely reached Glasgow in
sufficient force to have compelled Bragg either to retreat or accept
battlet

	1 do not think he could.

	Question. What was the earliest moment after the battle of Perry-
ville at which it was known that the enemy would cross Dicks River ~

	I do not think that it was decided before 12 oclock on the 11th. It was strongly
suspected, however, on the night of the 10th. Colonel Harkers brigade, in Woods di-
vision, had quite a skirmish with their rear guard on the morning of the 11th.

	Question. Could any earlier information have beeu reasonably gained
on this subject?

	We were compelled, of course, to depend for our information on persons who were
friendly to the Federal cause. We had to feel our way entirely from Perryville to the
crossing of Dicks River. The information we received from some of those loyal per-
sons was that they were retreating across Dicks River; but of course we had to
ascertain that positively ourselves, and it was necessary to be sufficiently strong to
resist any attack on their part.

	Question. What was your position on the 8th of October ~

	1 was in command of the right wing.

	Question. What was the position of the right wing in reference to
the town of Perryville?

	The extreme right was about 3 miles southwest of Perryville, on the hills bordering
the stream that runs by Perryville (Chaplin River I think it is called). The troops
were facing toward the east.

	Question. Where were your headquarters or personal position on the
night of the 8th?

	Half a mile in rear of the center of the right wing.

	Question. On the morning of the 9th did you receive any report from
any source as to the enemy being in view in retreat near the town of
Perryville; and, if so, from what source and at what hour?

	I did not receive any such report.

	Question. Did you receive any report on the morning of the 9th of
the fact of any officer in your command having been in the suburbs of
the town of Perryville?

	I did not.

	Question. Where was General Buell duiing the day of the 8th of
October?

	He was at night, when I saw him, at his headquarters, immediately on the road be-
tween Springfield and Perryville. I do not know the exact distance, but I believe
his headquarters were about half a mile beyond the line. I passed the camp of one
division in going to his headquarters, which was but a short distance in front of this
camp. During the day of the 8th I did not leave the right wing, and therefore do not
know where General Buell was during the day.

	Question. Was General Buell ill during that day ~

	Yes, sir; he was lame from the effects of a fall from his horse or the falling of his
morse upon him.

	Question. Was your personal whereabouts on the forenoon of the
iJth probably known to the corps, division, and brigade commanders
under your command?

	It should have been. I sent word to all of them on the day of the 8th where 

Page 187

CHAP. XXVIII.]
GENERAL REPORTS.

could be found, and it was understood that I should return to the same place on the
morning of the 9th. After the troops commenced moving I could easily have been
found by any one, as I was on the road all the time from the position the troops
occupied in the morning until they reached the camp near Perryville, where they
encamped that night.

	Question. General, from the habits of the sub-commanders under your
orders is it at all, likely that any one of them on the morning of the
0th made any reports to the headquarters of the army which were not
made through your headquarters?

	I do not think they would have done it. They usually reported through me. I am
not aware of an instance of their having reported direct to headquarters.

	Question. On the morning of the 9th did you hear of any baggage
trains of the enemy being seen in retreat?

	I do not remember any such report being made.

	Question. On the night of the 8th, after the battle was ended, what
was your belief as to the relative condition of the two armies as affected
by the work of the day?

	The only information I received was after reaching headquarters (General Bi~iells)
on the night of the 8th, that is, regarding the battle on the left, and the impression
made on my mind then was that General McCooks corps had been very much cut up
and could do but little fighting the next day, but General Gilberts corps an4 the
right wing wer~in as good condition as before the battle. I believed from what I
had heard that the rebel army would resist us the next day; that they cousidere4
they had achieved a victory on the left and would resist us the next day.

	Question. At what time on the day of the 8th did you become aware
that the left wing was engaged with the enemy?

	I did not know that a battle had been fought on the left~until after night-fall,
when, as I was riding to my tent, Lieutenant Fitzhugh, of General Buells staff, over
took me and told me. This must have been about 7 oclock.

	Question. II~id you hear any firing on that day; and, if so, what was
the character of it?

	I heard cannonading about the time that the head of Crittendens corps reached
the position it was to take up, and I directed Captain Mack, my chief of artillery, to
report to General Buell that I had arrived in position and with the head of the col-
umn, and would superintend the placing of troops in position, and requested the
general 10 send me any orders by Captain Mack. Captain Mack returned about 12,
with a plan of the ground and directions from the general to dispose the troops in a
certain manner preparatory to an attack the next morning at Perryville; but the ar-
rangement was not positive; it left the arrangement of the troops somewhat to my
discretion if I thought it was necessary, I asked Captain Mack if he knew what
that firing was we heard on the left in front; his reply was that the report came to
headquarters that it was Captaiii Gay, chief of cavalry, reconnoitering, and the
cuemy were firing upon him with artillery. About 3 oclock in the afternoon I again
heard very heavy cannonading, and directed General Crittenden to send a staff officer
to General Gilbert to know what that firing was. The sun was probably half an
hour high when he returned. General Gilbert replied to General Crittenden by a
short note, stating that he had met with some little resistance himself
camping his trooI)s for the night; that General Rousseau had been ,but was then
engagedI think
he said had been driven back slightly, but had regained his ground. The firing con-
tinued at intervals from about half past two till about an hour of sundowu, but I am
not positive.

	Question. Would such firing as that which you describe proceed from
the resistance of a reconnaissance?

	I do not think so; and for that reason I sent to General Gilbert to know why there
was such firing.
	Question. Taking into consideration the relative distance of yours
and General Buells headquarters from the scene of this conflict and
the direction of the wind, would the sound of artillery or small-arms
be more readily heard at General Buells headquarters than at yours?
18

Page 188

188	KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAr. XXVIII.

	I think that with as high a wind- blowing as there was that day the cannonading
was not more distinctly heard at his headquarters than where I was. The wind was
blowing very heavily.

	Question. Was the wind blowing from his headquarters toward the
firing or from the firing to his headquarters ~

	I think the direction of the wind was to his left from the direction of the firing.

	Question~ At the hour that General Gilbert sent his report in answer
to General Orittendens inquiry as to what the firing was, what was the
actual condition of things in reference to his own and McCooks coin-
mand?

	With reference to his own, he reported that he was putting his troops in camp for
the night. In reference to Crittendens command, it had been in position for several
hours and the troops were quiet in camp, with the exception of Smiths division, a
portion of which was skirmishing with the enemy in front. Smiths division was
moving up gradually to gain the hills which overlooked the creek and was skirmish-
ing with the enemy till dark. The other two divisions of Crittendens corps were in
position and qnite in supporting distance of one another. I cannot state what the
condition of McCooks command was, because I had no knowledge of it at that time.

	Question. The last question is intended to get the inf~rmation as tn
whether the reply of General Gilbert at that time gave the correct in-
formation which was desired of him, or whether, from your subsequent
knowledge, you do not know that his statement was inc~rect.

	I learned at General Buells headquarters that night that the information received
from General Gilbert was not a true statement of the case, but at the same time I be-
lieve General Gilbert reported all he knew at the time.

	Question. Is General Gilberts ignorance of the actual condition of
things at that time a sufficient proof that he was not at those parts of
the field where the presence of a commander is most called for while
his troops are engaged?

	No; I do not think it is. General Gilbert had the superintendence of three divis-
ions, and while superintending those three divisions he could not reasonably be
expected to know what was going on at a distant point from his command. There
was no unusual delay in the reception of his reply to General Crittendens note;
therefore I think he must have been with his corps.

	Question. How many years is it since you first commenced the study
of the military profession; how and in what scenes of service have
you been engaged since that time?

	About twenty-nine years. I have served in the Florida ~var, in the Mexican war,
and in this rebellion.

	Question. Placing yourself in the position of General Buell, in com-
mand of the Army of the Ohio, at the time he commenced his retro-
grade movement toward Nashville from INorthern Alabama, and being
possessed of such information as he was then probably possessed of,
what at that time would probably have been your plans and disposi-
tions in reference to performing your duties in the best possible man-
ner so as to have subserved the best interests of your Government, to
have inflicted the most damage on the enemy, and to have properly
guarded, to the best of your ability, the States of Tennessee and Ken-
tucky? Keep in view in answering this question the information which
General Buell probably got from day to day during the whole course
of the movement.

	I think it very likely that I should have pursued the same course that he l)arsue(l,
although I believe now, from the information I had myself, that he should have met
the enemy at Sparta and fought him there. The information I had, however, at that
time was probably very different from that General Buell had. It is my opinion that.
could we have fought the enemy at Sparta we could have destroyed his army there.



Page 189

CHAP. XXVIII.]	GENERAL REPORTS.	189


	Question. Were you second in command of the Army of the Ohio?

I was the second officer in rank.

	Question. During the term of the campaign was General Buell as
Communicative to you as regards his plans as was proper for a com-
mander to be and as was necessary to be in the event of an accident
befalling him?

	Whenever we met General Buell was always communicative, and after our arrival
at Lonisville 1 think that he explained to me his plan of the campaign as fully as
was necessary. Previous to that we were not a great deal together, and although.I
did not know what his intentions were on all occasions, I believe he would have coin-
municated with me freely if we could have been together so that we could converse
with safety. He did not like to risk his plans to the hands of a courier or any other
means.

	Question. Do you know whether a failure to relieve the garrison at
iMnnfordville is in any way to be attributed to the commander of the
Army of the Ohio?

	I do not know.

By General ORD:
	Question. When you suggested to the commander of the army, Gen-
eral BueJl, the propriety of concentrating a sufficient force at Sparta to
meet the enemy, had you any reliable information of the enemys posi-
tion? If so, what was it?

	I had information from the citizens of the Sequatchie Valley, the neighborhood of
Kingston and Crossville, also from scouts sent out by myself~, that the eliemy was
erossing that portion of.the conntry, and said it was their intention to pass through
Sparta, and some said attack MeMiunville; others said Murfreesborough, others said
Nashville, and again others sai
direct to Kentucky.	d the army was marching by that road as the most

	Question. Did the position of the enemy, as located by this informa-
tion, afford General Buell ample time, considering the roads and the
condition of his men, to concentrate a sufficient force at Sparta to have
met them?

I think it did.

	Question. After arriving at Sparta, in case the enemy had delayed in
the valley or taken another route, was the condition of our supplies
such that we could have remained some time at Sparta as the best posi-
tion for an army of observation?

	We could not have remained for any length of time at Sparta with the amount of
supplies we had at that time.
	Question. Were there at that time other practicable roads leading to-
ward Kentucky which would have enabled the enemys army to have
avoided the army at Sparta?

	There is a road from Kingston to Montgomery and Livingston which they could
have used. There was also a road from Knoxville, Clinton, Jacksboronigh, and Monti-
.cello which they could have nsed, and there are intermediate countryroads, of which
I have been told, on which troops conld have moved, but they are very difficult.

Cross-examination by General BUELL:
	Question. At what date would you have concentrated your army at
Sparta to have resisted Bragg?

	I would have concentrated at Sparta about the time that the army concentrated at
Murfreesborough - Instead of moving the troops to Murfreesborough I would have
placed them in such a position as to concentrate at Sparta the day it became neces-
sary to fight; that I think was about the 2d or 3d of September

Page 190

190	KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAP.XXVIIL

	Question. Where would the enemy have been at that time?

	I believe the main body of the enemy would have been between Spencer and Sparta
at that time.

	Question. How long would it have taken you to move your army from
MeMiunville to Sparta?
	The troops that were at McMinnville could have been removed to Sparfa in two
days from where they were and placed in position. The other t7roops could have been
started in sufficient time to have arrived immediately afterward. The one division
would probably require four days, the other two divisions would have reached iu five
days, as well as I remember the position of the troops now.

	Question. You suppose, do you not, that the enemy would be ap-
prised of your movement?
	Yes.

	Question. How close could the enemy come to McMinnville before
deciding whether to go to Sparta or McMinnville?
	They could come. within about 24 miles.

	Question. Not any nearer?
	They might come nearer, but with a force at McMinnville, if they designed going
to Sparta, they would turn off before getting so near.
	Question. Is there not a road following the general direction of the
mountain on its top nearly midway between McMinnville and Pike-
ville or MeMiunville and Dunlap and running into the Sparta road;
and, if so, how close would that have brought the enemy to McMinn-
ville before he must necessarily determine whether to go to Sparta or
MeMinuville?
	That is the road I had in view in answering the first questionabout 24 miles.
According to my recollection that road runs about midway of one edge of the mount-
ain to another; it is nearer to Dunlap than it is to MeMiunville.

	Question. What is the distance from McMinnville to Dunlap?
	The citizens there always represented it to me as being 40 miles. It is about :10
according to the military map and 25 by another map.

	Question. Does your estimate of the distance from McMinnville to
where the road turns off to go to Sparta remain the same?
	The road, as I understood it, was on the top of the mountain, and ran along the
mountain near the top of the ridge, it must be 20 miles at least from McMinnville.
	Question. How far is it from McMinnville to the foot of the mount-
ain, according to your recollection?
	It is 12 miles by one road and 14 by another; there are two roads.

	Question. How far is it from McMinnville to Sparta?
	According to my best recollection now it is about 22 miles, and a little over 20 in
a direct course. By the military map, reckoning the winding of the roads, I presume
it would be almost 22.

	Question. With your army at Sparta, the enemy concealing his
movements by cavalry and other means which are possible, which d~
you think would reach McMinnville first, if jie were suddenly to deter-
mine to march on that point ?
	I think I could march there first with my forces.

	Question. Will you explain why?
	Because the road is better.

	Question. How much time would you allow yourself to get knowl-
edge of his movements before commencing your movement?
	That is a matter of uncertainty; but in concentrating my forces at Sparta I shoul

Page 191

CHAP. XXVIII.]	GENERAL REPORTS.	191


not have left McMinnville unoccupied. I should have left a force sufficiently strong
to have checked him in any attempt to take possession of the town, and as far a~
possible made him determine to take one road or the other decidedly; that is, either
the road to McMinnville or the road to Sparta.

	Question. Would you not in that way divide your force and render
yourself liable to be beaten in detail?

	I do not think I would have done so there. As a general rule the forces should not
be divided, but the physical features of the ground at MeMinuville and between
there and Sparta are such as to enable an officer to divide his troops, in my opinion.

	Commission adjourned to meet December 19, at 10 oclock a. m.

NASHVILLE, Friday Morning, December 19, 1862.
	The Commission met pursuant to adjournment. All the membera
present; also the judge-advocate and General Buell.

	General Tnoa~tAs examination continued.

Cross-examination continued by General BtTELL:
	Question. Would the enemy in descending from the mountains upon
McMinnville have been able to use more than one road?

	They would not have been able to use but one road direct from Dunlap. They would
approach McMinnville by one road. They could, however, ha~e approached McMinn-
ville by turning off after reaching the road from McMinnville to Pikeville or they
might pass from Dunlap to Manchester and descend the mountains toward Altamont.

	Question. Or farther away toward Winchester?

	Yes; they might descend into the highlands of Tennessee toward Winchester or
Peiham.

	Question. Or directly from Altamont to McMiunville by a good road ~

	That would be if they approached direct from Altamont. To reach MeMinuville
from Altamont they had to strike the road from Dunlap to Altamont in the valley of
Rock River some distance from McMinnville. It is, as near as I remember, S or 10
miles from MeMiunville where the road turns off.

	Question. Would an army in descending upon McMinnville by these
different roads meet with any greater difficulties than you would have
in crossing Caiiey Fork between Sparta and MeMiunville?

	I think it ~vould, for the reason that the roads I saw on the side of the mountain
were very rocky and difficult. The only great obstacle on the road between McMinn-
yule and Sparta is the crossing of Caney Fork at Rock Island.

	Question. Is that a formidable obstacle?
	It is; but an army could pass that easier than down those hill-sides.

	Question. Did you travel over the road from McMinnville to Alta-
mont by the way of Beersheba Springs, and is it not a good mountain
stage road?

	I did not pass over that road, but I haye always heard that it was a rood mountain
stage road, and the only one that is good from the mountains to the highlands.

	Question. When you were at McMinuville did you ever have any in-
formation which indicated that the enemy might cross or was crossing
the mountains by the way of Altamont?

	I did not get that information myself. The information I received from my scouts
indicated that the enemy were passing toward Pikeville and Sparta, but I think, front
the message which I received from General Buell, it was reported to him that the
enemy were passing or might pass across the mountains through Altamont.

	Question. Did your cavalry report the enemy on the Altamont road d1

	They reported a portion of the enemy on the top of the ridge, but marching toward
Spencer, as far as they could learn

Page 192

192	KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAP. XXVIII

	Question. At what time did you propose a concentration of the Army
~of the Ohio at Sparta and in what manner?

	As well as I can remember the dates, it was somewhere about the 28th of August,
and I proposed to have the troops in readiness near MeMinuville to either sustain the
troops that were under my command there if attacked, or if the enemy turned in the
~direction of Sparta decidedly to take position there.

	Question. How was this recommendation made?

	I do not remember whether it was sent by a messenger or by telegraph in cipher.

	Question. Have you a copy of the recommendation?

	I have with my papers, but not here.

	General BUELL. I request that it may be presented to the Commis-
~sion.
	Question. Have you ever heard that I proposed to abandon Nashville
in marching the Army of the Ohio into Kentucky and what do you know
of my determination upon that matter?

	General Bue1l, in conversation with me after the army was concer~trated in Nasb-
yule, frequently said that it would be perfectly disastrous to abandon Nashville; that
we woul4 lose more than we could gain in twelve months, or perhaps more than we
could gain at all in Tennessee or in this part of the country. That was the substance
.of his remarks. I never had an idea that he thought of abandoning Nashville. When
he left me to take command of Nashville in his absence he wished me to designate the
number of troops I wanted to defend the place, and said that if he could possibly
spare them I should have them. And I remember about the last conversation I had
with him the subject was again spoken of in the same terms, and I replied that if I
had to abandon Nashville I would leave it a heap of ashes.

	Question. Have you any reason to suppose that my determination
upon that question was influenced by or was the result of any consulta
-tion with Governor Johnson?
	I have no reason to suppose so.

	Question. Did you see while at Prewitts Knob a man by the name
of Pratt, who came into camp and represented himself as having infor-
mation from the rebel army?
	I do remember him, sir. He came to my tent the evening before the army marched,
and I sent him to General Buell.

	Question. What statement did he make to you?
	I was very busy at the time; just returned from the picket line, and did not have
a great deal of conversation with him, and cannot say positively what information he
~did give me. I thought it of more importance that he should see General Buell, and
therefore sent him to him immediately.

	Question. Did you deem his information very important, if you re-
member it?

	That was the reason why I sent him to General Buell. He told me in general terms
that he was just from the rebel army and could give important information, and
knowing he had gone out for the purpose of procuring it and his story being a very
,connected one I sent him at once to General Buell, thinking it was of very great im-
portance that he should know what information this young man could give.

	Question. Did he then or at any other time represent that he had
counted the rebel forces, and that they did not exceed 22,000, infantry
an(l artillery?

	It appears to ixie that he stated he had counted the rebel forces, but I do not remem-
ber what statement he made as to the number.

	Question. Whatever his statement may have been, have you at any~
time entertained a doubt as to his honesty?

	I thought it a little singular that he shouhi have appeared so suddenly at that time

Page 193

	CHAP. XXVIII.]	GENERAL REPORTS.	193

Since tben the members of my staff have sp~ken of him, and without having any
positive ground to base an opinion on I myself have doubted his loyalty and I think
they have too.

	Question. Were you present when General i\JcCook came to my head-
quarters on the night after the battle of Perryville ~?

	I was.

	Question. Did you hear the conversation which passed between us?

	I heard the greater part of it.

	Question. iDid you hear General McCook make application for re-
enforcements to enable him to withdraw his corps from the position
which it occupied, and did you from that conversation think that tbe
re-enforceinents were necessary to enable him to do it safely?

	I do not remember tbat General McCook made any direct application for re-enforce-
meats. It seems to me that General Buell was qnestioning him as to whether he had
made certain dispositions of his troops, and General McCook replied that the disposi-
tions were being made or that they were about completed, but represented that some
portion of his troops were in bad condition and onght to be sustained, andKl think
that General Buell replied that if he could make this disposition he did not think
snpport was necessary, but that he would give him support if lie possibly conld. I
do not rememher the particular words of this conversation, but think this was the
purport of it, as my attention was particularly called to the dispositions of the troops
on the right of the army for the attack in the morning that we were to make. I
was thinking of these dispositions more than of the other.

	Question. Was any such impression made oii your mind as that Gen-
eral iXicCook asked assistance which was necessary for the safety of his

command and that I peremptorily refused it?
	No such impression was made on my mind.

	Question. Will you state, if you please, what the orders were for the
following day?

	The orders for Crittendens corps were to form in column so as to be able to deploy
into line of battle immediately and march upon Perryville and attack the enemy if
he was there in the morning, and it was the impression that we weuld have a battle
the next day.

	Question. At what hour was the advance to be made?

	At 4 oclock in the morning.

	Question. Were those orders executed?

	They were not executed at the time. The troops did not get fairly in motion, I
piesumue, before halt past six. I was detained at General Buells headquarters till
nearly 4 oclock myself, but sent a message by signal to General Crittenden to corn-
0	mence the movement, and when I reached the ground, about half past six, I found
the troops were just about to move. I believe the cause of their not moving was the
result of General Crittendens misconstruing the order. The impression was that he
was to be ready to move at 4 oclock.

	Question. Will you give the particulars of the movements of that day,
as far as they are important, stating where you stopped?

	After the right wing entered Perryville I sent word to General Buell that the troops
were in Perryville and that the enemy seemed to have retired toward llarrodsburg.
this must have been about half past ten or eleven oclockand then asked for orders.
The orders for Crittendens corps were to go on to the spring beyond Perryville and
encamp for the day. There was a considerable delay in getting this order, as it took
some time for messengers to go to General Buells headquarters and back. I do not
know where General Gilberts corps encamped that night nor McCooks. In advanc-
ing to the position in which I was to encamp the right wing, I was told to be par-
ticular in guarding against any demonstration of the enemy to attack us. One divis-
ion was placed on the road between Perryville and Danville.

	Question. Will you explain, if you please, general, why the right corps

13 R RVOL XV

Page 194

KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAr. XXVIII.
194

did not get into Perryville before the time you mentioned and what
delayed its movements?

	The division of General Smith had some skirmishing on the morning of the 9th with
the enemys cavalry. That was the only delay of which I know. After this cavalry
was driven off the troops then marched into Perryville as rapidly as the ground
would permit. A portion of the troops marched by the road and the other across the
fields and pasture.

	Question. How much of the time was occupied with this skirmishing?
	The troops must have been engaged skirmishing through the woods from half past
six till probably 9. I do nor remember to have noted the time particularly, hut the
troops moved as soon as I arrived there.

	Question. Did you know of a portion of General Woods division be-
ing very near the town early in the morning?

	I did not know of it.

	Question. Did you know of their being recalled and why?

	No, I did not.

	Question. At what time and on what occasion did you ~eeommena
that the army should take position at Danville?

	That was on the 10th, I think; the day after we left Perryville and marched to
Mr. Harlans farm, I think on the Salt River or a branch of it. My recollection is
that I suggested that Crittendens corps should be sent to l)anville and that the
whole army should he sent, its after niovernents to be regnlated by what we might
discover the enemy to be about.

Question. How far, in fact, was Crittendens corps from Danville?
	I think about 5 miles, as well as I cnn remember.

	Question. Was one division encamped at Frys Spring?

	Yes, sir.

	Question. Was it known then what the position of the enemy was
certainly?

	It was not certainly known.

	Question. Was it known until the evening of the 12th that the en-
emy had certainly crossed Dicks River, and in moving from ilarrods-
burg might he not have gone toward the Kentucky River without his
destination being certainly known until it was traced up?
	I do not think it was certainly known that he had crossed Dicks River until the
12th, but from the information which we got from the citizens of th~ country I was
under the impression that he would cross there, and that was the reason why I recoin-
mended to General Buell to place Crittendens corps in Danville. He could have
crossed the Kentucky River from Harrodshnrg and either have gone to Camp Dick
Robinson or to Lexington. I presume that that was one reason why General Buell
was influenced not to send Crittendens corps to Danville on the 11th.

	Question. Considering the character of the enterprise the enemy had
undertaken, do you think it unreasonable to suppose that he might go
into the interior of Kentucky or that he might move on the Frankfort
road and thence across to Louisville?

	I dont think it is unreasonable to suppose that he might have gone to Central Ken-
tucky, thence to cross Dicks River, and attempt to hold that part of the State, at
least long enough for them to have completed preparations to get omit of the State,
but I do not think that he would attempt to mumatch on Louisville without retiring
from Perryville.

	Question. Was there anything in the condition of Braggs army or in
its relative strength to justify the assumption that he was fleeing igno-
miniously, and that no enterprising service was to be expected frost
him

Page 195

CHAr. Xxviu.j
GENERAL REPORTS.

	Nothing hut the fact of his having retired from Perryville; for, as far a~ I could
learn, he had retired iu good order. As I said before, I did not think that he would
attempt to go to Louisville because he had retired before us from Perryville. There
is no reasou to suppose that he might not have attempted to hold Central Kentucky,
and having selected a strong position, remain there and await a good opportunity to
undertake some new enterprise or to resist us as we attacked him.

	Question. Was not the attack which he made at Perryville made by
a portion of his forces, and was It not calculated to inspire respect
rather than contempt for him as an adversary I

	As far as I could learn the attack at Perryville was made by a portion of the forces,
and the character of the battle was such and the result such that it would have
been imprudent to have marched against him without proper precautions.

	Question. Is it to Jie assumed that he had no other design, and that
he had no alternative except to retreat by Lancaster and (Drab Orchard
from Camp Dick Robinson I

	No; it cannot be assumed that he had no other design.

	Question. Suppose my army had been put in the way of his retreat
by that route, what line of conduct was he at liberty to pursue by a
study of the map I

	If he should choose to run the risk of battle, and, if successful, he might have re-
tired through Danville toward the south by Hustonville and Liberty and Jamestown
or by the roads south, or he might have passed through Stanford and Somerset if he
felt obliged to leave Kentucky. If successful against us, of course then he could
have remained in Kentucky. If we had fought him and he had been defeated, he
still might have been strong enough to have marched by way of Richmond toward
the eastern part of Kt~ntucky, but I do not think he could have retreated through
Mount Vernon and the Rockcastle Hills or by Somerset if we had had a battle and
had whipped him.

	Question. Suppose he had crossed the Kentucky River at Camp Dick
Robinson toward Lexington, what would you have done?

	I would have secured all the ferries and fords on the river with a sufficient force to
have held him there and thea march against him by way of Frankfort, that route
being the best for the security of our supplies.

	Question. What force would be required, do you suppose, for these
different crossings to prevent him from making use of any one of them
at his option?

	I believe a brigade of infantry and one battery of artillery could hold the Hickman
Bridge against any force that could be brought against it. The crossing at the mouth
of Dicks River, as well as I understood it, could be held by probably the same amount
of troops; and I am also of opinion that a brigade con Id hold the crossing at Clays
Ferry.

	Question. What force would have been sufficient to prevent you from
crossing the river at Frankfort?

	We had possession of Frankfort at that time, so I was informed.

	Question. Was that possession in sufficient force to withstand Braggs
army, considering the character and the number of the troops?

	I do not suppose it was sufficient to withstand it entirely.

	Question. Suppose he had designed to pursue this course, crossing
the river on the Lexington and Richmond road, which would have been
likely to procure possession of that crossing first?

	The enemy would, of course.

	Question. What would prevent the enemy, then, while you were
marching to Frankfort fr
Cumberland Gap	, om actually marching out of Kentucky by the
	If he secured the ferry, of course he could take that road to the Cumberland Gap.
19

Page 196

KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAP. XXVIII.
196

	Question. Is not the river fordable near that point at a low stage ~

	It is seldom, if ever, ford~~b1e there; so I ani infermed by the citizens.

	Question. Are there many fords lower down on the river?
	There is one about half way between Clays Ferry and Hickman Bridge which is
fordable at a very low stage of water, but it is a difficult crossing. That is the only
ford I know of.

	Question. Is it your impression that the river is generally not forda-
ble; that is, only passable by ferries and bridges?
	Yes, sir.

	Question. State, if you please, the more important particulars of your
march from Corinth into Middle Tennessee last summerthe date of
your orders, and the occasion of any delay you met with in the march,
and the route you took, & c.
	I do not remember now the date that I left Corinth, because I do not tix those things
in my mind. It would have been in the latter half of the month of June. I left un-
der orders to distribute my division along the railroads from Inka to Decatur. The
troops commenced moving the second or third day after I received the order. It was
as soon as they could move and get rations. We reached Inka the second day. As
soon as I arrived there General Nelson marched, and I sent a cavalry force to distrib-
nte along the road for the purpose of relieving the bridge guards and allow General
Nelsons troops to concentrate at Tuscumbia. I think it was about four days after
General Nelson left that the troops again moved forward to Tuscumbia, leaving in-
fantry guards at differeiit bridges as far as that town. At Tuscumbia details were
made to relieve the bridge guards which had been posted by General Wood from Tus-
cun)bia to Decatur; the remainder of the divisions remained at Tuscumbia. It took
some little time to make these different arr~ngexuents, but I do not think there was
any unnecessary delay.
	About the last of July I received information that my division would be relieved
from duty on the railroad, and General Buell ordered me to concentrate as soon as pos-
sible and march to Huntsville, I believe. Before that was commenced, however, Gen-
eral Frys brigade was ordered to cross the river and go to Reynolds Station, on the
Nashville and Decatur Railroad, I believe it is called, for the purpose of guarding a
provision train from Reynolds Station to Pulaski. The railroad not being completed
at that thee, General Schoepfs brigade was ordered to march by way of Athens, and
the third brigade was ordered to cross at Florence and Eastport and march to
Huntsville by way of Athens. There ~vas also some delay in effecting all these move-
ments, because it was necessary to wait for the arrival of the division which was to
relieve my troops, and also the difficulty of crossiu~, the Tennessee River. The troops
were occupied in crossing the Tennessee River probably two days. After the delay
of about tea days from the time the order was given to the time he division was re-
lieved from guarding that road there was no delay from Corinth to the point where
the troops were finally ordered, namely, Decherd, after the crossing of the Tennessee
River was effected. As well as I remember now the division was concentrated in
Decherd about the 10th of August.

	Question. Were there any rumors, about the time of your arrival at
Declierd of an advance of the enemy into Middle Tennessee from Chat-
tanooga and other points?

	Yes; there were rumors that Forrest and Morgan were reported to be at Sparta.

	Question. Do you know anything of any difficulty in supplying the
troops in North Alabama in consequence of roads being out of order?
	I suppose I may s~y I know officially, as I was informed by Captain Darr, that it
was a very difficult matter to get supplies for the troops. This, however, was in or-
dinary conversation between officers. I may have been told by General Buell himself
when I met him in Huntsville, though I am not positive; but I know that Captain
Darr informed me.


FRIDAY AFTERNOON, December 19, 1862.

	General THOMAS examination continued.
Cross-examination by General BUELL:
	Question. Did you know of any petition having been gotten up an

Page 197

CHAP. XXVIII.]	GENERAL REPORTS.	197


signed by officers within your own division for the removal of one of
your brigade commanders ~ If you do, please state what you know
about it and how that matter came to my notice ~
	There was such a petition, signed by a good many officers of the brigade, and it was
handed to me with this officers resignation. I tried to persuade him uot to resign,
but he insisted on doing so, and requested. also to forward this application with his
resignation. I permitted him to do so without approving of his resi~nation in the
Army, and I presume that was the way in which the information reached General
Buell.

	Question. State, if ~ on I)lease, what I did in reference to that matter.
	I think General Bud saw this officer, and after conversation with him his resigun-
tion was withdrawn and the application of those officers with it. I do not remember
that any other action was taken in the matter. I sent for some officers and ~spoke to
them myself about it, and I believe that the greater part of them apologized to the
brigade commander for having signed any such paper; but I do not know whether
General Buell saw any of these officers or not.

	Question. Do you remember whether that paper was referred to you
for official information with reference to official action ~
	That paper was referred to me, as I remember now, for a report of hew it came to
my headquarters, and I explained on the indorseinent that was sent back with the
resignation how it came to my headquarters. It came to my headquarters, and I sent
it .back to the officer concerned, the brigade commander. The officer concerned heard
of it and tendered his resignation, and requested me to permit him to hand that pa-
per with his resignation. I tried to dissuade him from doing so, but he still desired
it and I permitted him to do it, but disapproved of the acceptance of his resignation,
and that was the explanation I gave to General Buell when the paper was sent back.

	Question. Do you know any reason why I could not at that time take
any further steps with reference to such a breach of discipline ~

	I think abont the next day after my division was transferred from the Army of the
Ohio to the Army of the Tennessee.

	Question. Who commanded that division immediately after the battle
of Perryville and who were the brigade commanders in it, as well as
you remember~

	General Schoepf commanded the division up to the day of the battle of Perryville;
and I was informed by some person a few days afterward that he had obtained a leave
of absence about that tim.e, probably the day after the battle, and that General Fry,
being the senior brigadier-general in the division, commanded the division. General
Steedman command~ed the Third Brigade; Colonel Walker, of the Thirty-first Ohio, com-
manded the First Brigade, and Colonel Harlan, of the Tenth Kentucky, commanded
the Second Brigade. Up to the battle of Perryville I presume General Fry commanded
the Second Brigade.

Redirect examination by the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:
	Question. General, did you hear General Buell express any discon-
tent ot admiuister any rebuke to General MeCook for his conduct on
the 8th at Perryvilte ~

	I do not think I heard him administer any rebuke, but I heard him say to General
MeCook that he had no idea that a battle was being fought till it was all over. I in-
ferred from the remark of General Buell that he thought that General McCook ought
to have been certain of his being informed of the necessity of sending some re-en-
forcements, though I might have been mistaken. The conversation was friendly
no harshness on the part of General Bach at all.

	Question. General Buell is remarkable, is he not, for the manner in
which he holds subordinate officers to what lie considers their duty?

	I regard General Buehl as an excellent disciplinarian. I do not know that he i~
more remarkable than any other good disciplinarian in enforcing discipline.

	Question. Can you state whether the signal corps was at work on
that afternoon?
	Yes, sir; part of it was

Page 198

198	KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAP. XXVIIL

	Question. Do you know whether any information was sent regarding
that fight in the afternoon by the signal corps?

	None was received by me. The first information I ever received was through Lieu-
tenant Fitzhugh.

	Question. Do you know whether General Buell or any part of the
army not immediately engaged did receive through the signal corps
any information of that fight?

I do not know.

	Question. Had we any higher respect or regard for the enemy after
that fight than we had before?

	I should think not.

	Question. Was the attack there of such a nature as to throw us on
the defensive?

