TITLE: The war of the rebellion: a compilation of the official records of the Union and Confederate armies. / Series 1 - Volume 11 (Part I) AUTHOR: United States. War Dept., John Sheldon Moody, Calvin Duvall Cowles, Frederick Caryton Ainsworth, Robert N. Scott, Henry Martyn Lazelle, George Breckenridge Davis, Leslie J. Perry, Joseph William Kirkley PUBLISHER: Govt. Print. Off., Washington, 1884 Page A Production Note Cornell University Library produced this volume to preserve the informational content of the deteriorated original. The best available copy of the original has been used to create this digital copy. It was scanned bitonally at 600 dots per inch resolution and compressed prior to storage using ITU Group 4 compression. Conversion of this material to digital files was supported by the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation. Digital file copyright by Cornell University Library 1995. This volume has been scanned as part of The Making of America Project, a cooperative endeavor undertaken to preserve and enhance access to historical material from the nineteenth century. Page B Title Page Page R001 0 THE WAR OF THE REBELLION: A COMPILATION OF THE OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMLES~ PREPARED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR, BY BYT. IJEUT. COL. ROBERT N. SCOTT, THIRD U. S. ARTILLERY, AND PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO ACT OF CONGRESS APPROVED JUNE 16, 1S& ~. SERIES IVOLUME XIIM THREE PARTS. PART 1.REPORTS. WASHINGTON: GOVERNMENT FRINTING OFFICE. 1884 Page R002 A//iS Page R003 PREFACE. By an act approved June 23, 1874, Congress made an appropriatior~ to enable the Secretary of War to begin the publication of the Official Records of the War of the IRebeflion, both of the Union and Confed- erate Armies, and directed him to have copied for the Public Printer all reports, letters, telegrams, and general orders not heretofore copied or printed, and properly arranged in chronological order. Appropriations for continuing such preparation have been made from time to time, and the act approved June 16, 1880, has provided for the ~)rinting an~l binding, under direction of the Secretary of War, of I 04i10 copies of a compilation of the Official Records (Union and Con- federate) of the War of the Rebellion, so far as the same may be ready for publication, during the fiscal year; and that of said number, ~,OQ0 copies shall be for the use of the House of Representatives, 2,000 copies for the use of the Senate, and 1,000 copies for the use of the Executive Departments.~~* This compilation will be the first general publication of the military records of the war, and will embrace all official documents that can be obtained by the compiler, and that appear to be of any historical value. Wolume I to V distributed under act approved June 16, 1880. The act approved August 7, 1882, provides that The volumes of the official records of the war of the rebellion shall be distributed as follows: One thousand copies to the executive departments, as now provided by law. One thousaud copies for distributiou by the Secretary of War among officers of the Army and contributors to the work. Eight thousand three hundred copies shall be sent by the Secretary of War to such libraries, organizations, and individuals as may be designated by the Senators, Representatives, and Delegates of the Forty~ seventh Con~ress. Each Senator shall designate not exceeding twenty-six, and each Representative and Delegate not exceeding twenty-one of such addresses, and the volumes shall be sent thereto from time to time as they are published, until the pub- lication is completed. Senators, Representatives, and Delegates shall inform the Secretary of War in each case how many volumes of those heretofore published they have forwarded to such addresses. The remaining copies of the eleven thousand to. be published, and all sets that may not be ordered to he distributed as provided herein, shall be sold by the Secretary of War for cost of publication with ten per cent. added thereto, and the proceeds of such sale shall be covered into the Treasury. If two or more sets of said volumes are ordered to the same address the Secretary of War shall inform the Senators, Representatives or Delegates, who have designated the same, who thereupon may designate other libraries, organizations, or individuals. The Secretary of War shall report to the first session of the Forty-eighth Congress what volumes of the series heretofore published have not been furnished to such libraries, organizations, and individuals. He shall also inform distributees at whose instance the volumes are sent. rr Page R004 lv PREFACE. The publication will present the records in the following order of arrangement: The 1st Series will embrace the formal reports, both Union and Con- federate, of the first seizures of United States property in the Southern States, and of all military operations in the field, with the correspond- ence, orders, and returns relating specially thereto, and, as proposed, is to be accompanied by an Atlas. In this series the reports will be arranged according to the campaigns and several theaters of operations (in the chronological order of the events), and the Union reports of any event will, as a rule, be imme- diately followed by the Confederate accounts- The correspondence, & c., not embraced in the reports proper will follow (first Union and next Confederate) in chronological order. The 2d Series will contain the correspondence, orders, reports, and returns, Union and Confederate, relating to prisoners of war, and (so far as the military authorities were concerned) to State or political prisoners- The 3d Series will contain the correspondence, orders, reports, and returns of the Union authorities (embracing their correspondence with the Confederate officials) not relating specially to the subjects of the first and second series. It will set forth the annual and special reports of the Secretary of War, of the General-in Chief, and of the chiefs of the several staff corps and departments; the calls for troops, and the correspondence between the National and the several State authorities. The 4th Series will exhibit the correspondenoe, orders, reports, and returns of the Confederate authorities, similar to that indicated for the Union officials, as of the third series, but excluding the correspondence between the Union and confederate authorities given in that series. ROBERT N. SCOTT, Major, Third Art., and Bvt. Lieut. Gol. WAR DEPARTMENT, August 23, 1880. ~Approved: ALEX. RAMSEY, & cretary of War Table of Contents Page R005 CONTENTS. CHAPTER XXIII. Page. he Penineular Campaign, Virginia. March 17September 2, 1862 11077 (v Page R006 Additions and Corrections Page A001 THE WAR OF THE REBELLION: A COMPiLATiON OF THE OFFICIAL 7RECOHDS OF TILE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES. AI)1)ITIUNS AND (JURRECTIONS TO SERIES IVOLUME XI. (To be inserted in the voimne. For explanation see General Index volume, Serial No. 130, page XXVIII.) PUBLISHEL) UNDER TILE DIRECTION OF The Hon. ELIHU ROOT, Secretary of War, BY BRIG. GEN. FRED C. ALNSWORTH, CILLEF OF TILE RECORD AND PENSION OFFICE, WAR DEPARTMENT, AND MR. JOSEPH W. KIRKLEY. Mr. JOHN S. MOODEY, Indexer. WASHINGTON: GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE. 1902 Page A002 2 ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS. TEXT. PART i. Page 264. First line, insert * after maps and add foot-note, * See Plate i8, Map 2, also Plate 19, lilaps I andg, of the Atlas. Page 267. Thirteenth line, bottom, insert * after Second Alabama Infantry and add foot-note, *A,i error. Second Alabama at Fort Pillow, dis- banded lI/arc/i, 1862. Page 363. Fourth line, bottom, insert * after map and add foot-note, *For General Smiths map, see Plate z~, Map 2, of the Atlas. Page 395. Forty-third line, top, insert * after sketch and add foot-note, * See Plate 17, lIfap 2, of the Atlas. Last line of report, and in foot-note to which it refers, change * to t. Page 462. 1\IcAlesters report, second line, insert * after sketch and add foot-note, *See Plate 20, Maps 2,3, and ~, of the Atlas. Page 463. Thirteenth line, bottoni, for than read that. Page 583. Fifteenth line, top, for Donelsonville read Donaldsonville. Page 666. Foot-note, for so officers, wherever it appears, read z officer. Page 667. Rushs report, sixteenth line, insert * after forwarded and add foot- note, * See Plate 21, Map s, of the Atlas. Page 702. Thirty-first line, top, insert * after diagram and add foot-note, * See Plate 21, Map 2, of the Atlas. Page 722. Eleventh line, bottom, insert * after sketch and add foot-note, *See Plate 21, Map ii, of the Atlas. Page 727. Strykers report, third line, insert * after sketch and add foot-note, * See Plate 21, Map 3, of the Atlas. Page 7~7. Second line, bottom, insert * after day and add foot-note, *See Plate 21, Map ~, of the Atlas. Page 758. Gormans Brigade, for Andrew Sharpshooters read 2d company Min- nesota Shapshooters (Russell). Insert * after z5th Massachusetts and add foot-note, * ist Company Massachusetts Sharpshooters attached. Page 760. Transfer Got. J. H. Hobart Ward from First Brigade and insert in Sec- ond Brigade, following Brzg-. Geit. David B. Birney. Page 812. Erase foot-note To appear in Atlas and insert Not found. Page 820. Thirty-ninth line, top, for Tenth read Sez!entieth. Page 917. For 96th Pennsylvania read 96th New York. Page IooI. Seventh line, top, insert * after position and add foot-note, *For map accompanying, see Plate 21, Map 6, of the Atlas. Page 1052. Address, for C. 9/. Lovel read 0. 9/. Sorrel. Page 1134. Foot-note, for Hawes read Haws. PART 2. Page 36. Insert * after 6th U. S. Gavatry and add foot-note, * Detached with Stonemnan s commnand. Page 48. Third line, top, for Been [?] read Behm. Page 54. Eleventh line, bottom, for New York read Pennsylvania. Page 122. Sixth line, top, for Fifth read Eighth. Page 349. Twenty-first line, top, for Ninety-third read Ninety-sixth. Page 398. Erase foot-note and insert See Plate 21, Maps 7 and 8, ofthe Atlas. Page 438. Fourteenth line, bottom, for words read woods. Page 460. Twenty-seventh line, insert [Raszewski] after malor. Page 466. Fifteenth line, top, insert a semicolon after us and before to Page A003 ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS. 3 Page 488. Deshlers Artillery, first column, insert Thomas B. after Frenchs. Wises Command, second column, for Andrelvs ( Vi;ginia balteiy read Andreres (Alabama) batte;y; insert J)azid A. after Frenchs. Page 507. For First Battalion Li~rht Artille;y read Sceond J?attc,:J (haltiniore) Li~rht Artillery. Page 513. Stuarts report, seventeenth line, insert [Screvenl after ,Scrizene,; Page 694. Fifth line, hottom, for July30 read June 30. Page 832. Grammers report, sixth line, for Nulson read f/udson; twenty-sixth line, for Hudson read unIson. Page 852. Hill to Chilton, date line, for 1862 read s86~. Page 915. Eighth line, top, for D. A. Frenchs read T. P. Frenchs. Page 923. Erase foot-note and insert See Plate 66, Map 7, of 11w Atlas. Page 942. Eighth line, top, for point read part. Page 944. Eighteenth line, bottom, insert to before iJfaycoxs. Page 986. Under Louisiana. ist Infantry, second line, for Jiow 15 read June 25. Page 988. Insert under North Carolina. 38111 Infant,y.Lieut. iJJilcs 9/. Gowles, adjutant, died of wounds ,-eceized June 26. Page 990. Under South Carolina. 12th Infantry, for J)elan read Delleney. Page 1053. Under iJIississ~ppz Troops, insert Regiments. after Gavairy au(l l)efore Jeff Davis Legion. Page Io9o. Sixth line, bottom, insert Regiments: before ist. PART 3. Page 107. McClellan to Stanton, 2.30 a. Iii., secon(l line, for (livision rea(l position. Page 126. McClellan to Stanton, third line, for battery rea(l boyau. Page 203. Keyes to Marcy, first line, insert Lieutenant TUishinglon after Chetwood. Page 250. McClellan to Rodgers, fifth line, for oxide read James River; eleventh line, for oyster read Richmond. Page 321. McClellan to Lincoln, date line, for July z~ read July Ii; first line, erase [July 131. Page 366. Twenty-seventh line, top, for officers read offices. Page 403. Special Orders, No. 699, change Paragraph XXI to XVI. Page 493. Lee to Johnston, date line, for May 3 read May ~. Page 529. Thirty-first line, top, for Robinsons read Robe,-tsons. Page 6s~. For Turners battery, Richmond Howitzers, read Tu,-ncrs battery, Vir- ginia Artillery. Page 650. Third line, bottom, for William Nelsons read C. TV. Nelsons. Page 652. For W. H. Frenchs (Virginia) battery read Thomas h. Frenchs ( Vir- ginia) battey; for (hpt. B. H. S,uiths company rea(l Gapt. G. L. Smiths company, and insert Capt. B. II. lih)tlels company after (hpt. E. R. }bungs company. Page 724. Sixteenth line, bottom, insert Regiments. 1)efore sst. INDEX. Insert all words and figures in italics and strike out all in [brackets]. An asterisk (*) following a correction indicates that Additions an(i corrections to the text should lie consulted. References are to parts of volume. Part Part. A bandoned Lands, Refugees, etc. .1 rmy Loips, 3th (Potomac), Porter. Support, etc., of refugees, 120 3 Organized, ~ 232 3 Allen, William [Major] 2 Army Coips, 6th. A miss, Williani H. [Amos, Dr.] Orgaiiized, iSs, 333 3 Andrew, John W i Army coips, 7th (Viiginia). Arkansas Troops. Organized, 333 3 InfantryBattalions Army Corps, 8th. Pronanghis [2d] 2, 3 Orcranized, ~g Page A004 ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS. Part. Army C~orps, 9th. Organized, 333 3 Baker, B. 6~J., Messrs 3 Bates, Willard [William] W Beattie, William [Sergeant] Behm, Charles F. W. [Been [?], Captain] 2 Blakeney [Blakeny], Thomas 3 2 Blandford, Joseph A. [Blanchard, Private] .. Boardman, Mary A., Steamer I Boyd, Waller [Walter] M 2 Brashear, D. T. [F.] 2 Brodnax [Broadnax], William F 2 Brown, George ~ [Brown, George, 553].. Brunot, Felix R. [Mr.] Buffum, George R 2 Bullock, 3. W. [N.] 2 Cahot, Samuel [Dr.] Cavada, Adolph F Chamhers, William H 2 Chamblin, C. W. [ ] Chamblin, Thomas S. [ ] Chesnut [Chestnut], John Chittick [Chittuch], Michael 2 Clarke [Clark], George J 3 C7arke, Richard~ [Clark, Lieutenant] 2 Clarke, Will W [Clark, William W.] Cogswell, Mason F. [Dr.] Colhert,JamesP. [3. 3.] 2 Conner, James, 632, 633; Conner, W. G., [632, 633] Cook, Benjamin C [Corporal] 2 Cooper, Raleigh L. [Lieutenant] 2 Corinth, Miss. Advance upon and siege of April 29June 10, 1862 [Affairs at] 3 Coster, John H. [F.] 2 Cowles, Miles M., 988* 2 Curry, James 7. [Curray, Sergeant] Dahney, R. L. [T.] 2 Deacon, Edward P De LIsle [De Lisle], V. G Delleney [Delaney], 3. W 2 Doherty [Dougherty], Philip Drew, Edward, i8 [Drew, Charles, 418] 2 Duncan, Alender [Alexander] P 2 Dunlap, James H 2 Dutcher, Salem [Sergeant] Egan [Eagan], Michael Ellersons Mill, Va. See Ellisons Mill, Va.. x, 2 Emmet [Emmett], Temple 2 Fairly [Fairley], John S 2 Field, William G. [ ] 2 Fitzgerald, Louis [Lewis] Fowle, William H., jr Franks, F. P. [Sergeant] 2 Fraysers Farm, Va. See Fraziers Farm, Va I, 2 Fry, Thomas W. G. [G. W.] Gaddes [Geddes], Robert 2 Gaskill [Gaskell], Charles B 1,2 Gaston, 3. McF. [M. F.] Georgia Troops. ArtilleryBattalions: Sumter (Batteries), A (Ross), 6~z, B (Price), 6~s, C (Crawford), 6~z, D (Blackshear), 652 3 Part. Georgia TroopsContinued. InfantryRegiments: ist (Regulars), 532 3 [ist (Volunteers), 5321 3 26th, [626] 2 27th, 6s6 2 Gready [Grady], Timothy 2 Grimstead, G. !V [Sergeant] 2 Ilagemeister [Hagenineister], Dii lInt 2 Haley, A. G. [Lieutenaut] Hampton, Wade, jr., 993, Hampton, Walle Hampton Roads, Va. Operations in, April II [12] Harmeling, C. D. [Hariiiiliii, Sergeant] Harmeling, C. I). [Sergeaiit] 2 Hazes [Hawes] Shop, Va Healy [Healey], Virgil 51 Henry, Patrick, C. S. S. See hi/rick henry, C.S.S 3 Hoff,JohnJ 2 Howard, MeHenry [henry] 2 Howell, Thomas 3., /39 [howell, Thomas. 439] 2 Jackson, Lewis [Louis] W James, Charles 7. [F.] 3 Jewell, Ja vies AL [Corporal] Johnson, I. [3.] L 2 Jones, Francis [Frank] B 2 Keen, Charles W.,.jr 1,3 Kelley, Lewis W., 832 [Kelley, T,ewis, 832] 2 Kelly [Kelley], Johu F Kennedy, Teranee [Terence] J . Kenney [Kinney], Peter 2 K/eiser [Kleisser], Alfred von Knapp, Fred. N. [Mr.] Kneeland, Jonathan [I)r.] . Keackowizer, Ernest [Kraekowitzer, l)r.] ... Kuhn, Jo/in C. [3. H.] 2 Lacy [Lacey],J. Horace Ladue, William N. [II.] Lamonion [Lamonier], Geor~e 2 Landstreet, Fdzviird ~~ [lid.] Lansing,Jo/in [Dr.] Larrabee [I,arahee], Cli Lee, John Ak. [li.] 2 Lees Mill, Va. Engagement at, April i6. Rel)orts If Kennedy, Teranee [Terence] J Lerich, !Vi//iani F [Corporal] 2 Lineharger, 7. James [James I.] 2 Louisiana Troops. InfantryBattalions: 649 3 InfantryRegiments: [3d, 649] 3 McAlpine, Charles L 1 MeAlpine, Char/es L. [MeAlpin, C. S.] 3 MeCallum, B. C. Correspondence with CYiar/es L. McA ipine [C. S. MeAlpin] 3 McDaniel [MeDaniels], Charles W 2 McGrnder [Magruder], Z. S 2 McGrnder, Z. S. [Magruder, Jolni 11.] 3 MeGnunegle, Gecige K. [Lieutenant] 2 McIntosh, A. A 2 Page A005 ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS. Part. McKinne [MeKennie], Barna i Macomh, J. N [Alexander] 3 Markoe, John [A.] I Marple, Alfred [William W.] Mary A. Boardman, Steamer, 6i8 I Marye, Morton, ~ [Marve, R. H., 765] 2 Maryland Troops (C.). ArtilleryBatteries: Andrews, [so;] * 2 Baltimore, 507* 2 Massachusetts Troops. InfantryRegiments: i5th, 758* I Mathews, Salmon [Solomon] S 2 Mayo, Joseph, Jr Meconkey, Elbridge [Lieutenant] 2 Miller, Jacob [John] H 2 Minnesota Troops. SharpshootersCompanies: Rnssells, 755* I Mintzer, William if Monroe [Munroe], F. I~e Baron 2 Morris, George U. [Q.] 3 Morris, William S. [Dr.] 3 Nelson, G. W., 9/6 [Nelson, William, 946] ... Nelson, C. (V.56/; Nelson, William, [564] 3 Nesinith, Samuel P. [Major] New Bridge, Va. Skirmishes at, etc. Reports of Cumming, A., 66~ [~55] Hnnt, ~l,. G., 66~ [655] Newhall, Walter S. [Harrison L.] 2 New Jersey Troops. InfantrvRegiments: ~th, [122]* 2 8th, 122* New York Troops. EngineersRegiments: 3ath, 51 3 InfantryRegiments: [both, 5] 3 71St, [~~] * 2 96th,9175 I Nolan [Nolen], Patrick Noland, C. St. Geoge [St. George C.] North Carolina, Department of. Limits e.rtendc(t, 6zi 3 Norwood, I. [3.1 T I, 2 ODonnell, James S. [Assistant Snrgeoi~] 2 Ol;;isted, Frederick Law [Olmstead, Mr.] .... CYNeill [ONeilj, Thomas 2 Ongheltree [Ongheltree], George 2 Page. Richard L 3 Page. Thomas Jefferson, Jr., /13, /16; Page, Thomas Jefferson, [413, 416] Palmer, Henri F. [lieutenant] Parker, A. N [M.] 2 Parsons, A Sd K [Lieutenant] 2 Peehles,John N [Sergeant] Peirce [Pierce], Ehenezer (V 2 Peirson [Pierson], Charles I, Peninsnlar Campaign. Sketches, Iso I Pennsylvania Troops. ArtilleryBatteries: Jones, 30 [31] 3 Schooleys, 30 [31] 3 Part. Pennsylvania TroopsContinued. CavalryRegiments: [26th, 126] InfantryRegiments: 26/h, is6 71st, 54* 93d, [349] * 96th, 3/9* 96th, [917]* Peyton, T. Jefferson Pierson, John U. [Private] Potter, Carroll H. [Captain] Raszewski, Alexander, 460* Rawls, R. [Private] Reilly [Reily], Terrence Rhode Island Troops. CavalryRegiments: [2d, 149, 212] Infan/ryRegiments: 2d, 1/9, 212 5. [3.] R. Spaulding, Steamer Saint Marys Church, Va. Reconnaissance, etc. Report of Duncan, Alender [Alexander] P Sanders, William P Sanford, Edward S. [Mr.] Scheetz, Henry A. [Lieutenant] Seven-Days Battles. Julie 25July i. Reports of Schack, George W von Stricker [Striker], B. L Shackleford [Shackelford], J. C Sharpe, Robert [Sharp, Private] Shorts, William [W.] Sketches. Peninsular Campaign, iso Smith, William (Col. 49th [~9th] Va.) Spaulding, S. [J.] R., Steamer Spaulding, S. R., Steamer Sprz~gs, John S. [Sprigg, Captain] Sproat, F. L. [Mr.] Stirling, Charles R., 522 [Sterling, Charles R., 522] Stricker [Striker], D. L Strong, W. C Stuckey [Stuckley], Charles M Studdiford [Studdeford], J. S Sturges, W. F. [G.] Sutphin, Charles H. [Corporal] Sweitzer, Nelson [Napoleon] B Swimihurne, John [Dr.] Tait [Tate], George P Taylor, John H., 778; Taylor, Joseph H., [778] Taylor, Murray F Teazer, Yacht, 738, Teazer, C. S. S., [738] Thieman [Thierman], August Thronebnrg, Marcns A. [Thorbora, Lieu- tenant] Tillapaugh [Tillepaugh], 3. M Trepp, Casper [Gaspard] Tren/len [Trentlen], John P Trezevant, J. Howell [Corporal] rriplett, Marshall [Captain] Union Troops. VolunteersRegiments: 1st Sharpshooters, [313] Up/on, John U. [Upson, Colonel] 5 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 Page A006 ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS. Part. 2 Upton, John C Utterlack [Utterbach], R. E Van Sickle, Moracic [Vansickle, Moratia] Vermont Troops. CavalryRegiments: [3d, 103] InfantryRegiments: 3d, 103 Virginia Troops. ArtilleryBatteries: Branchs, 504 [Frenchs, 561, 611, 652]* Frenchs (David A.), [909912, 915,984]... McComas-Frenchs, D. A., ~6s [Moseleys, 539,615,651] Peninsula, 691 [696] Pittsylvania (Motley, B. H.), 652* Richmond Howitzers (Companies), (Mc Carthy), ~8o, 532, 6~z; sd (Hudnall- Watson), 340, 6z~, 6~s, 3d (Stanard- Moseley-Smith, B. H.),340, 481, 532, 539, 6i~, 6~i [(McCarthy), 480,532, 6~i; (Hud- nail), ~~o; (Smith), 652; (Stanard), 340, 481, 532] [Ritters, 652,688] [Sands, 480,532] Sands-Ritters, ~8o, 532, 6~s, 688 Smiths (C. L.), 652* 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 Part. Virginia TroopsContinued. ArtilleryBatteries: Stafford (French, T. B.), 488, 909-912, 91.5, 916, 984 2 Stafford (French, T. B.), 6iz, 6~s 3 [Watsons, 6i5, 652] 3 Youngs (F. R.), [575] 3 Youngs (J.~),575 3 Wagner,Jean [John] P 2 Washington, J. B., 203 * 3 Weeks, George H. [A.] 2 Wentz, Erasmus L. [Mr.] 3 West, E. Walter [Lieutenant] I Westmoreland, Thomas P. [Private] 2 White Oak Swamp Bridge, Va. Reconnaissance to, etc., August ~ [~fl. Report of McGruder [Magruder], Z. S 2 Wieber, George [Surgeon] 2 Willard, Sylvester D. [Dr.] Williams, J. N., 898 [Williams, J. W., 898] 2 Williams, Lawrence A 1,3 Williams, Lewis [Louis] B., jr I Witthack [Whittack], Henry, 457, 460 [Whit- tock, Henry, 457, 460] 2 Woodruff, George [Carle] A Wormley, Carter W. [Dr.] Young,JohnJ. [E. R.] 3 Page A007 Page A008 Special Index Page R007 CONTENTS OF PRECEDING VOLUMES. VOLUME I. CHAPTER L Page. Operations in Charleston Harbor, South Carolina. December 20, 1860April 14, 1861 1317 CHAPTER II. The secession of Georgia. January 326, 1861 318325 CHAPTER IlL The secession of Alabamaand Mississippi. January 420, 1861 326330 CHAPTER TV. Operations in Florida. January 6-August 31, 1861 331473 CHAPTER V Page. The secession of North Carolina. Janu ary 9-May 20, 1861 474-488 CHAPTER VL The secession of Louisiana. January 10 February 19, 1861 489-501 CHAPTER VII. Operations in Texas and New Mexico. February 1-June 11, 1861 502638 CHAPTER VIII. Operations in Arkansas, the Indian Terri- tory, and Mlssonr. February 7-May 9, 1861 637691 VOLUME II. CHAPTER IX. Page. Operations in Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and West Virginia. April 16-July 31,1861. 1-1012 VOLUME III. CHAPTER X. Page. Operations in Missouri, Arkansas, Kansas, and Indian Territory. May 10-November 19, 1861. 1-749 VOLUME IV. CHAPTER XL Page. CHAPTER XIII. Page. Operations in Texas, New Mexico, and Operations in North Carolina and South- Arizona. June 11, 1861February 1,1862. 1174 eastern Virginia. August 1, 1861Jan. CHAPTER XII. uary 11, 1862 506-721 Operations in Kentucky and Tennessee. July 1-November 19, 1861 175-565 VOLUME V. CHAPTER XIV. Page. Operations in Maryland, Northern Virginia, and West Virginia. August 1, 1861-March 17,1862. 1-1108 VOLUME VI. CHAPTER XV. Operations on the coasts of South Carolina, Georgia, and Middle and East Florida. August 21, 1861April 11, 1862 Page. CHAPTER XVI. Page. Operations in West Florida, Southern Al. abama, Southern Mississippi, and Lou- 1435 isiana. September 1,1861May 12,1862. 436894 VOLUME VII. CHAPTER XVII. Page. Operations in Kentucky, Tennessee, N. Alabama, and S. W. Virginia. Nov. 19, 1861Mar. 4,1862. 1-946 VOLUME VIII. CHAPTER XVIII. Page. )perations in Missouri, Arkansas, Kansas, and Indian Territory- Nov. 19, 1861April 10, 1882. 1-834 (vii Page R008 VIII CONTENTS OF PRECEDING VOLUMES. VOLUME IX. CHAPTER XIX. Page. CHAPTER XXI. Page. Operations in Southeastern Virginia. Jan- I Op orations in Texas, New Mexico, and nary 11March 17, 1862 171 Arizona. February 1September 20, CHAPTER . 1862 481-738 Operations in North Carolina, January 11August 20, 1882 72480 VOLUME XIN TWO PARTS. CHAPTER XXII. Operations in Kentucky, Tennessee, North Mississippi, North Alabama, and Southwest Virginia March 4June 10, 1862. Page. Pan IReports 1-927 Pars IlCorrespondence 1-64 Page 1 CHAPTER XXIII. THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VIRGINIA. March 17September 2, 1862.* PART I. REPORTSMarch 17-June 24, 1862. SUMMARY OF TIlE PRINCIPAL EWENTS.I Mar. 17, 1862.Embarkation of the Army of the Potomac commenced at Alex- andria, Va. 26, 1862. Confederate Department of Henrico, under command of Brig. Gen. John H. Winder, extended to embrace Petersburg and vicinity. 27, 1862.General Joseph E. Johnston, C. S. Army, ordered to re-enforce the Army of the Peninsula. 31, 1862. Blenkers division ordered to Mountain (Fr6monts) Department. April 1 2, 1862.Headquarters Army of the Potomac transferred to vicinity of Fort Monroe. 4,1862.The First Army Corps (McDowells) detached from Army of the Potomac and merged into Department of the Rappahannock. The Fifth Army Corps (Banks) merged into Vhe Department of the Shenandoah. Skirmish at Howards Mill, near Cockletown. 5-May 4, 1862.Siege of Yorktown. 11, 1862.Confederate naval operations in Hampton Roads. 12, 1862.Command of General Joseph E. Johnston, C. S. Army, extended over the Departments of Norfolk and the Peninsula. 22, 1862.Franklins division arrives at Yorktown. May 4, 1862.Skirmishes near Williamsburg. 5, 1862.Battle of Williamsburg. 6, 1862.Williamsburg occupied by the Union forces. 7, 1862.Engagement at West Point, Rarhamsville, or Elthams Lauding. 78, 1862.Reconnaissance to Mulberry Point, James River. 8, 1862.Naval demonstration upon Sewells Point. lncluding the transfer of the Army of the Potomac from the defenses of Washington to the Peninsula; the corresponding movements of the Army of Northern Virginia (Con- federate) and its operations to August 13, 1862; and the return of the Army of the Potomac to the vicinity of Washington. The operations of the main portio of the Army of Northern Virginia from August 13 to September 2, 1862, will appear in the operations from March 17 to September 2, 1862, in Northern Virginia, Wes Virginia, and Maryland. See Series I, Vol. XII. Of some of the minor conflicts noted in this Summary no circumstantial reports are on file. 1 R RVOL XI Page 2 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXITh May 9, 1862.Norfolk evacuated by the Confederate forces. Skirmish at Slatersville. 10, 1~62.Norfolk and Portsmouth eceupied by the Union forces. 13, 1862.Skirmish at Baltimore Cross-Roads, near Ne~v Kent Court-house. 15, 1862.Engagement at Fort Darling, James River. 17, 1862.Maj. Gen. Irvin McDowell onltreAl to move npon Richmond in co-operation with Maj orG neral McClellan. Expedition up the Pamunkoy River. ~i8,1862.Brig. Gen. Fitz Job11 I~ortei, U. S. Army, assumes command of Fifth Army Corps (reouganized). Maj. Gen. William B. Franklin, U. S. Army, assumes command of Sixth Army Corps. ~l819, 1862.Reconnaissance toward Old Church. 19,1862.Skirmish at City Point, James River. Skirmish at Gaines Mill. ~2O23, 1862.Operatiens about Bottoms Bridge, Chickahominy River. 21, 1862.Advance across Bottoms Bridge. 22, 1862.Reconnaissance to New Castle and Hanovertown Ferries. 23, 1862.Reconnaissance from Bottoms Bridge toward Richmond. Reconnaissance from BottomsBridge to the Turkey Island Creek Bridge. Skirmish at Ellisons Mill, near Mechaniesville. Skirmish at Hogans, near New Bridge. 24, 1862.~McDOWell5 orders to move upon Richmond suspended. Skirmish at New Bridge. Skirmish at Seven Pines. Skirmish at Mechanicsville. Reconnaissance toward Hanover Court-house. -25--26, 1862.Expedition from Bottoms Bridge to James River. 26, 1862.RecOnnaissance toward Hanover Court-House. 27, 1862Skirmish at Slash Church. Skirmish at White Oaks. 2729, 186.2.~Engagement at Han6ver Court-House (27th) and operations (28th 29th) in that vicinity. 28, 1862.Virginia Central Railroad Bridge, on South Anna River, destroyed by Union forces. Destruction of Confederate supplies at Ashland. 29, 1862.Skirmish near Seven Pines. Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad Bridge, on South Anna River, destroyed. 30, 1862.Skirmish near Fair Oaks. Skirmish near Zuni. 31June 1, 1862.Battle of Fair Oaks, or Seven Pines. June 1, 1862.General Robert E. Lee, C. S. Army, assumes command of the Army of Northern Virginia. The Department of Virginia extended and embraced in Maj. Gen. George B. McClellans command, Maj. Gen. John E. Wool, U. S. Army, being assigned to the Middle Department, and Maj. Gen. John A. Dix, U. S. Army, to command at Fort Monroe. 1 2, 1862.~-Reconnai55ance beyond Seven Pines. 2, 1862.Expedition to Wormleys Ferry, Pamunkey River. 3 7, 1862.Reconnaissance to the James River to communicate with the Union fleet. 6, 1862.Skirmish at New Bridge. .7, 1862.Reeonnaissanee on east bank of the Chiekahominy Page 3 CHAP. XXIII.] SUMMARY OF TILE PRINCIPAL EVENTS. 3 June 8, 1862.Skirmish near Fair Ouks. Major-General McDowell or(lered, under conditions stated, to operate in the direction of Richmond. Reconnaissance on the New Market Road. 11, l86~.Re-enforcements sent from Army of Northern Virginia to the Valley District. 1213, l862.McCalls division re-enforces the Army of the Potomac. 1315, l862.Stuarts raid, including skirmishes at Hawes Shop, 01(1 Church, and Garlicks Landing. 15, l8o2.Reconnaissance to vicinity of New Market. Skirmish near Seven Pines. Parley between Brig. Gen. Howell Cobb, C. S. Army, and Col. Thomas M. Key, U. S. Army. 17, l86~2.Jacksons command moves from vicinity of Staunton and Weyers Cave for the Peninsula. 18, 1862.Skirmish near Fair Oaks. Skirmish on Nine Mile Road, near Richmond. 19, 1862.Skirmish on the Charles City Road, near Richmond. 20, 1862.Skirmish near New Bridge. Affair at Gills Bluff, James River. 21, 1862.The Confederate Department of North ~Jarolina extended to the south bank of James River. Skirmish near Fair Oaks Station. 2223, l862.Reconnaissance to tke left of White Oak Swamp. 23, l862.Operations about New Kent Court-House. 24, 1862.Skirmish near Mechanicsville. 25July 1, 1862.The Seven-days Battles. 27, 1862.Jackson re-enforces Army of Northern Virginia. 28July 4, l862.Expedition from Fort Monroe to open communication with Army of the Potomac. July 2, 1862.Skirmish near New Kent Court-House. Skirmish at Malvern Hill. Affair near Haxalls Landing. 3, l862.Reconnaissance from Harrisons Landing, on Charles City Road. 3 4,1862.Skirmishes near Herring Creek, or Harrisons Landing. 4, l862.Reconnaissance from Harrisons Landing. Skirmish at Westover. 5 6, l862.Operations against Union shipping, James River. 7 9, I862.Reconnaissance from Yorktown. 9, l862.Reconnaissance on the Long Bridge Road. 10, l862.Reconnaissance from Harrisons Landing toward White Oak Swamp and skirmish. 11, l862.Reconnaissance from Harrisons Landing beyond Charles City Court-House, Va. 16, l862.Reconnaissance from Westover, on the Richmond Road. 22, 1862.Maj. Gen. John A. Dix assnmes command of the Seventh Army Corps, Department of Virginia. Maj. Gen. A. E. Burnside assumes command of the Ninth Army Corps. Affair near Westover. 2230, l862.Scout in King William, King and Queen, and Gloucester Coma- ties. 23, 1862.Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck assumes command of the Armies of the United States. 29, l862.Reconnaissance from Harrisons Landing to Saint Marye Church Page 4 4 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIII. July 30, 1862.McClellan ordered to remove his sick, etc. Reconnaissance from Harrisons Landing to Jones Ford, Chicka- hominy River. 31-Aug. 1,1862.Attack on Union camps and shipping between Shirley and Harrisons Landing. Aug. 2 8, 1862.Reconnaissance from Harrisons Landing and reoccupation of Mal- vein Hill by the Union forces. 3, 1862.Reconnaissance on south side of James River and skirmish at Sycamore Church. McClellan ordered to withdraw his forces to Aquia Creek. 4- 5,1862.Reconnaissance from Coggins Point beyond Sycamore Church. 5,1862.Skirmish at White Oak Swamp Bridge. Engagement at Malvern Hill. 6,1862.Skirmish at Malvern Hill. 13,1862.Preliminary orders issued for the movement of the Army of North- ern Virginia from the Peninsula. 14-15,1862.The Third and Fifth Army Corps move from Harrisons Landing for Aquia Creek. 1419, 1862.Operations of the cavalry covering the rear of the Army of the Potomac from Harrisons Landing to Williamsburg. 17, 1862.Reconnaissance toward Forge Bridge. 20,1862.The Fifth Army Corps embarked at Newport News. 21,1862.The Third Army Corps 8ail from Yorktown. 23,1862.The Sixth Army Corps embarked at Fort Monroe. 26, 1862.The Second Army Corps left Fort Monroe. GENERAL REPORTS. No. 1.Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, U. S. Army, commanding Army of the Potomac. No. 2.Brig. Gen. John G. Barnard, U. S. Army, Chief Engineer, of operations from May 23, 1861, to August 15, 1862. No. 3.Lient. Col. Barton S. Alexander, U. S. Army, Engineer Officer, of operations from April 20 to July 12. No. 4.Brig. Gen. Daniel P. Woodbury, U. S. Army, commanding Engineer Brigade, of operations from May 1~ to June 30. No. 5.Brig. Gen. Andrew A. Humphreys, U. S. Army, Chief of Topographical En- gineers. No. 6.Col. Charles P. Kingsbury, U. S. Army, Chief Ordnance Officer. No. 7.Brig. Gen. Stewart Van Yliet, U. S. Army, Chief Quartermaster, of operations from July 27, 1861, to July 10, 1862. No. 8.Brig. Gen. Rufus Ingalls, U. S. Army, Chief Quartermaster, of operations from August, 1861, to September 2, 1862. No. 9.Col. Henry F. Clarke, U. S. Army, Chief Commissary of Subsistence, of opera- tions from August 1, 1861, to November 9, 1862. No. 10.Surg. Charles S. Tripler, U. S. Army, Medical Director, of operations from March 17 to July 3. No. 11.Surg. Jonathan Letterman, U. S. Army, Medical Director, of operations from July 4 to September 2. No. 12.Maj. Albert J. Myer, Chief Signal Officer, U. S. Army. No. 13.E. J. Allen [Allen Pinkerton], Chief of Secret Service Division. No. 14.CoL Robert 0. Tyler, First Connecticut Heavy Artillery, commanding siege train. No. 15.General Joseph E. Johnston, C. S. Army, commanding Department of North- ern Virginia, of operations from April 15 to May 19 Page 5 CHAP. XXIII.J GENERAL REPORTS. 5 No.1. Report of lJIaj. Gen. George B. McClellan, U. S. Army, commanding Army of the Potomac. NEW YORK, Aug~8t 4, 1863. SIR: I have the honor to submit herein the official report of the operations of the Army of the Potomac while under my charge. Accompanying it are the reports of the corps, division, and subordinate commanders pertaining to the various engagements, battles, and occur- rences of the campaigns, and important documents connected with its organization, supply, and movements. These, with lists of maps and memoranda submitted, will be found appended, duly arranged, and marked for convenient reference: * * * * * * * * SECOND PERIOD. CHAPTER I. The council composed of the four CO~l)5 commanders, organized by the President of the United States, at its meeting on the 13th of March, adopted Fort Monroe as the base of operations for the movement of the Army of the Potomac upon IRichmond.f For the prompt and successful execution of the projected operation it was regarded by all as necessary that the whole of the four corps should be employed, with at least the addition of 10,000 men drawn from the forces in the vicinity of Fortress Monroe; that position and its dependencies being regarded as amply protected by the naval force in its neighborhood and the advance of the main army up the Peninsula, so that it could be safely left with a small garrison. In addition to the land forces, the co-operation of the Navy was desired in the projected attack upon the batteries at Yorktown and Gloucester, as well as in controlling the York and Janmes Rivers, for the protection of our flanks and the use of the transports bringing supplies to the army. With these expectations, and for reasons stated elsewhere in this report, my original plan of moving by Urbana and West Point was abandoned, and the line with Fort Monroe as a base adopted. In the arrangements for the transportation of the army to the Peninsula by water the vessels were originally ordered to rendezvous mainly at Annapolis; but upon the evacuation of Manassas amid the batteries of the Lower Potomac by the enemy it becamne more convenient to embark the troops and material at Alexandria, and orders to that effect were at once given. In making the preliminary arramigemnents for the movement it was determined that the First Corps, General McDowells, should move as a unit first, and effect a landing either at the Sand-box, some 4 miles south of Yorktown, in order to turn all the enemys defenses at Ship Point, Howards Bridge, Big Bethel, & c., or else, should existing cir- cumstances render it preferable, land on the Gloucester side of York River and move on West Point. The transports, however, arrived slowly and few at a time. In order, * So much of this report as relates to the First Period will be found in Series I, Vol. Y, pp. 166. tSee Series I, Vol. V, p. 55 Page 6 6 THE PENiNSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIII~ therefore, to expedite matters I decided to embark the army by divis- ions as transports arrived, keeping army corps together as much as possible, and to collect the troops at Fort Monroe. In determining the order of embarkation convenience and expedition were especially con- sulted, except that the First Corps was to be embarked last, as I in- tended to move it in mass to its point of (hisembarkatioll, and to laud it on either bank of the York, as might then he determined. On the 17th of March Hamiltons division, of the Third Corps, em- barked at Alexandria, and proceeded to Fort Monroe with the following orders: WASHINGTON, D. C., Afarch 17, 1862. You will, on your arrival at Fort Monroe, report to General Wool, and request him to assign you ground for encamping your division. You will remain at Fort Monroe until further orders from General McClellan. Should General Wool require the serv- ices of your division in repelling an attack, you will obey his orders and use every effort to carry out his views. H. B. MARCY, Chief of Stuff. General C. S. HAMILTON, Commanding Didsiou. On the 22d of March, as soon as transportation was ready, General Fitz John Porters division, of the same corps, embarked. General lleintzelman was ordered to accompany it, under the following instruc- tions: HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Seminary, March 22, 1862. GENERAL: Upon the disembarkation of Porters division at Fort Monroe I have to request that you will move your two divisions (Porters and Hamiltons) some 3 or 4 miles out from the fort, to find good camping p laces, where wood and water can be readily obtained, and where your positions will be good in a defensive point of view. You may find it advisable to place one division on or near the road leading to York- town from Newport News; the other upon that leading to Yorktown direct from Fort Monroe. If you find that the nature of the country will permit easy communication and mutual support between the two divisions it will be best to place one on each road. It will he best to remain pretty near the fort for the present, in order to give the impression that our object is to attack Norfolk rather than Yorktown. You will do well, however, to push strong reconnai-ssances well to the front, to ascertain the position of the enemy and his pickets. I will, as soon as possible, re-enforce you by the third division of your corps, and it is probable that a part or the whole of the Fourth Corps will also move from Fort Monroe. This will probably be determined before your disembarkation is completed, and you will be informed accordingly. My desire would be to make no important move in advance until we are fully pre- pared to follow it up and give the enemy no time to recover. The quartermaster of your corps will receive detailed instructions in regard to land transportation from General Van Vliet. It will be advisable to mobilize your corps with the least possible delay and have it prepared for an advance. I have directed extra clothing, ammunition, & c., to be sent to Fort Monroe, so that all deficiencies may be supplied without delay.. Please report to me frequently and fully the condition of things on the new field of operations and whatever intelligence you gain as to the enemy. Engage guides in sufficient numbers at once, and endeavor to send out spies. I am, very truly, yours, GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Major-General, Commanding. Brig. Gen. S. P. HEINTZELMAN, Comniandinq Third Gorp8. The remaining divisions embarked as rapidly as transports could be supplied. On the 1st of April I embarked with the headquarters on the steamer Commodore, and reached Fort ~Ionroe on the afternoon of the 2d. In consequence of the delay iii the arrival of the horse transports a Page 7 CHAP. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 7 Alexandria but a small portion of the cavalry had arrived, and the artillery reserve had iiot yet comI)leted its disembarkation. I tound there tlie Third Pennsylvania Cavalry and the Fifth Regular Cavalry. The Second Regular Cavalry an(l a portion of the First had arrived, but not disembarked. So few wagons had arrived that it was. not possible to move Caseys division at all for several days, while the~ other divisions were obliged to move with scant supplies. As to the force and position of the enemy, the information then in oar l)ossessiolL was vague and untrustworthy. Much of it was obtained~ from the staff officers of General Wool, and was simply to the effect that Yorktown was surrounded by a continuous line of earthworks,. with strong water batteries on the York River, and garrisoned by not less thaii 15,000 troops, under command of General J. B. Magruder~ Maps, which had been prepared by the topographical engineers under General Wools command, were furnished me, in which the Warwick River was represented as flowing parallel to but not crossing the road from Newport News to Williamsburg, making the so-called Mulberry Island a real island; and we had no information as to the true course of the Warwick across the Peninsula nor of the formidable line of works which it covered. Information which I had collected during the winter placed General Marruders command at from 15000 to 20 000 men, inde~ of General Hugers force at Norfolk, estimated at about 15,000. It was also known that there were strong defensive works at or near Williamsburg. Knowing that General Huger could easily spare some troops to re- enforce Yorktownthat he had, indeed, done soand that Johnstons army of Manassas could be brought rapidly by the James and York Rivers to the same point, I propose(l to invest that town without delay~ The accompanying map of Colonel Cram, U. S. Topographical En- gineers, attached to General Wools staff; given to me as the result of several months labor, indicated the feasibility of the desigu.* It was. also an object of primary importance to reach the vicinity of Yorktown before the enemy was re-enforced sufficiently to enable him to hold in force his works at Big Bethel, Howards Bridge, Ship Point, & c., on the direct road to Yorktown and Youngs Mill, on the road from New~ port News. This was the more urgent as it was now evident that some days must elapse before the First ~5orps could arrive. Everything possible was done to hasten the disembarkation of th& cavalry, artillery, and wagons in the harbor; and on the 3d the orders. of march were given for the following day. There were at Fort Monroe and in its vicinity on the 3d, ready to move, two divisions of the Third Corps, two divisions of the Fourth Corps, and one (livision of the Second Corps, and Sykes brigade of regular infantry, together with Hunts artillery reserve and the regi- ments of cavalry before namedin all about 58,000 men and 100 guns, besides the division artillery. Richardsons and Hookers divisions of the Second and Third Corps. had not arrived, and Caseys division of the Fourth Corps was unabl& to move for want of wagons. Before I left Washington an order had been issued by the War Department placing Fort Monroe and its dependencies under my con- trol, and authorizing me to draw from the troops under General Wool Maps to appearju Atlas Page 8 THE PENINSULAI~ CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIII. a division of about 10,000 men, which was to be assigned to the First Corps. During the night of the 3d I received a telegram from the Adjutant- General of the Army stating that by the Presidents order I was de- prived of all control over General Wool and the troops under his command and forbidden to detach any of his troops without his sanc- tion. This order left me without any base of operations under my own control, and to this day I am ignorant of the causes which led to it. On my arrival at Fort Monroe the James River was declared by the naval authorities closed to the operations of their vessels by the com- bined influence of the enemys batteries on its banks and the Confed- erate steamers Merrimac, Yorktown, Jamne~town, and Teazer. Flag- O~cer Goldsborough, theim in command of the United States squadron in Hampton Roads, regarded it (and no doubt justly) as his highest and most imperative duty to watch and neutralize the Merrimac, and as he designed using his most powerful vessels ina contest with her, he did not feel able to detach to the assistance of the army a suitable force to attack the water batteries at Yorktown and Gloucester. All this was contrary to what had been previously stated to me and ma- terially affected my l)lans. At no time during the operations against Yorktown was the Navy prepared to lend us any material assistance in its reduction until after our land batteries had ~)artially silenced the works. I had hoped, let me say, by rapid movements to drive before inc or capture the enemy on the Peninsula, open the James River, and press on to Richmond before he should be materially re-enforced from other portions of his territory. As the narrative proceeds the causes will be developed which frustrated these apparently well-grounded expecta- tions. I determined, then, to move the two divisions of the Fourth Corps by the Newport News and Williamsburg roads to take up a position between Yoi-ktown and Willia.msburo while the two divisions of the Third Corps moved direct from Fort Monroe upon Yorktown, the re- serves moving so as to support citlmer corps, as might prove necessary. I designed, should time works at YorL town and Williamsburg offer a serious resistance, to land the First Corps, re-enforced, if necessary, on the left bank of the York or on time Severn, to move it on Gloucester and West Point, iii order to take in reverse whatever force the enemy might have on the Peninsula, and compel him to abandon his posi- tioii5. In the commencement of the movement from Fort Monroe -serious difficulties were encountered from the want of precise topographical information as to the country, in advance. Correct local maps were not to be found, and the country, thoimgh known in its general features, we found to be inaccurately described in essential particulars in the only maps and geographical memoirs or 1)~l)CV5 to which access could be had. Erroneous courses to streams and i-oads weme frequently given, and no dependence could be phiced on the information thus derived. This difficulty has been found to exist with respect to most portions of the State of Yirginia through which my military operations have extended. Reconnaissances, frequently under flue, proved the only trustworthy sources of information. Negroes, however truthful their reports, pos. ~essed or were able to communicate very little accurate and no compre- bensive topographical information Page 9 CHAP. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 9 On the 3d the following orders were given for the movement of the 4th: Porters and Hamiltons divisions and Averells cavalry, of the Third Corps, and Sedg- wicks division, of the Second Corps, under Brigadier-General Heintzelman, command- ing Third Corps, will move to-morrow in the following order: Porters division, with Averells cavalry, at 6 a. in., over the New Market and New Bridges to Big Bethel and Howards Bridge. This division will send forward to the batteries where the Ship Point road intersects the main Yorktown road a sufficient force to hold that point and cut off the garrison of the Ship Point batteries. The whole division may be used for this purpose if necessary, and if possible the batteries should be occupied by our troops to-morrow. The portion of the division not necessary for this purpose will en- camp at Howards Bridge hamiltons division will march at 7 a. m. by the New Bridge road to Big Bethel, and will encamp on Howards Creek. Sedgwicks division will march at S a. m. by the New Market Bridge, taking the direct road to Big Bethel, and will also encamp at Howards Bridge. Brigadier-General Keyes, commanding Fourth Corps, will move with Smiths and Couchs divisions at 6 a. m. (Smiths division in advance) by the James River road. The Fifth Regular Cavalry, temporarily assigned to this corps, will move with Smiths division, which will encamp at Youngs Mill, throwing forward at least one brigade to the road from Big Bethel to Warwick. Couchs division will encamp at Fishers Creek. The reserve cavalry, artillery, and infantry will move at 8.30 a. m. by the New Mar- ket Bridge to Big Bethel, where it will encamp. On the march it will keep in rear of Sedgwicks division. The following is an extract from the order issued on the 4th for the march of the 5th: The following movements of the army will be carried out to-morrow (5th): General Keyes will move forward Smiths division at 6 a. in., via Warwick Court- House and the road leading near the old ship-yard, to the Half-way House, on the Yorktown and Williamsburg road. General Couchs division will march at 6 a. m. to close up on General Smiths divis- ion at the Half-way House. General Keyes command will occupy and hold the narrow dividing ridge near the Half-way House, so as to prevent the escape of the garrison at Yorktown by land and prevent re-enforcements being thrown in. General Heintzelman will move forward General Porters two rear brigades at 6 a. m. upon the advance guard, when the entire division will advance to a point about 2~ miles from Yorktown, where the road turns abruptly to the north and where a roa4 comes in from Warwick Court-House. General Hamiltons division will move at 6 a. in., and follow General Porters divis- ion, camping as near it as possible. General Sedgwicks division will march at 5 a. m. as far as the Warwick road, which enters the main Yorktown road near Dr. Powers house, and will await fur- ther orders. The reserve will march at 6 a. in. upon the main Yorktown road, halting for further orders at Dr. Powers house, the intantry leading, the artillery following next, and the cavalry in rear. General Sedgwicks division will for the present act with the reserve, and he will receive orders from headquarters. In giving these orders of march for the 4th and 5th it was expected that there would be no serious opposition at Big Bethel, and that the advance of the Third Corps beyond that point would force the enemy to evacuate the works at Youngs Mill, while our possession of the latter would make it necessary for him to abandon those at Howards Bridge, and the advance thence on Yorktown would place Ship Point in our possession, together with its garrison, unless they abandoned it promptly. The result answered the expectation. During the afternoon of the 4th General Keyes obtained information of the presence of some 5,000 to 8,000 of the enemy in a strong posi- tion at Lees Mill. The natnre of that position in relation to the War- wick not being at that time understood, I instructed General Keyes to attack and carry this position upon coming in front of it Page 10 10 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [Cii~i. XXIII Early in the afternoon of the 5th the advance of each column was bronght to a halt; that of lleintzelinan (Porters division), in front of Yorktown, after overcoming some resistance at Big Bethel an(l flow- ards Bridge; that of Keyes (Sniiths division) unexpectedly before the enemys works at Lees Mill, where the road from Newport News t~ Williamsburg crosses Warwick River. The progress of each column had beeii retarded by heavy rains on that day, which had made the roads almost impassable to the infantry of Keyes column and impassable to all but a small portion of the artillery, while the ammunition, provisions, and forage could not be brought up at all. When General Keyes approached Lees Mill his left flank was ex- posed to a sharp artillery fire from the farther bank of the Warwick and upon reaching the vicinity of the mill he found it altogether stronger than was expected, unapproachable by reason of the Warwick River and. incapable of being carried by assault. The troops composing the advance of each column were during the afternoon under a warm artillery fire, the sharpshooters even of the right column being engaged when covering reconnaissances. It was at this stage and moment of the campaign that the following telegram was sent to me: ADJUTANT-GENERALS O~YICE, April 4, 1862. General McCLIu~.& x: By direction of the President, General ~ J)owells army corps has been detached from the force under your immediate com~.. ~1, au. the general is ordered to report to the Secretary of War. Letter by mail. L. THOMAS, Adjut~wt-Goneral. The President having promised, in an intex view following his order of March 31, withdrawing Blenkers division of 10,000 men from my command, that nothing of the sort should be repeatedthat I might rest assured that the campaign should proceed with no further deduc- tions from the force upon which its operations had been plannedI may confess to having been shocked at this order, which, with that of the 31st ultimo and that of the 3d, removed nearly 60,000 men from my command, and reduced my force by more than one-third after its task had been assigned, its operations planned, its fighting begun. To me the blow was most discouraging. It frustrated all my plans for impending operations. It fell when I was too deeply committed to withdraw. It left me incapable of continuing operations which had been begun. It compelled the adoption of another, a different, and a less effective J)lan of campaign. It made rapid and brilliant operations im;)ossible. it was a fatal error. It was now, of course~ out of my power to turn Yorktown by West Point. I had therefore no choice left but to attack it directly in Iront, as I best could with the force at my command. Reconnaissances made under fire on that and the fidlowing day determined that the sources of the Warwick River were near York- town, commanded by its guns, while that stream, for sonic distance from. its mouth on the James River, was controlled by the Coimfederate gunboats; that the fords had been (lestroye(l by damns, time approaches to which were generally through dense forests and dccl) swamnl)s, and defended by extensive and formidable works; that timber felled for defensive purposes and the flooding of the roads, caused by the dams, had made these works apparently inaccessible and impossible to turn Page 11 CHAP. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 11 that Yorktown was strongly fortified, armed, and garrisoned, and con~ nected with the defenses of the Warwick by forts and intrenchments, the ground in front of which was swept by the guns of Yorktown. It was also ascertaine(1 that the garrisons had been and were daily being re-entorce(l by troops from Norfolk and the army nnder General J. E. Johnston. heavy rains made the roads to Fort Monroe impassable, and delayed the arrival of troops, ammunition, aud supplies while storms prevented for several days the sailing of transports from Hamp- ton Roads and the establishment of depots on the creeks of York River near the army. The ground bordering the Warwick River is covered by very dense and extensive forests, the clearings being small and few. This, with the comparative flatness of the country and the alertness of the enemy, everywhere in force, rendered thorough reconnaissances slow, dan- gerous, and difficult; yet it was impossible otherwise to determine. whether an assault was anywhere practicable or whether the more tedi- ous but sure operations of a siege must be resorted to. I made on the 6th and 7th close personal reconnaissauces of the right and left of the enemys positions, which, with information acquired already, convinced me that it was best to prepare for an assauilt by the preliminary employment of heavy guns and some siege operations. In- stant assault would have been simple folly. On the 7th I telegraphed to the President as follows: HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TEE PoToi~c, April 7, 1862. Your telegram of yesterday is received.* In reply I have the honor to state that. my entire force for duty amounts to only about 85,000 men. General Wools command, as you will observe from the accompanying order has been taken out of my control, although he has most cheerfully co-operated wit~Li me. The only use that can b& made of his command is to protect my communications in rear of this point. At this time only 53,000 men have joined me, but they are coming up as rapidly as my mean& of transportation will permit. Please refer to my dispatch to the Secretary of War to-night for the details of our present situation. GEO. B. McCLELLAN, To the PRESIDENT, Washington, D. ~. Major- General. On the same day I sent the following: HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TEE POTOMAC, In Front of Yorktown, April 7, 18627 p. m. Your teleoram of yesterday * arrived here while I was absent examining the enemys right, whic~i I did pretty closely. The whole line of the Warwick, which really heads within a mile of Yorktown, is strongly defended by detachcd redoub~ s and other fortifications, armed with heavy and light guns. The approaches, except at Yorktown, are covered by the Warwick, over which there is but one, or, at most, two passages, both of which are covered by strong batteries. It will be necessary to resort to the use of heavy guns and some siege operations before we assault. All the prisoners state that General J. E. Johnston arrived at Yorktown yesterday with strong re-enforcements. It seems clear that I shall have the whole force of the enemy on my handsprobably not less than 100,000 men, and probably more. In consequence of the loss of Bleakers division and the First Corps my force is possibly less than that of the enemy, while they have all the advantage of position. I am under great obligations to you for the offer that the whole force and material of the Government will be as fully and as speedily under my command as heretofore or as if the new departments had not been created. Since my arrangements were made for this campaign at least 50,000 men have been taken from my command. Since my dispatch of the 5th instant five divisions have been in close observation of the enemy, and frequently exchanging shots. When my present command all join I shall have about 85,000 men for duty, from which a large See dispatches on p. 14 Page 12 12 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [GeAr. XXUL force must be taken for guards, scouts, & c. With this army I could assault the en- emys works, and perhaps carry them, but were I in possession of their intrench- irients and assailed by double my numbers I should have no fears as to the result. Under the circumstances that have been developed since we arrived here I feel fully impressed with the conviction that here is to be fought the ,reat battle that is to decide the existing contest. I shall of course commence the attack as soon as I can get up my siege train, and shall do all in my power to carry the enemys works; but to do this with a reasonable degree of certainty requires, in my judgment, that I ahould, if possible, have at least the whole of the First Corps to land upon the Severn River, and attack Gloucester in the rear. My present strength will not admit of a detachment sufficient for this purpose without materially impairing the efficiency of this column. Flag-Officer Goldsborough thinks the works too strong for his available vessels unless I can turn Gloucester. I send by mail copies of his letter and one of the commander of the gunboats here. GEG. B. McCLELLAN, Major- General. Hon. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War. I had provided a small siege train and moderate supplies of intrench- ing tools for such a contingency as the present. Jmmediate steps were taken to secure the necessary additions. While the engineer officers were engaged in ascertaining the character and strength of all the de- fenses and the configuration of the ground in front of Yorktown in order to determine the point of attack, and to develop the approaches, the troops were occupied in opening roads to the depots established at the nearest av~tilable points on branches of York River. Troops were brought to the front as rapidly as l)ossible, and on the 10th of April the army was posted as follows: rs, and Hamiltons Heintzelmans corps, composed of Porters Hooke divisions, in front of Yorktown, extending in the order named from the mouth of Wormleys Creek to the Warwick road opposite Wynns Mill; Sumners corpsSedgwicks division only having arrive(lon the left of Hamilton, extending down to Warwick and opposite to Wynns Mill works; Keyes corps (Smiths, Conchs, and Caseys divisions), on the left of Sedgwick, facing the works at the one-gun battery, Lees Mill, & c., on the west bank of the Warwick. Sumner, after the 6th of April, commanded the left wing, composed of his own and Keyes corps. Throughout the preparations for and during the sie-e of Yorktown I kept the corps under General Keyes, and afterward the left wing, nuder General Sumner, engaged in ascertaining the character of the obstacles presented by the Warwick, and the enemy intrenched on the right bank, with the intention, if possible~ of overcoming them and breaking that line of defense, so as to gain l)ossession of the road to Williamsburg and cut oft Yorktown from its supports and supplies. The forces under General Heintzelman were engaged iii similar efforts upon the works between Wynns Mill and Yorktown. General Keye5~ report of the 16th of April, inclosing reports of brigade commanders engaged in reconnaissances up to that day, sai(i that no part of his (the enemys line opposite his own) line, so far as discovered, can be taken by assault without an enormous waste of life. Reconnai~sances on the right flank demonstrated the fact that the Warwick was not passable in that direction except over a narrow dam, the approaches to which were swept by several batteries and intrench- ments, which could be filled quickly with supports sheltered by the timber immediately in rear. General Barnard, chief engineer of the Army of the Potomac, whose position entitled his opinions to the highest consideration, ex- pressed the judgment that those formidable works could not with any reasonabl& degree of certainty be carried by assault. General Keyes Page 13 CHAP. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. commanding Fourth Army Corps, after the examination of the enemys defenses on the left, before alluded to, addressed the following letter to the Hon. Ira Harris, United States Senate, and gave me a copy. Although not strictly official, it describes the situation at that time iii some respects so well that I have taken the liberty of introducing it here: HEADQUARTERS FOURTH CoRPs Warwick (kkurt-House, Va., ApriL 7, 1862. M~ DEAR SENATOR: The plan of campaign on this line was made with the distinct understanding that four army corps should be employed, and that the Navy should co-operate in the taking of Yorktown, and also (as I understood it) support us on our left by moving gunboats up James River. To-day I have learned that the First Corps, which by the Presidents order was to em- brace four divisions and one division (Blenkers) of the Second Corps, have been with- drawn altogether from this line of operations and from the Army of the Potomac. At the same time, as I am informed, the Navy h~s not the means to attack Yorktown, and is afraid to send gunboats up James River for fear of the Merrimac. The above plan of campaign was adopted unanimously by Major-General McDowell and Brigadier-Generals Sumner Heintzelman, and Keyes, and was concurred in by Major-General McClellan, who t~rst proposed Urbana as our base. This army being reduced by 45,000 troops, some of them among the best in the serv- ice, and without the support of the Navy, the plan to which we are reduced bears scarcely any resemblance to the one I voted for. I command the James River column, and I left my camp near Newport News the morning of the 4th instant. I only succeeded in getting my artillery ashore the after- noon of the day before, and one of my divisions had not all arrived in camp the day I left, and for the want of transportation has not yet joined me. So you will observe that not a day was lost in the advance, and in fact we marched so quickly and so rapidly, that many of our animals were twenty-four and forty-eight hours without a ration of forage. But, notwithstanding the rapidity of our advance, we were stopped by a line of defense 9 or 10 miles long, strongly fortified by breastworks erected nearly the whole distance behind a stream or succession of on s, nowhere fordable, one ter- minus being Yorktown and the other ending in the James River, which is commanded by the enemys gunboats. Yorktown is fortified all around with bastioned works, and on the water side it and Gloucester are so strong that the Navy are afraid to attack either. The approaches on one side are generally through low, swampy, or thickly-wooded ground, over roads which we are obliged to repair or to make before we can get for- ward our carriages. The enemy is in great force, and is constantly receiving re-en- forcements from the two rivers. The line in front of us is therefore one of the strongest ever opposed to an invading force in any country. You will then ask why I advocated such a line for our operations. My reasons are few, but I think good. With proper assistance from the Navy we could take Yorktown, and then, with gun- boats on both rivers, we could beat any force opposed to us on Warwick River, because the shot and shell from the gunboats would nearly overlap across the Peninsula; so that if the enemy should retreatand retreat he musthe would have a long way to go without rail or steam transportation, and every soul of his army must fall into our hands or be destroyed. Another reason for my supporting the new base and plan was that this line, it was expected, would furnish water transportation nearly to Richmond. Now, supposing we succeed in breaking through the line in front of us, what can we do next? The roads are very bad, and if the enemy retains command of James River and we do not first reduce Yorktown it would be impossible for us to subsist this army three marches beyond where it is now. As the roads are at present it is with the utmost difficulty that we can subsist it in the position it now occupies. You will see, therefore, by what I have said that the force originally intended for the capture of Richmond should be all sent forward. If I thought the four army corps necessary when I supposed the Navy would co-operate, and when I judged of the obstacles to be encountered by what I learned from maps and the opinions of officers long stationed at Fort Monroe and from all other sources, how much more should I think the fnll complement of troops requisite now that the Navy cannot co-operate, and now that the strength of the enemys lines and the number of his guns and men prove to lie almost immeasurably greater than I had been led to expect. The line in front of us, in the opinion of all the military men here who are at all competent to judge, is one of the strongest in the world, and the force of the enemy capable of be- ing increased beyond the numubers we now have to oppose to him. Independently of the strength of the lines in flout of us amid of the force of the enemy behind them, w Page 14 14 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIII. cannot advance until we get command of either York River or James River. The efficient co-operation of the Navy is therefore absolutely essential, and so I considered it when I voted to change our base from the Potomac to Fort Monroe. An iron-clad boat must attack Yorktown, and if several strong gunboats could be sent up James River also our success will be certain and complete and the rebellion will soon be put down. On the other hand, we must butt against the enemys works with heavy artillery, an(l a great waste of time, life, and material. If we break through and advance, both our-flanks will be assailed from two great water-courses in the hands of the enemy; our supplies would give out; and the enemy, equal, if not superior, in numbers, would, with the other advantages, beat and destroy this army. The greatest master of the art of war has said that if you would invade a country successfully, you must have one line of operations and one army under one general. But what is our condition? The State of Virginia is made to constitute the command, in part or wholly, of some six generals, viz: Fr~mont, Banks, McDowell, XVool, Burn- side, and McClellan, besides the scrap over the Chesapeake in t.he care of Dix. The great battle of the war is to come off here. If we win it, the rebellion ~vill be crushed; if we lose it, the consequences will be more horrible than I care to tell. - The plan of cam paign I voted for, if carried out with the means proposed, will certainly succeed. I an artof the means proposed are withheld or diverted, I deem it due to myself to say that our success will be uncertain. It is no doubt agreeable to the commander of the First Corps to have a separate department, and as this letter advocates his return to General McClellans command, it is proper to state that I am not at all influenced by personal regard or dislike to any of my seniors in rank. If I were to credit all the opinions which have been poured into my ears, I must believe that in regard to my present fine command I owe much to General McDowell and nothing to General McClellan. But I have disregarded all such officiousness, and I have from last July to the present day supported General McClellan and obeyed all his orders with as hearty a good-will as though he had been my brother or the friend to whom I owed most. I shall continue to do so to the last and so long as he is my commander; and I am not desirous to displace him, and would not if I could. He left Washington with the understanding that he was to execute a definite plan of campaign with certain prescribed means. The plan was good and the means sufficient, and without modification the enterprise was certain of success. But ~vith the reduction of force and means the plan is entirely changed, and is now a bad plan, with means insufficient for certain success. Do not look upon this communication as the (Jflspring of despondency. I never despond, and when you see me working the hardest you may be sure that fortune is frowning upon me. I am working now to my utmost. Please show this letter to the President, and I should like also that Mr. Stanton should know its contents. Do me the honor to write to me as soon as you can, and believe me, with perfect respect, your most obedient servant, E. D. KEYES, Brigadier-General, Commanding Fourth Arnry (Jorp8. Hon. IRA HARRIS, United State8 Senate. On the 7th of April, and before the arrival of the divisions of Gen- erals Hooker, Richardson, and Casey, I received the following dis- patches from the President and Secretary of War: WASHINGTON, Apri~ 6, 18628 p. m. General GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN: Yours of 11 a. m. to-day received.* Secretary of War informs me that the forward- ing of transportation, animunition, and Woodburys brigade, under your orders, is not, and will not, be interfered with. You now have over 100,000 troops with you, independent of General Wools command. I think you better break the enemys line from Yorktown to Warwick River at once. This will probably use time as advan- tageonsly as you can.t A. LINCOLN, President. WASHINGTON, April 6,18622 p. m. General GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN: The President directs me to say that your dispatch to him has been received. Gen- eral Sumners corps is on the road to join you and will go forward as fast as possible. *See Correspondence, etc., Part III. t Reply on p. 11 Page 15 CHAP. XXLII.j GENERAL REPORTS. 15 Franklins division is now on the advance toward Manassas. There is no means of transportation here to send it forward in time to be of service in your present opera- tions. Telegraph frequently, and all in the power of the Government shall be done to sustain you as occasion may require.~ EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War. By the 9th of April I had acquired a pretty good knowledge of the position and strength of the enemys works and the obstacles to be overcome. On that day I received the following letter from the Pres- ident: WASHINGTON, April 9. 1562. Mv DEAR Sin: Your dispatches complaining that you are not properly sustained, while they do not offend me, d6 pain inc very much. Blenkers division was withdrawn from you before you left here, and you know the pressure under which I did it, and, as I thought, acquiesced in itcertainly not with- out reluctance. After you left I ascertained that less than 20,000 unorganized men, without a single field battery, were all you designed to be left for the defense of Washington and Manassas Junction, and part of this even was to go to General Hookers old position. General Banks corps, once designed for Manassas Junction, was diverted and tied up on the line of Winchester and Stra~sburg, and could not leave it without again expos- ing the Upper Potomac and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. This presented, or would present when McDowell and Sumner should be gone, a great temptation to the enemy to turn back from the Rappahannock and sack Washington. My explicit order that Washington should, by the judgment of all the commanders of army corps, be left entirely secure, had been neglected. It was precisely this that drove me to detain McDowell. I do not forget that I was satisfied with your~ arrangem cut to leave Banks at Ma- nassas .Junction; but when that arrangement was broken up and nothing was sub- stitute(l for it, of course .1 was constrained to substitute something for it myself. And allow me to ask, do you really think I should permit the line from Richmond via Manassas Junction to this city to be entirely open except what resistance could be presented by less than 20,000 unorganized troops? This is a question which the country will not allow inc to evade. There i8 a curious mystery about the number of troops now with you. When I tel- egraphed you on the 6th, saying you had over 100,000 with you, I had just obtained from the Secretary of War a statcmcnt, taken, as he said, from your own returns, making 108,000 then with you and en route to you. You now say you will have but .55,000 when all en route to you shall have reached you. How can the discrepancy of 23,000 be accounted for? As to General Wools command, I understand it is doing for you precisely what a like number of your own would have to do if that conimand was away. I suppose the whole force which has gone forward for you is with you by this time, ~and, if so, I think it is the precise time for you to strike a blow. By delay the enemy will relatively gain upon youthat is, he will gain faster by fortifications and re-en- forcements than you can by re-enforcemnents alone. And once more let me tell you it is indispensable to you that you strike a blow. I am powerless to help this. You will do me the justice to remember I always insisted that going down the bay in search of a field, instead of fighting at or near Manassas, was only shifting and not surmounting ~ difficulty~ that we would find the same enemy and the same or equal intrenchinents at either pface. The country will not fail to note, is now noting, that the present hesitation to move upon an intrenched enemy is but the story of Manassas repeated. I beg to assure you that I have never written you or spoken to you in greater kind- ness of feeling than now, nor with a fuller purpose to sustain you, so far as, in my most anxious judgment, I consistently can. But you must act. Yours, very truly, A. LINCOLN. Major-General MCCLELLAN. With great deference to the opinions and wishes of His Excellency the President, I most respectfully beg leave to refer to the facts which I have presented and those contained in the accompanying letter of General Keyes, with the reports of General Barnard and other officers, as furnishing a reply to tbg above letter. His Kxcellency could not * Reply on p. 11 Page 16 16 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIII. judge of the formidable character of the works before us as well as if he had been on the ground; and whatever might have been his desire for prompt action (certainly no greater than mine), I feel confident if he could have made a personal inspection of the enemys defenses he would have forbidden me risking the safety of the army and the pos- sible successes of the campaign on a sanguinary assault of an advan- tageous and formidable position, which, even if successful, could not have been followed up to any other or better result than would have beeu reached by the regular operations of a siege. Still less could I forego the conclusions of my most instructed judgment for the mere sake of avoiding the personal consequences intimated in the Presidents dispatch. The following extracts from the report of the chief engineer (Brig. Gen. J. G. Barnard) embody the result of our reconnaissances, and give with some degree of detail the character and strength of the de- fenses of Yorktown and the Warwick and some of the obstacles which the army contended against and overcame: Extract8 from General Barnard8 report. The accompanying drawing (map No. 2) gives with accuracy the outline and arma- inent of the fortifications of Yorktown proper, with the detached works immediately connected with it. The three bastioned fronts looking toward our approaches appear to have been earliest built, and have about 15 feet thickness of parapet and 5 feet to 10 feet depth of ditch, the width varying much, but never being less at top of scarp than 15 feet I think generally much more. Thc works extending around the town from the westeiu salient of fronts just men- tioned appeared to have been finished during the past winter and spring. They have formidable profiles, 18 feet thickness of parapet and generally 10 feet depth of ditch. The water batteries had generally 18 feet parapet; the guns in barbette. They were (as well as all the works meutioned) carefully constructed, with well-made sod revet- ments. There were numerous traverses between the guns, and ample magazines; how suffi- cient in bomb-proof qualities I am unable to say. The two first guns of the work on the heights bear upon the water as well as the land, and were of iheav y caliber. The list herewith gives all the guns in position or for which there were emplacements. The vacant emplacements were all occupied before the evacuation by siege guns, rifled 4j-inch 24-pounders and 18-pounders. In Fort Magruder (the first exterior work) there were found one 8-inch columbiad, one 42-pounder, and one 8-inch siege howitzer, the two former in barbette. The sketch will show the emplacements for guns on field and siege carriages, making, I think, with the foregoing, twenty-two. Two of these were placed behind traverses, with e,nbrasures covered by blindages. The two external redoubts, with the connecting parapets, formed a re-entrant with the fronts of attack, and all the guns bore on our approaches. It will be seen, therefore, that our approaches were swept by the fire of at least forty- nine guns, nearly all of which were heavy, and many of them the most formidable guns known. Besides that, two-thirds of the guns of the water batteries and all the guns of Gloucester bore on our right batteries, though under disadvantageous circumstances. The ravine behind which the left of the Yorktown fronts of attack was placed was not very difficult, as the heads formed depressions in front of their left, imperfectly seen by their fire, and from which access could be had to the ditches; but we could not be sure of this fact before the evacuation. The enemy held, by means of a slight breast- work and rifle trenches, a position in advance of the heads of these ravines as far for- ward as the burned house. The ravines which head between the Yorktown fortifications and the exterior works are deep and intricate. They were tolerably well seen, hoiv- ever, by the works which run westwardly from the Yorktown works, and which were too numerous and complicated to be traced on paper. Fort Magruder, the first lunette on our left, appears to have been built at an early period. The external connection between this work was first a rifle trench, probably afterwards enlarged into a parapet, with external ditch and an emplacement for four guns in or near the small redan in the center. Behind this they had constructed numerous epaulements, with connecting boyaes not fully arranged for infantry fires, and mainly intended, probably, to protect their camps and reserves against the destructive effects of our artillery. Froiii the 1e(l redoubt these trenches and epaul Page 17 CuAP. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 17 ments ran to the woods and rivulet which forms one head of the Warwick, and con- tinue almost without break to connect with the works at Wynns Mill. This stream just mentioned, whatever be its name (the term Warwick, according to some, apply- ing only to the tidal channel from the James River up as high as Lees Mill), was in- undated by a number of dams from near where its head is crossed by the epanlements mentioned down to Lees Mill. Below Lees Mill the Warwick follows a tortuous course through salt marshes of t200 yards or 300 yards in width, from which the land rises up boldly to a height of 30 or 40 feet. The first group of works is at Wynns Mill, where there is a dam and bridge. The next is to guard another dam between Wynns and Lees Mills. (This is the point attacked by General Smith on the 16th ultimo, and where Lieutenant Merrill was wounded. The object of the attack was nierely to prevent the further construction of works and feel the strength of the position.) A work, of what extent is not now known, was at the sharp angle of the stream just above Lees Mill, and a formidable group of works was at Lees Mill, where there was also a (lam and bridge. From Lees Mill a line of works extends across Mulberry Island, or is supposed to do so. At Southalls Landing is another formidable group of works, and Irono here, too, they extend apparently across to the James River. These groups of field works were con- nected by rifle trenches or parapets for nearly the whole (listance. They are far more extensive than may be supposed from the mention of theni I make, and every kind of obstruction which the country affords, such as abatis, marsh, inundation, & c., was skillfully used. The line is certainly one of the most extensive known to modern times. The country on both sides of the Warwick, from near Yorktown down, is a dense forest, with few clearings. It was swampy, and the roads impassable during the heavy rains we have constantly load, except where our own labors had corduroyed them. If we could have broken the enemys line across the isthmus we could have invested Yorktown, and it must, with its garrison, have soon fallen into our hands. It was not deemed practicable, considering the strength of that line and the difficulty of hand- ling our forces (owing to the impracticable character of the country), to do so. If we could take Yorktown or drive the enemy out of that place the enemys line was no longer tenable. This we could do by siege operations. It was deemed too hazardous to attempt the reduction of the place by assault. The plan of the approaches and their defenses, as determined upon and finally executed, is exhibited on the accompanying map. It was, in words, to open the first parallel as near as possible to the works of the enemy, and nnd er its protection to establish almost simul- taneously batteries along the whole front, extending from York River on the right to the Warwick on the left, a chord of about 1 mile in length. The principal approaches were directed against the east end of the main work, which was most heavily armed, and bore both on the water and land, and lay between Wormleys Creek and York River. There. also, were placed the most of the batteries designed to act against the land front, to enfilade the water batteries and to act upon Glou- cester. I designed at the earliest moment to open simultaneously with several batteries, and as soon as the enemys guns which swept the neck of land between Wormleys Creek and the Warwick were crippled and their fire kept down, to push the trenches as far lorward as necessary and to assault Yorktown an(l the adjacent works. The approaches to the batteries, the necessary bridges, and the roads to the depots had been vigorously pushed to completion by the troops under Generals Heintzelman and Sumner, and were available for in- fantry, and in some instances for artillery, on the 17th of April, when the batteries and their connections were commenced and labor upon them kept up night and day until finished. Some of the batteries on easy ground and concealed from the view of the enemy were early com- pleted and armed and held ready for any emergency, but not permit- ted to open, as the return fire of the enemy would interfere too much with the labor on other and more important works. The completion of 2 U UVOL X Page 18 [ChAP. XXHL 18 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. the more exposed and heaviest batteries was delayed by storms, pre- venting the lauding of guns and ammunition. It having l)een discovered that the enemy were receiving artillery stores at the wharf in Yorktown, on May 1 Battery No. 1 was opened with effect upon the wharf and town. On the 22d of April General Franklin, with his division from General McDowells corps, had arrived and reported to me. The garrison of Gloucester Point had been re-enforced and the works strengthened; but as this division was too small to detach to the Severn and no more troops could be spared, I determined to act on Gloucester, by disem- barking it on the north bank of the York River, nuder the protection of the gunboats. The troops were mainly kept on board ship while the necessary preparations were made for landing them and supporting them in case of necessity. For a full account of this labor I refer to the report of Lieut. Col. B. S. Alexander, of the Engineer Corps, de- tailed for this expedition. While the siege works were being rapidly cOml)leted, the roads on the left wing necessary for communication and advance were opened and corduroyed over the marshes, batteries were erected to silence the enemys guns and drive him from his works at Wynns and Lees Mills, prel)aratory to the general attack. Active reconnaissances were con- tinually going on and attempts in force made to drive the enemy from the banks. The result of various reconnaissances, made under the immediate direc- tion of General W. F. Smith, commanding Second Division. Fourth Corps, led to the belief that the weakest point of that part of the enemys lines was opposite a field where it was ascertained that there was a dam covered by a battery known to contain at least one gun. It was determined to pnsh a strong reconnaissance on this point, to silence the enemys fire, and ascertain the actual strength of the posi. tion. Being prepared to sustain the reconnoitering party by a real attack, if found expedient, General W. F. Smith was directed to under- take the operation on the 16th of April. He silenced the fire of the ~flemy~s guns, discovered the existence of other works previously con- cealed and unknown, and sent a strong party across the stream, which was finally forced to retire with some loss. Smith intrenched himself in a position immediately overlooking the dam and the enemys works, so as to keep them under control and prevent the enemy from using the dam as a means of crossing the Warwick to annoy us. Many times toward the end of tlie month the enemy attempted to drive in our pickets and take our rifle pits near Yorktown, but always without success. As the siege progressed it was with great difficulty that the rifle pits on the right could be excavated and held, so little covering could be made against the hot fire of the enemys artillery and infantry. Their guns continued firing up to a late hour of the night of the 3d of May. Our batteries would have been ready to open on the morning of the 6th May at latest; but on the morning of the 4th it was discovered that the enemy had already been compelled to evacuate his position during the night, leaving behind him all his heavy guns, uninjured, and a large amount of ammunition and supplies. For the details of the labors of the siege I refer to the accompanying reports and journals of Brig. Gen. J. G. Barnard, chief engineer, charged with the selection, laying out, and completion of the approaches and batteries; of Brig. Gen. William F. Barry, chief of artillery, charged with arming and supply- ing with ammunition all the siege and field batteries; and of Brig. Gen Page 19 CHAP. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 19 Fitz Johii Porter, director of the siege, to whom was assigned the guard- ing of the trenches th parties, , e assembling and distribution of the working morning of the 4th, upon the enemys abandoning his lines at Yorktown, I ordered all the available cavalry force, with four batteries of horse artillery, under Brigadier-General Stoneman chief of cavalry, in immediate pursuit, by the Yorktown and WilliamsbUrg road, with orders to harass the enemys rear ai,d try to cut off such of his forces as had taken the Lees Mill and Williamsburg road. General Heintzelmau was directed to send Hookers division forward on the Yorktown and Williamsburg road to support General Stoneman, and Smith was ordered to proceed with his division on the Lees Mill and Williamsburg road for the same purpose. Afterward the divisions of Generals Kearny, Couch, and Casey were put en route, the first on the Yorktown road and the others on the Lees Mill road. These roads unite about a quarter of a mile south of Fort Magruder, and a~re con- nected by cross roads at several points between Yorktown and Williams. burg. After these directions had been given General Sumner (the officer secon(l in rank in the Army of the Potomac) was ordered to pro. ceed to the front and take immediate charge of operations nutil my arrival. General Stoneman moved forward promptly with his command, con- sisting of four batteries of horse artillery, under Lieutenant-Colonel Hays, the First and Sixth United States Cavalry, the Third Pennsyl- vania, and Eighth Illinois, and Barkers squadron, meeting with but little opposition until he arrived in front of the enemys works about 2 miles east of Williamsburg. At a point about 8 miles from Yorktown i structions, he detached General Emory, n accordance witJ~ my in- with Bensons battery, the Third Pennsylvania Cavalry (Colonel Averell), and Barkers squadron to gain the Lees Mill road, and endeavor, with the assistance of Gen- eral Smith, to cut off the portion of the enemys rear guard which had taken that route. General Emory had some sharp skirmishes with a regiment of cavalry and a battery under General Stuart, and drove them in the direction of Lees Mill. General Smith, having met with obstructions in his front, had trans- ferred his column by a cross road to the Yorktown and Williamsburg road, so that General Emory, finding no force to co-operate with him, was unable to cut off the rear guard, and they succeeded in escaping by a circuitous route along the bank of the James River. The position in which General Stoneman encountered the enemy is about 4 miles in extent, the right resting on College Creek and the left on Queens Creek, nearly three-fourths of its front being covered by tributaries of these two creeks, upon which there are ponds. The ground between the heads of the boundary streams is a culti~ vated plain, across which a line of detached works had been constructed, consisting of Fort Magrudei-, a large work in the center with a bastion front, and twelve other redoubts and epaulements for field guns. The parapet of Fort Magruder is about 6 feet high and 9 feet thick, the ditch 9 feet wide and 9 feet deep, filled with water. The length of the interior crest is about 600 yards. The redoubts have strong profiles, but are of small dimensions, having faces of about 40 yards. The woods in front of the position were felled and the open ground in front of the works was dotted with numerous rifle pits. The roads leading from the lower part of the Peninsula to Williams. burgone along the York River (the Yorktown road) and the othe Page 20 (CHAP. XXIIL 20 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. along the James (the Lees Mill road)unite between the heads of the tributary streams a short distance in front of Fort Magruder, by which they are commanded, and debouch from the woods just before uniting. A branch from the James River road leaves it about 1~ miles below Fort Magruder, and unites with the road from Allens Landing to Will- iamsburg, which crosses the tributary of College Creek over a dam at the outlet of a pond and passes just in rear of the line of works, being commanded by the three redoubts on the right of the line. At about the same distance from Fort Magruder a branch leaves the York River road and crosses the tributary of Queens Creek on a dam, and passing over the position and through the works in its rear finally enters Will- iamsburg. This road is commanded by redoubts ou the left of the line of the works. General Stoneman debouched from the woods with his advance guard (consisting of a part of the First U. S. Cavalry and one section of Gibsons battery, under the command of General Cooke), and the enemy immediately opened on hini with several field pieces from Fort Magruder, having the correct range, and doing some execution. Gib- sons battery was brought into position as rapidly as the deep mud would permit and returned the fire, while the Sixth U. S. Cavalry was sent to feel the enemys left. This regiment passed one redoubt, which it found unoccupied, and appeared in the rear of a second, when a strong cavalry force, with infantry and artillery, came down upon it~ where- upon the regiment was withdrawn. The rear squadron, under coin- mand of Captain Sanders, repelled a charge of the enemys cavalry in the most gallant manner. In the mean time the enemy was being re- enforced by infantry, and the artillery fire becoming very hot, General Stoneman, having no infantry to carry the works, ordered the with- drawal of the battery. This was accomplished, with the exception of one piece, which could not be extricated from the mud. The enemy attempted to prevent the movement, but their charges were met by the First U. S. Cavalry, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Grier, and they were driven back, losing several officers and one stand of colors. General Stoneman then took up a defensive position a short distance in the rear of the first, to await the arrival of the infantry. The advance of General Smiths column reached Skiff Creek about 11.30 oclock, and found the bridge over that stream in flames and the road impassable. A practicable route to the Yorktown road having been discovered, the division, by order of General Sumner, moved on by that road, and reached General Stonemans position about 5.30 oclock. General Sumner, arriving with it, assumed command. Generals Heintzelman and Keyes also arrived. During the afternoon of the 4th, near the Half-way House, the head of General Hookers column encountered Smiths division filing into the road, and was obliged to halt between three and four hours until it had passed. General Hooker then followed on, and at Cheesecake Church turned off, by General Heintzelmans direction, taking a cross road, and moved out on the Lees Mill road, thus changing places with General Smith. Marching part of the night, he came in sight of Fort Magruder early in the morning of the 5th. General Smiths division having been deployed, General Sumner or- dered an attack on the works in his front; but the lines having been thrown into confusion while moving through the dense forest and darkness coming on, the attempt for that night was abandoned. The troops bivouacked in the woods, and a heavy rain began, which co Page 21 ChAP. XXIII.J GENERAL REPORTS. 21 tinned until the morning of the 6th, making the roads, already in very bad condition, almost impassable. During the morning of the 5th General Sumner reconnoitered the position in his front, and at 11 oclock ordered Hancocks brigade, of Smiths division, to take possession of a work on the enemys left, which had been found to be unoccupied. The remainder of Smiths division occupied the woods iii front without being actually engaged. The divisions of Couch and Casey had received orders during the night to march at daylight, but on account of the terrible condition of the roads and other impediments were not able to reach the field until after 1 oclock p. in., at which time the first brigade of Conchs divis- ion arrived, and was posted in the center, on Hookers right. The other two brigades came up during the afternoon, followed by Caseys division. in the mean time General Hooker, having reconnoitered the enemys position, began the attack at 7.30 a. in., and for a while silenced the guns of Fort Magruder and cleared the ground in his front; but the enemy being continually re-enforced, until their strength greatly ex- ceeded his, made attack after attack, endeavoring to turn his left. For several hours his division struggled gallantly against the superior numbers of the enemy. Five guns of Webbers battery were lost, and between 3 and 4 oclock his ammunition began to give out. The, loss had been heavy and the exhaustion of the troops was very great. At this time the division of General Kearny came up, who at 9 a. in. had received orders to re-enforce Hooker, and who had succeeded by the greatest exertions in passing Caseys troops and pushing on to the front through the deep mud. General Kearny at once gallantly attacked and thereby prevented the loss of another battery, and drove the enemy back at every point, enabling General Hooker to extricate himself from his position and withdraw his wearied troops. Pecks brigade, of Couchs division, as has been mentioned before, was immediately on its arrival ordered by General Sumner to deploy on Hookers right. This was promptly done, and the attacks of the enemy at that point were repulsed. General Peck held his position until late in the afternoon, when he was relieved by the other two brigades of Couchs division, and they were in quiet possession of the ground, when night closed the contest. The vigorous action of these troops relieved General Hooker considerably. General Emory had been left with his command on the night of the 4th to guard the branch of the Lees Mill road which leads to Allens farm, and on the morning of the 5th it was ascertained that by this route the enemys right could be turned. A request for infantry for this purpose was made to General Heintzehnan, who late in the afternoon sent four regiments and two batterjes of Kearnys division the first disposable troops he hadand directed General Emory to make the attack. With these re-enforcements his force amounted to about 3,000 men and three batteries. General Emory, on account of want of knowledge of the ground and the lateness of the hour, did not succeed in this movement. It involved some risks, but if successful might have produced important results. At 11 a. in., as before mentioned, General Smith received orders from General Sumner to send one brigade across a dam on our right, to occupy a redoubt on the left of the enemys line. Hancocks brigade was selected for this purpose. He crossed the dam, took pos- session of the first redoubt, and afterward finding the second one vacated lie occupied that also, and sent for re-enforcemnents to enable him to advance farther and take the next redoubt, which commande Page 22 22 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIII. the plain between his position and Fort Magruder, and would have enabled him to take in reverse and cut the communication of the troops engaged with Generals Hooker and Kearny. The enemy soon began to show himself in strength before him, and as his rear and right flank were somewhat exposed, he repeated his request for re-enforcemnents. General Smith was twice ordered to joia hini with the rest of his division, but each time the order was coun- termanded at the moment of execution, General Sumner not being willing to weaken the center. At length, in reply to General hancocks repeated messages for more troops, General Sumner sent him an order to fall back to his first position, the execution of which General Han- cock deferred as long as possible, being unwilling to give up the advantage already gained and fearing to expose his command by such a movememit. During the progress of these events I had remained at Yorktown to complete the preparations for the departure of General Franklins and other troops to West Point by water and to make the necessary ar- rangements with the naval commander for his co-operation. By pushing General Franklin, well snpported by water, to the right bank of the Pamunkey, opposite West Point, it was hoped to force the enemy to abandon whatever works he might have on time Peninsula below that point or be cut off. It was of paramount importance that the arrangements to this end should be promptly made at an early hour of the morning. I had sent two of my aides (Lieutenant-Colonel Sweitzer and Major Hammerstein) to observe the operations in front, with instructions to report to me everything of importance that might occur. I received no information from them leading me to suppose that there was anything occurring of more importance than a simple affair of a rear guard until about 1 ~ in., when a dispatch arrived fromu one of them that everything was not progressing favorably. This was con- firmed a few minutes later by the reports of Govermior Sprague and Major Hammerstein, who came directly from the scene of action. Completing the necessary arrangemuents, I returned to my camp with. out delay, rode rapidly to the front, a distance of some 14 miles, through roads much obstructed by troops and wagons, and reached the field between 4 and 5 ~ in., in time to take a rapid survey of the groumid. I soon learned that there was no direct communication between our center and the left, under General lleimmtzehnan. The center was chiefly in the nearer edge of the woods, situated between us and the enemy. As heavy firing was heard in the direction of General flancocks com- mand 1 immediately ordered General Smith to proceed with his two remaining brigades to support that part of the line. General Kaglee, with his brigade, received similar orders. I then directed our center to advance to the farther edge of the woods mentioned above, which was done, and I attemnpted to open direct coummunication with General Heintzelman, but was prevented by the marshy state of the ground in the direction in which the attempt was made. Before Generals Smith and Naglee could reach the field of General Hancocks operations, although they moved with great rapidity, lie had been confronted by a superior force. Feigning to retreat slowly, he awaited their onset and then turned upon them, and after some terrific volleys of musketry he charged them with thc bayonet, routing and dispersing their whole force, killing, wounding, and capturing from 500 to 600 men; lie himself losing only 31 men. This was one of the most brilliant engagements of the war, and General Hamicock merits th Page 23 CHAP. XXIII.1 GENERAL REPORTS. 23 highest praise for the soldierly qualities displayed and his perfect ap- preciation of the vital importance of his position. Night put an end to the operations here, and all the troops who had been engaged in this contest slept on the muddy field, without shelter and many without food. Notwithstanding the report I received from General Heintzelman during the night that General Hookers division had suffered so much that it could not be relied upon next day and that Kearnss could not do more than hold its own without re-enforcements, being satisfied that the result of Hancocks engagement was to give us possession of the decisive point of the battle-field, during the night I countermanded the order for the advance of the divisions of Sedgwick and Richardson, and directed theiii to return to Yorktown, to proceed to West Point by water. Our loss during the day, the greater part of which was sustained by Hookers division, was as follows: Killed, 456; wounded, 1,400; miss- ing, 372. Total, 2,228.* On the next morning we found the enemy~s position abandoned, and occupied Fort Magruder and the town of Williamsburg, which was filled with the enemys wounded, to whose assistance eighteen oftheirsurgeons were sent by General J. E. Johnston, the officer in command. Several guns and caissons, which the enemy could not carry off on account of the mud, were secured. Colonel Averell was sent forward at once with a strong cavalry force to endeavor to overtake the enemys rear guard. He found several guns abandoned and picked up a large number of stragglers, but the con(lition of the roads and the state of his supplies forced him to return after advancing a few miles. It is my opinion that the enemy opl)osed us here with only a portion of his army. When our cavalry first appeared there was nothing but the enemys rear guard in Williamsburg. Other troops were brought back during the night and the next day to hold the works as long as possible, in order to gain time for the trains, & c., already well on their way to Richmond, to make their escape. Our troops were greatly exhausted by the laborious march through the mud from their positions in front of Yorktown and by the protracted battle through which they had just passed. Many of them were out of rations and ammunition, and one division, in its anxiety to make a prompt movement, had marched with empty haversacks. The supply trains had been forced out of the roads on the 4th and 5th to allow the troops and artillery to pass to the front, amid the roads were now in such a state, after thirty- six hours continuous rain, that it was almost impossible to pass even empty wagons over them. General flookers division had suffered so severely that it was in no condition to follow the enemy, even if the roads had been good. Under these circumstances an immediate pur- suit was impossible. Steps were at once taken to care for and remove the wounded, and to bring up provisions, animunition and forage. TIme condition of tIme roads, as has been said, rendered it miext to impossible to accomplish this by land from Yorktown. A temporary depot was therefore promptly established on Queens Creek, and sup- plies drawn, and the wounded shipped from that place. The divisions of Franklin, Sed gwick, Porter, and Richardson were sent from Yorktown by water to the right bank of the Pamunkey, in the vicinity of West Point. The remaining (livisions, the trains, and the reserve artillery moved subsequently by land. But see revised statdnient, ~. 450 Page 24 24 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [ChAr. XXIII. Early on the morning of the 7th General Franklin had completed the disembarkation of his division, and had placed it in a good position to cover the landing place, both his flanks and a large l)ortion of the front being l)rotected by water. Danas brigade, of Sedgwicks division, arrived during the morning. At about 9 a. m. a large force of the enemy appeared, consisting of Whitings division and other troops, an(l between 10 and 11 they attacked the part of the line held by Newtons brigade. The action ~eontinued until 3 p. in., when the enemy retired, all his attacks having been repnlsed. This affair, the most important in which the division 1~ad yet been engaged, was highly creditable to General Franklin and his command. For the details I refer to his report, which is herewith ~3ubmitted. Our loss was 49 killed, 104 wounded, and 41 missing. Total, 194, which includes a large proportion of officers.* Cavalry reconnaissances were sent out from Williamsburg on the 6th and 7th, and on the 8th General Stoneman moved with an advance guard of cavalry, artillery, and infantry to open communication with General Franklin. As soon as our supplies had been received and the condition of the roads had become a little better, though still very bad, theadvance of the remaining troops was begun, Smiths division moving on the 8th. On the 10th headquarters were at Ropers Church, 19 miles from Williamsburg, all the divisions which had moved by land, except Hookers, being in the vicinity of that place. We were now in direct communication with the portion of the army which had gone by water, and we began to draw supplies from Eltham. On account of the small number and narrowness of the roads in this neighborhood movements were difficult and slow. On the 15th headquarters and the divisions of Franklin, Porter, Sykes, and Smith reached Cumberland, which was made a temporary depot. Couch and Casey were then near New Kent Court-House, Hooker and Kearny near Ropers Church, and Richardson and Sedg. wick near Eltham. On the 14th and 15th much rain fell. On the 15th and 16th the divisions of Franklin, Smith, and Porter were with great difficulty moved to White House, Smiles in advance. So bad was the road that the train of one of these divisions required thirty-six hours to pass over this short distance. General Stoneman had occupied this place some days before, after several successful skir. mishes, in which onr cavalry proved superior to that of the enemy. The reports of these affairs are appended. About this time, with the consent of the President, two additional corps were organized, viz, the Fifth Provisional Corps, consisting of the divisions of Porter and Sykes an(l the reserve artillery, under the com- mand of General F. J. Porter, and the Sixth Provisional Corps, con- sisting of the divisions of Franklin and Smith, under the command of General ~T B. Franklin. Headquarters reached White House on the 16th, and a permanent depot was at once organized there. On the 19th headquarters and the corps of Porter and Franklin moved to Tunstalls Station, 5 miles from White House. On the 20th more rain fell. On the 21st the position of the troops was as follows: Stonemans advance guard 1 mile from New Bridge; Franklins corps 3 miles from New Bridge, with Porters corps at supporting distance iii its rear; * But see revised statement, p. 618 Page 25 CHAP XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 25 Sumners corps on the railroad, about 3 miles from the Chickahominy, connecting the right with the left; Keyes corps on New Kent road, near Bottoms Bridge, with Heintzelmans corps at supporting distance in the rear. The ford at Bottoms Bridge was in our possession, and the rebuilding vf the bridge, which had been destroyed by the 6nemy, was commenced. On the 22d headquarters moved to Cold Harbor. On the 2.6th the railroad was in operation as far as the Chickahom- my, and the railroad bridge across that stream nearly completed. CHAPTER II. When, on the 20th of May, our advanced light troops reached the banks of the Chickahominy River at Bottoms Bridge, they found that this, as well as the railroad bridge about a mile above had been de- stroyed by the enemy. The Chickahominy in this vicinity is about 40 feet wide, fringed with a dense growth of heavy forest trees, and bor- dered by low, marshy bottom-lands, varying from half a mile to a mile in width. Our operations embraced that part of the river between Bottoms and Meadow Bridges, which covered the principal approaches to Rich- mond from the east. Within these limits the firm ground lying above high-water mark seldom approaches near the river on either bank, and no locality was found within this section where the high ground came near the stream on both sides. It was subject to frequent, sudden, and great variations in the volume of water, and a rise of a few feet over- flowed the bottom-lands on both sides. At low water it could be forded at almost any point, but during high water it rose above a ford- ing stage, and could then be crossed only at the few points where bridges had been constructed. These bridges had all been destroyed by the enemy on our approach, and it was necessary not only to recon- struct these, but to build several others. The west bank of the river opposite the New and Mechanicsville Bridges was bordered by elevated bluffs, which afforded the enemy commanding positions to fortify, establish his batteries, enfilading the approaches upon the two principal roads to Richmond on our right, and resist the reconstruction of the important bridges. This obliged us to select other less exposed poimits for our crossings. As the enemy was not in great force opposite Bottoms Bridge on the arrival of our left at that point, and as it was important to secure a lodgment upon the right bank before he should have time to concen- trate his forces and contest the passage, I forthwith ordered Caseys division to ford the river and occupy the opposite heights. This was promptly done on the 20th, and reconnaissances were at once pushed out in advance. These troops were directed to throw up defenses in an advantageous position to secure our left flank. General Heintzelmans corps was thrown forward in support, and Bottoms Bridge immediately rebuilt. In the mean time our center and right were advanced to the river above, and on the 24th we carried the village of Mechanicsville, driving the enemy out with our artillery, and forcing them across the bridge, which they destroyed. Gen~ral Naglee, on the same day, dislodged a force of the enemy from the vicinity of the Seven Pines,~~ on the Bottoms Bridge road, and our advance on the left secured a strong position near that place Page 26 26 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIII. All the information obtained from deserters, negroes, and spies indi- cated that the enemy occupied in force all the approaches to Richmond from the east, and that be intended to dispute every step of our advance beyond the Chickahominy and the passage of the stream opposite our right. That their army was superior to ours in numbers did not admit of a doubt. Strong defenses had been constructed around Richmond. Impressed by these facts with the necessity of strengthening the army for the struggle, I did not fail to urge repeatedly upon my supe- riors the importance of re-enforcing the Army of the Potomac with every disposable man in order to insure the success of our attack upon the rebel capital. On the 10th of May I telegraphed as follows: CAMP AT EWELLS FAR~I, Three miles beyond JViiliarnsbisrg, May 10, 18625 a. m. From the information reaching me from every source I regard it as certain that the enemy will meet us with all his force on or near the Chickahominy. They can con- centrate many more men than I have, and are collecting troops from all quarters, es- pecially well-disciplined troops from the South. Casualties, sickness, garrisons, and guards have much reduced our numbers, and ivill continue to do 50. I shall fight the rebel army with whatever force I may have, but duty requires me to urge that every effort be made to re-enforce me without delay with all the disposable troops in Eastern Virginia, and that we concentrate all our forces as far as possible to fight the great battle now impending and to make it decisive. It is possible that the enemy may abandon Richmond without a serious struggle, but I do not believe he will, and it would be unwise to count upon anything but a stubborn and desperate defensea life-and-death contest. I see no other hope for him than to fight this battle, and we must win it. I shall fight them whatever their force may he, hut I ask for every man that the Department can send me. No troops should now be left unemployed. Those who entertain the opinion that the rebels will abandon Richmond without a struggle are in my judgment badly advised, and do not comprehend their situation, which is one requiring desperate measures. I beg that the President and Secretary will maturely weigh what I say, and leave nothing undone to comply with my request. If I am not re-enforced, it is probable that I will be obliged to fight nearly double my numbers, strongly intrenched. I do not think it will be at all possible for me to bring more than 70,000 men upon the field of battle. GEG. B. McCLELLAN, Major-General, Commanding. Hon. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War. On the 14th of May I sent the following telegram to the President: CAMP AT CUMBERLAND, May 14, 1862. I have more than once telegraphed to the Secretary of War, stating that in my opinion the enemy were concentrating all their available force to fight this army in front of Richmond, and that such ought to be their policy. I have received no reply whatever to any of these telegraphs. I beg leave to repeat their substance to Your Excellency, and to ask that kind consideration which you have ever accorded to my representations and views. All my information from every source accessible to me establishes the fixed purpose of the rebels to defend Richmond against this army by offering us battle with all the troops they can collect from east, west, and south, and my own opinion is confirmed by that of all my commanders whom I have been able to consult. Casualties, sickness, garrisons, and guards have much weakened my force, and will continue to do so. I cannot bring into actual battle against the enemy more than 80,000 men at the utmost, and with them I must attack in position, probably in- trenched, a much larger force, perhaps double my numbers. It is possible that Rich- mond may be abandoned without a serious struggle, but the enemy are actually in great strength between here and there, and it would be unwise, and even insane, for me to calculate upon anything but a stubborn and desperate resistance. If they should abandon Richmond it may well be that it is done with the purpose of making the stand at some place in Virginia south or west of there, and we should be in condi- tion to press them without delay. The Confederate leaders must employ their utmost efforts against this army in Virginia, and they will be supported by the whole bod Page 27 CHAP. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 27 of their military officers, among whom there may be said to be no Union feeling, as there is also very little among the higher class of citizens in the seceding States. I have found no fighting men left in this Peninsula. All are in the ranks of the opposing foe. Even if more troops than I now have should prove unnecessary for purposes of mili- tary occupation, our greatest display of imposing force in the capital of the rebel Government will have the best moral effect. I most respectfully and earnestly urge upon Your Excellency that the opportunity has come for striking a fatal blow at the enemies of the Constitution, and I beg that you will cause this army to be re-enforced without delay by all the disposable troops of the Government. I ask for every man that the War Department can send me [by water*1. Any commander of the re-en- forcements whom Your Excellency may designate will be acceptable to me, whatever expression I may have heretofore addressed to you on that subject. I will fight the enemy, whatever their force may be, with whatever force I may have, and I firmly believe that we shall beat them, but our triumph should be made. decisive and complete. The soldiers of this army love their Government and will fight well in its support. You may rely upon them. They have confidence in me as their general and in you as their President. Strong re~enforcements will at least save the lives of many of them. The greater our force, the more perfect will be our combinations and the less our loss. For obvious reasons I beg you to give immediate consideration to this communica- tion, and to inform me fully at the earliest moment of your final determination. GEG. B. McCLELLAN, Major- General. His Excellency ABRAHAM LINCOLN, Pre8ident of the United States. To whiefi, on the 18th of May, I received this reply: t WASHINGTON, May 18 [17]2 p. m. GENERAL: Your dispatch to the President asking re-enforcements has been received and carefully considered. The President is not willing to uncover the capital entirely, and it is believed that even if this were prudent, it would require more time to effect a junction between your army and that of the Rappahannock by the way of the Potomac and York Riv- ers than by a land march. In order, therefore, to increase the strength of the attack upon Richmond at the earliest moment General McDowell has been ordered to march upon that city by the shortest route. He is orderedkeeping himself always in posi- tion to save the capital from all possible attackso to operate as to put his left wing in communication with your right wing, and you are instructed to co-operate, so as to establish this communication as soon as possible, by extending your right wing to the north of Richmond. It is believed that this communication can be safely estab- lished either north or south of the Pamunkey River. In any event you will be able to prevent the main body of the enemys forces from leaving Richmond and falling in overwhelming force upon General McDowell. He will move with between 35,000 and 40,000 men. A copy of the instructions to General McDowell are with this. The specific task assigned to his command has been to provide against any danger to the capital of the nation. At your earnest call for re-enforcements he is sent forward to co-operate in the reduction of Richmond, but charged, in attempting this, not to uncover the city of Washington; and you will give no order, either before or after your junction, which can put him out of position to cover this city. You and lie will communicate with each other by telegraph or otherwise as frequently as may be necessary for sufficient co-operation. When General McDowell is in position on your right his supplies must be drawn from West Point, and you will instruct your staff officers to be prepared t~ supply him by that route. The President desires that General McDowell retain the command of the Depart- ment of the Rappahannock and of the forces with which he moves forward. By order of the President: EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War. Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN, Commanding Army of the Potomac, before Richmond. * The words by water are in the dispateh as received at War Department. t See also Lincoln to McClellan, May 15, in Correspondence, etc., Part III Page 28 28 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIII. it will be observed that this order rendered it impossible for me to nse the James River as a line of operations, and forced me to establish our depots on the Pamunkey and to approach Richmond from the north. I had advised and preferred that re-enforcements should be sent by water, for the reasons that their arrival would be more safe and certain, and that I would be left free to rest the army on the James River when- ever the navigation of that stream should be opened. The land movement obliged me to expose my right in order to secure the junction, and as the order for General McDowells march was soon countermanded, I incurred great risk, of which the enemy finally took advantage, and frustrated the plan of campaign. Had General Mc. Dowell joined me by water I could have approached Richmond by the James, and thus avoided the delays and losses incurred in bridging the Chickahominy, and would have had the army massed in one body, instead of being necessarily divided by that stream. The following is a copy of the instructions to General McDowell: * WAR DEPARTMENT, Wa8hiugton, May 17, 1862. GENERAL: Upon being joined by General Shields division, you will move upon Richmond by the general route of the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad, co- operating with the forces under General McClellan now threatening Richmond from the line of the Pamunkey and York Rivers. While seeking to establish as soon as possible a communication between your left wing and the right wing of General McClellan, you will hold yourself always in such position as to cover the capital of the nation against a sudden dash of any large body of the rebel forces. General McClellan will be furnished with a copy of these instructions, and will be directed to hold himself in readiness to establish communication with your left wing and to prevent the main body of the enemys army from leaving Richmond and throw- ing itself upon your column before a junction of the two armies is effected. A copy of his instructions in regard to the employment of your force is annexed. By order of the President: EDWIN M. STANTON~ Secretary of War. General MCDOWELL, Commanding Department of the Rappahannock. Having some donbts, from the wording of the foregoing orders, as to the extent of my authority over the troops of General McDowell and as to the time when I might anticipate his arrival, on the 21st of May I sent this dispatch: HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Camp near Tun8tatl8 Station, Va., May 21, 186211 p. m. Your dispatch of yesterday, respecting our situation and the batteries of Fort Dar- ling, was received while I was absent with the advance, where I have been all this day. I have communicated personally with Captain Goldsborough and by letter with Captain Smith. The vessels can do nothing without co-operation on land, which I will not be in condition to afford for several days. Circumstances must determine the propriety of a land attack. It rained again last night, and rain on this soil soon makes the roads incredibly bad for army transportation. I personally crossed the Chickahominy to-day at Bottoms Bridge Ford and went a mile beyond, the enemy being about half a mile in front. I have three regiments on the other bank, guarding the rebuilding of the bridge. Keyes corps is on the New Kent road, near Bottoms Bridge. Heintzelman is on the same road, within supporting distance. Sumner is on the railroad, connecting right with An indorsement, in Secretary Stantons handwriting, on the original draught of these instructions, states that they were prepared by General Meigs, on consultation of the President, Generals Totten, Meigs and Ripley, and Colonel Taylor. See also memorandum of May 17, in Correspondence, etc., Part III, p. 176 Page 29 CHAr. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 29 left. Stoneman, with advance guard, is within 1 mile of New Bridge. Franklin, with t~vo divisions, is about 2 miles this side of Stoneman. Porters division, with the reserves of infantry and artillery, is within supporting distance. HeadquarterM ivill probably be at Cold Harbor to-morrow, 1 mile this side of Franklin. All the bridges over the Chickahominy are destroyed. The enemy are in force on every road leading to Richmond within a mile or two west of the stream. Their main body is on the road front New Bridge, encamped along it for I or 5 miles, spreading over the open ground on both sides. Johnstons headquarters are about 2 miles beyond the bridge. All accounts report their numbers as greatly exceeding our own. The position of the rebel forces, the declaration of the Confederate authorities the resolutions of the Virginia Legislature, the action of the city goverumear, the conduct of the citizens, and all other sources of information accessible to me give positive assurance that our approach to Richmond involves a desperate battle between the opposing armies. All our divisions are moving toward the foe. I shall advance steadily and carefully, and attack them according to my best judgment and in such manner as to employ my greatest force. I regret the state of. things as to General McDowells command. We must beat the enemy in front of Richmond. One division added to this army for that effort would do more to protect Washington than his whole force can possibly do anywhere else in the field. The rebels are concentrating from all points for the two battles at Richmond and Corinth. I would still most respectfully suggest the policy of our concentrating here by movements on water, I have heard nothing as to the probabilities of the con- templated junction of McDo~vells force with mine. I have no idea when he can start, what are his means of transportation, or when he may be expected to reach this vicinity. I fear there is little hope that he can join me overland in time for the com- ing battle. Delays on my part will be dangerous. I fear sickness and demoralization. This region is unhealthy for Northern men, and unless kept moving I fear that our soldiers may become discouraged. At present our numbers are weakening from disease, but our men remain in good heart. I regret also the configuration of the Department of the Rappahannock. It includes a portion even of the city of Richmond. I thiitk that my own departuient should em- brace the entire field of military operations designed for the capture and occupation of that city. Again, I agree with Your Excellency that one bad general is better than two good ones. I am not sure that I fully comprehend your orders of the 17th instant, addressed to myself and General McDowell. If a junction is effected before we occupy Riqhmond, it must necessarily be east of the railroad to Fredericksburg and within my depart- ment. This fact, my superior rank, and the express language of the Sixty-second article of war, will place his command under my orders, unless it is otherwise specially directed by Your Excellency; and I consider that he will be under my command, ex- cept that I am not to detach any portion of his forces or give any orders which can put him out of position to cover Washington. If I err in my construction, I desire to be at once set right. Frankness compels me to say, anxious as I am for an increase of force, that the march of McDowells column upon Richmond by the shortest route will in my opinipri uncover Washington as to any interposition by it as completely as its movement by water. The enemy cannot advance by Fredericksburg on Washington. Should they attempt a movement, which to me seems utterly improbable, their route would be by Gordonsville and Manassas. I desire that the extent of my authority over McDowell may be clearly defined, lest misunderstandings and conflicting views may produce some of those injurious results which a divided command has so often cattsed. I would respectfully suggest that this danger can only be surely guarded against by explicitly placing General Mc- Dowell under my orders in the ordinary way, and holding me strictly responsible for the closest observance of your instructions. I hope, Mr. President, that it is not necessary for me to assure you that your instructions would be observed in the utmost good faith, and that I have no personal feelings which could influence me to disregard them in any particular. I believe that there is a great struggle before this army, but I am neither dismayed nor discouraged. I wish to streng hen its force as much as I can, but in any event I shall fight it with all the skill, caution, and determination that I possess, and I trust that the result may either obtain for me the permanent confidence of my Government or that it may close my career. GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Major-General, Commanding. His Excellency ABRAHAM LINCOLN, Pre8ident of the United Staten Page 30 30 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIII. On the 24th I received the following reply: * MAY 24, 1562(Frorn Washington, 24th.) I left General McDowells camp at dark last evening. Shields command is there, but it is so worn that he cannot move before Monday morning, the 26th. We have so thinned our line to get troops for other places that it was broken yesterday at Front Royal, with a probable loss to us of one regiment infantry, two companies cavalry, putting General Banks in some peril. The enemys forces under General Anderson now opposing General McDowells ad- vance have as their line of supply and retreat the road to Richmond. If, in conjunction with McDowells movement against Anderson, you could send a force from your right to cut off the enemys supplies from Richmond, preserve the rail- road bridges across the two forks of the Pamunkey, and intercept the enemys retreat, you will prevent the army now opposed to you from receiving an accession of num- bers of nearly 15,000 men, and if you succeed in saving the bridges you will secure a line of railroad for supplies in additioii to the one you now have. Can you not do this almost as well as not while you are building the Chickahominy bridges? Mc- Dowell and Shields both say they can, and positively will, move Monday morning. I wish you to move cautiously and safely. You will have command of McDowell, after he joins you, precisely as you indicated in your long dispatch to us of the 21st. A. LINCOLN, President. Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN. This information that McDowells corps would march from Fredericks- burg on the following Monday (the 26th), and that he would be under my command, as indicated in my telegram of the 21st, was cheering news, and I now felt confident that we would on his arrival be suffi- ciently strong to overpower the large army confronting us. At a late hour on the same day I received the following: MAY 24, 1562(From Washington, 4 p. in.) In consequence of General Banks critical position I have been compelled to sus- pend General McDowells movements to join you. The enemy are making a desperate push upon Harpers Ferry, and we are trying to throw General Fr6monts force and part of General McDowells in their rear.t A. LINCOLN, President. Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN. From which it will be seen that I could not expect General McDowell to join me in time to participate in immediate operations in front of Richmond, and on the same evening I replied to the President that I would make my calculations accordingly. It then only remained for me to make the best use of the forces at my disposal and to avail myself of all artificial auxiliaries, to compen- sate as much as possible for the inadequacy of men. I concurred fully with the President in the injunction contained in his telegram of the 24th, that it was necessary with my limited force to move cautiously and safely. In view of the peculiar character of the Chickahominy and the liability of its bottom-land to sudden inundation it became necessary to construct between Bottoms Bridge and Mechanicsville eleven new bridges, all long and difficult, with extensive log-way ap- proaches. The entire army could probably have been thrown across the Chicka- hominy immediately after our arrival, but this would have left no force on the left bank to guard our communications or to protect our right and rear. If the communication with our supply depot had been cut by the enemy, with our army concentrated upon the right bank of the See abo Lincoln to McClellan, May 21, in Correspondence, etc., Part III. tMcClellans reply, of same date, appears in Correspondence, etc., Part III Page 31 CHAP. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 31 Chiekahominy, and the stage of water as it was for many days after our arrival, the bridges carried away, and our means of transportation not furnishing a single days supplies in advance, the troops must have gone without rations and the animals without forage, and the army would have been paralyzed. It is true I might have abandoned my communications and pushed forward toward Richmond, trusting to the speedy defeat of time enemy and the consequent fall of the city for a renewal of supplies; but the approaches were fortified and the town itself was surrounded with a strong line of intrenchmnents, requiring a greater length of time to reduce than our troops could have (lispensed with rations. Under these circumstances I decided to retain a portion of the army on the left bank of the river until our bridges were completed. It will be remembered that the order for the co-operation of General McDowell was simply suspended, not revoked, and therefore I was not at liberty to abandon the northern approach. A very dashing and successful reconnaissance was made near New Bridge on the 24th of May by Lieutenant Bowen, Topographical Engi- neers, escorted by the Fourth Michigan Volunteers and a squadrou of the U. S. cavalry, commanded respectively by Colonel Woodbury and Captain Gordon. Our troops encountered a Louisiana regiment, and with little loss drove it back upon its brigade, killing a large number and capturing several prisoners. Great credit is due to the staff officers, as well as to Colonel Woodbury, Captain Gordon, and their commands, for their conduct on this occasion. The work upomi the bridges was commenced at once and pushed foiward with great vigor; but the rains, which from day to day con- tinued to fall, flooded the valley, and raised the water to a greater height than had been known for twenty years. This demolished a great amount of our labor, and our first bridges, with their approaches, which were not made with reference to such extreme high water, were carried off or rendered impassable. We were obliged, with immense labor, to constrnct others, much longer, more elevated, and stable. Our men worked in the water, exposed to the enemys fire from the opposite bank. On the 25th of May I received the following telegram: WASHINGTON, May 25, 1862. Your dispatch received. General Banks was at Strasburg, with about 6,000 men, Shields having been taken from him to swdl a column for McDowell to aid you at Richmond, and the rest of his force scattered at various places. On the 23d a rebel force of 7,000 to 10,000 fell upon one regiment and two companies guarding the bridge at Front Royal, destroying it entirely; crossed the Shenandoah, and on the 24th (yes- terday) pushed on to get north of Banks, on the road to Winchester. General Banks ran a race with them, beating them into Winchester yesterday evening. This morn- ilig a battle ensued between the two ~~rces, in which General Banks was beaten back iito full retreat toward Martinsburg, and probably is broken up into a total rout. Cleary, on the Manassas Gap Railroad, just now reports that Jackson is now near Fr out Royal, with 10,000 troops, following up and supporting, as I understand, the force now pursuing Banks. Also that another force of 10,000 is near Orleans, follow- ing on in the same direction. Stripped bare, as we are here, I will do all we can to prevent them crossing the Potomac at Harpers Ferry or above. McDowell has about -20,000 of his forces moving back to the vicinity of Front Royal, and Frdmont, who wns at Franklin, is moving to Harrisonburg; both these movements intended to get in the enemys rear. One more of McDowells brigades is ord*~red through here to Harpers Ferry; the rest of his forces remain for the present at Fredericksburg. We are sending such regiments and dribs from here and Baltimore as we can spare to Harpers Ferry, sup- plying their places in some sort by calling in militia from the adjacent States. W Page 32 32 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIIL also have eighteen cannon on the road to Harpers Ferry, of which arm there is not a single one at that point. This is now our situation. If McDowells force was now beyond our reach we should be entirely helpless. Ap- prehensions of something like this, and no unwillingness to sustain you, have always been my reason for withholding McDowells from you. Please understand this, and do the best you can with the forces you have. A. LINCOLN, Pre8ident. Major-General MCCLELLAN. On the 25th the following was also received: WASHINGTON, May 25, 18622 p. in. The enemy is moving north in sufficient force to drive General Banks before him~. precisely in what force we cannot tell. He is also threatening Leesburg, and Geary, on the Manassas Gap Railroad, from both north and southin precisely what force we cannot tell. I think the movement is a general and concerted one, sneb as wonl(l not be if he was acting upon the purpose of a very desperate defense of Richmond. I think the time is near when you must either attack Richmond or give up the job and come to the defense of Washington. Let me hear from you instantly. A. LINCOLN, President. Major-General MCCLELLAN. To which I replied as follows: COLD HARBOR, May 25, 1862. Telegram received. Independently of it, the time is very near when I shall attack Richmond. The object of the movement is probahly to prevent re-enforcements being sent to me. All the information obtained from balloons, deserters, prisoners, and con- trabands agrees in the statement that the mass of the rebel troops are still in the im- mediate vicinity of Richmond, ready to defend it. I have no knowledge of Banks position and force nor what there is at Manassas; therefore cannot form a definite opinion as to the force against him. I have two corps across Chickahominy, within 6 miles of Richmond; the others on this side at other crossings within same distance, and ready to cross when bridges are completed. GEO. B. MCCLELLAN, Major-General, Commanding. His Excellency ABRAHAM LINCOLN, President. On the 26th I received the following: WASHINGTON, May 26, 186212.40 a. m. We have General Banks official report. lie has saved his army and baggage and has made a safe retreat to the river, and is probably safe at Williamsport. He re- ports the attacking force at 15,000. A. LINCOLN, President. Major-General MCCLELLAN. On the 26th I received the following: WASHINGTON, May 26, 1862. Can you not cut the Aqula Creek Railroad? Also, what impression have you as to intrenched works for you to contend with in front of Richmond? Can you get near enough to throw shells into the city? A. LINCOLN, President. Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN. On the same day I sent the following: COLD HARBOR, May 26, 1862. Have cut the Virginia Central Road in three places bet~veen Hanover Court-House and the Chickahominy. Will try to cut the other. I do not think Richmond intrench- ments formidable, but am not certain. Hope very soon to be within shelling distance Page 33 CHAP. xxm.~ GENERAL REPORTS. 33 Have railroad in operation from White House to Chickahominy. Hope to have Chick- ahominy Bridge repaired to-night. Nothing of interest to-day. GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Major-General, Commanding. His Excellency ABRAHAM LINCOLN, Preeident. The interruption of the railroad here referred to was effected by the command of Brigadier-General Stoneman, and was intended to prevent the enemy from drawing supplies by that route or from sending re-en- forcements to Anderson or Jackson. At 10 a. m. I sent also the following dispatch: Telegrams of last night received. I am glad to know affairs are not so bad as~ might have been. I would earnestly call your attention to my instructions to General Banks of March 16, to General Wadsworth of same date, and to my letter of April 1 to the Adjutant-General. I cannot but think that a prompt return to the principles. there laid do~vn would relieve all probability of~ danger. I will forward copies l~v mail. I beg to urge the importance of Manassas and Front Royal in contradistinction to Fredericksburg. GEO. B. MCCLELLAN, His Excellency ABRAHAM LINCOLN, Pre8ident. Major- General. Later on the 26th 1 sent the following: CAMP NEAR NEW BRIDGE, May 26, 15627.30 p. m. Have arranged to carry out your last orders. We are quietly closing in upon the enemy preparatory to the last struggle. Situated as I am, I feel forced to take every possible precaution against disaster and to secure my flanks. against the probably superior force in front of me. My arrangements for to-morrow are very important,. and, if successful, will leave me free to strike on the return of the force detached. GEG. B. McCLELLAN, His Excellency ABRAHAM LINCOLN, President. Major-General. On the same day I received intelligence that a very considerable forc& of the enemy was in the vicinity of Hanover Court-House, to the right and rear of our army, thus threatening our communications, and in a position either to re-enforce Jackson or to impede McDowells junction,. should he finally move to unite with us. On the same day I also re- ceived information from General McDowell, through the Secretary of War, that the enemy had fallen back from Fredericksburg toward Rich- mond, and that General McDowells advance was 8 miles south of the Rappahannock. it was thus imperative to dislodge or defeat this force,~ independently even of the wishes of the President, as expressed in his telegram of the 26th. I intrusted this task to Brig. Gen. Fitz John Porter, commanding the Fifth Corps, with orders to move at daybreak on the 27th. Through a heavy rain and over bad roads that officer moved his command as follows: Brig. Gen. W. H. Emory led the advance, with the Fifth and Sixth Regiments U. S. Cavalry and Bensons horse battery of the Second U. S. Artillery, taking the road from New Bridge, via Mechanicsville, to Hanover Court-House. General Morells division, composed of the brigades of Martindale, Butterfield, and MeQuade, with Berdans regiment of Sharpshooters and three batteries, under Capt. Charles Griffin, Fifth U. S. Artillery, followed on the same road. Col. G. K. Warren, commanding a provisional brigade, composed of the Fifth and Thirteenth New York, the First Connecticut Artillery, 3 U RVOL X Page 34 34 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIII. acting as infantry, the Sixth Pennsylvania Cavalry, and Weedens Rhode Island Battery, moved from his station at 01(1 Church by a road running to Hanover Court-House parallel to the Pamunkey. After a fatiguing march of 14 miles through the mud and rain Gen- eral Emory at noon reached a point about 2 miles from Hanover Court- House where the road forks to Ashland, and found a portion of thc enemy formed in line across the Hanover Court-House roa(l. General Emory had betore this beemi joined by the Twenty-fifth New York (of Martindales brigade) and Berdans Sharpshooters. These regiments were deployed, with a section of Bensons battery, and ad- vanced slowly toward the enemy until re-enforced by General Butter- field with four regiments of his brigade, when the enemy was charged and quickly routed, one of his guns being captured by the Seventeenth New York, under Colonel Lansing, after having been disabled by the fire of Bensons battery. The firing here lasted about an hour. The cavalry and ~ battery were immediately ordered in pursuit, fol- lowed by Morells infantry and artillery, with the exception of Martin- dales brigade. Warrens brigade having been delayed by repairing bridges, & c., now arrived, too late to participate in this affair. A lx)r- tion of this command was sent to the Pamunkey to destroy bridges, and captured quite a number of prisoners. The remainder followed Mor- elis division. In the mean time General Martindale, with the few re- maining regiments of his brigade and a section of artillery, advanced on the Ashland road and found a force of the enemys infantry, cavalry, and artillery in position near Peakes Station, on the Virginia Central Railroad. He soon forced them to retire toward Ashland. The Twenty-fifth New York having been ordered to rejoin him, Gen- eral Martindale was directed to form his brigade and move up the rail- road to rejoin the rest of the command at Hanover Court-House. He sent one regiment up the railroad, but remained with the Second Maine, afterward joined by the Twenty-fifth New York, to guard the rear of the main column. The enemy soon returned to attack General Martindale, who at once formed the Second Maine, Twenty-fifth New York, and a portion of the Forty-fourth New York, with one sectiou of Martimis battery, on the New Bridge road, facing his own position of the morning, and then held his ground for an hour against large odds until re-enforced. General Porter was at Hanover Court-House near the head of his column, when he learned that the rear had been attacked by a large force. He at once faced the whole column about, recalled the cavalry sent in pursuit toward Ashland, moved the Thirteenth and Fourteenth New York and Griffins battery direct to Martindales assistance, pushed the Ninth Massachusetts and Sixty-second Pennsylvania, of McQnades brigade~ through the woods on the right (our original left), and attacked the flank of the enemy, while Butterfield, with the Eighty-third Penn- sylvania and Sixteenth Michigan, hastened toward the scene of action by the railroad and through the woods farther to the right, and ecm- pleted the rout of the enemy. During the remainder of this and the following day our cavalry was active in the pursuit, taking a number of prisoncxs. Captain Harrison, of the Fifth U. S. Cavalry, with a sin- gle company~ brought in as prisoners two entire companies of infantry, with their ~rnm~s and ammunition. A part of Rushs Lancers also cap- tured an eatire company, with their arms. Time in d~iate results of these affairs were some 200 of the enemyXs edead buri6d by our troops, 730 prisoners sent to the rear, one 12- jpounder hu~it& e~r1 one caisson, a large number of small-arms, and tw Page 35 CHAP. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 35 railroad trains captured. Our loss amounted to 53 killed, 344 wounded and missing.* The force encountered and defeated was General Branchs division of North Carolina and Georgia troops, supposed to have been some 9,000 strong. Their camp at Hanover Court-House was taken and destroyed. Having reason to believe that General Anderson, with a strong force, was still at Ashland, I ordered General Sykes division of regulars to move on the 28th from New Bridge toward Hanover Court-House, to be in position to support General Porter. They reached a point within 3 miles of Hanover Court-House, and remained there until the evening of the 29th, when they returned to their original camp. On the 28th General Stonemans command of cavalry, horse artillery, and two regiments of infantry were also plated under General Porters orders. On the same day I visited Hanover Court-House, whence 1 sent the following dispateh: HANOVER COURT-HOUSE, May 282p. m. Porters action of yesterday was truly a glorious victory. Too much credit cannot be given to his magnificent division and its accomplished leader. The rout of the reb- els was completenot a defeat, but a complete rout. Prisoners are constantly com- ing in; two companies have this moment arrived, with excellent arms. There is no doubt that the enemy are concentrating everything on Richmond. I will do my best to cut off Jackson, but am doubtful whether I can. It is the policy and duty of the Government to send me by water all the well-drilled troops available. I am confident that Washington is in no danger. Engines and cars in large numbers have been sent up to bring down Jacksons command. I may not be able to cut them off, but will try. We have cut all but the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad. The real issue is in the battle about to be fought in front of Richmond. All our available troops should be collected herenot raw regiments, but the well-drilled troops. It cannot be ignored that a desperate battle is before us. If any regiments of good troops remain unemployed it will be an irreparable fault committed. GEG. B. MCCLELLAN, Major- General. Hon. B. M. STANTON, Secretary of War. Having ascertained the state of affairs, instructions were given for the operations of the following day. On the 28th a party under Major Williams, Sixth U. S. Cavalry, de- stroyed the common-road bridges over the Pamunkey and the Virginia Central Railroad Bridge over the South Anna. On the 29th he destroyed the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad Bridge over the South Anna and the turnpike bridge over the same stream. On the same day, and mainly to cover the movement of Major Will- iams, General Emory moved a column of cavalry toward Ashland from Hanover Court-House. The advance of this column under Captain Chambliss, Fifth U. S. Cavalry, entered Ashland, driving out a party of the enemy, destroyed the railroad bridge over Stony Creek, and broke up the railroad and telegraph. Another column of all arms, under Colonel Warren, was sent on the same day by the direct road to Ashland, and entered it shortly after General Emorys column had retired, capturing a small party there. General Stoneman on the same day moved on Ashland by Peakes Station, covering well the movements of the other columns. * But see revised statement, p. 685 Page 36 36 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIII. The objects of the expedition having been accomplished and it being certain that the First Corps would not join us at once, General Porter withdrew his command to their camps with the main army on the even- ing of the 29th. On the night of the 27th and 28th I sent the following dispatch to the Secretary of War: HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Camp near New Bridge, May 28, 186212.30 a. m. Porter has gained two complete victories over superior forces, yet I feel obliged to move in the morning with re-enforcements to secure the complete destruction of the rebels in that quarter. In doing so I run some risk here, bnt I cannot help it. The enemy are even in greater force than I had supposed. I will do all that quick move- ments can accomplish, but you must send me all the troops you can, and leave to me full latitude as to choice of commanders. It is absolutely necessary to destroy the rebels near Hanover Court-House before I can advance. GEO. B. MCCLELLAN, Major-General. Hon. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War. In reply to which I received the following from the President: WASHINGTON, May 28, 1862. I am very glad of General F. J. Porters victory. Still, if it was a total rout of the enemy, I am puzzled to know why the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad was not seized again, as you say you have all the railroads but the Richmond and Fredericksburg. I am puzzled to see how, lacking that, you can have any, except tbe scrap from Richmond to West Point. The scrap of the Virginia Central from Richmond to Hanover Junction without more is simply nothing. That the whole of the enemy is concentrating on Richmond I think cannot be certainly known to you or me. Saxton, at Harpers Ferry, informs us that large forces, supposed to be Jacksons and Ewells, forced his advance from Charlestown to-day. General King telegraphs us from Fredericksburg that contrabands give certain information that 15,000 left Hanover Junction Monday morning to re-enforce Jackson. I am painfully impressed with the importance of the struggle before you, and shall aid you all I can consist- ently with my view of due regard to all points. A. LINCOLN. Major-General MCCLELLAN. At 6 p. m. of the 29th~ I sent the Secretary of War the following dispatch: HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, May 29, 18626 p. m. General Porter has gained information that General Anderson left his position in vicinity of Fredericksburg at 4 a. m. Sunday with the following troops: First South Carolina, Colonel Hamilton; one battalion South Carolina Rifles; Thirty-fourth and Thirty-eighth North Carolina; Forty-fifth Georgia; Twelfth, Thirteenth, and Four- teenth South Carolina; Third Louisiann; two batteries, of four guns eachnamely, Letchers Virginia ant McIntoshs South Carolina batteries. General Anderson and his command passed Ashland yesterday evening en route for Richmond, leaving men behind to destroy bridges over the Telegraph road, which they traveled. This infor- mation is reliable. It is also positively certain that Branchs command was from Gordonsville, bound for Richmond, whither they have now gone. It may be regarded as positive, I think, that there is no rebel force between Fred- ericksburg and Junction. GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Major-General. Hon. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War. The following was also sent on the same day: HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, May 29, 1862. A detachment from General F. J. Porters command, under Major Williams, Sixt Page 37 CHAP. xxm.j GENERAL REPORTS. 37 Cavalry, destroyed the South Anna Railroad Bridge at about 9 a. m. to-day. A large quantity of Confederate public property was also destroyed at Ashland this morning. R. B. MARCY, Hon. E. M. Sr~roN, Secretary of War. Chief of Staff. In reply to which the following was received: WASHINGTON, May 29, 1862. Your dispatch as to the South Anna and Ashland being seized by our forces this morning is received. Understanding these points to be on the Richmond and Fred- ericksburg Railroad, I heartily congratulate the country, and thank General McClel- lan and his army for their seizure. A. LINCOLN. General R. B. MARCY. On the 30th I sent the following: HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, May 30, 1862. From the tone of your dispatches and the Presidents I do not think that you at all al)preciate the value and magnitude of Porters victory. It has entirely relieved my right flank, which was seriously threatened; routed and demoralized a considerable por- tion of the rebel forces; taken over 750 prisoners; killed and wounded large numbers; one gun, many small-arms, and much baggage taken. It was one of the ihandsomest things in the war, both in itself and in its results. Porter has returned, and my army is again well in hand. Another day will make the probable field of battle passable for artillery. It is quite certain that there is nothing in front of McDowell at Fredericks- burg. I regard the burning of South Anna bridges as the least important result of Porters movement. GEO. B. MCCLELLAN, Hon. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War. Major- General. The results of this brilliant operation of General Porter were the dis- persal of General Branchs division and the clearing of our right flank and rear. It was rendered impossible for the enemy to communicate by rail with Fredericksburg or with Jackson via Gordonsville except by the very circuitous route of Lynchburg, and the road was left en- tirely open for the advance of McDowell, had he been permitted to join the Army of the Potomac. His withdrawal toward Front Royal was, in my judgment, a serious and fatal error. He could do no good in that direction, while, had he been permitted to carry out the orders of May 17, the united forces would have driven the enemy within the immediate intrenchments of Richmond before Jackson could have re- turned to its succor, and probably would have gained possession promptly of that place. I respectfully refer to the reports of General Porter and his subordinate commanders for the names of the officers who deserve especial mention for the parts they took in these affidrs, but I cannot omit here my testimony to the energy and ability dis- played by General Porter on this occasion, since .to him is mainly due the successes there gained. On the 20th of May a reconnaissance was ordered on the south side of the Chickahominy toward James River. This was accomplished by Brig. Gen. II. M. Naglee, who crossed his brigade near Bottoms Bridge and pushed forward to within 2 miles of James River without serious resistance or finding the enemy in force. The rest of the Fourth Corps, commanded by General E. D. Keyes, crossed the Chickahominy on the 23d of May. On the 24th, 25th, and 26th a very gallant reconnaissance was pushed by General Naglee with his brigade beyond the Seven Pines, and on th Page 38 38 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAr. XXIII. 25th the Fourth Corps was ordered to take up and fortify a position in the vicinity of the Seven Pines. The order was at once obeyed, a strong line 0? rifle pits opened, and an abatis constructed a little in the rear of the point where the Nine-mile road comes into the Williamsburg road. On the same day General Heintzelman was ordered to cross with his corps (the Third) and take a position 2 miles in advance of Bottoms Bridge, watching the crossing of White Oak S~vamp, an(l covering the left and the rear of the left wing of the army. Being the senior officer on that side of the river, he was placed in command of both corps, and ordered to hold the Seven Pines at all hazards, but not to withdraw the troops from the crossings of White Oak Swamp unless in an ciner- gency. On the 28th General Keyes was ordered to advance Caseys division to Fair Oaks, on the Williamsburg road, some three-quarters of a mile in front of the Seven Pines, leaving General Conchs division at the line of rifle pits. A new line of rifle pits an(l a small redoubt for six field guns were commenced, and much of the timber in front of this line was felled on the two days following. The picket line was established r from the Chickahominy to White Oak Swamp. On the 30th General Heintzelmnan, representing that the advance had met with sharp opposition in taking up their position and that he con- sidered the point a critical one, requested and obtained authority to make such dispositions of his troops as he saw fit to meet the emner- gency. He immediately advanced two brigades of Kearnys division about the fourth of a mile in front of Savage Station, thus placing them within supporting distance of Caseys division, which held the advance of the Fourth Corps. On the 30th the troops on the south side of the Chickahominy were in position as follows: Caseys divisiomi on the right of the Williams- burg road, at right angles to it; the center at Fair Oaks; Couchs division at the Seven Pines; Kearnys division on the railroad from near Savage Station toward the bridge; Hookers division on the borders of White Oak Swamp. Constant skirmishing had been kept up between our l)ickets and those of the enemy. While these lines were being taken up and strengthened large bodies of Confederate troops were seen immediately to the front and right of Caseys position. During the day and night of the 30th of May a very violent storm occurred; the rain, falling iii torrents, rendered work on the rifle pits and bridges impracticable, made the roads almost impassable, and threatened the destruction of the bridges over the Chickahominy. The enemy, perceiving the unfavorable position in which we were placed and the possibility of destroying that part of our army which was apparently cut off from the main body by the rapidly-risimig stream, threw an overwhelming force (grand divisions of Generals D. H. Hill, Huger, Longstreet, and G. W. Smith) upon the position occupied by Caseys division. It appears from the official reports of General Keyes and his subor- dinate commanders that at 10 oclock a. m. on the 31st of May an aide. de-camp of General J. E. Johnston was captured by General Naglees pickets. But little information as to the movements of the enemy was obtained from him, but his presence so near our lines excited suspicion and caused increased vio-ilance, and the troops were ordered by General Keyes to be under arms at 11 oclock. Between 11 and 12 oclock i~ was reported to General Casey that the enemy were approaching in considerable force on the Williamsburg road. At this time Casey Page 39 CHAP. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 39 division was disposed as fiAlows: Naglees brigade extending from the Williamsburg road to the Garnett field, having one regiment across the railroad; General Wessells brigade in the ride pits, and General Palmers in the rear of General Wessells; one battery of artillery in advance with General Naglee; one battery in rear of rifle pits to the right of the redoubt; one battery iii rear of the redoubt, and another battery unharnessed in the redoubt. General Couch8 division, holding the second line, had General Abercrombies brigade on the right along the Nine-mile road, with two regiments and one battery across the rail- road near Fair Oaks Station; General Pecks brigade on the right, and General Devens in the center. On the approach of the enemy, General Casey sent forward one of General Palmers regiments to support the l)icket line, but this regi- ment gave way without muakimig much, if any, resistance. Heavy firiiig at once commenced and the pickets were driven in. General Keyes ordered General Couch to move General Pecks brigade to occupy the ground on the left of the Williamsburg road, which had not before been occupied by our forces, and thus to support General Caseys left, where the first attack was time most severe. The enemy now came on in heavy force, attackimmg General Casey simultaneously in fromit and on both flanks. General Keyes semit to General fleintzelman for re-enforce- memits, but the messenger was delayed, so that orders were not sent to Generals Keariiy and Hooker until imearly 3 oclock, and it was nearly 5 l m. when Generals Jamueson and Berrys brigades, of General Kearnys division, arrive(l on the field. General Birney was ordered up the railroad, but by General Kearnys order halted his brigade before ar- riving at the scene of action. Orders were also dispatched for General Hooker to move up from White Oak Swamp, and he arrived after dark at Savage Station. As soon as the firing was heard at headquarters orders were sent to General Sumner to get his command nmmder arms and be ready to move at a moments warning. His corps, consisting of Generals Richardsons and Sedgwicks (livisions, was encamped on the north si(le of the Chickahomniny, some 6 miLes above Bottoms Bridge. Each (livision had thrown a bridge over the stream opposite to its own position. At 1 oclock General Sumner moved the two divisions to their re- spective bridges, with instructiomis to halt and await further orders. At 2 oclock orders were sent from headquarters to cross these divisions without delay and Push tlmemn rapidly to General Heintzelm ans sup- port. This order was received amid communicated at 2.3() oclock, and the passage was immediately commenced. In the mean time Geim- eral Naglees brigade, with the batteries of General Caseys divisi 0mm, which General Naglee directed, struggled gallantly to maintain the redoubt and rifle pits against the over~vhelming masses of the enemy. They were re-enforced by a regiment from General Pecks brigade. The artillery, under comumnand of Col. G. D. Bailey, First New York Artillery, and afterward of General Naghee, did good execution oim the advancing column. The left of this position was, however, soon sharp At~Y1~~Il the turned and a cross-tire ~ upon gunners and men imi time rifle l)its. Colonel Bailey, Major Van Yalkenberg, aim(h Adjutant IRumusey, of tIme same regiment, were killed; some of the gnus in the redoubt were taken, and the whole line was driven back 111)011 the position occupied by Gemmeral Couch. The brigades of Generals Wessells. an(l Palmer, with the re-enforcemnents which had been semut them from General Couch, had also been drivemi from the field with heavy loss, Page 40 40 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXTIL and the whole position occupied by General Caseys division was takeii by the enemy. Previous to this time General Keyes ordered General Couch to advance two regiments to relieve the pressure upon General Caseys right flank. In making this movement General Couch discovered large masses of the enemy pushing toward our right and crossing the rail- road, as well as a heavy column which had been held in reserve, and which was now making its way toward Fair Oaks Station. General Couch at once engaged this column with two regiments; but, though re-enforced by two additional regiments, he was overpowered, and the enemy pushed between him and the main body of his division. With these four regiments and one battery General Couch fell back about half a mile towards the Grapevine Bridge. where, hearing that General Sumner had crossed, he formed line of battle facing Fair Oaks Station, and prel)ared to hold the position. Generals Berrys and Jamesons brigades had by this time arrived in front of the Seven Pines. General Berry was ordered to take posses- sion of the woods on the left, and push forward so as to have a flank fire on the enemys lines. This movement was executed brilliantly, General Berry pushing his regiments forward through the woods until their rifles commanded the left of the camp and works occupied by General Caseys division in the morning. Their fire on the I)urslling columns of the enemy was very destructive, and assisted materially in checking the pursuit in that part of the field. He held his position in these woods against several attacks of superior numbers, and after dark, being cut off by the enemy from the main body, he fell back toward White Oak Swamp, and by a circuit brought his men into our lines in good order. General Jameson, with two regiments (the other two of his brigade having been (letachedone to General Peck and one to General Birney), moved rapidly to the front, on the left of the Williamsburg road, and succee(led for a time in keeping the abatis clear of the enemy. But large numbers of the enemy pressing past the right of his line, he, too, was forced to retreat through the woods toward White Oak Swamp, and in that way gained camp un(ler cover of night. Brigadier-General iDevens, who had held the center of General Couchs division, had made repeated and gallant efforts to regain por- tions of the ground lost in front, but each time was driven back, and finally withdrew behind the rifle pits near Seven Pines. Meantime General Sumner had arrive(l with the advance of his corps, General Sedgwicks division, at the l)oint held by General Couch with four regimemits and one battery. The roads leading from the bridge were so miry that it was only by the greatest exertion General Sedg- wick had been able to get one of his batteries to the front. The leading regiment (First Minnesota, Colonel Sully) was immedi- ately deployed to the right of Couch to l)rotect the flank, and the rest of the division formed in line of battle, Kirbys battery near the center, in an angle of the woods. One of General Couchs regiments was sent to open communication with General lleintzelman. No sooner were these dispositions made than the enemy came in strong force and opened a heavy fire along the line. He made several charges, but was each time repulsed with great loss by the steady fire of the inflin try and the splen- 4li(l practice of the battery. After sustaining the enemys fire for a coin- siden-able time General Sumner ordered five regiments (the Thirty- fourth New York, Colonel Suiter; Eighty-second New York, Lieutenant- Colonel Hudson; Fifteenth Massachusetts, Lieutenant-Colonel Kimball Page 41 C~rAr. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 41 Twentieth Massachusetts, Colonel Lee; Seventh Michigan, Major Rich- ardsonthe three former of General Gormans brigade, the two latter of General Danas brigade) to advance and charge with the bayonet. This charge was executed in the most brilliant manner. Our troops, springing over two fences which were between them and the enemy, rushed upon his lines and drove him in confusion from that part of the field. Darkness now ended the battle for that day. During the night dispositions were made for its early renewal. Gen- eral Couchs division and so much of General Caseys as could be col- lected, together with General Kearnys, occupied,, the rifle pits near Seven Pines. General ~eck,in falling back on th~ left, had succeeded late in the afternoon in rallying a considerable number of stragglers, and was taking them once more into the action, when he was ordered back to the intrenched camp by General Kearny. General Hooker brought up his division about dark, having been delayed by the heavi- ness of the roads and the throng of fugitives from the field, through whom the colonel of the leading regiment (Starr) reports he was obliged to force his way with the bayonet. This division bivouacked for the night in rear of the right of the rifle pits on the other side of the rail- road. General Richardsonsdivision also came upon the field about sun- set. He had attempted the passage of the Chickahominy by the bridge opposite his own camp, but it was so far destroyed that he was forced to move Generals Howards and Meaghers brigades, with all his artillery, around by General Sedgwicks bridge, while General Frenchs brigade, with the utmost difficulty, crossed by the other. General Sedgwicks division, with the regiments under General Couch, held about the same position as when the fight ceased, and General Rich- ardson, on his arrival, was ordered to place his division on the left, to connect with General Kearny; General Frenchs brigade was l)oSted along the railroad and Generals Howards and Meaghers brigades in second and third lines. All his artillery had been lett behind, it being impossible to move it forward through the deep mud as rapidly as the infantry pushed toward the field, but during the night the three bat- teries of the division were brought to the front. About 5 oclock on the morning of the 1st of June skirmishers and some cavalry of the enemy were discovered in front of General Richard- sons division. Captain Pettits battery (B, First New York), having come upon the ground, threw a few shells among them, when they dis- persed. There was a wide interval between General Richardson and General Kearny. To close this General Richardsons line was extended to the left and his first line moved over the railroad. Scarcely had they gained the position when the enemy, appearing in large force from the woods in front, opened a heavy fire of musketry at short range along the whole line. He approached very rapidly with columns of attack formed on two roads which crossed the railroad. These columns were supported by infantry in line of battle on each side, cutting Gen- eral Frenchs line. He threw out no skirmishers, but appeared deter- mined to carry all before him by one crushing blow. For nearly an hour the first line of General Richardsons division stood and returned the fire, the lines of the enemy being re-enforced and relieved time after time, till finally General Howard was ordered with his brigade to go to General Frenchs assistance. He led his men gallantly to the front, and in a few minutes the fire of the enemy ceased and his whole line fell l)ack on that part of the field. On the opening of the firing in the morning General Hooker pushed forward on the railroad with two regi- ments (Fifth and Sixth New Jersey), followed by General Sickle Page 42 42 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAr. XXIIL brigade. It was found impossible to move the artillery of this division from its position on account of the mud. On coming near the woods, which were held by the enemy in force, General Hooker found General Birneys brigade, Col. J. H. Hobart Ward in command, in line of battle. He sent back to hasten General Sickles brigade, but ascertained that it had been turned off to the left by General Heintzolman to meet a column advancing in that direction. He at once made the attack with the two New Jersey regiments, calling upon Colonel Ward to support 1dm with General Birneys brigade. This was well done, our trOOl)S advancing into the woods under a heavy fire, and pushing the enemy before them for more than an hour of hard fighting. A charge with the bayonet was then ordered by ~eneral Hooker with the Fifth and Sixth New Jersey, Third Maine, and Thirty.eighth and Fortieth New York, and the enemy fled in confusion, throwing down arms and even cloth- ing in his flight. General Sickles, having been ordered to the left, formed line of battle on both sides of the Williamsburg road and ad- vanced under a sharp fire from the enemy, deployed in the woods in front of him. After a brisk interchange of musketry fire while crossing the open ground, the Excelsior Brigade dashed into the timber with the bayonet and put the enemy to flight. On the right the enemy opened fire after half an hours cessation, which was promptly responded to by General Richardsons division. Again the most vigorous efforts were made to break our line, and again they were frustrated by the steady courage of our troops. In about an hour General Richardsons whole line advanced, pouring in their fire at close range, which threw the line of the enemy back in some confusion. This was followed up by a bayonet charge, led by General French in person, with the Fifty-seventh and Sixty-sixth Ne~v York, 5u1)pOrted by two regiments sent by General Heintzelmnan, the Seventy-first and Seventy-third New York, which turned the confusion of the enemy into precipitate flight. One gun captured the previous day was retaken. Our trool)s pushed forward as far as the lines held by them on the 31st before the attack. On the battle-field there were found many of our own and the Confederate wounded, arms, caissons, wagons, sub- sistence stores, and forage, abandoned by the enemy in his rout. The state of the roads and impossibility of maneuvering artillery prevented farther pursuit. On the next morning a reconnaissance was sent for- ward, which pressed back the pickets of the enemy to within 5 miles of liichmond~ but again the impossibility of forcing even a few batteries forward Precluded our holding permanently this positiomi. The lines held previous to the battle were therefore resumed. General J. E. Johnston reports loss of the enemy in Longstreets amid G. W. Smiths divisions at 4,283; General D. H. Hill, who had taken the advance in the attack, estimates his loss at 2 ,50(h which would give the enemys loss 6,783. Our loss was, in General Sumners corps, 1,223; General Heintzehmans corps, 1,394; General Keyes corps, 3,120; total, 5~737* Previous to the arrival of General Sumner upon the field of battle, on the 31st of May, General Heintzelman, the senior corps commander l)rcsent, was in the immne(liate command of the forces engaged. The first information I received that the battle was in progress was a dis- patch from him stating that Caseys division had given way. During the night of the 31st 1 received a dispatch from him, dated 8.45 p. in., in which he says: But see revised statement, pp. 757762 Page 43 CHAP. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 43 I am just in. When I got to the front the most of General Caseys division had dispersed. * * The rout of General Caseys men had a most dispiriting effect on the troops as they came up. I saw no reason why we should have been driven back. This official statement, together with other accounts received previous to my arrival upon the battle-field, to the effect that Caseys division had given way without niaking a proper resistance, caused inc to state, in a telegram to the Secretary of War on the 1st, that this division gave way unaccountably and discreditably. Subsequent investiga- tions, however, greatly modified the impressions first received, a iid T accordingly advised the Secretary of War of this in a dispatch on the 5th of June. The official reports of Generals Keyes, Casey, aiid Naglee show that a very considerable portion of this division fought well, and that the brigade of General Yaglee is entitled to credit for its gallantry. This division, among the regiments of which were eight of comparatively iiew troops, was attacked by superior numbers; yet, according to the reports alluded to, it stood the attack for three hours before it was re- enforced. A portion of the division was thrown into great confusion upon the first onslaught of the enemy; but the personal efforts of General Naglee, Colonel Bailey, and other officers, who boldly went to the front and encouraged the men by their presence and example at this critical juncture rallied a gre at part of the division, and thereby enabled it to act a prominent part in this severely-contested battle, it therefore affords me great satisfaction to withdraw the expression con- tained in my first dispatch, and I cordially give my indorsement to the conclusion of the division commander, that those j)arts of his coni- niand which behaved discreditably were exceptional cases. On the 31st, when the battle of Fair Oaks commenced, we had two of our bridges nearly completed; but the rising waters flooded the log- way aI)proaches and made them almost impassable, so that it was only by the greatest efforts that General Sumner crossed his corps and par- ticipated in that hard-fought engagement. The bridges became totally useless after this corps had passed, and others on a more permanent plan were commenced. On my way to headquarters, after the battle of Fair Oaks, I attempted to cross the bridge where General Sunnier had taken over his corps on the day previous. At the time General Sumner crossed this was the only available bridge above Bottoms Bridge. I found the approach from the right bank for some 400 yards submerged to the depth of sev- eral feet, and on reaching the place where the bridge had been I found a great part of it carried away, so that I could not get my horse over, and was obliged to send him to Bottoms Bridge, 6 miles below, as the only practicable crossing. The approaches to New and Mechaniesyille Bridges were also over- flowed, and both of them were enfiladed by the enemys batteries, es- tablislied upon commanding heights on the opposite side. These bat- teries were supported by strong forces of the enemy, having numerous rifle pits in their front, which would have made it necessary, even had the approaches been in the best possible condition, to have fought a sanguinary battle, ~vith but little l)rosI)ect of success, before a 1)assage could have been secured. The only available means, therefore, of uniting our forces at Fair Oaks for an a(lvance on ltichmond soon after the battle was to march the troops from Mechaniesyille and other points on the left bank of the Chickahominy down to Bottoms Bridge, and thence over f lie Williams- burg road to the position near Fair Oaks, a distance of about 23 miles Page 44 44 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. (CHAP. XXIIL In the condition of the roads at that time this march could not have been made with artillery in less than two days, by which time the enemy would have been secure within his iutrenchments around Richmond. In short, the idea of nniting the two wings of the army in time to make a vigorous pursuit of the enemy, with the prospect of overtaking him before he reached Richmond, only 5 miles distant from the field of bat- tle, is simply absurd, and was, I presume, never for a moment seriously entertained by any one connected with the Army of the Potomac. An advance, involving the separation of the two wings by the impassable Chickahominy, would have exposed each to defeat in detail. Therefore I held the position already gained and completed our crossings as rap- idly as possible. In the mean time the troops at Fair Oaks were directed to strengthen their positions by a strong line of intrenchmeuts, which protected them while the bridges were being built, gave security to the trains, liberated a larger fighting force, and offered a safer retreat in the event of dis- aster. On the 2d of June I sent the following dispatch: HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, New Bridge, June 2, 18621O.30 a. m. Our left is everywhere advanced considerably beyond the positions it occupied be- fore the battle. I am in strong hopes that the Chickahominy will fall sufficiently to enable me to cross the right. We have had a terrible time with our communications bridges and causeways, built with great care, having been washed away by the sud- den freshets, leaving us almost cut off from communication. All that human labor can do is being done to accomplish our purpose. Please regard the portion of this relating to condition of Chickahominy as confiden- tial, as it would be serious if the enemy were aware of it. I do not yet know our loss; it has been very heavy on both sides, as the fighting was desperate. Our victory com- plete. I expect btill more fighting before we reach Richmond. GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Major- General. Hon. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War. On the same day I received the following from the Secretary of War: WASHINGTON, June 2, 1862. Your telegram has been received, and we are greatly rejoiced at your successnot only in itself; but because of the dauntless spirit and courage it displays in your troops. You have received, of course, the order made yesterday in respect to Fortress Monroe. The object was to place at your command the disposable force of that de- partment. The indications are that Fr6mont or McDowell will fight Jackson to-day, and as soon as he is disposed of another large body of troops will be at your service. The intelligence from Halleck shows that the rebels are fleeing, and pursued iu force, from Corinth. All interest now centers in your operations, and full confidence is en- tertained of your brilliant and glorious success. EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War. Major-General MCCLELLAN. On the 3d I received the following from the President: WASHINGTON, June 3, 1862. With these continuous rains I am very anxious about the Chickahominyso close in your rear and crossing your line of communication. Please look to it. A. LINCOLN, President. Major-General McCLELLAN Page 45 CHAP. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 45 To which I replied as follows: HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, New Bridge, Juno 3,1862. Your dispatch of 5 p. in. just received. As the Chickahominy has been almost the only obstacle in my way for several days Your Excellency may rest assured that it has not been overlooked. Every effort has been wade, and will continue to be, to lielfect the communications across it. Nothing of importance, except that it is again raining. GEG. B. McCLELLAN, ABRAHAM LINCOLN, Prenident, Wa8hin glen. Major-General, Commanding. My views of the condition of our army on the 4th are explained in the following dispatch to the President: HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, New Bridge, June 4, 1862. Terrible rain-storm during the night and morning; not yet cleared off. Chicka- hominy flooded; bridges in bad condition. Are still hard at work at them. I have taken every possible step to insure the security of the corps on the right bank, but I cannot re-enforce them here until my bridges are all safe, as my force is too small to insure my right and rear, should the enemy attack in that direction, as they may probably attempt. I have to be very cautions now. Our loss in the late battle will probably exceed 5,000. I have not yet fall returns. On account of the elkct it mi~ht have on our own men and the enemy I request that you will regard this information as confidential for a few days. I am satisfied that the loss of the enemy was very con- si(leral)ly greater; they were terribly punished. I mention these facts now merely to show you that the Army of the Potomac has had serious work, and that no childs play is before it. You must make your calculations on the supposition that I have been correct from the beginning in asserting that the serious opposition was to be made here. GEO. B. MCCLELLAN, ABRAHAM LINCOLN, Pre8ident. Major-General, Commanding. And in the following to the Secretary of War on the same day: HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, New Bridge, June 4, 1862. Please inform me at once what re-enforcements, if any, I can count upon having at Fortress Monroe or White House within the next three days, and when each regiment may be expected to arrive. It is of the utmost importance that I should know this immediately. The losses in the battle of the 31st and 1st will amount to 7,000. Re- gard this as confidential for the present. If I can have five new regiments for Fort Monroe~ and its dependencies I can draw three more 01(1 regiments from there safely. I can well dispose of four more raw regiments on my communications. I cau ~iell dispose of from fifteen to twenty well- drilled regiments among the old brigades in bringing them up to their original effective strength. Recruits are especially necessary for the regular and volunteer batteries of artillery as well as for the regular and volunteer regiments of infantry. After the losses in our last battle I trust that I will no longer be regarded as an alarmist. I believe we have at least one mole desperate battle to fight. * GEG. B. MCCLELLAN, Hon. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War. Major-General, Commanding. Also in my dispatch to the Secretary of War on the 5th: HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, New Bridge, June 5, 1862. Rained mo8t of the night. Has now ceased, but is not clear. The river is still very high and troublesome. Enemy opened with several batteries on our bridges * This dispatch, as received, continues as follows: Our loss has been greater than I had first supposed. The publication of this at this particular time might have an unfavorable effect upon the spirits of our army and give confidence to the enemy, although they undoubtedly suffered much more than we did. I therefore submit it to your judgment whether it will be policy to make it public until after the next battle Page 46 46 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIII. near here this morning. Our batteries seem to have pretty much silenced them, though some firing still kept up. The rain ibrees us to remain in 8tatu quo. XVith great diffi- culty a divisiou of infantry has been crossed this morning to support the troops on ih~ other side should the enemy renew attack. I felt obiged to do this, although it leaves us rather weak here. GEG. B. McCLELLAN, Major-General, Commanding. Hon. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War. On the 5th the Secretary telegraphed me as follows: WAsIUNGTON, June 5, 18628.30 p. m. I will send you five new regiments as fast as transportation can take them; the first to start to-morrow from Baltimore. I mnteu(l sending you a part of McDowells force as soon as it can return from its trip to Front Ho a ; )robably as many as you want. The order to ship the new regiments to Fort Monroe has already been given. I suppose that they may be sent directly to the fort. Please advise me if this be as you desire. EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War. Major-General MCCLELLAN. On the 7th of June I telegraphed as follows: HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, June 7, 18624.40 p. m. In reply to your dispatch of 2 p. m. to-day I have the honor to state that the Chick- ahominy River has risen so as to flood the entire bottoms to the depth of 3 or 4 timet. I am pushing forward the bridges in spite of this, and the men are working night and day up to their waists in water to complete them. The whole face of the country is a perfect bog, entirely impassable for artillery, or even cavahy, except directly in the narrow roads, which renders any general movement either of this or the rebel army entirely out of the question until we have more favorable weather. I am glad to learn that you are pressing forward re-enforcements so vigorously. I shall be in perfect readiness to move forward and take Richmond the moment McCall reaches here and tbe ground will admit the passage of artillery. I have advanced my pickets about a mile to-day, driving off the rebel pickets and securing a very advan- tageous position. The rebels have several batteries established commanding the d6boucluls from two of our bridges and fire upon our working parties continuafly, but as yet they have killed but very few of our men. GLO. B. MCCLELLAN, Major-General, Commanding. Hon. E. M. ST& NTON, Secretary of War. As I did not think it pi~obabIe that any re-enforcements would be sent me in time for the advance on Richmond, I stated in the forego- ing dispatch that I should be ready to move when General MWaIls division joined me; but I did not intend to be understood by this that no more re-enforcements were wanted. as will be seen from the follow- ing dispatch: JUNE 10, 18623.30 p. m. I have again information that Beauregard has arrived, and that some of his troops are to follow him. No great relianceperhaps none whatevercan be attached to this; but it is possible, and ought to be their policy. I am completely checked by the weather. The roads and fields are literally impas. sable for artillery; almost so for infantry. The Chickahominy is in a dreadful state. We have another rain-storm on our hands. I shall attack as soon as the weather and ground will permit; but there will be a delay, the extent of which no one can foresee, for the season is altogether abnormal. In view of these circumstances I present for your consideration the propriety of detaching largely from Hallecks army to strengthen this, for it would seem that Hal- leek has now no large organized force in front of him, while we have. If this cannot be done, or even in connection with it allow me to suggest the movement of a heavy column from Dalton upon Atlanta. 1f but the one can be done, It would better con- form to military principles to strengthen this army. And even although the re en Page 47 OfTAP. XXIII] GENERAL REPORTS. 47 forcements might not arrive in season to take part in the attack upon Richmond, the moral effect would be great, and they would furnish valuable assistance in ulterior movements. I wish to be distinctly understood that whenever the weather permits I will attack with whatever force I may have, although a larger force would enable me to gain much more decisive results. I would be glad to have McCalls infantry sent forward by water at once, without waiting for his artillery and cavalry. If General Prim returns via Washington please converse with him as to the condi- tion of affairs here. GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Hon. E. M. STANTON, Secrctary of War. Major-General, (Joinmanding. Our work upon the bridges continued to be 1)UShed forward vigor. ously until the 20th, during which time it rained almost every day, and the exposure of the men caused much sickness. On the 11th the following was received from the Secretary of War: WASHINGTON, JUne 11, 186~. Your dispatch of 3.30 yesterday has been received. I am fully impressed with the difficulties mentioned, and which no art or skill can avoid, but only endure, and urn striving to the uttermost to render you every aid in the p~~er of the Government. Your suggestions will be immediately communicated to General Halleck, with a re- quest that he shall conform to them. At last advices he contemplated sending a col- ninn to operate with Mitchel against Chattanooga, and thence upon East Tennessee. Buell reports Kentucky and Tennessee to be in a critical condition, demanding imine- diate attention. Halleck says the main body of Beauregards force is with him at Okolona. McCalls force was reported yesterday as havin.~ embarked and on its way to join you. It is intended to send the residue of McDowells force also to join you ~ speedily as possible. Fr6mont had a hard fight day before yesterday ~vith Jacksons force at Utiioii Church, 8 miles from Harrisonburg. He claims the victory, but was pretty badly handled. It is clear that a strong force is operating with Jackson for the purpose of detaining the forces here from you. I am urging as fast as possible the new levies. Be assured, general, that there never has been a moment when my desire has been otherwise than to aid you with my whole heart, mind, and strength since the hour we first met; and whatever others may say for their own purposes, you have never had, and never can have, any one more truly your friend, or more anxious to support you, or more joyful than I shall be at the success which I have no doubt will soon be achieved by your arms. EDWIN M. STANTON, Maj. Gen. GEOROB B. MCCLELLAN. & cretar,y of War. On the 1~h and 13th General McCalls division arrived. On the 13th of June two squadrons of the Fifth United States Cav- alry, under the command of Captain Iloyall, stationed near Hanover Old Church, were attacked and overpowered by a force of the etiemys cavalry, numbering about 1,500 men, with four guns. They pushed on towards our depots, but at some distance from our main body, and, though pursued very cleverly, made the circuit of the army, repassing the Chickahominy at Long Bridge. The burning of two schooners laden with forage and fourteen Government wagons, the destruction of some sutlers stores, the killing of several of the guard and teamsters at Garlicks Landing, some little damage done at Tunstalls Statioi~, and a little 6clat were the precise results of this expedition. On the 14th I sent the following to the Secretary of War: HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, (Janmp Lincoln, June 14, 18432midnight. All quiet in every direction. The stampede of last night has passed away. Weather now very favorable, I hope two days more will make the ground practicable. I shall advance as soon as the bridges are completed and the ground fit for artillery to move. At the same time I would be glad to have whatever troops can be sent to me. I can use several new regiments to advantage Page 48 48 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIII. It ought to be distinctly understood that McDowell and his troops are completely under my control. I received a telegram from him requesting that McCalls division might be placed so as to join him immediately on his arrival. That request does not breathe the proper spirit. Whatever troops come to me must be disposed of so as to do the most good. I do not feel that in such circumstances as those in which I am now placed General McDowell should wish the general interests to be sacrificed for the purpose of increasing his command. If I cannot fully control all his troops I want none of them, hut would prefer to fight the battle with what I have, and let others be responsible for the results. The department lines should not be allowed to interfere with me, but General Mc.. Dowell and all other troops sent to me should be placed completely at my disposal, to do with them as I think best. In no other way can they be of assistance to me. [ therefore request that I may have entire and full control. The stake at issue is too great to allow personal considerations to be entertained. You know that I have none. The indications are, from our balloon reconnaissances and from all other sources, that the enemy are intrenching, daily increasing in numbers, and determined to fight desperately. GEO. B. McCLELLAN Alajor-General, Commanding. Hon. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War. On the 20th the following was communicated to the President: HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Camp Lincoln, June 20, 18622 p. ia. Your Excellencys dispatch of 11 a. m. received, also that of General Sigel. I have no doubt that Jackson has been re-enforced from here. There is reason to believe that General R. S. Ripley has recently joined Lees army with a brigade or division from Charleston. Troops have arrived recently from Goldsboron gh. There is not the slightest reason to suppose that the enemy intends evacuating Richmond. He is daily increasing his defenses. I find him everywhere in force, and every recolk- naissunce costs many lives, yet I am obliged to feel my way foot by foot at whatever cost, so great are the difficulties of the country. By to-morrow night the defensive works covering our position on this side of the Chickahominy should be completed. I am forced to this by my inferiority in numbers, so that I may bring the greatest possible numbers into action and secure the army against the consequences of unfore- seen disaster. I would be glad to have permission to lay before Your Excellency, by letter or telegraph, my views as to the present state of military affairs throughout the whole country. In the mean time I would be pleased to learn the disposition as to numbers and position of the troops not under my command in Virginia and elsewhere. GEO. B. McCLELLAN Major-General, Commanding. His Excellency ABRAHAM LINCOLN, Pre4dent. To which I received this reply: WASHINGTON, June 21, 18626 p. m. Your dispatch of yesterday (2 p. in.) was received this morning. If it would not divert too much of your time and attention from the army under your immediate com- niand I would be glad to have your views as to the present state of military affairs throughout the whole country, as you say you would be glad to give them. I would rather it should be by letter than by telegraph, because of the better chance of secrecy. As to the numberR and positions of the troops not under your command in Virginia and elsewhere, even if I could do it with accuracy, which I cannot, I would rather not transmit either by telegraph or letter, because of the chances of its reaching the enemy. I would be very glad to talk with you, but you cannot leave your camp and I cannot well leave here. A. LINCOLN, President. Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN. To which I sent the following reply: CAMP LINCOLN, June 221 p. m. I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your telegram of 8 p. m. yesterday. Under the circumstances, as stated in your dispatch, I perceive that it will be better at least to defer for the present the communication I desired to make. GEO. B. McCLELLAN Major-General, Commanding. His Excellency the PRESIDENT Page 49 CHAP. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 49 All the information I could obtain previous to the 24th of June re- garding the movements of General Jackson led to the belief that he was at Gordonsville, where he was receiving re-enforcements from Rich- mond via Lynchburg and Staunton; but what his purposes were did not appear until the date specified, when a young man, very intelligent, but of suspicious appearance, was brought in by our scouts from the direction of Hanover Court-House. He at first stated that he was an escaped prisoner from Colonel Kenlys Maryland regiment, captured at Front Royal, but finally confessed himself to be a deserter from Jacksons command, which he left near Gordonsville on the 21st. Jack- sons troops were then, as he said, moving to Fredericks Hall, along the Virginia Central Railroad, for the purpose of attacking my rear on the 28th. I immediately dispatched two trusty negroes to proceed along the railroad and ascertain the truth of the statement. They were un- able, however, to get beyond Hanover Court-House, where they encoun- tered the enemys pickets, and were forced to turn back without obiain- ing the desired information. On that day I sent the following dispatch: HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, June 24, 156212 p. m. A very peculiar case of desertion has just occurred from the enemy. The party states that he left Jackson, Whiting, and Ewell (fifteen brigades) at Gordonsville on the 21st; that they were moving to Fredericks Hall, and that it was intended to attack my rear on the 2Sth. I would be glad to learn, at your earliest convenience, the most exact information you have as to the position and movements of Jackson, as well as the~ sources from which your information is derived, that I may the better compare it with what I have. GEO. B. MCCLELLAN, Hon. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War. Major- General. The following is his reply: WAsHINGTON, June 25, 1862. We have no definite information as to the numbers or position of Jacksons force. General King yesterday reported a deserters statement that Jacksons force was, nine days ago, 40,000 men. Some reports place 10,000 rebels under Jackson at Gordonsville; others, that his force is at Port Republic, Harrisonb~~rg,- and Luray. Fr6rnont yester- (lay reported rumors that Western Virginia was threatened, and General Kelley that Eweil was advancing to New Creek, where Frdmont has his depots. The last telegram from Fr6mont contradicts this rumor. The last telegram from Banks says the enemys pickets are strong in advance at Luray. The people decline to give any information of his whereabouts. Within the last two days the evidence is strong that for some purpose the enemy is circulating rumors of Jacksons advance in various directions, with a view to conceal the real point of attack. Neither McDowell, who is at Manassas, nor Banks and Fr6mont, who are at Middletown, appear to have any accu- rate knowledge of the subject. A letter transmitted to the Department yesterday, purporting to be dated Gordonsville, on the 14th instant, stated that the actual attack was designed for Washington and Baltimore as soon as you attacked Richmond, but that the report was to be circulated that Jackson had gone to Richmond, in order to mislead. This letter looked very much like a blind, and induces inc to suspect that Jacksons real movement now is toward Richmond. It came from Alexandria, and is certainly designed, like the numerous rumors put afloat, to mislead. I think, there- fore, that while the warning of the deserter to you may also be a blind, it could not safely be disregarded. I will transmit to you any further information on this subject that may be received here. EDWIN M. STANTON, Major-General MCCLELLAN. Secretary of War. On the 25th, our bridges and intrenchments being at last completed, an advance of our picket line of the left was ordered, ~prepaiatory to a general forward movement. Immediately in front of the most advanced redoubt on the Williams- 4 R HVOL X Page 50 50 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXm. burg road was a large open field; beyond that a swampy belt of timber, ~some 500 yards wide, which had been disputed ground for many days. Farther in advance was an open field, crossed by the Williamsburg road and the railroad , and commanded by a redoubt and rifle pits of the enemy. It was decided to push our lines to the other side of these woods, in order to enable us to ascertain the nature of the ground and to place Generals lleintzelmau and Sumner in position to support the attack intended to be made on the Old Tavern on the 26th or 27th by General Franklin by assailing that position in the rear. Between 8 and 9 oclock on the morning of the 25th the advance was begun by General fleintzelm ans corps. The enemy were found to be in strong force all along the line and contested the advance stubbornly, but by sunset our object was accomplished. The troops engaged in this affair were the whole of lleintzelrnans corps, Palmers brigade of Couchs division of Keyes corps, and a part of Richardsons division of Sumners corps. For the details I refer to the report of General ileint- zelman. The casualties (not including those in Palmers brigade, which have not been reported) were as follows: Officers killed,1; wound ed,14; missing, 1; enlisted men killed, 50; wounded, 387; missing, 63; total, 516.* The following telegrams were sent to the Secretary of War during the day from the field of operations: REDOUBT No. 3, June 25, 18621.30 p. m. We have a(lvanced our pickets on the left considerably, under sharp resistance. Our men behaved very handsomely. Some firing still continues. GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Major-General, Commanding. Hon. E. M. STANTON. REDOUBT No. 3, June 25, 18623.15 p. m. The enemy are making a desperate resistance to the advance of our picket lines. Kearnys andone-half of Hookers are where I want them. I have this moment re-enforced Hookers right with a brigade and a couple of guns, and hope in a few minutes to finish the work intended for to-day. Our men are be- having splendidly. The enemy are fighting well also. This is not a battle; merely an affair of Heintzelmans corps, supported by Keyes, and thus far all goes well. We hold every foot we have gained. If we sncceed in what we have undertaken it will be a very important advantage gained. Loss not large thus far. The fighting up to this time has been done by Gen- eral Hookers division, which has behaved as usualthat is, most splendidly. On our right Porter has silenced tbe enemys batteries in his front. GEG. B. McCLELLAN, Major- General, Gommanding. Hon. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War. REDOUBT No. 3, June 25, 18625 p.m. The affair is over, and we have gained our point fully and with but little loss, not- withstanding the strong opposition. Our men have done all that could be desired. The affair was partially decided by two guns that Captain De Russy brought gallantly into action under very difficult circumstances. The enemy was driven from the camps in front of this place and is now quiet. GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Major-General, Commanding. Hon. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War. ~ But see revised statement, Part II, pp. 37, 38. Page 51 CHAP. XXIII.] GENERAL RgPORTS. 5 Also, on the same day, the following: HEADQUARTERS An~i~ OF THE POTOMAC, Camp Lincoln, June 25, 18626.15 p. in. I have just returned from the, field, and find your dispatch in regard to Jackson. Several contrabands just in give information confirming the supposition that Jack- sons advance is at or near Hanover Court-house, and that Beauregard arrived, with strong re-enforcements, in Richmond yesterday. I incline to think that Jackson will attack my right and rear. The rebel force is stated at 200,000, including Jackson and Beauregard. I shall have to contend against vastly superior odds if these reports be true; but Ihis army will do all in the power of men to hold their position and repnlse any attack. I regret my great inferiority in numbers, but feel that I am in no way responsible for it, as I have not failed to represent repeatedly the necessity of re-enforcements; that this was the decisive point, and that all the available means of the Government should be concentrated here. I will do all that a general can do with the splendid army I have the honor to command, and if it is destroyed by overwhelming numbers, can at least die with it and share its fate. But if the result of the action, which will probably occur to-morrow, or within a short time, is ,a disaster, the responsibility can- not be thrown on my shoulders; it must rest where it belongs. Since I commenced this I have received additional intelligence confirming the sup- position in regard to Jacksons movements and Beauregards arrival. I shall probably be attacked to-morrow, and now go to the other side of the Chickahominyto arrange for the defense on that side. I feel that there is no use in again asking for re-enforce- ments.* GEG. B. MCCLELLAN, lIon. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War. J The report of the Chief of the Secret Service Corps, herewith for- warded, and dated the 26th of Jnne,f shows the estimated strength of the enemy, at the time of the evacuation of Yorktown, to have been from 100,000 to 120,000. The same report put his numbers on the 26th of June at about 180,000, and the specific information obtained reoardin g their organization warrants the 1)elief that this estimate did not ex- ceed his actual strength. It will be observed that the evidence con- tained in the report shows the following organizations, viz: Two hundred regiments of infantry and cavalry, including the forces of Jackson and Ewell, just arrived; eight battalions of independent troops; five bat- talions of artillery; twelve companies of infantry and independent cav- alry, besides forty-six companies of artillery; amounting in all to from forty to fifty brigades. There were undoubtedly many others, whose designations we did not learn. The report also shows that numerous and heavy earthworks had been completed for the defense of Richmond, and that in thirty-six of these were mounted some two hundred guns. On the 26th, the day upon which I had decided as the time for our final advance, the enemy attacked our right in strong force, and turned my attention to the protection of our communications and depots of supply. The event was a bitter confirmation of the military judgment which had been reiterated to my superiors from the inception and through the progress of the Peninsular Campaign. I notified the Secretary of War in the following dispatch: HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Camp Lincoln, June 26, P56212 m. I have just heard that our advanced cavalry pickets on the left bank of Chicka- hominy are being driven in. It is probably Jacksons advance guard. If this be true, you may not hear from me for some days, as my communications will probably be cut off. The case is perhaps a difficult one, but I shall resort to desperate measures, and ~ See Lincoln to McClellan, Part III, p. 259. 1 See p. 269 Page 52 52 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIII. will do my best to outmaneuver, outwit, and outfight the enemy. Do not believe reports of disaster, and do not be discouraged if you learn that my communications are cut off, and even Yorktown in possession of the enemy. Hope for the best, and I will not deceive the hopes you formerly placed in me. GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Major- General. Hon. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TIlE POTOMAC, Camp Lincoln, June 26, 18622.30 p. in. Your dispatch and that of the President received. Jackson is driving in my pickets, on the other side of the Chickahominy. It is impossible to tell where re-enforce- ments ought to go, as I am yet unable to predict result of approaching battle. It will probably be better that they should go to Fort Monroe, and thence according to state of affairs when they arrive. It is not probable that I can maintain telegraphic communication more than an hour or two longer. GLO. B. MCCLELLAN, Major- General. Hon. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War. On the same day I received the following dispatches from the Secre- tary of War: WASHINGTON, June 25, 186211.20 p. m. Your telegram of 6.15 has just been received. The circumstances that have hitherto rendered it irupossibe for the Government to send you any more re-enforcements than has been done have been so distinctly stated to you by the President, that it is need- less for me to repeat them Every effort has been made by the President and myself to strengthen you. Kings division has reached Falmouth; Shields division and Ricketts division are at Manas- sas. The President designs to send a part of that force to aid you as speedily as it can be done. EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War. Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. McCLELLAN. XVASHINGTON, Ju,~e 26, 18626 p. in. Arrangements are being made as rapidly as possible to send you 5,000 men as fastas they can be brought from Manassas to Alexandria and embarked, which can be done sooner than to wait for transportation at Fredericksburg. They will be followed by more, if needed. McDowells, Banks, and Fr6mouts force will be consolidated as the Army of Virginia, and will operate promptly in your aid by laud. Nothing will be spared to sustain you, and I have undoubting faith in your success. Keep me ad- vised fully of your condition. EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War. Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN. But 5,000 of the re-enforcements spoken of in these communications came to the Army of the Potomac, and these reached us at Harrisons Bar after the seven days. in anticipation of a speedy advance on Richmond, to provide for the contingency of our communications with the depot at the White House being severed by the enemy, and at the same time to be prepared for a change of the base of onr operations to James River if circumstances should render it advisable, I had made arrangements more than a week previous (on the 18th) to have transports with supplies of provisions and forage under a convoy of gunboats sent up James River. They reached Harrisons Landing in time to be available for the army on its arrival at that point. Events soon proved this change of base to be, though most hazardous and difficult, the only prudent course. In order to relieve the troops of the Sixth Corps, on the 19th of June General Reynolds and General Seymours brigades, of General McCall Page 53 CHAP. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 53-~ division (Pennsylvania Reserves), were moved from Gaines farm to a position on Beaver Dam Creek, General Meades brigade being held in reserve in front of G~aines farm. One regiment and a battery wej~e thrown forward to the heights overlooking Mechaniesyille, and a line of pickets extended along the Chickahominy River between the Me- chanicsville and Meadow Bridges. As has been already stated, I re- ceived, while engaged on the 25th in directing the operations of Heint-- zelmans corps, information which strengthened my suspicions that Jackson was advancing with a large force upon our right and rear~ On this day General Casey, at the White House, was instructed to pre- pare for a vigorous resistance, and defensive works were ordered at Tunstalls Station. Early on the 25th General Porter was instructed to send out reconnoitering parties toward Hanover Court-House to dis- cover the position and force of the enemy, and to destroy the bridges on the Totopotomoy as far as possible. Up to the 26th of June the operations against Richmond had been conducted along the roads leading to it from the east and northeast. The reasons (the Presidents anxiety about covering Washington from Fredericksburg, McDowells promised co-operation, partial advance, and immediate withdrawal) which compelled the choice of this line of approach and our continuance upon it have been alluded to above. The superiority of the James River route as a line of attack and supply is too obvious to need exposition. My own opinion on that subject had been early given, and need not to be repeated here. The dissipation of all hope of the co-operation by land of Geiteral McDowells forces, deemed to be occupied in the defense of Washington, their inability to hold or defeat Jackson, disclosed an opportunity to the enemy, and a new danger to my right and to the long line of supplies from the White House to the Chickahominy, and forced an immediate change of base across the Peninsula. To that end from the evening of the 26th every energy of the army was bent. Such a change of base in the presence of a powerful enemy is one of the mQst difficult under- takings in war. I was confident of the valor and discipline of my brave army, and knew that it could be trusted equally to retreat or advance an(l to fight the series of battles now inevitable whether retreating from victories or marching through defeats; and, in short, I had no doubt whatever of its ability, even against superior numbers, to fight its way through to the James River, and get a position whence a suc- cessful advance upon Richmond would be again possible. Their superb conduct through the next seven days justified my faith. On the same day General Van Vliet, chief quartermaster of the Army of the Potomac, by my orders telegraphed to Colonel Ingalls, quarter- master at the White House, as follows: Run tlie cars to the last moment, and load them with provisions and ammunition. Load every wagon you have with subsistence, and send them to Savage Station by way of Bottoms Bridge. If you are obliged to abandon White House burn everything that you cannot get off. You must throw all our supplies up the James River as soon as possible, and accompany them yourself with all your force. It will be of vast im- portance to establish our depots on James River without delay if we abandon White House. I will keep you a4vised of every movement so long as the wires work; after that you must exercise your own judgment. All these commands were obeyed. So excellent were the disposi- tions of the different officers in command of the troops, depots, and gunboats, and so timely the warning of the approach of the enemy, that almost everything was saved, and but a small amount of stores destroyed, to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy. General Stonemans communications with the main army being cu Page 54 54 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXilL off, he fell back upon the White House and thence to Yorktown, when the White House was evacuated. ~On the 26th orders were sent to all the corps commanders on the right bank of the Chickahominy to be prepared to send as many troops as they could spare on the followiiig day to the left bank of the river, as will be seen from the appended telegrams. General Franklin re- ceived instructions to hold General Slocums division in readiness by daybreak of the 27th, and if heavy firing should at that time be heard in the direction of General Porter, to move it at once to his assistance without further orders. At noon on the 26th the approach of the enemy, who had crossed above Meadow Bridge, was discovered by the advanced l)ickets at that point, and at 12.30 p. m. they were attacked and driven in. All the pickets were now called in, and the regiment and battery at Mechan- icsville withdrawn. Meades brigade was ordered up as a reserve in rear of the line, and shortly after Martindales and Griffins brigades of Morells division were moved forward and deployed on the right of McCalPs division, toward Shady Grove Church, to cover that flank. Keither of these three brigades, however, were warmly engaged, though two of Griffins regiments relieved a portion of Reynolds line just at the close of the action. The position of our troops wa~ a strong one, extending along the left bank of Beaver Dam Creek, the left resting on the Chickahominy and the right in thick woods beyond the upper road from Mechanicsville to Cold Harbor. The lower or river roa(l crossed the creek at Ellisons Mill. Seymours brigade held the left of the line from the Chicka- homirty to beyond the mill, partly in woods and partly in clear ground, and Reynolds the right, princi~)ally in the woods and covering the upper road. The artillery occupied positions commanding the roads and the open ground across the creek. Timber had been felled, rifle pits dug, and the position generally pre- pared with a care that greatly contributed to the success of the day. The passage of the creek was difficult along the whole front, and un- practicable for artillery, except by the two roads where the main efforts of the enemy were directed. At 3 p. mu. he formed his line of battle, rapidly advanced his skir- mishers, and soon attacked our whole line, making at the same time a determined attempt to force the passage of the upper road, which was successfully resisted by General Reynolds. After a severe struggle lie was forced to retire with very heavy loss. A rapid artillery fire, with desultory skirmishing, was maintained along the whole front, while the enemy massed his trool)s for another effort at the lower road about two hours later, which was likewise re- pulsed by General Seymour with heavy slaughter. The firing ceased, and the enemy retired about 9 p. in., the action having lasted six hours, with entire success to our arms. But few, if any, of Jacksons troops were engaged on this day. The l)ortioul of the enemy encountered were chiefly from the troops omi the right bank of the river, who crossed near Meadow Bridge and at Mechanicsville. The information in my possession soon after the close of this action convinced me that Jackson was really aJ)proaching in large force. The position on Beaver Dam Creek, although so successfully defended, had its right flank too much in the aim, and was too far from the main army to make it available to retain it longer. I therefore determiumed to send the heavy guns at Hogans and Gaines houses over the Chickahomnin Page 55 CHAP. XXIII.) GENERAL REPORTS. 55 during the night, with as many of the wagons of the Fifth Corps as l)ossible, and to withdraw the corps itself to a position stretching around the bridges, where its flanks would be reasonably secure, and it would be within supporting distance of the main army. General Porter car- ried out my orders to that effect. It was not advisable at that time, even had it been practicable, to withdraw the Fifth Corps to the right bank of the Chickahominy. Such a movement would have exposed the rear of the army, placed as between two fires, and enabled Jacksons fresh troops to interrupt the movement to James River, by crossing the Chiekahominy in the vicinity of Jones Bridge before we could reach Malvern Hill with our trains. I deter- mined then to resist Jackson with the Fifth Corps, re-enforced by all our disposable troops in the new position near the bridge I ieads, in order to cover the withdrawal of the trains and heavy guns, and to give time for the arrangements to secure the adoption of the James River as our line of supplies in lieu of the Pamunkey. The greater part of the heavy guns and wagons having been removed to the right bank of the Chickahominy, the delicate operation of with- drawing the troops from Beaver Dam Creek was commenced shortly before daylight and successfully executed. Meades and Griffins brigades were the first to leave the ground. Seymours brigade covered the rear with the horse batteries of Captains Robertson and Tidball, but the withdrawal was so skillful and gradual and the repulse of the preceding day so complete, that although the enemy followed the retreat closely and some skirmishing occurred, he did not appear in front of the new line in force till about noon of the 27th, when we were prepared to receive him. About this time General Porter, believing that General Stoneman would be cut off trom him, sent him orders to fall back oii the White House, and afterwards rejoin the army as best he could. On the morning of the 27th of June, durimi g the withdrawal of his troops from Mechanicsville to the selected position already mentioned, General Porter telegraphed as follows: I hope to do without aid, though I request that Franklin, or some other command, l)e held ready to re-enforce inc. The enemy are so close that I expect to he hard pressed in front. I hope to have a 1)Ortion in position to cover the retreat. This is a delicate movement, hut relying on the good qualities of the commanders of divisions and brigades, I expect to get back and hold the new line. This shows how closely Porters retreat was followed. Notwithstanding all the efforts used during the entire night to remove the heavy guns and wagons, some of the siege guns were still in posi- tion at Gaines house after sunrise, and were finally hauled off by hand. The new position of the Fifth Corps was about an arc of a circle, cover- ing the approaches to the bridges which connected our right wing with the trool)5 on the o~)posite side of the river. Morells division held the left of the line in a strip of woods on the left bank of the Gaines Mill stream, resting its left flank on the descent to the Chickahominy, which was swel)t by our artillery on both sides of the river, and extending into open ground on the right toward New Cold Harbor. in this line General Butterfields brigade held the extreme left, General Martindales joined his right, and General Griffin still farther to the right, joined the left of General Sykes division, which, l)artly in woods an(l partly in open ground, extended in the rear of Cold Harbor. Each brigade had in reserve two of its own regiments. ~IcCalls livision, having been engaged on the day before, was formed iii a secon Page 56 56 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIU. line in the rear of the first, iNleades brigade on the left near the Chick- ahominy, Reynolds brigade on the right, covering the approaches from Cold Harbor and Dispatch Station to Sumners bridge, and Seymours in reserve to the second line, still farther in rear. General P. St. George Cooke, with five companies of the Fifth Regular Cavalry, two squadrons of the First Regnlar and three squadrons of the Sixth Pennsylvania Cavalry (Lancers), was posted behind a hill in rear of the position and near the Chickahominy, to aid in watching the left flank and defending the slope to the river. The troops were all in position by noon,with the artillery on the commanding ground and in the intervals between the divisions and brigades. Besides the division batteries there were Robertsons and Tidballs horse batteries, from the artillery reserve; the latter posted on the right of Sykes division, and the former on the extreme left of the line, in the valley of the Chickahominy. Shortly after noon the enemy were discovered approaching in force, and it soon became evident that the entfre position was to be attacked. His skirmishers advanced rapidly, and soon the firing became heavy along our whole front. At 2 p. m. General Porter asked for re-enforcements. Slocums division, of the Sixth Corps, was ordered to cross to the left bank of the river, by Alexander bridge, and proceed to his support. General Porters first call for re-enforcements, through Genei~al Bar- nard, did not reach me, nor his demand for more axes, through the same officer. By 3p.m. the engagement had become so severe,and the enemy were so greatly superior in numbers, that the entire second line and reserves had been moved forward to sustain the first line against re- peated and desperate assaults along our whole front. At 3.30 p. in. Slocums division reached the field, and was immediately brought into action at the weak points of our line. On the left the contest was for the strip of woods running almost at right angles to the Chickahominy, in front of Adams house, or between that and Gaines house. The enemy several times charged up to this wood but were each time driven back with heavy loss. The regulars, of Sykes division, on the right, also repulsed several strong attacks. But our own loss under the tremendous fire of such greatly superior numbers was very severe, and the troops, most of whom had been under arms more than two days, were rapidly becoming exhausted by the masses of fresh men constantly brought against them. When General Slocums division arrived on the gronnd it increased General Porters force to some 35,000, who were probably contending against about 70,000 of the enemy. The line was severely pressed in several points, and as its being pierced at any one would have been fatal, it was unavoidable for General Porter, who was required to hold his position until night, to divide Slocums division and send parts of it, even single regiments, to the points most threatened. About 5 p. in., General Porter having reported his position as criti- cal, Frenchs and Meaghers brigades of Richardsons division (Second Corps) were ordered to cross to his support. The enemy attacked again in great force at 6 p. in., but failed to break our lines, though our loss was very heavy. About 7 p. m. they threw fresh troops against General Porter with still greater fury, and finally gained the woods held by our left. This reverse, aided by the confusion that followed an unsuccessful charge by five companies of the Fifth Cavalry, and followed as it was by more de- termined assaults on the remainder of our lines, no~v outflanked, cause Page 57 CHAP. XX~.] GENERAL REPORTS. 57 a general retreat from our position to the hill in rear, overlooking the bridge. Frenchs and Meaghers brigades now appeared, driving before them the stragglers who were thronging toward the bridge. These brigades advanced boldly to the front, and by their example, as well as by the steadiness of their bearing, reanimated our own troops and warned the enemy that re-enforcements had arrived. It was now dusk. The ene- my, already repulsed several times with terrible slaughter, and hearing the shouts of the fresh troops, failed to follow np their advantage. This gave an opportunity to rally our men behind the brigades of Generals French and Meagher, and they again advanced up the hill ready to repulse another attack. During the night our thin and exhausted regiments were all with- drawn in safety, and by the following morning all had reached the other side of the stream. The regular infantry formed the rear guard, and about 6 oclock on the morning of the 28th crossed the river, de- stroying the bridge behind them. Our loss in this battle in killed, wounded, and missing was very heavy, especially in officers, many of whom were killed, wounded, or taken prisoners while gallantly leading on their men or rallying them to renewed exertions. It is impossible to arrive at the exact numbers lost in this desperate engagement, owing to the series of battles which followed each other in quick succession and in which the whole army was engaged. No general returns were made until after we had ar- rived at Harrisons Landing, when the losses during the whole seven days were estimated together. Although we were finally forced from our first line after the enemy had been repeatedly driven back, yet the objects sought for had been obtained. The enemy was held at bay; Our siege guns and material were saved, and the right wing had now joined the main body of the army. The number of guns captured by the enemy at this battle was twenty- two, three of which were lost by being run off the bridge during the final withdrawal. Great credit is due for the efficiency and bravery with which this important arm of the service (the artillery) was fought, and it was not until the last successftil charge of the enemy that the cannoneers were driven from their pieces or struck down, and the guns captured. Diederichs, Knieriems, and Grimms batteries took position during the engagenient in the front of General Smiths line on the right bank of the stream, and with a battery of siege guns, served by the First Con- necticut Artillery, helped to drive back the enemy in front of General Porter. So threatening were the movements of the enemy on both banks of the Chickahominy that it was impossible to decide until the afternoon where the real attack would be made. Large forces of infantry were seen during the day near the Old Tavern, on Franklins right, and threatening d1~monstrations were frequently made along the entire line on this side of the river, which rendered it necessary to hold a consider- able force iu position to meet them. On the 26th a circular was sent to the corps commanders on the right bank of the river, asking them how many of their troops could be spared to re-enforce General Porter, after retaining sufficient to hold their positions for twenty-four hours. To this the following replies were received Page 58 58 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CRAP. XXIII. HEADQUAIiTERS THIRD CORPS, June 264 p. m. I think I can hold the intrencliments with four brigades for twenty-four hours. That would leave two brigades disposable for service on the other side of the river, but the men are so tired and worn-out that I fear they would not be in a condition to fight after making a march of any distance. * * S. P. HEINTZELMAN, Brigadier-General. General R. B. MARCY. Telegrams from General Heiutzelman, on the 25th and 26th, had indicated that the enemy was in large force in front of Generals Hooker and Kearny, and on the Charles City road (Longstreet, Hill, and Huger), and General Heintzelman expressed the opinion, on the night of the 25th, that he could not hold his advanced position without re- enforcements. General Keyes telegraphed: As to how many men will be able to hold this position for twenty-four hours, I must answer, all I have, if the enemy is as strong as ever in front, it having at all times appeared to me that our forces on this flank are small enough. On the morning of the 27th the following dispatch was sent to Gen- eral Sumner: HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, June 278.45 a. ni. General Smith just reports that six or eight Fe~,iments have moved down to the woods in front of General Sumner. R. B. MARCY, Chief of Staff. General E. V. SUMNER, Commanding Second Army Corps. At 11 a. m. General Sumner telegraphed as follows: The enemy threaten an attack on my right, near Smith. At 12.30 p. m. he telegraphed: Sharp shelling on both sides. At 2.45 ~ in.: Sharp musketry firing in front of Burns. We are replying with artillery and infan- try. The man on the lookout reports some troops drawn up in line of battle about opposite my right and Smiths left; the number cannot be made out. In accordance with orders given on the night of the 26th, General Slocuins division commenced crossing the iiver to support General Porter soon after daybreak on the morning of the 27th; but as the firing in front of General Porter ceased the movement was 51151)ended. At 2 p. in. General Porter called for re-enforcements. I ordered them at once, and at 3.25 p. in. sent him the following: Slocum is now crossing Alexanders Bridge with his whole commau(l. Enemy has commenced an infantry attack on Smiths left. I have ordered dowa Sumners and Heintzelmans reserves, and you can count on the whole of Slocums. Go on as you have begun. During the day the following dispatches were receive& l, which will show the condition of affairs on the right bank of the Chiekahominv: JUNE 27, 1~62. General Smith thinks the enemy are massing heavy columns in the clearings to the right of James Garnetts house and 01] the other side of the river opposite it. Three regiments are reported to be moving from Sumners to Smiths front. The arrange- ments are very good, made by Smith. W. B. FRANKLIN, Brigadier-General. Col. A. V. COLBURN, Assistant Adjutant-General Page 59 CHAP. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 59 Afterwards he telegraphed: The enemy has begun an attack on Smiths left with infantry. I know no details. Afterwards the following: The enemy has opened on Smith from a battery of three pieces to the right of the White House. Our shells are bursting well, and Smith thinks Sumner will soon have a cross-fire upon them that will silence them. Afterwards (at 5.50 p. in.) the following was sent to General Keyes: Please send one brigade of Conchs division to these headquarters without a mo- ments delay. A staff officer will be here to direct the brigade where to go. Subsequently the following was sent tL) Generals Sumner and Frank- lin: Is there any sign of the enemy being in force in your front~ Can you spare any more force to be sent to General Porterl Answer at once. At 5.15 p. in. the following was received from General Franklin: I do not think it prudent to take any more troops from here at present. General Sumner replied as follows: If the general desires to trust the defense of my position to my front line alone, I can send French with three regiments, and Meagher with his brigade, to the right. Everything is so uncertain that I think it would be hazardous to do it. These two brigades were sent to re-enforce General Porter, as has been observed. At 5.25 p. in. I sent the following to General Franklin: Porter is hard pressed. It is not a question of prudence, but of possibilities. Can you possibly maintain your position until dark with two brigades I I have ordered eight regiments of Sumners to support Porter; one brigade of Couchs to this place; Ileintzelmans reserve to go in rear of Sumner. If l)Ossible send a brigade to support Porter. It should follow the regiments ordered from Sumner. At 7.35 p. in. the following was sent to General Sumner: If it is possible send another brigade to re-enforce General Smith. It is said three heavy columns of infantry are moving on him. From the foregoing dispatches it will be seen that all disposable troops were sent tiom the right bank of the river to re-enforce General Porter, and that the corps commanders were left with smaller forces to hold their positions than they deemed a(leqliate. To have done more, eveii though Porters reverse had been l)revented, would have had the still more disastrous result of imperiling the whole movement across the Peninsula. The operations of this day proved the numerical superiority of the enemy, and made it evident that while he had a large army on the left l)auk of the Chickahominy, which had already turned our right and was in position to intercept the communications with our (lepot at the White House, he was also in large force between our army and Iticli- mond. I therefore effecteda~ junction of our forces. This might l)rol)ably have been executed on either side of the Chicka- hominy, and it the concentration had been elketed On the left bank it is Possible we might with our entire force have defeated the enemy there; but at that time they held the roads leading to the White House, so that it would have been impossible to have sent forward supply trains in advance of the army in that direction, and the guardin~ of those trains would have seriously embarrassed our operations in the battle. We wonld have been compelled to fight if concentrated on that bank of the river. Moreover, we would at once have been followed b Page 60 60 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XX1II. the enemys forces upon the Richmond side of the river operating upon our rear, and if in the chances of war we had been ourselves defeated in the effort, we would have been forced to fall back to the White House, and probably to Fort Monroe, and as both our flanks and rear would then have been entirely exposed, our entire supply train, if not the greater part of the army itself, might have been lost. The move- ments of the enemy showed that they expected this, and, as they them- selves acknowledged, they were pyepared to cut oft our retreat in that direction. I therefore concentrated all our forces on the right bank of the river. During the night of the 26th and morning of the 27th all our wagons, heavy guns, & c., were gathered there. It may be asked, why, after - the cont~entration of our forces on the right bank of the Chickahominy, with a large part of the enemy drawn away from Richmond upon the opposite side, I did not, instead of strik- ing for James River, 15 miles below that place, at puce march directly on Richmond. It will be remembered that at this juncture the enemy was on our rear, and there was every reason to believe that he would sever our communications with the supply depot at the White House. We had on hand but a limited amount of rations, and if we had ad- vanced directly on Richmond it would have required considerable time to carry the strong works around that place, during which our men would have been destitute of food, and even if Richmond had fallen be- fore our arms the enemy could still have occupied our supply communi- cations between that place and the gunboats and turned the disaster into victory. If, on the other hand, the enemy had concentrated all his forces at Richmond (luring the progress of our attack, a4nd we had been defeated, we must in all ~)robability have lost our trains before reaching the flotilla. The battles which continued day after day in the progress of our flank movement to the James River, with the exception of the one at Gaines Mill, were snecesses to our arms, and the closing engagenient at Malvern Hill was the most decisive of all. On the evening of the 27th of June I assembled the corps command- ers at my headquarters and informed them of my plan, its reasons, and my choice of route and method of execution. General Keyes was directed to move his corps, with its artillery and baggage, across the White Oak Swamp Bridge and to seize strong positions on the opposite side of the swamp, to cover the passage of the other troops and trains. This order was executed on the 28th by noon. Before daybreak on the 28th I went to Savage Station and remained there during the day and night, directing the withdrawal of the trains and supplies of the army. Orders were given to the different commanders to load their wagons with ammunition and provisions and the necessary baggage of the officers and men, and to destroy all property which could not be trans- ported with the army. Orders were also given to leave with those of the sick and wounded who could not be transported a proper complement of surgeons and attendants, with a bountiful supply of rations and medical stores. The large herd of 2,500 beef cattle was by the chief commissary, Colonel Clarke, transferred to the James River without loss. On the morning of the 28th, while General Franklin was withdraw- ing his command from Goldings farm, the enemy opened upon General Smiths division from Garnetts Hill, from the valley above, and from Gaines Hill, on the opposite side of the Chickahominy, and shortl Page 61 CHAP. XXIII.]. GENERAL REPORTS. 61 afterwards two Georgia regiments attempted to carry the works about to be vacated, bat this attack was repulsed by the Thirty-Third New York and the Forty-Ninth Pennsylvania Volunteers on picket and a section of Motts battery. Porters corps was moved across White Oak Swamp during the day and night, and took up positions covering the roads leading from Richmond toward White Oak Swamp and Long Bridge. McCalls division was ordered on the night of the 28th to move across the swamp and take a proper position to assist in covering the remaining troops and trains. During the same night the corps of Sumner and lleintzelman and the division of Smith were ordered to an interior line, the left resting on Keyes old intrenchments and curving to the right, so as to cover Savage Station. General Slocums division, of Franklins corps, was ordered to Savage Station, in reserve. They were ordered to hold this position until dark of the 29th, in order to cover the withdrawal of the trains, and then to fall back across the swamp and unite with the remainder of the army. On the 28th 1 sent the following to the Secretary of War: HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Savage Staion, June 28, 186212.20 a. m. I now know the full history of the day. On this side of the river (the right bank) we repulsed several strong attacks. On the left bank our men did all that men could do, all that soldiers could accomplish, but they were overwhelmed by vastly superior numbers, even after I brought my last reserves into action. The loss on both sides is terrible. I believe it will prove to be the most desperate battle of the war. The sad remnants of my men behave as men. Those battalions who fought most bravely and suffered most are still in the best order. My regulars were superb, and I count upon what are left to turn another battle, in company with their gallant coin- rades of the volunteers. Had I 20,000 or even 10,000 fresh troops to use to-morrow I could take Richmond, but I have not a man in reserve, and shall be glad to cover my retreat and save the material and personnel of the army. If we have lost the day we have yet preserved our honor, and no one need blush for the Army of the Potomac. I have lost this battle because my force was too small. I again repeat that I am not responsible for this, and I say it with the earnestness of a general who feels in his heart the loss of every brave man who has been need- lessly sacrificed to-day. I still hope to retrieve our fortunes, but to do this the Govern- ment must view the matter in the same earnest light t.h at I do. You must send me very large re-enforcements, and send them at once. I shall draw back to this side of Chickahominy, and think I can withdraw all our material. Please understand that in this battle we have lost nothing but men, and those the best we have. In addition to what I have already said, I only wish t.o say to the President that. I think he is wrong in regarding me as ungenerous when I said that my force was too weak. I merely intimated a truth which to-day has been too plainly proved. It; at this instant, I could dispose of 10,000 fresh men, I could gain a victory to-morrow. I know that a few thousand more men would have changed this battle from a defeat to a victory. As it is, the Government must not and cannot hold me responsible for the result. I feel too earnestly to-night. I have seen too many dead and wounded comrades to feel otherwise than that the Government has not sustained this army. If you do not do so now the game is lost. If I save this army now, I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you or to any other persons in Washington. You have done your best to sacrifice this army. GEO. B. McCLELLAN. Hon. E. M. STANTON, The headquarters camp at Savage Station was broken up early on the morning of the 29th, and moved across White Oak Swamp. As the essential part of this days operations was the passage of the trains across the swamp and their protection against attack from the direction o Page 62 62 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIII. New Market and Richmond, as well as the immediate and secure estab- lishment of our communications with the gunboats, I passed the day in examining the ground, directing the posting of troops and securing the uninterrupted movement of the trains. In the afternoon I instructed General Keyes to move during the night to James River, and occupy a defensive position near Malvern Hill, to secure our extreme left flank. General F. J. Porter was ordered to follow him, and prolong the line toward the right. The trains were to be pushed on toward James River in rear of these corps, and placed under the 1)rotection of the gunboats as they arrived. A sharp skirmish with the enemys cavalry early this day on the Quaker road showed that his efforts were about to be directed toward impeding our progress to the river, and rendered my presence in that quarter necessary. BATTLE OF ALLENS FARM. General Sumner vacated his works at Fair Oaks on June 29 at day- light, and marched his command to Orchard Station, halting at Allens field, between Orchard and Savage Stations. The divisions of Richard- son and Sedgwick were formed on the right of the railroad, facing toward Richmond, Richardson holding the right and Sedgwick joining the right of lleintzelmans corps. The first line of Richardsons division was held by General French, General Caldwell supporting in the second. A log building in front of Richardsons division was held by Colonel Brooke with one regiment (Fifty-third Pennsylvania Yolunteers), with ilazzards battery on an elevated piece of ground, a little in rear of Colonel Brookes command. At 9 a. m. the enemy commenced a furions attack on the right of General Sedgwick, but were repulsed. The left of General Richardson was next attacked, the enemy attempting in vain to carry the position of Colonel Brooke. Captain ilazzards battery, and Pettits battery, which afterward replaced it, were served with great effect, while the Fifty-third Pennsylvania kept np a steady fire on the advancing enemy, compelling them at last to retire in disorder. The enemy renewed the attack three times, but were as often repulsed. BATTLE OF SAVAGE STATION. General Slocum arrived at Savage Station at an early hour on the 29th, and was ordered to cross White Oak Swamp and relieve General Keyes corps. As soon as General Keyes was thus relieved he moved toward James River, which he reached in safety with all his artillnry and baggage early on the morning of the 30th, and took up a position below Turkey Creek Bridge. During the morning General Franklin heard that the enemy, after having repaired the bridges, was crossing the Chickahominy in large force and advancing toward Savage Station. He communicated this information to General Sumner, at Allens farm, and moved Smiths division to Savage Station. A little after noon General Sumner united his forces with those of General Franklin, and assumed command. I had ordered General lleiutzelman, with his corps, to hold the Williamsburg road until dark at a point where there wem e several field. works, and a skirt of timber between these works and the railroad, but he fell back before night, and crossed White Oak Swamp at Bracketts Ford Page 63 CHAP. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 63 General Sumner, in his report of the battle of Savage Station, sayt~: When the enemy appeared on the Williamsburg road I could not imagine why Gen- eral Heintzelmau did not attack him, and not until some time afterward did I learn, to my utter amazement, that General Heintzelman had left the field, and retreated with his whole corps (about 15,000 men) before the action commenced. This defection might have been attended with the most disastrous consequences, and although we beat the enemy signally and drove him from the field, we should certainly have given him a more crushing blow if General Heintzelman had been there with his corps. General lleintzelman, in his report of the operations of his corps, says: On the night of the 25th of June I received orders to withdraw the troops of my corps from the advanced position they had taken on the 25th of June, and to occupy the intrenched lines about a mile in rear. A map was sent me, showing the positions General Sumners and General Franklins corps would occupy. About sunrise the next day our troops slowly fell back to the new position, cau- tiously followed by the enemy, taking possession of our camps as soon as we left them. From some misapprehension General Sumner held ~ more advanced position than was indicated on the map furnished me, thus leaving a space of about three-fourths ot a mile between the right of his corps and General Smiths division of General Frank- lins corps. * * * * * * At 11 a. m. on the 29th the enemy commenced an attack on General Sumners troops, a few shells falling within my lines. Late in the forenoon reports reached me that the rebels were in possession of Dr. Trents house, only l~ miles from Savage Station. I sent several cavalry reconnaissances, and finally was satisfied of the fact. General Franklin came to my headquarters, when I learned of the interval between his left and General Sumners right, in which space Dr. Trenis house is; also that the rebels had repaired one of the bridges across the Chickahominy and were advancing. * * * * * * * I rode forward to see General Sumner, and met his troops falling back on the Will- iamsburg roa(l through my lines. General Sumner informed me that he intended to make a stand at Savage Station, and for me to join him to determine upon the position. This movement of General Sumners uncovering my right flank, it became necessary for me to at once withdraw my troops. * ~ ~ I rode back to find General Sumner. Mter some delay from the mass of troops in the field I found him and learned that the course of action had been determined on; so I returned to give the necessary orders for the destruction of the railroad cars, ammunition, and provisions still re- maining on the ground. * * * * * U * The whole open space near Savage Station was crowded with troopsmore than I supposed could be brought into action judiciously. An aide from the commanding general had in the morning reported to me to point out a road across the White Oak Swamp, starting from the left of General Kearnys position and leading by Bracketts Ford. * * * * * * * The advance of the column reached the Charles City road at 6.30 p. m. and the rear at 10 p. m. without accident. The orders given by me to Generals Sumner, lleintzelman, and Franklin were to hold the positions assigned them until dark. As stated by General lleintzelman, General Sumner did not occupy the designated position; but as he was the senior officer present on that side of the White Oak Swamp, he may have thought that the move- ments of the enemy justified a deviation from the letter of the orders. It appears from his report that he assumed command of all the troops near Savage Station an(l determined to resist the enemy there, and that he gave General lleintzelman orders to hold the same position as I had assigned him. The aide sent by me to General lleintzelman to point out the road across the swamp was to guide him in retiring after dark. On reaching Savage Station, Si and Franklins commands were (Irawn up in line of battle in the large open field to the left of the railroad, the left resting on the edge of the woods and the righ Page 64 64 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [ChAP. XXIII. extending down to the railroad. General Brooks, with his brigade, held the wood to the left of the field, where he did excellent service, receiving a wound, but retaining his command. General Hancocks brigade was thrown into the woods on the right and front. At 4 p. m. the enemy commenced his attack in large force by the Williamsburg road. It was gallantly met by General Burns brigade, supported and re-enforced by two lines in reserve, and finally by the New York Sixty-ninth, ilazzards and Pettits batteries again doing good service. Osborns and Bramhalls batteries also took part effectively in this action, which was continued with great obstinacy until between 8 and 9 p. in., when the enemy were driven from the field. Immediately after the battle the orders were repeated for all the troops to fall back and cross White Oak Swamp, which was accom- plished during the night in good order. By midnight all the troops were on the road to White Oak Swamp Bridge, General French, with his brigade, acting as rear guard, and at 5 a. m. on the 30th all had crossed, and the bridge was destroyed. On the afternoon of the 29th I gave to the corps commanders their instructions for the operations of the following day. As stated before, Porters corps was to move forward to James River, and, with the corps of General Keyes, to occupy a position at or near Turkey Bend, on a line perpendicular to the river, thus covering the Charles City road to Richmond, opening communication with the gunboats, and cov- ering the passage of the supply trains, which were pushed forward as rapidly as possible upon ilaxalls plantation. The remaining corps were pressed onward and posted so as to guard the approaches from Richmond, as well as the crossings of the White Oak Swamp, over which the army had passed. General Franklin was ordered to hold the passage of White Oak Swamp Bridge and cover the withdrawal of the trains from that point. His command consisted of his own corps, with General Richardsons division and General Naglees brigade, placed under his orders for the occasion. General Slocums division was on the right of the Charles City road. On the morning of the 30th I again gave to the corps commanders within reach instructions for posting their troops. I found that, not- withstanding all the efforts of my personal staff and other officers, the roads were blpcked by wagons, and there was great difficulty in keep- ing the trains in motion. The engineer officers whom I had sent forward on the 28th to recon- noiter the roads had neither returned nor sent me any reports or guides. Generals Keyes and Porter had been delayedone by losing the road and the other by repairing an old roadand had not been able to send me any information. We then knew of but one road for the movement of the troops and our immense trains. It was therefore necessary to post the troops in advance of this road, as well as our limited knowledge of the ground permitted, so as to cover the movement of the trains in the rear. I then examined the whole line from the swamp to the left, giving final instructions for the posting of the troops and the obstruc- tions of the roads toward Richmond, and all corps commanders were directed to hold their positions until the trains had passed, after which a more concentrated position was to be taken up near James River. Our force was too small to occupy and hold the entire line frouX the White Oak Swamp to the river, exposed as it was to be taken in reverse by a movement across the lower part of the swamp, or across the Chick Page 65 CHAP. XXHJ.j GENERAL REPORTS. 65 ahominy, below the swamp. Moreover, the troops were then greatly exhausted, and required rest in a more secure position. I extended my examination of the country as far as Haxalls, look- lug at all the approaches to Malvern, which position I perceived to be the key to our operations in this quarter, and was thus enabled to ex- pedite very considerably the passage of the trains and to rectify the positions of the troops. Everything being then quiet, I sent aides to the different corps commanders to inform them what I had done on the left, and to bring me information of the condition of affairs on the right. I returned from Malvern to ~ and having made arrange. ments for instant communication from Malvern by signals, went on board of Captain Rodgers gunboat, lying near, to confer with him in reference to the condition of our supply vessels and the state of things on the river. It was his opinion that it would be necessary for the army to fall back to a position below City Point, as the channel there was so near the southern shore that it would not be possible to bring up the transports should the enemy occupy it. Harrisons Landing was, in his opinion, the nearest suitable point. Upon the termination of this interview I returned to Malvern Hill, and remained there until shortly before daylight. BATTLE OF NELSONS FARM, OR GLENDALE. On the morning of the 30th General Sumner was ordered to march with Sedgwicks division to Glendale (Nelsons Farm). General Mc. Calls division (Pennsylvania Reserves) was halted during the morn- ing on the New Market road, just in advance of the point where the road turns off to Quaker Church. This line was formed perpendien. larly to the New Market road, with Meades brigade on the right, Sey. mours on the left, and Reynolds brigade, commanded by Col. S. C-. Simmons, of the Fifth Pennsylvania, in reserve; Randels regular bat- tery on the right, Kerns and Coopers batteries opposite the center, and Diederichs and Knieriems batteries of the artillery reserve on the left, all ~in front of the infantry line. The country in General McCalls front was an open field, intersected toward the right by the New Mar- ket road and a small strip of timber parallel to it. The open front was about 800 yards, its depth about 1,000 yards. On the morning of the 30th General Heintzelman ordered the bridge at Bracketts Ford to be destroyed and trees to be felled across that road and the Charles City road. General Slocums division was to extend to the Charles City road. General Kearnys left to connect with General Slocums left. General McCalls position was to the Thft of the Long Bridge road, in connection with General Kearnys left. General Hooker was on the left of General McCall. Between 12 and 1 oclock the enemy opened a fierce cannonade upon the divisions of Smith an(l Richardson and Naglees brigade at White Oak Swamp Bridge. This artillery fire was continued by the enemy through the day, and he crossed some infantry below our position. Richardsons division sut- fered severely. Captain Ayres directed our artillery with great effect. Captain Hazzards battery, after losing many cannoneers and Captain Hazzard being mortally wounded, was compelled to retire. It was re- placed by Pettits battery, which partially silenced the enemys guns. General Franklin held his position until after dark, repeatedly driv- ing back the enemy in their attempts to cross the White Oak Swamp. At 2 oclock in the day the enemy were reported advancing in 5 R KVOL X Page 66 66 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIII. force by the Charles City road, and at half past 2 oclock the attack was made down the road on General Slocums left, but was checked by his artillery. After this the enemy in large force, comprising the di- visions of Longstreet and A. P. Hill, attacked General McCall, whose division, after severe fighting, was compelled to retire. General McCall, in his report of the battle, says: * * * * * About half past two my pickets were driven in by a strong advance, after some skir- mishing, without loss on our part. At 3 oclock the enemy sent forward a regiment on the left center and another on the right center, to feel for a weak point. They were under cover of a shower of shells and boldly advanced, but were both driven backon the left by the Twelfth Regi- ment and on the right by the Seventh Regiment. For nearly two hours the battle raged hotly here. * * * At last the enemy was compelled to retire before the well-directed musketry fire of the reserves. The German batteries were driven to the rear, but I rode up and sent them back. It was, however, of little avail, and they were soon after abandoned by the cannon- eers. * * * The batteries in front of the center were boldly charged upon, but the enemy were speedily forced back. ~ * * Soon after this a most determined charge was ~iade on Randols battery by a full brigade, advancing in wedge-shape without order, but in perfect recklessness. Somewhat similar charges had, I have stated, been pre- viously made on Coopers and Kerns batteries by single regiments without success, they having recoiled before the storm of canister hurled against them. A like result was anticipated by Randols battery, and the Fourth Regiment was requested not to fire until the )attery had done with them. Its gallant commander did not doubt his ability to repel the attack, and his guns did, indeed, mow down the advancing host; but still the gaps were closed, and the enemy came in upon a run to the very muzzle of his guns. It was a perfect torrent of men, and they were in his battery before the guns could be removed. Two guns that were, indeed, successfully limbered had their horses killed and wounded and were overturned on the spot, and the enemy dashing past drove the greater part of the Fourth Regiment before them. The left company (B) neverthc~ss stood its ground, with its captain, Fred. A. Conrad, as did likewise certain men of other companies. I had ridden into the regiment and endeavored to check them, but with only partial success. * * * * * * U There was no running; but my division, reduced by the previous battles to less than 6,000, had to contend with the divisions of Longstreet and A. P. Hill, considered two of the strongest and best among many of the Confederate Army, numbering that day 18,000 or 20,000 men, and it was reluctantly compelled to give way before heavier force accumulated upon them. * * * * * * * General Heintzelman states that about 5 oclock p. m. General McCalls division was attacked in large force, evidently the principal attack; that in less than an hour the division gave way, and adds: General Hooker being on his left, by moving to the right repulsed the rebels in the handsomest manner, with great slaughter. General Sumner, who was with General Sedgwick in McCalls rear, also greatly aided with his artillery and infantry in driv- ing back the enemy. They now renewed their attack with vigor on General Kear- nys left, and were again repulsed with heavy loss. * * * * * * This attack commenced about 4 p. in., and was pushed by heavy masses with the utmost determination and vigor. Captain Thompsons battery, directed with great precision, firing double charges, swept them back. The whole open space, 200 paces wide, was filled with the enemy. Each repulse brought fresh troops. The third attack was only repulsed by the rapid volleys and determined charge of the Sixty-third Pennsylvania, Colonel Hays, and half of the Thirty-seventh New York Volunteers. General McCalls troops soon began to emerge from the woods into the open field. Several batteries were in position, and began to fire into the woods over the heads of our men in front. Captain De Russys battery was l)laced on the right of General Sumners artillery, with orders to shell the woods. General Burns brigade was then advanced to meet the enemy, and soon drove him back. Other troops b.egan to return from the White Oak Swamp. Later in the day, at the call o Page 67 CHAP. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 67 General Kearny, General Taylors First New Jersey Brigade, Slocums division, was sent to occupy a portion of the position from which Gen- eral McCalls division had been forced back by the attack of superior numbers, a battery accompanying the brigade. They soon drove back the enemy~ who shortly after gave up the attack, contenting themselves with keeping up a desultory firing till late at night. Between 12 afld 1 o clock at night General lleintzehnan commenced to withdraw his corps, and soon after daylight both of his divisions, with General Slocums division and a portion of General Sumners command, reached Malvern Hill. On the morning of the 30th, General Sumner, in obedience to orders, had moved promptly to Glendale, and upon a call from General Frank- lin for re-enforcements, sent him two brigades, which returned in time to participate and render good service in the battle near Glendale. General Sumner says of this battle: The battle of Glendale was the most severe action since the battle of Fair Oaks. About 3 oclock p. m. the action commenced, and after a furious contest, lasting until after dark, the enemy was routed at all points and driven from the field. The rear of the supply trains and the reserve artillery of the army reached Malvern Hill about 4 p. m. At about this time the enemy began to appear in General Porters front, and at 5 oclock advanced in large force against his left flank, posting artillery under cover of a skirt of timber, with a view to engage our force on Malvern Hill, while with his infantry and some artillery he attacked Colonel Warrens brigade. A concentrated fire of about thirty guns was brought to bear on the enemy, which, with the infantry fire of Colonel Warrens command, compelled him to retreat, leaving two guns in the hands of Colonel Warren. The gunboats rendered most efficient aid at this time, and helped to drive back the enemy. It was very late at night before my aides returned to give me the results of the days fighting along the whole line and the true position of affairs. While waiting to hear from General Franklin, before send- ing orders to Generals Sumner and Heintzelman, I received a message from the latter that General Franklin was falling back, whereupon I sent Colonel Colburn, of my staff, with orders to verify this, and, if it were true, to order in Generals Sumner and Heintzelman at once. He had not gone far when he met two officers, sent from General Franklins headquarters, with the information that he was falling back. Orders were then sent to Generals Sumner and Heintzelman to fall back also, and definite instructions were given as to the movement which was to commence on the right. The orders met these troops already en route to Malvern. Instructions were also sent to General Franklin as to the route he was to follow. Generals Barnard and A. A. Humphreys then received full instruc- tions for posting the troops as they arrived.. I then returned to Haxalls, and again left for Malvern soon after daybreak. Accompanied by several general officers, I once more made the entire circuit of the position, and then returned to Haxalls, whence I went with Captain Rodgers to select the final location for the army and its depots. I returned to Malvern before the serious fighting com- menced, and after riding along the lines, and seeing most cause to feel anxious about the right, remained in that vicinity. BATTLE OF MALVERN HILL. The position selected for resisting the farther advance of the enemy o Page 68 68 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIII. the 1st of July was with the left aiid center of our lilies resting on Mal- vein Hill, while the right curved backwards through a wooded country toward a point below Haxalls, on James River. Malvern Hill is an elevated plateau about a mile and a half by three-fourths of a mile in area, well cleared of timber, and with several converging roads running over it. In front are numerous defensible ravines, and the ground slopes gradually toward the north and east to the wood-land, giving clear ranges for artillery in those directions. Toward the northwest the plateau falls off more abruptly into a ravine which extends to James River. From the position of the enemy his most obvious lines of attack would come from the direction of Richmond and White Oak Swamp, and would almost of necessity strike us upon our left wing. Here, therefore, the lines were strengthened by massing the troops and collecting the principal part of the artillery. Porters corps held the left of the line (Sykes division on the left, Morells on the right), with the artillery of his two divisions advantageously posted, and the artil- lery of the reserve so disposed on the high ground that a concentrated fire of some sixty guns could be brought to bear on any point in his front or left. Colonel Tyler also had, with great exertion, succeeded in getting ten of his siege guns in position on the highest point of the hill, Couchs division was placed on the right of Porter; next came Kearny and Hooker, next Sedgwick and Richardson~ next Smith and Slocum, then the remainder of Keyes corps, extending by a backward curve nearly to the river. The Pennsylvania Reserve Corps was held in re-- serve, and stationed behind Porters and Couchs position. One brigade of Porters was thrown to the left on the low ground to protect that flank from any movement direct from the Richmond road. The line was very strong along the whole front of the open plateau, but from thence to the extreme right the troops were more deployed. This forma- tion was imperative, as an attack would probably be made upon our left. The right was rendered as secure as possible by slashing the timber and by barricading the roads. Commodore Rodgers, commanding the fib. tilla on James River, placed his gunboats so as to protect our flanks and to command the approaches from Richmond. Between 9 and 10 a. m. the enemy commenced feeling along our whole left wing with his artillery and skirmishers as far to the right as Hookers division. About 2 oclock a column of the enemy was observed moving toward our right within the skirt of woods in front of Heintzehnan5 corps, but beyond the range of our artillery. Arrangements were at once made to meet the anticipated attack in that quarter, but, though the column was long, occupying more than two hQurs in passing, it disappeared and was not again heard of. The presumption is that it retired by the rear, and participated in the attack afterward made on our left. About 3 p. m. a heavy fire of artillery opened on Kearnys left and Couchs division, speedily followed up by a brisk attack of infantry on Couchs front. The artillery was replied to with good effect by our own, and the infantry of Couchs division remained lying on the ground until the advancing column was within short musket range, when they sprang to their feet and poured in a deadly volley, which entirely broke the attacking force and drove them in disorder back over their own ground. This advantage was followed up until we had advanced the right of our line some 700 or 800 yards, and rested npon a thick clump of trees, giving us a stronger position and a better fire. Shortly after 4 oclock the firing ceased along the whole front, but no disposition was evinced on the part of the enemy to withdraw fro Page 69 ChAr. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 69 the field. Caidwells brigade, having been detached from Richardsons division, was stationed upon Couchs right by General Porter, to whom he had been ordered to report. The whole line was surveyed by the generals, and everything held in readiness to meet the coming attack. At 6 oclock the enemy suddenly opened upon Conch and Porter with the whole strength of his artillery, and at once began pushing forward his columns of attack to carry the hill. Brigade after brigade, formed under cover of the woods, started at a run to cross the open space and charge our batteries, but the heavy fire of our guns, with the cool and steady volleys of our infantry, iu every case sent them reeling back to shelter, and covered the ground with their dead and wounded. In several instances our infantry withheld their fire until the attacking column, which rushed through the storm of canister and shell from our artillery, had reached within a few yards of our lines. They then poured in a single volley and dashed forward with the bayonet, cap. turing prisoners and colors, and driving the routed columns in confa- sion from the field. About 7 oclock, as fresh troops were accumulating in front of Porter and Conch, Meagher and Sickles were sent with their brigades, as soon as it was considered prudent to withdraw any portion of Sumners and lleintzelmans troops, to re-enforce that part of the line and hold the l)osition. These brigades relieved such regiments of Porters corps and Couchs division as had expended their ammunition, and batteries from the reserve were pushed forward to replace those whose boxes were empty. Until dark the enemy persisted in his efforts to take the posi- tion so tenaciously defended; but despite his vastly superior numbers his repeated and desperate attacks were repulsed with fearful loss, and darkness ended the battle of Malvern Hill, though it was not until after 9 oclock that the artillery ceased its fire. Iii~uring the whole battle Commodore Rodgers added greatly to the discomfiture of the enemy by throwing shell among his reserves and ad- vancing columns. As the army in its movement from the Chickahominy to Harrisons Landing was continually occupied in marching by night and fighting by day, its commanders found no time or opportunity for collecting data which would enable them to give exact returns of casualties in each engagement. The aggregate of our entire losses from the 26th of June to the 1st of July, inclusive, was ascertained, after arriving at Harrisons Landing, to be as follows: Li8t of killed, wounded, and missing in the Army of the Potomac from the 26th of June to the 1st of July, 1862, inclusive.* Corps I ~ a a a a 1st, McCalls division (Pennsylvania Reserves) 253 1, 240 1, 581 3, 074 2d, 5umners 187 1, 076 848 2, 111 3d, Heintzelmans - 189 1, 051 833 2, 073 4th, Keyes 69 507 201 777 5th, Porters - 620 2, 460 1, 198 4, 278 6th, Franklin 245 1, 313 1, 179 2, 737 Engineers - 2 21 23 Cavaky 19 ~ 97 176 Total 1,582 7,709 ~, 958 15, 249 * But see revised statement of losses from June 25 to July 1 in Part II, pp. 2441 Page 70 70 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIIL Although the result of the battle of Malvern was a complete victory, it was nevertheless necessary to fall back still farther, in order to reach a point where our supplies could be brought to us with certainty. As before stated, in the opinion of Captain Rodgers, commanding the gun- boat flotilla, this could only be done below City Point. Concurring in his opinion, I selected Harrisons Bar as the new position of the army. The exhaustion of our supplies of food, forage, and ammunition made it imperative to reach the transports immediately. The greater portion of the transportation of the army having been started for Harrisons Landing during the night of the 30th of June and 1st of July, the order for the movement of the troops was at once issued upon the final repulse of the enemy at Malvern Hill. The order prescribed a movement by the left and rear, General Keyes corps to cover the maneuver, it was not carried out in detail as regards the divisions on the left, the roads being somewhat blocked by the rear of our trains. Porter and Couch were not able to move out as early as had been anticipated, and Porter found it necessary to place a rear guard between his command and the enemy. Colonel Averell, of the Third Pennsylvania Cavalry, was intrusted with this delicate duty. He had under his command his own regiment and Lieutenant-Colonel Buchanans brigade of regular infantry and one battery. By a judi- cious use of the resources at his command he deceived the enemy so as to cover the withdrawal of the left wing without being attacked, re- maining himself on the previous days battle-field until about 7 oclock of the 2d of July. Meantime General Keyes, having received his or- ders, commenced vigorous preparations for covering the movement of the entire army and protecting the trains. It being evident that the immense number of wagons and artillery carriages pertaining to the army could not move with celerity along a single road, General Keyes took advantage of every accident of the ground to open new avenues and to facilitate the movement. He made preparations for obstructing the roads afier the army had passed, so as to prevent any rapid pursuit, destroying effectually Turkey Bridge, on the main road, and rendering other roads and approaches temporarily impassable by felling trees across them. He kept the trains well closed up, and directed the march so that the troops could move on each side of the roads, not obstruct- ing the passage, but being in good position to repel an attack from any quarter. His dispositions were so successful that, to use his own words: I do not think more vehicles or more public property were abandoned on the march from Turkey Bridge than would have been left, in the same state of the roads, if the army had been moving toward the enemy instead of away from him. And when it is understood that the carriages and teams belonging to this army, stretched out in one line, would extend not far from 40 miles, the energy and caution necessary for their safe withdrawal from the presence of an enemy vastly superior in numbers will be appreciated. The last of the wagons did not reach the site selected at Harrisons Bar until after dark on the 3d of July, and the rear guard did not move into their camp until everything was secure. The enemy fol- lowed up with a small force, and on the 3d threw a few shells at the rear guard, but were quickly dispersed by our batteries and the fire of the gunboats. Great credit must be awarded to General Keyes for the skill and energy which characterized his performance of the important and deli- cate duties intrusted to his charge. High praise is also due to the officers and men of the First Connecticut Artillery, Colonel Tyler, fo Page 71 CHAP. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 71 the manner in which they withdrew all the heavy guns during the seven days and from Malvern Hill. Owing to the crowded state of the roads the teams could not be brought within a couple of miles of the position, but these energetic soldiers removed the guns by hand for that distance, leaving nothing behind. THIRD PERIOD. On the 1st July I received the following from the President: WASHINGTON, July 1, 1862330 p. m. It is impossible to re-enforce you for your present emergency. If we had a million of men we could not get them to you in time. We have not the men to send. If you are not strong enough to face the enemy you must find a place of security, and wait, rest, and repair. Maintain your ground if you can, hut save the army at all events, even if you fall hack to Fort Monroe. We still have strength enough in the country and will bring it out. A. LINCOLN. Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN. In a dispatch from the President to me, on the 2d of July, he says: * If you think you are not strong enough to take Richmond just now, I do not ask you to. Try just now to save the army, material, and personnel, and I will strengthen it for the offensive again as fast as I can. The Governors of eighteen States offer me a new levy of 300,00 , which I accept. On the 3d of July the following kind dispatch was received from the President: t WASHINGTON, July 3, 18623 p. m. Yours of 5.30 yesterday is just received. I am satisfied that yourself; officers, and men have done the best you could. All accounts say hetter fighting was never done. Ten thousand thanks for it. * * 4 * * * * A. LINCOLN. Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN. On the 4th I sent the following lo the President: HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC Harrisons Bar, James River, July 4, 1862. I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your dispatch of the 2d instant. I shall make a stand at this place, and endeavor to give my meu the repose they so much require. After sending my commuuication on Tuesday the enemy attacked the left of our lines, and a fierce battle ensued, lasting until night. They were repulsed with great slaughter. Had their attack succeeded the consequences would have heen disas- trous in the extreme. This closed the hard fighting, which had continued from the afternoon of the 26th ultimo in a daily series of engagements wholly unparalleled on this continent for determination and slaughter on both sides. The mutual loss in killed and wounded is enormous; that of the enemy certainly greatest. On Tuesday morning, the 1st, our army commenced its movement from Haxalls to this point, our line of defense there heing too extended to he maintained by our * The entire dispatch appears in Correspondence, etc., Part III. The original reads: If you think you are not strong enough to take Richmond just now, I do not ask you to try just now. Save the army, material, & c. I The entire dispatch appears in Correspondence, etc., Part III. t See Correspondence, ~ Part III. ~ See also McClellan to Lincoln, 1 p. m. July 4, in Correspondence, etc., Part III Page 72 72 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIIL weakened forces. Our train was immense, and about 4 a. m. on the 2d a heavy storm of rain began, which continued during the entire day and until the forenoon of yester- day. The roads became horrible. Troops, artillery, and wagons moved on steadily, and our whole army, men and material, was finally brought safe into this camp. The last of the wagons reached here at noon yesterday. The exhaustion was very great, but the army preserved its morale, and would have repelled any attack which the enemy was in condition to make. We now occupy a line of heights about 2 miles from the James, a plain extending from there to the river. Our front is about 3 miles long. These heights command our whole position, and must be maintained. The gunboats can render valuable sup. port upon both flanks. If the enemy attack us in front we must hold our ground as we best may, and at whatever cost. Our positions can be carried only by overwhelm- ing numbers. The spirit of the army is excellent. Stragglers are finding their regi- ments, and the soldiers exhibit the best results of discipline. Our position is by no means impregnable, especially as a morass extends on this side of the high ground from our center to the James on our right. The enemy may attack in vast numbers, and if so, our front will be the scene of a desperate battle, which, if lost, will be deci- sive. Our army is fearfully weakened by killed, wounded, and prisoners. I cannot now approximate to any statement of our losses, but we were not beaten in any con- flict. The enemy were unable by their utmost efforts to drive us from any field. Never did such a change of base, involving a retrogade movement, and under in- cessant attacks from a most determined and vastly more numerous foe, partake so little of disorder. We have lost no guns except twenty-five on the field of battle, twenty-one of which were lost by the giving way of McCalls division under the onset of superior numbers. Our communications by the James River are not secure. There are points where the enemy can establish themselves with cannon or musketry and command the river, and where it is not certain that our gunboats can drive them out. In case of this, or in case our front is broken, I will still make every effort to preserve at least the personnel of the army, and the events of the last few days leave no question that the troops will do all that their country can ask. Send such re-enforcements as you can. I will do what I can. We are shipping our wounded and sick and landing supplies. The Navy Department should co-operate with us to the extent of its resources. Captain Rod- gers is doing all in his power in the kindest and most efficient manner. When all the circumstances of the case are known it will be acknowledged by all competent judges that the movement just completed by this army is unparalleled in the annals of war. Under the most difficult circumstances we have preserved our trains, our guns, our material, and, above all, our honor. GEO. B. McCLELI4N, Major-General. The PRESIDENT. To which I received the following reply: WAShINGTON, July 5, 18629 a. m. A thousand thanks for the relief your two dispatches, of 12 and 1 p. m. yesterday, gave me. Be assured the heroism and skill of yourself and officers and men is, and forever will be, appreciated. If~vou can hold your present position we shall hive the enemy yet. A. LINCOLN. Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN, Commanding Army of the Potomac. The following letters t were received from His Excellency the Presi- dent: WAR DEPARTMENT, Washington (Jity, D. 0., July 4, 1S62. I understand your position as stated in your letter and by General Marcy. To re enforce you so as to enable you to resume the offensive within a month, or even six weeks, is impossible. In addition to that arrived and now arriving from the Potomac, about 10,000 men, I suppose, and about 10,000 I hope you will have from Buruside very soon, and about 5,000 from Hunter a little later, I do not see how I can send you another man within a month. Under these circumstances the defensive for the present must be your only care. Save the army, first, where you are, if you can; secondly, by removal, if you must. You, on the ground, must be the judge as to which you will attempt and of the means for effecting it. I but give it as my opinion that with the For that of 1 p. in., see Correspondence, etc., Part III. t Only one dispatch follows Page 73 CuAr. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 73 aid of the gunboats and the re-enforcements mentioned above you can hold your pres- ent position, provided, and so long m, you can keep the James River open below you. If you are not tolerably confident you can keep the James River open, you had better remove as soon as possible. I do not remember that you have expressed any appre- hension as to the danger of having your communication cut on the river below you, vet I do not suppose it can have escaped your attention. Yours, very truly, A. LINCOLN. P. S.If at any time you feel able to take the offensive you are net restrained from doing so. Major-General MCCLELLAN. The following telegram was sent Oil the 7th: HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAc, Berkeley, July 7, 18628.30 a. m. As boat is starting I have only time to acknowledge receipt of dispatch by General Marcy. Enemy have not attacked. My position is very strong, and daily becoming more so. If not attacked to-day I shall laugh at them. I have been anxious about my communications. Had long consultation about it with Flag-Officer Goldsborough last night. He is confident he can keep river open. lie should have all gunboats possible. Will see him again this morning. My men in splendid spirits, and anxious to try it again. Alarm yourself as little as possible about me, and dont lose confidence in this army. GEG. B. McCLELLAN, ABRAHAM LINCOLN, President. Major-General. While General-in-Chief~ and directing the operations of all our armies iii the field, I had become deeply impressed with the importance of a(lopting and carrying out certain views regarding the conduct of the war, which, in my judgment, were essential to its objects and its suc- cess. During an active caml)aign of three months in the enemy~s coun- try these were so fully confirmed, that I conceived it a duty, in the critical position we then occupied, not to withhold a candid expression of the more important of these views from the Commander-in-Chief, whom the Constitution places at the head of the armies and navies, as well as of the Government of the nation. The following is a copy of my letter to Mr. Lincoln: HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Camp near Harri8ons Landing, Va., July 7, 1862. Mr. PRESIDENT: You have been fully informed that the rebel army is in our front with the purpose of overwhelming us by attacking our positions or reducing us by blocking our river communications. I cannot but regard our condition as critical, and I earnestly desire, in view of possible contingencies, to lay before Your Excellency for your private consideration my general views concerning the existing state of the rebellion, although they do not strictly relate to the situation of this army or strictly come within the scope of my official duties. These views amount to convictions, and are (leeply impressed upon my mind and heart. Our cause must never be abandoned; it is the cause of free institutions and self government. The Constitution and the Union must be preserved, whatever may be the cost in time, treasure, and blood. If secession is successful, other dissolutions are clearly to be seen in the future. Let neither military disaster, political faction, nor foreign war shake your settled purpose to enforce the equal operation of the laws of the United States upon the people of every State. The time has come when the Government must determine upon a civil and military policy covering the whole ground of our national trouble. The responsibility of de- termining, declaring, and supporting such civil and military policy, and of directing the whole course of national affairs in regard to the rebellion, must now be assumed and exercised by you, or our cause will be lost. The Constitution gives you power sufficient even for the present terrible exigency. This rebellion has assumed the character of a war. As such it should be regarded, and it should be conducted upon the highest principles known to Christian civiliza- tion. It should not be a war looking to the subjugation of the people of any Stat Page 74 74 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIIT. in any event. It should not be at all a war upon population, but against armed forces and political organizations. Neither confiscation of property, political executions of persons, territorial organization of States, or forcible abolition of slavery should be contemplated for a moment. In prosecuting the war all private property and unarmed persons should be strictly protected, subject only to the necessity of military operations; all private property taken for military use should be paid or receiptcd for; pillage and waste should be treated as high crimes, all unnecessary trespass sternly probibited, and offensive de- meanor by the military toward citizens promptly rebuked. Military arrests should not be tolerated, except in places where active hostilities exist, and oaths not required by enactments constitutionally made should be neither demanded nor received. Mili- tary government should be confined to the preservation of public order and the pro- tection of political rights. Military power should not be allowed to interfere with the relations of servitude, either by supporting or impairing the authority of the master, except for repressing disorder, as in other cases. Slaves, contraband under the act of Congress, seeking military protection, should receive it. The right of the Government to appropriate permanently to its own service claims to slave labor should be asserted, and the right of the owner to compensation therefor should be recognized. This principle might be extended, upon grounds of military necessity and security, to all the slaves of a particular State, thus working manumission in such State; and in Missouri, perhaps in Western Virginia also, and possibly even in Maryland, the expe- diency of such a measure is only a question of time. A system of policy thus consti- tutional, and pervaded by the influences of Christianity and freedom, would receive the support of almost all truly loyal men, would deeply impress the rebel masses and all foreign nations, and it might be humbly hoped that it would commend itself to the favor of the Almighty. Unless the principles governing the future conduct of our straggle shall be made known and approved the effort to obtain requisite forces will be almost hopeless. A declaration of radical views, especially upon slavery will rapidly disintegrate our present armies. The policy of the Government must 1e supported by concentrations of military power. The national forces should not be dispersed in expeditions, posts of occupation, and numerous armies, but should be mainly collected into masses, and brought to bear upon the armies of the Confederate States. Those armies thoroughly defeated, the political structure which they support would soon cease to exist. In carrying out any system of policy which you may form you will require a Com- mander-in-Chief of the Armyone who possesses your confidence, understands your views, and who is competent to execute your orders by directing the military forces of the nation to the accomplishment of the objects by you proposed. I do not ask that place for myself. I am willing to serve you in such position as you may assign me, and I will do so as faithfully as ever 8ubordinate served superior. I may be on the brink of eternity, and as I hope forgiveness from my Maker I have written this letter with sincerity toward you and from love for my country. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Major- General, Commanding. His Excellency ABRAHAM LINCOLN, President. I telegraphed the President on the 11th as follows: * HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TIlE POTOMAC, Berkeley, July 11, 18623 p. m. * * * * * * We are very strong here now, so far as defensive is concerned. Hope you will soon make us strong enough to advance and try it again. All iu fine spirits. GEO. B. MCCLELLAN, iftVor- General, Commanding. ABRAHAM LINCOLN, President. These telegrams were sent on the 12th, 17th, and 18th to flis Excel- lency the President: HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Berkeley, July 12, 18627.15 a. m. Hill and Longstreet crossed into New Kent County, via Long Bridge. I am still ignorant what road they afterward took, but will know shortly. * Entire dispatch appears in Correspondence, etc., Part III Page 75 CHAP. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 75 Nothing else of interest since last dispatch. Rain ceased, and everything quiet. Men resting well, but beginning to be impatient for another fight. I am more and more convinced that this army ought not to be withdrawn from here, but promptly re-enforced and thrown again upon Richmond. If we have little more than half a chance we can take it. I dread the effects of any retreat upon the morale of the men. GEG. B. McCLELLAN, ABRAHAM LINCOLN, President. Major-General, Commanding. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Berkeley, July 17, 18628 a. m. I have consulted fully with General Burnside, and would commend to your favor- able consideration the generals plan for bringing seven additional regiments from North Carolina by leaving New Berne to the care of the gunboats. It appears mani- festly to be our policy to concentrate here everything we can possibly spare from lesa important points to make sure of crushing the enemy at Richmond, which seems clearly to be the most important point in rebeldom. Nothing should be left to chance here. I w~ild recommend that General Burnside, with all his troops, be ordered to this army, to enable it to assume the offensive as soon as possible. GEO. B. MCCLELLAN, ABRAHAM LINCOLN, President. Major-General, Commanding. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Berkeley, July 18, 1862S a. m. No change worth reporting in the state of affairs. Some 20,000 to 25,000 of the enemy at Petersburg, and others thence to Richmond. Those at Petersburg say they are part of Beauregards army. New troops arriving via Petersburg. Am anxious tc have determination of Government, that no time may be lost in preparing for it. Hours are very precious now and perfect unity of action necessary. GEO. B. McCLELLAN, ABRAHAM LINCOLN, Pre8ident. Major- General, Commanding. The following was telegraphed to General ilalleck on the 28th: HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Berkeley, July 28, 18628 a. m. Nothing especially new except corroboration of reports that re-enforcements are reaching Richmond from south. It is not confirmed that any of Braggs troops are yet here. My opinion is more and more firm that here is the defense of Washington, and that I should be at once re-enforced by all available troops to enable me to ad- vance. Retreat would be disastrous to the army and the cause. I am confident of that. GEO. B. MCCLELLAN, Major-General. Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECE Commanding U. S. Army~ Washington, D. C. On the 30th I sent the following to the General-in-Chief: * HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Berkeley, July 30, 18627 a. m. * * * * * * I hope that it may soon be decided what is to be done by this army, and that the decision may be to re-enforce it at once. We are losing much valuable time, and that at a moment when energy and decision are sadly needed. GEG. B. MCCLELLAN, Major-General. Maj. Gen. H. XV. HALLECK Commanding U. S. Army Washington, D. C. *Entir~~jj~pat~h, with another to Halleck of same date, appears in Correspondence, etc., Part Ill Page 76 76 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXITL About half an hour after midnight, on the morning of August 1, the enemy brought some light batteries to Coggins Point and the Coles house, on the right bank of James River, directly opposite Harrisons Landing, and opened a heavy fire npon our shipping and encampments. It was continued rapidly for about thirty minutes, when they were driven back by the fire of our guns. This affair was reported in the following dispatch: HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Berkeley, August 2, 18628 a. m. Firing of night before last killed some 10 men and wounded about 15. No harm of the slightest consequence done to the shipping, although several were struck. Sent party across river yesterday to the Coles house; destroyed it and cut down the timber. Will complete work to-day, and also send party to Coggins Point, which I will probably occupy. I will attend to your telegraph about pressing at once. Will send Hooker out. Give me Bnrnside, and I will stir these people up. I need more cavalry; have only 3,700 for duty in cavalry division. Adjutant Generals Office forgot to send Sykes commission as major-general with those of other division commanders; do me the favor to hurry it on. GEO. B. McCLELLAN Mnj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, Washington, D. Major- General, ~Jomrna~ding. To prevent another demonstration of this character, and to insure a d~bouc1i6 on the south bank of the James, it became necessary to occupy Coggins Point, which was done on the 3d, and the enemy, as will be seen from the following dispatch, driven back toward Petersburg: HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Berkeley, August 3, 186210 p. m. Coggins Point was occupied to-day, and timber felled so as to make it quite defensible. I went over the ground. myself, and found that Duane had, as usual, selected an admirable position, which can be intrenched with a small amount of labor, so as to make it a formidable t~te-de-pont, covering the landing of a large force. I shall begin intrenching it by the labor of contrabands to-morrow. The position covers the Coles house, which is directly in front of Westover. We have now a safe d6bouch~ on the south bank, and are secure against midnight cannonading. A few thousand more men would place us in condition at least to annoy and disconcert the enemy very much. I sent Colonel Averell this morning with 300 cavalry to examine the country on the south side of the James, and try to catch some cavalry at Sycamore Church, which is on the main road from Petersburg to Suffolk, and some 5 miles from Coles house. He found a cavalry force of 550 men, attacked them at once, drove in their advance guards to their camp, where we had a sharp skirmish, and drove them off in disorder. He burned their entire camp, with their comniissary and quartermasters stores, and then returned and recrossed the river. He took but 2 prisoners, had 1 man wounded by a ball and 1 by a saber cut. Captain McIntosh made a handsome charge. The troops engaged were of the Fifth Regulars and the Third Pennsylvania Cavalry. Colonel Averell conductedthis affair, as he does everything he undertakes, to my entire satisfaction. GEG. B. McCLELLAN, Major-General, Commanding. Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLEOK, Gomdg. U. S. Army, Washington, D. C. On the 1st of August I received the following dispatches: WASHINGTON, J~ely 30, 18628 p. m. A dispatch just received from General Pope says that deserters report that the enemy is moving south of James River and that the force in Richmond is very small. I suggest he be pressed in that direction, so as to ascertain the facts of the case. H. W. HALLECK, Major-General. Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN. WASHINGTON, July 30, 18625 p. m. In order to enable you to move in any direction, it is necessary to relieve you of you Page 77 CHAr. XXLLI.l GENERAL REPORTS. 77 sick. The Surgeon-General has therefore been directed to make arrangements for them at other places, and the Quartermaster-General to provide transportation. I hope you will send them away as qnickly as possible, and advise me of their removal. H. W. HALLECK, Major-General. Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN. It is clear that the General-in-Chief attached some weight to the report received from General Pope, and I was justified in supposing that the order in regard to the removing the sick contemplated an offensive movement rather than a retreat, as I had no other data than the telegrams just given from which to form an opinion as to the inten- tions of the Government. The following telegram strengthened me in that belief: WASHINGTON, July 31, 186210 a. m. General Pope again telegraphs that the enemy is reported to be evacuating Rich- mond and falling back on Danville and Lynchburg. H. W. HALLECK, Major-General. Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN. In occupying Coggins Point, as already described, I was influenced by the necessity of possessing a secure dJbouche~ on the south of the James, in order to enable me to move on the communications of Rich- mond in that direction as well as to prevent a repetition of midnight cannonades. To carry out General Hallecks first order of July 30 it was necessary first to gain possession of Malvern Hill, which was occupied by the enemy, apparently in some little force, and controlled the direct ap- proach to Richmond. Its temporary occupation, at least, was equally necessary in the event of a movement upon Petersburg or even the abandonment of the Peninsula. General Hooker, with his own division and Pleasontons cavalry, was therefore directed to gain possession of Malvern Hill on the night of the 2d of August. He failed to do so, as the following dispatch recites: HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Berkeley, August 3, 186210.20 p. m. The movement undertaken np the river last night failed on account of the incom- petency of guides. The proper steps have been taken to-day to remedy this evil, and I hope to be ready to-morrow night to carry out your suggestions as to pressing, at least to accomplish the first indispensable step. GEG. B. MCCLELLAN, Major-General, Commanding. Major-General HALLECK, Commanding U. S. Army. On the 4th General Hooker was re-enforced by General Sedgwicks division, and having obtained a knowledge of the roads, he succeeded in turning Malvern Hill and driving the enemy back toward Richmond. The following is my report of this affair at the time: MALvERN HILL, Augu8t 5, 18621 p. m. General Hooker, at 5.30 this morning, attacked a very considerable force of infantry and artillery stationed at this place and carried it handsomely, driving the enemy to- ward New Market, which is 4 miles distant, and where it is said they have a large force. We have captured 100 prisoners, killed and wounded several, with a loss on our part of only 3 killed and 11 woundedamong the latter 2 officers. I shall probably remain here to-night, ready to act as circumstances may require Page 78 78 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIII. after the return of my cavalry reconnaissances. The mass of the enemy escaped under the cover of a dense fog, but our cavalry are still in pursuit, and I trust may succeed in capturing many more. This is a very advantageous position to cover an advance on Richmond and only 141 mtles distant, and I feel confident that with re-enforce- ments I could march this army there in five days. I this instant learn that several brigades of the enemy are 4 miles from here, on the Quaker road, and I have taken steps to prepare to meet them. General Hookers dispositions were admirable, and his officers and men displayed their usual gallantry. GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Major- General, Commanding. Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, Commanding U. S. Army. MALVERN HILL, August 5, 15625 p. m. Since my last dispatch Colonel Averell has returned from a reconnaissance in the direction of Savage Station toward Richmond. He encountered the Tenth Virginia Cavalry near White Oak Swamp Bridge, charged and drove them some distance toward Richmond, capturing 28 men and horses, killing and wounding several. Our troops have advanced 12 miles in one direction and 17 in another toward Rich- mond. To-day we have secured a strong position at Coggins Point, opposite our quarter- masters depot, which will effectually prevent the rebels from using artillery hereafter against our camps. I learn this evening that there is a force of 20,000 men about 6 miles back from this point, on the south bank of the river. What their object is I do not know, but will keep a sharp lookout on their movements. I am sending off sick as rapidly as our transports will take them. I am also doing everything in my power to carry out your orders to push reconnaissances toward the rebel capital, and hope soon to find out whether the reports regarding the abandonment of that place are trne. GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Major-General. Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, Commanding U. S. Army. To the dispatch of 1 p. in., August 5, the following answer was re- ceived: WASHINGTON, August 6, 18623 a. m. I have no re-enforcements to send you. H. W. HALLECK, Major-General. Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. McCLELLAN. And soon after the following: WASHINGTON, Augu8t 6, 1862. You will immediately send a regiment of cavalry and several batteries of artillery to Burnsides command at Aqula Creek. It is reported tlat Jackson is moving north with a very large force. H. W. HALLECK, Major- General. Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN. On the 4th J had received General Hallecks order of the 3d (which appears below), directing me to withdraw the army to Aquia, and on the same day sent an earnest protest against it. A few hours before this General Hooker had informed me that his cavalry pickets reported large bodies of the enemy advancing and driving them in, and that he would probably be attacked at daybreak. Under these circumstances I had determined to support him; but as I could not get the whole army in position until the next afternoon I concluded, upon the receipt of the above telegram from the General- in-Chief to withdraw General Hooker, that there might be the leas Page 79 CHAP. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 79 I)ossible delay in conforming to General ilallecks orders. I therefore sent to General Hooker the following letter: HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Berkeley, August 6, 186210 p. m. MY DEAR GENERAL: I find it will not be possible to get the whole army into position before some time to-morrow afternoon, which will be too late to support you and hold the entire position, should the enemy attack in large force at daybreak, which there is strong reason to suppose he intends doing. Should we fight a general battle at Malvern it will be necessary to abandon the whole of our works here, and run the risk of getting back here. Under advices I have received from Washington, I think it necessary for you to abandon the position to-night, getting everything away before daylight. Please leave cavalry pickets at Malvern, with orders to destroy the Turkey Creek Bridge when they are forced back. The roads leading into Haxalls from the right should be strongly watched, and Haxalls at least held by strong cavalry force and some light batteries as long as possible. I leave the manner of the withdrawal entirely to your discretion. Please signal to the fleet when the withdrawal is about completed. Report frequently ~o these headquarters. General Sumner was ordered up to support you, but will halt where this passes him, and will inform you where he is. GEO. B. McCLELLAN, General J. HOOKER, Commanding at Malvern Hill. Major- General. And the following reply was sent to General Halleck: HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC Berkeley, August 6, 186211.30 p. m. Dispatch of to-day received. I have not quite 4,000 cavalry for duty in cavalry division, so that I cannot possibly spare any more. I really need many more than I now have to carry out your instructions. The enemy are moving a large force on Malvern Hill. In view of your dispatches and the fact that I cannot place the whole army in position before daybreak, I have ordered Hooker to withdraw during the night if it is possible. If he cannot do so I must support him. Until this matter is developed I cannot send any batteries. I hope I can do so to-morrow if transporta- tion is on hand. I will obey the order as soon as circumstances permit. My artillery is none too numerous now. I have only been able to send off some 1,200 sick. No transportation. There shall be no delay that I can avoid. GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Major-General, Commanding. Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, Commanding U. & Army. Five batteries, with their horses and equipments complete, were em- barked on the 7th and 8th, simultaneously with General Hookers opera. tions upon iVialvern. I dispatched a cavalry force, under Colonel Averell, toward Savage Station to ascertain if the enemy were making any movements toward our right flank. He found a rebel cavalry regiment near White Oak Swamp Bridge and completely routed it, pursuing well toward Savage Station. These important preliminary operations assisted my preparations for the removal of the army to Aquia Creek, and the sending off our sick and supplies was pushed both day and night as rapidly as the means of transportation permitted. On the subject of the withdrawal of the army from Harrisons Land- ing the following correspondence passed between the General-in- Chief and myself while the reconnaissances toward Richmond were in progress: On the 2d of August I received the following: WASHiNGTON, August 2, 18623.45 p. m. You have not answered my telegram of July 30, 8 p. in., about the removal of your sick. Remove them as rapidly as possible and telegraph me when they will be out of your way. The President wishes an answer as early as possible. H. W. HALLECK, Major- General. Mnj. Gen. GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN Page 80 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIIL 80 To which this reply was sent: HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Berkeley, August 311 p. m. Your telegram of 2d is received. The answer to dispatch of July 30 was sent this morning. We have about 1~2,500 sick, of whom perhaps 4,000 might make easy marches. We have here the means to transport 1,200, and will embark to-morrow that number of the worst cases. With all the means at the disposal of the medical director the remainder could be shipped in from seven to ten days. It is impossible for me to decide what cases to send off, unless I know what is to be done with this army. Were the disastrous measures of a retreat adopted, all the sick who cannot march and fight should be dispatched by water. Should the army advance, many of the sickeould be of service at the depots. If it is to remain here any length of time, the question assumes still a different phase. Until I am informed what is to be done I cannot act understandingly or for the good -. of the service. If I am kept longer in ignoranCe of what is to be effected, I cannot be expected to accomplish the object in view. In the meantime I will do all in my power to carry out what I conceive to be your wishes. GEG. B. McCLELLAN Major-General, Commanding. Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, Commanding U. S. Army, Washington, D. C. The moment I received the instructions for removing the sick I at once gave the necessary directions for carrying them out. With the small amount of transportation at hai,id the removal of the severe cases alone would necessarily take several days, and in the mean time I desired information to determine what I should do with the others. The order required me to send them away as quickly as possible, and to notify the General-in-Chief when they were removed. Previous to the receipt of the dispatch of the 2d of August, not hav- ing been advised of what the army under my command was expected to do, or which way it was to move, if it moved at all, I sent the follow- ing dispatch: HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Berkeley, August 3, 1862. I hear of sea steamers at Fort Monroe. Are they for removing my sick? If so, to what extent am I required to go in sending them off? There are not many who need go. As I am not in any way informed of the intentions of the Government in regard to this army, I am unable to judge what proportion of the sick should leave here, and must ask for specific orders. GEG. B. MCCLELLAN, Major-General, Commanding. Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, Comdg. U. S. Army, Washington. If the army was to retreat to Fort Monroe it was important that it should be unencumbered with any sick, wounded, or other men who might at all interfere with its mobility; but if the object was to operate directly on Richmond, from the position we then occupied, there were many cases of slight sickness which would speedily be cured and the patients returned to duty. As the service of every man would be important in the event of a forward offensive movement, I considered it to be of the utmost conse- quence that I should know what was to be done. It was to ascertain this that I sent the dispatch of 11 p. m. on the 3d, before receiving the following telegram: \VAsnD~GTON, August 3, 181327.45 p. m. I have waited most anxiously to learn the result of your forced reconnaissance toWard Richmond, and also whether all your sick have been sent away, and I can get no answer to my telegram. It is determined to withdraw your army from the Peninsula to Aquia Creek. Yo Page 81 CHAP. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 81 will take immediate measures to effect this, covering the movement the best you can Its real object and withdrawal should be concealed even from your own officers. Your material and transportation should be removed first. You will assume control of all the means of transportation within your reach, an(L ap~)ly to the naval forces for all the assistance they can render you. You will consult freely with the commander of these forces. The entire execution of the movement is left to your discretion and jud~ment. You will leave such forces as you may deem proper at Fort Monroe, Norfolk, and other places, which we must occupy. H. W. HALLECK, Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN. Major-General, Commanding U. S. Army. I proceeded to obey this order with all possible rapidity, firmly impressed, however, with the conviction that the withdrawal of the Army of the Potomac from Harrisons Landing, where its communica- tions had by the co-operation of the gunboats been rendered perfectly secure, would, at that time, have the most disastrous effect upon our cause. I did not, as the commander of that army, allow the occasion to pass without distinctly setting forth my views upon the subject to the authorities in the following telegram: HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC Berkeley, August 4, 186212 m. Your telegram of last evening is received. I must confess that it has caused me the greatest pain I ever experienced, for I am convinced that the or(ler to withdraw this army to Aqnia Creek ~vi1l prove disastrous to our cause. I fear it will be a fatal blow. Several (lays are necessary to complete the preparations for so important a movement as this, and while they are in progress I beg that careful consideration may be given to my statements. This army is now in excellent discipline and condition. We hold a d6bouch6 on both banks of the James River, so that we are free to act in any direction; and with the assistance of the gunboats I consider our communications as now secure. We are 25 miles from Richmond, and are not likely to meet the enemy in force suf- ficient to fight a battle until we have marched 15 to 18 miles, which brings us practi- cally within 10 miles of Richmond. Our longest line of land transportation would be from this point 25 miles, but with the aid of the gunboats we can snpply the army by water during its advance certainly to within 12 miles of Richmond. At Aquia Creek we wonid be 75 miles from Richmond, with land transportation all the way. From here to Fort Monroe is a march of about 70 miles, for I regard it as impracti- cable to withdraw this army and its material except by land. The result of the movement would thus he a rxiarch of 145 miles to reach a point now only 25 miles distant, and to deprive ourselves entirely of the powerful aid of the gun- boats and water transportation. Add to this the certain demoralization of this army which would ensue, the terribly depressing effect upon the people of the North, and the strong probability that it would iitluence foreign powers to recognize our adver- saries, and these appear to me sufficient reasons to make it my imperative duty to urge in the strongest terms afforded by our language that this order may be rescinde(l, and that far from recalling this army, it may be 1)romptly re-enforced to enable it to resume the offensive. It may be said that there are no re-enforcements available. I point to Burusides force; to that of Pope, not necessary to maintain a strict defensive in front of XVushing- ton and Harpers Ferry; to those portions of the Army of the West not required for a strict defensive there. Here, directly in front of this army, is the heart of the rebel- lion. It is here that all our resources should be collected to strike the blow which will determine the fate of the nation. All points of secondary importance elsewhere should be abandoned, and every available man brought here; a decided victory here and the military strength of the rebellion is crushed. It matters not what partial re- verses we may meet with elsewhere. Here is the true detense of Washington. It is here, on the banks of the James, that the fate of ho Union should be decided. Clear in my convictions of right, strong in the consciousness that I have ever been, and still am, actuated solely by the love of my country, knowing that 110 ambitions or selfish motives have influenced me from the commencement of this war, I do now, what I never did in my life before, I entreat that this order may be rescinded. If my counsel does not prevail, I will with a sad heart obey your orders to the ut- 6 R RYOL X Page 82 82 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIII. most of my power, directing to the movement, which I clearly foresee will be one of the utmost delicacy and difficulty, whatever skill I may possess. Whatever the result may beand may God grant that I ant mistaken in my forebodingsI shall at least have the internal satisfaction that I have written and spoken frankly, and have sought to do the best in my power to avert disaster from my country. GLO. B. McCLELLAN, Major- General, Commanding. Mnj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, Commanding U. S. Army. Soon after sending this telegram I received the following in reply to mine of 11 p. m. of the 3d: WASHINGTON, August 4, 186212.45 p. m. My telegram to you of yesterday will satisfy you in regard to future operations. It was expected that you ~vould have sent off your sick as directed without waiting to know what were or would be the intentions of the Government respecting future movements. The President expects that the instructions wbich were sent you yester- day with his approval will be carried out with all possible (lispatch and caution. The Quartermaster-General is sending to Fort Monroe all the transportation he can collect. H. W. HALLECK, M~jor- General. Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. McCLELLAN. To which the following is my reply: HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TIlE POTOMAC, Berkeley, August 5, 18627 a. m. Your telegram of yesterday received, and is being carried out as proml)tly as possi- ble. With the means at my command no human power could have moved the sick in the time you say you expectedthem to be moved. * * * * * * * GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Major- General. Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, Commanding U. S. Army. My efforts for bringing about a change of policy were nnsuccessfnl, as will be seen from the following telegram and letter received by me in reply to mine of 12 m. of the 4th: WAShINGTON, Augu8t 5, 186212 m. You cannot regret the order of the withdrawal more than I did the necessity of giv- ing it. It will not be rescinded, and you will be expected to execute it with all possi- ble promptness. It is believed that it can be done now without serious danger. This may not be so, if there should be any delay. I will write you my views more fully by mail. II. W. HALLECK, Major- General, Conmmanding U. S. Army. Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN. The letter was as follows: hEADQUARTERS OF THE Amwr, JVasltin glen, August 6,1862. GENERAL: Your telegram of yesterday was received this morning, and I immediately telegraphed you a brief reply, promising to write you more fully by mail. You, general, certainly could not have been more pained at receiving my order than I was at the necessity of issuing it. I was advised by high officers, in whosejudgment I had great confidence, to make the order immediately on my arrival here, but I de- termined not to do so until I could learn your wishes from a personal interview; and even after that interview I tried every means in my power to avoid withdrawing your army, and delayed my decision as long as I dared to delay it. I assure you, general, it was not a hasty and inconsiderate act, but one that caused me more anxious thoughts than any other of my life; but after full and mature consideration of all the pros an Page 83 CHAP. XXIII] GENERAL REPORTS. 88 cons, I was rein ctantly forced to the conclusion that the order must be issued. There was to my mind no alternative. Allow me to allude to a fe~v of the facts in the case. You and your officers at one interview estimate(l the enemys forces in an(l around Richmond at200,000 men. Since then you and others report that they have received aud are receiving large re-enforce- nients from the South. General Popes army covering Washington is only about 40,000. Your effective force is only about 90,000. YOH are 30 miles from Richmond, and General Pope 80 or 90, with the enemy directly between you, ready to fall wiih his superior numbers upon one or the other, as he may elect. Neither can re-enforce the other in case of such an attack. If General Popes army be diminished to re-enforce you, Washington, Maryland, and Pennsylvania would be left uncovered and exposed. If your fore. be reduced to strengthen Pope, you would be too weak to even hold the position you now occupy should the enemy turn round and attack you in full force. In other words, the old Army of the Potomac is split into two parts, with the entire force of the enemy directly between them. They cannot be united by land without exposing both to destruction, and yet they must be united. To send Popes forces by water to the Peninsula is, nuder present circumstances, a military impossibility. The only alternative is to send the forces on the Peninsula to some point by water, say Fredericksburg, where the two aruties can be united. Let me now allude to some of the objections which you have urged. You say that the withdrawal from the present position will cause the certain demoralization of the army, which is now in excellent discipline and condition. I cannot understand why a simple change of position to a new antI by no means (listant base will demor- alize an army in excellent discipline, unless the officers themselves assist in that demoralization, ~vhich I am satisfied they will not. Your change of front from your extreme right at Hanover Court-House to your present position was over 30 miles, but I have not heard that it demoralized your troops, notwithstanding the severe losses they sustained in effecting it. A new base on the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg brings you within about 60 miles of Richmond, and ~ecnres a re-enforcement of 4QOut or 50,000 fresh and disciplined troops. The change, with such advanrages, will, I think, if properly represented to your army, encourage rather than (lemoralize your troops. Moreover, you yourself suggested that a junction might be effected at York- town, but that a flank march across the isthmus would be more hazardous than to retire to Fort Monroe. You will remember that Yorktown is 2 or 3 miles farther thami Fredericksburg is. Besides, the latter is between Richmond and Washington, and covers Washington from any attack of the enemy. The political effect of the with- drawal amy at first be unfavorable; but 1 think the public are beginning to under- stand its necessity, and that they will have much more confidence in a united army than in its separated fragments. But you will reply, why not re-enforce me here, so that I can strike Richnmond from my present position ~ To do this you said at our interview that you required 30,000 additional troops. I told you that it was impossible to give you so many. You finally thought that you would have some chance of success ~vith 20,000. But you after- ward telegraphed me that you would require 35,000, as tIme enenmy was beimug largely re-enforced. If your estimate of the enemys strength was correct, your requisition was perfectly reasommable, but it was utterly impossible to fill it until mmew troops could be enlisted and organized, which would re(luire several weeks. To keep your armoy in its present position until it could be so re-enforced would almuost destroy it in that climate. The months of August and September are almost fatal to whites who Ii ye on that part of Jamues River, and even after you received-time re-euforcemuents asked for, you admitted that you must reduce Fort Darling and the river batteries before von could a(lvimnce on Richmond. It is by no means certain that the reduction of these fortifications would not require considerable time, perhaps us much as those at Yorktown. This delay might not only be fi~tal to the health of your army, but in time mean time Gemmeral Popes forces would be exposed to the heavy blows of the enemy without the slighi~est hope of assistance from you. In regard to the demoralizing effect of a withdrawal from the Peninsula to the Rap- panannock I must remark that a large number of your highest officers, indeed a ma- jority of those whose opinions have been reported to me, are decidedly in favor of time movement. Even several of those who originally advocated the line of the Peninsula now advise its abandonment. I have not inquired, and do not wish to know, by wimose advice or for what reasons the Army of the Potomac was separated into two parts, with the enenmy between them. I must take things as I find them. I thud the forces divided, and I wish to unite them. Only one feasible plan has been presented for doing this. If you or any one else had presented a better plan I certainly should have adopted it. But all of your plans require re-enforcemnents, which it is impossible to give you. It is very easy to ask for re-entorcements, but it is not so easy to give them when you have no dis- posable troops at your command Page 84 84 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHA?. XXIII. I have written very plainly as I understand the case, and I hope you will give rue credit for having fully considered the matter, although I may have arrived at very different conclusions from your own. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, H. ~. HALLECK, Generat-in-Chief. Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN, Commanding, 4~c., Berkeley, Va. On the 7th J received the following telegram: WASHINGTON, AugUst 7, 156210 a. m. You will immediately report the number of sick sent off since you received my order, the number still to be shipped, and the amount of transportation at your disposal; that is, the number of persons that can be carried on all the vessels which by my order you were authorized to control. H. W. HALLECK, Majw-General. Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN. To which I made this reply: HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, August 7, 186210.40 p. m. In reply to your dispatch of 10 a. m. to-day I report the number of sick sent off since I received your order as follows: 3,740, including some that are embarked to-night and will leave in the morning. The number still to be shipped is, as nearly as can be ascertained, 5,700. The embarkation of five batteries of artillery, with their horses, wagons, & c., re- quired most of our available boats, except the ferry-boats. All the transports that can ascend to this place have been ordered up; they will be here to-morro~v evening. Colonel Ingalls reports to me that there are no transports now available for cavali y, and will not be for two or three days. As soon as they can be obtained I shall send off the First New York Cavalry. After the transports with sick and wounded have returned, including some heavy- draught steamers at Fort Monroe that cannot come to this point, we can transport 25,000 men at atime. We have some propellers here, but they are laden with com- missary supplies and are not available. The transports now employed in transporting sick and wounded will carry 12,000 well infantry soldiers. Those at Fort Monroe, and of too heavy draught to come here, will carry 8,000 or 10,000 infantry. Several of the largest steamers have been nsed for transporting prisoners of war, and have only become available for the sjck to-day. GEG. B. McCLELLAN, Major-General. Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, Chmmanding U. S. Army. The report of my chief quartermaster upon the subject is as follows: HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC Office o~ Chief Quarter~aa8ter, llarrkons Landing, August 7, 1862. GENERAL: I have the honor to return the papers herewith which you sent me with the following remarks: We are embarking five batteries of artillery, with their horses, baggage, & c., which requires the detailing of most of our available boats, except the terry-boats. The nie(Iical department has ten or twelve of our largest transport vessels, which, if dis- posable, could carry 12,000 men. Besides, there are some heavy-draught steamers at Fort Monroe that cannot come to this point, but which can carry 8,000 or 10,000 in- fantry. I have ordered all up here that can ascend to this depot. They will be here to- morrow evening. As it now is, after the details already made, we cannot transport from this place more than 5,000 infantry. There are no transports now available for cavalry. From and after to-morrow, if the vessels arrive, I could transport 10,000 infantry. In two or three days a regiment of cavalry can be sent if required. If you wait, and ship from Yorktown or Fort Monroe after the sick and wounded transports are at my disposal, we can transport ~5,000 at a time. The number that can be transported is contingent on circumstances referred to Page 85 Ca& r. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 85 Most of the propellers here are laden with commissary or other supplies, and most of tke tugs are necessary to tow off sail craft also laden with supplies. I am, very respectfully, your most obedient servant, RUFUS INGALLS, General R. B. MARcY, Ch~ief of Staff. Chief Quartermaster. On the 9th I received this dispatch: WASHINGTON, August 9, 186212.45 p. m. I am of the opinion that the enemy is massing his forces in front of Generals Pope and Buruside, and that he expects to crush them and move forward to the Potomac. You must scud re-enforcements instantly to Aquia Creek. Considcring the amount of transportation at your disposal, your delay is not satisfactory. You must move with all possible celerity. H. W. HALLECK, Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN. Major-General. To which I sent the following reply: HEADQUARTERS ARM? OF THE POTOMAC, Berkeley, August 10, 186~8 a. m. Telegram of yesterday received. The batteries sent to Buruside took the last avail- a ble transport yesterday morning. Enough have since arrived to ship one regiment of cavalry to-day. The sick are being embarked as rapidly as possible. There has been no unnecessary delay, as you assertuot an hoursbut everything has been and is being pushed as rapidly as possible to carry out your orders. GEG. B. MCCLELLAN, Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, Major-General, Commanding. Commanding U. S. Army. The following report, made on the same day by the officer then in charge of the transports, exposes the injustice of the remark in the dis- patch of the General-in-Chief; that Considering the amount of trans- portation at your disposal, your delay is not satisfactory :~ AssIsm~xT QUARTERMASTERS OFrIc1~, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC Harrisons Landing, Va., August 10, 1862. Colonel Ingalls, being himself ill, has requested me to telegraph to you concerning the state and capacity of the transports now here. On the night of the 8th I dis- patched eleven steamers, principally small ones, and six schooners, with five batteries of heavy horse artillery, none of which have yet returned. Reqnisition is made this morning for transportation of 1,000 cavalry to Aquia Creek. All the schoouers that had been chartered for carrying horses have been long since discharged or changed into freight vessels. A large proportion of the steamers now here are still loaded with stores, or are in the floating hospital service, engaged in removing the sick. To transport the 1,000 cavalry to-day will take all the available steamers now here not engaged in the service of the harbor. These steamers could take a large number of infantry, but are not well adapted to the carrying of horses, and much space is thus lost. Several steamers are expected here to-day, and we are unloading schooners rapidly. Most of these are not chartered, but are being taken for the service required, at same rates of pay as other chartered schooners. If you could cause a more speedy return of the steamers sent away from here it would facilitate matters. C. G. SAWTELLE, Captain and Assistant Quartermaster, Commanding Depot. General M. C. MEIGS, Quartermaster-Gcneral U. S. Army, Washington. Our wharf facilities at ilarrisons Landing were very limited, admit- ting but few vessels at one time. These were continually in use as long as there were disposable vessels, and the officers of the medical and quartermasters departments, with all their available forces, were incessantly occupied day and night in embarking and sending off the sick men, troops, and material Page 86 86 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXITh Notwithstanding the repeated representations I made to the Gen- eral-in-Chief that such were the facts, on the 10th I received the PA- lowing: WASHINGToN, August 10, 186212 p. in. The enemy is crossing the Rapidan in large force. They are fighting General Pope to-day. There must be no further delay in your movements. That which has already occurr~d was entirely unexpected, and must be satisfactorily explained. Let not a moments time be lost, and telegraph me daily what progress you have made in exe- cuting the order to transfer your troops. H. W. HALLECK, Msj. Gen. GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN. Major-General. To which I sent this reply: HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Berkeley, August 10, 186211.30 p. m. Your dispatch of to-day is received. I assure you again that there has not been any unnecessary delay in carrying out your orders. You are probably laboring under some great mistake as to the amount of transportation available here. I have pushed matters to the utmost in getting off our sick and the troops you ordered to Buruside. Colonel Ingalls has more than once informed the Quartermaster-General of the con- dition of our water transportation. From the fact that you directed me to keep the or(ler secret, I took it for granted that you would take the steps necessary to provide the requisite transportation. A large number of transports for all arms of service and for wagons should at once be sent to Yorktown and Fort Monroe. I shall be ready to move the whole army by land the moment the sick are (lisposed of. You may be sure that not an hours delay will oc~ir that ean be avoided. I f~ you do not realize the difficulty of the operation l)roi)osed. The regiment of c~valry for Burnside has been in course of embarkation to-day and to-night. Ten steamers were required for the purpose. Twelve hundred and fifty- eight sick loaded to-day and to-night. Our means exhausted, except one vessel re- turning to Fort Monroe in the morning, which will take some 500 cases of slight sick- ness. The present moment is probably not the proper one for me to refer to the unnecessa- rily harsh and unjust tone of your telegrams of late. It will, however, make no dif- ference to my offic.al action. GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Major-General, Commanding. Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, Commanding U. S. Army. On the 11th this report was made: HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Berkeley, August 11, 186211.30 p. m. The embarkation of 850 cavalry and one brigade of infantry will be completed by 2 oclock in the morning. Fiie hundred sick were embarked to-day. Another vessel arrived to-night, aml (500 more sick are now being embarked. I still have some 4,000 sick to dispose of. You have been g.ssly misled as to the amount of transportation at my disposal. Vessels loaded to their utmost capacity with stores, and others indispensable for service here, have been reported to you.as available for carrying sick and well. I am sending off all that can be unloaded at Fort Monroe, to have them return here. I re- peat that I have lost no time in carrying out your orders. GEO. B. MCCLELLAN, Major-General, Commanding. Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, Commanding U. S. Army. On the same day I received the following from the quartermaster in charge of the depot: ASSISTANT QUARTERMASTERS OFFICE, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Harrisons Landing, August 11, 1862. COLONEL: In reply to the commnnication from General Marcy, which was referred to me by you, I have to state that there are now in this harbor no disposable tran Page 87 CHAP. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 87 ports not already detailed, either for the use of the hospital department, for the trans- portation of the First New York Cavalry, or for the necessary service of the harbor. I think the steamers loading an(l to be loaded with cavalry could take in addition 3,000 infantry. These boats are, however, directed to leave as fast as they are loaded; some have already started. The embarkation of this cavalry regiment is going on very slowly, and it is not in my power to hurry the matter, although I have had sev- eral agents of the department and one commissioned officer at the wharf, to render all the assistance possible. The entire army is this morning turning in, to be stored on vessels, knapsacks, offi~er~~ baggage, and other surplus p~operty, and with our limited wharf facilities it is impossible, unless the regular issues of forage, & c., are sus- IJeuded, to avoid great confusion and delay wit.h what is already ordered to he done. Of course, if any infantry is ordered to emhark on these cavalry transports, the con- fusion and difficulties will he increased. I know of no boats that may be expected here to-day, except the South America and Fanny Cadwallader, a propeller which wa~ ordered to he sent hack from Fort Monroe. The transports with the artillery left for Aquia Creek on the night of the 8th and the morning of the 9th. They were ordered to return immediately. I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, C. G. SAWTELLE, Captain and Assi8tant Quartermaster, Commanding Depot. Lient. Col. RUFUS INGALLS, Aide-de-Camp and Chief Quarlerma8ter, Army af the Potomac. Oi~ the 12th I received the following: WASHINGTON, August 12, 186212 m. The Quartermaster-General informs me that nearly every availahle steam vessel in the country is now under your control. To send more from Philadelphia, Baltimore, and New York would interfere with the transportation of army supplies and hreak up the channels of travel by which we are to bring forward the new troops. Buruside moved nearly 13,000 troops to Aqula Creek in less than two days, and his transports were immediately sent back to you. All vessels in the James River and the Chesa- peake Bay were placed at your disposal, and it was supposed that 8,000 or 10,000 of your men coul(l he transported daily. in addition to steamers, there is a large fleet of sailing vessels which could he used as transi)orts. The bulk of your material on shore it was thought could he sent to Fort Monroe, covered by that part of the army which could not get water transportation. Such were the views of the Government here. Perhaps we were misinfornied as to 1 lie facts; if so, the delay could be explained. Nothing in my telegram was intentionally harsh or unjust, hut the (telay was so unexpected that an explanation was required. There has been an(l is the most urgent necessity for (lispatch, and not a single moment must he lost in getting additional troops in front of Washington. H. W. HALLECK, Major-General. Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN. I telegraphed the following reply: HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Berkeley, August 12, 186211 p. m. Your dispatch of noon to-day received. It is positively the Thft that no more nien could have been embarked hence than have gone, and that no unnecessary delay has occurred. Before your orders were received Colonel Ingalls directed all available ves- sels to come from Monroe. Officers have been sent to take personal direction. Have heard nothing here of Burusides fleet. There are some vessels at Monroe, such as Atlantic and Baltic, which draw too niuch to conic here. Hospital accommodations exhausted this side of New York Propose filling Atlantic and Bahic with serious cases for New York, and to encamp slight cases for the present at Monroe. Iii this way can probably get off the 3,400 sick still on hand by (1ay after to-morro~v night I am sure that you have been niisinfornied as to the availability of vessels en hand. We cannot use heavily-loaded supply vessels for troops or animals, and such constitute the amass of those here which have been represented to you as capable of transporting this araiy. I fear you will find very great delay in embarking troops and material at Yorktown and Monroe, both from want of vessels ai~d of facilities of embarkation. At least two additional wharves should at once be built at each place. I ordered two at the latter sonic two weeks ago, hut you countermanded the order Page 88 88 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIII. I learn that wharf accommodations at Aquia are altogether inadequate for landing troops and supplies to any large extent. Not an hour should be lost in remedying this. Great delay will ensue there from shallow water. You will find a vast deficiency in horse transports. We had nearly two hundred when we came here; I learn of only twenty provided now; they carry about 50 horses each. More hospital accommoda- tions should he provided. We are much impeded here because our wharves are used night and day to land current supplies. At Monroe a similar difficulty will occur. With all the facilities at Alexandria and Washington six weeks, about, were occupied in emharkiug this army and its material. Burnsides troops are not a fair criterion for rate of embarkation. All his means were in hand, his outfit specially prepared for the purpose, and his men habituated to the movement. There shall he no unnecessary delay, but I cannot manufacture vessels. I state these difficulties from experience, and because it appears to me that we have been lately working at cross purposes because you have not been properly informed by those around you, who ought to know the inherent difficulties of such an undertaking. It is not possible for any one to place this army where you wish it, ready to move, in less than a month. If Washington is in danger now this army can scarcely arrive in time to save it. It is in much better position to do so from here than from Aquin. Our material can only be saved by using the whole army to cover it if we are pressed. If sensibly weakened by detachments the result might be the loss of much material and many men. I will be at the telegraph office to-morrow morning to talk with you. GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Major General. Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, Wa8hington, D. C. To the reasons given in the foregoing dispatch to show why General Burusides movement from Fort Monroe was not a fair criterion for our operations the following may be added: He was not encumbered by either sick or wounded men. He had no cavalry, artillery, wagons, or teams. His force consisted of infantry alone, with a few ambulances and officers horses. His baggage was already on the transports, where it had remained since his arrival from North Carolina, and his men had only to resume their places on board. The cavalry and artillery mentioned in my dispatches of the 7th, 10th, and 11th were sent to supply his total deficiency in those arms. I may also repeat that the vessels used by General Burnside had not returned from Aquia Creek when the army left Harrisons Bar. It will be seen by the concluding paragraph of the foregoing dis- patch that in order to have a more direct, speedy, and fill explanation of the condition of affitirs in the army than I could by sending a single dispatch by steamer to the nearest telegraph office at Jamestown Island, some 70 miles distant, and waiting ten hours for a reply, I l)roPosed to go in person to the office. This I did. On my arrival at Jamestown Island there was an interruption in the electric current, which ren- dered it necessary for me to continue on to Fort Monroe and across the Chesapeake Bay to Cherrystone Inlet, on the Eastern Shore, where I arrived late in the evening, and immediately sent the annexed dis- patches: CHERRYSTONE, August 13, 186211.30 p. m. Please come to office; wish to talk to you. What news from Pope? GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Major-General. Maj. Gen. H. XV. HALLECK, Washington. CHERRYSTONE INLET, August 14, 186212.30 a. m. Started to Jamestown Island to talk with you; found cable broken and came here. Please read my long telegram. (See above dispatch of August 1211 p. in.) All quiet at camp. Enemy burned wharves at City Point yesterday. No rebel pickets within 5 miles of Coggins Point yesterday. Richmond prisoners state that large force, with guns, left Richmond northward on Sunday. GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Major-General. Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, Washington Page 89 CHAr. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 89 To which the following reply was received: WASHINGTON, AUgu8t 14, 18621.40 a. m. Ihave read yourdispatch. There is no change of plans. You will send up yourtroops as rapi(lIy as possiblc~ There is no difficulty in landingthem. According to your owu accounts, there is now no difficulty in withdrawing your forces. Do so with all possi- ide rapidity. H. W. HALLECK, Maj. Gen. GEOt?G!~ B. MCCLELLAN. Major-General. Before I had time to decipher and reply to this dispatch the tele- graph operator in Washington informed me that General Halleck had one out of the office immediately after writing this dispatch, without leaving any intimation of the fact for me, or waiting for any further information as to the object of my journey across the bay. As there was no possibility of other communication with him at that time I sent the following dispatch, and returned to Harrisons Landing: CHERRYSTONE INLET, August 14, 18621.40 a. m. Your orders will be obeyed. I return at once. I had hoped to have had a longer and fuller conversation with you after traveling so far for the purpose. GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, Washington, D. ~. Major-General. On the 14th and 15th, and before we had been able to embark all our sick men, two army corps were put in motion toward Fort Monroe. This was reported in the annexed dispatch: HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Berkeley, August 14, 186211 p. m. Movement has commenced by land and water. All sick will be away to-morrow ght. Everything being (lone to carry out your orders. I dont like Jacksons move- i~euts. He will suddenly appear when least expected. Will telegraph fully and understandingly in the morning. GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Maj. Gen. H. XV. HALLECK, Washington, D. C Major-General. The phrase movement has commenced ~ it need not be remarked, referred obviously to the movement of the main army after completing the necessary preliminary movements of the sick, & c. The perversion of the term to which the General-in-Chief saw fit to give currency in a letter to the Secretary of War should have been here rendered im- l)ossible by the dispatches which precede this, of the 14th, which show that the movement really began immediately after the receipt of the order of August 4. The progress made in the movement of the 15th was reported in the fNlowing dispatches: HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, August 15, 186212 m. Colonel Ingalls this moment reports that after embarking the remaining brigade of MCCalls divi -ion with the sick, who are constantly accumulating, the transports now disposable will be all consumed. Two of my army corps marched last night and this morning en route for Yorktown one via Jones Bridge and the other via Barretts Ferry, where we have a pontoon li-idge. The other corps will be pnshed forward as fast as the roads are clear, and I hope before to-morrow morning to have the entire army in motion. A report has jnst been received from my pickets that the enemy in force is advanc- ing on us from the Chickahominy, but I do not credit it; shall know soon. Should any more transports arrive here before my departure, and the enemy do not show suc Page 90 90 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIII. a force in our front as to require all the troops I have remaining to insure the safety of the laud movement with its immense train, I shall send every man by water that transports will carry. GEG. B. McCLELLAN, Major- General. Maj. Gen. I-I. W. HALLECK, Commanding U. S. Army. HEADQUARTE iS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Berkeley, August 15, 18621.30 p. m. The advance corps and trains are fairly started. I learn nothing more in relation to reported advance of rebels via Jones Bridge. Shall push the movement as rapidly as possible. GEG. B. McCLELLAN, Major-General. Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, Washington, D. C. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Berkeley, Angn.st 15, 186210 p. m. Coggius Point is abandoned. The whole of McCalls division, with its artillery, is now en route for Buruside. We have not yet transportation sufficient for our sick. I hope we will get it to-morrow. Porter is across the Chickabominy, near its month, with his wagons and reserve artillery. Heiatzelman at Jones Bridge with a portion of his corps. They will all be up by morning. Averells cavalry on the other side. All quiet thos far. I cannot get the last of the wagons as far as Charles City Court-House before some time to- morrow afternoon. I am hurrying matters with the utmost rapidity possible. Wagons will move all night. GEG. B. McCLELLAN. Major- General. Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, Washington, D. C. After the commencement of the movement it was Continued with the utmost rapidity until all the troops and material were en route both by land and water on the morning of the 16th. Late in the afternoon of that day, when the last man had disappeared from the deserted camps, I followed with my personal staff in the track of the Grand Army of the Potomac, bidding farewell to the scenes still covered with the marks of its presence, and to be forever meutorable in history as the vicinity of its most brilliant exploits. Previous to the departure of the troops I had directed Captain Duaiie, of the Engineer Corps, to l)rOceed to Barretts Ferry, near the mouth of the Chickahominy, and throw across the river at that point a l)ontOOIl bridge. This was executed promptly and satisfactorily under the cover of gunboats, and an excellent bridge of about 2,000 feet iii length was rea(ly for the first arrival of troops. The greater part of the army, with its artillery, wagon trains, & c., crosse(l it rapidly all(l in perfect order an(l safety, so that on the night of the 17th everything was across the Chickahominy except the rear guard, which crossed early on tIme morning of the 18th, when the pon. toon bridge was imme(Iiately removed. General Porters corps, which was the first to march from Ham isons Landing, had been pushed forward rapidly, and on the 16th reached Williamsburg, where I had directed ~him to halt until the entire army was across the Chickahominy. On his arrival at Wilhiamsburo how- ever, he received ami intercepted letter, which led to the belief that General Pope would have to contend against a very heavy force then in his front. General Porter therefore very properly took the responsi- bility of continuing his march directly on to Ne~vport News, which place he reached on the morning of the 18th of August, having niarched his corps 60 miles in the short period of three days and one night, halt- ing one day at the crossing of the Chickahominy Page 91 CHAr. XXIII.] GI NERAL REPORTS. 91 The embarkation of this corps commenced as soon as transports were ready, and on the 20th it had all sailed for Aqnia Creek. I made the following report from Barretts Ferry: HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Barretts Ferry, Chickahominy, August 17, 1862li a. m. Everything is removed from our camp at Harrisons Bar. No property or men left behind. The Fifth Corps is at Williamsburg, with all its wagons and the reserve artillery. The Third Corps is on the march from Jones Bridge to Williamsburg via Diascund Bridge, and has probably passed the latter before this honr. Averells cav- alry watches everything in that direction. The mass of the wagons have passed the pontoon bridge here and are parked on the other side. Pecks wagons are now cross- lug; his division will soon be over. Headquarters wagons follow Pecks. I hope to have everything over to-night and the bridge removed by daylight. May be delayed beyond that time. Came here to see Burnside, otherwise should have remained with the rear guard. Thus far all is quiet, and not a shot that I know of since we began the march. I shall not feel entirely secure until I have the whole army b~eyoud the Chickahominy. I will then begin to forward troops by water as fast as transporta- tion permits. GEG. B. MCCLELLAN, Major- General, Commanding. Maj. Gen. H. XV. HALLECK, Comdg. U. S. Army, Washington, D. C. On the 18th and 19th our march was continued to Williamsburg and Yorktown, and on the 20th the remainder of the army was ready to embark at Yorktown, Fort Monroe, and Newport News. The movement of the main body of the army on this march was covered by General Pleasoiiton with his cavalry and horse artillery. That officer remained at ilaxalls untit the army had passed Charles City Court- House, when he gradually fell back, picking up the stragglers as he procee(led, and crossed the bridge over the Chickahominy after the main body had marched toward Williamsburg. His troops were the ]a~st to cross the bridge, and he deserves great credit for time manner in which he performed this duty. General Averell did a similar service, in the same satisfuctory way, in covering the march of the Third Corps. As the campaign on the Peninsula terminated here, I cannot close this part of my report without giving an expression of my sincere thanks and gratitude to the officers and men whom I had the honor to command. From the commencement to the termination of this most arduous campaign the Army of the Potomac always evinced the most perfect subordination, zeal, and alacrity in the Performance of all the duties required of it. The amount of severe labor accomplished by this army in the construction of intrenchments, roads, bridges, & c., was enormous; yet all the work was performed with the most gratifying cheerfulness and devotion to the interests of the service. During the campaign ten severely-contested and sanguinary battles had been fought, besides numerous smaller engagements, in which the troops exhibited the most determined enthusiasm and bravery. They submitted to exposure, sickness, and even death without a murmur. Indeed, they had become veterans in their countrys cause, and richly deserved the warm com- mendation of the Government. It was in view of these fucts that this seemed to me an appropriate occasion for the General-in-Chief to give in general orders sonic appre- ciative expression of the services of the army while upon the Peninsula. Accordingly on the 18th I sent him the following dispatch: HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, August 18, 18~2ii p. m. Please say a kind word to my army, that I can repeat to them in general orders, in regard to their conduct at Yorktown, Williamsburg, West Point, Hanover Court Page 92 92 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XX~ House, and on the Chickahominy, as well as in regard to the Seven Days and the re- cent retreat. No one has ever said anything to cheer them but myself. Say nothing about me. Merely give my mefl and officers credit for what they have done. It will do you much good, and will strengthen you much with them if you issue a handsome order to theni in regard to what they have accomplished. They deserve it GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Major- General. Major-General HALLECK, Washington, D. C. As no reply was received to this communication, and no order was issued by the General-in-Chief; I conclude that suggestion did not meet with his al)probatiOn. All the personnel and material of the army had been transferred from Harrisons Landing to the different points of embarkation in the very brief period of five days without the slightest loss or damage. Porters troops sailed from Newport News on the 19th and 20th. lleintzehnaus corps sailed from Yorktown on the 21st On that day I received the following telegram from the Geiieral-iu-Chief: WAShINGTON, Augnst 21, 18626 p. in. Leave such garrisons in Fort Monroe, Yorktown, & c., as you may deem proper. They will be replaced by new troops as 1api(lly as possble. The forces of Buruside and Pope are hard pushed, and require aid as rapidly as you can send it. Come yourself as soon as you can. By all means see that the troops sent have plenty of ammunition. We have no time here to supply them. Moreover, they may have to fight as soon as they land. H. W. HALLECK, Major-General, Commanding U. S. Army. General MCCLELLAN. To which the following are replies: HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TIlE POTOMAC, ~ Monroe, August 21, 18627.30 p. m. Your dispafeb of 6 p. m. received. I have not lost an hour in sending troops, nor will I. Franklin is here, and I will try to get some of his troops on board to-night. I had already ordered all the ammunition Ibrward. I will put headquarters on board ship early to-morrow morning, so that I can leave at a moments notice. I hope that I can get off to-morrow. Shall I go in person to Aquia, or do you wish to see me first at Washington? If you wish it, I can probably ship quite an amount of ammunition for other troops than this army. GEG. B. McCLELLAN, Major-General. Major-General HALLECK, Washington, D. C. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Fort Monroe, Aagust 21, 18621Q.25 p.m. I have ample supplies of ammunition for infantry and artillery, and will have it up in time. I can supply any defieiency that may exist in General Popes army. Quite a number of rifled field guns are on hand here. The forage is the only question for you to attend to. Please have that ready for me at Aqula. I want many more schooners for cavalry horses. They should have water on hand when they come here. If you have leisure, and there is no objection, please communicate to me fully the state of affairs and your plans. I will then be enabled to arrange details understand- ingly. GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Major-General. Major-General HALLECK, Washington. Immediately on reaching Fort Monroe I gave directions for strength- ening the defenses of Yorktown to resist any attack from the direction of Richmond, and left General Keyes, with his corps, to perform the work and temporarily garrison the place Page 93 CHAP. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 93 I telegraphed as follows on the 22d: HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Fort Monroe, August 22, 18622. 1~ p. m. Dispatch of to-day received. Franklins corps is embarking as rapidly as possible. Sumners corps is at Newport News, ready to embark as fast as transportat bit arrives. Keyes is still at Yorktown, putting it in a proper state of defense. I think that all of Franklins corps will get oil to-day, and hope to commence with Sumner to-morrow. I shall then push off the cavalry and wagons. GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Major- Geiteral. Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, Washington, D. C. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Fort Monroe, August 22, 18623.40 p. in. Two good ordnance sergeants are needed immediately at Yorktown and Gloucester. The new defenses are arranged and commenced. I recommend that 5,000 new tioops be sent immediately to garrison York and Glouces- ter. They should be commanded by an experienced general officer, who can disci- pline and instruct them. About 900 should be artillery. I recommend that a new regimcut, whose colonel is an artillery officer or graduate, be designated as heavy artillery, and sent there. A similar regiment is absolutely necessary here. GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Major- General. Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, Commanding U. S. Army. On the 23d Franklins corps sailed. I reported this in the following dispatch: HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Fort Monroe, August 23, 18621.30 p. m. Franklins corps has started. I shall start for Aqula in about half an hour. No transports yet for Sumners corps. GEG. B. McCLELLAN, Major- General. Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, Commanding U. S. Army. On that evening I sailed with my staff for Aqula Creek, where I ar- rived at daylight on the following morning, reporting as follows: HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Aquia Greek, August 24, 1862[6 a. in.]. I have reached here, and respectfully report for orders. GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Major- General. Major-General HALLECK, Commandi.ig U. S. Army. I also telegraphed as follows: HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Aquja Creek, August 24, 18622 p. in. Your telegram received. Morells scouts report Rappahannock Station burned and abandoned by Pope, without any notice to Morell or Sykes. This was telegraphed you some hours ago. Reynolds, Reno, and Stevens are supposed to be with Pope, as nothing can be heard of them to-day. Morell and Sykes are near Morrisvillc Post- Office, watching the lower fords of the Rappahannock, with no troops between them and Rappahannock Station, which is reported abandoned by Pope. Please inform me immediately exactly where Pope is and what doiu~,; until Iknow that I cannot regulate Porters movements. He is much exposed now, anti decided measures should be taken at once. Until I know what my command and position are to he, and whether you still intend to place me in the command indicated in your first letter to me and orally through General Bumnside at the Chickahominy, I cannot d Page 94 94 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIII. dde where I can be of most use. If your determination is unchanged I ought to go to Alexandria at once. Please define my position and duties. GEG. B. McCLELLAN, Major- General. Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, Commanding U. S. Army. To which I received the following reply: WASHINGTON, August 24, 186211.10 p.m. You ask me for information which I cannot give. I do not know either where Gen- eral Pope is or where the enemy in force is. These are matters which I have all day been most anxious to ascertain. H. XV. HALLECK, Major-General MCCLELLAN. General-in- Chief. On the 26th I received the following: WASHINGTON, August 26, 186211 a. xi. There is reason to believe that the enemy is moving a large force into the Shenan- doah Vadey. Reconnaissances will soon (leterinine. General Ileintzelmaas corps was ordered to report to General Pope, and Kearny will probably be sent to-day against.the enemys flank. Dont draw any troops down the Rappahannock at pres- ent; we s~iall probably want them all in the (liredtion of the Shenandoah. Perhaps you had l)etter leave General Buruside in charge at Aquia Creek and come to Alexan- (Irma, as very great irregularities are reported there. General Franklins corps will march as soon as it receives transportation. H. W. HALLECK, Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN. General-in-Chief. On receipt of this I immediately sailed for Alexandria, and reported as follows: ALEXANDRIA, August 27, 18628 a. m. I arrived here last night, and have taken measures to ascertain the state of affairs here, and that proper remedies may he applied. Just received a rumor that railway bridge over Ball Run was buraed last night. GEG. B. MCCLELLAN, Major-General. Mnj. Gem H. W. HALLECK, Commanding U. S. Army. ALEXANDRIA, August 27, 18629.40 a. xi. The town is quiet, although quite full of soldiers, who are said to be chiefly con- valescents. The affairs of the quartermasters department are reported as going on well. It is said that the Bull Run Bridge will be repaired to-morrow. The disem- barkation of Sumners corps commenced at Aquia yesterday afternoon. I found that he could reach Rappahannock Station earlier timat way than from here. GEO. B. MCCLELLAN, Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, ~2omma uding U. S. Army. Major- General. On the same day I received the following: WASHINGTON, August 27, 1862. Telegrams from General Porter to General Buruside, just received, say that Banks is at Fayetteville; McDowell, Sign], and Ricketts near Warrenton; Reno on his right. Porter is marching on Warrenton Junction to re-enforce Pope. Nothing said of Heintzelman. Porter reports a general battle imminent. Franklins corps should niove out by forced marches, carrying three or fommr days provisions, and to be sup- plied as far as possible by railroad. Perhaps you may prefer some other road than to Centreville. Colonel Haupt has just telegraphed about sending out troops. Please see him, and give him your directions. There has been some serious neglect to guard the railroad, which should be immediately remedied. H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief. Major-General McCLEu~Ax Page 95 CHAP. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 95 I replied as follows: ALEXANDRIA, Augu8t 27, 186210 a. m. Telegram this moment received. I have sent orders to Franklin to prepare to march with his corps at once, and to repair here in person to inform me as to his means of tin usportation. Kearny was yesterday at Rappahannock Station, Porter at Bealeton, Kellys, Bar- netts, & c. Sumner will commence reaching Falmouth to-day. Williams Massachu- setts cavalry will be mostly at Falmouth to-day. I loaae(l l3urnside my personal escort (one squadron Fourth Regulars) to scout down Rappahan nock. I have sent for Cinchs division to come at once. As fast as I gain any information I will torwar(l it, although you may already have it. GEG. B. McCLELLAN, Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, Washington, D. ~. Alajor- General. I also received the following telegrams: WASHINGTON, August 27, 1862. Direct General Casey to furnish you about 5,000 of the new troops nuder his coai. mand Take entire direction of the sendiug out of the troops from Alexandria. Determine questions of priority in transportation, and the places they shall occupy. Popes headquarters are near Warrenton Junction, but I cannot ascertain the pies- ent position of his troops. H. W. HALLECK, Major-General MCCLELLAN. General-in- Chief. WAShINGTON, August 27, 1862. I can get no satisfactory information from the front, either of the enemy or of our troops. There seems to have been great neglect and carelessness about Manassas. Franklins corps should march in that direction as soon as l)Ossible. A conipetent officer should be sent out to take directiou of affairs in that vicinity. H. W. HALLECK, Major-General MCCLELLAN. Genera i-in- Chief. Upon the receipt of these I immediately sent the following telegram to Generals Heintzelman and Porter: ALEXANDRIA, August 27, 186210.30 a. m. Where are you and what is state of affairswhat troops in your front, right ,and left? Sumner is now landing at Aquia. Where is Popes left, and what of enemy? Enemy burned Ball Run Bridge last night with cavalry force. GEG. B. McCLELLAN, Major-General HEINTZELMAN, Warronton. Major- General. Major-General PORTER, Bealeton. P. 8.If these general officers are not at the places named, nearest operator will please have message forwarded. I also telegraphed to the General-in-Chief as follows: ALEXANDRIA, August 27, 186210.50 a. m. I have sent all the information I possess to Bnrnside, instructing him to look out well for his right flank between the Rappahannock and Potomac, and to send no trains to Porter without an escort. I fear the cavalry who dashed at Bull Run last night may trouble Buruside a little. I have sent to comnmunicate with Porter and H. intzelrnan via Falmouth, and hope to give you some definite information in a few hours. I shall land the next cavalry I get hold of here, and send it out to keep open the conimunica- tion between Pope and Porter, also to watch vicinity of Manassas. Please send me a number of copies of the best maps of present field of operations. I cau use fifty to ad- vantage. GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Major- General. Major-General HALLECK, Commanding U. S. Army Page 96 96 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIII. ALEXANDRIA, August 27, 186211.20 a. in. In view of Burusides dispatch,just received, would it not be advisable to throw the mass of Sumners corps here to move out with Franklin to Centreville or vicinity? If a decisive battle is fought at Warrenton, a disaster would leave any troops on Lower Rappabannock in a dangerous position. They would do better s~rvice in front of Washington. GEG. B. McCLELLAN, Major-General. Major-General HALLECK, Washington, D. C. ALEXANDRIA, August 27,186212.05 p. in. My aide has just returned from General Franklins camp; reports that Generals Franklin, Smith, and Slocum are all in Washington. He gave the order to the next in rank to place the corps in readiness to move at once. I learn that heavy firing has been heard this morning at Centreville, and have sent to ascertain the truth. I can find no cavalry to send out on the roads. Are the works garrisoned and ready for defense? GEG. B. McCLELLAN, Major- General. Major-General HALLECK, Washington. ALEXANDRIA, August 27, 186212.20 p. in. What bridges exist over Bull Run? Have steps been taken to construct bridges for the advance of troops to re-enforce Pope or to enable him to retreat if in trouble? There should be two gunboats at Aquia Creek at once. Shall I push the rest of Sumners corps here, or is Pope so strong as to be reasonably certain of success? I have sent to inspect the works near here and their garrisons. As soon as I can find General Casey or some other commanding officer, I will see to the railway, & c. It would be well to Ifave them report to me, as I do not know where they are. I am trying to find them, and will lose no time in carrying out your orders. Would like to see Barnard. GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Major- General. Maj. Gen. H. XV. HALLECK, Washington. ALEXANDRIA, August 27,18621.15 p. m. Franklins artillery have no horses except for four guns without caissons. I can pick up no cavalry. In view of these facts, will it not be well to push Sumners corps here by water as rapidly as possible, to make immediate arrangements for placing th~i works in front of Washington in an efficient condition of defense? I have no means of knowing the enemys force between Pope and ourselves. Can Franklin, without his artillery or cavalry, effect any useful purpose in front? Should not Buruside take steps at once to evacuate Falmouth and Aquia, at the same time covering the retreat of any of Popes troops who may lall back in that direction? I do not see that we have force enough in hand to form a connection with Pope, whose exact position we do not know. Are we safe in the direction of the valley? GEG. B. McCLELLAN, Major-General. Major General HALLECK, Washington. ALEXANDRIA, August 27,18621.35 p. in. I lei.rn that Taylors brigade, sent this morning to Bull Run Bridge,. is either cut to pieces or captured; that the force against them had many guns and about 5,000 infan- try, receiving re-enforcements every minute; also that Gainesville is in possession of the enemy. Please send some cavalry out toward Dranesville, via Chain Bridge, to watch Lewinsville and Dranesville, and go as far as they can. If you will give me even one squadron of good cavalry here, I will ascertain the state of the case. I think our policy now is to make these works perfectly safe, and mobilize a couple of corps as soon as possible, but not to advance them until they can have their artillery and cavalry. I have sent for Colonel Tyler to place his artillerymen in the works. Is Fort Marcy securely held? GEG. B. McCLELLAN, Major- General. General HALLECK. ALEXANDRIA, August 27, 18622.30 p. in. Sumner has been ordered to send here all of his corps that are within reach. Orders have been sent to Couch to come here from Yorktown with the least possible delay Page 97 CHAP. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 97 But one squadron of my cavalry has arrived; that will be disembarked at once and sent to the front. If there is any cavalry in Washington it should be ordered to report to me at once. I still think that we should first provide for the immediate defense of Washington on both sides of the Potomac. I am not responsible for the past, and cannot be for the future, nuless I receive authority to dispose of the available troops according to my judgment. Please inform me at once what my position is. I do not wish to act in the dark. GEO. B. MCCLELLAN, Major-General. Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, Commanding U. S. Army. ALEXANDRIA, August 27, 18626 p. m. I have just received the copy of a dispatch from General Pope to you, dated 10 a. m~ this morning, in which he says: All forces now sent forward should be sent to my right at Gainesville. I now have at my disposal here about 10,000 men of Franklins corps, about 2,800 of General Tylers brigade, and Colonel Tylers First Connecticut Artillery, which I recommen(l should 1)e held in hand fir the defense of XVashington. If v at ouwi~hme to order any part of this force to the front, it is in readiness to march notee to any point you may indicate. Ia view of the existing state of things in our front, I have deemed it best to order General Casey to hold his men for Yorktown in readiness to move, but not to send them oft till further orders. GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, Major-General. Commanding U. S. Army. On the 28th I telegraphed as follows: HEADQUARTERS CAMP NEAR ALEXANDRIA, Jngnst 28, 16624.10 p. m. General Franklin is with me here. I will know in a frw minutes the condition of artillery and cavalry. We are uot yet iu condition to move ; ion be by to-morrow morning. Pope must cut through to-day or adopt the plan I suggested. I have ordered troops to garrison the works at Uptous liii 1. They must be held at any cost. As soon as I can see the way to spare them I will scud a cori~s of good troops there. It is the key to Washington, which cannot be seriously menaced as bug as it is held. GEG. 13. McCLELLAN, Major-General HALLECK; Washington, D. ~. Major- General. I received the following from the General-in-Chief: WAShINGTON, Angust 28, 1862. I think you had better place Sumners corps as it arrives near the fortifications, and particularly at the Chain Bridge. The pimepal thing to be feared now is a cavair ra.i(l into this city, especially in the night-time. Use Coxs and Tyler y - s brigades and the new troops for the same object, if you need them. Porter writes to Burnside from Bristoe, 9.30 a. m. yesterday, that Popes forces were then moving on Manassas, and that Buriiside would soon hear of them by way of Alexandria. General Cullum has gone to Harpers Ferry, and I have only a single regular officer for duty in the office. Please send some of your officers to-day to see that every precaution is taken at the forts against a raid; also at the bridge. Please answer. H. W. HALLECK, Major-General MCCLELLAN. General-in- Chief. On the 29th the following dispatch was telegraphed: CAMP NEAR ALEXANDRIA Angnst 29, 186210.30 a. m. Franklins corps is in motion; started about 6a. m. I can give him but two squadrons of cavalry. I propose moving General Cox to Uptons Hill to bold that important point with its works, and to push cavalry scouts to Vienna, via Freedom Hill and Hunters Lane. Cox has two squadrons of cavalry. Please answer at once whether 7 R HVOL X Page 98 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIII. 98 this meets your approval. I have directed Woodbury, with the Engineer Brigade, to hold Fort Lyon. Sumner detached last night two regiments to vicinity of Forts Ethan Allen and Marcy. Meaghers brigade is still at Aquia. If he moves in support of Franklin, it leaves us without any reliable troops in and near Washington. Yet Franklin is too weak alone. What shall be done? No more cavalry arrived; have but three squadrons. Franklin has but 40 rounds of ammunition, and no wagons to move more. I do not think Franklin is in condition to accomplish much if he meets with serious resistance. I should not have moved him but for your pressing order of last night. What have you from Vienna and Dranesville? GEG. B. McCLELLAN, Major-General. Major-General HALLECK, Washington, D. C. To which the following is a reply: WASHINGTON, August 29, 186212 m. Uptons Hill arrangement all right. We must send wagons and ammunition to Franklin as fast as they arrive. Meaghers brigade ordered up yesterday. Fitzhugh Lee was, it is said on good authority, in Alexandria on Sunday last for three hours. I have nothing from Dranesville. H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief. Major-General MCCLELLAN. On the same day the following was received from His Excellency the President: WASHINGTON, August 29, 18622.30 p. m. What news from direction of Manassas Junction? What generally? A. LINCOLN. Major-General MCCLELLAN. To which I replied as follows: CAMP NEAR ALEXANDRIA, August 29, 18622.45 p. m. The last news I received from the direction of Manassas was from stragglers, to the effect that the enemy were evacuating Centreville and retiring toward Thoroughfare Gap. This by no means reliable. I am clear that one of two courses should be adopted: First, to concentrate all our available forces to open communications with Pope; Second, to leave Pope to get out of his scrape, and at once use all our means to make the capital perfectly safe. No middle ground will now answer. Tell me what you wish me to do, and I will do all in my power to accomplish it. I wish to know what my orders and authority are. I ask for nothing, but will obey whatever orders you give. I only ask a prompt decision, that I may at once give the necessary orders. It will not do to delay longer. GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Major-General. ABRAHAM LINCOLN, President. And copy to General ilalleck. To which the following is a reply: WASHLNGTON, August 29, 18624.10 p. m. Yours of to-day just received. I think your first alternative, to wit, to concen- trate all our available forces to open communication with Pope, is the right one, but I wish not to control. That I now leave to General Halleck, aided by your counsels. A. LINCOLN. Major-General MCCLELLAN. It had been officially reported to me from Washington that the enemy in strong force was moving through Vienna in the direction of the Chain Bridge, and had a large force in Vienna. This report, in connection with the dispatch of the General-in-Chief on the 28th, before noted, in Page 99 CuAP. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 99~ dticed me to direct Franklin to halt his corn mand near Annandale until it could be determined by recounaissances to Vienna and toward Manas- sas whether these reports were true. General Cox was ordered to send his small cavalry force from Uptons Hill toward Vienna and Dranes- yule in one direction and toward Fairfax Court-House in the other, and Franklin to push his two squadrons as far toward Manassas as possi- l)le, in order to ascertain the true position of the enemy. With the enemy in force at Vienna and toward Lewinsville it would have been~ very injudicious to have pushed Franklins small force beyond Annan- dale. It must be remembered that at that time we were cut off from direct communication with General Pope; that the enemy was, by tl?ie last accounts, at Manassas in strong force and that Franklin had only from 10,000 to 11,000 men, with an entirely insufficient force of cavalry and artillery. In order to represent this condition of affairs in its proper light to the General-inChief, and to obtain definite instructions from him, I telegraphed as follows: CAMP NEAR ALEXANDRIA, August 29, 186212 m. Have ordered most of the Twelfth Pennsylvania Cavalry to report to General Bar- nard for scouting duty toward Rockville, Poolesville, & c. If you apprehend a raid of cavalry on your side of river, I had better send a brigade or two of Sumners to near Teanallytown, where, with two or three old regiments in Forts Allen and Marcy, they can watch both Chain Bridge and Tennallytown. Would it meet your views to post the rest of Sumners corps between Arlington and Fort Corcoran, whence they can either support Cox, Franklin, or Chain Bridge, and even Tennallytown? Franklin has only between 10,000 and 11,000 for duty. How far do you wish this force to advance? GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Major-General HALLECK, Washington. Major-General. CAMP NEAR ALEXANDRIA, August 29, 18621 p. m. I anxiously await reply to my last dispatch in regard to Sumner. Wish to give the order at once. Please authorize me to attach new regiments permanently to my old brigades. I can do much good to old and new troops in that way. I shall endeavor to hold a line in advance of Forts Allen and Marcyat least with strong advance guards. I wish to hold the line through Prospect Hill, Mack alls, Minors, and Halls Hill. This will give us timely warning. Shall I do as seems best to me with all the troops in this vicinity, including Franklin, who I really think ought not, under present circum- stances, to advance beyond Annandale? GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Major-General. General HALLECK. On the same day I received a dispatch from the General-in-Chief, in which he asks me why I halted Franklin in Annandale, to which I re- plied as follows: CAMP NEAR ALEXANDRIA, August 29, 18628 p. m. By referring to my telegramsof 10.30 a. in., 12 in., and lp. in., together with yourreply of 2.48 p. in, you will see why Franklins corps halted at Annandale. His small cavalry forceall I had to give himwas ordered to push on as far as possible toward Manassas. It was not safe for Franklin to move beyond Annandale, under the cir- cumstances, until we knew what was at Vienna. General Franklin remained here until about 1 p. in., endeavoring to arrange for sup- plies for his command. I am responsible for both these circumstances, and do not see that either was in disobcdience to your orders. Please give distinct orders in refer- ence to Franklins movements of to-morrow Page 100 100 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIII. I have sent to Colonel Haupt to push out construction and supply trains as soon as possible; General Tyler to furnish the necessary guards. I have directed General Banks supply trains to start out to-night at least as far as Aniiandale, with an escort from General Tyler. In regard to to-morrows movements I desire definite instructions, as it is not agree- able to me to be accused of disobeying orders when I have simply exercised the discre- tion you committed to me. GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Major-General. Major-General HALLECK, Washington, D. C. On the same evening I sent the following dispatches: CAMP NEAR ALEXANDRIA, August 29, 186210 p.m. Not hearing from you, I have sent orders to General Franklin to place himself in communication with General Pope as soon as possible, and at the same time cover the transit of Popes supplies. Orders have been given for railway and wagon trains to move to Pope with least possible delay. I am having inspections made of all the forts around the city by members of my staff, with instrnctions to give all requisite orders. I inspected Worth and Ward myself this evening; found them in good order. Reports, so far as heard from, are favorable as to condition of works. GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Major-General. Major-General HALLECK, Washington. CAMP NEAR ALEXANDRIA, August 29, 186~210 p. m. Your dispatch received. Franklins corps has l)een ordered to march at 6 oclock to-morrow morning. Sumner has about 14,000 infantry, without cavalry or artillery, here. Coxs brigade of four regiments is here, with two batteries of artillery. Men of two regiments, much fatigued, caum e in to-day. Tylers brigade of three new regi- ments, but little drilled, is also here. All these troops will be ordered to hold them- selves ready to march to-morrow morning, and all except Franklins to await further orders. If you wish any of them to move toward Manassas please inform ale. Colonel Wuagner, Second New York Artillery, has just come in from the front. He reports strong infantry and cavalry force of rebels near Fairfax Court-Honse. Reports rumors from various sources that Lee and Stuart, with large forces, are at Manassas; that the enemy with 120,000 men intend advancing on the forts near Arlington and Chain Bridge, with a view of attacking Washington and Baltimore. General Barnard telegraphs me to-night that the length of the line of fortifications on this side of the Potomac requires 2,000 additional artillerymen, and additional troops to defend intervals, according to circumstances. At all events, he says, an old regiment should be added to the force at Chain Bridge, and a few regiments dis- tributed along the lines, to give confidence to our new troeps. I agree with him fully, and think our fortifications along the upper part of our line on this side of the river very unsafe with their present garrisons, and the movements of the enemy seem to indicate an attack upon those works. GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Major General. General H. W. HALLECK, General-in Chief U. S. Army, Washington, D. C. CAMP NEAR ALEXANDRIA, August 30, 186211.30 a. m. Your telegram of 9 a. m. received. Ever since General Franklin received notice that he was to march from Alexandria he has been endeavoring to get transportation from the quartermaster at Alexandria, but he has uniformly been told that there was none disposable, and his command marched without wagons. After the departure of his corps, he procured twenty wagons to carry some extra ammunition by unloading Banks supply train. General Sumner endeavored, by application upon the Quartermnaster~s Department, to get wagons to carry his m-eserve ammunition. hut without success, and was obliged to march with what he could carry in his cartridge boxes. I have this morning directed that all my headquarters wagons that are landed be at once loaded with ammunition for Sumner an(l Franklin, bmmt they will not go far toward supplying the deficiency. Eighty-five wagons were got together by the quartermasters last night, loaded wit Page 101 GENERAL REPORTS. CHAP. XXIII.] 101. subsistence, and sent forward at 1 a. m. with an escort via Annandale. Every effort has been made to carry out your orders promptly. The great difficulty seems to con- sist ia the fact that the greater part of the transportation on hand at Alexandria and. Washington has been needed for current supplies of the garrisons. Such is the state of the case as represented to me by the quartermasters, and it appears to be true. I take it for granted that this has not been properly explained to you. * GEO. B. MCCLELLAN, Major-General HALLECK, General-ia- Chief. Major- General. On the morning of the 30th heavy artillery firing was heard in the direction of Fairfax (Jonrt-llouse, which I reported to the General-in~- Chief At 11 a. m. the following telegram was sent: CAMP NEAR ALEXANDRIA, August 30, 186211 a. m. Have ordered Sumner to leave one brigade in vicinity of Chain Bridge, and to move the rest via Columbia pike on Annandale and Fairfax Court-House. Is this the route you wish them to take? He and Franklin are both instructed to join Pope as promptly as possible. Shall Couch move out also when he arrives? GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Major-General HALLECK, Washington. Major-General. On the same day I received the following: WASHINGTON, August 30, 18621.45 p. m. Ammunition, and particularly for artillery, must be immediately sent forward to Centreville for General Pope. It must be done with all possible dispatch. H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief. General MCCLELLAN. To which this reply was made: CAMP NEAR ALEXANDRIA, August .30, 18622.10 p. m. I know nothing of the calibers of Popes artillery. All I can do is to direct my ord- nance officer to load up all the wagons sent to him. I have already sent all my head- quarters wa~ons. You will have to see that wagons are sent from Washington. I can do nothing more than give the order that every available wagon in Alexandria shall be loaded at once. The order to the brigade of Sumner that I directed to remain near Chain Bridge and Tennallytown should go from your headquarters to save time. I understand you to intend it also to move. I have no sharpshooters except the guard around my camp. I have sent off every man but those, and will nov send theta with the train as you direct. I will also send my only remaining squadron of cavalry with General Sumner. I can do no more. You now have every man of the Army of the Potomac who is within my reach. GEO. B. MCCLELLAN, Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK. Major-General. At 10.30 p. m. the following telegram was sent: CAMP NEAR ALEXANDRIA, August 30, 186210.30 p. m. I have sent to the front all my troops with the exception of Couchs division, and have given the orders necessary to insure its being disposed of as you directed. I hourly expect the return of one of my aides, who will give authentic news from the field of battle. * See also McClellan to Halleck, August 30, in Correspondence, etc., Part III Page 102 102 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIIL I cannot express to you the pain and mortification I have experienced to-day in listening to the distant sound of the firing of my men. As I can be of no further use here, I respectfully ask that, if there is a probability of the conflict being renewed to-morrow, I may be permitted to go to the scene of battle with my staff, merely to be with my own men, if nothing more; they will fight none the worse for my being with them. If it is not deemed best to intrust me with the command even of my own army, I simply ask to be permitted to share their fate on the field of battle. Please reply to this to-night. I have been engaged for the last few hours in doing what I can to make arrange- ments for the wounded. I have started out all the ambulances now landed. As I have sent my escort to the front, I would be glad to take some of Greggs cavalry with me, if allowed to go~ GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Major- General. Maj. Gun. H. W. HALLEOK, Commanding U. S. Army, Wa8hington, D. C. To which, on the following day, I received this answer: XVASIIINGTON, Augu8t 31, 18629.18 a. m. I have just seen your telegram of 11.5 last night. The substance was stated to me when received, but I did not know that you asked for a reply immediately. I can- not answer without seeing the President, as General Pope is in command, by his or- ders, of the department. I think Couchs division should go brward as rapidly as possible and find the battle- field. H. W. HALLECK, Major-General MCCLELLAN. General-in-Chief. On the same day the following was received: WASHLNGTON, August 31, 186212.45 p. m. The Subsistence Department are making Fairfax Station their principal depot. It should be well guarded. The officer in charge should be directed to secure the depot by abatis against cavalry. As many as possible of the new regiments should be pre- pared to take the field. Perhaps some more should be sent to the vicinity of Chain rid e. H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief. Major-General MCCLELLAN. At 2.30 p. m. the following dispatch was telegraphed: CAMP NEAR ALEXANDRIA, August 31, 18~2.30 p. m. Major Haller is at Fairfax Station with my provost and headquarters guard and other troops. I have requested four more companies to be sent at once and the pre- cautions you direct to be taken. Under the War Department order of yesterday I have no control over anything ex- cept my staff, some 100 men in my camp here, and the few remaining near Fort Monroe. I have no control over the new regimentsdo not know where they are, on anything about them, except those near here. Their commanding officers and those of the works are not under me. Where I have seen evils existing nuder my eye, I have corrected them. I think it is the business of General Casey to prepare the new regiments for the held, and a mat- ter between him and General Barnard to order others to the vicinity of Chain Bridge. Neither of them is under my command, and by the War Department order I have no right to give them orders. GEO. B. McCLELLAN, General HALLEcK, Washington. Major-General. To which the following is an answer: WASHINGTON, August 31, 186210.7 p. m. Since receiving your dispatch, relating to command, I have not been able to answer any not of absolute necessity. I have not seen the order as published, but will writ Page 103 CHAP. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 103 to you in the morning. You will retain the command of everything in this vicinity not temporarily belonging to Popes army in the field. I beg of you to assist me in this crisis with your ability and experience. I am utterly tired out. H. W. HALLECK, General MCCLELLAN. General-in-Chief. The order referred to in the preceding dispatch was as follows: WAR DEPARTMENT, August 30, 1562. The following are the commanders of the armies operatincr in Viroinia: General Burnside commands his own corps, except those t%at hav~ been temporarily detached and assigned to General Pope. General McClellan commands that portion of the Army of the Potomac that has not been sent foward to General Popes command. General Pope commands the Army of Virginia and all the forces temporarily at- tached to it. All the forces are under the command of Major-General Halleck, General-in-Chief. E. D. TOWNSEND, A88i8tant Adjutant-General. I was informed by Colonel Townsend that the above was published by order of the Secretary of War. At 11.30 p. m. I telegraphed the following: CAMP NEAR ALEXANDRIA Augu8t 31, 186211.30 p. m. The squadron of Second Regular Cavalry that I sent with General Sumner was captured to-day about 2p. in., some 3 miles from Fairfax Court-House, beyond it on the Little Riverpike, by Fitzhugh Lee, with 3,000 cavalry and three light batteries. I have conversed with the first sergeant, who says that when he last saw them they were within a mile of Fairfax. Pope had no troops on that road, this squadron getting there by mistake. There is nothing of ours on the right of Centerville but Sumners corps. There was much artillery firing during the day. A rebel major told the ser- geant that the rebels had driven in our entire left to-day. He says the road is filled with wagons and stragglers coming toward Alexandria. It is clear from the sergeants account that we were badly beaten yesterday, and that Popes right is entirely ex- posed. I recommend that no more of Couchs division be sent to the front, that Burnside be brought here as soon as practicable, and that everything available this side of Fairfax be drawn in at once, including the mass of the troops on the railroad. I apprehend that the enemy will or have by this time occupied Fairfax Court-House and cut off Pope entirely unless he falls back to-night via Sangsters and Fairfax Station. I think these orders should be sent at once. I have no confidence in the dispositions made as I gather them. To speak franklyand the occasion requires itthere appears to be a total absence of brains, and I fear the total destruction of the army. I have some cavalry here that can carry out any orders you may have to send. The occasion is grave and demands ~,rnve measures. The question is the salvation of the country. I learn that our loss yesterday amounted to 15,000. We cannot afford such losses with- out au object. It is my deliberate opinion that the interests of the nation demand that Pope should fall back to-night if possible, and not one moment is to be lost. I will use all the cav- alry I have to watch our right. Please answer at once. I feel confident that you can rely upon the information I give you. I shall be up all night, and ready to obey any orders you give me. GEO. B. MCCLELLAN, General HALLECK, Wash iii gtoa. Major-General. To which this reply was received: WASHINGTON, September 1, 18621.30. a. m. Burnside was ordered up very early yesterday morning. Retain remainder of Couchs forces, and make arrangements to stop all retreating troops in line of works or where you can best establish an outer line of defense. My news from Pope was up to 4 p. m. He was then all right. I must wait for more definite information before I can order a retreat, as the falling back on the line of works must necessarily be directed in case o Page 104 104 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CnAI~. XXIII. a serious disaster. Give me all additional news that is reliable. I shall be up all night, and ready to act as circumstances may require. I am fully aware of the gravity of the crisis, and have been for weeks. H. W. HALLECK, General-in. Chief. Major-General MCCLELLAN. FOURTH PERIOD. On ~he 1st of September I went into Washington, where I had an in- terview with the General-in-Chief, who instructed me verbally to take command of its defenses, expressly limiting my jurisdiction to the works and their garrisons, and ~)rohibiting me from exercising any con- trol over the troops actively engaged in front nnder General Pope. During this interview I suggeste(l to the Generalin-Chief the necessity of his going in person or sending one of his l)ersonal staff to the army under General Pope, for the pnrpose of ascertaining the exact condition of affairs. He sent Colonel Kelton, his assistant adjutant-general. Dnring the afternoon of the same day I received a message from the General-in-Chief to the effect that he desired me to go at once to his house to see the President. The President informed me that be had reason to believe that the Army of the Potomac was not cheerfully co-operating with and sup- porting General Pope ; that he had always been a friend of mine, and now asked me, as a special favor, to use my influence in correcting this state of things. I replied, substantially, that I was confident that he was misinformed that I was sure, whatever estimate the Army of the Potomac might entertain of General Pope, that they would obey his orders, snpport him to the fullest extent, and do their whole duty. The President, who was much moved, asked inc to telegraph to Fitz John Porter, or some other of my friends, and try to do away with any feeling that might exist; adding that I could rectif~- the evil, and that no one else could. I thereupon told him that I would cheerfully telegraph to General Porter, or do anything & lse in my power to gratify his wishes and re- lieve his anxiety; upon which he thanked me very warmly, assured inc that he could never forget my action in the matter, & c., and left. I then wrote the following telegram to General Porter, which was sent to liim by the General-in-Chief: WASHINGTON, September 1, 1862. I ask of you, for my sake, that of the country, and the old Army of the Potomac, that you and all my friends will lend the fullest and most cordial co-operation to General Pope in all the operations now going on. The destinies of our country, the honor of our arms, are at stake, and all depends now upon the cheerful co-operation of all in the field. This week is the clisis of our fate. Say the same thing to my friends in the Army of the Potomac, and that the last request I have to make of them is, that for their countrys sake they will extend to General Pope the same support they ever have to me. I am in charge of the defenses of Washington, and am doing all I can to render your retreat safe, should that become necessary. GEO. B. McCLELLAN. Major-General PORTER. To which he sent the following reply: FAIRFAX COURT-HOUSE, September 2, 18621O a. m. You may rest assured that all your friends, as well as every lover of his country, will ever give, as they have given, to General Pope their cordial co-operation and constant support in the execution of all orders and plans. Our killed, woIlu(led, and enfeebled troops attest oni- devoted (luty. F. J. PORTER. General GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN, Major-General, Comeig., Washington Page 105 CHAP. XXIII.1 GENERAL REPORTS. 