	It was not. General Buell made his dispositions to attack the enemy in the
morning.

	Question. Had the enemy attempted to hold Central Keutneky what
position would he have selected and from whence would he have drawn
his supplies?

	If I had been placed in his position and should have attempted to hold Central
Kentucky I should have taken a position somewhere near Lexington, where I could
have drawn all my supplies. Of course every one has his idea as to the proper posi-
tion to hold any territory.

	Question. The enemy then would have had to draw his supplies from
the country around Lexington?

	Yes, sir.

By General D ~NA:
VQuestion. Besides the instance you have mentioned of the officers of
a brigade signing a petition for the removal of their brigade com-
mander, do you know of any other instance in the Army of the Ohio of
a similar petition being signed for the removal of a division com-
mander ~ And, if so, state the time and circumstance.

	I merely know from report that such a petition was signed by the majority of tlie
officers of the division. Some of the officers of rank in that divisidn refused to sign it.
The paper never came to me, although the petition was forwarded, and I believe
retnrned to the officers.

	Question. What division was that, and did any of the brigade
commanders refuse to sign it?
	It was then the Seventh Division of the Army of the Tennessee, now the First Di-
vision of the Army of the Ohio. Ote brigade commander I heard of who refnsed to
sigii itBrigadier-General Schoept~

	Question. Had General Schoepf aiy conversation with you and did
he state any reasons for refusing to sign this petition?
	He did have some conversation with me upon the subject, and stated that he re-
fnsed to sign it because h~ did not think there was any reason for signing it; and in
addition to that he rcgarded it as an act of insubordination, to say the least, and
might be construed into a combination. If they were dissatisfied they should prefer
charges against the officers~ and he would have nothing to do with it. I think that
was the only time that the subject was mentioned, when General Schoepf told me
what he had done and asked me if I had heard of this petition being sent in.

By General ORD:
	Question. In the retreat of General Braggs ariiiy, after the battle of
Pcrry.ville, did the enemys cavalry sufficiently outnumber ours to r

Page 199

CHAP. XXVIII.]	GENERAL REPORTS.
	199
quire that our infantry or artillery should deploy at times in order to
dislodge them?

	Yes.

	Question. Did this involve the necessity of halts or delays on the
part of our columns tha
again?	,	t our infantry might form and take the road
	It did on two occasions, once at Stanford and the second time on the road beyond
Crab Orchard. There were two other halts until our advance could dislodge the en-
emys rear guard of cavalry. We did not halt for the night until 9 oclock.

	Question. Did these maneuvers of the cavalry in the rear of their in-
fantry make corresponding halts necessary to the enemys infantry on
the retreat?
	No; not at all.

	Question. In the pursuit of an enemy by the roads taken by Gen-
eral Braggs army after the battle of Perryville did the country afford
facilities especially for defensive positions?
	The country did afford facilities for defensive positions at intervals o~ 3 or 4 miles.
Strong defensive positions could have been taken after leaving Crab Orchard.

	Question. Did the enemy make use of these?
	Yes.

	Question. Did this involve further necessity for slow and cautious
pursuit?

	It did; that is, it involved the necessity for cautious pursuit. The pursuit was as
rapid as we could make it under the circumstances.

	Question. After the battle of Perryville do you think there were rea-
sons why the enemy were not pursued farther than they were?

	The difficulty of obtaining forage was one cause; the difficulty of getting subsist-
ence for the men over one narrow and bad road another cause; and the obstruction
thrown in the road by ceiling trees to so great an extent that by the time the road
was cleared the enemy had effected his escape.

	Question. As the pursuit advanced did the country become more dif-
ficult for the pursuing army to form and more susceptible of defense?

	It did. It became more difficult and more susceptible of defense until we reached
the neighborhood of London; there the country became open again. Before we could
reach London the enemy had been enabled by the obstructions placed in tile road to
escape.

	Question. Had we had as efficient and as large a force of cavalry as
the enemy could we not have forced them to form the columns of in-
fantry and give us battle on some ground favorable to ourselves?

	Not unless we could have anticipated their line of retreat before they reached Crab
Orchard. We might, however, if we had had a very 1ar~e force of cavalry, have at-
tacked them at Loudou as their column was passing through while their rear was
involved in the hills of Rockcastle and have thrown them into confusion.

	Question. Supposing the marching qualities of both retreating and
pursuing armies the same, is plenty of good cavalry necessary to force
a battle from a retreating army?

	I should think it was.

	Question. Did the enemys large force of cavalry and our deficiency,
on the other hand, give them any great advantage in the way of ena-
bling their infantry to form and select their own ground upon which to
fight did they not feel disposed to continue their retreat?

	Yes, sir; I think it did

Page 200

200	KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAr. XXVIII.

	Question. Which army can march the fastest, a large army or a small
one?

A small one.

	Question. Was our army larger or smaller than the enemys after the
battle of Perryville?

	I think our army was the largest.

	Question. Do you think the new troops which joined from Louisville
in order to enable our army to pursue Bragg were able to march as
fasr as old troops or as fast as the enemys troops? Were they any
clog to our movements in rapid pursuit?

	The new troops would have impeded our rapid march.; they could not endure the
fatigue of marching as well as the old soldiers.
By General TYLER:
	Question. Was it a military probability that Bragg could pass his
army and baggage over the mountain at Altamont, and was not the
route by Perryville and Sparta in fact the only practicable military
route up into the Tennessee Valley after he had l)assed forward into the
Sequatchie Valley?

	I think so.

	Qiestion. Crittenden was ordered to move on the enemy at 4 oclock
on the 9th of October, and moved at 6.30 oclock, and Smiths corps en-
gaged the enemy until 9 oclock; during the whole of this time what
kind of forces did General Smith engage? Did it or did it not indicate
that the enemy was in force in his front?

	He was under the impression that the enemy was in force in his front until he had
cleared those skirmishers from the woods. The skirmishing had been quite heavy at
times. There were some few dismounted men, whether cavalry or not I do not know;
the largest portion was cavalry.

	Question. Did General Buells army ever get hold of Braggs army
before he fought the battle of Perryville?

	We had several sharp skirmishes after the battle of Perryville between portions of
our troops and the enemys. I think it more than likely that portions of the two
armies were opposed to each other at the battle of Shiloh. There were skirmishes in
Alabama, but they occurred with General MeCooks and General Crittendens troops,
not as army against army.

	Question. The battle of Perryville was fought on the 8th . you tes-
tify that on the 11th was the first time you knew that Braggs army had
crossed Dicks iRiver; between what places were thq enemys forces
during this interval and what area of country did they go over?

	We knew by 12 oclock on the 11th that they had crossed, but we received informa-
tion from the citizens that they were crossing before. Their rear guard crossed on
the morning of the 11th either at Kings Mill or at tbe month of the river. A portion
of them were pursued by Harker to the crossing at Kings Mill.

	Question. What was the distance from Perryville to where Bragg
crossed Dicks River?

	I think about 16 miles; I am not positive.

	Question. Where was the bulk of General Buells army when the
enemy crossed Djcks River; how far to the rear?

	I believe the whole army was in the vicinity of Harrodsburg by 12 oclock of the
11th, 6 or 8 miles from the crossing at Kings Mill

Page 201

CHAP. XXVIII]	GENERAL REPORTS.	201

	Question. If Bragg had been hardly pursued would not the crossing
of Dicks River have been a serious obstacle to him?
	It would, I think; though he would have crossed a portion of his forces at the
mouth of the river.

	Question. Assuming that Kirby Smith had occupied and plundered
Lexington and had abandoned it, what possible military inducement
could Bragg, after the battle of Perryville, have had in moving on Lex-
ington?
	He could have had none, except the desire to hold Kentucky or draw his supplies
from the surrounding country.

	Question. General, did or did not the battle of Perryville make it
almost a military necessity that Braggs army should commence its
retreat, coupled with the abandonment of Lexington and that part of -
Kentucky, and that the intention was, if possible, to join the two armies
and get out of Kentucky ~
	I thought so.

	Question. We have heard of large trains of transportation, plunder,
& c., which Bragg took out of Kentucky. What disposition did he make
of those trains in the retreat and what was their position at the battle
of Perryville, if you know?
	I do not know what their position was at the battle of Perryville, but I believethey
were assembled at Camp Dick Robinson, for we had heard before that they were as-
sembling all their trains of transportation at Camp Dick Robinson; and after the re-.
treat was decided npou these trains must have been sent in front as we came across
very few wagons on the road.

	Quest.ion. Would you not consider it a very great military success
for a small army, hampered with a large transportation train, retreat-
ing, to make its escape out of any country in the face of a superior
army?
	Yes; I should consider it a great military success.

	Question. Is not the transportation train to an army a great hinder-
ance to rapid military movement?
	Yes.

	Question. Were you encumbered by any of that l~ind of train except
artillery in following up the enemy?
	We were encumbered by the necessary subsistence train; nothing more.

	Question. Where was Braggs base of operations and supplies from
the time he crossed the Tennessee River at Chattanooga or the vicinity?
	I think be obtained his supplies from the country until he got to J3ard~toxxn; then
he commenced collecting supplies from different points in Kentucky, with tbe inten-
tion of making a permanent depot at Camp Dick Robinson.

	Question. What distance did Bragg march his army from the time he
crossed the Tennessee River until he commenced what is now known
to have been his retreat?
	It was probably about 200 miles.

	Question. During this whole march how did Bragg get his supplies?

	I think he took ten days supplies from Chattanooga; after that he drew his sup-
plies from the countryTennessee and Kentucky.

	Question. What number of days did Braggs military movement in
Tennessee and Kentucky cover from the timue he crossed the Tennessee
River at Chattanooga until he was out of the reach of the
cral Buell beyond London?	army of Gen
	I do not know precisely the date of his crossing the Tennessee River, but I suppos

Page 202

202	KY., M. AND E. TENN, N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAP. XXVIIX.

that it was about fifty days from the time he got fairly across the river to the time
he got safely beyond London.

	Question. During this time did General Braggs army, with the ex-
ception of the ten days provisions be brought from Chattanooga, neces-
sarily subsist on the country?

Yes.

	Question. Would not a country that would furnish provisions to a
rebel army no more loyal than the States of Tennessee and Kentucky,
under a proper military management, furnish at least half rations for
an army of the same size as that of Braggs?

Yes, I suppose it would.

	Question. Have the military rules that an army occupying a section
of country possessed by the rules of war [has the right] to draw pro-
visions from the country, been efficiently exacted by General Buell dur-
i~ng his command of the Army of the Ohio?

	I do not know that any supplies have been drawn from the country occupied by
General Buells army except cattle, occasionally flour, and forage for the animals; the
animals have generally been foraged on the country.

	Question. And has not the result been that General Bragg, marching
through the same country, has been consequently enabled to subsist
his army?
	General BIJELL. I beg leave to suggest to the Commission that one
of their members is proceeding to condemnation, when their business is
consideration. I must say for myself that I am astonished it should be
asked; I am very glad that it has been asked.
	The court was cleared. On being reopened the witness proceeded.
	The WITNESS. General Bragg has not marched over the same ground, except in
Kentucky from Bardstown as far as London and from Chattanooga up to Murfrees-
borough. I presume he had drawn some of his supplies in the vicinity of the railroad
from Chattanooga to Murfreesborough.

By the PRESIDENT:

	Question. From the time he concentrated his army at Murfrees.
borough to the time he reached Louisville was General Buell acting on
the defensive or offensive?
	I should consider it as acting on the defensive; that is, first defending Nashville
and then Louisville, with the railroad to Louisville.

	Question. In your judgment what circumstance, if any, required such
a policy from General Buell?
	The fact of the injury to the railroad making it necessary for him to keep between
the enemy and Louisville, taken in connection with the fact that Kirby Smith had
invaded and already had got possession of Central Kentucky.

	Question. Do you mean to say that those circumstances required
that policy from him from the time Bragg marched through the Se-
quatchie Valley until General Buell with his ~trmy reached Nashville?

	I believe that General Bach thought so.

	Question. I am not asking that; I am asking your judgment.

	I have said already that I desired to concentrate the~rmy and meet Bragg at Sparta
and fight him, because I thought we had supplies enough to enable us to do it.
	Question. How am I to understand your answer, general?

	According to my judgment there was not a sufficient reason for falling back from
Murfreesborough to Nashville

Page 203

CHAP. XXVIII.]	GENERAL REPORTS.	203

By General BUELL:
	Question. What force would you have required to meet the enemy
at Sparta as you proposed?

	I believe that four divisions would have been sufficient.

	Question. What number of men?

	Four divisions of 6,000 men; 24,000.

	Question. And hy that estimate what force do you suppose the en-
emy to have?

	I supposed, from all I knew, that the enemy had marched into Tennessee with 45,000
men, but I do not believe he could have brought that many men into an engagement
at Sparta.

	Question. About how many?

	I do not suppose that he could have brought into an engagement more than 30,000
men.

	Question. You think, then, that with 24,000 men you could have kept
Bragg out of Tennessee?

	If I could have brought him to a battle at Sparta.

	Question. Do you not regard that as a matter of certainty?

	I believe he could have been brought to battle at Sparta.

	Question. How many days rations would you require to make that
result certain?

	Twenty days would have been sufficient.

	Question. Suppose that at the end of twenty days the enemy faiLed
to give you battle at Sparta.

	Then I should have been compelled to subsist upon the country.

	Question. Could you have done that and maintain your position at
Sparta? if so, explain how.

	I think we could have maintained our position at Sparta ten days longer by sub-
sisting on the country; that is, thirty days.

	Question. Do you give that opinion from your knowledge of the sup-
plies the country affords?

	Not from positive knowledge, but from reliable information.

	Question. Do I understand you that you made a deliberate proposi-
tion t~ concentrate the army at Sparta and meet the enemy there?

	I did.

	Question. And you have a copy of that communication?

	Yes, sir.

	Question. Did you specify the force you thought necessary?

	I think that I proposed arranging the whole army so that it could be concentrated
at Sparta.

	Question. Did you give the details of your plan?

	Nothing fQrther than the proposition to hold McMinnville, so as to compel the
enemy to march by Sparta, and then concentrate the army at Sparta to meet him
when he was compelled to march by Sparta on his way to Kentucky.

	Question. Do you know what trains or supplies Bragg carried with
him from Chattanooga?

	I do not know

Page 204

204	KY., M. AND E. TENK., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAP. XXVIII.

	Question. How long was the principal part of Kentucky in posses-
sion of the rebel forces before Braggs arrival there?

	I do not remember; I expect a couple of months or so.

	Question. Did the mass of the people make any active resistance to
that occupation do you suppose?

	They did not seem to make any active opposition.

	Question. Was it very well known during that time that Kirby Smith
was collecting supplies of various sorts necessar& for the army; that
he was making shot and shell and preparing other necessary supplies?

	I heard after my arrival in Louisville that he had been very actively engaged in
collecting supplies, and also had been preparing ammunition at Lexington, and one
man also told me he had seen a train of twenty-five or thirty wagons going from Lex-
ington to Camp Dick Robinson loaded with ammunition.

	Question. As a source of supplies for an army, what comparison is
there between Middle Tennessee in July and August last and the blue-
grass region of Kentucky in September and October?

	The resources of the blue-grass region of Kentucky were far greater than those of
Middle Tennessee; there was an abundant supply in Kentucky. The supply in Mid-
dle Tennessee was not so great by half at least.

	Question. Was it by seven-eighths?

	The supply of some things in Tennessee was quite abundantgreen corn, and there
is some cattle; not a great deal of wheat, as far as I could learn; but a very abun-
dant supply of all these in Kentucky.

	Question. Have you any reason to suppose that in retreating from
Kentucky Bragg took with his army any greater train than was neces-
sary to carry the subsistence for it on the niarch; if so, how do you
know it?

	I could not learn positively of any train larger than was seen to carry supplies for
his army. We heard from citizens that he had sent before his army large quantities
of dry goods and things of that sort.

	Question. Has it ever, that you know of, been stated that the rebel
army plundered Lexington?

	I think I heard some reports of that sort from citizens but I do not think it has
ever been known that they plundered Lexington; that is, that they stripped it of
everything. They may have taken some things from Lexington.

	Commission adjourned to meet December 20, at 10 oclock a. m.

NASHVILLE, Saturday Morning, December 20, 1862.
	Commission met pursuant to adjournment. All the members present;
also the jud ge-advocate and General Buell.

	Col. JOHN T. WILDER (a witness for the Government), being duly
sworn by the judge-advocate, testified as follows:

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

	Question. State your name and position in the service and all you
know about the surrender of Munfordville and the failure on our part
to relieve it.

	John T. Wilder; colonel Seventeenth Indiana Voluntcers. I was ordered to Man-
fordville from Louisville by General Wright, on, I think, the 6th of September, to
take command of the post. Shortly after I got thereI thiuk it was the 7th of Sep-
tembera party of guerrillas burned the bridge on the Salt River, 18 miles from Lonis-
ville, cutting off communication with Louisville. We had no rations, and telegraphed
to Colonel Bruce at Bowling Greea to send me some. He telegraphed back to me t

Page 205

CHAP. XXVIII.]	GENERAL REPORTS.	205

be sparing of my rations, as General Buells whole army was coming. He, however,
sent me some hard bread. I collected the balance of my provisions from the country.
On the 11th of September some deserters, reported to be from Buckners division of
Braggs army, reached me. I questioned them as to the whereabouts of the rebel
army. They stated that Buckner was 7 miles on the way toward Mnnfordville from
Sparta, Teun., and that Braggs army was in the immediate vicinity. I telegraphed
this information to General Buell at Nashville. Whether he received it or not I
cannot say. I have understood since he had left Nashville. Here is a copy of the
original dispatch:

Dispatch No. 1.

MUNFOIIDYILLE, Kr., September 11, 1862.

Col. J. B. Fny,
Assistant Adjutant-General and Chief of Staff, Nashville, Tenn.:
	SIR: Two deserters, Irishmen, from Buckners division of Braggs army, came in
here this morning, and report Buckner, with 10,000 men and Forrests cavalry, 7 miles
this side of Sparta, Tenn., on Sunday last; have two batteries. These men came
across the country on mules abont 160 miles. I think they tell the truth. Bragg was
in the vicinity. I am bailding fortifications here with two raw regiments. Deserters
say that Bowling Green is their point (the enemys) for concentration.
J. T. WILDER
Colonel Seventeenth Indiana, Corn mending at Green River.


	A number of Kentuckian deserters from the army came and reported that Braggs
whole army was on its way to take, first, Bowling Green, and then Munfordville.
That is what is meant in that last clause in that dispatch. On Thursday night, Sep-
tember 11, I learned that the advance of General Buells army had reached Bowling
Green. Trains ran through to Louisville from Bowling Green, I think, on Friday.
On Friday night, the 12th, the rebels took possession of the railroad from Bowling
Green to Munfordville. The advance division of infantry arrived in Glasgow the
evening before.

Dispatch No. 2.

MUNFORDVILLE, Ky., September 12, 18623 a. m.
J. FrwARD STACY,
Chief of Staff, Louisville, fly.:
	Sm: S. T. Purcell and R. Huggins have just come in from Glasgow, saying that
Braggs army arrived there at sundown last evening. Cheatham is reported in com-
mand. I have a force here of 2,600 raw men, with four pieces of artillery and pr@vis.
ions for eight days. What shall I do; fight them or fall back if attacked? They are
reported to be from 22,000 to 50,000 strong. I am posted on south bank of river.
	6~olonel,	J. T. WILDER,
Coa~n~anding at Green River.

Brigadier-General DUMONT, Lebanon Junction,
Capt. A. D. BRUCE, Bowling Green, Ky.:
	Rebels under Bragg are reported at Glasgow last night, 22,000 to 50,000 strong,
their infantry command arriving last night.
J. T. WILDER,
Colonel, Commanding at Green River.

	I was under the command of General Gilbert at the time; in fact all the time I was
there I was under orders from Louisville. This dispatch was directed to Louisville.

Dispatch No. 3.

MUNFORDYILLE, Ky., September 12, 1862.
J. EDWARD STACY,
Assistant Adjutant-General and Chief of Staff, Louisville, fly.:
	Parties who left Glasgow late last night say they counted twelve regiments in-
fantry and one of cavalry. Regiments small. Cheatham in command of advance of
General Polks division. Buckner reported not far off. My scouts left vicinity of
Glasgow since noon; report no further advance of rebels to that time. Rebels say
they are expecting division to-night.
J. T. WILDER
Colonel, Commanding Force at Green River

Page 206

206	KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAr. XXVIII
Dispatch No. 4.

MUNFORDYILLE, Ky., September 12, 1862.
Brigadier-General BOYLE, Louisville, Ky.:
	Lacey, one of my scouts, left the vicinity of Glasgow since noon. The rebels are
there enforcing conscription. Lacey thinks they will go toward Columbia.
J. T. WILDER,
Colonel, Commanding.
Dispatch No. 5.
MUNFORDYILLE, KY., September 13, 1862.
J. EDWARD STACY,
Assistant Adjutant General and Chief of Staff, Louisville, Ky.:
	Scouts and numbers of citizens coming in state that the enemy are advancing 7,000
strong, and that a force has come in between here and Bowling Green to prevent re-
enforcements from joining us. If I had one more good regiment and a few pieces of
artillery that force could not take me. As it is I shall do my best to prevent it. Can
you send me re-enforcements to-night? I shall send trains to Salt River for them.
J. T. WILDER,
Colonel, Commanding at Green River.

Copy of return dispatch.

Col. J. T. WILDER:
	I send you what you ask.
J. EDWARD STACY,
Assistant Adjutant-General and Chief of Staff.

	These are not all the dispatches I sent. The original copies formerly in my pos-
session I committed to an officer, with instructions to destroy them in case we were
taken. He did so. The dispatches here submitted I got from the telegraph office
while I was prisoner.

Dispatch No. 6.

MUNFORDYILLE, KY., September 15, 18629 p. m.
Brigadier-General BOYLE, Louisville, Ky.:
	No advice from Bowling Green. Rebels at Cave City, under Bragg, in force. See
J. E. Stacy, assistant adjutant-general; have telegraphed him all to-day. Rebels
on north side of river coming down 2,000 strong.
J. T. WILDER,
Colonel, Commanding at Green River.

Dispatch No. 7.

MUNFORDYILLE, KY., September 13, 1862.

J. EDWARD STACY
Assistant Adjutant-General and Chief of Staff, Louisville, Ky.:
	SIR: I have construction train and light cars here. Citizens state that about 300
rebel cavalry are at Bills and 200 at Cave City; also that Rousseaus advance fell
back yesterday. I have started scouts to try and reach Bowling Green. Some indi-
cations that main rebel force are going toward Lebanon.
J. T. WILDER,
Colonel, Commanding.

Dispatch No. 8.

MUNFORDYILLE, KY., September 13, 1862.

J. EDWARD STACY,
Assistant Adjutant-General and Chief of Staff, Louisville, Ky.:
	Mr. Retter, one of the most loyal men in the county, keeper of the Woodland
House, 10 miles south of here, sends his colored man, saying that Bragg is at Cave
City with 20,000 men and that Buckner will join him to-morrow. His pickets are
within 5 miles of here we know. The rebels boast of having taken off a dispatch
from Louisville and exult over it. I believe half of this.
J. T. WILDER,
Colonel, Commanding at Green River

Page 207

CHAP. XXVIII.]
GENERAL REPORTS.
207
	General DANA. I do not see the use of reading all these dispatches.
The colonel is not brought here to justify himself in the surrender of
Munfordville. He was an officer acting under another general. He
was not under the immediate command of General Buell, but under
the command of General Wright. If the colonel has any testimony to
give as to communications between himself and General Buell or bear-
ing on the movements of General Buells army, so far it is proper to
have the testimony introduced; but I see no use in entering on the rec-
ord this volume of dispatches, which go to the rear.
	The JUDGE-ADVOCATE. These dispatches are introduced to show the
position of the enemy at the time General Buell was marching to or
occupying Bowling Creen. ~I wish to show that General Buell had suf-
ficient time to relieve Munfordville.

Dispatch No. 9.


MUNFORDYILLE, Kr., September 15, 1862.
J. EDWARD STACY.
As8istant Adjutant-General and Chief of Staff, Loui8ville, Ky.:
	SIR: I received the following dispatch this moment

ELIZABETRTOWN, Ky, Septembr 13, 1862.
Colonel WILDER:
	My men must be relieved immediately; their time is out and they will serve no
longer and we cant make them. They will go if not relieved; they will not remain.
L. G. KNOX,
Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding Tiff y-jourth Indiana.

	. I cannot relieve them from here. Scouts say that no forces have left Bowlij~g
Green for this place. Rebels were last night camped 2 miles this side of Glasgow, at
Beaver Creek. Artillery ammunition has not come. My intreuchments will be com-
pleted to-day.
	I just learn that rebel pickets are at Woodland on ral
in considerable force.	,	lroad, S miles south of here,
		  J. T. WILDER,
Colonel, Commanding at Green River.

	On the 13th of September I learned that the rebels were with their n~in force en-
camped on Beaver Creek, 2 or 3 miles north of Glasgow, with their line extending
down near to Cave City; also that a force of 2,0U0 were coming down on the north
side of Green River, which proved afterward to be Scotts cavalry, of Kirby Smiths
forces. On Saturday night, 13th of September, he summoned me to surrender. On
Sunday morning before daylight they attacked me on the north side of the river;
also by an infantry force on the south side commanded by General Chalmers.
	I repulsed them after about five hours fighting, and that evening, the 14th, 1 drove
them back 3 or 4 miles in all directions around the town, and the next morning got
up a telegraphic comniunication to Louisville again. On Sunday evening, after the
fight, I was re-enforced by 490 men, under Colonel Dunham, of the Fiftieth Indiana,
who remained in command till Tuesday, the 16th, until about 5 oclock in the even-
ing, when he was placed under arrest in order to -report to General Gilbert. We had
been fighting them nearly all day on Tuesday. Colonel Dunham had been summoned
to sulTender, and I was summoned to surrender on Tuesday evening by General Bragg.
I refused to do so till I knew the force he had. We parleyed about the matter con-
siderably, and finally they consented to let me see the batteries. I went out to ex-
amine their guns, and surrendered the whole force on Wednesday morning, the 17th.
The reason why I wished to see their force was I believed they would have the major
part of it to hold General Buell in check.- I did not believe they had their whole force
there to take me, although my information all the time was that they were coming
up with their main force.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

	Question. During that time, colonel, what efforts, if any, were made
to communicate with General Buell?

	I had railroad communication to Bowling Gr?en till Friday noon. I then sent out
scouts. I sent one scout on Saturday, 13thMr. Wash. Miller, and two or three others

Page 208

208
KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAP. XXVIII.
 I did not send written communications, only verbal ones, to the commanding officer
at Bowling Green (I did not know if General Bach got them), stating that I must
receive assistance, HS a large force was coming in to take Munfordville. Mr. Miller
got through to Bowling Green. Whether the others did or not I do not know. I have
never seen them since. Mr. Miller staid there till Monday, the 15th, 3 oclock, and
then started back for M~infordville, and got back Tuesday night at dark, and told
me I could expect no assistance from Bowling Green; that no troops had started to
relieve me at the time he left. Up to that time I intended to fight them, be their
force what it might, expecting, from the dispatch I had received from General Gilbert,
that I would receive assistance froni Bowling Green. At the time Mr. Miller came in
Polks right wing of Braggs army had crossed the river S miles above and come down
on the north side, com~leteiy surrounding me. I knew that no force could relieve
me from Bowling Green, except a large one, after Friday, the 13th, and that after the
fight on Sunday a large force was between Bowling Green and Munfordville, and lay
there apparently quiet, I think, two days. I afterward asked Colonel Walter, of
Braggs staff, what was their object in lying still, and why they did riot come up in
force and take me instead of having a small force so cut up as Chalmers force was on
Sunday. He said they had a cavalry force on the north side of the river to prevent
my retreating, and that they lay there expecting a force would come from Bowling
Green to relieve me, in which case they meant to fall upon it and cut it to pieces, but
that when they found General Buell moving up with his whole army, they then moved
forward to take Munfordville and hold Green River against General nells army.
	When I was a prisoner hy some accident they did not parole me. ~Vhen I got into
General Buells lines I went to his headquarters and told all I knew about their forces,
their means of subsistence, & c. This was on the ni~ht of the 18th, about 9 or 10
oclock. His headquarters were at Prewitts Knob. General Buell questioned me
closely about their numbers and position. I told him they had from 35,000 to 40,000
men; that they had no provisions that would sustain them three days; that if their
whole force fonght as they had fought me, no reasonable force could drive them away
from Green River; but if their supplies were cut off from the east they could not live
there three days; they would either be compelled to come out and fight or fall back
from there, which afterward proved to be the case. In the terms of surrender I oh-
tai~ed four days rations for my men, leaving only one days for their forces there.
They seemed much disappointed at not getting more provisions.
	On Wednesday and Thursday, 17th and 18th, they gave me liberty to go anywhere
I pleased throughout their camp, and I went about as I pleased. I saw no trains of
provisions. I noticed some wagons with ammunition. I examined a number of
haversacks of the dead killed on Sunday, and found that their provisions consisted
almost entirely of green corn. I never saw an army in a more perfect state of dis-
cipline. They were terribly ragged and dirty and apparently tired out. I was
present with General Buell when the information reached him that the enemy had
reached Munfordville. That was on Sunday, 21st, then about 7 miles from Munford-
ville. We were then moving forward in line of~ battle apparently. General Buell
had immediately on my arrival in his lines ordered my exchange. I supposed I was
on duty. I was also with him explaining the road and the character of the country
when he received notice that Kirby Smiths and Braggs forces had formed a junction,
which proved afterward to be false. I then came through with the army to Louis-
ville, and was there notified that my exchange was not consented to by General
Bragg.

	Question. What number of men, munitions, and other stores were
surrendered at Mnnfordville?

	There were 3,546 men, according to the parole list, ten pieces of artillery, tents ior
about one and one-half regiments, and one days rations for the men.

	Question. What sort of a man is this scout you speak of~?

	A very reliable man; at least, so I found him.

	Question. State in what manner you made up your estimate of Braggs
army.

	I received information on the 15th by way of Glasgow that Braggs army consisted
of one hundred and four regiments, including cavalry and artillery. I received in-
formation from another source, from a Mr. Simpson, of Glasgow, and by citizens and
scouts, that Bragg had eighty-four regiments of infantry, that he had twelve batteries
of artillery, and that his cavalry force numbered from 6,000 to 10,000; that the regi-
ments would number about 350, some said 400, some not over 325; but from my own
observation I think they averaged 350 men. One hundred and four regiments of 350
men would be 36,400; twelve batteriesof 130 men each would be 1,560, mal~ing in the
aggregate one hundred and four regiments, 37,960 men. If the regiments numbere

Page 209

Cn~p. XXV~.]
GENERAL REPORTS.
209
400 each, it would make an aggregate of 43,160. He had six divisionsone under
Buckner, sixteen regiments; one under Anderson, sixteen regiments; one under Bush-
rod Johnson, twelve regiments; Cheatham had sixteen regiments; Withers twelve
regiments, and a man ~named Jones with twelve regiments (I have never heard of him
since). That would make eighty-four regiments of infantry. That they had six di-
visions I am satisfied. I was introduced to officers while a prisoner, and know that
they were divided in that shape, and were divided into two wings. Hardee com-
manded one and Polk the other.

	Question. At the time of giving this information to General Buell
was he satisfied of its correctness?

	I do not know.

	Question. How did he express himself?

	I am not certain. He simply asked questions and I answered them.

	Question. Made any comments on them?

	No; in asking about the position of Munfordville, and slated that he had in person
examined the semicircle of hills about the river with a view of using them himself,
and knew it to be one of the strongest positions for a large force he ever saw.

	Question. What comments, if any, did General Buell make upon the
surrender of Munfordville?

	None at all.

	Question. At the time you sent this scout Miller to General Buell
where was General Buells army, and can you state where at that time
the main body of Braggs force was?

	The advance of General Buells army was at Bowling Green, I think, in three di-
visions; this was my opinion. The main hody of Braggs army was in the vicinity
of Glasgow. His advance forces held the railroads and the turnpike between Mun-
fordville and Bowling Green.

	Question. You can state to the Commission whether it was possible,
from the position of the force of both armies f

relieved you at that time?	or General Buell to have
	I do not know. I think he could not have relieved me unless he had throwna very
large force forward to relieve me; a small force would undoubtedly have been cut up.

By General ORD:
	Question. You say that when you were summoned to surrender by
General Bragg on the 16th, Tuesday evening, the words are: I re-
fused to do so until I knew what force he had. What was the literal
meaning of those words that as soon as you could learn what force he
had you would surrender?

	General Bragg summoned me to surrender, stating he had over 25,000 troops and
over sixty pieces of artillery then in position. My answer was, as near as I can rec-
ollect, that Colonel Dunham had held a council of the officers commanding the regi-
ments, and that they had unanimously agreed that if the force was as great as was
represented it would be folly to hold out longer, and, that if we could have evidence
that his force was such as he had represented I would surrender, otherwise I would.
not. His answer was the only evidence he could give of his force would be the use of
it.	I then sent out another person to the hearer of the flag of truce, told him that we
had been summoned to surrender four times before by a force incompetent to compel
it, and that unless we had evidence that was indisputable to us that he had a force
there snificient to reduce us in a short time we would not surrender. They then
gave me an hour. I told the bearer of the flag, Colonel Walter, of General Braggs
staff, that it was useless to parley; that I would not surrender until I knew what
force they had. I did not believe that the bulk of Braggs army was there, but that
a part of i~ was held back to hold General Buell in check, and that against a part of
their army I would fight. He said it would be useless bloodshed, and went back to
take my message to General Bragg. I asked then to see General Bragg in person.
He took me up to his headquarters. We parleyed about it for an hour backward and

14 R RYOL XV

Page 210

210
KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAP. XXVIII.
forward. I told General Buckner that I did not think they could take me by assault
of infantry; they had been trying that twice on that day, Tuesday. Buckner said he
had attempted twice to take us by assault, but when they cam~e through the strip of
woods they could not form in line, and that they had (letermined to shell us out by
concentrating a fire in which we could not live for an hour. I told them if they had
that force there it would be useless for me to contend against them, but if they had
that force there was no reason why I should not see it, and that I would undoubt-
edly surrender if I saw it; that I did not suppose they could afford to waste as much
ammunition as would he required to reduce me upon a mere quibble. General Buck-
ner then went with me to see the batteries. Lieutenant Bullitt, acting adjutant of
the post, went on the north side and I on the south side. I counted forty-six guns on
the south side; he counted twenty-six on the north side, so he reported to me; fifty-
four of which were in position. This was Tuesday, about midnight. It was 2 oclock
when the articles of surrender were signed.

	Question. How much of the time during the defense of Munfordville
did your men live on half rations ~

	I think ~nly two days.

	Question. Supposing you had put your men on the smallest amount
of food possible how long would your provisions have lasted?

	Probably fifteen days. It was not a lack of provisions that compelled the surrender.

	Question. About what time Tuesday evening or afternoon did the
council and yourself come to the conclusion that if their force was an
overwhelming one you must surrender ~

	About 4 oclock. This was while Colonel Dunham was in command that that
council was held; before he was put under arrest.

	Question. About what time were you satisfied that the time had come
to surrender, from the overwhehuing force around you?

	About midnight. Fi~om all I could see of the force surrounding us and the nature of
it I was satisfied before sundown that unless re-enforcemeuts reached us I could not
hold out. But for fear there was any mistake about the force there I determined I
would know something more about it; and not to be deceived I would draw their
fire, and sustain their whole fire before I would risk being deceived in the matter. I
had fully determined I would not surrender except to an overwhelming force.

	Question. About what time did you tell their flag-of-truce bearer
you would not surrender except to an overwhelming force aud that
you would inspect it yourself?

	That was about 7 oclock in the evening, It was at 5 oclock I received a sum-
inons from General Bragg, and the parleying was continued all the evening.

	Question. About what time did the scout Miller bring you the infor-
mation that you could expect no help from General Buell?

	It was about half past five, a short time after I received a summons to surrender;
not more than half an hour.

	Question. Was there a strong disposition to surrender among the
officers when they held the council in the afternoon in case the force

was overwheming.
	I was present, and for fear there might be a disposition of that kind among them I
suggested that I would not surrender under any circumstances and to no force unless
I knew what it was, and it was adopted by all the officers present unanimously. This
was about 4 oclock in the afternoon.

	Question. Did you apprehend that it is no longer the duty of an offi-
cer to hold a garrison when he finds that he is surrounded by an over-
whelming force and that the prospects of relief are remote?

	I think that when everything looks as though there was no chance of success it
would be folly to murder the men. This is the way I looked upon it at the time.
The rebels had positions commandiug us on every side, and my information as regards
relief was such that I could not expect any in time to save us

Page 211

CHAP. XXVIII. I
GENERAL REPORTS.
211

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:
	Question. Had you received assurances from your scout of relief
would you have made an effort to hold out and how much longer?

	I do not know how much longer, but I should have held out till I was overpowered.

	Question. Reference is made in one of those dispatches to conscript-
ing. iDo you know how much they added to their force by that process?

	I do not know.

	Question. Do you know whether they received any additions in the
way of volunteers ~

	They did some; there was quite a number left the vicinity oC Munfordville and
joined them, their friends giving as the reason that they prcferred lighting on that
side to being drafted to go into the Federal Army. This was about the time they
were preparing to force a draft for troops in Kentucky.

	Questions. What actions if an
have you ~en	,	y, have you been in; what service
	I was in the campaign in Western Virginia under General Rosecrans; under Gen-
eral Reynolds in the Cheat Mountain Division; I was in probably half a dozen small
fights about Cheat Mountain and in one considerable fight at Greoubrier River
under General Reynolds; I was in General Buells ai~ny when that marched from
Louisville to Corinth, and was in a number of skirmishes about Corinth.

By General ORD:
	Question. Were you aware at the time of the surrender that in a
position not easily taken by assault shelling out is a very slow busi-
ness?
	I have never l)een subjected to a very severe fire of shells. The mibels had positions
within 600 yards around us; that on the north side especially commanded us. The
ground in the main work sloped toward the north, exposing the men in the works
to a fire from the north side.

Question. Were your guns under cover?
	They were behind breastworks.

Question. Were the enemys guns under cover?
	They were not (except one battery), excepting the cover afforded by the woods and
behind ridges.

Question. What small-arms had your men?
	Mostly rifles. The men were chiefly raw recruits. Those engaged in the fight on
Sunday had none of them been in service over three weeks. None of them had ever
seen a battle before. A good many of them had not a complete outfit; some of them
had no cartridge-boxes; quite a number of these men had no arms; a detachment of
102 had not a single gun; they were convalescents.

	Question. After you made the statement you did to the council about
not surrendering except to an overwhelming force, did the officers all
concur that the force was too overwhelming and that it was time to
surrender?
	They all agreed about that, but I consulted none of them after having seen the
fortifications of the enemy.

By General DANA:
	Question. How many mouths have you been in service?
	I have been in service over a year and a half. I enlisted April 21, 1861; have been
in active service in the field since July, 1861. I have not always been in the capacity
of a commander of a regiment. I started a private, and was at le~igth elected captain
of artillery. The battery was afterward put in the infantry service, and I was made
lieut~nant-colonel of the regiment, afterward made colonel. I have been in com~
wand of the regiment most of the time since July 1, 1861

Page 212

212
KY., M. AND E. TENK., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAP. XXVIII.
	Question. Was the information brought by the scout Miller that you
need expect no aid from Bowling Green founded on his own opinion or
on information lie received from General Buell ~?

	He received none from General Buell whatever, he told me. He said General Buell
asked him especially about the crossing of Green River, and about the road leading
from Bowling Green to Elizabethtown leaving Munfordville to the right, but he sent
no word to me whatever; that while he was present word was brought to General Buell
that I had surrendered. The impression Mr. Miller had was that General Buell
would try to reach Elizabethtown and get ahead of Braggs forces by that short route
to Elizabethtown. I was astonished that we got no infbrmation; no word sent by
anybody. I had directed Mr. Miller to see General Wood and General Ilascall, my
brigade and division commanders, as soon as he could get there; that if General
Buell was not there they would undoubtedly tell him what I might expect, as Gen-
eral Wood knew Mr. Miller personally and knew him to be reliable.

	Question. At what time and in what manner were you placed under
command of General Gilbert ~

	I had been in Indiana obtaining recruits for my regiment and came to Louisville;
waited there a week for transportation, trying to join iiiy regiment in Buells army.
The railroad was destroyed, communication cut off, and I was sent with my recruits,
214, to Mnnfordville; was then ordered back to Louisville by a telegraphic dispatch
from General Boyle in person. I went to Lonisville, there met General Wright, Gen-
eral Boyle, and Governor Morton. They were talking about the position of things in
Munfordville. General Boyl~ was going to bring me to Louisville to take command
of a brigade of new troops there; he wanted some one to drill them. General Wright
opposed this; said I must go back to Munfordville and take command. I said I could
not, as General Ward was the general in command of Munfordyille at the time, a~d
Colonel Dunham was also there; both of those officers ranked me, so I could not take
command, but both of these officers were ordered away, and I was sent there to take
command; having the Sixty-seventh and Eighty-ninth Indiana, both new regiments,
the recruits of my own regiment, and two companies of the Seventy-fourth indiana,
and some scattered fragments of men, and about 400 convalescents without arms. The
whole force was 2,600. I had 2,122 with arms. The principal parts of the works I
built. Part of those built by General McCook I destroyed. His works were built for
infantry; I wanted works for artillery. I tried to arrange the works to employ a
small force from 200 up to 1,000. There was a stockade built at the end of the bridge,
which 1,200 men could have held against almost any infantry force. I was ordered
to direct all my efforts to maintain Green River Bridge. About the 11th of Septem-
ber I was ordered by telegraph to send my reports and dispatches to General Gilberl~.
I was notified that he was in command of that part of Kentucky. Up to that time I
had reported to General Boyle.

	Question. Was it possible for these unarmed men to have procured
arms at Louisville on their way down?

	Three hundred of them belonged to the Thirty-third Kentucky, then organizing at
Munfordville, and had not yet got arms; I had made efforts to have them drawn;
and over a hundred were convalescents, joining their regiments without arms, who
came there on Saturday, the 13th, in charge of Lieutenant Nichols, of a Wisconsin
regiment.

	Question. When you sent Miller and other scouts to General Buell
at Bowling Green did you give distinct information as to the length of
time you would be enabled to hold your position if not relieved?

	I told him to say what force I had and that I had provisions for ten days. I did
not say how long I could hold my position, not knowing what force was coming
ag~nst me. I left that for them to infer. I simply sent a statement of my condition,
the position I held, and the forces at my command, & c.

	Question. Did you send information to General Buell that you were
in a straitthat you must have relief; and did you inform General Buell
that you had no reasonable expectation of relief from your rear?

	I did not know General Buell was at Bowling Green when I sent my scouts. I sent
to the officer commanding at Bowling Green that the rebels were in force between
Munfordville and Bowling Green. I sent more to know what I might expect from
there after giving a statement of my own condition than anything else

Page 213

CRAP. XXVTtt.l	GENBRAL IIEPORTS.	213


	Question. Did you give these scouts or messengers any official infor-
mation for General Buell, or did they bear about any proofs by which
General Baell could recognize them as messengers from you?

	I gave them no official communication, nothing but verbal ones, but sent the men
I kuew could prove beyond doubt their reliability. I knew they had to pass the
coemys lines and would be thoroughly searched if taken and I did not wish to in-
lorin the enemy of my position at Munfordville.

	Question. Did these men, when they left your camp, know that you
were in danger of surrendering to the enemy, and did they know that
you were not to be relieved from the rear?

	Neither did they know it nor I.

	Question. Have you any reason to suppose that these men gave as-
surances to Gene~a1 Buell that your garrison would not receive relief
from Louisville or from your rear?

	I do not think they did, as they had no directions to do so. I myself had no doubt,
after intbrming my superior officers of the state of things, that I would be taken care
of some way; to the last I believed I would be re-enforced.

	Question. Have you any reason to believe that General Buell clearly
understood, prior to your surrendering, that you would not receive re-
lief from yonr rear?

	I had no means of knowing what General Buells opinion of the matter was; I really
did not know myself what I might expect, but was confident I should get relief from
some source.

By the PRESIDENT:

	Question. What time did you receive this dispatch which you have
before referred to as coming from General Gilbert, telling you you would
be aided or assisted from Bowling Green?

	I think it was on the 12th September.

	Question. How did you construe that dispatch; what meaning did
you give it?

	I supposed from that dispatch that General Buells army would come to relieve me
before Bragg could get there.

By General DANA:
	Question. Did you ever send to General Buell or in the direction of
General Buell an intimation that you had ever received such a dispatch
as that~

	I do not remember. I think I told Mr. Miller of it, that I had expected relief from
Bowling Green. At the time I sent the rebels were in force between Mnnfordville and
Bowling Green. I could not expect relief from Bowling Green except the rebels were
driven out first.

	Question. Do you now distinctly remember whether you gave Mr.
Miller special instructions to inform General Buell that you had received
an intimation from Louisville that he was expected to relieve you at
Mnnfordvmlle?

	I do not remember that I did. I supposed, as a matter of course, that General Gil-
bert had information from General Buell that I had not, and was puzzled to know
why he had not informed me more fully.

	Question. Have you reason now to suppose that General Buell at
that tune knew that if he did not relieve you at Munfordville you
could get no relief from your rear and would therefore be obliged to
Surrender?

	I do not know.

	Question. Do you or do you not now believe that the reason for you

Page 214

214
KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAP. XXVIII.
expecting relief from General Buell was owing to circumstances whieli
might not probably have been known to him, inasmuch as you were
depending for your supplies and support on your own commander?

	My expectation was that General Gilbert would see. that I was taken care of. I
was under his command, and supposed he knew what relief I would get. I did not
know what General Buell knew about it or what expectations General Gilbert had
from General Buell except that dispatch. All the information I got of General Buells
forces, or from General Gilbert in regard to General Buells forces, was this single
dispatch in which Colonel Bruce telegraphed me that General Buells whole army
was coming, a~d that left me almost entirely in the dark. I supposed General Buds
army was moving north, but when I found General Bragg had got in his rear I sup-
posed General Buell would drive him out of the way and relieve me. When I found
he could not do so I telegraphed to General Gilbert. When the head of Polks column
was coming down the north side of the river I telegraphed back to General Gilbert
that I had not force enongh to hold the position, and that I was not alone in the
opinion. This was on the 16th, after dark, that I got his answer. I do not know
whether General Buell knew I expected relief from him or from Louisville. I believe
I told Mr. Miller that Ihad been promised relief from Bowling Green.

	Question. Have you learned since whether Mr. Miller distinctly told
this to General Buell, that you had been promised relief fro~m there?

	I asked Mr. Miller some time this week in Nashville, and in fact when he came to
Mnnfordville from Bowling Green, if he had conveyed my message; he said he had.
This message was directed to the commander of the forces in Bowling Green. Wheii
Mr. Miller left I did not know that General Buell had got to Bowling Green.

	Question. Do you know whether the commanding officer at Louis-
ville or Cincinnati had any means of communicating direct with Gen-
eral Buell which was not known to you at that time?

	I did not suppose but that the commanders of two departments, with such armies
nnder their control, must certainly have communication with each other; I expect
they had.

	Question. Was there any other line of communication with that army
except from Munfordville?

	None that I know of. The cars had Feen running through Mnnfordville up to Fri-
day, the 1~2th. I supposed, of course, there would be a concert of action between the
commanders of the two armies.

By General TYLER:
	Question. Your expectation that Miller would receive credence at
headquarters was founded on the fact that he was personally known to
General Wood?

General Mc
I knew Mr. Miller had been ~mployed in the secret service by	Cook, and
he told me he was known to General Wood, and would have no difficulty in establish-
ing his reliability. General McCook had had him in his empiny in the same kind of
service the winter before.

By General DANA:
	Question. Does anything else now occur to you bearing upon this in-
vestigation which you have not stated in your testimony?

	I heard General Buell say that General Gilbert had evidently placed too great a
value on the possession of Munfordville. I could have got away from Munfordville
with my whole force up to 5 oclock on Tuesday if I had been allowed to, crossing the
river on the north side, following the road down to the river through a woody, hilly
country, and come around and joined General Buells forces at Cave City or below
there.

By General TYLER:
	Question. Why did you not leave the position?

	I had been ordered to hold out as long as possible and telegraphed the whole stat~i-
ment of facts to General Gilbert, expecting him to order me to get away if I could,
which he did not

Page 215

C~p. XXVIII.]	GENERAL REPORTS.	215

SATURDAY AFTERNOON, December 20, 1862.
	Colonel WILDERS examination continued.
/
Cross-examination by General BUELL:
	Question. At what hour Tuesday were you summoned to surrender?

	At 5 oclock in the evening.

	Question. Was the rebel force in position around your post before
that hour?
	On the south side of the river they were, and just coming around on the north side.
They had not got all their artillery in position then; probably not more than four
batteries.

	Question. When you sent your messenger to me did you know of the
position and strength of the force of the rebel army that was threaten-
ing you?

	At that time I was pretty well aware that the whole force of the rebels was on their
way, but did not believe that more than 7,000 were t~ireatening me then; the balance
was back, coming on, and were between Munfordville and Glasgow; part ~of them
were not yet arrived at Glasgow.

	Question. In what way did your informant arrive at the strength of
the regiments of Braggs army?
	I was informed by a great many persons. Some of them arrived at it by counting
the regiments ia some of the divisions and learned froni men belonging to them what
the force was. There was one man who had a relative in the advanced cavalry who
told him what the force was; and there had been parties of rebel cavalry scouting
the country for two weeks before, some of whom represented the force to be as high
as 60.000; but taking all the information I could get I think it was about 40,000. The
community about Munfordville are largely loyal, and have a good many relatives in
the Southern army, who would come in from a distance to within 10 or 12 miles to see
their friends, and from these I obtained information of the strength of the rebel army.
I also obtained it from deserters.

	Q~estion~ Which of these sources of information would represent the
minimum strength?

	Those who connted. Reports went through the country that they had as high as
75,000, but I gave no credence to them.

	Question. Would what is called the effective strength of the forces
according to returns be represented by the number of men found in
the ranks?

	My experience is that the paper showing is always in excess of that you can get in
line for action.

	Question. And particularly is it not in excess of the number that
would appear in the ranks on the march, where this kind of informatiou
would be obtained?

	The ranks in a regiment on the march wonld count for generally much smaller than
when in camp. There are always stragglers and details for wagon guards in every
army.

	Question. So is it not likely that the information of those who have
actually counted the strength of a corps on the march would fall short
of its actual strength?

	Very much so.


	MORROW P. ARMSTRONG (a witness for the Government), being (luly
sworn by the judge-advocate, testified as follows:

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:
	Question. State, if you please, your name and position in the service

Page 216

ta., M. ANP B. T1~NN., N. AtA., ANb SW. ~A. t~tiAP. xk~lit

and what you know of the number of the army under General Bragg at
the capture of Munfordville, how you came by that knowledge, and all
abotit it.

	My name is MorrOw P. Armstrong. My position in the Army is that of chaplain to
the Thirty-sixth Indiana Volunteers. As near as I conid form a judgment in reference
to the numbers of Braggs army they would be: Infantry ninety regiments, averag-
lug 325 to a regiment, making 29,250; cavalry, I estimated at 7,000; batteries, twelve,
Whi~h I averaged at 130; giving a total of 37,810. My information I obtained pntly
by sight and partly by conversation with officers in that army. I saw, I believe, all
or the greatest part of Braggs army I was with except Buckners; two divisions of
that were across the river. I was not across the river after the capture; did not pass
through that part of Braggs army.

	Question. State, if you please, how you obtained those facilities for
estimating the size of the army.

	I was with the forces at Mianfordville when they were captured and remained with
them until they arrived within our lines; then I joined my regiment. I was unre-
stricted; I was privileged to go where I pleased. No person interfered with my move-
ments. In fact, they told me they did not care where I went so that I did not go
toward Louisville. The officers that I had most conversation with wete a colonel on
General Braggs staff, a Tennessee captain, and a captain of the Mis~1ssippi Tenth;
his name was [R. A.] Bell.

	Question. State what you did with this information; whether you
communicated it to any superior officers or not and whether it went to
General Buell.

	I told first General Wood, after entering our lines, all that I knew with reference
to their numbers and of their position; secondly, I told General Smith; thirdly, Gen-
eral Rousseau; and,lastly, General Buell. General Smith and General Rousseau sent
me to General Buell. If I mistake not it was on the 19th of September; at least it
was on the Friday night after the night we were captured at Munfordville. I got to
General Buells headquarters somewhere near 11 oclock at night.

	Question. Do you know whether the rebel army had been increased
after the invasion by recruits or volunteers?
	I do not.

	Question. Did you observe the condition of the rebel troops and can
you state how they were off for provisions; whet her they had aity
train accompanying them or not?
	They had wagon trains accompanying them, but I think that their stock of pro-
visions was scarce; at least they stated to us on Thursday morning that the reason
why they did not give us more subsistence was they had it not to spare; that they
had given us more than their men had. My share of that was about one hard cracker
and a very small piece of fat bacon a day. This is what the officer who had that
matter in charge said. A number of officers in that army told me that their men had
to subsist on burnt corn and peaches, such as they could gather up. My observation
among them was that they had little to eat.

By General DANA:
	Question. Do you know whether the force you saw and estimated
around Munfordville was the whole of Braggs force?
	From the information I had I am inclined to believe it was; of course I go on in-
formation I received, in making up my judgment, from the number of generals present
and their rank; this must be the case. From them I learned pretty well the arrange-
mnent of their army under their commanders. I was informed that Polk and Elardee
commanded wings. They had as division generals Buckner, Cheatham, Withers,
Jones, Anderson, and Johnson; at least I got these names as division commanders.
I saw most of these generals.

Cross-examination by General BUELL:
	Question. How did you arrive at the strength of the regiments?
	I arrived at the strength of a majority of those regiments by a comparison of the

Page 217

CHAP. XXVIII.J	GENERAL REPORTS.	217

with regiments of our own with which I had been associated, carefully considering
their length, estimating their numbers by the numbers of our own regiments, and
hence I averaged those regiments at 325; some of them were quite small, others
pretty large.

	Question. Explain the process of this estimate.

	I have been associated with a regiment of our own nearly nine months as a line
officer of the regiment, and accustomed to measure with the eye the distance that a
regiment would occupy drawn up in line of battle. Knowing what was the number
of that regiment all along, at least during the nine months, I then with the eye
measured the distance that those regiments occupied, and then endeavored to strike
an average.

	Question. What was the strength of the regiments that you com-
pared these with?

	My own more particularly.

	Question. What was the strength of that regiment?

	I made the comparison with my regiment, and the strength of that when I was last
associated with it as a line officer was about 475.

	Question. How was that regiment formed when you estimat~ed the
length of line it occupied?

	On cress parade.

	Question. What was the length of line it occupied when so formed?

	It would be difficult to give it by feet.

	Question. By yards?

	That would be difficult too.

	Question. By any kind of measure you choose?

	The manner in which I have been accustomed to measure was by appointing a dis-
tance. It would be something near the length of this capitol.

	Question. From that can you -arrive at some standard of measure-
ment?

	I have no idea myself how long this capitol is; I do not know the number of feet.

	Question. Did you ever see a regiment of Braggs army on parade?

	I saw them draw up in line and I saw them on the march.

	Question. Did you estimate the length of the line occupied by any of
them and how many of them?

	I estimated the length of their lines in my mind thus: When I saw a regiment
drawn up in- dress parade or line I looked along that line carefully, made up my
judgment, and compared it in my mind with my own regiment. I did that with a
number, and the mujority of their regiments that I estimated were not as large as
my regiment; some of them were larger, in my judgment.

	Question. Did you count any of them?

	No, sir; I did not. I was afraid to do that, because I purposed, if I was not placed
under pledge of honor, to reveal everything I knew in reference to them.

Redirect examination by the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:
	Question. You say in reply to General Buells question that you never
measured by yards or feet the distance occupied by your regiment on
dress parade?

	I have never stepped it; I have only measured it with my eye. -

	Question. You did not count the number in the rebel regiment or
measure by yards or feet the distance they occupied ?

	I did not

Page 218

218	KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAP. XXVIIL

	Question. You arrived at the conclusion by comparing the length of
one of their regiments with your own ~

	Yes, sir.

	Commission adjourned to meet December 22, 1862, at 10 oclock a. m.

NASHVILLE, TENN., Monday Morning, December 22 1862
	The Commission met pursuant to adjournment. All the members
present; also the judge-advocate and General Buell.

	General SPEED S. FRY (a witness for the Government), being duly
sworn by the judge-advocate, testified as follows:

	By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:
	Question. State, if you please, your name and position in the service
of the United States.

	Speed S. Fry; I am brigadier-general of the volunteer service.

	Question. Did you accompany the march of the Army of the Ohio in
the pursuit of Bragg after he crossed the Tennessee ~

	I did, sir.

	Question. What was the condition of the Army of the Ohio as to dis-
cipline ~

	It was considerably demoralized.

	Question. State, if you please, the cause of that demoralization, as
far as you know.

	There were two or three causes tending to demoralize the army. One was the want
of supplies and the necessity of foraging upon a destitute country. Another was the
idea that Bragg would b~ permitted with a large army to invade Kentucky. There
seemed to be an intense feeling throughout the whole army on the subject of per-
initting the rebel army again to invade Kentucky. Officers and men felt that Bragg
could have been checked before reaching Kentucky. if proper diligence had been
nsed.

	Question. What estimate was placed upon the number of the invad-
ing army by intelligent officers, from all their sources of information,
previous to reaching Munfordville?

	From all the information obtained upon that subject the force of Bragg was esti-
mated at 36,000. There were rumors, ho~vever, in the camp and throughout the
country that Bragg had an army of from 50,000 to 60,000 men. The most intelligent
officers with whom I conversed believed that Braggs army did not exceed 36,000.

	Question~ You can state whether it was known at that time, that is,
previous to your arrival at Munfordville, that Kirby Smith had invaded
Kentucky, and what the object of Kirby Smith and Bragg was.

	It was known before that that Kirby Smith had invaded Kentucky, and from all I
could gather in regard to their object in this invasion it was to hold Kentucky as a
part of the Southern Confederacy.

	Question. You can state whether it was known at the time how Bragg
was situated in reference to supplies and what expectation he had of
forming a junction with Kirby Smith.

	From the best information I could obtain Bragg was poorly supplied with pro-
visions at the time of the invasion by his army. I could not ascertain certainly at
what point they expected to form a jur ctiou; but, judging from events since that
time, they must have expected to unite at Perryville or Harrodsburg.

	Question. I ask you, general, in reference to the information or opin-
ion held~y the army at the time; that is, previous to the capture o

Page 219

CHAP. XXVIII.]
GENERAL REPORTS.

Munfordville. I ~wish to know at what point it was expected that Bragg
could get supplies for his army that he was then marching without.

	I do not think he could have obtained supplies short of Bardstown, Lebanon, and
through that region Qf country. Of course he could have obtained some supplies
soon after reaching Kentucky; not I think to a very great extent.

	Question. State, if you please, whether you were at the battle of
Perryville; what you know of the number of the enemy, and of their
movements on the night after the battle and the day subsequent.

	I was at the battle of Perryville. I had no certain means of ascertaining the num-
ber of the enemy at Perryville during the fight. My only information was obtained
from citizens living iu and around the place. From that information I came to the
conclusion that Bragg and Kirby Smith formed a junction at Perryville, and Kirby
Smith, with the whole or a portion of his army, was there. The day after the battle
the evacuation took place, and they moved in the direction of Harrodsbnr~.,, as I learn,
with the larger portion of their army. A portion of it, I learned, moved in the direc-
tion of Danville.

	Question. State, if you please, whether you are acquainted with that
region of country and how you came to a knowledge of it.

	I am very well acquainted with that part of the country. I was born and raised
within 8 miles of the place and have traveled a great deal over it.

	Question. What was your position, general, on the day of the battle
of Perryville and the day succeeding the battle; that is, what field were
you in and what were you doing ~

	I was made the officer for the day of the center of the army the night previous to
the battle. About 11 oclock at night I passed out with one regiment of my brigade
to the house of Mr. Jardine Peter. I there filed a regiment off to the left of the
Springfield pike, and ordered them to take a position not far in the rear of the ridge
upon which the battle commenced in the morning. General Gilbert, after some re-
flection, concludedto send a strong picket out. He ordered out Colonel McCook with
his brigade, from, I believe, General Sheridans division. I directed Colonel MeCook,
with four regiments, I think, of his brigade, to take a position npon the right of the
road and upon this ridge. I took one regiment from his brigade and placed it upon
the left of the road and the left regiment which I had already stationed there. From
the Tenth Indiana Regiment I directed one company to advance as near to the front
as the officer might deem safe. They advanced a little beyond this ridge of which
I have already spoken to a house situated on the west side of another ridge nearer
the town. There they found the pickets of the enemy. A few shots were exchanged,
and, according to the directions I had given, my pickets fell back out of reach of their
guns in order to prevent any alarm. Colonel McCook, with his brigade, came upon
the enemy just before day and had a considerable engagement, at least with the
pickets. I immediately went out to where the two regiments were on the left and
advanced them at least half a mile. I remained there some time watching the move-
ments of the enemy, and felt satisfied from what I saw and from my knowledge of the
position of the ground that just in front of me and to my left the enemy would make
the most decided stand. In the course of an hour after I had advanced those two
regiments two pieces of artillery, together with some two or three regiments of cav-
alry, came to this point. I inonired of Colonel Gay, who was in command of the
cavalry, if there was any enemy just in front of that battery and of our forces. He said
the enemy had taken their position, he believed, just on the point of the first ridge
of the two of which I have spoken, and deemed it advisable that I should go there
and drive them away. I followed his advice and succeeded in doing what he desired.
The fight was still going on immediately to my right by General Sheridans division.
These two regiments remained there some time, but were finally ordered back; the
Tenth Indiana to the rear to join its brigade, and the other, the Eighty-sixth Illinois,
to join Colonel MeCook. I was not in the fight after that during the day.

	Question. What was the conduct of General Gilbert immediately
previous to the fight, pending the fight, and subsequent to it ~

	General Gilberts conduct toward me was generally courteous and polite. I had no
reason to complain of him personally. I heard a great deal of complaint from subor-
dinate officers in regard to his conduct toward the men. They spoke of it as being
very unofficerlike and ungentlemanly. I, however, saw nothing of it myself~ I saw
very little of General Gilbert during the day of the fight. I cannot therefore say
what part he took in the engagement.
21

Page 220

220	KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAP. XXVIII.

	Question. I ask you, general, in reference to whaf he did; whether
he did his duty; whether it was done with ability as a general, if you
kvow.
	The two divisions besides my own under his command were in the fight and be-
haved well, and I suppose that they were nnder the immediate control and direction
of General Gilbert. So far as I could learn in regard to the management of those two
divisions General Gilbert behaved well, though I know nothing of the part he took
in it personally. He gave me no directions as to what I should do dnring the day.
All the directions I obtained from him were as to what I should do the night previous
to the battle as officer of the day, and what I did on the day of the fight was done,
I must say, upon my own responsibility. I do not think I saw General Gilbert any
time during the day of the fight. What directions he gave to his other divisions I
am unable to say, and cannot therefore say whether he displayed great military skill
or not.

	Question. Had General Gilberts entire force been engaged iu that
fight what effect would it have had upon the fortunes of the day, in
your opinion ~?

	My opinion is that the fortunes of the day would have turned a great deal more in
our favor than they did.

	Question. At the time you were approaching Perryville was it known
to the army what the movements of Kirby Smith werein what direc-
tion he was marching?

	I learned that information had been obtained to the effect that Kirby Smith was
ma,rching in the (lirection of Ha.rrodsburg from the north of Harrodsbnrg; that a
portion of his army and General Sills division had a slight engagement near Hardens-
vilJ.e, I think iii Shelby County, and perhaps another slight engagement near Law-
renceburg, 20 miles north of Harrodsburg.

	Question. At what time ou the morning of the 9th was it knowu to
your army that Bragg was moving toward llarrodsburg and was the
object of that movement understood?

	I do not know at what time it was reported at headquarters. Ilearned it between
7 and 8 oclock in the moi nirrg. I (10 not know what was the object of the movement.
I suppose what was the object, but do not know certainly. I was satisfied myself
that they were anxious to get out of our way.

	Question. Had our army moved from Perryville on the morning of
the 9th to Dauville, or in that direction, what would have been the effect,
instead of going to Harrodsburg?

	I think ~he effect would have been to have ebecked them at Camp Dick Robinson,
yrovided our army had continued to move in the proper direction beyond Danville.
rhere was but one way of escape, in my opinion, for theni from Camp Dick Robin-
son, and that way was left entirely open.

	Question. By your moving toward Harrodsburg instead of Dauville?

	Yes, sir.

By General DANA:
	Question. What was your rank and the character of your command
in the Army of the Ohio from the time Bragg crossed the Tennessee
River during the retrograde movement of the Army of the Ohio?

	I was brigadier-general of the volnnteer forces, and in command of a brigade com-
prising four regiments and one bar tery. From October the 9th, the day after the bat-
tle, I was in command of the First Division, and have been up to this time.

	Question. Do you know anything, during one or two days prior to the
battle of Perryville, of General Gilbert taking possession of a spring of
water for the exclusive use of himself and his staff?

	I knew nothing of it personally; I only heard that sn~h was the fact. General Gil-
bert ordered me the night before the battle to place a guard over a pool of water for
the use of the men

Page 221

CHAP. XXVIII.]
GENERAL REPORTS.
221
	Question. Do you know anything of the size and quantity of. water
in the spring you heard he took possession of?
	I do not, sir. I did not know there was a spring there. All the water I drank, ex-
cept on one occasion, was from the pool before spoken of.
	Question. At this time were the men suffering from the want of water?

	They were suffering very much.

By General Gun:
	Question. Before the battle of Perryville did GenQral Buell place
over you any officer with whose right and capacity to command yon
were dissatisfied?
	I cannot say that I was wholly dissatisfied myself, that is, on my own account. I
was dissatisfied, however, on account of the treatment of that officer placed over me
by General Buell toward officers nuder my immediate command. As to his right to com-
mand, I know nothing about it except what I have heard since. I have learned that
he had no right to command me; indeed, I may say I heard it prior to his being re-
lieved of his command, but made no complaint. I obeyed his orders as cheerfully as
though he had been my superior in rank.

	Question. State the name of this officer.
C.	C. Gilbert.

	Question. You say the Army of the Ohio was demoralized at that
time; do you know positively the state of discipline in other divisions
besides your own at that time?
	I was thrown a great deal among other divisions, and found them as much, if not
more, demoralized than my own.

	Question. Do you know of any petition to remove General Buell from
the command of the Army of the Ohio either before or after the battle
of Perryville?
	I know of only one and that was never presented.

	Qaestion. What was this petition based upon?
	Simply upon the idea that those signing it did not believe General Buell was com-
manding the army in such a manner as to secure success for our arms.

	Question. Did it make any specific charges against General Buell?
	None that I recollect except that.

	Question. About how many colonels of regiments signed this petition?
	I did not count the number. Eight or ten, I suppose; perhaps more; not less, I am
satisfied.

	Question. Did you consider at the time that this petition was right
and well founded?
	I thought it was well founded at the time.

	This question being objected to by the jndge-advocate, the court was
cleared.
	Question. Do you know the names of any officers of the rank of
colonel or above that rank who signed this petition I
	Yes, sir.

	Question. Will you state those names?
	General James B. Steedman, Third Brigade of the First Division; Col. J. M. Har-
lan, commanding Second Brigade of the First Division; Colonel George, command-
ing Second Minnesota Regiment; Col. J. M. Connell, commanding Seventeenth Ohio;
Col. M. B. Walker, commanding First Brigade, First Division; Col. John T. Croxton,
commanding Fourth Kentucky; Maj. D. Ward, of the Seventeenth Ohio; Lieut. Col.
F. W. Lister, of the Thirty-first Ohio, and several others whose names I cannot now
call to mind

Page 222

222
KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAP. XXVIT1.
	Question. Did you sign thi~ petition?

	I decline to answer that question, sir.

	Question. To whom do you consider that a general is responsible for
the performance of his official dutiesto his superior who places huin
in position or to his subordinates under his command?

	I think he is responsible to his superior and to the people of his country, the sub-
ordinate officers included.

	Question. Do you think this responsibility extends to the Propriety
of any move he may make?

In some instances I should think it did.

	Question. How do you suppose a general should go to work to obtain
the opinion of the subordinates under his command in regard to the
propriety of any movement he was about to make?

	I know no other means than by consultation.

	Question. To what limit do you consider the responsibility to his sub-
ordinate officers extends, going down?

	Under ordinary circumstances it is the duty of a general commanding an army to
consult more especially general officers as low down as the commanders of divisions,
and through them be could obtain the opinions of intelligent and xvell-informed
officers of a lower grade. Under extraordinary circumstances there are n~any instances
in which a general commanding an army would be greatly benefited in his movements
by the consultation of officers of even the very lowest grades; and I think during the
movements of our army in Kentucky there were many instances in which it would
have been advisablo that General Buell should have consulted the officers who were
familiar with the cce~ntry, and who, in my opinion, would have been of great service
to him.

	Question. Would it not be necessary, if the general had pursued the
course you speak of in obtaining the opinions of officers of a lower
grade, after consultation with higher officers, to postpone the movement
until the officers of the lower grades might be consulted upon the special
move about which they had no previous information?

	If it were necessary to consult a great many officers, as a matter of course the
movement would have been postponed to some extent; but generally speaking it
would not be necessary to consult a great many officers; and the information neces-
sary to be obtained from those officers who were acquainted with the character of the
country and the strength of any particular position could be obtained very readily
and very quickly.

	Question. Is there any method or manner you know of by which the
commanding officer can make these subordinate officers, to whom you
think he is more or less reSl)Onsible, responsible for the disasters which
may ensue from following their advice?

	General DANA.. I object to that question as irrelevant.
	The court was then Z~1eared. On being reopened the witness pro.
ceeded.
	The WITNESS. If an officer was called upon by his commanding general for infor-
ination on any particular subject connected with the movements of the army, and that
officer, having it in his power to give such information, should make a misrepresenta-
tion of facts, I do not see why he should not be court-martialed; but as a general
thing, as I said before, I do not suppose there would be any way of reaching this
officer for any disaster which might occur from following his advice.

	Question. In your opinion do you consider that want of confidence
which you state existed in General. Buell was somewhat due to his not
consulting the officers under his command enough?

	I do, sir. There seemed to be a general complaint on that. subject even with the
officers who in the opinion of every one should have been consulted

Page 223

CHAP. XXVIII.]	GENERAL REPORTS.	223

By CTeneral DANA:
	Question. Within the precincts of whose corps and division was the
meeting held to which you have testified I

	It was at a house not within any officers command.


MONDAY AFTERNOON, December 22, 1862.

	General FRYS examination continued.

Cross-examined by General BUELL:
	Question. How long had this scarcity of provisions lasted which you
say tended in a measure to demoralize the troops I

	Our supplies were cat off some time in the month of August. While my division
was stationed at Decherd we were on half rationsfrom that time until we reached
Louisville or Bowling Green, I do not recollect which; Louisville I think.

	Question. Are you able to say, general, how far this interruption of
our communications was my fault I

	I cannot say how far General Buell was in fault in regard to the cntting off of sup-
plies; but our forces were very much scattered and at
protection to the railroads.	,	points where there was no

	Question. Will you specify the positions of the troops by way of illus-
tration on this point?

	So far as my recollection now serves me a portion of our troops were at Huntsville,
a portion on the road between Huntsville and Decherd, and some few of them at Pu-
laski. My brigade and Colonel Walkers brigade were for a time at Decherd and Win-
chester~ which is close by. A short time after we reached Decherd the First and
Second Brigades were sent to Pelham, 16 miles southeast, I think, of Decherd. Gen-
eral McCook was, if I recollect rightly, at Stevenson or near there. General Woods
division and the division commanded by General Ammen were sent to MeMinuville.
I do not know what troops there were between this place and Decherd. I do not
recollect the particular locality of any of the rest of the command.

	Question. When did the interruption occur in the communications of
the army during the time the troops were occupying these positions?

	I think the principal interruption was at the tunnel some 7 or 8 miles beyond Gal-
latin. There were some other slight interruptions. I do not now recollect the exact
point.

	Question. Were they south of Nashville or north I

	They were north.

	Question. What force do you think would have been necessary to
keep open the communications of the army between Nashville and Lou-
isville?

	I cannot tell what force it would take; at some points it would take a considerable
force, at other points a less force.

	Question. Do you know, or did you know, the object of the concen-
tration of the troops on the line from McMinnville to Decherd I

	I snpposed the object was to meet the enemy, as I at first understood they were
coming in that direction, but afterward satisfied myself that the enemy was rapidly
making its way toward Kentucky, and so informed General Buell.

	Question. When did you first be~ome convinced that Bragg was
marching for Kentucky, and not for Nashville, Tenn. I

	I became thoroughly convinced while I was at Decherd, though I was fully of the
opinion that that was his purpose while I was stationed at Tuscumbia, Ala., and so
expressed it to officers of the army and by letter to my friends in Kentucky.

	Question. On what was that opinion based I

	It was based on information received fvoni reliable rersone who were conversan

Page 224

224
KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAP. XXVIII.
with the movements of the rebel army, and who told me they had conversed with
citizens and with officers of the rebel army.

	Question. Did that opinion have reference to the movements of the
army under General Bragg or to those of the army under Kirby Smith?

	It had reference to the movements of the army under General Bragg. When I be
came thoroughly satisfied that Bragg was moving toward Kentucky, Kirby Smith
was already there with his army.

	Question. What time?

	I cannot specify the day of the month, but it was some time in the month of August.

	Question. It was after the time, however, when you were first satisfied
that an invasion of Kentucky would be made?

	Yes, sir; it was.

	Question. Wa~ this opinion of such a character as to admit of no
doubt?

	I thought so, sir, and it turned out correct.

	Question. Was it equally convincing to others as to you~rself?

	I believed it was universally believed that Bragg was moving toward Kentucky
with the view of invading it.

	Question. Did you believe that he had no intermediate object in the
movement, particularly the capture of Kashville?

	That idea was held out by some, and it may have been his purpose to have attacked
Nashville; but from the direction in which his army went I did not believe myself
that he contemplated any attack upon Nashville, knowing that he could do our army
here as much injury by getting in its rear as he could by taking Nashville, add if his
object in going to Kentucky would have been secured he would have gained more
than by taking Nashville.

	Question. In what way could he have derived advantage from get.
ting into the rear of the Army of the Ohio in Kentucky?

	He would have cut them off entirely from all supplies, and have had more and better
opportunities of securing Kentucky to the rebel cause.

	Question. Did you in your mind trace the route he would pursue in
this invasion?

	I traced it from information I received from others as to the direction in which he
was going.

	Question. I mean before the route was actually known by his own
movements.

	I cannot say that I traced it exactly, and had to be governed by information re-
ceived from others as to the route he intended to take, but knew that there were
routes by which he could very safely pass into Kentucky.

	Question. What course would you have adopted in order to thwart
him; and I ask, first, did you at the time form any definite plan with
reference to it?

	I thought we ought, under all the circumstances, to have attacked him at some
point before he reached the Cumberland River, but not knowing well the geography
of the country did not select any particular spot myself at which he ought to have
been attacked. I gathered from well-informed officers that SpartaI think that was
the placewas the point at which he might easily have been attacked and driven
back.

	Question. From what officers did you get this information?

	My impression now is that General Thomas gave it as his opinion that that was the
point at which he might have been successfully attacked, though I would not say
certainly & at this was the point, but some point was designated

Page 225

CHAP. XXVIII.]	GENERAL REPORTS.	225


	Question. When was that opinion expressed?

	I do not know that I heard General Thomas express it prior to the time of General
Braggs passing the point, but I understand that he had some time previously given
it as his opinion and had urged the necessity of it.

	Question. When did you hear that he had expressed that opinion?

	I cannot specify the exact time, sir; I did not keep a memorandum of it- bu
was while the army was at Louisville, I think.

	Question. Do you know where the army of Bragg was when that ad-
vice was given?

	I do not know exactly where General Braggs army was, but I understood ~he
opinion was expressed while General Thomas was at McMinnville. General Braggs
army was constantly moving in the direction of Kentucky, as I understood.

	Question. Was the impression made on your mind that when this
advice was given Bragg was actually in a position to be attacked at
Sparta?

	It was that Bragg was moving in that direction, and that there was an elio~ible
point to concentrate our forces and prevent his passage into Kentucky.

	Question. Are you well enough acquainted with the country to say
now that Bragg could not have pursued any other route?

	I suppose there are other routes he might have followed, but it would have thrown
him, in my opinion, a great deal out of his way. His army would, in my opinion,
have been checked.

	Question. What routes do you think of now?

	I do not know that I can exactly specify the route he might have followed, unless
he had taken some other route higher up the Cumberlaud River and entered Kentucky
somewhere near Birchville; that is, I understand there is a road in that direction
through which he could have gone.

	Question. Do you think that Bragg would have attacked your army
in position?

I think it is very doubtful, sir.

	Question. How strong a force would it have required to attack him
in position?

	It would have depended entirely upon whether he was fortified or not. If not for-
tified, I think we would have had force enough to have attacked him anywhere almost.
He was not fortified anywhere on the road, as I understood.

	Question. Do you not recognize that there are natural positions, par-
ticularly in mountainous regions, which have many, if not all, the ad-
vantages of artificial works?

	Yes, sir; there are strong positions in the mountains and on rivers where there are
bluffs through which the enemy would not venture to go; but, as I understood the
region of country around the direction in which Braggs army was at the time, we
would have had as great an advantage as the enemy if we had pushed on and taken
a position equally as good as we had at Murfreesborough, where our army was con-
centrated, as I understood, for the express purpose of meeting the enemy.

	Question. Do you mean that the enemy could not have taken a posi-
tion at Sparta which would not have given him greatly the advantage,
numbers being equal?

	I do not pretend to say so, if he had gotten there before we did.

	Question. Suppose you had got there first and taken a position too
strong for him to attack, could not he have changed his route and
avoided you?

	~ have already stated that he might.

15 R RYOL XV

Page 226

226	KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. ICHAP. XXZVUL

	Question. In your plan for meeting the enemy at Sparta or there-
abouts what force did you suppose he would have and what force did
you suppose yourself to have i

	My information was that the enemy had 36,000 men. I did not see the reports of
our army, but understood we had aearly 50,000 men. I think that would have been
sufficient to have met him.

	Question. Suppose you could have interposed but 24,000, would you
have thought it judicious to interpose yourself in that.positioii when
you could have increased the force by taking a positiou nearer your base?

	1 do not think so, unless the position taken was of such a strength as to have given
us the advantage.

	Question. Do you not think that in opposing yourself to an enemy
that might choose his route, that might attack you or avoid at his op-
tion,it would be necessary for you to have a sufficient force to act on
the offensive in order certainly to defeat his purpose?

	It might be necessary and it might not; I cannot say. It is a very general sort of
a question, and I do not suppose any man can answer it entirely satisfactorily.

	Question. If an enemy may pursue various routes you can only put
yourself on the defensive with reference to one of them; since while
you are preparing yourself on one he may suddenly take advantage of
the other and deprive you of the benefit of the position and thus com-
pel you to attack him or let him alone. Perhaps you can answer the
question with that explanation more definitely.

	If he failed to attack me and I became satisfied that an attack on me would be dis-
astrous I would let him pass. If I felt satisfied that I had an equal chance of secur-
ing a victory I should mosb unquestionably pursue him and attack him wherever I
could catch him.

	Question. Do you not think that under such circumstances, in order
to defeat the purpose of your enemy, you ought to have a sufficient force
to assume the offensive; that is, to pursue and attack him wherever
you find him, notwithstanding some advantage of position he may have?

	Of course it would be necessary to pursue him if you wished to attack him. It
would not be advisable to attack 20,000 with 5,000 or 40,000 with 10,000.

	Question. Would it always be advisable to attack 10,000 with 10,000
or 10,000 with 15,000?

	Not always, sir. There are many instances in which it would be advisable and
many in which it would not be advisable. I do not know, however, that this was an
instance in which it would not be advisable.

	Question. Has your condemnation of the campaign in Tennessee last
summer been bftsed on the supposition that we had an army of 50,000,
or nearly that, which could be brought to bear upon any point, which
could have been opposed to Bragg~s army as it passed through the
State?

	I so understood it, sir; that when our army was concentratedI mean that army
with which General Buell left Corinthwe had something near 50,000 men, and per-
haps more.

	Question. Can you not see why Murfreesborough might have had
some advantage over a more remote point for concentration and battle,
su~)posing the enemy wished to advance upon you? Did the fact of its
being nearer your base give it any advantage?

	I had very little opportunity of examining the ground, and cannot say certainly
that the advantages of Murfreesborongh were greatly superior to those of other points.
I bad no objection to concentrating the forces there, under tbe idea that Bragg was
moving on ihat point~ I thought w~ could tight Vhe~e as w~U ns iinywhiere else in a

Page 227

CHAP. XXVIII.]
GENERAL REPORTS.

open field fight. There was one advantage I might mention: it was a rich country,
and we could supply our army better there than we could perhaps beyond there. There
might also be an advantage in being neai~er Nasyille.

	Question. How does the condition of Middle Tennessee compare now,
general, with what it was in July or August in regard to supplies?

	When our army reached here last fall I suppose, so far as forage was concerned, it
was better than when we left here early in September. As to provisions for an army
and for feeding the men I suppose it is not so good now as then, both armies having
drawn supplies to a certain extent from Middle Tennessee. The last years crop added
some supplies to a country previously pretty well exhausted. In other portions, how-
ever, through which I passed there was a large amount of supplies prior to the com-
ing in of the present years crop.

	Question. Has the crop of last summer increased that supply or not,
do you think?

	I suppose it did increase it; but in some localities the supply must now be as low
as it was prior to the coming in of the last years crop by being drawn upon by both
armies.

	Question. Was the crop of last year really available when we left
here?

	We made it so; we used it very freely.

	Question. Had not the crop of 1861 been drawn upon by both armies
and to a greater extent than the crop of this year is now?

	In some localities I suppose it was; in other localities it was not. In the immediate
vicinity of Nashville, Murfreesborough, and Gallatin I suppose the crop for this year
(1862) has been well-nigh exhausted; whereas the crop of 1861, in a very large region
of country in Middle Tennessee, when I passed through that country, was scarcely
touched, except now and then by a brigade passing along the road. The crops in the
southern part of Middle Tennessee this year were very fine, at least corn. The rebels
may since that time have taken all the forage in that region of country.

	Question. What crop were we fed from last summer; the crop of
1861 or 1862? The crop of 1862 is the one just gathered.

	 In some places we were obliged to forage upon the crops of 1862, owing to the
scarcity of the crop of 1861. In many places, however, we found the greatest abun-
dance of corn, and sometimes hay, sometimes oats, of the crop of 1861.

	Question. Suppose the Army of the (Jumberland to be cut off from
Louisville now, would it or would it not be in a condition to assume
offensive operations?

	It would not be in a position to assume offensive operations, as I understand it; not
for the want of supplies and provisions for the men, but for the lack of forage.

	Question. You mean that the supply of provisions for the menfor
the armyis greater than the supply of forage?

	I understand so, sir; for they have to forage upon the country here and have to
fight for a great deal they get.

	Question. Suppose the communication with Louisville to be effectually
severed and that this army was opposed by one which could fight it or
not at its option, how long could it stay here, supposing it to have on
hand now supplies for ten days?

	If we were compelled to fight the enemy and were overcome its stay would be but
short; if, however, it succeeded in driving the enemy back and scattering its forces,
it might be able to stay some time; I cannot say how long.

	Question. Suppose the enemy did not give it battle but simply hov.
ered about to prevent it from foraging?

	If the communication between this and Louisville was effectually cut off I should
think that our army here would be most effectually ruined, nnless they had provisions
enough on hand to take them to a point w
ve8tw~rd o~ elsewhere.	here they eould s~iwe supplies front th
22

Page 228

228
KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CrTAP. xxviii.
	Question. Besides the necessity which existed last summer for forag.
ing on the country to some extent, do you think there was a prevalent
tendency among the troops to plunder and maraud upon the community
through which they passed ~?

	Yes, sir; I do.

	Question. Was that due to the neglect of the officers, do you think,
general ~

	I cannot say that it was due to the neglect of the officers altogether; there might
have been some instances, and no doubt there were, in which it was due to the neg-
lect of officers; but there seemed to be,.outside of the necessity of foraging and seizing
food from the country, a disposition on the part of the men to pillage, arising, I think,
out of the fact that they were not allowed to strike a blow at some point npon the
enemy. I heard this among the men themselves, and used as much influence and power
as I possessed to prevent these depredations from being committed.

	Question. Would you believe in the honor and courage of a man who
pretended that he pillaged his unarmed friend because he had not an
opportunity to fight a manly and armed foe ~

	There are some instances in which I would have great confidence in n\en who would
even be guilty of pilfering u~:der such circumstances as those; but, generally speak-
ing, men who are disposed to pilfer, and who pilfer under any and all circumstances,
are not to he relied upon. Men, however, in an army act very differently frow what
they do under ordinary circumstances, when at home, under the influences of peace. I
helieve there is such a thing as making men who are generally considered honest and
upright at home thieves in an army, and I think this can be done by inefficiency and
neglect on the part of officers. I have twice in my life been connected with the
Army of the United States, and I have found this rule to prevail iu both instances.

	Question. When did this disposition to pilfer first evince itself?

	This general system of pilfering was more clearly evinced after we left Decherd to
march to Peiham in the month of August.

	Question. Do you not think that this disposition was in fact (lue to
the encouragement which it had received from the popular sentiment
through the country and the idea of carrying on a war of vengeance
instead of one for the preservation of the Union?

I do not think it was, sir. That may have had something to do with it with some.

	Question. You have stated in your direct testimony that Bragg was
moving into Kentucky with the purpose of forming a junction with
Kirby Smith at llarrodsburg. Was it probable that after forming that
junction he would suddenly determine to abandon his purpose in Ken-
tucky without a decisive battle?

	My opinion is that Bragg and Smith had a doable object in view in invading K~u-
tucky. One was to provide their army with such provisions and clothing as they
could take from the citizens there; another was, if it was in their power, to hold Ken.
tucky by power of arms and make it part and parcel of the Southern Confederacy.
They gathered together all the provisions and clothing they could find in that por-
tion of the State through which they passed, but finding that they were unable to
hold the State against the army that was pursuing them they determined to evac-
uate i.t.

	Question. When do you think that determination was formed?

	My opinion is it was formed after the battle of Perryville, if the statements of the
people of Kentucky are to be relied on at all.

	Question. Was there anything at the time to indicate that the battle
of Perryville had been of a decisive character or of such a character as
to determine the result of an important campaign?

	I think they became satisfied that if our whole force, had moved upon them at
Perryville they would liaye been very badly beaten and were afraid to yentum an-
other battle

Page 229

CHAP. XXVIII.].	GENERAL REPORTS.
229
	Question. Is your opinion based upon the assumption that Braggs
army and Kirby Smithsthe whole rebel force in Kentuckywere
concentrated at Perryville V

	Not entirely. I understood that Kirby Smith, with a portion of his army, would
form a junction with Bragg at Perryville; whether tine or not I am not able to say;
but I believe, whether they formed it there or not, they did afterward unite their
arms somewhere between that point and Lancaster.

	Question. Was there anything to prevent that junction from being
formed at Perryville V

	Nothing, sir, that I know of; and I think it was partly accomplished.

	Question. Suppose it proved that it was not accomplished at Perry-
yule an(l that the enemy deliberately planned to form a junction at
llarrodsburg, would that indicate an intention to retreat from the State
without another battle V

	I do not think that would indicate an intention to retreat from the State without
a battle, but I think they were satisfied that they were not able to cope with our
army, and that if our army had been hurled upon them at Perryville thely would
either have been captured or scattered to the winds. That determined the abandon-
inent of the main object of the invasion of the State by the rebel army.

	Question. Was there anything in the movements of the enemy imme-
diately after the battle to indicate that he intended to retreat from the
State ~i

	Their leaving their position whi& h they held there at Perryville and moving toward
Harrodsburg indicated to some extent to my mind a determination to ]eave the State.

	Question. Why should they have moved toward Harrodsburg, sul)-
posing them to be concentrated at Perryville V

	Some of them move4 toward Dauville, as I understand; some toward Harrodsbnrg;
and I suppose their object was to concentrate their forces and get them together, if
possible, at Camp Dick Robinson, and move them off from there with all the provis-
ions they had collected together. They moved in different directions to expedite
their retreat as much as possible.

	Question. What portioii moved by Danville V

	I cannot say; I only learned that some of them did.

	Question. Are you satisfied that any portion of the army marched
that wayV

	I have the same evidence for that which I have for the other; that is, from citizens.

	Question. Were they cavalry or infantry V

	I cannot say for certain which.

	Question. Would your opinion of their plans be affected by the ques-
tion whether a portion of them actually moved off by IDanville or
whether they formed a junction with the whole force at Harrodsburg;
is that a matter which would be likely to affect your opinion of their
plans V

	My opinion was that at the time they left Perryville, whatever direction they went,
their intention was to leave the State, and it so turned out.

	Question. IDo you not think that opinion is rather confirmed by the
result than founded in reason at the time V

	I think there were good reasons for it. One is that if they had felt satisfied of
being enabled to drive us back and hold a position which they did hold at Perry-
yule they would never have left it, for there is no point between Louisville and the
farthest point to which our army went beyond Perryville at which they could have
successfully met us. Perryville was the point, and I learn that General Bragg so
0xpressed him8elf

Page 230

230	KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. rOHAP. XXYIIL

	Question. Do you know of their having selected a battle ground at
Harrodsburg?
I heard such a thing, but the fact of their abandonment shows very conclusively
to my mind that they did not consider the place tenable against an army.
	Question. Which army suffered most in the battle of Perryville do
you think?
	From the best information I could get and from an examination of the matter the
suffering was almost equal.
	Question. Have you ever heard the enemys loss estimated at 4,000
and upward in that fight?
	I have seen it stated that it is about equal to ours. I heard various rumors as to
the numbers killed, wounded, and missing on both sides, and they all seemed to cor-
roborate the statement that the sufferings of the two armies were about equal.

	Question. Do you know when the rebel army commenced their re-
treat from Camp Dick Robinson?
	Not exactly, save from what citizens told us. They were leaving there for some two
or three days. From accounts I received I understood they commenced leaving there
about the 10th or 11th of October.

	Question. How far was our army, or a large portion of it, from Dan-
yule on the 10th of October?
	I think I left Perryville on the 10th. I cannot tell how far the army was away, as
I was not with it.

	Question. How far is the spring which bears your name from Dan-
yule ~t
	It is estimated at 5 miles by the pike.

	Question. What extent of ground, in miles, would the army we had
at Perryville occupy?
	Judging from what I was told by those who were on the extreme right and left of
our army and my knowledge of the ground it must have extended over the space of
8 to 10 miles; perhaps farther. I speak of the ground over which the enemy would
have extended on the day of the battle.

	Question. What extent of ground would necessarily have been re~
quired for it in camp?
	If the ground were level the army could be encamped, I suppose, in a space of half
that length. If the ground were rough aud uneven it would have occupied more
space.

	Question. Suppose it had been known that the enemy had designed to
retreat by the way of Crab Orchard and that before he could do that our
army was placed across his route, what course could he have pursued?
	He might possibly have pursued the course of Kentucky River Bridge. I do not
know of any other way he could have got out of Camp Dick Robinson. I stated this
morning that there was only one way to get out of Camp Dick Robinson, and that
way was left open. He could, as I have stated, have succ ceded in getting across
the Kentucky River Bridge, unless pursued too hotly.

	Commission adjourned to meet December 23, 1862, at 10 oclock a. m.

IN \ SHVILLE, Tuesday Morning, December 23, 1862.
	The Commission mci pursuant to adjournment. All the wembers
present; also the judge-advocate and General Buell.

	General FRYs cross-examination continued.

By General BUELL:
Question. Who were the principal movers in the meotin~ which ha

Page 231

CHAP. XXVIII.]	GENERAL REPORTS.	231


for its object to prepare a petition for the removal of General l3uell
from the command of th~ Army of the Ohio I

	I believe I have said on that subject all that is proper to say.

	The court was here cleared.

	I cannot say who first moved in it. I gave yesterday the names of some of the princi-
pal parties concerned, and that is as far as I know.

	Question. Was the object of that meeting made the subject of dis-
cussion by officers within your knowledge?

	I have heard the matter discussed by those whom I have mentioned and others.

	Question. Were these discussions attended by a knowledge of the
facts which affect the question and had these discussions for their ob-
ject to arrive at a correct understanding of it, or did they merely con-
sist in expressions of dissatisfaction?

	I do not know what knowledge they had of the facts affecting the question. There
were expressions of dissatisfaction, based on the idea that the Army of the Ohio was
not properly managed.

	Question. Were these discussions in public or in private?

	In one sense they might be called public and in another sense private.

	Question. Were they in the presence and hearing of subordinate offi-
cers and soldiers?

	I have in some instances heard expressions of dissatisfaction in the presence of snb-
ordinate officers and soldiers, and I have beard expressions of dissatisfaction among
the soldiers, without having any reference ~o anything said by officers.

	Question. Were these murmurings .concurred in or discountenanced
by officers senior to those who signed the petition I

	I think that they were generally discountenanced.

	Question. I put a question to you yesterday in regard to the causes
of the demoralization of the troops in a form which did not express my
meaning nor the idea which 1 wish to l)resent to you. I now ask
whether the disposition to plunder and pillage on the part of the troops
was not encouraged by the popular idea, which at that time was her-
aided through the country, of living upon the enemy, as it is called, and
regarding that as constituting a vigorous prosecution of the war I

	I cannot say that I have beard that officers endeavored to advance the idea that it
was proper on thc part of a soldier to plunder and pillage; on the contrary, nearly all
with whom I had anything to do seemed to discountenance it.

Redirect examination by th~ JUDGE-ADVOCATE:
	Question. You have said in response to questions asked by the Continis-
sion that a general commanding is answerable to his subordinates as he
is to the people. Am I to understand from this that he isto be controlled
or directed by his subordinates or that by consulting thcm he can iii
any case escape the responsibility imposed upon him by his position?

	Not at all.

	Question. Do you know whether these l)rol)ositions to remove officers
by subordinates have been common in our army or not I

	I understand it has, sir. I know of only one instance personally; that was in the
case of T. W. Sherman, when he commanded the First Division. A large number of
officers waited upon General Buell anti requested him in peison to have us twins-
ferred to his army and to aid us in getting General Sherman removed from the co:u-
mand of the division, and my impression now is that General Bush told us the proper
way to come at the matter was by a written petition in respectful terms. We a 1ter~
ward~ on the sanie day, waited upon General Hahleck, and he gave us denny to mm

Page 232

232	KY., M. AND B. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [(ThAP. XXVIII.

derstand that General Sherman should be removed; that he knew onr troubles and
difficulties, and that he would remedy them as soon as possible, having for some days
had the matter under consideration. General Sherman was in a short time relieved
from the command.

	Question. You have been asked, general, what confidence you would
have in the honor and courage of a man who pretended that he pillaged
his unarmed friends because he had not an opportunity to fight a manly
and armed foe. How would your confidence in that soldier be affected
by the fact of marching through a country where the inhabitants were
hostile and the entire army subject to continued insult and abuse from
the inhabitants?
	My confidence in a soldier who was constantly insulted by the inhabitants of the
country through which we were marching and who would commit depredations
upon such citizens would not be greatly impaired. Although I discountenance pil-
lage under any plea, I believe it is common with the best armies in the world.

	Question. iDo you not know that it is quite common in this war for
the inhabitants of the country to be in arms against the forces of the
United states as this force approached and then return to their usual
avocations as farmers as the army goes through?

	Yes, sir; I believe it has been very common.

	Question. What has been the effect upon our army, so far as demor-
alizing it is concerned, by giving protection and guards to rebel prop-
erty?

	It has been, in my opinion, somewhat deleterious; I might say cousiderably so.

	Question Has not the jealous care of rebel property impressed upon
our forces that our generals were Yeally sympathizing with that side?

	I think it has to a~couslderable extent, sir.

	Question. You have been asked in reference to the lines of supp1ies~
Do you know up to what time the trains were run upon the railroad
between Bowling Green and Louisville?

	I think they were running to within a short time before we reached Bowling
Green, or about the time we reached there, in September.

	Question. Do you recollect what interruption there was upon that
line between Bowling Green and Nashville?

	The Pinnel was blown up; one bridge between the tunnel and Gallatin was de-
stroyed; there were also some bridges destroyed between Gallatin and Nashville
after we were on our return to Tennessee.

	Question. Are you acquainted personally with the country about
that tunnel that was destroyed?

	I have only passed through it once and am not very well acquainted with it, but
I know that it is quite a rough, hilly country.

By General DANA:
	Question. Did you know or hear, at the time when General Buell was
in command of the Army of the Ohio, of any proposition or attempt on
the part of officers of his command, other than that already testified to,
to depose him from the command and put General Thomas in his place?

	I know of no attempt being made to place General Thomas in command. I bave
heard there was an attempt, but know nothing of the truth of it.

	Question. Where and at what time did you hear that this proposi-
tion was made?

	I heard it at Louisville, when we were marching back from Tennessee through
Kentucky

Page 233

CHAP. XXVUI.]	GENEI~AL Rrn~olLTs.	233


	Question. Do you remember how you got this information?

	From rumor, sir.

By General TYLER:
	Question. General, I understand that you were born in the neighbor-
hood where the battle of Perryville was fought and that you are ac-
quainted with that section of country thoroughly. Suppose a vigorous
advance had been made early on the morning of the 9th by General
Buells army upon General Braggs force, would not obstacles of Dicks
River render it almost impossible for Bragg to pass it under the cir-
cumstances?

	I was born in that region of country and am pretty well acquainted with it. I
cannot say that it would have been altogether prudent in the early part of the action
to have made a vigorous attack upon General Bragg, as I understood that General
Crittendens corps had not yet gotten into position. After General Crittenden had
gotten into position my opinion is that a vigorous attack ought to have been made
and would have resulted in the route of Braggs army; and that in the event of its
being routed it would have been almost impossible for him to have suec~ieded in
crossing Dicks River at the point at which I understood he had crossed. It is a rough,
broken, bluffy country, and my impression is that the passage across the river at that
point at which he crossed is very narrow. I mean if the victory had been followed
tip rapidly.

	Question. At what time, general, was General Crittendens division
[corps] in position?

	I think I heard General Crittenden himself say that lie was in position somewhere
in the middle of the day; between 10 and 12 oclock on the day ot the battle.

By General Onn:
	Question. General, you stated that the divisions of General Gilberts
corps, as far as you kno~v, were not mismanaged at the battle of Perry-
yule; do you know whether the divisions of Crittendens corps were mis-
managed?

	I remarked that the divisiotis of Generals Sheridan and Mitchell, of General Gilberts
corps, so far as I know or observed, were well mauno-ed The First Division I thought
was very badly managed, from the fact that it. was~ept lying still difring the greater
part of the day and while the heaviest portion of the fight was going on. I cannot
say, for I do not know, whether General Crittendens corps was badly managed or not.
I understood that when that corps was in position General Thomas and General Crit-
tenden were both very anxious to advance and engage the enemy, and they seemed
to be satisfied with the position of that corps. General Crittenden expressed himself
in my presence as being highly delighted with the position of his corps, and said
that all he desired at that time was to be allowed to advance upon the enemy.

	Question. What position did your division occupy in the corps rela-
tive to the corps of General McCook; about how far from it and in
what direction?

	During the greater part of the day my division was lying within a short distance
of and in front of General Enells headquarters, and I suppose it niust have been 2
miles to the rear and to the right of General McCooks corps. I understand that in
the evemng General Steedmans brigade was ordered to the support of General Mc-
Cook, but learned that it was not allowed to go into action. This I heard from Gen-
eral Steedman himself. I understood from General Steedman that the battery con-
nected with his brigade fired a few rounds.

	Question. Do you know anything about the position of the enemy in
front of General McCooks corps?

	I know the ground pretty well, and from what I learned they occupied a pretty
strong position, where they had the advantage in the ground.

IRecross-examination by General BUELL:
	Question. When the officers of the First Division called upon Gemi-
oral Bu~ell at Co2ip~h w~ 1~ their eommkw4er or in a po~jtion wit

Page 234

234
ICY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. R~HAP. XX~Itt
reference to them that would have justified him in admonishing or re-
buking them?

	lie was not the commander of the First Division; it was not in his corps; but I
suppose, being a superior officer, he would have the right, if we were guilty of any vio-
lation of military etiquette, to admonish or rebuke us.

	Question. Was not the visit rather a social and complimentary one,
though having for its object that which the witness has stated?

	The visit was not intended merely as a social visit; it might be in one sense a com-
plimentary one. We went to General Buell believing that he would give us such
aid and such advice in the premises as were necessary, and he gave us the advice,
according to my recollection, stated in a previous answer.

	Question. Did he not decline to apply for a transfer of the division
to his command, while at the same time expressing himself much grati-
fied that they should desire to return to it?

	He did decline to use his influence to have us transferred to his command, but gave
us all the advice we wanted in regard to the particular object of our visit.

	Question. Did he not advise you delicately, but as pointedJy as would
be becoming under the circumstances, that as far as your proceeding
had for its object the removal of your commander it was improper; that
the same course might with equal propriety be pursued by your sub-
ordinates in reference to any and all of you; and in parting with you
personally did he not say to you that he would be very much gratified
to have you back again, but that you must not, as lie expressed himself
pleasantly, be insubordinate?
	He did express a desire to have us back in his command, and warned us not to be
insubordinate, and told us that our manfler of proceeding, he thought, was a little im-
proper, and that subordinate officers might act in the same way toward us; but, as I
have before stated, advised us as to the proper niode of getting our removal. XVe as-
sured General Buell that there was no disposition on the part of any of us to be at all
insubordinate; that what we did or what we should do in the premises should be done
in the most respectful and officerlike manner.

	Question. Have you ever of your own accord given protection to the
property of 0itizens in the vicinity of your command and without troub-
ling yourself about inquiring as to whether they were loyal or disloyal?
	I have scarcely ever been called upon by citizens for protection until my arrival at
Gallatin. I there, under the direction of General Thomas, gave protection to citizens,
both loyal and disloyal; but in most instances it was done wheu we had taken from
them all the forage and such other articles as were necessary for us, leaving only
enough for the support of the family and stock daring the winter. In some few in-
stances I may have given protection when the parties had been foraged upon to the
extent authorized.

	Question. Will you please state, general, who they were who pro-
posed to depose General Buell from his command and from whom you
acquired the information in regard to such a purpose?
	I do not know who they were, sir; I had nothing to do with it.

	Question. Can you not remember the names of those who mentioned
itto you?

	No, sir.

	Question. Whom did General Steedinan complain of as having pre-
vented him from going into action on the evening of the 8th, after he
was detached from his division?

	I do not recollect that he named any particular person.

	Question. in your answer to the question by the judge-advocate did
you mean to convey the idea that General Thomas aI4d General Cri

Page 235

CHAP. xxvm.j
GENERAL REPORTS.
235
tendeii complained during the day that they were not permitted to en-
gage the enemy ~

	I do not know that they complained during the day, for I was not with them; but I
thought from General Crittendens conversation that he felt a little aggrieved becanse
he was not allowed to engage the enemy, though he did not say so in so many words.
I heard General Thomas say that it was very late when he heard the fight was going
on, and wondered why he had not been informed of it. He heard the artillery, an4
my impression now is that he said that upon inquiring as to what it meant the reply
came that Colonel Gay was amusing himself with the rebel cavalry.

	The judge-advocate proposes, in view of the movement of the Army
of the Cumberland, to arrest for the preseiit the case of the Government,
reserving to himself the right hereafter to introduce further evidence,
for the purpose of summoning the witnesses General Buell wishes to
have examined.

	Col. G. D. WAGNER (a witness for the Gove;nment), being duly
sworn by the judge-advocate, testified as follows:

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:
	Question. State, if you please, your name and positiou in the United
States service.
G.	D. Wagner; colonel of the Fifteenth Indiana Volunteers.

	Question. State whether you were at the battle of Perryville; whether
you took any part in that fight, and what you saw of the enemy on the
night of the 8th, and what you know of his subsequent movements on
the morning of the 9th.

	I was at the battle of Perryville and took part in that fight. On the night of the
8th I saw very little of the enemy except his fires, or moving of troops except strag-
glers and unorganized bodies around the fires. These were on the leftabout a mile
on the left and half a mile to the fronttill abont daylight, or a little before. Some
time before daylight I heard considerable moving of wheels, which I supposed to be
artillery. It .was retiring. I did not see any troops at the time, but at break of day
I rode some distance to the front of my command, gained an eminence from which I
could look into the town of Perryville, and saw the enemy, as I thought, retiring by
the Danville road. This was so early that I could just see a black line, but could
not tell whether it was infantry or cavalry. When it became a little lighter I heard
this column passing up the creek toward the right of our army, and the thought
struck me that they were changing position of their forces from the left of Perryville
to the right of our armyabout an hour and a half after sunupa body of cavalry
I should think a thousandfrom the front on the right of our army. These I sup-
posed to be the troops I saw going in that direction early in the, morning. When I
became convinced that they were retiring I immediately ordered forward my brigade
and Coxs battery and commenced shelling them. Colonel Carlin, who was at my
right, also advanced. ColonelConnor,[?] commanding a brigadeof thedivision belong-
ing to General Gilberts corps, made a similar advance. The skirmishers of my com-
mand entered the town and took possession of it, capturing a few prisoners. They
entered the town about sunup, or it might have been half an hour later. It was as
quick as it could be done after daylight. I made another small advance to gain a
better position for the battery; another body of rebel troops then appeared coming
out of the woods to the left of the town near the spritigs, with the evident intention
of gaining the Danville road, by which they retired. There were scattering troops
seen in front, but after a few minutes there was no- body of troops in sight. This was
after shelling the first column. These troops marched down the road, and we had
our battery in such a position as to enfilade the road. The enemy had two guns,
which were put in position just at daylight back of the town, and they remained there
till the last troops came. Captain Coxs battery again opened upon this body of
troops and scattered them. A portion of the troops went up the road very orderly.
	Immediately after these troops passed the cavalry I have referred to retired from
the right of the army in the range of my guns, and I ordered my battery to open upou
them, but two or three colonels and officers standing by insisted that they were our
cavalry advancing. They came out cautiously from the wood and formed in line, but
did not act like an enemy advancing, so we did not open fire on them. I think that
eavaWy was the body of troops going, as I supposed, toward the right in the mornin

Page 236

236
KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAP. XXYIIL
just at daybreak, as when they passed half a mile from the town to the right there
was some timber which obscured them from view, and I could not see their position
until they again retired across the open space of ground over which they had to pass.


AFTERNOON SEsSIoN.

	Colonel WAGNERS examination continued.

Cross-examination by General BUELL:
	Question. Do you know any reason why you were not ordered to
attack the enemy when he was so near you, or could any other attack
have been judiciously made than that which you made without the con-
current action of other troops?

	The reason that I did not advance farther that morning into the town and beyond
it and undertake to cut off those troops that were retreating was because I was then
much farther advanced than I was ordered to go.. I had gone about as far as I
thought I dared go witlrouit being ordered. After I had at dark ordered the troops
to lay upon their arms, not even allowing them to go for water, a staff officer of Gen-
eral Gilbert came to me, with the request that I would advance up to tl~e edge or into
the town with my brigade. Colonel Carlin was at the edge of the town, and did not
think it safe to remain in that position without support. I declined to do so, saying
that he could get support from the rear from General Wood or General Crittenden to
protect the right. This was for the reason that I was informed during the day that
there was a large force in front of General Crittendens main body; which, if I had
advanced to that position, would have left them in my rear. I went with the aide-
de-camp back to General Woods headquarters, reporting the position of affairs in
front, and joined with him in asking for support so as to enable us to hold the town
during the night. General Wood sent one of his officers with the aide of General Gil-
bert to General Crittenden. I returned to my command. We received no further
orders. Colonel Carlin took position on my left. When I went to the rear at this time
I heard from officers a confirmation of the report referred to, that there was a large
force in front of General Smiths division, on the extreme right of the army. This
information, it is but just to say, was said to be reported by General Smith.

Redirect examination by the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:
	Question. At what time did you arrive on the battle ground on the
afternoon of the 8th?

	I arrived in the#ear line about half past two, as near as I can remember.

	Question. How did this arrival of yours place Crittendens corps on
the battle ground at that time?

	His forces were upon either side of the pike leading from Perryville to Lebanon, or
about 2 miles from Perryville.
	Question. llow was that position in reference to that held by General
McCook?

	I do not know what General McCooks position was. I know only the position of
General Gilbert.

	Question. How was it in reference to General Gilbert?

	My orders were on arriving in the rear of the line to form in line of battle on the
left of General Van Cleve, whit was the left of General Crittendens line, prolonging
the line in the direction of General Gilberts right; therefore the general direction
of these two lines was parallel to each other or nearly so.

	Question. What was done for the next two or three hours after your
arrival upon the battle-field?

	Before I had quite formed my brigade in line of battle General Wood gave me an
order to march immediately to the support of General Sheridans right, which he said
was being turned; this I immediately did. That was about half a mile directly to
my left. On arriving within 600 yards of General Sheridans forces I came in contact
with a brigade of the enemy advancing upon General Sheridans right, which I imme-
diately attacked; bnt the mere appearance of my force upon their flank caused them
immediately to about-face and retire, we advancing and they retiring until night

Page 237

CHAP. XXVIII.]	GENERAL REPORTS.	237


	Question. Can you say, colonel, from your knowledge of the ground,
how far you were in the afternoon from General ~ corps?

	I could see the troops that were engaged with him off to ~ur left; I should think
it was about a mile; but I never rode over the ground, and it is only by looking from
one point to another that I form this judgment.

	Question. What did the movement of troops and firing that after-
noon indicate to you?

	Very little, if anything, of a fight, and it was remarkable and perfectly astounding
to me and many other officers when we heard that there had been a great tight ana
there was heard so little firing; that was a common remark of the offici~rs. Four
miles before I arrived in the rear of the line of battle General Wood ordered me for-
ward as fast as possible; to leave all transportation. He said it was reported that a
light was going on. He and I rode up the road till we got within 2 miles of Perryville,
he frequently remarking, How is it possible that there is a fight going on when we
can scarcely hear firing at all ?

	Question. How was that firing after you arrived there?

	After I arrived in line for some time my own firing drowned that of everything else.
I have no distinct recollection about the firing after that. But when I wns Within a
mile of General Gilberts corps I scarcely heard any firing worth talking about. I
thought there was a skirmishing going on, but did not think there was a battle raging.

	Question. About what time of day was it that General Wood or-
dered you hurriedly forward?

It was about 1 oclock.

	Question. Was the information you obtained given to your superior
officers?

	I made my rcport from time to time to General Wood, my division commander. All
the flitie from daylight or soon after daylight there was quite a dust upon the Har-
rodsburg road, the road leading from Perryville to Harrodsburg, as though there was
a niovenent of troops taking place. The road was hidden from view by timber.
I supposed this to be the retiring of troops.

	Question. flow late in the day did you observe this, colonel?

	That was about two hours after daylight. It went on at the same time that the
movement took place on the Danville road, and continued, I should say, till about 8
oclock.

	Question. You say you were not engaged in the contest that day but
slightly?

	My brigade was engaged in Woods division the first day.

Recross-examinatiou by General BUELL:
	Question. Do you know what time the corps to which you belonged
advanced that morning?

	1 think the command began to move at about 7 audleft about 9. Two divisions
preceded me; two brigades followed me. This refers to the march from camp on the
morning of the 8th.

	Question. Do you know at what time your corps advanced toward
the position of the enemy on the morning of the 9th?

	I do not know the exact time, but can tell pretty nearly from certain facts. At
about 9 to 9.30 oclock, my brigade being at that time near the town of Perryville, with
no enemy in view, I received an order to report to the rear of General Crittendens
corps. The explanation was that General Crittenden was going to advance upon the
town of Perryville with his corps. General Woods division, of which my brigade was
a part, was to form a reserve in that advance. I pointed down to the town and told
the aide-dc-camp who brought the order that I had had possession of it froni about
sunup, and that there had not been a rebel near it, at least in sight, tbr an hour, and
the last I saw of the enemys cavalry they were retiring from ~he front of General
Smith. At that time they were entirely out of sight, and I could see from the to
l~i the direetton of their ietirin~ at le~mst i~ mn4le.	

Page 238

KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAP. XXVfll
238

	Question. Did you report this information, and was any change made
in the disposition of your brigade in consequence of it ~

	I can oniy state th~t from the information of others. I remarked to the aide-de-
camp that he should go and inform the general of the fact, and that I could not con-
sent to march my troops 2 miles to the rear and back again for nothing, as I supposed
from the order it was known at headquarters that the rebel troops had retired. I re-
tired my brigade some half mile to the rear, where I soon received orders to await
further orders before I made any movement. I supposed that order to be the result
of the information that I sent back by the aide-de-camp.

	Question. Did you understand that these details with reference to
the movoment of the right corps were directed specially by myself or
that they were under the direction of the corps commander, General
Thomas ~
	I certainly supposed, sir, that all our orders came from . I had no knowledge as
a brigade comniander that you specially dii~ected our movements. My intention was
to send information toGeneral Thomas and General Crittenden. I knewat least I
heardthat you were not on that portion of the line by one of your own staff.

	Col. D. MUCOOK (a witness for the defense), being duly ~worn by the
judge-advocate, testified as follows:

By General BUELL:
	Question. Coonel, will you state to the Commission, if you please,
what you know of the operations in front of Perryville on the evening
of the 7th and on the 8th ~ Confine yourself, if you please, to important
incidents, so as not to occnpy more time than is necessary for yourself
and the Commission. Also please state your name and position in the
service of the United States.
	My name is Daniel McCook, colonel of the Fifty-second Ohio Volunteer Infantry, at
that time commanding the Thirty-sixth Brigade and still commanding it, forming a
part ot the Tenth Division of the Third Army Corps of the Army of the Ohid. On
the night of the 7th of October, 1862, my brigade went into camp within about 4 miles
of Perryville, on the Springfield pike. We encamped on the right of the road, three-
quarters of a mile from it, in line of battle. The Eighty-fifth Illinois, one of the regi-
ments composing my brigade, was detailed for picket at 2 oclock that night. I had just
got my troops into position when I received an order from Maj. J. M. Wright, one of Gen-
eral Buells assistant adjutants-general, ordering Major-General Gilbert to throw for-
ward one of his brigades and seize the ground in front of Doctors Fork, which our
corps was depending upon for water, and also to consult Captain Gay as to the position
and conformation of the country. This order was properly referred to General Sheri-
dan by General Gilbert, and General Sheridan ordeied my brigade to exeente the
duty. I immediately got on my horse, wakened np my men as quietly as possible, left
orders for them to file into the Springfield road and there await further commands,
while I went to find Captain Gay. During my meanderings to find Captain Gay I
Stnml)lCd into General Buells camp, and asked the sentinel if he could tell me where
Captain Gay was. General Buell, I suppose recognizing my 4oice, reqnested me to
come in. I found Captain Gay, got the information desired from him, put my column
in motion for the high ground, ~vhich I subsequently learned to be called Peters Hill.
On the advice of General Buell I had dispatched a staff officer to get a battery from
General Sheridan. He sent me Captain Barnetts illinois battery. As soon as I got
to the outpost Colonel Grensel pointed to me the enemys picket line, which wm~s on
the crest of Peters Hill. I formed the Eighty-fifth Illinois on the right of the Spring-
field pike, the Fifty-second Ohio (my own regiment) on the left of the Springfield
l)ike, throwing forward ~vell~to the front and flanks two companies of each regiment
as skirmishers. I formed the One hundred and twenty-fifth Illinois, another regiment
composing my bri~ade, the right wing on the left side of the road and the left wing
on the right side. My skirmishers had scarcely taken intervals, it being a bright
moonlight night (between 3 and 4 oclock in the morning), when the enemy opened
upon me with a heavy musketry fire. My skirmishers advanced steadily up the hill
on the left of the road, it being open ground; but being wood on the right of the road,
the principal .force of the enemy was concentrated there, and the Eighty-fifth Illinois
made very slow progress. As soon as I discovered that their progress was so slow I
ordered ray skirmishers to change direction to the right, followed by the battalion,
attack the rebels in dank, amid drive them front the woods, thereby gaining the crest
of Pet~r~ Hill. In ~rr~~in~ this vosition ~ lQst ~ men killed and 27 wou~de4. 

Page 239

CHAP. XXVflL]	GENERAL REPORTS.	239

threw my skirmishers 1,000 yards to the front, far enough to keep my main line from
being annoyed, and ordered my men to lay down on the crest of the hill, well covered
by it. By this time Barnetts battery had arrived. I put four guns into position on
the left of the road, commanding the open country and valley, upon which part of
General Rousseaus division subsequently formed; two guns I put off to the right of
the road, commanding another open plain stretching oft toward Perryville.
	By this time it had got daylight. I dispatched staff officers to General Buell and
to General Sheridan, informing them that I had carried the position and would await
further orders. I hardly had the right section in position when the rebels came
down the Springfield road from Perryville with a battery and what seemed to be two
brigades of infantry. They put their battery in position on the bill at the back of
the Bottom house and began shelling the woods. As soon as I saw them go into
position I ordered the right wing of the Eighty-fifth Illinois onto the crest of the hill
to the right of the section of the battery, as a support to it, which I had before or-
dered to the right of the road. I thea ordered my men to lay down. The rebels
shelled the woods for an hour and a quarter. Supposing from the quietness which I
required my men to keep that they had run us out of the woods they deployed in the
open ground to attack us. I restrained the impatience of the men till they got with-
in 200 yards of me, and they only waited for one volley, which was delivered by the
Eighty-fifth Illinois and the right wing of the One hundred and twenty-fifth Illinois
and the section of artillery.
	About this time two regiments of rebel cavalry showed themselves on th~ left of
my position on the Mackyille road, their infantry pickets being scattered through the
field. The cavalry was heading from Perryville out toward Mackville. I opened on
that cavalry with the two James guns whicli I had left on the left of the road and
drove it back. About this time I became apprehensive from clouds of dust which I
saw on my right hand and dust also which I saw to my extreme left along the bottom
of Chaplin Creek that they were turning my position and surrounding me, and sent
back to General Sheridan or General Gilbert, I do not remember which, for re-enforce-
meilts. General Gilbert came out, preceded a fe~v minutes by General Sheridan,
and examined my position, and told me not to advance any farther and that he would
go back and report to General Buell. That was about 6 oclock in the morning. Two
brignd~ of General Sheridans division were immediately dispatched to my assistance.
	About this time there seemed to be a lull in the firing; occasionally a sharpshooter
would annoy the line; my skirmishers would reply. Immediately on the left of the
Springfield road was a grove of tiniber. Buckner came up with two brigades, slip-
ping along the dry bed of Doctors Fork, and got into those woods about 250 yards in
my front. As soon as this was discovered the Second Missouri, supported by the
Forty-fourth Illinois, with a section of artillery, was ordered to dislodge them. A
few minutes before Captain Gay canie out with hi~ cavalry. He desired me to throw
forward my skirmishers and clear the wood, which I declined to do. He then re-
ported to General Gilbert, from whoum I received a note telling me to hold my posi-
tionnot to advance. This was between 6 and 7 oclock in the morning. Captain
Gay started hi~ cavalry into the woods, and they came back very ra~)i(lly; then he
dismounted a portion of his command, and the Second Missouri and Forty-fourth
Illinois, with Gays cavalry dismounted, drove the rebels from that piece of woods,
which movement ~vas hastened by General Fry opportunely ordering forward the
Eighty-sixth Illinois Regiment, which was on picket, to charge the left of the piece
of woods over the open fields. The Second Missouri followed up their advantage,
following the rebels over the open-country clearing beyond Sam. Bottoms house up
through his orchard, and seized the line of heights, over which they could see Chap-
liii River very plainly, being the same line of heights and the same orchard ocen-
pied at a later period of the day by eighteen guns of the enemy. By some persons
orders this regiment was ordered to fall back to the wood from which we had cleared
the rebels. About this time all firing and appearance of the enemy ceased in our
front. This happened.between 7 and 8 oclock.
	Between 9 and 10 oclock I received a note from General Gilbert informing me that
General McCook was coming up immediately to my left, and that I must not be
alarmed at any appearance of forces in that direction. About 10 oclock I saw the
head of Rousseaus column coming up to the Russell house on the Mackville and Perry-
ville road; they went beyond the house a short distance and seemed to be halted
there awaiting orders. Between 11 and 12 oclock the same day General Gilbert, I
think, ordered forward Hescocks battery and Sheridans division to occupy the sanme
woods from which he had driven General Buckner. We ~vent into those woods and
formed a line of battle, our right resting over the Springtield pike. About this time
Captain Gay, finding that he could not get down the Springfield road to Perryville,
made a detour off to the left, and went down through the open fields to the left of
Peters Hill, and an artillery fire opened. A short time after this the rebels began to
make their appearance with their artillery on Bottonis Hill and in the mouth of
Povtoj~m Forlj y~rit1l their ~ of inft~ntry, Capt~4n Jes~cl~ wheneye~ 1u~ sit

Page 240

240
KY., M. AND E~ TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAP. XXVflI.
them appear on this hill with their artillery, would open upon them or enfilade their
position, and whenever the rebel masses would show themselves in the mouth of this
Doctors Fork he would drive them hack. Between 12 and 1 oclock everything was
quiet except these occasional escapades of artillery, happening abont every half hour;
between 1 and 2 oclock General Rousseau put Loomis battery into position, which
soon opened, and formed his line of hattie, the right of it resting on a barn, which was
subsequently burned hy the rebel artillery, and his left stretching off obliquely in the
direction of Chapliu Fork. His line was a continuation of General Gilberts line.
With the aid of Hescock, Loomis soon silenced this battery on Bottoms Hill, part of
it in Bottoms orchard, and for some time the battle seemed to be over.
	About 2 oclock General Gilbert ordered ns to fall back from our position in the
woods. General Gilberts line was separated from General Rousseaus by the rocky
and dry bed of what I learned to be Doctors Fork and about 150 paces distant.
About 2 oclock we were ordered back on this hill, our troops being raw. The regi-
ments fell back individnally in good order, but the brigades became so mixed up that
I halted mine and would not move a step till the other brigades passed me. We fell
back, forming a circular line on Peters Hill, and with our left flank to the woods
above referred to and the original line. I pointed out to General Gilbert the danger
of our left flank and requested him to perniit me to fill the woods we had just left with
skirmishers, which reqnest he granted; and in order to prevent a flank movement,
under the cover of the woods I put the Eighty-sixth Illinois behind a picket fence,
faced it by the rear rank, and told it to open on any troops it saw coming through the
woods. We had scarcely got into this new position when eighteen pieces ol the ene-
mys artillery galloped up to Bottoms Hill and opened on General Rousseaus right.
This position had been enfiladed, and no donbt by Captain Hescocks battery. Two
brigades of rebels formed in front of the new line of General Sheridan and attacked
us. They came within 100 yards of our batteries, when the whole line charged bay-
onets on them and they ran. Our whole division was laying there, about four regi-
ments deep, not covering more than a brigade and a half in front. The rebels re-
formed under the crest of the hill and attacked us again. By this time some troops
on our right attacked them in flank and they fell back and left us; this was about 3
oclock. The two attacks of battle lasted an hour.
	After we drove them off the excitement which attends such little affairs ~s this
subsided. I turned around and saw the barn on General Rousseaus right in flames,
and saw the rebels in three lines in line of battle, with two regiments doubled on
the center, their left flank coining np Doctors Fork. They changed direction
slightly to the right; these two regiments doubled on the center made a right partial
wheel. They were so near I could see the daylight through their ranks with ray
glass. I saw theni envelop and drive back Lytles right flank. At that time oar
division, with two batteries, was lying idle. I begged General Sheridan to at least
allow us to open on them with artillery, for from the fierceness of the engagement on
our left and the weak attacks on our right I felt satisfied that the rebels were con-
centrating their whole force against our left wing. The answer I received to this
earnest entreaty was that it might concentrate the fire of the enemys artillery upon
our troops. This came to me from General Gilbert through General Sheridan. I
suggested that the troops could be moved over on the other slope of the hill, which
was a backbone, and would be perfectly safe.
	The rebels, after they had pulverized Rousseaus right with their eighteen guns,
moved a portion of their artillery from Bottoms Hill to the clump of trees on the left
of the Mackville road as you go toward Perryville. At the time I made the request
to turn our batteries on them we could see theni going into battery ~in this new posi-
tion spoken of. We at last did, by General Sheridan, get purmission for these bat-
teries to open on the rebel battery and rebel column as we saw them on our left. We
then opened a conceatri~ fire upon them, crossing our fire in the enemys battery. At
the second discharge I saw one of their caissons blow up, and in one of those regi-
ments doubled en the center that I spoke of before I saw the standard go down three
times, caused by the execution of our artillery. This seemed to check 1 hem, which
check we afterward learned was assisted by the arrival of Goodings brigade on the
field. By marching my regiment 250 yards over an open-plain corn field I could have
taken the rebels in rear and flank and had them between Lytles battery and mimy own.
	About this time or shortly afterward darkness fell upon the scene, arid we biv-
ouacked on the hill 1 had originally carried in the morning. There was a strong
wind blowing in the direction of General MeCooks army corps from the direction of
General Buells headquarters; it was so high that at times I could distinguish mus-
ketry a half mile from me. It is my impression that I was informed by one of the
signal officers on our hill, about fifteen minutes after 2 oclock, that General Rousseau
had telegraphed he was attacked along his entire front by infantry, cavalry, and ar-
tillery. I am not liositive that the signal officer informed me that General Rousseau
sent that dispatch, but I am satisfied that such a dispatch went through tIme signal
o~ce~ and that this conversatiqu was extorted by a bur8t of ~ndi~ation of mmc

Page 241

CHAP. XXVIII.]
GENERAL REPORTS.
241
coupled with a few oaths, demanding of General Sheridan why we had been ordered
out of those woods.

	Commission adjourned to meet December 24, 1862, at 10 oclock a. m.

NASHVILLE, Wednesday Morning, December 24, 1862.
	The Commission met pursuant to adjournment. All the members
present; also the judge-advocate and General Buell.

	Col. C. G. HARKER (a witness for the defense), being duly sworn by
the judge-advocate, testified as follows:

By General BUELL:
	Question. Will you state your name, rank, and position in the serv-
ice of the United States ~

C. G. Harker; colonel of tlte Sixty-lifth Regiment Ohio Volunteers; commanding
Twentieth Brigade, Sixth Division.

	Question. State, if you please, colonel, what march you made on the
7th of October last, as the army was approaching Perryville; where
you encamped, and at what hour you marched the next morning.

We left camp in the vicinity of Springfield, Ky., on the morning of the 7th. After
marching slowly all day and all night of the 7th we arrived at camp on the stream
known as Rolling Fork about daybreak on the morning of the 8th. We took up the
line of march about 11 oclock or somewhat after, and started in the direction of
Perryville. The march was retarded by the trains and troops in front causing delay.

	Question. Was your camp on the night of the 7th on the direct route
to Perryville?

It was not, sir; we turned off the direct route in order to get water; we were in-
formed there was no water on the direct route suitable for the troops and animals.

	Question. Do you know where you were expected to have encamped
that night~

We were expecting to encamp 21 miles from Haysville, at a point about 6 or 7 miles
from Perryville.

	Question. How much did your march to get water on the 7th take
you out of your direct .1 oute ~ What distance was lost in your march
of the following day ~

I have learned from 3 to 4 miles.

	Question. State, if you please, what position you took when you ar-
rived near Perryville and what your command did, what you saw and
what your command did on the evening of the 8th and morning of the
9th, and what you saw of the movements of the enemy on the morning
of the 9th.

About half past two oclock on the day of the 8th we received orders from General
Crittenden, through General Wood, to go forward with my brigade, and arrived at a
point on the right of Colonel Wagner at a late hour in the afternoon. We had pre-
viously received orders from General Wood to form in line of battle on the right of
Colonel Wagners brigade. At that time there was some artillery firing on the left.
No enemy could be seen in our front and my troops were not engaged. After having
formed in line of battle we reneived orders to advance to the front, which we did;
perhaps we advanced three-quarters of a mile from the position where we first formed
in line of battle; we still saw no enemy in our front. It then being about dark, we
received orders from General Wood to fall back in some timber and bivouac for the
night, which was done. Some time during the night orders came from General Wood
to be in readiness to march at daylight. I believe he said. march ; he may have said
attack. The order was a verbal one. My command was under arms as per order,
but received no further instructions from General Wood or any higher authority

16 R RVOL XV

Page 242

242
KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAP. XXVII1
until a late hour in the morning, perhaps between 9 and 10 oclock. We, however,
heardflring a little after sunrise; there was skirmishing upon. our right; there were
also one or two rounds of artillery, but from the conformation of the ground I conid
not tell the direction of the artillery. The position I then ha4 not being a good one
I advanced to the front without orders, taking a commanding position, from which I
had a good view of the surrounding conutry. From this position bodies of cavalry
could be seen to the front; we could not see whether they were our own troops or
those of the enemy. By my glass I could see that they had on a blue uniform similar
to our own. Not knowing what troops they were, I sent word to the rear for informa-
tion and orders. These troops, after halting a short time in front of us, filed off to
the right toward the direction of Harrodsburg. We could distinguish no infantry
to a certainty, but a body of troops on the left could be seen, which were supposed to
be infantry, and which also filed off in the direction of Harrodsbnr~. I sent back
to General Wood to the place where he was expected to be found and reported all these
circumstances. The messenger returned, stating that he could not be found at that
point. This was about one hour after sunrise.
	Some time after this Captain Lennard, aide to General Wood, came to the front, stat-
in g that the Sixth Division was ordered back to the reserve. I reported to him what
we had seen. He replied that we were too far in the advance~ that we had exceeded
our orders; and that it was General Woods orders to fall hack, taking a position in
the rear of the divisior~ on our right to the left of the Fifteenth Brigade, resting upon
the Perryville and Lebanon road. We fell back as ordered, having troops resting on
our right. We were halted about 2j miles from Perryville and hwaited forther
orders. Some time in the afternoon we received orders to proceed to the springs near
Perryville; took up the line of march, and arrived there late in the afternoon and
encamped. The springs were but a short distance, about half a mile, beyond Perry-
yule, near the road leading from Perryville to Harrodshnrg.

	Question. Did you see any infantry on the morning of the 9th?

	In my answer to the preceding question I stated that we could distinguish a body
of troops that were supposed to be infantry, but could not tell for a certainty.

	Question. Did any infantry move off on the IX nyille road or any
troops you supposed to be infantry 0?

	No, sir.

	Question. Did your brigade form a part of the right corps?

	Yes, sir.

	Question. What part of the line of that corps did it occupy?

	The Sixth Division formed the left of the line. My own brigade had a central posi-
tion in the division.

	Question. W~t time did you get into camp on the night of the 9th?

	I slated at a late hour in the afternoon; some time before sunset-

	Question. What movement did you make on the following day?

	The Sixth Division moved off to the right of the Perryville and Harrodsbnrg road
and halted at a place known as Cecil Farm, about equidistant from the towns of Dan-
ville, Perryville, and Harrodsburg.

	Question. Did you make any movement on the 11th?

	My brigade was ordered to make a reconnaissance in the direction of Harrodsburg.
I proceeded in that direction, leaving camp between 8 aid 9 oclock. My orders were
to approach as near Harrodsburg as I could with safety; the enemy was supposed to
be in force at that place. I reached a point on the Danville and Harrodsbnrg road
about 21 miles from Harrodsbnrg abont 11 oclock; proceeded down this road cau-
tiously to the town of Ilarrodsburg, skirmishing slightly with the enemys cavalry all
the way from about a mile from where we encamped in the morning until we reached
Harrodsburg, the rear of the enemys cavalry having left the town on oar approach.
It was after 1 oclock that I reached the town. I received positive orders from General
Thomas not to bring on an engagement, as he thought the enemy was there in force.

	Question. Were the instructions of General Thomas distinct and im-
pressive with respect to the presence of the enemy in force at Illarrods-
burg?

	They were decidedl~T so

Page 243

Cui~r. XXVIII.]	GENERAL REPORTS.	243

	Question. Did you ascertain certainly on the 11th what route the
enemy took and whether he had crossed Dicks River at all?

	I learned that he had taken the Bryantsville road in the direction of Dicks River,
but did not learn positively that he had crossed. There was a strong force of cavalry
reported to be a short distance from Harrodsburg, near Cave Run. It was not deemed
safe to push the reconnaissance beyond Harrodsburg from the best information I
could get.

	Question. Did you report the result of your reconnaissance to General
Thomas, and what further instructions did you receive, if any?

	I sent him verbal messages of my reconnaissance, and received orders to take up a
strong position near the town of Harrodsburg and await further orders.

	Question. When did you receive further orders and what were the
and what action did you take upon them?	y
	I received orders on the morning of the 12th from General Wood to proceed on the
Bryautsville road until I came to the crossing of Cave Run and there await further
instructions. I proceeded as ordered, and after some skirmishing with the enemys
cavalry arrived at the crossing of Cave Run about 12 oclock. I was there joined by
a body of cavalry, in the command of Colonel McCook, who proceeded to the front
with his troops. Learning that General Wood, with the balance of his command, was
on my right and a little to my front, I pushed forward my own brigade to a point
about 3 miles from Dicks River. I remained there in position till between 2 and 3
oclock in the afternoon, when I received orders from General Wood to fall back and
join tbe division, which was about to go into camp at a point about a mile from the
Danville and Harrodsburg road and 4 miles from Harrodsburg.

	Question, What time did you get into camp that day?
	About dark.

	Question. Did you see General Thomas at that time; did you know
where he was?
	I did not see him. I made my reports to General Wood in person. I learned that
he was in camp near General Crittendens headquarters; it was so reported. He was
encamped on the Danville and Harrodsburg road.

	Question. Did you find any of the enemys property in llarrodsburg
when you arriv-il there on the 11th and any of his sick?
	I found about 70 head of cattle, some 200 barrels of pork, and 1,000 to 1,200 sick and
wounded. This latter was reported by one of our officers, from the best information
he could get and visiting the hospitals. We bad taken quite a number of prisoners,
stragglers, on the way and also in the town. As these cattle were in good condition
to be driven, I imagine the enemy left very hurriedly.

	Question. Will you state the particulars of your service in North Ala.
bama during the months of July and August last, the date of your
arrival there from Corinth, the position you took, and the service you
were engaged in?

	I was sent to the town of Stevenson, Ala., about the middle of July with my bri-
gade. This was at the time a depot for supplies for the army serving in Alabama. I
was ordered to fortify the place, and for that purpose was ordered to impress the
services of the slaves in that vicinity and any private property that might be neces-
saryto make use of every means in my power to fortify and strengthen the place. I
constructed a large earthwork, making use of some 400 negroes for that purpose. I
also constructed a series of stockades to secure the place from an attack of the enemy
or a dash of cavalry. I remained there until the troops left Battle Creek under Gen-
eral McCook, when I was ordered to join General Crittenden with three regiments of
my brigade and a battery of artillery, leaving a regiment of infantry in the works at
Stevenson.

	Question. What garrison were the works at Stevenson designed to
accommodate?
	The earthwork was designed for about 500 infantry, a battery of four pieces of
~rti1lery, the larger ~tool~ade for abo4 ~O infantry

Page 244

244	KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAr. XXVIIL

	Question. Did you understand that these works had for their object
to make the place secure as a depot for supplies for the army?

	Not as a permanent depot, but as a depot of reception; the other troops were sup-
plied from this point. That was my impression.

By General TYLER:
	Question. On your arrival at Harrodsburg did you see any signs of
burning up camp equipments, wagons, & c., on the part of Braggs army?

	They had undertaken to burn up the stores that were left there. I received no
report as to the camp equipage.

	Question. Did you find any amount of tents, wagons, & c., left behind?

	There were none reported to me.

By General BuiLL:
	Question. What is your opinion in regard to the supply of camp
equipage which the rebel forces had with them in Kentucky?

	All the information that I received went to show that they had but little camp
equipage; they were without tents.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

	Question. Do you know anything about their destruction of property,
their stores and wagons, subsequent to their leaving llarrodsburg, on
their route to Cumberland Gap?

	I know nothing about it, for the reason that our division was left back in the
reserve.

	Question. You accompanied the army through Danville?

	Yes, sir; to a point some distance from Crab Orchard.

	Capt. J. II. GmMAN (a witness for the defense), being duly sworn by
the judge-achocate, testified as follows:

By General BUELL:
	Question. Will you please state your name and position in the service
of the United States?

	J. H. Gilman; captain Nineteenth Regiment United States Infantry, and inspector
of artillery in the Army of the Ohio.

	Question. What was your positionin the service during the recent
campaign in Kentucky?

	Inspector of artillery on the staff of General Buell.

	Question. Did you inspect the ground in front of Perryville on the
8th of October last, with a view to posting the troops for battle?

I inspected a portion of it.

	Question. Explain, if you please, what portion of it you inspected,
what time you went on, and what time you left it.

	I left camp about half past Son the morning of the 8th, returned about 11; inspected
that portion of the ground near that occupied by General Sheridans command along
the road leading from Springfield to Perryville and on the right of the road.

	Question. Were you in front of the troops at that time or did your
inspection extend to the front of them?

	We commenced near the road, just a short distance in the rear of the skirmishers. In
passing toward the right about one-fourth of a mile from the road we got between our
lines and the enemys. The ground from which we selected our positions was in the
rear of our line at the time, for the ground was occupied by them; they were partly
on the ground

Page 245

CHAP. XXVIII.]
GENERAL REPORTS.
245
	Question. Were there any movements of the enemy in front, while
you were there, that indicated preparation for an attack?

	Firing was going on all the time we were there, but not very heavy. There was
nothing there at that time that would indicate an immediate and strong attack.
When we passed between the enemys line and our own there was no firing between
the two until we discovered we were between the two lines by the enemys rising up
in a small number, apparently not more than 200 or 300.

	Question. Were the enemy to be seen in force anywhere?

	Not from where we were. We went on the top of the high hills and we could not
see the enemy in any large force.

	Question. Was a reconnaissance being made by the cavalry while
you were there?

	It was; Captain Gay was there in charge of cavalry. Just as we left the Perry-
ville road to go off to the right Captain Gay went off to the left with a heavy cavalry
force, and I think with a section of artillery.

	Question. Where were you during the balance of the day?

	At or near General Buells headquarters.

	Question. How far was that from the ground on which General Mc-
Cooks corps fought that day?

	I think about 3 miles.

	Question. Did you hear any firing which indicated to your mind that
a battle was going on any time during the day?

	We heard artillery fire, but not very heavy; nothing to indicate that anything
more than skirmishing was taking place; about the same as occurred the day previous,
when Captain Gay was engaged with the enemy near the same place.

	Question. Did you hear any musketry?

	I do not remember hearing any musketry after I returned to camp.

	Question. At what hour in the day did you first become aware that
a serious fighlAad taken place on the left?

	I think between 4 and 5 oclock I received the first intimation of it.

	Question. Did you go to the scene of the fight that night; if so, with
what orders and for what purpose and what did you see there?

	I went to the ground occupied by our left on that day about 9 or 10 oclock. The
same night I had orders to collect what I could of General Jacksons division, find
out who the senior officer was that was left in that division, and get them into posi-
tion. I found a very small part of this division; got together what I could under
Colonel Hall. I went there with General Rousseau; found General McCook there
just in the rear of the line. He spoke to me about moving two batteries back which
were apparently very near the enemy. There was a large fire just in front of these
guns, at which place it was reported to General McCook that the enemy were putting
up a heavy battery to enfilade this battery of his. I asked him if he felt sure that
the enemy was putting up a battery there. He said there was very little doubt about
it.	He said he thought they had better be moving back, and asked if it was not my
opinion, and I said it was. He then told General Rousseau that he had better move
back. General McCook then went to General Bachs headquarters (this was between
11 and 12), word having been brought to General McCook that General Buell wished
to see him. Soon after~vard this line was moved back. The left of the line was
moved very little and the right was thrown back some 300 or 400 yards. In going
and returning I noticed that there was a large gap between General McCooks right
and General Gilberts left not occupied by troops. The troops before this movement
were in front of the Perryville and Mackville road; after ward they were thrown to
the rear.

	Question. Did General Rousseau proceed to make this change with-
out further orders from General McCook?

	So far as I know he-did. He may have received other orders, but not to my knowl-
edge

Page 246

246	KY.,. M. AND ~. TE1~ThT., ]~7. ALA., AND SW. VA. (CHAP. XXVIII

	Question. Was there anything in the condition of things as they ap-
peared to you to make it necessary to re-enforce General McCook in
order to effect this change safely?

	There was not. I thought it probable they might be fired upon in withdrawing
the guns, but did not think it probable that the enemy would follow.

Cross-examination by the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:
	Question. You moved down toward Perryville expecting to find the
enemy there in force, did you not?

	I supposed we were to meet the enemy iu force at some place or other, but I did
not know whether it would be exactly at Perryville, but supposed it would be near
there; as soon as we could overtake them.

	Qu~stion. Upon what was the expectation founded?

	Upon the fact that we knew the enemy were not very far off; their rear guard was
often in sight of our advance guard, and there had been several skirmishes between
them.

	Question. Was it not known that Kirby Smith was moving in the
direction of Perryville and that a junction would be formed at or near
that place?

	I do not know.

	Question. What report did you make to General Buell, on returning
from a survey of the battle-field, as to what you saw, and what conclu-
sions did you draw?.

	I do not know that I made any report to General Buell personally. I spoke to
Colonel Fry, chief of staff. I reported to him that there was some skirmishing going
on and that there seemed to be too much firing of artillery, and that they were evi-
dently wasting their ammunition, as I could see no enemy in large force.

	Question. What time of day was that?

	About 11 oclock in the forenoon.

	Question. Did that firing continue from the time of your survey up
to 5 or 6 oclock in the evening?

	It did not seem to be continuous, but we heard occasional firing of artillery and
sometimes quite heavy. I think about 5 oclock we heard it quite heavy.
	Question. Was it continuous between 3 and 5 oclock?

	I do not think we heard it continnonsly during that time.

	Question. Do you mean to say that it was not continuous or that you
were so situated that you could not hear it?

	I mean to say that we did not hear it. I have understood since that the firing was
continuous.

	Question. Do you mean to say that the firing on the 8th was as heavy
or not heavier than it was on the 7th, only that it was more contitinous;
that it was of the same character as that on the day before ~

	No; I mean to say that it sounded where we were not like a severe battle. We did
not hear the musketry.
	Question. Were you about headquarters all that afternoon?

	I think I was there all the time during the afternoon.

	Question. Whom did you see there during the afternoon; that is,
officers arriving from the direction of the battle-field, or did you see any
one?

	I do not think I saw any one until about dark arriving from the battle-field. I then
saw Lieutenant Parsons and another officer

Page 247

OffAl. XXVIIL]	GENERAL REPORTS.	247


	Question. Did you not see Colonel Harlan there that afternoon?

	I do not remember seeing him.

	Question. What was said about headquarters in reference to that
firing at that time?

	Most of the remarks made in regard to the firing were that they were probably
shelling the woods or firing at skirmishers and that the enemy probably intended to
make a stand. The firing seemed to remain pretty much in the same place; it did
not appear to advance or recede.

	Question. Do you say that General ~ headquarters were about
3 miles from the ground occupied by General McCook; was it not in
fact 3 miles from Perryville?

	I think his headquarters were fully 3 miles from Perryville. The ground occnpied
by General McCook was, I think, muchfarther to the left than Perryville. I rode over
the ground but twice from where General McCook fought to General BuelPs head-
quarters, and that was at night. I should think the distance was about 3 miles.

By General TYLER:
	Question. You say the enemys rear guard were often in sight of our
ad~nce guard and that skirmishing in consequence took place; do
you suppose from this that Braggs army was in retreat before General
Buells army?

	I snpposed that General Bragg was either retreating before the army or was going
to select his own ground to fight upon.

	Question. In throwing back General Rousseaus line was the partic-
ular ground he was to occupy pointed out and ordered by Major-Gen-
eral IVicCook?

	I think not, from the fact that General Rousseau spent some time after General
McCook left in reconnoitering the ground. The movement did not take place im-
mediately on General McCooks leaving.

	Question. You stated that General McCooLs command would not be
attacked in changing his line because it was in the night; was this the
only reason? If not, what other reasons had you for supposing he
would not attack?

	I have stated in my answer that I thought it probable they wotild be fired on in
withdrawing the guns, but that it would not be followed np by the enemy in the
night-time, as I supposed it would be considered a dangerous thing, they at the same
time knowing that there was a higher good position in the rear, where they would
naturally suppose we would have a force posted to check them in case they followed.


	Col. W. P. INNES (a witness for the defense), being duly sworn by the
judge-advocate, testified as follows:

By General BUELL:
	Question. Will you please state your name and positionin the service?

W.	P. Innes; colonel First Regiment Michigan Engineers and Mechanics.

	Question. Were you in command of your regiment during last sum-
mer?

	Yes, sir.

	Question. Please state the manner in which your regiment was em-
ployed from about the time that it left Corinth in June until the army
marched into Kentucky in September.

	It was employed in the month of June with eight companies rebuilding the Mem-
p his and Charleston Railroad; two companies were employed during the same month
between Huntsville and Stevenson rebuilding the bridges and assisting to operate
the road. In July we were engaged on the Tennessee and Alabama road and on th

Page 248

248	KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAP. XXVIII

Nashville and Chattanooga road. We were also engaged in building pontoon boats.
We were then ordered, with part of my regiment, in the latter part oC August, to come
up here and repair the Louisville and Nashville road. We were employed building
the bridges on this road when we were desired to take up the line of march for Ken-
tucky.

	Question. Please explain the extent of the work, particularly on the
Tennessee and Alabama road and the Nashville and Chattanooga road;
whether your troops were constantly and industriously engaged upon
the work and when it was completed so that the roads were in use
throughout.

	We built one bridge on the Tennessee and Alabama road across what is called Elk
River. It was 700 feet long and 58 feet high, in about 20 feet of water. That was the
heaviest bridge built. Four companies were employed on that work, with a large
infantry detail. At that time we worked incessantly at it, rain or shine. At the
same time I had three companies at work at what was called Richland Creek No. 1,
which is a bridge 375 feet long, I think, 2~3 feet high, and in about 6 feet of water.
I had two companies at the same time engaged on what is called the heavy trestle
near the tunnel; we rebuilt 1,050 feet of it; that was about 64 feet high. I had then
another set of men working at Richland Creek No. 2; that is .a bridge about 300
feetong and 30 feet high. We also relaid about 2 miles of track and c4eared out the
tunnel on the same road. We also built a bridge across Mill Creek nt MilIville; came
up to Columbia with two companies and repaired the bridge across Duck Creek that
had been washed away by the high water. The companies that were at work on Elk
River Bridge joined me about the middle of August on the Nashville and Chattanooga
road. While this work was going on I rebuilt Crow Creek Bridge No. 3, as it was
called; also cleared out the tunnel and built the bridge at Cowan.

	Queston. At what time were these works completed so that the
roads were in use to Stevenson I

	About the 28th of August.

	Question. Are you an engineer I

	I have engineered for about eighteen years.

	Question. Were these works prosecuted with industry and energy;
was any time wasted I

	They were. I took some pride in it. I think there was more work done during
the time, considering the force, within a short time, as has ever been completed by the
same amount of men. I could say also that I had a double incentive, for I was con-
tinually being urged on verbally and by telegraph that everything depended on the
opening of these roads.

	Question. Were these roads essential for supplying the troops with
a view to advance the army I

	I should consider them very essential. I hardly see how the army could be sup-
plied without them.
	Question. You have spoken of being engaged in the construction ~of
boats for a pontoon bridge. Will you explain the object of that bridge
as far as you know it and what progress you made in the construction
of them?

	I understood the object of the boats was to cross the Tennessee River in the vicinity
of Bridgeport, for the purpose, I understood, of marching to Chattanooga or some
other place. The boats were completed before I left them, except putting the bot-
toms together, which I decided had better not be done until they were ready to be
launched, probably half a days work on the whole of them. The tackle, anchors,
and everything were on hand ready to launch them. The boats were finished about
the 20th of August, except putting the bottoms together. They would have been
finished long b~ore if we could have got the timber. There was but one mill on the
road that could saw the long timber required for the bridges, and I ran that mill day
and night, not only with the force belonging to the mill, but with the detail from my
own regiment. We used, I think, every means that we could to get it out in as short
time as possible

Page 249

ChAP. XXVIII.]
GENERAL REPORTS.
249
	Question. Do you know anything of the construction of works at
Stevenson for the protection of a depot of supples for the army?

	Yes, sir.

	Question. Did you understand that depot was with a view to ad-
vance the army?

	Yes, sir, I so understood it; for the purpose of protecting the supplies.

	Question. State, if you please, colonel, of what value the Memphis
and Charleston Railroad was to the Army of the Ohio as a means of
supplying it; that is, west of Decatur.

	The Memphis and Charleston Railroad from Decatur to Huntsville and from there
to S evenson was of incalculable advantage to the army as a means of transportation.
It was the only possible means except by land carriage.

	Question. State whether that portion west of Decatur was of any
value to the army.
	I think not, sir.

	Question. State its condition with regard to rolling stock from Deca-
tur west.
	It was very poorly supplied with stock. When I first went there there were a
number of engines that could have been made available by a small amount of work.

	Question. Do you know whether those engines were used or any
serviceable amount of rolling stock was put in use between JDorinth
and Decatur?
	I think not, sir; the road was very poorly managed; that was my impression at
the time. I know Fwas three days making the trip from Decatur to Corinth.

	Question. Who had the control of that road?
	General J. B. McPherson. I was desired to report to him while constructing the
bridges there. I think he was styled military superintendent.

	Question. Was it under my immediate control in any manner?
	I think not, sir. I should have had control if it had been.

	Question. Did you go directly from the work on that road to the
work which you have described in your previous answer?
	Yes, sir; in less than twenty-four hours from my arrival in Huntsville, when I was
ordered with a detachment of my regiment on to the Tennessee and Alabama road.

	Question. Explain, if you please, how and when you were employed
on the Louisville and Nashville road.
	It ~vas on the 25th of August 1 commenced building what is called Therman Cove
Creek Bridge and completed it as soon as possible; it is a bridge 300 feet long, 64
feet high, and a very difficult bridge to construct on account of the quicksand
foundation. I then proceeded to the Pilot Knob Bridge; that is a bridge 350 feet
long and 20 feet high; and then to the Alexander Creek Bridge, which is a bridge
al)Ollt the same size as Pilot Knob Bridge. I was engaged upon that when we had
orders to march to Kentucky. That was about the 7th or 10th of September.

	Question. Were hired workmen employed on the road at any point
about that time?
	I think not, sir. I understood they were getting out some timber for these bridges,
but at the time I was working at Pilot Knob Bridge there were parties working at
Saundersville. I think there were parties working beyond the tunnel, at Gallatin,
but they did not come under my observation.

	Question. Will you state what the condition of that road was at that
time as a means of transportatiou for the army and what was the
cause of its condition?
	I consider the road was perfectly nseless from Gallatin to this point from my ow

Page 250

250	KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAP. XXVIIL
knowledge, made so by the destruction of the bridges and the filling up of the tun-
nels by the rebels.

	Question. Do you know how long it had been in that condition?

	I could not state the exact time. I heard when I was at Stevenson that the road
was destroyed before I started to come here.

	Question. Do you know anything of the condition of the Edgefield
and Kentucky road at that time?

	I understood, sir, that that was perfectly destroyed. With respect to that road I
should say it was hardly competent to supply the army, on account of its heavy
grades.

	Question. Do you know anything of the Cumberland River as a
means of transportation at that time?

	My knowledge of the river now is that it was useless at that time, as it now is.

	Question. Did you perform any work on the march to Louisville and
from Louisville toward Bardstown; and state, if you please, what?

	Yes, sir; we rebuilt the pontoon bridge at Barren River on our way up; also
planked the railroad bridge for transporting troops over. We also did some work on
the fortifications at Bowling Green; made platforms for ten guns. We rebuilt the
bridge on the march from Louisville to Bardstown across what is called Floyds Fork,
and got out a large part of the timber for the bridge across Salt River. We may
have done other little pieces of Work, such as repairing roads, but none of any great
consequence.

	Question. Was the army on its march from Louisville depending on
wagon transportation?

	Entirely so.

Cross-examination by the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:
	Question. Was the railroad from MeMinuville to Tullahoma and
from thence to Nashville in running order on the 22d of August, 1862 l
	If so, it must have been just completed and that was all, for I find I was ordered
by telegraph to go to MeMinuville and put the road in immediate order. I also had
a personal interview with General Buell at that time.

	Question. What was the date of that order and when did you have
that personal interview?
	Iii was Tuesday, August 19.

	Question. How soon thereafter can you say positively that that road
was in working order; that is, the two roads from Nashville to Tulla-
homa and from Tullahoma to McMinnville ~
	As far as the road from Tullahoma to MeMinuville is concerned, I do not know
when that was from my personal knowledge, though I heard on my way there that
the road was in order on the 23d.

	Question. What bridges were destroyed between Nashville and Bowl-
ing Green at that time?
	Therman, Cave Creek, Saundersville Trestle, Pilot Knob Bridge, Alexander Creek,
and two other bridges between there and Gallatin and two small bridges having no
name.

	Question. What time did it take you to repair those bridges?

	We were about fourteen days.

	Question. How long has, it taken to open that tunnel that was de-
stroyed?

	I cannot say of my own knowledge. It was under the charge of General Steed-
man. It was some ten days after those other bridges were built and longer than
it took us to rebuild those bridges

Page 251

CHAP. XXVIII.]	GENERAL REPORTS.	251


	Question. Where is that tunnel?
	It is about 7 miles from Gallatm.

	Question. What sort of a road is there around this tunnel?
	Very bad indeed; impracticable for teams.

	Question. How long would it require to make it practicable?
	You could not do it, on account of the elevation to be overcome.

	Question. What time did you arrive in Nashville?
	From the 23d to the 25th of August.

By General BUELL:
	Question. How long has it taken to put this road in order since the4
return of the army to Tennessee?
	I think about thirty days.

	Question. What force do you suppose has been employed on it or
present along it during that time?
	I think that between Gallatin and this point, on our way back to repair the bridges,
there were four brigades besides General Woods force; that I understood was in the
vicinity of Gallatin. These were all the troops I had knowledge of, but I never went
off the railroad and therefore had no means of knowing.

By General TYLER:
	Question. Was the railroad from Corinth to Stevenson after its re-
pair of any practicable use to General Buells army in the transporta-
tion of provisions and men?
	I think not, sir. There was great complaint that we could get neither men nor
provisions over the road.
	Question. And why not?
	Because I think the road was not well managed.

	Question. You spoke of some road with heavy grade that was of no use.
	The Edgefield and Kentucky road.

	Question. Why do heavy grades make a road useless?
	Because of its requiring greater motive-power to transport the same amount of
tonnage.
	Question. What do you suppose would be the requirement for the
daily transportation (in tons) for an army of 50,000 men?
	I could not say, sir, without calculation. It would depend entirely upon the amount
of transportation allowed to each regiment, and the amouut of forage depending
upon the number of horses they had.

	Question. What was the capacity of this road; what would an en-
gine of 25 tons carry?
	Over that grade three or four cars would be considered a load for a 25-ton engine.
	Question. Is the grade uniform over the entire road, so that a 25.ton
engine will take only three cars?
	No. sir; there are portions of the road where a larger train than that could be
taken; probably ten or twelve cars.
	Question. What is the maximum grade per mile on that road?
	I un(lerstand, going over the mountain, the grade is over 200 feet to the mile.

	Question. Do you mean to say that a 25-ton engine would not take
more than three loaded cars over a grade of 200 feet to the mile, sup-
posing the grade did not extend over one mile?
	I think, sir, if the track wm wet it would be about as much as a 25-ton engine
could do

Page 252

252
KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. (CHAr. XXVIII.
	The Commission adjourned to meet December 25, 1862, at it) oclock
a. m.

NASHVILLE, December 25, 1862.
	The Commission met pursuant to adjournment, all the members being
present; also the judge-advocate and General Buell.

	Major SmELL (a witness for the defense), being duly sworn, testified
as follows:

By General BUELL:
	Question. Stateyour name and position in the service, if you please,
and the special duty upon which you have been engaged for some
months past as far back as the month of July.

	W.	H. Sidell; major of the Fifteenth U. S. Infantry. I have been engaged on
special duty as assistant adjutant-general since July 20 at Nashville.

	Question. Give, if you please, major, a concise statem~nt of the
operations of the enemy in the vicinity of Nashville during the last
summer, and of the effect of these operations and the measures adopted
to counteract them.

	The operations here were irregular and generally of small significance. At the
time that I arrived Morgan, with his force, entered Kentucky, and I was detained in
Louisville by General Boyle with reference to that condition of things. When I arrived
here 1 found a small garrison of perhaps 1,200 effective men, with a body of conva-
lescents, who were considered available to a certain extent, under the command of
Col. J. F. Miller, Twenty-ninth Indiana Volunteers, who commanded the post. Im-
mediately on my arrival the aggressions of these parties or forces, under various
leaders and sometimes without leaders, began in cutting off couriers and interfering
with forage and general trains of the army and interrupting the communication be-
tween this place and the varions corps of the army in the vicinity. We had to be on
the alert all the time in order to counteract these operations as they occurred, the
general meaning of which is that the country was alive with these irregular forces.
Among their operations they made an attack on Gallatin, or rather they entered
there, for there was no great force, and there were. two expeditions to go upon the
road and endeavor to drive them away, which was effected by Colonel Miller. Sub-
sequently to that a third movement was made by Lieutenant-Colonel Heffren, of
the Fiftieth Indiana, who went to Gallatin and went into the tunnel, which was
burning, 3 miles beyond Gallatin, and to prevent its falling in was lined with wood.
The burning out of the interior was of very serious detriment. It is only now just
repaired. This Lieutenant-Colonel Heffren, going without proper precaution, met
with a disaster, that Colonel Miller was careful enougb. to avoid, in having his com-
munications cut off in the rear. This.so encouraged the enemy that nearly all the
communications were destroyed between here and Gallatin. All this occurred toward
the end of July and the beginning of August. Some cavalry were sent, under com-
mand of R. W. Johnson, brigadier-general, to Gallatin, going by the way of Lebanon,
in this State, for the purpose of driving away such of these forces as were concen-
trated (a force of four companies at Gallatin, under Colonel Boone, a Kentucky regi-
ment, had been taken by surprise, without any firing, and were captured). General
Johnson met the rebels at Gallatin and was repulsed. Stragglers began to arrive in
this city by way of Lebanon about S or 9 oclock in the evening, giving us informa-
tion.
	This movement of Colonel Heffren and this repulse of General Johnson was the
finale to the communication between this city and Louisville. This was early in Au-
gust. In the other direction from Nashville, south, there were no large conflicts, but
a continued series of annoyances, sometimes taking, in one instance 80, prisoners, who
went out with wagon trains; at other times squads of from 8 to 10, who were sent in
here for parole, as they called it. There was no knowledge that the enemy were
always in an organized condition; in fact it was fair to be ir~fcrred that they were
countrymen, without any organization.
	When affairs had arrived at this point, as the forces here were not adequate to any
large movement, it was thonght proper to organize a light brigade; that is, a brigade
so organized as to move with the fiicility of cavalry. Men were monnted as cavalry
or artillery or infantry with the means of a mount, and provided with the means of
transpo rtation in wagons, the intention being to follow the enemy and to be self

Page 253

CHAP. XXV]IE1
GENERAL REPORTS.
253
supporting. This was under the command of Colonel Miller, and was organized, I
think, about the 20th or 25th of August. Before, however, there had been any effi-
cient action of this brigade the army returned from the South, and it was no longer
necessary. Previously, as testified, the garrison here was very small and could spare
a very indifferent force, but subsequently sufficient was spared to organize this light
brigade, which would have answered a good purpose had the general army remained
in the south. It was considered expedient also to throw up works of defense about
the city, and I received an order from General Buell to reconnoiter for that object.
At the same time he informed me that an engineering officer would be sent herc to
carry into effect whatever measures might be considered good in that relation. This
officer was Captain Morton, of the Corps of Engineers of the U. S. Army, who planned
his works with reference to their speedy completion, but with the capability of being
indefinitely extended; and essentially the same works exist now with the strength
added. About the 1st of September the army came here from below, and within the
first ten days had gone north, leaving a garrison of about 20,000 effective mend or
rather it was strengthened to that point by the arrival of the Army of the Mississippi.
It was originally about. 10,000 men of all grades. This was nuder the command of
Brigadier-General Negley. General Negley was ordered to exercise vigilance and to
defend the place to the last extremity, and accordingly did everything that occurred
to him as a vigilant officer to do, particularly strengthening the works, sendii igout
expeditions to the country, preparing a boat bridge on the river, laying in supplies,
such as could be obtained in the country, with reference to a protracted~siege, and
building the bridge and defending themselves when attacked. The city was thereby
held until the arrival of this army, an4 I think could have been held with the sup-
plies we had some two or three weeks without getting further supplies.
	When Colonel Miller was in command here, with his small garrison, he was ordered
to defend the three railroads which go from this place, one north, the Louisville road,
as far as the Tennessee line, and the two south, about 15 or 20 miles. The remaining
portion of the road south also had a defense organized, without our having much in-
formation with regard to their particular means here in Nashville; we knew simply
that there was a sufficient force on those roads to protect them. I believe General
W. S. Smith was charged with that duty.

	Question. Were those operations of the enemy at any time of so for-
midable a character as to give ground of apprehension for the safety of
Nashville?

	At one time, when there was a small ~garrison and no works of defense, and an illy-
disposed population, as there has always been, it was possible that a dash could be
made by such forces as those cavalry leaders of the enemy could have brought. On
one or two occasions when this was apprehended measures were taken by barricading
the stre~ts with wagons, & c., and blocking up the main entrances to the city. At a
later date, when we had a larger garrison, there were threatenings and sufficient ap-
prehension to keep us at least on the alert. The day before the arrival of the army
from Louisville, nuder General Rosecrans, an attempt had been made to destroy the
bridges across the Cumberland and feel our works by a considerable force. They
made an attack on the city on all the roads leading south at the same time and
simultaneously an attack on the other side of the river an attack of cavalry, the object
being to get to the bridges to destroy them. I do not think they could have taken the
city by regular siege with such a force as we then had in the city and vicinity. In
addition to the strengthening of the works by operations of engineering were those
of mounting all the pieces of artillery left by the enemy, making cartridges, & c.

	Question. Do you know anything of the capture of Murfreesborough
and of the inconvenience that resulted from that misfortune?

	No, sir; I have no specific information on that subject, because it occurred before I
came here.

	Question. Did any portion of the army with which Bragg crossed the
Tennessee IRiverto invade Kentucky turn upon this place and take part
in the siege?

	I am not informed on that subject.

	Question. What was the character of the force that was acting against
the city during the abseuce of the army in September and October and
what was its strength?

	It was mostly cavalry. The last instance I was speaking of before the arrival of
the army, was infantry and artillery. The force I have no means of knowing, except

Page 254

254
KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAP. XXVIII.
ing that that portion which was on the other side the river consisted of cavalry, said
to be 700 or 750.

	Question. Was there any infantry with it in the beginning?

	I think there was no infantry. This answer does not refer to that last day spoken
of but to the~ operations generally.

	Question. Do you know who the commander was?

It was said to be Breckinridge.
	Question. Do you know whether orders were given for fortifying
positions occupied by bridge guards along the roads?

	Yes, sir; I knew that such orders were given to fortify these positions by stockade
or other means, and I am aware that it was generally done.

	Question. What force do you think would have been necessary to
keep open the communications between here and Louisville against
cavalry operations of the eifemy?

	It ought to be stated that the cavalry operations of the enemy could always count
on the assistance of the inhabitants. There is good reason to believe that in each
one of the outrages committed in this vicinity the citizens, acting temporarily as
soldiers, were engaged in it. I do not know howless than from 15,000 to 20,000 men
could have made the communications secure.

	Question. Were the difficulties of less magnitude in defending the
roads south of Nashville?

	There were some physical features on the Louisville and Nashville road giving pecu-
liar facilities to an enemy; otherwise the difficulties were the same in defending the
roads south of this point.

Cross-examination by the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:
	Qnestion. What time do you say you arrived here?

	~On the 18th or 20th of July. I was in Louisville, and received one or two telegrams,
and arrived on the 18th.

	Question. What time after your arrival was communication cut off
between Bowling Green and Nashville?

	I think there was no communication within ten days after my arrival.

	Question. Am I to understand that there was a force of no magni-
tude or an organized force at all threatening Nashville and its commu-
nications while General Buells army was in Tennessee?
	No more than those forces of partisan leaders, Morgan and Forrest; there was no
further organized force that I was cognizant of.

	Question. Do you know that Morgan or Forrest was in the neighbor-
hood of Nashville at that time?
	The most precise information of the presence of Morgan refers to the time when
General Johnson met him at Gallatin. This was about the middle o~ August. Pre-
viously to that I had no other information than a common report that sometimes For-
rests, sometimes Starnes or Woodwards or Morgans forces were there, but I have
no absolute knowledge of the presence of any one of them.

	Question. While you were being alarmed or excited in Nashville by
these reports did you not frequently hear of Morgan being in two
places at the same time?
	I have no doubt that rumors of his presence often were erroneous; but, strictly
speaking, I cannot recall any instance in which I heard of his being in two places at
the same time.
	Question. Do you not know that these attacks upon railroads and
lines of communication were made by the inhabitants and attributed
to Morgan or Forrest as a cover for their rascality?
I have fair reaoons to suppose that the citizens did sometimes commit these acts an

Page 255

CRAP. XXVIII.J
GENERAL REPORTS.
255
attribute them to the forces of the enemy. I judge, however, that they generally
acted in concert with some forces present or in the vicinity.

	Question. Up to what time were the trains running from Louisville to
Bowling Green?

	I cannot answer. The fact that communication was interrupted from Bowling
Green here prevents absolute knowledge of that fact.

	Question. What force, iu your opinion, would have been requisite to
have kept the railroad open from Bowling Green to Nashville?

	To have kept it open beyond peradventure I think that not less than from 10,000 to
12,000 men would have been necessary.

	Question. How is it necessary to distribute 10,000 to 12,000 men
along that road to keep it open?

	Well, I do not know how I could definitely state where the forces should be posted,
but I think they should be distributed along the road in such a manner as to be always
near any point which might be subject to attack in sufficient force to repel the attack.
I take into consideration the disposition of the people, their capacity to injure, and
the character of the force that was thrown against it. If this force could be counted
on to be exl)ected at any one place they could be met by a similar force, butdn order
to iiiake this secure for an army it should be such that at any one point sufficient force
could l,e had to meet an attack.

	Question. Can you designate the points along the road where it
would be necessary to have a force stationed?

	The first principle would be to have them distributed i~itl reasonable equality;
then, in regard to the selection of places, I would have a force between Goodlevtsville
and Gallatin, between Mitchellsville and Gallatin two forces, and between Franklin
and Bowling Green. When I say these places I do not mean the towns, but at such
works in the vicinity as are peculiarly important in relation to the conntry roads in
the vicinity.

	Question. What forces would you station at Goodlettsville?

	I am not prepared to answer that question as to the exact disposition of these forces
at the various points. If I were obliged to do the work it would be with the topog-
raphy of the country before me and such information as I could collect for doing it.

	Question. Why, then, do you say it would require from 10,000 to
12,000 to keep that road open?

	The answer was given on the general ideaof the exposure of the road and the neces-
sity for defending all points.

	Question. Is it customary in guarding a road to place a guard at any
other points than to take care of the tunnels and bridges on the road ~?

	That question depends, of course, upon the amount of force there to spare for the
pnrpose; such a force as could be no doubt would be disposed of at the most vulner-
able points.

	Question. Has it not been the practice to guard railroad bridges and
tunnels from the fact that to destroy the one is a serious injury to the
road, the other a permanent one, while the track is easily and quickly
relaid?

	Yes, sir.

	Question. The largest force you mentioned as numbering 700 cavalry;
how many infantry at any one point would you think necessary to repel
an attack of 700 cavalry?
	This number of cavalry mentioned was referring to the attack that was made pre-
vious to the entrance of General Rosecrans army; a larger force was assembled at
the time of the battle with General Johnson. The question resolves itself into the
character and circumstances of the attack. If a regular advance is made upon a par-
ticular point of road a regiment of infantry would repel them; but as the attack may
be made unexpectedly and at unexpected points, the~ force necessary to repel them
would be indefinite

Page 256

256
4

KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAP. XXVIII.
	Question. Major, were the inhabitants along the road of such a char-
acter as that between Bowling Green and Nashville at the timeyou
mention?. Is it possible for any amount of men to keep a road open by
being stationed along it to repel attacks?

	It is not absolutely possible.

	Question. Would not that road have been protected between Bowling
Green and Nashville under those circnmstances if the inhabitants had
been notified that for every interruption their country would be laid
waste right and left?
	That question involves so many considerations that I do not know how Ican answer
it categorically. It is not possible to decide what effect the declaration of such a
policy would have throughout the State of Kentucky.

	Question. Would it preserve the road?
	I think it would have a conservative effect on the road.

	Question. Do you not know of railroad lines and telegraph lines being
preserved through disaffected regions in that way?
	I have heard of the operations of the policy in Missouri.

By General TYLER:
	Question. Did you not state in your testimony that the garrison of
Nashville would require 20,000 men; would you regard 17,000 or 20,000
men necessary for th~ protection of Nashville against the guerrilla par.
ties?

	No, sir.

	Question. Was Nashville at the time this garrison was left here
threatened by anything but guerrilla parties and small bodies of cav-
alry?

	We heard on several different occasions of theconcentr~tion of troops in the vicinity
south; we heard also of the possible arrival of the army defeated at Corinth; and
probably on two or three occasions we received information from the inhabitants
which indicated the coming of regular forces.

	Question. Did these rumors prove true or false; was there ever any
large concentration of forces .agaiist Nashville?

	I think there was never a positive concentration until it began to gather a short
time before the arrival of General RosecranR army. I presume the beginning of that
force was there a long time since. They had a general meeting at Murfreesborough,
in which there were very strong persuasions used by Governor Harris with reference to
the collection of forces there to attack Nashville and without a word of difference of
opinion existing in regard to that subject.

Redirect examination by General BUELL:
	Question. Is there any difference in the character of the military
operations in Missouri and those of the Army of the (i3umberland now?

	I think there is, consisting of this, that in Missouri the object seemed to be to keep
the State itself in a loyal condition as nearly as practicable, to suppress treasonable
acts, and bring the State back to a tranquil condition; whereas here the object is the
movement of a large army for strategic purposes.

	Question. Is there any more effective way that you know of certain
of counteracting the objects of this large army than by operating on its
communications?

	I know of no better way.

	Question. Suppose the country on either side the railway should be
laid waste by fire and ~word, do you think it would be less an object
with the enemy to destroy the road and interrupt communication by it?

	I do not think it would be less an object; but I think it would interfere with th

Page 257

CHAP. XXVIII.]	GENERAL REPORTS.	257

means, and I think that the threat of it might suppress the disposition on the part of
the inhabitants.

	Question. Do you really think that the inhabitants have acted very
powerfully in interrupting the communications between here and Louis-
ville in destroying the road as a means of transportation?

	I do not think that the inhabitants, announcing themselves as such, have done
much harm, but that they have acted clandestinely and in concert with the organized
enemy. That question. of course, is one of oPinion, depending on such minors or infor-
mation as we received from time to time in regard to the probable alliance between
the inhabitants and the enemy, and the opinion is to be taken with much allowance.

	Question. Is not the presence of large bodies of cavalry under For-
rest, Morgan, and other rebel generals, operating upon the line of com-
munication of the army during the past summer, as much a matter of
fact as the presence of Kirby Smiths army in Kentucky?

	I have no doubt that these forces were regularly operating against the communica-
tions of the army. I have no doubt, not only from the facts of their actual interrup-
tion, but also from the information brought by spies and others who obtained it, that
such were their plans.

	Question. There is no question of the fact, I suppose, that a consider-
able force of our troops was captured by a large body of the enemys
cavalry at Murfreesborough in July last, and does not that establish
the fact of the presence of such large bodies in the country?

	I was not in Nashville at the time of the battle of Murfreesborough but immediately
subsequent, and became acquainted with the fact of a large number of persons hav-
ing been taken in the battle and of the successful attack of the enemy at Murfrees-
borough. The business of my office brought that information constantly before me.


	General ~EGLEY (a witness for the defendant), being duly sworn,
testified as follows:

By General BUELL:
	Question. State, if you please, general, your name and position in
the service of the United States.

	James S. Kegley, brigadier-general in the United States service.

	Question. Give, if you please, a concise statement of your services
(luring the past summer and up to the time of the return of the army
to this place recently. State what the enemys operations were in your
vicinity and what measures were adopted to counteract them.

	I was in command of the post at Columbia from the 1st of July. My comniand ocen-
pie4 the railroad from Franklin to the Tennessee River, on the Alabama and Ten-
nessee Railroad. The enemy were quite numerous throughout the country. They
were raising guerrilla parties in the vicinity of all the interior towns. Biffie was
raising a regiment in the vicinity of Waynesborough, west of Columbia; Napier was
raising another regiment in the vicinity of Charlotte and Centreville, nearly west of
Columbia; and Major Hawkins was raising a regiment in the vicinity of Hillsborough,
over toward Chapel Hill. There was a battalion raising between Columbia and
Pulaski, in the neighborhood of Culleoka, a point on the railroad. There was a bat-
talion, afterward a regiment, of guerrillas organizing on the edge of Atlanta, coin-
manded by John T. Morgan. This force numbered in all between 2,500 and 3,000 men.
Forrest at the same time was operating east of the line of railroad between Nash-
ville and Tullahoma. He was operating between Manchester and extending toward
Carthage and Sparta. The rapidity with which these guerrillas could organize at
any one given point require4 a great deal of vigilance and watchfulness, for the troops
would move from point to point in order to cut off the line of communication to the
south. Scarcely a day would pass in which they did not commit some depredations
on the road, stopping trains and pulling up the rails. They were very annoying in
the vicinity of Columbia, their forces generally outnumbering the forces at the post.
They threw the cars off the track three times and interrupted the. travel for several
days at different periods. At the time of the withdrawal of the troops they succeeded

17 R RYOL XV

Page 258

KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. (CHAP. XXVIII.
258

on one occasion in burning the bridges on each side of one of the trains that was
bringing up troops.
	At the beginning of september I withdrew my forces, by the order of General Buell,
from the line of railroad. They were concentrated at Nashville. I took command of
the forces at Nashville on the 14th of September. GeneralThomas was leftin command
of tho post, with three divisions that General Buell lefthis own division, General
Palmers division of the Army of the Mississippi, and the Eighth Division, which I
command. General Thomas, by order of General Buell, marched to Kentucky; took
with him his own division, leaving with me two divisions. Shortly after the army had
proceeded to Kentucky the unorganized party concentrated their forces in the vicinity
of the city, at a place called La Vergne, under the command of Major-General Ander-
son. About that time General Forrest was sent from Kentucky to take command and
organize the detached forces in Tennessee. He brought with him a portion of his
own command to do so. He reached Murfreesborough while General Anderson, with
over 3,000 men, was at La Vergue. Before he could carry his orders into execution we
pursued the forces of General Anderson and captured a number, one of their pieces of
artillery, and demoralized their forces entirely. This led to the disbanding of two
regiments of cavalry and the withdrawal of General Anderson from that portion of
the command. General Forrest then assumed command of all the forces and retained
it until General Breckinridge arrived. This was between the 4th and 2~th of October.
	Theenemyusedeve~effo~ to prevent our obtaining supplies and forage. We
were without supplies here for fifty days except what we procured from the country.
We were obliged to go about 20 miles into the country. The enemy~would drive off
their cattle to some secluded point, which we had to ascertain and then follow them
there. They were then concentrating their forces in the neighborhood of Gallatin and
Goodlettsville for the purpose of surprising our forage trains, and before we could
send out our small force we had to disperse the bands concentrated there. Some ten
days previous to the arrival of re-enforcements to General Rosecrans army General
Breckinridge had organized a force in the neighborhood of 25,000 men. Of that force
6,000 were cavalry. He had twenty-eight pieces of artillery, three of which were siege
guns. Their advance post was moved to La Vergue, then to the asylum, 5 miles dis-
tant, on the MurfreesborOugh road. From that point they would make sallies on our
picket lines and forage parties. The day previous to the arrival of General McCooks
command they made an attack upon the east and north side of the defenses at the
same time, with the intention of destroying the bridge, I presume. Tue forces on the
north side of the river, numbering 3,000, with two pieces of artillery, were commanded
by General Morgan. They had only about 1,500 of those in action. The attack was
made about 3 oclock in the morning. It commenced on the eastern side of the Mur-
freesborough road, by the enemy, numbering about 3,000, with three pieces of artillery,
driving in our pickets. They were speedily driven off without success on the north
side. We constructed banquettes along the railroad, which they were only enabled to
approach before they were driven back. On the eastern sidethey fired some fifteen
or twenty shots from their artillery. We then opened on them two of the heavy guns
at the fort, which obliged them to shift their position. They then moved over to the
Franklin road and brought up Hansons brigade, three batteries of artillery, station-
ing it between the Noleneville pike and the Mnrfreesborough pike, on a cross-road
which runs diagonally from the asylum to the Franklin road. Their cavalry, about
3,000, with six pieces of artillery, moved down near the Franklin road on the inter-
mediate, which runs parallel with the Franklin dirt road. A small force from this
command approached the picket line on the Franklin road. Believing it possible that
we could punish that party that came up the Franklin road, I sent a brigade on the
MurfreesborOugh road to cover the real movements on the Franklin road, to engage
them apparently on the Murfreesborough road while I took the regiments of infan-
try and some cavalry, with four pieces of artillery, and preceded the forces on
the Franklin road. They retreated, making a stand upon every rising piece of ground,
until they reached a distance of 3 miles from the city. I then endeavored to draw
them upon our artillery by sending our cavalry forward, with directions to charge
upon the rear of the enemy and then retreat, turning into the woods on the right, in
hopes of bringing them on an ambuscade. My cavalry were so inexperienced that
they followed a small portion of the enemy that remained on the Franklin road to
within 5 miles of Franklin, and obliged me to move forward with my infantry force
5 miles farther to support them, taking us about Smiles from the city. Before I could
get the cavalry back the enemy had formed in considerable force on my left, with
seven pieces of artillery, and we moved up toward the Franklin road to cut off their
retreat. I left a regiment of infantry to protect the cavalry, and fell back opposite
the position they assumed, and succeeded in placing two guns in position and open-
ing fire simultaneously with their artillery. This enabled me to withdraw my cavalry
and get in the rear in time to make preparations for a charge of cavalry which they
had formed upon the Franklin road. They shifted three of their guns, and began to
move up the reserve toward the Franklin road while trying to get into our rear, a

Page 259

CRAP. xxvm.j
GENERAL REPORTS.
259
the same time forming a line, which I presume was a regiment and a half, across the
Franklin road, about 900 or 1,000 yards distant. I placed a regiment of infantry be-
hind a fence close by the road to conceal them from view, and threw out two com-
panies of cavalry as a decoy, with orders to open fire upon the enemy at a long range
and then retreat. The enemy accepted the challenge, charging very handsomely over
the rolling piece of ground that lay between the regiment and the line they had
formed. Simultaneously with that I placed the threepieces of artillery to cover their
retreat, which was extendingto myrear. They charged up to within a hnndredyardsof
the line of infantrythe fence that was on the Franklin roadwhen they discharged
their pieces, halting temporarily to do so, andthen charged forward, still not seeing our
concealed regiment of infantry, and within about 40 yards they received the volley
of the entire regiment, which drove them back in confusion, causing considerable
loss. I took advantage of their retreat andthe confusion they were in to withdraw my
force to a better position in the rear, and in time to meet the movement from what I
presume was their reserve, and moved toward the Franklin road about 2 miles from
the city. They would perhaps have succeeded in getting into my rear but for a
section of artillery which I had ordered from the city upon a rising piece of ground
overlooking the ground upon which they were marching. The enemy then withdrew
their force to La Yergne, Where they remained till the arrival of General Rosecrans
army.
The troops that occupied thecity of Nashville numbered about 10,000 effective men.
There were 3,000 convalescents, organized into regiments, that remained in the city,
and we were unable to send them out. Duringthe siege we procured 3,500 foads of
forage and provisions within a radius of 20-odd miles. The troops marched 540 or
660 miles in procnrin~ supplies. We captured about 350 Confederate prisoners, had
three engagements with the enemy and about twenty skirmishes. Our whole loss
was about 5 killed, 40 wounded, and about 60 persons captured. We lost no wagons
or animals by the acts of the enemy, and the garrison was maintained in 4ery good
order and condition.

Question. Were your troops actually employed during the summer
and did you succeed in inflicting punishment on those guerrilla bands
that you have spoken of?

Yes, sir.

Question. Did General Bragg, in marching through Tennessee, leave
any of his force to operate against Nashville?

He left General Breckinridges division, which had been ordered into Kentucky,
and had reached Knoxville on its way to Kentucky when General Breckinridge and
his command were ordered to Murfreesborough.

	Question. Your answer implies that they did not form part of the
force with which Bragg left Chattanooga?

Yes, sir; he left none of his forces that he marched from Chattanooga with.

Question. Do you know anything of the road from McMinnville to
the Sequatchie Valley by way of Altamont?

Yes, sir.

	Question. Is it a practicable mountain road?

It is in the summer-time; the great difficulty is a deficiency of water.

	Question. Is there not the same difficulty with all the mountain
roads; that is, 8carcity of water?

Yes, sir; there is but one stream of water between MeMinuville and the Sequatchie
Valley, and that is in the neighborhood of Altamont.

Question. Did you march with your troops to the Tennessee River
opposite Chattanooga?

Yes, sir.

	Question. State, if you please, what route you took.

I concentrated my forces at Pulaski; This was about the 30th of May; marched
from Pulaski to Fayetteville, and found the enemy we were after had gone towards
Sweedens Cove, which is on the road to Jasper. We took the Fayetteville and Win-
chester road to Winchester; from Winchester, by way of Cowan, across the ridge o

Page 260

KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. (CHAP. XXVIII
260

the Cumberland Mountains, into Sweedens Cove to the west of Battle Creek. Then
we took the Jasper road. Four miles beyond Jasper I divided my forces, sending a
portion of the infantry across Waldens Ridge by a path 16 miles to the ferry opposite
Chattanooga. We marched the artillery and transportation 22 miles np the valley
to the Anderson and Therman road, crossing the ridge by the Therman or Anderson
road to the ferry opposite Chattanooga. 1 returned by the same road to the Ander-
son cross-road in the Sequatchie Valley, sending one portion to Battle Creek to sus-
tain a small force I had left there to engage the enemys attention, and with that
force to march to Stevenson, while with the other portion, commanded personally, I
took the Therman road to Altamont, with the intention of attacking Starnes cavalry,
that were encamped at Altamont when I was crossing the mountains from Chatta-
nooga. Before I arrived there Starnes moved to Pikeville, and I received intelli-
gence that the enemy were proposing to cross the river and attack our forces at Fay-
etteville. I marched from Altamont through Hubbards Cove to Manchester; from
Manchester to Wartrace and Shelbyville. I then left a portion there to sustain that
line, and marched the remainder by the Shelbyville road to Columbia. The time oc-
cupied in marching from Columbia to Chattanooga and returning was fourteen days;
the distance we traveled was nearly 300 miles.

	Question. How long were you in crossing the mountains from the
Sequatchie Valley to Altamont?

	Two days.

	Question. How does that road compare with the Manchester and
Jasper road?

	It is a better road; that is, ascending from the eastern side; it is equally as bad
ascending from the western side.

	Question. Is there any difficulty about it at all ~iore than with other
mountain roads in that regiont

	No, sir; the roads are all very rough.

	Question. Is there a good wagon road down the Sequatchie Valley
and on to Stevenson?

In the summer-time very gooda level, smooth road; with the exception of Se-
quatchie River and Battle Creek it is a very good one. One has to be forded and the
other has a bridge over.

	Question. Is it, beyond all comparison, better than any other road out
of the Sequatchie Valley?

	Yes, sir.

	Question. Do you know any roads crossing the mountain out of the
Sequatchie Valley east of the Therman road?

	Yes, sir; it is what is called the Dunlap or Grassy Cove road. It intersects the
Grassy Cove road to Chattanooga and Knoxville to Dunlap. That is a very good road
in summer-time. Where it crosses Caney Fork it is well supplied~with water.

	Question. How far is that from McMinnville?

	Between 20 and 30 miles.

	Question. Do.you know anything of the road from Dunlap to Sparta?

	Yes, sir; the road runs on the ridge for a considerable distance.

	Question. is there a road from Harrison into the Sequatchie Valley?

Yes, sir; it passes to the right of Therman road 44 miles in turning the mor.intain.

	Question. Do you know of a road following the main ridge of the
Cumberland, Crossing these different roads, by which you can turn off
to the left from the Dunlap and MeMiunville road and come into the
Therman road near Altamont?

	There is a ridge road that runs to Alexandriastrikes the Carthage and McMinn-
ville road at Alexandria. Where the Therman road strikes the Tracy City at Alta-
mont there are cross-roads by which you could proceed to Pikeville, Spencer, Al

Page 261

CHAP. XXVIII.]	GENERAL REPORTS.	261

oxandria, McMinnville, or Hubbards Cove and Manchester, and also one that leads
by Tracy City to Cowan.

Cross-examinationby the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:
	Question. Do you say you were shut off~ from supplies in Nashville
some fifty days 01 Did your forces suffer any during that time?

	Only inconvenience; they suffered no want.

	Question. The organization of these guerrilla bands that you speak
of was subsequent to the invasion of Kentucky by Bragg 01

	Yes, sir.

	Question. At what time was it that Breckiuridge came over to take
the command you speak of 01

	I cannot give you the exact date, but it was between the 4th and 21st of October.
The Governor had offered opportunities to the people throughout Tennessee to enlist
and select their own companies and organizations, and large numbers enrolled them-
selves. General Bragg refused to recognize the authority of the Governor or the pro-
priety of the order, and ordered the troops to be organized into organizations o~lready
existing, except such reoiments
cept two regiments. ~ as were full. They disbanded all the forces here ox-

	Question. At what time did Bragg cross from Chattanooga and Har-
rison with his invading army?

	In the middle of August.

	Question. Where were you at the time?

At Columbia.

	Question. Bragg marched up the Sequatchie Valley through Dunlap
and Pikeville to Sparta. Was it known at the time he crossed that that
would be the line he would take 01

	When he marched to Sparta he had not determined whether he would attack Nash-
ville or march into Kentucky. He was contending against the pr~gramme laid out
for him by Governor Harris. He approached Nashville in consequence of the pres-
sure brought on him by Governor Harris. The governor was opposed to his march.
ing in to Kentucky, and had induced President Davis to send Bragg into Tennessee to
retake Nashville. That is one reason why General Bragg threw a portion of his
forces along the line of the Chattanooga and Nashville Railroad.

	Question. What I asked you was whether it was known to you or to
the more intelligent officers at the time of crossing the Tennessee River
that Bragg would take that line up through Dunlap, Pikeville, and
Sparta, and whether it was anticipated that that would be his line of
march?

	It was not known to me. I was aware of his crossing the river and the force he
had, and it was presumed that he would go to Pikeville, from the fact that a portion
of his cavalry came so low down the Sequatchie Valley.

	Question. Did not his condition as to supplies and transportation,
& c., force him up the Sequatchie Valley through Pikeville and Sparta?

	That must have had an influence upon his march, but at the same time he h~d
placed himself in a condition where there was no waterbetween Sparta and Alexan-
dria. His forces were almost demoralized by the hardships of the march.

By General DANA:
	Question. With what force did Bragg cross the Tennessee River?

	Sixty thousand.

	Question. Do you know anything of the condition of Braggs army
as to supplies when he crossed?

Yes, sir

Page 262

KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. (CHAP. XXVIXL
262

	Question. What was his actual condition as to supplies?

	He had no more than three days provisions; he had not moro than three wagons to
every brigade; that is, for supplies.

	Question. With the quantity of supplies with which he crossed the
Tennessee and with the train of artillery and baggage he had with his
army was it or was it not at his option, with equal chances, to go
down into the plains of Tennessee by the different cross.roads you have
described in the vicinity of Altamont or to go to Sparta~
	No, sir; there was not a sufficiency of forage between Altamont and McMiunville
to feed his cavalry one meal.

	Question. Do you consider, then, that he was compelled on account
of lack of supplies to go by the road to Sparta I
	Yes, sir.

	Question. And that he could not go by the Anderson or Therman
road or by any other cross-road down into the plains of Tennessee?
	He could not go with the supplies he had with him. He would have had sufficient
supplies to maintain him three or four days.

	Question. Was it known at the time that Bragg was in the Se-
quatchie Valley that the lack of supplies under which he was suffering
prevented him from going by any other road than the Sparta road?
	I am unable to say, sir.

	Question. At the time that the Army of the Ohio occupied its posi-
tion in the vicinity of Altamont and McMinnville by which road did
you expect Bragg to come into the plains of Tennessee?
	By the Alexandria road to Lebanon by the way to Dunlap. That opinion I did not
form until I knew he was ascending the mountain. When he was in the Sequatchie
Valley I was unable to tell where he would ascend the mountain, but presumed he
would go to Pike.ville or Sparta.

	Question. At the time you entertained the opinion that he would
come out by the road to Dnnlap with what portion of the Army of the
Ohio were you stationed?
	I was at Columbia with 110 L~] men. There was one brigade extending along the
railroad to the Tennessee River; another portion of General Buells command was on
the line of the Chattanooga and Nashville road to Nashville. There was a portion of
General McCooks command near Altamont, so I understood; but I was not fully
aware of the disposition of the forces of General Buell on that line.

	Question. What was the programme Governor Harris laid down for
Braggs operations?
	It was intended that Bragg should concentrate his forces at Chattanooga and
march by way of Sparta, thus turning General Buells left, retake Nashville, compel
General Buells army to fall back and cross the Tennessee, while the forces north of
the Cumberland should be compelled to fall back to Louisville, thus obtaining posses-
Sion of the railroad north of Bowling Green to Huntsville. Governor Harris was so
well satisfied that that plan would succeed that lie had urged appropriations in the
Cenfederate Congress to establish defenses on the Cumberlaud and Tennessee Rivers.

	Question. Was this programme of Governor Harris generally under-
stood at that time among the officers of high rank in the Army of the
Ohio?
	No, sir.

	Question. At the time General McCook lay at Altamont and General
Thomas at McMinnville where was it generally expected among officers
of high rank in the Army of the Ohio that Bragg would debouch from
the Sequatchie Valley into the plains of Tennessee and by what road?
	I am unable to say, because I had no consultation with them at the time. M

Page 263

CELl. ixym.]
GENERAL REPORTS.
263
communication was so cut off that I had no opportunity of exchanging opinions with
them.

	Question. When Bragg crossed the Tennessee Rver did you know
at that time that he had but three days supply?

	Not till some days afterward.

	Question. Do you remember about how long afterward you obtained
the information?

	Five or six days.

	Question. Do you know anything of the letter of Governor Harris
detailing the programme having, been intercepted by our forces?

	I never heard of such a thing.

	Question. How did you arrive at the estimate of 60,000 men of Braggs
forces crossing the Tennessee River?

	By a man who counted them as they passed along the Grassy Cove road, and also
by a statement of the assistant ferry-man at Chattanooga.

	Question. What data did your informant give you by which you made
the estimate of 60,000?

He counted the regiments, gave me the number of regiments and number of bri-
divisions, and gave me the strength of several regiments of the different

	Question. What did lie state as the number of regiments and the aver-
age number of men to the regiment?

	I am unable to tell you the number of regiments in detail; he did not give me a
memorandum in writing, but the strength of the regiments. Those from Virginia,
from Tennessee, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama averaged from 300 to 350 men;
some from Tennessee were as low as 200; some brigades were composed of live regi-
ments. The regiments from Georgia would sometimes exceed 700; they ranged from
500 to 700 and 800. There were several Florida regiments that were very strong.

	Question. What was the name of your informant?

	Carter.

	Question. At the time Bragg was in the Sequatchie Valley by which
road did you consider it certain that he would debouch from the valley?

	I am unable, sir, to answer that question. I presumed that he would march by
way of Pikeville to Sparta, because it was a better road for his artillery and trans-
portation.

	Question. Are the Anderson and Therman road and the Grassy Cove
road equally practicable for an army as the road by way of Pikeville
and Sparta?

	Yes, sir.

	Question. At the time that General McCook lay at Altamont and
General Thomas at McMinnville, suppose the Army of the Ohio had
been concentrated in the vicinity of Spar~ to oppose Bragg, which road
would he then have traveled? Would he have given battle to this
army in position or traveled by some other road?

	He would have traveled by some other road.

	Question. Which road would he have taken?

	That would depend upon where he wished to go. When he left Sparta he had not
decided where he would go. It was not until he reached that point Governor Harris
understood from him that he determined to cross into Kentucky. Till he reached
Sparta or the vicinity Governor Harris was under the impression that he would go
to Nashville, and he frequently asserted that it was understood that he marched on
to Nashville

Page 264

264	KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. (CHAP.XXYIII.

	Question. Had General Buells army taken up the position before
spoken of would it have held Bragg under the necessity of either giv-
ing him battle in the vicinity of Sparta or of retreating by the line by
which he came?
	Yes, sir.

	Question. Could he not have gone by any other road?
	He would have been compelled to cross so as to reach Kentucky by the way of
Pikeville to obtain supplies; if he crossed the Cumbe~land farther east he would
have been unable to sustain his army.

	Question. Could General Bragg have avoided General Buell at Sparta
and continued on his march 0/
	I think not, with success.

	Question. Please state to the Commission how you obtained the in-
formation that Governor Harris plan of taking Nashville was not modi-
fied until after Braggs army reached Sparta.
	By having a person present at an interview between Governor Harris, ~Breckinridge,
and Ex-Governor Foote, General Forrest, and An drew Ewing.

	Question. At what date did you first consider it certain that Bragg
would not take Nashville?
	Not until I heard he was near Rome.

Redirect examination:
	Question. What is the distance from Dunlap to Sparta?
	I think it is 40 miles; but I am not positive of the exact distance.

	Question. low far is it from Dunlap to McMinnville?
	By the nearest road I should judge it was about 40 miles.

	Question. Do you know how far it is from McMinnville before you
strike the mountain in going over to Dunlap?
About 10 or 12 miles.

	Question. Is it a productive region about there?
	No, sir; not until you come into the neighborhood of McMinnville.

	Question. How far does this productive region extend toward Dunlap?
	Not more than S or 10 miles.

	Question. Is Sparta in the mountains or on the ridge of the mount-
ains?
	It is on the northern slope of the mountains.

	Question. What is the character of the country between Dunlap and
Sparta?
	V.ry thinly settled; very little cultivated.

	Question. Is it like the mountain region on the road from Dunlap
across to McMinnville?
	It is similar to it till you get near Sparta.

	Question. You say Sparta is on the slope of the mountains; how close
to Sparta do you get before you come to the productive region in that
direction?
	I understand, sir, not until you approach within 10 or 12 miles of Sparta.

	Question. Would not that take you on the mountains 10 or 12 miles
from Sparta?
	Yes, sir; those slopes are all cultivated; they form parts of the Cove, and are all
cultivated

Page 265

CHAP. XXVIII]	GENERAL REPORTS.	265


	Question. Which is the most productive region, that about Sparta
or that by McMinnville?

	That south of McMinnville; the advantage is in favor of McMinnville.

	Question. When you say in your testimony that those guerrilla bands
were organized subsequent to the marching of the Army of the Ohio,
do you mean that they had no effective organization at all or that they
were not consolidated ~

	I mean that they were not consolidated.

	Question. Were they effective as an offensive force?

	Yes, sir; from the manner in which they operated in interfering with our commu-
nications.

	Question. Have you been at McMinnviile, Dunlap, or Sparta your-
self?

	No, sir; I know them only by examinations made by my couriers and by persons
whom I sent to those points.

	General I~. W. JOHNSON (a witness for defendent), being duly sworn
by the judge-advocate, testified as follows:

By General BUELL:
	Question. Give your name and position in the service, if you please;
general?

Richard W. Johnson; brigadier-general of volnnteers.

	Question. Were you on duty with the Army of the Ohio in Tennessee
in the months of July and August last?

	I was; up to August 21.

	Question. State, if you please, concisely, the operations of the ene-
mys cavalry in Middle Tennessee prior to that time and the measures
adopted to counteract them, as far as you were concerned.

The enemys cavalry were all the time during the months of July and August at-
tempting to break up our communications by railroad, in which they succeeded in
several instances, and it became necessary to transport supplies by wagons, and these
were often threatened by cavalry. At one time it was reported that the enemys cav-
alry in large force were marching in the direction of Pulaski, Teun. The command-
ing officer of the Army of the Ohio telegraphed to me, then in Battle Creek, to report,
to him at once in Huntsville. On my arrival in Huntsville he showed me several maps,
told me what the enemys cavalry were doing, and asked me if with the cavalry in
the department I could stop the depredations of Morgan and his cavalry. I received
orders from General Buell to go to a place known as Reynolds Station, on the Ten-
nessee and Alabama Railroad, and there assume command of all the cavalry in that
neighborhood, and to march against any enemys cavalry found near that and Mur-
freesborough. I assumed command on my arrival, and within two days marched by
Fayettevvlle and Shelbyville in the direction where the cavalry were said to be. I
found that if any had been there in an organized form they had left, but I found that
citizens in the absence of the Federal forces would arm themselves and take advan-
tage of any small force left to guard the bridges on the railroad. These parties would
dismount on the approach of the Federal troops, secrete their arms, and be considered
as citizens and be loyal for the time.
I marched to Murfreesborough, and on my arrival I reported to General Nelson,
in obedience to General Buells orders. From this point I was sent to a town called
Liberty, and from Liberty to Smithfield, Smithfield to MeMiunville, and in fact
throughout the entire portion of country there, but was not able to find the en-
emy in any considerable force. I then marched from MeMinuville, with 640 men, to
a place known as Cookville; here I intercepted a message from Morgan himself, and
found that he had left on the 19th, marching in the direction of Gallatin, Tenn.
Marched on Gallatin, and met him in that place and had an engagement with him on
the 21st. I would state that all the cavalry in that portion of Tennessee was placed
under my command by instructions from General Buell. When I reported to General
Nelson he divided up the command, leaving me only 640 men. While at Huntsvill

Page 266

266	KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. (Cair. XXVIIL-
General Buell indicated on the map the line he wished to take up, and in order to
successfully occupy that line it was necessary to drive the rebel cavalry from be-
tween two roads and beyond the line that he wished to take up. This, I suppose,
was the object of my going there in advanceto render the road safe for the trans-
portation of supplies. There was at the time I started out a break in that road of
about 50 miles by the destruction of bridges which the mechanics were then em-
ployed in repairing. On my arrival at ~e~oids Station I found the cavalry posted
along the railroad for its protection at bridges and to guard the wagon trains with
provisions. The gathering up of these detachments required the two days delay
referred to in the tectimony.

Cross-examination by the JETDGE.ADVoCATE:
	Question. What number of men would it require between Bowling
Green and Nashville to protect it, supposing the inhabitants to be dis-
affected along the line of railroad?

Fifty thousand men.
	Question. An attempt, then, to guard the railroad under those cir-
cumstances is simply an absurdity?

	No, I do not think it is. I can take 50,000 and guard it perfectly, accprding to my
opinion, though I cannot operate outside the railroad. My operations must be con-
fined to it alone.

	Question. Would the road then do more than supply the army you
had to guard it?.

	That would depend upon the quantity of rolling stock on that road.

	Question. Were these depredations to be feared from the inhabitants
alone or from the inhabitants assisted by a few guerrillas, and is there
no other mode of protecting the road?

I know of no other.
	Question. What would be the effect of a notice to the inhabitants
along that road that the country would be laid waste on either side if
they interfered with it?

	Many of the persons who depredated upon these railroads have no interest in the
property lying contiguous to it, and a threat of that kind would have no effect upon
them. That plan has been pursued in Missouri and was unsuccessful there.

	Question. Was the threat in Missouri carried out where it was made?

	I am not prepared to say, but I think it was, part of the time, under General Pope,
in his early operations in Missouri.

	Question. Do you know of that mode of protecting railroad and tele-
graph lines having been adopted in Virginia?

	I do not.

	Question. At the time you speak of, when you were sent to take
command of the cavalry, was there a force in and about that region of
country you speak of?

	It was variously estimated. General Buell exhibited to me some dispatches he re-
ceived, I think from General Negley, in which General Negley stated that 500 rebel
cavalry were then marching on Pulaski. General Buell told me, to prevent the pos-
sibility of that detachment taking a train which was to have left that day, that he
had telegraphed for the train not to start till it was ascertained whether the force
was there along the road at different points. I found the officers in command of de-
tachments variously estimated that force, and some I believe that the whole or a
great portion of the rebel army was there.

	Question. Five hundred, then, is the largest body you know of?

	In answer to a previous question I stated it was variously estimated; 500 were re-
ported by General Negley, but of their actual existence I have reason to doubt. The
officers and people along the line thought that that force was there

Page 267

OnAw XXVIII.J	GENERAL REPORTS.	267

	Question. Is it possible or is it probable that any large organized
force could have been in and about these railroads from Nashville at
that time with General Buells army situated as it was?

	They might have been there for a short time, but could not remain there very long.

	Question. Do you not know, general, and was it not supposed at the
time, that these depredations upon the railroads were done by the in-
habitants in a great measure?

	I do not know it, but I believe the inhabitants Msisted the guerrilla force when
they came into the country, and when an opportunity offered they would act on their
own responsibility.

	Question. Now, if a general of General Buells known determined
and inflexible character had given notice to those along those roads
that he would hold the inhabitants responsible, would those depreda-
tions have been committed?

	I do not think General Buells order would have had any effect upon those people or
any other generals orders. There is a large idle floating popuration in these South-
ern States, and such characters as those would not be governed by any order that Gen-
eral Buell might issue. Just such characters General Mitchel had to deal with on
the railroad running from Huntsville to Stevenson. He threatened to burn their vii.
lages if they fired upon the trains, and several villages or railroad stations were
bqirned, and yet the trains were fired into afterward.

	Question. If you had no other than an idle, irresponsible population
to deal with a lesser guard would be necessary to take care of the road,
would it not?

	I think not; on the contrary, a still larger guard.

	Question. Why so?

	These men having no habitation, they are here to-day and in another place to-mor-
row.

	Question. If the responsible settled inhabitants along the railroad
knew that their property was in danger, would they not be guardians
of the railroad property as of their own?

	Individuals might be, yet individuals might be overpowered by this idle floating
population, who would not be influenced by the opinions of some few of the owners
along the railroad.

	Question. If the settled owners along the railroad were friends in-
stead of enemies, who would give you information of the approach of
these guerrillas and who would assist you in putting them down, your
trouble would be less, would it not?

I think so.
	Question. You speak of its having been tried by General Pope in
Missouri and failed; do you know this of your own knowledge or have
you heard it?

I have only heard so from the common reports in the newspapers.

	Colonel MILLER (a witness for the defendant), being duly sworn by
the judge-advocate, testified as follows:

By General BUELL:
	Question. State your name and position in the service, if you please.

My name is J. F. Miller; colonel of the Twenty-ninth Indiana Volunteers.
	Question. Were you on duty in Nashville in the months of July and
August and September last?

In the months of July and August I was on duty here, commanding the post

Page 268

268	KY., M. AND E. TENN.~ N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAP. XXVHL

	Question. State, if you please, what the operations of the enemy were
in your vicinity during that period, and, as well as you can, what forces
he employed and with what effect.

	Our troubles commenced here about the 8th of July, when the communication be.
tween here and Louisville was threatened. The enemy menaced the force at Bowl-
ing Green about that time, under John Morgan; perhaps 1,500 strong were reported
near Bowling Green. I sent up fifteen companies of infantry and a section of artil-
lery from this place, which, with the troops sent by General Boyle, drove off the en-
emy and saved those bridges at Bowling Green and Green River. The next trouble was
at Murfreesborough. The enemy had attacked Murfreesborough July 13 by a force
2,000 strong, under Colonel Forrest. Colonel Lester was in command at Murfreesbor-
ough up to the 12th July. He had the Third Minnesota, the Ninth Michigan, and Hew-
etts battery of four pieces. On the 12th General Crittenden took command there; on
the 13th the attack was made and the forces taken prisoners. The first reports we got
here were that the enemy were 7,000 strong, and to look out for this place and to be
prepared to defend it. I had at that time at Lebanon four companies of infantry and
two of cavalry. Lebanon is north of Murfreesborough. On hearing of the attack on
Murfreesborough Lebanon was evacuated and the troops bronght here, and I had two
regiments of infantry and four companies, three companies of cavalry, and ten field
pieces of artillery. It was uncertain at that time where the enemy would strike after
taking that place. We had a small force at Gallatin and along the raili~oad between
here and the Kentucky line. I think there were ten or twelve companies.
	I brought down three companies from Gallatin to re-enforce the garrison here, but
no attack was made and they were sent back. July 16 we had information that
there were a thousand of the enemy at Lebanon, and we expected they would strike
the road to Gallatin or beyond there; but on the 17th General Nelson came here with
a force of five or six regiments, and he assumed command with these troops. On the
18th he marched to Murfreesborongh. About the same time General Boyle asked for
re-enforcements in Kentucky, reporting the enemy along the line in considerable
force. As General Nelson had not increased the garrison materially no troops were
sent him.
	On the 19th General Nelson informed me that the enemy were in considerable force
near Murfreesborough and sent here for re-enforcements. He had taken nearly all
the force he brought here with him. But the enemy did not attack him there. For-
rest, with about 1,800 or 2,000 men (cavalry) came in his rear and menaced this
place. They drove in the pickets here, but made no attack. They went out to the
railroad and attacked the force General Nelson had left to guard the bridges, taking
about 80 men at the Mill Creek Bridge and burned the bridge, and then went off in
the direction of Lebanon and got away. General Nelson did not get them.
	Nothing occurred till about the 27th or 28th of July, when Colonel Boone, who was
in command at Gallatin, and I think seven or eight companies along the rear at a
place called Pilot Knob, became alarmed and desired re-enforcements. The Thirty-
first Indiana was sent to re-enforce him at that place. That was about the 30th
July. On the 4th or 5th of August those troops were taken away, General Nelson
deeming the force under Colonel Boone amply sufficient, as he said to me. About 10th
of August Colonel Boone was attacked by what from the best information I should
suppose would be a force of 600 to 700. He was surprised at daylight and captured.
It was as complete a surprise as that at Mnrfreesborough. I went up with parts of two
regiments after that to Gallatin and that region, but could not get a fight. Colonel
Heifren was in command of four companies of the Fiftieth Indiana, which were posted
at the different bridges between here and Gallatin in the stockades which had been
erected by General Buells orders. About the 20th he had from 50 to 60 men in each
stockade. About the 20th of August he took his men out of the stockades, leaving
about 8 or 10 in each, and went off on an expedition to Gallatin. On his return he
was attacked by Morgan with probably 600 or 700 men, and the enemy succeeded in
burning three of the bridges; and, the men being along the road, quite a number of
them were taken prisoners. The bridges were all burned but one, where a party of
18 got into the stockades and held it against the whole force. If he had left his men
in the stockades none of these bridges would have been injured at all in my opinion.
Colonel Boone neglected to build the stockades which he was ordered to build by
General Buell, and at the time he was captured at Gallatin the tunnel was destroyed
and one of the bridges this side of Gallatin. The force along the road was deemed
sufficient, and would have been, if the stockades had been built and the men kept in
them, as they ought to have been. It was not long after this that the fight at Galla-
tin occurred between General Johnson and Morgan, the particulars of which I sup-
pose have been stated here before.

	Question. State, if you please, the result of it.

General Johnson was captured, with probably 100 to 150 men. They nearly al

Page 269

CHAP. xxvIII.j	GENERAL REPORTS.	269

got away and retreated back to this place. The force General Johnson had was 650
men. I do nor know the f9rce the enemy had, but probably more than he had. We
were continually troubled here by guerrilla parties who hovered about the country
and along the lines, but with no serious results, except those I have mentioned, in the
vicinity. I always considered the force I had here sufficient to hold the city; md I
think I never asked General Buell for re-enforcements.

	Question. Did these large bodies of cavalry have artillery with them I

	I think not till after they took the four pieces at Murfreesborongh.

	Question. Did they do any harm to the railroad after the capture of
Murfreesborough?

	Yes, sir; they burned those three Mill Creek bridges after General Nelson had gone
out to Murfreesborough.

	Question. But before his arrival there did they not destroy some
bridges in the vicinity of Murfreesborougli?

	They destroyed a bridge and the depot at Murfreesborough at the time they bad
the fight there. I do not know what they did beyond Murfreesborough on the road.

	Question. Were these principal depredations you have mentioned
committed by organized troops in the rebel service and without refer-
ence to the inhabitants along the road?

	I do not know whether they were organized troops or not; I know they were in
the Confederate service; they were understood to be guerrillas. The Texas Rangers
were about, too; we knew them to be forces under Morgan, Forrest, and Starnes.

	Question. Are those commands not understood to be composed of
troops belonging as much to the rebel army as other troops; are they
not of the character of regular troops?

	Yes, sir; I suppose they are. They have always been treated the same as other
Confederate troops and appear to be organized into regiments and companies, and I
have no doubt are in the Confederate service the same as any other troops; that is
their reputation. Colonel Morgan has been promoted by the Confederate authorities
the same as other officers and so hes Colonel Forrest.

	Question. You did not understand that they were made up of the
inhabitants of the country along those railroads on which they had been
depredating?

	0, no; somel~nes the citizens have joined them perhaps, but they acted in bodies
as other invading troops, and seemed to understand their business as if acting under
orders.

	Question. Do you think if in consequence of these depredations you
were to lay the country.waste with fire and sword on either side of the
railroad the depredati~ns of these troops would be prevented?

	I do not think it would have any effect one way or the other. I think they are sent
out for the express purpose of destroying the lines of communication and supply lines.
They are organized for that business; they go mounted, and the troops are better
adapted for that kind of work than perhaps any other. As a reason for this opinion
I will state that in this part of the country the depredations they have committed
have been committed against the desire of the people, so far as I know, and I know
the people are complaining very bitterly of this kind of conduct, for they said, If
our lines are cut and destroyed the army in the State will subsist off the people, off
the country; whereas if the lines are left open they will get their supplies from the
North. I have heard this argument frequently by people who were not Union peo-
ple. Further, this railroad line from Louisville here was not troubled by the i~eople.
There was a time last spring, in the early part of the summer, when General Dumont
was in command, when the bridges were not guarded at all and no depredations
were committed.

	Question. Is this a very unusual method of operating against an
enemy?

	I think it is very common in the history of all wars. lt is one of the means of crip-
plin g an enemy, cutting off his supplies or cutting off his line of retreat, and I should
thin k a very good plan of operation

Page 270

270	KY.,~M. AND E. TENN, N. ALA., AND SW. VA. (CHAP. XXVHL

	Question. Is it usual among civilized nations to hold the inhabitants
of the country responsible for it I

	Not that I know of. I think non-combatants are respected in their rights of prop-
erty among civilized people.
Cross-examination by the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:
	Question. What force did the rebels have when they captured Grit-
tenden at Murfreesborough?

	They had, from the best information Icould get, five regiments, that weuld average
perhaps 300 or 400. I suppose from 1,500 to 1,800 men made the attack there.
	Question. Was there any artillery?

	No, sir.

	Question. What number of men had we there?

	Between 800 and 900, I think.

	Question. Were not the transactions upon the railroad between
Bowling Green and Nashville very much of the same character?

	I think that as far as Heifrens defense of these bridges is concerned it was very
bad. There might be a question in regard to Colonel Boones management.

	Question. Would it have been possible for us to send 1,800 men to
break up the line of communication between, say, Cleveland and Knox-
ville on that railroad or upon any other railroad running through the
enemys country?

	Of course it would be possible, but it would be hazardous.

	Question. What is the difference between a line of railroad running
between this city and Louisville and any railroad running through the
rebel country?

	The railroad is the same thing in the enemys country that it is in ours, perhaps as
easily destroyed in one as in the other, provided there are no natural obstructions in
the way; but it would be easier to get in the rear of the army where there were no
defiles to pass or large streams than it would if there were no high mountains and
large streams to cross; it would take a longer time and be in greater danger of being
intercepted and cut offi

	Question. J understand you to say, then, that the chan~cter and dis-
position of the inhabitants make no difference in the hazard of that un-
dertaking?

	I was presuming that the question implied that the character of the inhabitants
would be the same in bothcases; that they would be hostile to the attempting force
in either case.

	Question. Is there any difference between the character of the inhab-
itants along this line that has been broken up and that of any other
line running through rebel territory?

	I cannot answer that question; I really do not know.

	Question. You say that a notice to the inhabitants along this line of
railroad that they would be held responsible for its interruption and
be punished if it were injured or destroyed would made no difference?

	General BUELL. In order to save the Commission, the witness, and
myself, 1 am willing to withdraw the questions and evidence as to
whether threats to the inhabitants of the country bordering the railroads
would or would not interfere with the operations of the army.

	The Wrrxzss. I do not think it would make any difference. I do not think they
could prevent it if they were to try

Page 271

Cw. IXYIIL)	GENERAL REPORTS.	271

By General TYLER:
	Question. Do you think these parties of guerrillas, as you term them,
had any direct assistance from the people along the line of railroad by
giving information as to the condition of our troops?
	General BUELL. I object to this term guerrillas as applied to these
troops. They are as much troops as any in the rebel service. I think
there is a difference between the cavalry of Morgan, Forrest, and Starnes
and what we understand by guerrillas. I know of no reason for
giving them a character which does not belong to them, for they are
not guerrillas in the proper sense of that term.
	General TYLER. There is a letter from Beauregard in which he says
lie appointed this man (Morgan) for this very purpose, and calls them
~~guerrillas,~~ and says, You will hear from them.
	The PRESIDENT. They are called Partisan Rangers, I think, by the
Southerners.
	General BUELL. These troops are not of that character.
	The WITNESS. I think it is possible that some persons may have given them infor-
mation.
	The Commission adjourned to meet on December 26, 1862, at 10
oclock a. m.

NASHVILLE, December 26, 1862.

	The Commission met pursuant to adjournment. All the members
present; also the judge-advocate and General Buell.

	Colonel HAZEN (a witness for the defense), being duly sworn, testified
as follows:
By General BUELL:
	Question. State your name and position in the service, if you please.
	My name is W. B. Hazen, colonel of the Forty-first Ohio Volunteers. I have com-
manded a brigade in the Army of the Cumberland since January 1, 1862.
	Question. With what part of the army were you in the recent cam-
paign in Kentucky starting from Louisville?
	I was in the division commanded by General W. S. Smith, in the Second Corps; it
had position in the line of battle upon the right.
	Question. Was your brigade sent on a reconnaissance nuder your com-
mand on the 11th of October, after the battle of Perryville ~
	It was with the advance of a regiment of cavalry and. a battery of artiller~r.
	Question. State, if you please, where you went and what you saw.
	I went upon the road toward Danville. When within 1 mile of Danville I found a
line of rebel cavalry with two pieces of artillery opposed to me. The cavalry were
dismounted, and they made stout resistance to our progress. I pushed forward my
command, and after skirmishing for half an hour they gave way and passed through
the town of Danville, skirmishing all the way. I pursued them about a mile beyond
J)anville on the Camp Dick Robinson road, when, having executed my commission, I
returned to camp. I learned by citizens, and by the report of one of my aides who
saw the troops in person, that John Morgan, with from 200 to 300 cavalry, were drawn
up in line of battle l~ miles on the left of Danville, crossing the Harrodsburg road.
I saw the principal people of Danville, the most influential people, and learned all I
could of them us to their position and force. They all agreed in stating that the rebel
forces were then concentrated at Camp Dick Robinson, and there would give us fight.
I took great pains in being correct in regard to this information, and went back to
camp thoroughly impressed with this belief, and reported the same to General Cut-
tenden, commander of the corps I would further say that the people of Danville
were very enthusiastic in our reception and endeavored to give me as correct infor-
mation as possible. The people with whom I conversed were thoroughly our friends

Page 272

272	KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. (CHAP. XXVIIL

	Question. Did you discoer any indication that the enemy designed
to retreat from Camp Dick Robinson I

	None at all that I could discover; no one told me anything about it.

	Question. What time did you return to camp to your division?

	The same day, about 4 oclock in the afternoon.

	Question. When did you report to General Crittenden?

	I reported immediately afterward, in company with General Smith, commander of
the division.

	Question. Do you know wnere the headquarter3 of the army were at
that time?

	I do not know positively. I was never at the general headquarters.

Cross.examination by the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:
	Question. That movement was made on the 11th, you say; what time
did the army move afterward?

	The entire army moved on the 13th and 14th. Oar division, and I think our entire
corps, moved next day.

	Question. How far did you march next day and where did you en-
camp?

	We marched to the vicinity of Dicks River and turned to the vicinity of Danville,
upon the Danville and Harrodsburg pike, and encamped there, a distance of 10 or 12
miles.

	Question. Do you recollect whether it was on the Nicholasville road
or not from Danville?

	We marched across the country.

	Question. At the time you entered Danville in that reconnaissance
did you learn the number of the enemy?

	Not positively. I had the same means that we always hadthat is, reports and
rumorsgiving the number of the enemy from 40,000 to 100,000.

	Question. After returning from Dicks River how long did you remain
in camp before you moved again?

	We moved a short distance the next day; the second day the army marched all day
in the direction of Crab Orchard; that was on the 14th of October.
	Question. Do you know what stores or other property the rebels de-
stroyed at Camp Dick Robinson or do you know if they destroyed
anything at all?

	I know nothing of it.
	Question. When did you learn that the enemy did not make a stay
at Camp Dick Robinson?

	I think the day after was the first on which I believed they had not made a stand
there, but I had no positive information about it at all.

	Question. The day you marched to Dicks River did you see anything
of them at all?

	We saw a few pickets, who fired upon the right flank of our skirmishers; that
was all.

By General TYLER:
	Question. Did you know the location of Camp Dick Robinson, and
what part of the camp did the bulk of Braggs army occupy?

	I never was at Camp Dick Robinson, and know nothing in regard to the position
of Braggs army

Page 273

CHAP. XXVIII.]	GENERAL REPORTS.	273

	Question. How near do you suppose you were to Camp Dick Robin-
son on the 11th?

	Six or seven miles. Danville was the nearest place.

	Question. Were you nearer Camp Dick Robinson on the 12th than
you were on the 11th?

	We were. I supposed at the time we were about 5 miles from there.

	Question. When you supposed you were within 2 miles of Camp Dick
Robinson what enemys force did you find in your front?

	I would state that between us and what we supposed was Camp Dick Robinson was
Dicks River. We saw no enemy except the pickets that I have previously spoken ot
We did not cross the river. There was no force of the enemy on the side of the river
we were except the pickets I have mentioned.

	Question. Did you at that time drive the enemys pickets across
Dicks River?

	We did not attempt to; we paid no attention to their pickets.

	Question. By driving in those pickets and advancing to the banks of
Dicks River would you not probably have obtained valuable informa-
tion as to the position of the enemy on the other side?

	I do not think we could have obtained any more than we did. The banks of the
river were precipitous and covered with woods.

	Question. What military information as to the force and position of
the enemy did you obtain that day?

	I obtained none at all. My position was a subordinate one, and I knew nothing
of the object of the reconnaissance nor obtained any information than that I have
given.

	Question. Who commanded the reconnaissance on that day?

	I do not know that it was a reconnaissance nor the object of the movement. I
would say that General Smith commanded the troops that I was with. There were
other movements of the troops. I think the entire corps moved there.

Redirect examination by General BUELL:
	Question. Do you recognize, colonel, that the movement of a fraction
of a large army in the presence of an enemy does not indicate the move-
ment of the army itself or the character of the movement orethe extent
of it?

	I do.

	Question. Is the position of an army of 60,000 men to be indicated
by a point?

	It is not. It usuafly extends over a line of from 3 to 10 or 12 miles.

	Question. How much ground would an army of 60,000 men occupy in
order of battle?

	I would say, without making a calculation, that it would extend over from 4 to 5
miles.

	Question. Do you know anything of the character of Dicks River
and the ground between you and the position which the enemy were
supposed to occupy opposite to you?

	I never saw Dicks River, but from the character of the ravines leading into it and
from the representations of the inhabitants I should believe it to be impracticable for
troops to cross.

	Question. Do you know under whose supervision the movements of

18 R RVOL XVI







Page 274

274	KY., M. AND E. TEIiN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. (CHAP. XXVIII.

that part of the army to which you belonged were on the 12th and
13th?

	Under Major-General Crittendens, directed by his assistant adjutant-general, Lyne
Starling; he acted more as a guide than a director.

	Question. Do you know whether General Thomas moved with that
part of the army?

	General Thomas moved with that part of the army nearly all the time. He gave
his personal supervision to the movements of the troops. I do not know where Gen-
eral Thomas was on that particular day.

	Question. Do you know whether the other corps of the army did not
move on the 12th, that the whole army did not swing around upon its
right, changing its front?

	It was my impression that the whole army did move. I had no positive knowledge
except of the corps to which I belonged.

	Question. What division led your corps in the advance on the night
of the 13th toward Crab Orchard?

	I think the Fifth Division, commanded by General Van Cleve. I may, however?
be mistaken in the date.

	Question. Whatever division it may have been, do you know the hour
at which it started?

I do not know what division. It may have been General Woods, which started on
the night of the 13th.
Recross-examination by General TYLER:
	Question. You say it was impracticable for troops to cross Dicks
River. Did not almost the entire of Braggs army cross over Dicks River
after the battle of Perryville?

	It is probable they did.

	Question. At what distance from Dicks River was the bulk of Gen-
eral Buells army at the time they probably crossed?

	Probably from 12 to 18 miles.

	Question. If General Buells army had made a vigorous forward
movement could Bragg have passed his army over Dicks River under
offensive operations on the part of Genera] Buell?

	I do not know; my opinion is that he could have passed the greater part of his army
over.

	Question. Do you entertain that opinion in the face of the expression
you used that it was impracticable for troops to pass over Dicks
River?

	There is a difference in an army passing over and having nothing to impede it~
progress, and in an army crossing over having a powerful foe to impede its progress on
the other side. I conceive very readily how an army could cross over any ravine in the
world. I can conceive that the passage of such a ravine as that, with a strong army t& 
contest its passage, might be made absolutely impossible. There is another fact in
connection with this: the order of opposing troops in retreat may be very different ta
opposing troops in an attack in the lace of an enemy; it would make it a great obsta-
cle in one case and very slight in another.

By General BUIiLL:
	Question. Suppose a line like that of Dicks River, absolutely im-
pregnable against assault except at one or two points, with high com-
manding bluffs on the side toward which the enemy is retreating, ia
there anything more simple and certain than the passage of an army in
retreat in the face of almost any enemy, supposing him to get a certai

Page 275

CHAP. XXYm.]
GENERAL REPORTS.
275
initiative and supposing him to have time to establish batteries and
move them into position ~
	I would consider it a very easy military problem and have always supposed it to
be an easy matter.

By General TYLER:
	Question. Has not the passage of rivers and obstacles such as Dicks
River presented by an inferior army in the face of a superior always
beei considered one of the most difficult military problems 01
	General BUELL. I would suggest that Dicks River is not a river,
though it has the name i
makes it difficult. , t is a defile merely. It is not the water that
	The WIrNEss. It depends vastly upon the amount of l)ridging to be done and the
amount of preparations necessary. I should consider that a etreating foe crossing a
ravine of that kind, where there wag no bridging and iLothiug to do but move over as
soon as it arrived, if they had time Ic 1)lant their guns to cover the face of their cross-
ing with artillery of sufficient strength I should consider the crossing was certain.


	Capt. 0. A. MACK (a witness for the defendant), being duly sworn by
the judge-advocate, testified as follows:
By General BUELL:
	Question. Captain, state your name and position in the service, if
you please, and what position you occupied during the recent campaign
in Kentucky starting from Louisville.
	Capt. 0. A. Mack, Thirteenth Infantry, attached to the staff of Major-General
Thomas as inspector of artillery, and have served in that capacity in the campaign
referred to to the present time.

	Question. With what portion of the army did you move during the
few days previous to the battle of Perryville and subsequently 01
	After the first day from Louisville I moved with Majer-General Crittendens corps.

	Question. What was the position of that corps relatively in the ad-
vance upon Perryville 01
	After leaving Bardstown that corps was on the right; previous to that time it had
been in the center.

	Question. Did you visit General Buells headquarters on the morning
of the 8th of October, the day of the battle of Perryville 01 If so, please
state at what hour you arrived there and with what object you came.
	On the 8th of October I was sent by Major-General Thpmas to take a message to
General Buell, to inform him that two divisions of General Crittendens corps were in
position about 2j miles from Perryville~ that the Third Division was about 2 milea
in the rear, still on the march. I left 4eneral Thomas about 12 oclock, perhaps a
little later. .1 did not know where General Buells headquarters were, and I think it
was about half past 1 when I reached there, although the distance was only about
3 miles. I delivered the verbal message to General Buell, and remained at his head-
quarters for some time.

	Question. What time did you leave headquarters 01
	I think it was a little before 3 oclock.


if	Question. Did you return with instructions to General Thomas 01 And,
so, please state what they were.
	I took instructions to General Thomas. General Buell gave me a small map of the
positions around Perryville, with the positions of the other two corps marked on this
map in pencil, explaining to him their position; also indicating the general position
which he wished General Crittendens corps to occupy that night. The positions for
General Crittendens corps were: two divisions to be on the direct route to Perryville,
a little to the right of the road; the Third Division, the division which I had reported
in the rear, to take the right-hand road to Mitchellsville, and a brigade of cavalry t

Page 276

276
KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. YA. [CHAP. XXVIII.
precede it. General Buell instructed me to Bay to General Thomas that he did not
propose to attack that evening, but that if he could obtain water by advancing he
might proceed cautiously to the front. That is the general purport of my instruc-
tione, which I communicated to General Thomas.

	Question. When you were at General Buells headquarters did you
see or hear anything of a severe battle raging on the left of the army?

	Whfle I was going to General Buells lfeadquarters and while I remained there I
beard heavy firing, and I supposed there was an action going on until I reached his
Theadquarters, and was there informed that it was the cavalry under command of
~Captain Gay and the rebels, with artillery on both sides. I also met General Gilbert,
i~nd was told by him in answer to my question that that was the cause of the firing.

	Question. At what time was this that the firing made this impression
upon you?

	I heard the artillery during most of the time that I was making the passage from
.General Thomas headquarters tQ General Buells, and also while at General Buells.
It was during my trip across the country that my impression was that an action was
~oing on.

	Question. Which you say was between 12 and 1 oclock?

	My impression is that I arrived at General Buells headquarters at about half past 1.

	Question. .Did you hear any musketry firing while you were there?

	No; I did not while I was at General Buells headquarters.

	Question. Or anywhere in that vicinity?

	Previously to my starting for General Buells headquarters I thought I distinguished
ia volley-fire of musketry on several occasions when the wind was blowing strong, but
It do not know; I could not say positively that I did; that was my impression.

	Question. At what hour was that?

	I should say that was between 11 and 12 oclock.

	Question. When did you first hear that there had been severe fight.

on the left
	I think the first intiikiation I received was about half past six oclock in the even-
~ng; I should say it was after sundown. Lieutenant Fitzhugh came over with a
-verbal message to General Thomas. I recollect that we were on the way back to the
~place where we expected to encamp that night; it must have been fully as late as
Ihalf past 6. I would also state that I did not understand that there had been any
~general engagement. It was still later, after I had gone to bed, that I heard of the
.death of General Jackson, and that there had been a general engagement by General
MeCooks troops.

	Question. Have you a pretty clear understanding, from observation
~or otherwise, of the character of~ Dicks River for a distance of 12, 14,
~or 15 miles from its mouth?

	I have no personal knowledge of it.

	Question. Supposing it to be a stream almost dry, so as to not re-
~ufre bridging at all, with high cliffy banks, passable only at one or two
ipoints, and supposing yourself in command of an army desiring to re-
treat over such an obstacle, and that you have high bluffs ou the side
toward which you wish to retreat commanding the country on the op-
posite side, and that yQu have a certain time to get your artillery into
position on the opposite side, would you think it a very delicate mat-
ter to effect your passage in the face of almost any force?

	No; I should not think that the case supposed would be a very difficult operation,
the artillery being placed in position to cover the passage of the troops.

	Question. Would not the river, in fact, be a security to the retreat-
ting forces, instead of an embarrassment?

	After the artillery was over I should think it would

Page 277

CHAP. XXVIII.]	GENERAL REPORTS.	277

Cross-examination by the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:
	Question. Was the firing that you heard during the day of the 8th
of such a character as to indicate ~ cavalry reconnaissance and would
you suppose it to be such if you had not been told so?

	No, I should not; it was niuch heavier than was necessary, in my opinion, for a
cavalry reconnaissance.
By General DANA:
	Question. When you met General Gilbert on your way to the head-
quarters of General Buell where was he and how was he occupied?

	He was just riding out of the headquarters of General Buell.

	Question. Did he state where he got his information of the firing of
which he gave an account?

	No, he did not; he simply told me that it was Captain Gay operating upon the~
rebels.

	Question. Do you know whether he carried that information to Gen-
eral Buells headquarters himself?

	I do not.

By General TYLER:
	Question. Who told you at General Buells headquarters that it wa~
the cavalry under Captain Gay, with artillery, that was engaged with
the rebels?

	Colonel Fry, I think. The conversation was in General Buells tent.

	Question. What opinion did you entertain when you arrived at head-
quarters of the nature of the action going on?

	Before I arrived at headquarters I had no knowledge of the remaining dispositior~
of the corps. My impression was that it was a sharp action going on on the left.
	Question. Supposing a river with high bluffs and little water, with
only one or two practicable routes to pass it, had to be passed by ~
retreating army of, say, 40,000 men, with artillery, baggage, & c., with
a superior army of, say, 50,000 men in their front, what would b~
the fate of the rear of the retreating army if it should be vigorously
attacked?

	I cannot tell.
	Question. What chance do you think it would have of passing over
passages such as those described and under the circumstances stated
in the previous question?

	There are so many circumstances entering into an operation of that kind one can
hardly give an opinion on the supposed case; but I should say that, supposing tb~
troops to be equal on both sides and the commanders equally able, the retreating
force labored under a disadvantage; but it he effected the crossing of the stream
at all he would be able to cover h~ rear by the batteries established on the opposite
side.

	Question. How long a line would a retreating army of 40,000 men oe-
cupy, supposing it was operating or retreating on two roads?

	A great deal would depend on the character of the roads and the country. I shoul& I
suppose that on ordinary turnpikes a column of 15,000 men, properly closed up, would
not occupy more than 5 or 6 miles, with their trains; they ought not to.

	Question. At what distance would these batteries established on the
opposite side of the river cover these troops?

	With the field batteries in general use now, from three-quarters to one mile; with
rifled guns, still farther than that

Page 278

278	KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. [CHAP. XXVII1

By General ORD:
	Question. Do you remember whether there was much wind at the
battle of Perryville when you rode over to General Buells headquarters?
	Yes, sir; the wind blew heavily, but not steadily; it blew in gusts.

	Question. Was the wind blowing from such a quarter that you could
hear the sound of the cannonading you spoke of better or worse when
you arrived at General Buells headquarters than when you started or
while you were on the way?
	While going to General Buells headquarters I passed over considerable high land,
and on those elevated positions I was sensible of the difference the wind made in the
sound of the artillery. Whea I reached headquarters I do not recollect noticing
anything about the wind there; the cannonading was more distinct than at General
Thomas, being considerably nearer.

	Question. Were your opportunities of judging of the nature of this
cannonading while on the road better than they would have been at
General Buells headquarters?
	I do not think they were. There was no firing in front of Genenil Crittendens
corps, but all the firing I heard appeared considerably to the left.

	Question. Did you mentiou your impression of the nature of this fir.
ing to Colonel Fry?
	I do not recollect whether I did or not. I think I said to General Gilbert that I
thought there was a battle going on.

By General SCHOEFF:
	Question. Was not the signal corps in full operation on the day of
the battle?
	Not on General Crittendens front. The communication was opened with General
Gilberts corps in the evening. I recollect that during the day some of the officers
reported that a signal was discovered on a house far off to the left, and the impression
was that it was one of the signal corps, but it was subsequently ascertained that it
was not; and no communications were received until after we had gone back to
camp. During the night of the 8th and 9th, after the communications were opened,
they continued to operate.

	Question. Did you see General McCook at General Buells headquar-
ters before you left?
	I did not. I was told that General McCook had been there and had gone back to
his corps.

By General BUELL:
	Question. According to the history of that day, as it is now known,
at what time did the battle begin on the left, and what was in fact the
character of the engagement np to the time when you arrived at my
headquarters?
	My recollection of General McCooks report is that the heavy attack on his front
did not commence until about 1 oclock; but that the firing that I heard previous to
my arrival at General Buells headquarters was principally from the skirmishing and
the artillery that was with the cavalry.


	Capt. JOHN G. CHANDLER (a witness for the defendant), being duly
sworn by the judge-advocate~ testified as follows:
By General BwuLL:
	Question. State your name and position in the service, if you please,
and the position you occupied in the Army of the Ohio last summer.
	John G. Chandler, captain, quartermasters department. I was on duty as chief
quartermaster in the field of the Army sf the Ohio from about July 26 till about 30th
October. I was connected with the army before that in the early part of the season

Page 279

CEAP. XXVIII.]	GENERAL REPORTS.	279

but was detached about three months. I reported at Louisville about the 15th of
February, was with the army about a month, and was then detached from it and
served on the Tennessee River.

	Question. State, in a general way, if you please, the position of the
army in the months of July and August last and the means by which
it was supplied.

	The army was located from Tuscumbia, Ala., along the railroad running from that
point to Chattanoogafrom Battle Creek near Chattanooga; then from Decatur to
Nashville, on the Decatur and Nashville road; and from Battle Creek in the direction
of the Nashville and Chattanooga road and along that road. From the time the
army crossed the Tennessee River the supplies were drawn from Nashville; both
roads were used in the transportation of supplies from Nashville.

	Question. State, if you please, what means were used to supply the
troops in the positions which they occupied and to get supplies forward
to the point from which they would start to advance against Chatta-
nooga, that being the object.
	After the troops crossed the Tennessee River to march toward Chattanooga they
were supplied from Louisville as the principal depot and Nashville as an int~ermedi-
ate depot, and from Nashville by two railroads, one the Nashville and Decatur and
the other the Nashville and Chattanooga road. This was for ab6ut a month, for the
Nashville and Decatur road was soon abandoned, as the troops concentrated toward
Chattanooga, and then there was but one line of communication from Louisville to
the depot nearest to the position of the troops, which was Stevenson. The line was
about 350 miles. About fifteen days supplies were kept on hand at Nashville, and
about 100,000 half rations, barely two days supplies, at Stevenson; and this by using
every means of transportation that the railroads could furnish, and to do this cars
were purchased by Government and put upon the roads. In this state of affairs
the army was on nearly half rations from the middle of July till the army arrived
in Louisville. The supplies were carried to the camps at Battle Creek by means of
wagons, of which there was a very limited supply, as the bulk of the transportation
of the army was employed in carrying supplies to points where the railroads had been
previously cut; in other words, the wagons were on the railroad far above the army
while it was in the vicinity of Battle Creek.

	Question. Were these means used to the fullest extent to push for-
ward supplies to the depot at Stevenson?
	Yes, sir.

	Question. Do you know what efforts were made by orders and dis-
patches to have supplies thrown into Nashville rapidly?
	Generally I do. I know that I was kept pushed all the time to be more energetic,
to see that others were more energetic, and to push everybody that I could in my
position to hurry forward supplies; that was the cry, as it were. The military super-
intendent of the road was also at work day and night endeavoring to conduct the
road so that the greatest amount of work could be got from it with the limited amount
of rolling stock and its poor condition generally.

	Question. Were the Cumberland and Green Rivers made use of as
long as they were available to throw supplies into Nashville?
	The Cumberland was, I am enabled to state. Green River was not used while I
was attached to the army?

	Question. In what condition did you find the country in regard to
supplies; to what extent did you avail yourself of its resources?
	Forage was procured in the country. There was none brought by the railroad.
There was but a limited supply of forage up to the 20th of August, when the new crop
of corn came in, when there was plenty of forage. As far as I was able to learn there
was but very little forage in our advance toward Chattanooga after leaving Steven-
eon. There were no other supplies for the quartermasters department in the country.
There was a small supply of forage brought through from Nashville about the 1st of
August, but n~ accumulated supply.

	Question. What wa~ the force at lluntsville during the time you
were there?
	I should say about 3,000 men at Huntsville and within a mile or two

Page 280

280	KY., M. AND E. TENN., N. ALA., AND SW. VA. LOHAP. XXVIII.

	Question. Is the country about Huntsville productive?

Yes, sir.

	Question. To what distance did you usually have to send for forage
for the small force that was there?

	From 1 to 18 miles, about.

	Question. Do you know what the character of the country is on the
other side of the river from Bridgeport to Chattanooga?

	I never visited that country, but it has always been represented to me as a sterile
mountainous, unproductive country, with bad roads and creeks, and sparsely settled,

	Question. Could an army have found anything to subsist on in that
region?

I should think not.

	Question. With the railroads broken, as you have stated, and the
limited supplies, is it your opinion that it would have been possible for
the army to advance to Chattanooga prior to the movement of the rebel
army toward Nashville?

	The difficulties of supplying an army were so great when they were 40 or 50 milca
away from that point that I think it would have been almost impossible to move suc-
cessfully against Chattanooga and supply the troops.

	Question. Do you know whether the Memphis and Charleston Rail-
road from Decatur to Corinth was made use of to any extent; and, if
not, why it was not?

	It was not made use of to any extent in transporting supplies. There were but few
supplies to be drawn from that quarter. That is one reason why it was not more
used. There might have been other reasons that I am not aware of.

	Question. Do you know anything about the amount of rolling stock
and motive-power on that point of the road?

	There was but very little of either that was available for our army.

	Question. Were you at my headquarters on the 8th of October last,
near Perryville?

	Yes, sir.

	Question. Did you hear the firing of musketry during that day?

	No, sir.

	Question. Was it the supposition of any person about the headquar-
ters that a severe battle was raging on the left?

	No, sir.

	Question. When did you first learn that there had been a severe fight
there; at about what hour of the day?

About 4 oclock in the afternoon of that day.

	Question. And how did you learn it then?

	I learned it by the arrival at the camp of the headquarters of three or four of Gen-
eral MeCooks staff officers, very much disconcerted, who reported that they were
hunting their general; that a severe fight had occurred,and that they had not seen
their general for some time.

Cross-examination by the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:
	Question. At the time you mention that the army was on half rations
did it suffer?

No, sir; I should think not; they complained, however

Page 281

CHAP. XXVIII.]	GENERAL REPORTS.	281


	Question. Do they not complain at all times?

	Very apt to complain of their rations; new troops particularly.
	Question. There was sufficient in the country, with a little exertion~
to take the place of what was lacking, was there not?

	There was sufficient green corn and a few vegetables, with which they got along ~
of other supplies for the men there was little or none.
	Question. What did you suppose that firing indicated at Perryviller
on the 8th, when you heard it at headquarters?

	I supposed that our cavalry or some part of our army had become engaged with
the enemy.
	Question. Was that the supposition at headquarters?

	It must have been the impression, I should think.
	Question. Do you recollect whether it was talked about at lieadquar.
ters? If so, state what was said and what the speculations of the officers~
were.
	It was talked about. For three or four days previous to this Perryville fight on the
8th our cavalry, in command 6f Captain Gay, had been engaged with the enemy,
and on every occasion and different times of the day firing had been heard on our
front, and when this firing on the 8th first commenced it was supposed and talked of
as being Gays cavalry having met some of the cavalry of the enemy up to about the
middle of the day, when it was reported about the camp of the headquarters that the
troops on our left had been ordered to move forward to some creek, and it was sup-
posed by members of the staff at headquarters that in moving down there they had
met some force of the enemy; that is, when this rapid firing occurred. I myself knexx~
nothing of the orders given from headquarters. It was merely camp talk.

	Question. On any day previous after leaving Bardstown, when yo~
came up to the enemys rear, had you heard from Captain Gay a con~
tinuous firing extending over seven or eight hours in one spot?
	No, sir.

By General ORD:
	Question. Did the heavy firing on the left last seven or eight hours~
in one spot?
	No, sir; I think not.

	Question. Do you remember whether there was a strong wind blowing
on that day or not?
I dont remember.

By General TYLER:
	Question. What were the means of transportation that ~u found.
with the quartermaster on taking charge at Huntsville?
	When I joined the army the infantry regiments were supplied with 12 wagons each ~
cavalry regiments, about 25; artillery, 5 wagons to a company; division trains, an
average of about 75 serviceable wagons. These division trains were concentrated oa
the Nashville and Decatur road, to transport provisio