105 Neither at the time I wrote the telegram nor at any other time did I think for one moment that General Porter had been or would be in any manner derelict iii the performance of his duty to the nation an(l its cause. Such an impression never entere(l my mmd. The dispatch in question was written purely at the request of the President. On the morning of the 2d the President and General ilalleck came to my house, when the President informed me that Colonel Kelton had returned from the front that our aiThirs were in a bad condition that the army was in full retreat upon the defonses of Washington; the roads filled with stragglers, & c. He instructed me to take steps at once to stop and collect the stragglers, to l)lace the works in a proper state of defense, and to go out to meet and take command of the army when it a~)proache(l the vicinity of the wor1~s; then to l)lace the troops in the best Positioncommitting everything to my hands. I immediately took steps to carry out these orders, and sent au aide to General Pope with the following letter: HEADQUARTERS, Washington, September 2, 1862. GENERAL: General Halleck instructed me to repeat to you the order he sent this morning to withdraw your army to Washington without unnecessary delay. He feared that his messenger might miss you, au(l desired to lake this double precaution. In order to bring troops upon ~round wills which they are already familiar it would be best to move Porters corps upon Uptons Hill, tha.t it may occupy Halls Hill, & c. McDowells to Uptons Hill; Franklins to the works in front of Alexandria; Heintzel- mans to the same vicinity; Couch to Fort Corcoran, or, if practicable, to the Chain Bridge; Sumner either to Fort Albany or to Alexandria, as may be most convenient. In haste, general, very truly, yours, GEG. B. McCLELLAN Maj. Gen. JOHN POPE, Conrnaadiag Army of Virgiaia.~ u. 5: Army. Ju the afternoon I crossed the Potomac and rode to the front, and at Uptons Hill met the advance of McDowells corps, and with it Generals Pope and McDowell. After getting what information I could from them, I sent the few aides at my disposal to the left to give instructions to the troops approaching in the (lirection of Alexandria, and hearing artillery firing in the direction of the Vienna and Langley road, by which the corps of Sumner, Porter, and Sigel were returning, and learning from General Pope that Sumner was probably engaged, I went with a single aide and three orderlies by the shortest line to meet that column. I reached the column after dark, and proceeded as far as Lewinsville, where I became satisfied that the rear corps (Suniners) would be able to reach its intended position without any serious molestation. I there- fore indicated to Generals Porter and Sigel the positions they were to occupy, sent instructions to General Sumner, and at a late hour of the night returned to Washington. Next day I rode to the front of Alexandria, and was engaged in rec- tifying the positions of the troops and giving orders necessary to secure the issuing of the necessary supplies, & c. I felt sure on this day that we could repulse any attack made by the enemy on the south side of the Potomac.* * * * * * * * I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Brig. Gen. LoRENZo THOMAS, Major-General, U. AS. Army. Adjutant-General U. S. Army. * The whole of Mcclellans report for the Fourth Period will appear in Chapter XXXI, embracing operations of the Arnsy of the Potomac from September 2 to Novem- ber 9, k62 Page 106 106 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. X~ Ko.2. Reports of Brig. Gen. John G. Barnard, U. & Army, Chief Engineer of operations from May 23, 1861, to August 15, 1862. WASHINGTON, January 26, 1863. GENERAL: In compliance with the request of Major-General McClel lan, I make the following report of the engineer operations of the Army of the Potomac executed under my direction as chief engineer of that army from the time of its organization to the date at which it was with- drawn from the James River: On the night of the 23d24th of May, 1861, a portion of the force which had been raised under the difibrent calls of the President for three-months and three-years volunteers crossed the Potomac by the Long Bridge, by the Aqueduct Bridge, and by steamers to Alexandria. seized the city of Alexandria, the heights of Arlington, and interme- diate connecting points. As teAtes~de~pont to the Long Bridge and Aque- duct, Forts Runyon and Corcoran (the sites of which had been pre- viouslv reconnoiterd under my direction) were commenced at daylight on the morning of the 24th. The same day a reconnaissance was made in the vicinity of Alexandria by Captain Wright, Engineers (now major-general U. S. Volunteers), and Fort Ellsworth, to secure our 1)ossession of that city, was commen~ed. A coul)le of weeks later I laid out Fort Albany (intended to command the Columbia tnrnI)ike and the Aqueduct and Alexandria roads, and to give greater security to onr de~bouche~ by the Long Bridge), which was commenced under Captain Blunt, Engineers. These works were all of consi(lerable magnitude (Fort Runyon having a perimeter of 1,500 yards). They were not entirely completed, though very nearly so, and quite defensible at the date of the advance of the army under General McDowell, July 16. I give this brief account of these preliminary works because they formed the initiation of the sys- tem of the defenses of Washington. On the return of the army from the campaign of Bull Run the policy of surrounding Washington by a complete system of defensive works was no longer doubtful. Major-General McClellan, on his as- suinption of the command of the Army of the Potomac, was l)rompt to recognize the necessity of further fortifications, especially urgent at that time. In as rapid succession as possible, and in the order of the most urgent importance, new works were commenced. The interval between Fort Corcoran and Fort Albany was filled by a series of works forming a continuous line within snpportiiig distances, protecting the heights of Arlington. At the same time the most prominent points on the north of the Potomac and those contrblling the important routes leading to the capital were occupied by strong works. It was soon apparent that Fort Ellsworth, important as that work still is, was inadequate for the defense of Alexandria. It was found necessary to occupy with a l)owerfnl work the heights over Hunting Creek, and to form a line of works embracing the Seminary Heights, and connecting with our Arlington lines at Fort Albany. About the middle of September a portion of the army crossed the Chain Bridge and occupied the south shore of the Potomac at that l)oilmt. The same night strong works, the site of which had previously been reconnoitered by Major (now Brigadier-General) Woodbury, were commenced for holding this d~bouche. On the 29th of September (1 think it was) the army advanced to th Page 107 CHAP. Xxiii.] GENERAL REPORTS. 107 position of Uptons and Munsons Hills, and the works of Forts Ramsay, Buffalo, & c., were commenced and speedily finished. In September the fortification of the heights over the Eastern Branch was commenced. During the subsequent months of the autumn and winter the en- gineers, assisted by large details of troops and also by large gangs of hired laborers, were busily engaged in completing the system~ which, as you will observe, now extended front a point below Hunting Creek, near Alexandria~ to the Chain Bridge, thence from the Potomac to the Eastern Branch near Bladensburg, and thence along the heights south of the Eastern Branch to a point nearly opposite Alexandria, makin ga total development of 33 miles. I refrain from making here an exact enumeration or a minute de- scriptiou of the works. A report to the Chief Engineer, U. S. Army, made by me December 10, 1861, in c oinpliance with a resolution of the House of Representatives (a copy of which was furnished to General McClellan), will furnish all such details. They should not be made public. I incorporate in this report the following extract: The aggregate perimeter of all the works is about 15,500 yards, or nearly 9 miles (including the stockaded gorges, which, however, form a small proportion of the whole), requiring, computed according to the rule adopted for the lines of Torres Vedras, 22,674 men (about) for garrison. - The number of guns (most of which are actually mounted) is about 430, requiring about 7,200 men to furnish three reliefs of gunners. The permanent garrisons need consist of only .these gunners, and even in case of attack it will seldom be necessary to keep full garrisons in all the works. The total garrisons for all the works (152 in number) of Torres Vedras amounted to 34,125 men, and as the total perimeters are nearly proportional to the total garrisons, it appears that the lines about Washington involve a magnitude of works of about two-thirds of that in the three lines of Tortes Vedras. The works themselves, fewer in number, are generally much larger than those of Torres Vedras, and involve, I believe, when the amount of bomb-proof shelter is con- sidered, more labor per yard of perimeter, but the latter lines involved a far greater amount of auxiliary work, such as the scarping of mountain slopes, palisading, abatis, roads, & c., than we have had occasion to make. The lines of Torres Vedras were armed with 534 pieces of ordnance (12, 9 or C pounders, with a few field howitzers); ours with 480 pieces, of which the greater number are 32-pounders on barbette carriages, the rest being 24-pounders on the same carriages, ~24-ponnder siege guns, 10, 20, and 30 pounder rifled guns (Parrort), with a f~w field pieces and howitzers. As to number of guns, therefore, our armament approaches to equality with the famous lines mentionedi In weight of metal it more than doubles it. The above applies to our works as now nearly completed, and has no reference to the additional works I have elsewhere mentioned as here- after necessary. (Very considerable changes in works, armament, & c., have been made since the above account was written, which applies to their state when the Army of the Potomac left Washington, March, 1862.) * * * * * * 4 It remains with me to express my sense of the zeal and efficiency with which the officers of engineers serving with me since last April have discharged their duties. The theory of these defenses is that upon which the works of Torres Vedras were based, the only one admitted at the present day for de- fending extensive lines. It is to occupy the commanding points within cannon range of each other by field forts, the fire of which shall sweep all approaches. These forts furnish the secure empla~ements of artil- lery. They also afford covei7 to bodies of infantry. The works may be connected by lines of light parapets, or the ground (where practicable) may be so obstructed that the enemys troops cannot penetrate the in Page 108 108 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIII. terval without being exposed for considerable time to the destructive effects of the artillery or musketry tire of the forts. With such a system established, the defense against a powerful attack requires that all the forts shall be garrisoned; that a certain amount of iniVintry, cavalry, and movable artillery be distributed along the lines sufficient to hold them until reserves can be brought to their support; and, finally, it requires a movable force held as a reserve whicim may be shifted from point to point to meet the enemys effort wherever it may be made, and where, aided by the works, they can repel superior numbers. It is evident that without fortifications a place cannot be considered secure unless held by considerably greater numbers than the enemy can bring to assail it. No less an authority than Napoleon says that, aided by fortifications, 50,000 men and 3,000 artillerymen can defend a capital against 300,000 men, and he asserts the necessity of fortifying all national capitals. The engineer forces attached to the Army of the Potomac as it was constituted during its campaign on the Peninsula consisted of a brigade of two regiments of volunteer engineers (the Fifteenth New York, Col. John McLeod Murphy, and the Fiftieth New York, Col. Charles B. Stuart), commanded by Brigadier-General (Major of Engineers, U. S. Army) D. P. Woodbnry, and of a battalion (three companies) of regu- lar engineer troops, commanded by Capt. J. C. Duane, Engineers. The two regiments of volunteers had been placed under charge of Lieutenant-Colonel and Aide-de-Camp (Captain of Engineers, U. S. Army) B. S. Alexander in October, 1861, for instruction in the duties of engineer troops. The same officer had superintended, assisted by Captain IDuane and Lieutenant Comstock, the getting up of pontoon trains and other engineer equipage. Previous to the embarkation of the army he was taken sick, and was thereby prevented from taking charge of the brigade, though he rejoined the army soon after its ar- rival before Yorktown. The battalion of regular engineers was organized amid instructed by Captain Duane, assisted by First Lieuts. C. B. Reese, C. E. Cross, and 0. E. Babcock, which three last-named officers commanded the several companies of the same. The engineer equipage consisted of about 160 bateaux, or woodeii pontoons of the French model, with the necessary balks, chess, anchors, cordage, & c. There were also a certain number (of which I do not now find any exact statement) of Birago trestles and Russian canvas boats. As omigiimally got. up, this bridge equipage was orgamiized imi trains, of which there were six regular trains, consisting each of thirty-four French pontoons and eight Birago trestles, calculated to make a bridge of about 250 yards in length, and an advanced guard train composed of Birago trestles and Ruslan canvas boats. The wagons for but four of the regular trains and for the advanced guard train were provided. All or nearly all the above bridge equipage was taken to the isthmus, but it did not retain its organization, excel)t, I believe, one regular train taken along with the Engineer Battalion. The miscellaneons demand for bateaux for bridging Wormnleys Creek at the siege of Yorktown, for quartermasters use at Cheesemans Landing, for the disembarkation of General Franklins division, & c., rendered iml)Ossible amid unnecessary the preservation of such an organization. A large portion of this equi- paoe was in actual use for the purposes above namned during the siege of Yorktown. On the advance of the army the single bridge train of the Emigineer Battalion accompanied it, part of the remaining equipag Page 109 ChAP. XXIJI.j GENERAL REPORTS. 109 being in depot at Fort Monroe and the rest taken up by water to White House. Thirty wagons for engineer tools were 1)rel)ared, containing the special tools required for engineer troops. Twenty of these accompanied the Engineer Brigade and ten accompanied the Engineer Battalion. Besides these tool-wagons were provided to carry intrenching tools sufficient for the engineer trooI)s. For the geuieral service of troops in intrenching or siege work tools were supplied by the Quartermasters Department. The works prepared by the enemy to resist a landing at any point of the Peninsula south of Yorktown or an advance from Fort Monroe having been abandoned, the engineer ol)erations of the army commenced with the siege of Yorktown. These works, however, such as that at Ship Point and others near the mouth of Wormleys Creek, were of con- siderable magnitude. My special rel)ort of the siege of Yorktown (a. copy of which is fur- nished you) will preclude the necessity of any further account in this J)laee. I should have mentioned that beside the engineer officers and trool)s al i-ca dy enumerated the following engineer officers accompanied the arm v: Lient. Col. (Aide-de-Camp) B. S. Alexander, First Lient. C. B. Coin- stock, First Lient. lxi. D. McAlester, and First Lient. W. E. Merrill. Capt. C. S. Stewart, Second Lieut. F. U. Farqnhar. These two offi- cers were temporarily detached from their duties at Fort Monroe and joine(l the army about the middle of April. First Lieut. H. L. Abbot, Topographical Engineers. This officer having been detailed for engineer duty ~n the (lefeilses of Washinoton, accompanied me as an aide throughout the campaign. At the coinlllencement of the sieo-e ol)erations, Colonel Alexander (assisted by Lieutenant MeAlester) was cllarge(l with the very impor- tant duty of constructing time roads throuo-h the various ravines of Wormleys Ci-cek, which formed our main communication with the siege works. On the 20th of April he was attached to the headquarters of Brigadier-General Franklin, whose (livision was theiu ~)re~)aring- for a landing on some point of the enemys shores. Lieutenant Comstock during the siege acted most of the time under the immediate orders of Captain Duane, with whom he continued until after the battle of Fair Oaks. He was afterward attached to the head- quarters of General Sumner. Lieutenant MeAlester was attached to the headquarters of General lleintzelman throughout the campaign. Lieutenant lxlerrill was attached to the headquarters of General Keyes. At the action in front of the one-gun battery, April 16, he was severely wounded in the arm. He was hors de combat for the re- mainder of the campaign, and was brevetted for gallant services ~n that occasion. Captain Stewart and Lieutenant Farquhar were attached to General Sumners headquarters during the siege. On the advance of the army they accompanied the advance guard under Brigadier-General Stone- man, with whom they remained until the arrival on the Chickalmomniny, where Captain Stewart was taken sick from overexertion and was obliged to return to Fomt Monroe. Lieutenant Farquhar was subse- quently assigned to duty with General Sum ncrs headquarters. I directed full I)lans of the works constituting time strong defensive line extendimmg- aem-oss tile Peninsula at Williamsburg to be prel)ared, but they were never made. A sketch, however, showing the general char Page 110 110 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIII. acter of this line and the positions of the works was made from the re- connaissances of Lieutenant MeAlester, and it is, I believe, in the possession of the commanding general. Previous to the fall of Yorktown the (livision of Brig. Gen. W. B. Franklin had been held in readiness to be embarked and landed at such a point on York River as subsequent events might dictate. The prep- arations for these operatious had been directed by Lieut. Col. B. S. Alexander. The division actually made a landing nearly opposite West Point, which was followed by a severe engagement with a por- tion of the enemys forces. I inclose a report of Colonel Alexander herewith concerning the engineer operations.* In the movements of the army in its advance from Yorktown the officers of engineers were employed in various reconnaissances of the routes of the York and Painunkey Rivers, & c., while detachments from General Woodburys Engineer Brigade repaired roads and bridges. After reaching a point near Ropers Church, on the Williamsburg and Richmond road, the right wing, consisting of the corps of Porter and Franklin, took the road via Cumberland and the White House, striking the Chickahominy at New Bridge, while the left (corps of Heintzelmau and Keyes) kept the Richmond road to Bottoms Bridge. The advance guards reached these points about the 16th or 17th of May. On the 20th I proceeded, by orders of the commanding general, to make a forced reconnaissance of the position of Bottoms Bridge, ac- companied by Lieutenants Comstock and McAlester. On arriving, I found the ground already occupied by a portion of the division of General Casey, and I dismissed the force I had ordered. The result of the reconnaissance was the acquiring of a perfect knowledge of the character of the Chickahominy as an obstacle, and the presumptiou that at this point (Bottoms Bridge) no serious resistance was contein. plated; in fact, the next day our troops crossed and occupied the other bank. General Woodbury, with his brigade, was ordered to this point to re- pair the old bridge and the railroad bridge and to establish others, while Lieutenants Comstock and MeAlester made a reconnaissance in force on the right bank, with the view of establishing a t~te-de-pont to cover both Bottoms Bridge and the railroad bridge. This work was begun, but never entirely finished. On the 22d the general headquarters reached Cold Harbor, and I pro- ceeded immediately to the New Bridge to reconnoiter that position. A word is proper here concerning the Chickahominy, which at the season we struck it was one of the most formidable obstacles that could be opposed to the advance of the armyan obstacle to which an ordinary river, though it be of considerable magnitude, is comparatively slight. The Chickahominy, considered as a military obstacle, consists of a stream of no great volume, a swamp, and bottom land. The stream flows through a belt of heavily-timbered swamp, which averages 300 to 400 yards wide. A few hundred yards below New Bridge is a short length of the stream not margined by swamp timber, but everywhere else between New and Bottoms Bridges the belt of swamp timber is continuous and wide. The tops of the trees rise just about to the level of the crests of the high lands bordering the bottom, thus perfectly screening from view the bottom lands and slopes of the high lands on the enemys side. The disappearance in the place indicated of swamp timber near New Bridge, and the dwindling away of the same at some See No. 3, Alexanders report, dated January 28, 1863 Page 111 CHAP. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 111 points above the bridge to isolated trees, gave us some glimpse of the enemys side near this point. Through this belt of swamp the stream flows, sometimes in a single channel, more frequently divided into sev- eral, and when bat a foot or two above its summer level overspreads the whole swamp. The bottom lands between the swamp and the high lands are little elevated at their margins above the swamp, so that a few feet rise of the stream overflows large areas of them. They rise very gently toward the foot of the high-land slopes. These bottom lands are gen- erally cultivated, intersected by deep ditches, and their lower l)ortions are in wet weather, even when not overflowed, spongy, and impracti- cable for cavalry and artillery. The total width of bottom land varies from three-quarters to one and a quarter miles. The crests of the opposite high-land spurs are about one and a half or one and three- quarter miles apart. The road via Cold Harbor to Richmond crosses the stream by a wooden bridge on piles, which had been destroyed. After passing the bridge the road or causeway takes a direction oblique to the course of the stream, having reaches nearly parallel with it, and ascends the opposite heights by a ravine at a point nearly a mile from the bridge. Above New Bridge the character of the stream an(l mar- gins is not much different from what has been described, though the swamp was somewhat less regular in its width and density. The Mechanicsville and Meadow Bridges each consisted of several bridges, crossing different arms of the stream, the swamp being wide at both places. These were the only bridges and roads crossing the stream in the vicinity of the positions of the army. The distance from New Bridge to Bottoms Bridge is 8 miles. In this space there were two or three indifferent summer fords or places where a pedestrian could make his way through the swamp and stream, but it was currently reported at the time of our arrival that the stream was nowhere fordable. The knowledge of the Chickahominy gained at Bottoms Bridge showed me that the stream might be reached at almost any point with little risk and thoroughly examined, provided the enemys pickets did not actually hold our side. Taking with me Lieutenant Custer, of Fifth U. S. Cavalry, I reached it at a point three-fourths of a mile below New Bridge, and caused him to enter it. He waded across without any difficulty (the depth being about 4 feet), and a few days afterward, emboldened by this experiment, he caused the length of the stream to be waded from the bridge for a half a mile down. The attack and capture of the enemys pickets by him and Lieutenant Bowen was founded upon these reconilaissances, to which the successful results are due. Although it was thus shown that the stream was no obstacle for infantry, the swamp and the bottom lands were impracticable to cavalry and artillery. It was necessary to provi(Ie bridges, and (except at the site of the New Bridge) to corduroy a certain length of road on each margin. Three points were selected: New Bridge, a point a mile above, and another the same distance below. The bridge materials and corduroy stuff were collected and deposited at convenient points. At the same time General Sumner, whose corps had been stationed at a point intermediate between New Bridge and Bottoms Bridge, con- structed two corduroy bridges across the stream and swamp, one of which was completed on or before the 28th and the other on or before the 30th of May. So far as engineering preparations were concerned, the army could have been thrown over as early as the 28th, Sumne Page 112 112 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIII. uniting his corps to those of Heintzelman and Keyes, and taking the enemys positioli at New Bridge in flank and rear. Thus attacked the enemy could have made no formidable resistance to the passage of our right wing. I had twice reconnoitered the other side of the Chickahominy, and on the 28th found General Naglees (Caseys division) pickets holding the very edge of the large wheat field occupying the high lands irnme- diately facing our position at New Bridge. On the 30th I repeated the reconnaissance, and reached Goldings house, a point overlooking our d~bouch6 from the New Bridge at a distance of 1~ miles. I returned from that reconnaissance in the torrents of rain which commenced to fall that afternoon and which continued during the night, completely changing the whole aspect of aff~irs. On the afternoon of the 31st the enemy threw himself upon our left wing, doubtless believing that it was, by the swollen condition of the Chickahominy, entirely isolated. Fortunately General Sumner suc- ceeded in getting overboth divisions of his corps and one battery, though Richardson, finding the lower bridge impassable, was obliged to make a detour to the upper one, and did not arrive in time to take part in the action that evening. Soon after the upper bridge becanie impassable. Orders from headquarters were given for throwing that night the bridges at the l)oints selected at and near New Bridge. The night was intensely dark, and the dense foliage of the swamp excluded any little light there was in the heavens. The stream, which during the day had slowly exhibited the effects of the storm, rose rapidly during the night. Captain Duane, who at the New Bridge had the simplest task of all that of bringing his pontoons into l)osition between existing abutments found the darkness, the powerful current, an(l the rising stream too much to contend with, and postJ)oued his operations till daylight. At the upper point the bridge materials (trestles), which had been deposited near the site, nuder cover of the swamp timber, were found to be afloat. This, with the mnch more difficult character of the task than that of Captain Duanes, prevented any progress during the night. At the lower point the same or even greater difficulties were encoun- tered. The direction of the bridge, chosen while the water was dowu and well chosen, was found inadmissible after a rise of a couple of feet. Detachments of General Woodburys brigade had charge of the con- struction of these two last-named bridges. He reports to me: At 1.30 p. in., when the battle began over the river, I was at work 2 miles below New Bridge on a bridge or set of bridges over the Chickahominy. I comprehended in an instant the full import of the attack, and hastened bick to prepare for bridges. The six teams left to me I caused to be harnessed up and added to them as many as I could raise in my brigade. * * * About 10 oclock on the night of the 31st ultimo I received orders to commence bridges immediately. The three sub-reports herewith, nnmb ered 3, 4, 5,~ of the officers charged with the construction, will show the difficulties encountered. General Woodbury adds: No fault can be found with the officers or men of the Engineer Brigade. I have never seen officers work with more zeal or men work harder than they have done dur- ing the last two days. Only by more familiarity with the drill could they have had more experience available for the recent emergency. The result of the operation was that at 8.15 a. m. (June 1) the pon- toon bridge at the site of New Bridge was complete and passable to infantry, cavalry, and artillery. About noon the upper trestle bridge * See reports of Captains Braluerd, Ketchum, and Spaulding, inclosures to No. 4 Page 113 CHAP. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 113 was practicable for infantry. It was not till night that a practicable bridge for infantry was obtained at the lower trestle bridge. In reference to these two trestle bridges it must be observed that the bottom-land adjacent, dry, or nearly so, when we selected the sites, was overflowed or rendered boggy for a half mile on one or the other side, and could only be made passable to cavalry or artillery by cordu- royinga work which could not be done over so much water-covered ground in one day or two days, nor done at all on the enemys side under his unsubdued fire, as subsequent experience proved. At 8.15 a. in., the moment when the New Bridge pontoon bridge was being completed, I was on the spot. I have observed that the road crossing at this point was a raised causeway. On our own side the water had overflowed this causeway in two or three places near the bridge. On the other side were similar places. Anxious to ascertain how practicable the route was, I directed Lieutenant Babcock to pro- ceed with a few of his sappers as far as he safely could on the other side. He proceeded perhaps 200 yards, when he was fired upon by sharpshooters ambuscaded in the vicinity and one of hi~ men shot through the lungs. Supporting the wounded man himself, he with- drew, followed by repeated volleys. The intense anxiety I felt at this moment was partially relieved when I ascertained that it were not Lieu- tenant Babcock himself, as I supposed, who was shot. Although these overflows of the causeway existed on both sides, the road surface was hard and at that time practicable for artillery. Later in the day the water continuing to rise and flowing over with a power- ful current, cuts were made so deep that artillery could not pass until these were bridged. Whether this happened, too, on the enemys side (where the road, as stated, was likewise overflowed) there were no means of knowing. At a late hour (perhaps 10 or 12 oclock, for I find no record) I wa~ again at these bridges. Of the results of the battle w~e knew (or I knew) nothing. The enemy held with artillery, and undisturbed, the opposite heights. It was evidently impossible to pass here with our infantry, artillery, and cavalry confined to this narrow causeway, for I do not believe that even infantry in any numbers, in fighting order, could have passed over (opposed by the enemys fire) the overflowed and ditched lands that interposed between the two trestle bridges and the enemys positions. I so reported (in writing, I think, though I find no copy) to yourself. There was one way, however, to unite the army on the other side; it was to take advantage of a victory at Fair Oaks, to sweep at once the enemy from his position opposite New Bridge, and simultane. ously to bring over by the New Bridge causeway our troops of the right wing, which would then have met with little or no resistance. It should have been observed that soon after passing the Chicka- hominy at Bottoms Bridge General Keyes was directed to advanc~ and to select and fortify a strong position on the Richmond road. He commenced fortifying a position about a mile in advance of Savage Station and 1~ miles behind the Seven Pines. It was deemed necessary by the commanding general to hold the position of the Seven Pines (the junction of the Nine-mile road with the Williamsburg road), and by his order I directed Lieutenant MeAlester to select and fortify a posi- tion. Lieutenant McAlester found the point held by Brigadier-General Caseys division and some slight rifle pits, abatis, & c., made. He selected a position a half mile in advance of the Seven Pines, which he deemed more tenable than the first. On visiting this ground on the 8 R UVOL X Page 114 114 TIlE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIII. 28th I directed the commencement of a redoubt, rifle pits, felling of trees, & c. Lieutenant McAlester was unable to procure an adequate force to throw up rapidly a defensive line, and this redoubt was quite incomplete when the attack at this point was made, about 1.30 p. m. of the 31st. A few pieces of artillery were placed in it behind the uri- finished parapet, and in attempting to spike them, I think it was, the gallant Colonel Bailey lost his life. By the rise of the Chickahominy the two bridges built by General Sumner became impracticable by the night of the 31st. The bridges at Bottoms Bridge with difficulty were preserved from destruction, but the rising waters overflowed the adjacent road, and soon those bridges be- came useless for wagons or horses. Fortunately the railroad bridge had been repaired, and by this alone the left wing of the army was supplied. By means of planks laid between the rails, infantry and, with some risk, horses could pass. This for several days was the only communication between the two wings of the army. Immediately after the battle of Fair Oaks Lieutenant McAlester was directed to complete the redoubt already mentioned, and to extend the defensive line to the right, to embrace Fair Oaks, and to the left, to connect with the White Oak Swamp. At the same time Colonel Sully, under General Sumners orders, commenced a. line of barricades, con- tinuing the line toward Goldings house. Lieutenants Comstock and Farquhar were ordered to General Sumners headquarters to aid in this work, make reconnaissances, & c. Colonel Alexander took by your orders immediate charge of the bridges~ and a vigorous effort was made to corduroy the approaches on each sidea thing indispensable to making the two trestle bridges l)racticable. The. labor was completely thrown away. After being per- mitted to go on for a few days it was arrested by the enemys fire, and the approaches on the enemy~ s side to these two bridges never did become practicable. Two days after the battle of the 1stviz, June 3I was directed to join General Sumners headquarters temporarily. Previous to leaving 1 had urgently recommended the construction of a bridge at a point not far below .the lower trestle bridge, where the d~bouch~s On each side could be completed out of view of the enemy and under the protection of our own forces, now holding Goldings house. General Woodbury and Colonel Alexander made an exploration of the stream under direct orders from headquarters, and selected a point for a bridge favorable enough otherwise, but failing in the important object of bringing the two wings of the army into immediate connection, it being but 300 or 400 yards above Sumners upper bridge. This bridge was built over the stream upon framed trestles; through the swamp it was supported by cribs. The approaches to the bridge over the low bottom lands were either raised corduroy or on the north side simply earth raised 2 or 3 feet, the soil being here sandy, with a layer of brush 1 foot below the upper sur- face, deep lateral ditches being made. The whole structure of the bridge andapproaches was about 1,400 yards long. The trestle-work and crib- work bridge was mostly done by troops of the Engineer Brigade, under Woodbury; the approaches on the north by the Ninth and Twenty- second Massachusetts Regiments, Colonels Cass and Gove, both of whom were killed in the battles following; those on the shuth side by the Third Vermont. The bridge was ready for the passage of teams on the 14th, covered with earth, and the approaches entirely completed on the 17th. The bridge l)~Ol)C~ was 1~08() feet long, roadway 11 feet wide, number of cribs 40, of framed trestles 6. Simultaneously two infantr Page 115 CHAP. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 115 bridges were made across the swamp by the Engineer Brigadeone a short distance below the lower trestle bridge, and one nearly opposite Goldings, where an old summer ford had been found, and where Gen- eral Naglee had commence(l a bridge previous to the battle of Fair Oaks. To complete the history of bridges, I would add that on my return from General Sumners headquarters I still urged the necessity of a more direct communication, practicable for all arms, betxVeen the two wings of the army, the two trestle bridges having been virtually aban- doned. The l)oiIlt suggested by me being 9onsidered too much exposed, the commanding general himself selected a~.poiut somewhat lower down, where the d6bouch6 was entirely covered by our lines near Goldings, and this bridge was commenced by Captain Duanes Engineer Battalion (assisted by troops of General Porters and General W. F. Smiths com- mands) on the 10th or 11th. The structure was about equal in magni- tude to that already described. It was finished on the 18th or 19th. Besides the work described, detachments of the Engineer Brigade or Engineer Battalion were at work on the corduroy communication with the bridges commenced the night of 31~t, repairin~g and corduroying road, rebuilding Bottoms Bridge, & c. We had, June 19, the following bridges: Upper trestle bridge. D~boucMs held by enemy, and incomplete on his side. The New Bridge. Two pontoon bridges, Captain Duane having built a second one alongside the one completed June 1. The road was held on south side of Chickahominy by the enemy. The. lower trestle bridge. DJbouch6s held by enemy, and incomplete on his side. The foot bridge. Available for infantry under certain circumstances. It was on the shortest line between the two wiugs of the army. Duanes bridge. A fine structure, practicable for all arms, and afford- ing a very direct communication. The infantry bridge (of Woodbury). Available for infantry. Woodbury amid Alexanders bridge. For all arms. Sumners upper bridge, or the grape~-ine bridge. This had been put in condition to be used in emergency by all arms. Sumners lower bridge I think had never been repaired. The railroad bridge was the means of bringing the most of the sup- plies to the left wing. Bottoms Bridge was kept up and the t~te-de-pont held. While at General Sumners headquarters, June 4 to June 7, I laid out a redoubt at Goldings (No. 6 in Campaign Map No. 3) and directed Lieutenant MeAlester to lay out two others (Nos. 4 and 5) and to corn- plete No. 3, the one first commenced, and where Colonel Bailey was killed. Lieutenant Comstock, assisted by Lieutenant Farquhar, was directed to have the lines complete from No. 6, to connect with MeAlesters works. The woods in front were extensively slashed, as shown on the campaigmi map. Lieutenant MeAlester, in reconnoitering on the 5th, had his horse shot under him by the enemys pickets, and narrowly escaped capture. Subsequently redoubts Nos. 1 and 2 were constructed c left to the White Oak Swamp. arrying the The redoubts may be described as follows: No. 1, a lunette with open gorge, 8 guns; No. 2, a redan with Ol)CII gorge, 6 guns; No. 3, an inclosed redoubt (irregular pentagomi), 5 guns; No. 4, an inclosed r Page 116 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIII.. 116 doubt, 9 guns; No. 5, an inclosed redeubt, 6 guns; No. 6, an inclosed square of 30 yards wide, 6 guns. These works were connected by rifle pits or barricades. The object of these lines, over 3 miles long, was to hold our position of the left wing against the concentrated force of the enemy until communications across the Chickahominy could be estab- lished, or, if necessary, to maintain our position on this side while the bulk of the army were thrown upon the other, should occasion require it; or, finally, to hold one part of our line and communications by a small force, while our principal offensive effort was made upon another. Such an offensive effort it was the understood purpose of the command- ing general to make npou our right, driving the enemy from the large wheat field (where he opposed the passage of our right wing) and from his position at the Old Tavern, thus putting ourselves upon the Nine- mile road to Richmond and within 5 miles of that city. Reconnaissances with this view were constantly made by the engineers, roads and bridges across the ravine which separated our right wing from the enemy pre- pared, & c. At the same time several batteries were constructed under the direc- tion of Captain Duane on the left bank of the Chickahominy, either to operate upon the enemys positions and batteries opposite or to defend our bridges, & c. They were: No. 1, near Dr. Gaines house, 6 guns; No. 2, on left of road near New Bridge, 6 guns; No. 3, on right of road, near New Bridge, 6 guns; No. 4, on right of Hogans house, 6 guns; This last was armed with 44-inch siege ordnance, 1 think, and used with success against the enemys batteries. Several of these siege guns and the two 8.inch siege mortars were brought up to put either in or in the vicinity of redonbts Nos. 3, 4, and 5. Our reconnaissances showed that the enemy was throwing up works in the farther side of the large wheat field and in the neighborhood of Old Tavern, also in front of our lines from redoubt No. 2 to No. 5. It was impossible to distinguish the exact character of these works, though most of them were probably little more than rifle pits. In order, as I understood it, to drive back the enemys pickets and to throw forward our own, General Hooker was ordered on the 25th to push his division forward through the woods to the clearing three- fourths of a mile beyond his lines, and between the Williamsburg road and the railroad. Hearing the firing in the afternoon I went to that locality and pushed forward on the Williamsburg road to the farther edge of the woods (then held by our troops) with a hope of getting some better knowledge of the ground and works of the enemy. An opening of 1,200 or 1,500 yards extended before me, and I saw guns in position and tents partially hid by a depression in the ground, but no appearance of works. In returning, my horse was struck by a shell and disabled. In view of an advance to drive the enemy from the wheat field on our right it was decided as a preliminary to construct an epaulement for putting our guns on a commanding point on the edge of the field and near our picket lines. Colonel Alexander with. a large detail broke ground at dark on the night of the 26th withiu musket range of the enemys pickets, and succeeded by morning in obtaining cover without loss. The enemy did not interfere in any manner with the execution of this work, having probably other designs. It had been known some days previous to this that Jacksons com- mand had reached Fredericks Hall Station on its way from the Shenan- doah, and there was presumptive evidence that an attack on our right wing was meditated by the concentrated forces of the enemy, and that Page 117 CHAP. XXm.] GENERAL REPORTS. 117 too, on the 27th. it was understood by me to be the intention of the commanding general to concentrate our own forces either on one side or other of the Chickahominy, and, so far as I could infer from a conver- sation in which no positive decision was announced on his part, the plan to which preference was given was, after the enemys plans should be sufficiently developed, to withdraw from the left bank of the Chick. ahominy, concentrate on the right bank, and attack Richmond while the enemy was massed on the other side. Indeed, the work thrown up on the night of the 26th was understood to be a preparation for an attack to be made on the morning of the 27th. On the afternoon of the 26th I was told by the commanding general that in case of withdrawing from the other side (left bank) he would still be glad to maintain his hold on that side, in order to be able to recross should events make it necessary or desirable. I said to him that I thought with any small force it was impracticable to hold the d#ibouch6~ of all our bridges, or eveii those from Duanes down to Sumners upper bridge,,but that possibly the heads of the two impor.. taut bridges, Alexanders and Woodhurys, and Sumners upper bridge (which were within a few hundred yards of each other), might be held. He desired me to go that afternoon and reconnoiter the ground for a position for that ptirl)05e. This was probably about 4 p. m. I left the headquarters camp (then rear of Dr. Treuts) as soon as I could get my horses, and proceeded on this reconnaissance. I had passed the Chickahominy, when I was overtaken by an aide-de-camp (Lieutenant Custer), who informed me that the commanding general desired to modify his instructions; that he wished me to reconnoiter a position extending from near Dr. Gaines to Barkers Mill Pond. He (Lieutenant Custer) asked for my map, and sketched with a pencil a line extending between those limits. How or by what forces it was intended to occupy that position I was not informed. I took the road by McGees house to New Cold Harbor and to Dr. Gaines, thence back on to the spar on the right of Dr. Gaines; thence through the woods to New Cold Harbor again; thence to 01(1 Cold Harbor; thence by the road to Dispatch Station to near where I started; thence by the same road to near Barkers saw-mill. It was late when I commenced,audi had been obliged to ride fast. When I reached Barkers Mill it was getting dark, and I proceeded from there back to camp. I thought that a position moderately favor- able for a large force to fight a battle in equal or not greatly-inferior numbers might be taken along this line, but not one which gave any very decided advantages. According to the force in which it was occu- pied, its left would rest on the first spur to the right (east) of Dr. Gaines house, embracing the woods, or, contracting the front, rest on the spur where Watts house is, partially embracing the woods in front, and run- ning in front of McGees house. The right would extend past McGees house along the Dispatch Station road through the woods to the emi- nence near where a house is jnarked on the map, or, perhaps still better, keep along the edge of the woods toward the Chickahominy. When I returned to headquarters camp after dark I found that the commanding general bad left for General Porters camp, having been summoned either by General Porter himself or by the sound of the attack made late that afternoon. At 10 p. m. I received a telegram directing me to repair at once to General Porters headquarters. I reached there about midnight, and found the commanding general and General Porter together in bivouac (all camp equipage, wagons, ~& c., having been sent to the other side). After explaining on the map to the commandin Page 118 118 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIII. general what I had done in the afternoon, he rose to leave, intimating that he desired me to remain with General Porter. On his leaving General Porter se~med to be in doubt whether he should withdraw his troops from their actual positions. Finding that he had no positive instruction, I told him that I supposed it indispensa- ble to fall back at least to the position covering the bridges, in order to put himself in commnnication with the rest of the army, and he issued his orders to this effect abont 1 a. m. (27th), and at dawn ~r early day- light the troops were in motion near us, falling back. At this time the donbts seemed to have revived in General Porters mind as to the expediency of the movement, he alleging the probability of McCalls division being cut to pieces in the operation. I could only repeat my conviction that it was indispensable in order to put himself in connection with the rest of the army, and it was continued, and we proceeded together to the ground I visited the evening before. On the way, or before starting, he asked me how many troops I thought he ought to be re-enforced with. I replied substantially .that I could not answer the question; that, according to any undersianding I had of the matter, I supposed that the whole army was to fight on one side or theother; thatl had all along supposed that he was to retire to the other side. After reaching the ground he put his left on the spur of Watts honse, and riding farther along the position he concluded he could not extend his right beyond the clearing and spur where McGees house is. After this I returned to headquarters, presuming that in reference to the arrangements of the day the commanding general might have further instructions for me. I reached headquarters about 9 or 10 a. in., and being informed that the commanding general was reposing, I went to my tent, and remained there until afternoon. I have gone somewhat minutely into the history of my connection with that battle-field, because upon this battlefought by General Porter with 27,000 menhinged the fate of the campaign. On the afternoon of the 26th Lieutenant Reese was sent by Captain Duane (who had orders, I presume, direct from headquarters) to destroy the upper trestle and New Bridge. He found the first already taken up by a detachment of the Engineer Brigade, the trestles being de- stroyed and the flooring collected on the bank for burning. He took up the pontoons of the two bridges at New Bridge, loaded them with the flooring, and attempted to float them down the stream to the lower trestle bridge, but being unable to get theni along the channel, scuttled an(l sank them 100 or 200 yards below the bridge site. The afternoon of the 27th Colonel Alexander thoroughly destroyed Duanes bridge. General Porters forces passed over the two lower bridges in the night, and Captain Duane had orders to see all those bridges destroyed. That night it was understood, I believe, that the army was to march to the James River. General Woodbury received orders from head- quarters to proceed immediately to the White Oak Swamp and con- struct bridges, and I was ordered at an early hour the next morning to send out all the engineers to aid in the same and to explore the roads. Having retired to the headquarters camp at Savage Station, suffering with a violent headache, I was unable to go out in person in the morn- ing. In the course of the day Captain Duanes battalion, which had been engaged destroying the lower bridges, arrived at the headquarters camp. I directed him to continue on, by the shortest route he could find, tot he vicinity of points of crossing the White Oak Swamp, and. myself started by the beaten road to White Oak Bridge. I found tha Page 119 CHAP. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 119 General Woodbury had rebuilt the bridge (with the addition of side bridges, for infantry or cavalry) and repaired the corduroy road through the swamp, and that at a point about a mile an(l a quarter farther up the stream he had built another bridge. This point, it should be ob- served, was the site of an old ford (Bracketts), to which a road con- ducted on each side. In reference to the White Oak Swamp it may be observed that the stream itself is quite insignificant, but that, like the (Jhickahominy. it is bounded by swamp on each side, of which the width is about 20() yards. The extensive wooded region shown on the ilenrico Conuty map on the north side of the swamp, and usually included in that designation by us, was generally dry and firm, affording good roads. To make a bridge across the swamp involved, of course, not merely bridging the stream, but the cutting of heavy timber and the making of a raised cordnroy over this 200 yards of swamp. Besides which, unless each bridge had an independent wagon road through the forest, it added little to our facilities, since the moving cf our immense wagon trains was the principal difficulty of the problem. I found the upper bridge I have mentioned pretty well advanced to completion, and Major Magruder, of the Fifteenth New York, in charge of the work, promised it should be done before he left off work that night. I was not satisfied with the approaches, however, and feared that the first few wagons which passed would make them impracticable. I found, too, that there was as yet no established connection or fixed route by which the troops and trains near Savage Station were to reach this bridge. I started back to make this connection, and met Captain Duane with his battalion. I directed him to make it his business to keep this bridge and corduroy practicable, and to examine the vicinity to see if there was any other practicable crossing, after which I continued the exploration of the road to connect with the Williamsburg road near the. blacksmiths shop. It ~vas owing to this personal reconnaissance that a connection with the New Bridge wa~ established and troops and wagons put upon this route that night. (General Heintzelmans corps reached this bridge by another route, but this would not have answei~ed for other portions of the army nor for wagon trains.) In the evening I ordered Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander to take with him Lieutenants Comstock and Farquhar and reconnoiter the country in reference to the march and probable new positions of the army. The accompanying extract from his report * will make known his services. The headquarters left Savage Station between 2 and 3 a. m. June 29. I separated from them, and proceeded at once to the camp of Cap. tam Duane, following the route I had examined the night before, and over which General Sykes division had passed during the night. (This route is not delineated on the campaign map.) The road was in good condition, but I found the corduroy over the swamp required constant attention, and recognizing the inutility, or rather impossibility, of con- structil!g for the emergency any other crossing (Captain Duanes officers having been making additional explorations), I directed him to make it his especial business to keep this route practicable. Portions of the wagon trains and General Heintzelmans corps passed at this bridge during the day. From this point I proceeded to the White. Oak Swamp Bridge, and found the trains and troops rapidly passing. I then rejoined the headquarters at the house just beyond, south side of the swamp. As the passage of the army through or over this swamp * See No. 3, Alexander8 report of July 12, 1862 Page 120 120 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIII. was one of the difficulties of the march, I deem these particulars worthy of record. General Keyes corps had crossed on the 28th, with orders to take a position to cover our d6bouch.~% from the swamp and our line of march toward the James. General Woodbury had been directed to commu- nicate with him and assist him by reconilaissances, and Lieutenant Mc- Alester had been ordered by me to l)roceed to his positions and make such arrangements there, such as slasbings, obstructing roads, & c., as he could. Colonel Alexander had also, in execution of the duties assigned him, been on this ground and communicated with the command- ing general concerning it. * On the morning of the 30th Genera] Woodbury made a reconnais~ sauce between the Charles City and Long Bridge roads, assisting Gen- erals Kearny and McCall in posting their troops, and I went out on all the different roads, arriving at 12 or 1 p. m. at Malvern Hill. At this time the danger seemed to me that the Quaker road, over which our trains were passing, would be taken in flank by the cross roads which I had observed to exist from near Bultens or Warriners, striking the Quaker road near Malvern Hill (See Campaign Map No. 3.) I did not know what the general arrangement of troops was, nor could I see the commanding general, who was not on the field, but I mentioned the circumstance to General Porter, whose troops held the hill. Later in the day you directed me to post seine of the reserve artillery, and I took it to the right and front of Dr. Mellerts house, facing the debouch6 from the woods of the dangerous roads of which I speak and through which I had previously penetrated to withiu a half or three-quarters of a mile of the New Castle road. While I was- posting these batteries General Porter joined me and established Morells brigade on this line. About this time (perhaps 4 p. in.) the action commenced on the New Castle road. So near to us was it, that a shell (whether from friend or foe could not be kuowii) struck near where we were. Shortly after the enemy opened upon us with his artillery from the woods which skirted the bottom lands to the left or west of Malvern Hill. A brisk cannonade took place, in which we had the better. The gunboats took part in this, and though there seemed to be indications of force on the Richmond road, our position was found too strong to be assailed from this quarter. I passed the night at Drews house (General Porters headquarters), where the commanding general came and remained uj~til 12 or 1 oclock of the night. The Engineer Brigade (a detachment of which had de- stroyed the White Oak Swamp Bridge) and Engineer Battalion had proceeded to camp near the headquarters, ilaxalls Landing. The news of the action on the New Market road had been favorable. Subsequently and at a late hour it was reported that McCalls division had been routed with the loss of its general officers, and somewhat later, probably about midnight, it was known that General Franklin was falling back and that Sumner and lleintzelman were necessarily follow- ing his example. This left no latitude of judgment as to the arrange- ments for the next day. I was ordered to reconnoiter and assist in putting the troops in position as they came in. I went out early to get a more general view of the hill and its connections, and afterward, assisted by Brigadier-General llumphreys, Chief of Topographical En- gineers, Colonel Hudson, Captain Mason, and one or two other aides of the commanding general,I directed the formation of the line. Leaving the dispositions to be made here by others, I then went to * See No. 3, Alexanders report of July P2, lS6~ Page 121 OHAP. XXIJI.I GENERAL REPORTS. 121 Haxalls, to see how our communications with the James River were to be covered. I found the commanding general had put Franklins corps in position for this purpose. I directed General Woodbury and Captain Duane to make slashings on the roads intersecting our long line, which, exceedingly strong at Malvern, was weak elsewhere. In the mean time Brigadier-General Humplireys, with very great labor, had succeeded in running a line through the dense woods of the Turkey Creek Bottom, and posting troops so as to connect our left on Malvern Hill with our right in front of Haxalls. A further retreat to Harrisons Landing was ordered for that night (July 1), it being difficult to keep open our communication with the transports at Malvern. I made a reconnaissance at daylight, July 2, to form some idea of the position. Entirely ignorant of the locality, having arrived in the darkness of the night, it took some time to get a clear idea of it; a pouring rain, which commenced soon after sunrise, being unfavorable to distant vision. Finding a broad estuary to th~ northward, I followed it down beyond Westover, to ascertain that there was neither bridge nor ford leading out of it. I then hastened back to lind at the entrance of this cul-de-sac a temporary position, where our rear guard could cover its mouth, for the main body of the army was now pouring in. Having done this, 1 returned to the camp, and reported as speedily as possible to the commanding general, who accompanied me in the afternoon to the position, directing General Keyes, whose corps had covered the retreat, to occupy it. It is in place here to remark that in moving up from Yorktown to the Chick~ahominy the only pontoon equipage which accompanied the march of the army was the train with Captain Duanes command. All the other material which had been used at Yorktown or by General Franklin in his disembarkation was taken up to the White House. The pontoons of Captain Duanes train were all used in the various bridges on the Chickahominy, and several more (twenty-four, I believe) were brought up from White House (on abandoning the White House the bridge material remaining there was sent back, I think, to Fort Monroe); also a train consisting of thirty Birago trestles and four iRus- sian canvas pontoons. The pontoons at New Bridge were, with the flooring and other acces- sories, stink in the stream, an(l the upper and lower trestle bridges destroyed. What remained of bridge equipage, say thirty French and two canvas pontoons and ten trestles, was packed and collected on the south side of the Chickahominy by Captain Spaulding (under General Woodburys orders), but for want of transportation part of it was destroyed here and part after crossing the White Oak Swamp. About fifteen pontoons (with balks and chess) and a few trestles were brought safely through to Harrisons Landing. On the retreat from Malvern Hill and Haxalls a portion of the Engi- neer Brigade was directed to keep the road in order. The crossing of Kimages Creek (much swollen by the rain) in particular required in- cessant labor during the whole period of the passage of the army and trains to keep it practicable. One pontoon and four bays of balks and chess were used there in two bridges, all of which, with the wagons, were afterward destroyed by our own troops. On the 3d of July the army commenced moving out to more eligible positions. The brief reconnaissance of the preceding day had shown me that it was necessary to occupy heights on the other side of Herring Creek and to extend our lines. The engineer officers were employed this day in assisting in l)lacing the troops in new positions and in reco Page 122 122 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIII. loitering for a defensive line. A very satisfactory one was found which is tolerably well delineated on the Campaign Map No. 3. The left stretched for upwards of a mile along the left bank of Kimages Creek, which excavated a deep ravine in the table-land through which it flowed, and the lower half of the stream was so deep and marshy as to make an impassable obstacle. In front were cleared fields exposed to the fire of our gunboats, while on our own side were woods, which covered our movements and concealed our positions. From near the head of tbe creek the line turned at right angles and stretched three- quarters of a mile to the eastward to the mill-dam. From a point half a mile still farther to the eastward, on the mill-pond, the line was re- sumed, ran easterly through the woods about half a mile, and thence southeasterly a mile and a quarter through the cultivated fields of Westover, and then southerly a half mile to a point on Herring Creek, near Westover Church. It will be seen that of this line, 4 miles long, that portion on Kim- ages Creek was naturally very strong, and with the aid of the flanking fire of the gunboats might throughout .be considered (with proper de- fensive arrangements) unassailable, and of that portion of the line par- allel to James River the mill-pond covered nearly a mile of front, so that it could not be assailed, and that the half mile of line constituting our right flank and the approaches thereto by the Charles City road were flanked by the fire of our gunboats. The points at which attack was most practicable were where the two roads from the northward came inone on the left of t.he mill-pond and one on the right. Between the mill-pond and the road on the left a strong redoubt, con- sisting of two redans connected by a curtain, was laid out; thence rifle pits extended to the mill-dam on the right, barricades extended to the left toward Kimages Creek, and at the salient angle a redoubt for artillery was designed. On the right, through the open fields, the line consisted of rifle pits of strong profile, with two large redoubts or lunettesone where the road intersected the line and the other at the right salient angle, and both designed to contain a numerous artillery. Through the woods behind Kimages Creek and elsewhere the line consisted of timber barricades covered with earth, with numerous emplacements for artillery, having thick earthen epaulements in front, and everywhere, except through the open fields of Westover, the front of these lines was covered by extensive abatis of felled timber. The works thus, described were commenced by the troops themselves as soon as they got into position, who in a single night would cover themselves by quite a respectable obstacle in the shape of a barricade. The redoubts required more time, and though not entirely finished for two or three weeks, they were soon in condition to aid powerfully in the defense. The troops of both the Engineer Brigade and Engineer Battalion aided in these works. The general supervision of these works was given by me to Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander, who distributed the immediate supervision between Lieutenants Comstock, McAlester, and Farquhar. While this work was going on myself and other of the engineer officers were engaged in reconnaissances of the river or adjacent country. In company with General Woodbury I examined very carefully the right bank of the James River from City Point to the mouth of the Chicka- hominy, in view of an occupation on our part and to ascertain the most dangerous points. The defensive qualities of Coggins Point were clearly ascertained by me. In company with General Woodbury Page 123 CHAP. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 123 Colonel Alexander, Lieutenants Reese, Cross, and Farquhar, I recon- noitered the Peninsula just below Charles City Court-House, with a view to its eligibility as a defensive position. Subsequently General Woodbury examined the country from WiLsons Wharf across to the Chickahominy, and caused a map of the roads leading from Harrisons Landing to various points on the Chickahominy to be made by officers of his 1)rigade. On the 10th of August Lieutenant Comstock received orders from yourself to make an examination of the Chickahominy at ~ Ferry and roads leading to it, and on his return that night orders were issued for the construction of a bridge. The material (which consisted of sixty-one new pontoons and thirty-one old ones) was at Fort Monroe, and it took till the morning of the 12th to get it up to the point men- tioned. At noon of the 13th the material was all unloaded and the bridge commenced at both ends and in the middle, Captaiu Spaulding, Fiftieth Regiment New York Volunteers, being in charge of the western end, Lieutenant Comstock of the middle, and Lieutenant Cross of Lhe eastern end; Captain Duane being in charge of the whole. As the pontoniers had been severely worked during the two preceding days the work was suspended during the night and resmmed in the morning, the bridge being finished at 9.30 a. m. on the 14th, and a squadron of cavalry cross- ing at 10 a. m. The bridge was 1,980 feet long. The western end was built by successive pontoons, the rest by rafts. At times there was difficulty in maneuvering the rafts, from the depth of the water and the strength of the tidal currents. After its completion it was covered with straw to prevent the wear of the flooring. Excepting Heintzelmans corps, the whole Army of the Potomac, with its artillery and~ baggage wagons, crossed the bridge. There was no interruption to travel, the accidents being that a few horses got over- board without injury to the bridge. The straw proved a perfect pro- tection to the flooring, scarce]y a plank being found injured. The advance guard of General Porter passed on the morning of Friday, the 15th, and at 10 a. m. August 18 the extreme rear guard had passed. At 2.30 p. m. the boats were all out of the bridge, and at 3 p. m. all the bridge material was in tow of steamers bound for Old Point. Besides the officers already mentioned, Captain Duane was assisted by Lieu- tenant Reese. On Friday, the 15th, I left Harrisons Landing by steamer foi~ Fort Monroe, under orders from the commanding general, and on the 10th I received a telegram from the Headquarters at Washington relieving me from duty with the Army of the Potomac. Some allusion to the services of officers and troops during the cam- paign is called for from me in such a report as this. The account here given and in the report of the siege of Yorktown and the various sub- reports which accompany this will give a pretty clear idea of the amount and character of their services. Jn Brig. Gen. D. P. Woodbury I found an able and zealous coadjutor. The duties of his brigade did not give him a prominent part in the actual siege works of Yorktown, the Battery No. 4~ of 13-inch mortars, being the only one laid out and superintended by him, but in the con- struction of the numerous bridges and roads and in the making of gabions and fascines, the services of himself and brigade were arduous and important; and from Lieutenants Hassler and Farrell I received valuable assistance in reconnoitering the works Page 124 124 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CFAP. xxm. The sub report No. 2* gives a fair idea of the services of the brigade as connected witli the marches, of the army, and the sub-report No. 1 t shows that a I)Ortion of the brigade under Colonel Murphy rendered valuable services in the preparations for the landing of General Frank- uns division and in executing the same. On the Chickahominy and on the retreat to the James the duties of the brigade were arduona, as have been described, and I found in its chief throughout the campaign an officer prompt and fertile in expedients, daring and assiduous in exe- cution, and always exhibiting a wise foresight. The following officers of the Volunteer Engineer Brigade have been mentioned to me by their commander as particularly deserving of notice: Lient. Col. W. H. Pettes, Fiftieth New York, for constant and efficient attention to his duties. Capt. (now Maj.) Ira Spaulding, Fiftieth New York, for unremitting and successful work in the construction of military bridges. Capt. 0. E. line, Fiftieth New York, for habitual good conduct and for maintaining Bottoms Bridge under difficult circumstances. Captains Beers, Ford, and Brainerd, for untiring energy and fidelity. Maj. (now Lieut. Col.) James A. Magruder, Fifteenth New York, for energy an(1 perseverance. Capt. (now Maj.) E. C. Perry, for energy and perseverance. Capt. W. A. Ketchum, Fifteenth New York, for energy and hard work in the construction of roads and bridges. Lient. (now Capt.) H. V. Slosson, Fifteenth New York, for good con- duct throughout the campaign. Lient. T. M. Farrell, Fifteenth New York, for skill and perseverance. Lient. F. R. Hassler, aide-de-cainp, Fifteenth New York, for constant energy and intelligence in the performance of his duties. Capt. H. W. Bowers, assistant adjutant-general, for intelligence and perseverance in the discharge of his laborious duties. Lient. C. S. Webster, Fifteenth New York, died of disease contracted on the Chickahominy. Lieut. H. C. Yates, Fiftieth New York, died from disease contracted in the trenches at Yorktown. The services of Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander are so frequently alluded to, besides being exhibited in his own reports (see sub-reports Nos. 1 and 6), $ that it is hardly necessary to say that lie sustained as a military engineer in the field the high professional character which he had previously acquired. Capt. C. S. Stewart rendered valuable services at Yorktown, and at the battle of Williamsburg he discovered the unoccupied works on the enemys left, ascertained the existence of and reconnoitered the route by which they might be gained, and by which Lieutenaiit Farquhar (who had accompanied him) led Hancocks brigade. To him, therefore,the decided successes on that part of the field are in a gi eat measure due. Afterwards, with the advance guard under General Stoneman, he was so unsparing of himself in his reconnaissances and reports of the charac- ter of the country, roads, & c., as to induce the sickness which compelled him to leave the field. If I should have to mention any single individual as distinguished above any other in the army for unceasing toil and unsparing devotion it would be Capt. J. C. Duane. In the trenches at Yorktown, in the dangerous and laborious works in the swamps and floods of the Chicka * See Woodhurys report, No. 4. See No. 3, Alexanders report, dated January 28, 1863. ~ See No. 3, both reports Page 125 CHAP. XXIII.] GENERAL REk~ORTS. 125 hominy, he seemed to know no fatigue and to allow himself no repose. The pontoon bridge built by him over the Lower Chickahominy was one of the most extensive known to military history. Lients. C. B. Comstock and M. D. iVicAlester rendered most gallant and valuable services in the siege works of Yorktown, and the latter had again an opportunity at the battle of Williamsburg of exhibiting his gallantry and rendering important aid to his commanding general. On reaching the Chickahominy these two officers were with me at the first armed reconnaissance of Bottoms Bridge, and the works for the t~te-de-pont were laid out and executed by them. Lieutenant Coin- stock accompanied the advance under General Keyes until it took its first position near Savage Station. While the other engineer officers were mainly confined to specific works, a larger part of the duty of reconnaissances, particularly on the right bank of the Chickahominy, fell on these two, and under their immediate supervision the works described on that side were built, as subsequently at Harrisons Land. ing they had charge of considerable portions of those lines. They both exhibited unwearying assiduity and great gallantry. Lient. W. E. Merrill has been mentioned as having been severely wounded on the 16th of April in an attack upon a portion of the enemys lines near Yorktown. He has beeu already brevetted for gallant conduct on that occasion. Lieutenants Reese, Cross, and Babcock commanded the three com- panies constituting the Engineer Battalion under Capt. J. C. Duane, and though sometimes availablt, for general reconnaissances, their duties were usually with their command. They vied with their chief in their unwearying assiduity and in their gallantry. Upon them as upon their immediate chief devolved much of the most exposed service in the laying out and executing the trenches and batteries before York- town. An instance of great gallantry and magnanimity on the part of Lieu- tenant Babcock has been mentioned by me as occurring in my presence at the New Bridre on the morning of June 1. On the Chickahominy and subsequently their duties in construction of bridges, batteries, & c., were arduous and exposed. Second Lient. I. U. Farquhar rendered valuable services at the siege of Yorktown. He was one of the three engineer officers present at the battle of Williamsburg, accompanied Captain Stewart in his reconnaissances which discovered the enemys unoccupied redoubts, and led General Hancocks brigade thereto. He was sent back to the commanding general in the evening with the colors captured. With the advance guard of General Stoneman, and subsequently in the various engineer works and duties on the right bank of the Chicka- hominy he was daring and indefatigable. First Lient. (now Capt.) H. L. Abbot, Topographical Engineers~ was attached to my person throughout the campaign as an aide. His services were particularly noticeable during the siege of Y& rktown by his valuable reconnaissances and by his skill in combining the in- formation gained by others into maps of the works and of topography of the ground. During the maren to the Chickahominy, and while the army was encamped on the river, his time was principally occupied in making up the map ~f the country, founded on the reeonnaissanoes of the officers of both Engineer Corps and others, in which duty he was under the immediate direction of Brigadier-General Humphreys. His health, which had suffered from the miasma of the Potomac while serving on the defenses of Washington, was further iwpaired at York Page 126 126 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CUAP. XXIII. town and on the Chickahominy, and lie was unable to bear much physical labor or exposur~. After reaching the James River be was coml)elled to leave the army by an illness which prostrated him for two months, during which time, however, he superintended the preparation of the campaign maps. First Lieut. N. J. Hall, Fifth Artillery (now colonel of the Seventh Michigan Volunteers), was assigned to duty with me as adjutant before Yorktown, and accompanied me in that capacity. Besides his services in this capacity, he executed valuable reconnaissances both at York- town and on the Chickahominy. During the march of the army to the James River he was employed by yourself as bearer of dispat~hes, & c., between the different corps. I have enumerated twelve officers of the Engineer Corps (including Lieutenant Abbot, Topographical Engineers). Of these one possessed the rank of brigadier-general of volunteers, another of lieutenant- colonel, aide-dc-camp (the first is a major, the second a captain in the corps), and two were captains, seven others first lieutenants, and one a second lieutenant. The brigadier-general was so made expressly to enable him to command the brigade of volunteer regiments. The bat. talion of Regular Engineers was commanded by a captain, and each of its three companies by a single first lieutenant. It will be thus seen that the Corps of Engineers as now organized does not furnish adequate rank even to command the limited number of engineer troops brought into the field. The engineers attached to the army corps (with the single exception of Lieutenant-Colonel Alex- ander, who derived his rank not from the corps, but from a law having no particular relation to engineers, and since repealed) were but lieu- tenants. In a European service the chief engineer serving with an army corps would be a field officer, generally a colonel. There is a twofold evil in this want of rank: First, the great hard- ships and injustice to the officers themselves, for they have, almost without exception, refused or beeii refused high positions in the vol- unteer service (to which they have seen their contemporaries of the other branches elevated) on the ground that their services as engineers were absolutely necessary. Second, it is an evil to the service, since an adequate rank is almost as necessai~ to an officer for the efficient discharge of his duties as l)rofessional knowledge. The engineeis duty is a responsible one. He is called upon to decide important questions, to fix the positions of defensive works (and thereby of the troops who occupy them,) to indicate the manner and l)oints of attack of fortified positions. To give him the proper weight with those with whom he is associated he should have, as they have, adequate rank. The campaign on the Peninsula called for great labor on the part of the engineers. The country, notwithstanding its early settlement, was a terra incognita. We knew the York River and the James River, and we had heard of the Chickahominy, and this was about the extent of our knowledge. Our maps were so incorrect, that they were found to 1)e worthless before we reached Yorktown. New ones had to be pre- pared, based on reconnaissances made by the officers of engineers. The siege of Yorktown involved great responsibility, besides exposure and toil. The movements of the whole army were (letermined by the engineers. The Chickahoininy again arrested us, where, if possible, the responsibility and labor of the engineer officers were incrcased. In fact, everywhere ttnd on every occasion, even to our last position at Harrisons Landing, this responsibility and labor on the part of the engineers was incessant Page 127 CHAP. XXIII.]. GENERAL REPORTS. 127 I have stated above in what manner the officers of engineers per- formed their duties; yet thus far their services are ignored and unrec- ognized, while distinctions have been bestowed upon those who have had the good fortune to command troops. Under such circumstances it can hardly be expected that the few engineer officers yet remaining will willingly contiuue their services in this unrequited branch of the military profession. We have not sufficient officers of engineers at this time with any of our armies to commence another siege, nor can they be obtained. In another war, if their services are thus neglected in this, we will have none. Another evil of no inconsiderable magnitude was ex])erienced in this campaign, growing out of the want of a properly-organized engineer service in this country. In a European service every corps darm~e (or division, if this were the highest unit of command) would have its proper proportion of engineer trool)s, and to their charge wohld be committed the engineer train, carrying the intrenching tools for the use of the troops. For example, a corps of 30,000 or 40,000 men would have in the French service a train of 41 wagons, of which 30 would carry 10,000 intrenching tools. This train would be under the immediate charge of a company of sappers, whose business it would be to issue them to the troops where wanted, to be with the working parties, directing the same, and to receive the tools back again when the work was completed. For want of such an organization the issue of intrenching tools to the army was -necessarily left to the Quartermasters Department. This department, burdened with its immense duties, could not give especial attention to this, in consequence of which important works were fre- quently delayed, as at Yorktowmi, where details assembled to make roads were sent back for want of tools, though they were in ample quantities on board the transports. Furthermore, it was impossible to maintain any system of responsibility for the tools. The soldier found an ax or a shovel a very convenient thing to have at his camp, and carried one off with him. When the army moved he found it incon- venient to carry and threw it away. Thus, notwithstanding the mium- ber of tools issued to the army at Yorktown and on the Chickahominy, we were almost wholly (lependent in making the works at Harrisons Landing upon new supplies from the transports sent to the James River. The pontoon equil)age which accompanied the army was got up, as already mentioned, by Lientejiant-Colonel Alexander, assisted by Capt. J. C. Duane. The former had acquired an enviable reputation as the builder of the Minots Ledge light-house, possessed great practical ingenuity, and had had the means of knowing the best results arrived at in other services in this branch of military art. Captain Duane possessed a more extensive and thorough practical and exl)erimental knowledge of military bridges than any other man in this country. They gave, after full consideration of the subject, their J)reference to the French system. Even had they adopted this system blindly, becanse it was French, they would not have been without solid reasons, for the French have studied and experimented upon the best systems known to the world. Whatever may be said about the difference in the char- acter of the country, roads, & c., the thing to be done here and in Europe (now that our armies have assumed European magnitude) is essentially the same. But these officers had before them the best modern inven- tions of Europe and America. The India-rubber pontoons they knew thoroughly; corrugated iron bodies and countless other inventions of American genius were before them, and the former experimnetited upon Page 128 128 TILE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CLIAl. XXIII. My own prepossessions had been in favor of the Birago system of sectional pontoons and Birago (so called) trestles. The experience we had proved the wisdom which adopted the system in question. Not to advance, by any means, that nothing better can be found (the sub- stitution of iron for wood was one of the probable improvements well understood by the officers named, but not at that time adopted for sub- stantial reasons), it is enough to say that the French pontoon was found to be most excellent, useful, and reliable for all military purposes. They were used by the quartermasters del)artment in discharging trans- ports, were precisely what was needed for the disembarkation of Gen- eral Franklins division, constituted a portion of the numerous bridges built over Wormleys Creek during the siege of Yorktown, and were of the highest use on the Chickahominy, while over the Lower Chicka- hominy some 75,000 men, son~e 300 pieces of artillery, and the un- mense baggage trains of the army passed over a bridge of the extraor- dinary length of nearly 650 yardsa feat scarcely surpassed in military history. The Birago trestle, of which I had formed so high an opinion, proved itself dangerous and unreliableuseful for an advance guard or detach- ment, unfit in general for a military bridge. Of the American India- rubber and the Russian canvas pontoon we had no fair experimenL They may both be useful, but, again, I think not reliable for a military bridge, considered in all its aspects and uses. The weight of the French pontoons is objected to, but a certain floatation power is required which it is not easy to get, nor are the ways unobjectionable which seek to get it with less weight, and the vehicle which carries it is not heavier loaded than other vehicles of an army train. Less length would certainly make it more manageable on our narrow roads, while for advance guards and dashing minor~enter- prises greater lightness is requisite. Perhaps an iron sectional pontoon may be contrived which will meet these requirements, but prudence demands that the safety of an army shall not be jeopardized by giving it a bridge which experiment has not fully tested. American genius is fertile in this as in all other expedients, but no genius can provide for an object which is not understood. The numer- ous proposers of flying bridges forget that if a military bridge is in- tended to be carried with an army it is also intended to carry an army, its columns of men its cavalry, its countless heavy wagons, and its pon- derous artillery. it must carry all these, and it must do it with cer- tainty and safety, even though a demoralized corps should rush upon it in throngs. No make-shift expedient, no ingenious inventions not tested by severe experiment, nor light affair, of which the chief merit alleged is that it is light, will be likely to do what is required, and what the French pontoon has so often done. Here, perhaps, I might close, but it occurs to me that this paper, pur- porting to give a history of the operations of engineers from the or- ganization of the Army of the Potomac to the close of its campaign on the Peninsula, can hardly be considered complete without a retrospect, pointing out the mistakes that were made, and thus tracing the causes of its failure to their true sources. One of the prominent among the causes of the ultimate failure was the inaction of eight months, from August, 1861, to April, 1862. More than any other wars, rebellion demands rapid measures. In Novem- ber, 1861, the Army of the Potomac, if not fully supplied with all the material, yet was about as complete in numbers, discipline, and organi- zation as it ever became. For four months the great marine avenue t Page 129 CHAP. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 129 the capital of the nation was blockaded all(l that capital kept iii a par- tial state of siege by a greatly-inferior enemy, in face of a movable army of 150,000 men. In the winter 186162 Norfolk could and should have been taken. The Navy demanded it, the country demanded it, and the means were ample. By its capture the career of the i~ierrimac, which proved so disastrous to our subsequent operations, woul(l have been prevented. The preparation of this vessel was knowi~, and the Navy Department was not without forebodings of the mischief it would do. Though delay might mature more comprehensive plans an(l prom- ~se grcater results, it is not the first case iii which it had been shown that successful war involves something more tItan abstract military princil)les. The true question was to seize time first practicable moat emit to satisfy the l)erhal)s ulireasonable but natural longing of ami i!al)atient nation for results to justify its lavish confidemice, and to take a(lvantage of an nI)divided command and untrammele(l lil)ertv of action while it was J)ossesse(l. XYhen the army did move, a plan was adopted pem-feetly certain to imivite, nay, to compel, interference, and when the army was to go by Annapo- lis to the Lower Chesapeake I felt comifident that one-half would scarcely have embarked before the other half would be ordered back to Wash- ington. The enemy was then at Manassas, and the feint (even if 110 reality) of an attack on Washington was so obvious, so certain to create a pammic which no Executive could resist, that interference with time ic- moval of time mass of the army was certain. When the enemy had fallen back behind time Rappahannock and destroyed time railroad bridges the circumstances were greatly changed, amid there were strong arguments for time line adopted; yet results have proved how many reasons there were to be considered besides the purely muilitary ones which opposed themselves to the adoption of such a liime. The flicts connected with the withholding of McDowells corps have been so completely exhibited in the proceedings of the McI)owehh Court of Inquiry that every one who wishes camm form his own judoiuemmt.. Whether it was wise or unwise, it was one of those things resulting froum time taking a line of operations which did not itself cover Wash- immgtomm. At the time the Army of the Potomac landed on the Peninsula the rebel cause was at its lowest ebb. Its armies were demoralized by the defeats of Port Royal, Mill Springs, Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, Roanoke Island, and Pea Ridge, and reduced in numbers by sickimess, loss in battle, expiration of period of service, & c., while the conscription law was not yet even passed. It seemed as if it needed but one vigorous gripe to end forever this rebellion, ~o nearly throttled. How, then, happened it that the date of the initiation of the campaign of the mag- nificent Army of the Potomac was the date of the resuscitation of the rebel cause, which seemed to grow strong pan jpassu with the slow prog- ress of its operations? However I may be committed to any expression of professional opinion to the contrary (I certainly did suggest it), my opinion now is that the lines of Yorktown should have been assaulted. There is reason to believe that they were not held by strong force when our army aJ)peared before them, and we know that they were far from complete. The h)restige of power, the morale, was on our side. It was due to our- sehves to confirm and sustain it. We should probably have succeeded, and if we failed it may well be doubted whether the shock of an un- successful assault would have been more demoralizing than the labors 9 R UVOL X Page 130 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAr. XXLLL of the siege. Our trool)s toiled a month in the trenches or lay in the Swamps of the Warwick. We lost few men by the siege, but disease took a fearful hold of the army, and toil and hardship, unre(leemed by the excitement of combat, impaired the morale. We did not carry with us froux Yorktown so good an army as we took there. Of the bitter fruits of that month gained by the enemy we have tasted to our hearts content. They are not yet exhausted. The siege having been deterlnille(l upon, we should have opened our ~ba.tteries on the l)laee as fast as they were coml)leted. The effect on ithe tioops would have been j~spjn~~g It would have higl)tel)cd the siege and shortened our labors, and, besides, we would have had the tere(Lit of driving the enemy from Yorktown by force of arms, whereas, ~s it was, we only induced him to evacuate for prudential coIlsi(lera- tions. Yorktown having fallen, however, as it did, it was right to pursue the enemy with our whole force; but the battle of Williams- burg, fought as it was without reconnoitering the position, without concert of action among the dift~reut corps and division commanders, and almost without orders, was a l)luuder which ought not to have happened. We knew of this 1)OsitiOn beforehau(l, and we knew it was fortified. We might have bee mx sure, if the enemy made a stax~d there, that it would be a strong one, for lie would be fighting for time to get his trains out of our reach. We fought, and we lost several thousand men, and we gained notlxin~ If we had not fought till mxext day, a battle wonld in all probability have been unnecessary ; but if it had been, we could have had time to have brought up our resources, reconnoitered our l)osition, and delivered our attack in such a way that some results might have flowed from it. We had every advantage. Franklins division landed at West Point on the next day and Sedgwicks (livis- ion on the day following. These two divisions, had the enemy waited another day at Williamsburg, could have cut his communication, and in that case we would have beemi superior in his front aimd have had two divisions in his rear. His hasty retreat alx(l l)eIhial)s his cal)ture must inevitably have followed, and the great object of keeping Frank- un so long embarked, and finally sem)ding hini to West Point, woul(l have been accomplished. On leaving Williamsburg we should have crossed the Chickahominy and connected with the Navy in the James. We should have had a united army and the co-operation of the Navy, and ~)roba.bly wonid have been in Richmond in two weeks. The facts that we did not know the character of the Chickahominy as an obstacle (as it lay across our direct road to Richmond); that our transports were on the York River, and that the railroad furnished a good means of supply to the army; that we wished to connect with McDowell coining from Fredericks- burg, & c., determined our route. In taking it we lost essentially all that was worth going so far to gain, viz, the James River approach and the co-operation of the Navy. The route chosen, two weeks should not have been spent in ti-avers- ing the 40 miles from Williamsburg to Bottoms and New Bridge; amxd the barrier of the Chickahominy being left nmmguarded at Bottouxs Bridge, no time should have beemi lost in making use of the circum- stance to turn and seize the passage of New Bridge, which might have been done by the 28th and even earlier had measures beemi pressed to prepare for it. The repulse of the rebels at Fair Oaks should have been taken ad- vantage of. It was one of those occasions whicim if not seized do no Page 131 CHAP. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 131 repeat themselves. We now know the state of disorganiz~tion and dismay in which the rebel army retreated. We now know that it could have been followed into Richmond. flad it been so, there would have been no resistance to overcome to bring over our right wing. Although we did not then know all that we now do, it was obvious enough at that time that when the rebels struck a blow at our left wing they did not leave mmy means in their hands unused to secure success. It was obvious enough that they struck with their whole force, and yet we repulsed them in disorder with three-fifths of ours. We could have followed them up at the same time that we brought over the other two- fifths. After it was known that McDowell was called off to another quarter there was no longer hope of an increase of force by the junction of his corps. There were no other re-enforcements to look for be~ond what we received by the middle of the month of June. The rebel force was known or suppo~d to be constantly increasing by conscription, by the influx of troops from other parts, and by the breaking up of Beauregards army. At last a moment came when action was imperative. The enemy assumed the initiative, and we had warning of when and where he was to strike. Had Porter been withdrawn the night of the 26th, our army would have been concentrated on the right bank, while two corps, at least, of the enemys force were on the left bank. Whatever course we then took, whether to strike at Richmond and the portion of the enemy on the right bank or move at once for the James, we would have had a concentrated army and a fair chance of a brilliant result in the first place, and, in the second, if we accomplished nothing, we would have been in the same case on the morning of the 27th as we were on that of the 28th, minus a lost battle and a compulsory retreat; or had the fortified lines (thrown lU~? expressly for that object) been held l)y 20,000 men (as they could have been), we could have fought on the other side with 80,000 men instead of 27,000 ; or, finally, had the lines been abandoned, with our hold on the right bank of the Chickahommny we might have fought and crushed the enemy on the left bank, reopened our communications, and then returned and taken Richmond. As it was, the enemy fought with his whole force except enough left before our lines to keep up an appearance, and we fought with 27,000 men, losing the battle and 9,000 men. By this defeat we were driven from our position, our advance of conquest turned into a retreat for safety by a force probably not greatly superior to our own. In view of the length of time which our operations before Richmond actually consumed, there is now.no doubt that the depot at the White House should have been fortified, as well as one or two I)Oints on the railroad thence to the Chickahominy; that the t~te-de-pont at Bottoms Bridge should have been completed, and likewise t~tes-de-pont or strong positions prepared to cover the debouches from our bridges to the left bank of the Chickahominy. With these the army would have possessed freedom of motion and concentration on either side, and the disastrous battle of the 27th would scarcely have occurred. When the army reached the James River it needed no prophet to l)redict the disasters which have since befallen our countrys cause. If the army had sustained itself nobly it cannot be denied that so much fruitless toil and so much disaster had deprived it of the sian which results from success alone. It was, moreover (as well as our forces elsewhere), sadly diminished in numbers. On the other hand, the rebel army from its first low state had risen to be an army most formidable in numbers, excellent in organization, and inspired by a great success. Had it Page 132 132 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIII. numbers, indeed, approached to that attributed to it (200,000 men), there is little donbt that a march npon Washington would have speedily followed our withdrawal to the James. From such considerations, as well as those flowing from the results of past operations, I counseled the immediate withdrawal from the James to reunite with the forces covering Washington. Respectfully submitted. J. G. BARNARD, Brig. Gen. and late Chief Engineer Army of the Potomac. General R. B. MARCY, Chief of Staff. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Camp near New Bridge, Va., June 10, 1862. Sm: The officers of engineers on duty with the Army of the Poto- mac during the month of May are as follows: Maj. D. P. Woodbury, brigadier-general of volunteers, commanding Engineer Brigade of volunteer engineer regiments (Fifteenth and Fif- tieth New York). Capt. B. S. Alexander, lieutenant-colonel and aide-de-camp, attached to the army corps of Brig. Gen. W. B. Franklin. Capts. C. S. Stewart and J. C. Duane, corn manding Engineer Battalion of Regulars (Companies A, B, and C). First Lieuts. C. B. Comstock and M. D. McAlester, attached to head- quarters of General lieu itzelman. First Lients. C. B. Reese, C. E. Cross, and 0. E. Babcock, command- ing engineer companies under Captain Duane; Second Licut. F. U. Farquhar. The only engineer officers present at the battle of Williamsburg were Captain Stewart and Lieutenant Farqnhar, attached to the headquarters of General Sumner, and Lieutenant McAlester, with General ileint- zelman. Captain Stewart was the first to point out, I believe, the unoccupied works on the enemys left and to ascertain the route leading to them; a service which had a decided influence on the battle. Lieutenant McAlester rendered valuable services in reconnoitering and aiding in the disposition of the troops. Lieutenant Farquhar accompanied General Hancock in his occupa- tion of the enemys works, and was active throughout the day. On the advance of the army Captain Stewart and Lieutenant Far- quhar were attached to the advance guard under General Stoneman. The engineer officers have been generally employed in reconnais- sauces during the month. The Engineer Brigade has done much work on roads and bridges. On reaching the Chickahominy the passage of our left at Bottoms Bridge was undisputed by the enemy, and a portion of the Engineer Brigade, under General Woodbury, constructed two trestle bridges in place of the destroyed bridge at that point. On arrival of the right wing and headquarters of the army near New Bridge (May 22) it was found to be held by the enemy. The Chick- ahominy bottom varies from a half to one mile in width, about equally distributed on either side of the stream. The bed of the stream is usually bordered by a swamp, usually 300 or 400 yards in width. The bed is not much depressed below the marginal bottom lands, and ~ ris Page 133 CHAP. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 133 of 3 or 4 fret above the usual summer level overflows large areas. The bottom is usually cleared and cultivated, but intersected with deep ditches. The high lands rise on each side of the bottom with moder- ately steej) slopes to a height of 70 or 50 feet. When we reached the New Bridge, and for a week tI~ereafter,the stream, though somewhat swollen, did not overflow at all its margins, though the swamp proper was filled with water. The first day J caused it to be reached and forded, an(l a few days after, when we had driven the enemys pickets from the immediate vicinity, I caused it to be waded from the New Bridge site down ab6ut a quarter of a mile. Materials for bridging the stream were deposited at three points under shelter of the swamp tim- and about l)erthe New Bridge site, three-quarters of a mile above, the same distance below. The corps of, Jleintzelman and Keyes had advanced over Bottoms Bridge on the Williamsburg road to Seven Pines, a l)Oint from which the Nine-mile road (liverged, running nearly north to its intersection with the New Bridge road at Old Tavern. General Sumners corps was intermediate betweeii New and Bottoms Bridges, and had thrown two log bridges across the swamp and stream in his front. It was believed that, with the co-operation of the left and center, the passage at this point could be forced. The expeditioii to Hanover Court-House probably delayed the execution. Oii Friday, May 30, a yiolent rain-storm set in, and it rained in tor. rents (luring the night. On Saturday the enemy attacked our left. Sumner with difficulty got his two divisions and one battery over. The commanding general directed the bridges here to be thrown that night. The attempt was made, but it was very dark the stream was rising rapidly. A greater part of the night was spent in reselling from the flood the materials of the upper bridge. Captain Duane succeeded in getting in a pontoon bridge at the site of New Bridge at 8.15 Sunday morning. At the lower bridge the darkness and rising waters prevented any progress in the night, and after making some progress during the day it was found that the direction, well adapted to the ordinary stage of the stream, had to be changed. It was 2 a. m. of Monday before a bridge was completed. The upper tTestle bridge had been made practicable for infantry by 12 mu. on Sun- day; but these bridges were all mere bridges in the air. The flow ex- tended over the bottom lands and the single causeway of New l3ridge partially submerged, and for half a mile, with water on each side, was the sole practicable route for trOOl)5 or artillery, an(l it evidently [was] impracticable in the military sense to pass a n army in column over the route while un(ler fire of the enemy from tIme heights beyond. Since the date of the battle the approaches to the bridges have been improved an(l the debomch~s corduroyed as fir as the enemys fire would permit andi new bridges undertaken at other l)oints. The engineer officers are (listributed as mentioned in the beginning of this letter. The only engineer officer with the corps emigaged on Saturday amid Sunday was Lieutenant McAlester. He was absent on a reconnaissance in the commencement of the battle on Saturday and on Sunday the engagement was mainly with Sumners eorl)5. Intrench- ments had been commenced at the l)OsitiOn occupied by General Caseys division under direction of Lieutenant MeAlester, but they were very incomplete. Capt. C. S. Stewart was relieved, on account of sickness Page 134 134 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIII. from duty with this army, and returned to Fort Monroe on the 3d instant. I am, very respectfully, your most obedient servant, J. G. BARNARD, Brigadier- General and Chief of Engineers, Army of the Potomac. General J. G. TOTTEN, Chief Engineer, t-c., Washington, D. C. No. 3. Reports of Lient. Col. Barton S. Alexander, U. S. Army, Engineer Officer, of operations from April 20 to July 12. WASHINGTON, D. C., January 28, 1863. SIR: In compliance with your request I proceed to give you a sketch of the operations upon which I was engaged during the time I was detached from your command, while the army was before Yorktown, until I again joined you at Cumberland, on the Pamunkey River: On April 20, 1862, the army then being actively engage(l in prose- cuting the siege of Yorktown, I was directed by General McClellan to join General Franklin as the engineer of his division, which had then arrived at Cheesemans Landiug. I had previously understood from the general that it was his intention at the proper time to throw General Franklins division across to the north side of the York River, some 3 or 4 miles below Gloucester Point, an(l endeavor to seize the works there, or at least to turn them, and thus distract the attention of the enemy, while the main assault should be made at Yorktown. A few days afterward Generals McClellan and Franklin, Captain Rodgers, of the Navy, and myself proceeded to reconnoiter the shore on the north side of the York River, and select, as near as possible, the exact spot where the proposed landing should be effected. This point being settled, I had some soundings taken to ascertain how near our transports could be taken to the shore, the depth of water, and nature of the bottom over the intervening space. I found that we could take vessels drawing 8 feet of water to within a certain distanceI thi~k about 800 feet of high-water mark; that the bottom from this point to the shore was a very regular slope of sand, over which infantry could march when we should reach to within 250 feet of the shore, or to where the water was not over 2 feet 6 inches deep. This sand, how- ever, was like that on the south shore of the river, and was of such a nature that I supposed it would not be prudent to trust artillery upon it, as there would have been danger of the carriages settling to their axle-trees. As soon as this information was obtained I set about pre- paring the means to effect a rapid landing when it should be ordered. Col. J. MeLeod Murphy, with a detachment of 250 men of the Fifteenth New York Yolunteer Engineer R egimnent, was detailed to assist in these preparations. Many schemes were proposed, which were thoroughly discussed by General Franklin, Captain Rodgers, of the Navy, Captain Arnold, of the artillery, and myself. As the plan which I finally decided to adopt was afterward successfully carried out at West Point, it may be proper to describe it here. In general terms it was this: We had a number (ten or twelve) of canal barges (boats, say, 14 feet wide and 70 to 80 feet long), drawing, when loaded, 5 feet of water; when 1i~ht, 2 feet- o Page 135 CHAP. xxm.j GENERAL REPORTS. 135 about 80 tons burden. We also succeeded in picking up some four scows (flat-boats), say 12 feet wide and from 40 to 60 feet long. We also had, say, seventy pontoon-boats, with balks, chess, oars, anchors, & c.; 111 flict everything necessary to make a pontoon bridge, say, 1,400 feet long. In addition, we had all the lumber we wanted, for the precaution had beeu taken to load the canal barges with lumber of various dimensions l)ef ore they left Washington. We also had cordage and an abundant supply of tools. By lashing two of the canal barges together, placing the boats some 12 feet aJ)art, and throwing a false or additional deck over the whole, we had an area of some 40 feet wide and 45 feet long, upon which a whole battery of artillery could be placed. This boat, when so loaded, would draw only about 4 feet of water. Two more canal barges fixed in the same m~tnner would carry the horses of a battery, or at least enough of them to move the l)ieces an(l caissons, leaving the remaiiider to follow after~vard. Several of these double boats (four, I think) were thins l)repared, an(i the men were drilled for two or three (lays in taking them as near to the shore as they would float and then niakiiig a bridge from there to the shore. When this bridge was corn- pieted, the artillerymen were drilled in bringing on their artillery and horses and afterward in taking them off. As the shore on the south side of Cheesemans Creek was similar to that where it was proposed to land, this experience proved that we could land artillery very rapidly in this way, and wheui it was landed each double canal-boat became a wharf head, alongside of which our light- (lranght vessels could (liseharge their cargoes. Four of them could, con- seq uent.ly, give us four wharves as soon as the artillery was (liseharged. I also prepared several rafts of pontoon-boats, each raft being made of two 1)oats in the usual manner, except that the number of balks were doubled. Each of these rafts would carry one piece of artillery very conveniently, and as they did not, when so loaded, draw more thaii 9 inches of water, it was intended, when they grounded, to draw the pieces on shore by hand, putting about 200 men to each piece. Instead of drilling the men iu the use of these rafts, they were permitted to use them for two or three days in lauding both men and horses from the transports in Cheeseinans Creek. It was noticed that they soon became quite expert in handling them, and that they would carry 80 or 90 men with ease. Horses were also lauded from them with consi(lerable facil- ity. These (louble canal-boats and rafts, with the necessary ground tackle and gang-planks, completed the arrangements for landing the artillery. As it is frequently overlooked, it may be proper to state precisely what gun g.planks are required under such circumstances. We pre- pare(l the following: Four gang-planks, built so that a carriage or any- thing else could be taken from the deck of a vessel up to the gunwale; four about 20 feet long, reaching from thence to the canal barges; four more about 30 feet long, reaching from thence to the flat-boats; four more about 14 feet long, reaching from thence to the pontoon bridges or rafts; four mere about 12 feet long, reaching from thence to the shore. All these gang-planks were made 10 feet wide and very strong. Ropes were fastened to their corners, and the larger ones were placed on rolleis. For landing the infantry it was (lesigned to use the pontoon-boats. Each boat, besides the 3 men to manage it, will carry 40 nuen, with their arms and knapsacks, very cons-en iently. When a landing was to l)e effected, it was designed to move the fleet of transports front Cheesemaiis Landing to the York River, and imm Page 136 13(3 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIII. diatelv load about fifty boats with, say, 2,000 men, and let the boats at a given signal pull for the shore; the men manning the boats would then pull back for another load. The only preparations that it was iie~cssarv to make in reference to this operation was to provi(le I)~OPCP facilities to enable the men to get from the transports into the pontoon- bo~mts. It was at first proposed to leave this matter to the captains of the vessels, letting each captain l)rovide the means of getting the men horn his vessel into the pontoon-boats; but our experience at Cheese- maims Creek soon showed that this would not do,if any haste should become IieCeSsarv. lt w-as observed when a vessel containing several hundred meu would get l)erlmlission to laud the men for a (lay that the men had to climb dowim time sides of the vessel one by one, and that one man would not start until the man before him was in the l)olLtoon-boat. In this way it was found that fully half a day would be consumed in landing the men from some of the larger transports, although they had J)lenty of boats to carry them at One trip, and they could have been landed in an hour if the proper facilities fom- gettimmg from the vessel into time boats had been provided. I deemed it prol)er. therefore, to make a number of gang-plamiks, so that the men could walk in single file from the (leek of the vessel up to the gunwales on either side and (lown the sides by an easy slope to the boats, the exterior gang-planks being supported from the vessels and extending down into the water, and not resting on the boats, but being entirely independent of them. Two planks of the proper length, each 1 foot wide and l~ inches thick, laid side by side and battened together on both sides with strips of boards about 3 inches wide and 14 inches thick, were found to be very convenient for this pur- pose. All these preparations were about completed, amid we were engaged in making scaling ladders, thinking we might be called upon to assault the works at Gloucester Point, when suddenly, on the morning of May 4, the news spread through time fleet that the enemy had evacuated Yorktown. Orders were received (lurimmg time day by General Franklin to take his command around to Yorktown and prepare to proceed with it up the York River. The next morning found most of the fleet at Yorktown, all tIme prep- arations we had made for landing acconipammying it. This was the day of the battle of Williamsburg. During the forenoon Gemmeral McClel- lan came over to Yorktown and held a consultation with General Frank- lin. It was decided that he should proceed with Imis conimand at omice to West Point, at the head of the York River, and try ammd effect a laimd- ing on the right bank of that river, just at the mouth of the Pamnunkey River. All the infom-mation we could obtain on the subject led us to believe that Brick-House Point offered the greatest advammtages for timis purpose. A delay in the arrival of some of the tm-ammsl)orts prevented our leav- ing Yorktown during Monday, and it is probable that the gemmeral (Ic- cided that it was not wise to move from that place until the result of the battle then going on at Williamsburg should be known. Ilowex-er this may be, orders were received from Gemmeral McClellan late in the evening to proceed at ommee up the river; but it was then dark, an(i it was found impossible to commummicate the l)VOl)C~ orders for such a move- ment at night; besides, one or two of the large transports had i-un aground during the day, and as we were deficient in river pilots it was feared there would be danger of many more of them getting aground during a movement at night. In fact, the officers of the gnnboats r Page 137 ChAP. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 137 fused to convoy the fleet during the night, so General Franklin wa~s forced to l)ostpone the movement till morning. Soon after daylight on the morning of the 0th we got under way. It was a clear day, with a high wind. Nothing that was not foreseen happened on the voyage up the river. It may 1)e mentione(l, however, that tile fleet was much scattere(l, and that some of the pontoons which were towed by the steamers broke loose, causing considerable delay. Abaut 12 oclock, however, the vessels began to arrive at their desti- nation. One or two small boats were sent in close to shore to select tile exact spot where we should land and take the necessary soundings. The water was found to be shoal for some considerable distance from the shore, amid altogether the landing place was not unlike that for which preparations had been made below Gloucester. This being as- certained, the gunboats took up position so that they could brimig a cross-fire to bear on the enemy, should the landing be opposed. It may be remarked that the spot selected for the landing was a large, level plateau, only a few feet above the level of the river, and cleared for about a mile from the landing I)lace. The only opposition that could have been made to the landing would have been from artillery, which night possibly be concealed in the wooded heights beyond. We knew that no troops in any force would show themselves on the open plateau so directly under the fire of the gunboats. About 4 oclock in the afternoon, everything being in readiness, the artillery begmiinmng to arrive, amid the tide suiting, orders were given to land the troops. About fifty pontoon-boats, manned at first by the de. tachmeiit of the Fifteenth New York Regiment, moved to the trans- 1)OrtS containing the troops that were first to land; and now the prep. arations that we had made came into play. In less than an hour the boats were loaded and at a given signal they all pulled for the shore, carrying some 2,000 men, besides the oarsmen. As soon as the boats grounded the men jumped out and waded ashore, forming at once in line of battle. The oarsmen returned at once with the boats and con- tinued afterward to land the troops as rapidly as possible, but without order, or at will, so to speak, for after the first trip each boat went about its work independently of the others. Care was taken, however, as much as possible to confine the boats to one brigade umitil it was all landed before the landing of another brigade was commenced. In three hours the main body of the infhntry (say 8,000 imien) was on shore, formed in order of battle, with pickets thrown out into the woods be- you d the open l)lateau. The men carried their knapsacks and haver- sacks. The pontoon rafts were used by the officers to land their horses and baggage. The remainder of the infantry followed, but more slowly, as some of the boats were soon wanted for other purposes. As soon as the infantry began to land I directed my attention par- ticularly to the construction of a wharf. We first brought up one of the lightest of the double cammal-boats, as before described, loaded with a l)attery of artillery, as near to the shore as l)Ossible. This was se- curely anchored in the proper position at high water when it once urollilded. This raft was some 200 feet from the shore. Outside of it, l)arallel to it, and at a distance of some 20 feet from it, was placed and securely anchored the double canal-boat next lightest in draught of water, the space between the two being bridged by one of our heavy gang-~)laiiks. In the same manner was placed a third double canal boat or raft. Then we brought up a light-draught steamer, a ferry-boat, forming the pier head of our wharf. This barge also contained a battery of artillery. We then had left one of the double canal-boats with whic Page 138 138 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, yA. [CHAP. XXIII. to form the pier head of another wharf which we might want hereafter, and which we could build as soon as the pontoon-boats were set at liberty. These three double canal-boats and the barge carried us out some 220 feet farther into the stream than we were at the beginning, and at this point we had a sufficient depth of water for our light trans- ports to come alongside and discharge. While this was going on out- side the point of starting the work of making a roadway from there to the shore was also being done. First, a flat-boat or scow was brought up and secured on the line between the canal-boats and the shore and some 20 feet from the former, the connection between the two being made by a long gang-plank. Therm three or four of the pontoon rafts were floated into position next to the scow, the connection between being soon made in the usual manner with balks and chess, so as to make a regular pontoon bridge. A gang-plank for an apron established the connection with the shore, and we were now ready to discharge. This wharf was finished before dark. Some of our artillery was already on the wharf for a battery was in the first barge that had becim placed. The artillerists, with a detail from the infantry to assist, soon took time batteries ashore without the aid of horses aimd placed them in position on the left of our line. By 12 oclock at night the four batteries with time command were landed and ready for action, and the transports containiug their horses were alongside of our wharf and alongside of each other, all ready to land. The officers of the artillery were clamorous for their horses, par- ticularly Captain Arnold, who di~ layed great energy and judgment during the whole operation. And here I ought also to mention Cap- tain (how Major) Perry, of the Fifteenth New York, whom I left in charge of the wharf during the remainder of the night and the whole of the following day. To him more thaim to any one were we imidebted for the rapidity with which the landing was ciTheted. Shortly after 12 oclock at night I left the wharf, and wheii I returned in the morning I found the artillery nearly all lauded. I have entered into these details of the proposed landing below Gloucester and of the actual landing which was made at West Point not from any vanity, but to show predsely what was done with the means we had at hand. When the way of effecting a landing was first discussed I found officers of great intelligence entertaine(l very crude imotions on the subject, and many of theum were disposed to leave such matters to the sailors on the transports. Having had u~ gOO(I deal of experience at different times in landing building materials, sometimes under difficult circumstances, I knew that it would not do to trust to the crews of the vessels to land their cargoes, and hence I al)1)lied for a detachment of the Fifteenth New York Regiment and established a workshop on one of the steamers at Clicesemans Creek, where all our preparations were ma(le. The results you have above. Early the next morning (May 7) the enemy caine in contact with our pickets, an(l about 9 oclock the firimug grew serious. Time afl~air of that day was a musketry contest irm time woo(ls. Very little cannoimading was done on either side. Time plateau nl)omm which we landed was separated from the high land by a stream and impracticable marsh on the west side and by a smimaller stream and ravine on the south side, leaving, however, a pemmimisula about a quarter of a mile wide betweemi the llea(ls of the streams. Thispeninsula was thickly wooded; it was the key of the position, and it was there, or rather just iii trout of it, that time contest for its possessioum took place. Our trooj)s held it throughout the day Page 139 CRAP. XXIII.) GENERAL REPORTS. 13~ The division of General Sedgwick arrived on the morning of the 7th and were landed in the same manner during that day. Finding our landing deficient in depth of water for a permanent depot for supplying the army, I examined the Pamunkey River (luring the next day, with a view of selecting a spot higher up, where we couki make better wharf accommodations. For our immediate wants I selected Eltham, a point on the right bank of the Painunkey, some ~ or 7 miles above its mouth. The following day I reconnoitered the roads leading to it and from it, and commenced the construction of two telnl)orary wharves. In the course of the day Colonel Ingalls and Colonel Clarke arrived with some of the quartermasters and commissary transports. On the 10th I received instructions from General McClellan through General Franklin to proceed up the river as high as Cumberland, and report as to the possibility of carrying our transports to that point. With two gunboats and a steamer we proceeded up the river to an island some few miles below Cumberland. Here we found the river obstructed by a line of sunken vessels extending from the island to either shore. The obstructions looked formidable, but a short recon- naissance in boats showed that we could pass with our vessels between two of the sunken vessels. We did so, and then anchored for the in (~ht. Next morning, just at sunrise, we reached Cumberland, where we found General Stoneman had arrived the night before. The examina- tion showed that there was sufficient water for our light transports as far up as Cumberland, and that we could easily make wharves there. I accordingly sent back Captain Arnold, of the artillery, to report to this effect. Learning here some particulars that led me to suppose we might go still higher up the river, I determined to proceed to White House, where the railroad from West Point to Richmond crosses the Pamunkey River. We reached there early in tho day, and finding that General Stoneman had thrown forward a squadron of cavalry to that l)lace, I was enabled to go on shore and make such a thorough examination as induced me to believe that this was the proper spot for our final depot of supplies. Deeming this information of great impor- tance, I took the lightest-draught steamer and returned to Eltham the following night, and early next morning reported to General Franklin the result of my observations. During the day (the 12th) I joined the army on the march towards Cuinberland, and reported in person to General McClellan, when he reached that place on Tuesday, May 13. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, B. S. ALEXANDER, Lieutenant- Colonel of Engineers. Brig. Gen. J. G. BARNARD, Late Chief Engineer Army of the Potomac. CAMP NEAR HARRISONS LANDING, July 12, 1862. SIR: The following is a short statement of the operations upon which I have been engaged since I last submitted a report to you.. Events have been so crowded that I have found it impossible to report at an earlier day: On Thursday, June 26, 1 laid out a battery for thirty guns on th Page 140 140 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIII. hill ill advance of General Franklins right, to the west of Goldings farm, intending that this should be the principal position for onr artil- lery to drive the enemy from his positions at 01(1 Tavern, Mrs. Prices, and the two Garnetts. Thursday night we broke groun(l, with two regiments for the working party, two other regiments being the guards. Although we were within rifle-shot of the enemys pickets, we were iiot disturbed, and by morning we were under good cover. Friday, the 27th, General Porter was attacked in force on the other side (left bank of the Chickahominy), and a heavy cannonade being opened about noon on General Smiths position at Goldings, the work- ing j)arty was withdrawn, but the work was still held by our infhntry, and it c~ntributed materially in enabling us to repel the attacks of the enemy (luring the day. During the afternoon, seeing that General Porter was being (iriven back toward our lower bridges, I suggested to General Franklin the propriety of destroying Duanes bridge and the foot bridge below it. General Franklin acquiesced, and I put a regiment at Duanes bridge and a company at the foot bridge, and before sunset they were well torn to pieces. It is worthy of remark that when I proceeded to this work I found a small party had already commenced the work of destruction, about a platoon at l)uanes bridge and six men at the foot bridge; by whose orders they had gone to work I (11(1 not learn. Saturday, the 28th, General Franklin changed front, withdrawing from Goldings plain and the redoubt there. After assisting in the necessary slashing in front of the new line and in placing Carlisles battery in position near Courtenay~s house, I inspected our line of defense to the left as far as Fair Oaks. Returning in the afternoon, I was told by General Franklin that you wished to see me at headquar- ters, near Savage Station. - I immediately proceeded thither, aiid me- ceived your instructions to take Lieutenants Comstock and Farquhar with inc and proceed to James River and look for an eligible position to which the army might retreat and establish a new base of operations. While waiting for an escort the general-in-chief sent for me and reiter- ated your instructions. It may be remarked that the idea at that time was to take up a line joining the James and Chickahominy; at least such was my idea. Lieutenant Comstock and myself left Savage Station about 12 oclock Saturday night. We stopped with General Woodbury near the White Oak Swamp Bridge. On the morning of Sunday, the 29th, we proceeded to the headquar- ters of General Keyes, where we found the escort, under Mgjor Pleas- outon, of the Second Dragoons, had halted. Ilearing firing in General Keyes front, I rode forward to the dJbouch6 of the road over which General Sykes crossed the White Oak Swamp, and tried to get some axes to make a slashing across the roads leading from the Quaker road to Richmond, but in vain. Had 100 good axmen been put at work on these roads during that day we would probably been spared the subsequent battles of Monday and Tuesday. Returning, I saw General McClellan, for whom I sketched the roads as far as I had seen them, and from whom I received orders to try and comniunk~atc with our fleet on James River. We started at 12 m. and arrived at Carters Landing at 5 p. in. We met no enenly. Immediately procured a boat, and communicated with the gunboats below City Point. Returning to Carters about 7 oclock, I reported iii writing to Gen- eral McClellan, and sent an officer and 10 men to act as guides in con- .ducting columns to that 1)lace. I left a gunboat at Carters to protec Page 141 CHAP. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 141 the escort, an(l 1)roceede(l Lii) the river to see Captain lio(Igers, of the (}aleiia, in eoin~nand of the fleet. After stating to him the condition of aiThirs he sent a boat (lowil the river to order up the supply vessels as fir as Harrisons Landing; but finding him of opinion that the gun- boats could not keep the river 01)011 for supplies above Fort Powliatan, and that the true position of the army was at Dancing Point, the mouth of the Cliickahominy, we decided to proceed thither. As, however, I could not concur in this opinion at that time, and as it was then dark, we decided to remain where we were until morning. Monday, the 30th, we proceeded up the river to the bend above the mouth of Tnrkey Creek, to the point where the bluffs ou the right bank command the river and also the opposite shore. Returning, we stopped at Carters, xv here I ordered Major Pleasonton to send out parties on on all the roads, inform himself fully about them, and report direct to headquarters. I desired him to communicate, if possible, with the gun- boats supposed to be up the Chickahominy, as I intended to return with omme of his parties. I also instructed him to draw rations for the sick and wounded, several hundred of whom were already there. Leaving Carters about 12 m. in the Port Royal, Lieutenant Morris commanding, we proceeded to the mouth of the Chickahonminy, but in going over the bar we got aground and remained there until next morning. Tuesday, July 1, we proceeded up the Chickahominy about 25 miles to the Window Shades. Here we found three boats, and learned that this point was the head of navigation. Stopping there only a few minutes, I took a smaller vessel and returned to Turkey Creek as soon as possible. Major Pleasontons cavalry, although it had been within a few miles of the Chickahominy, did not reach its bank. Wednesday, the 2d, I found General McClellan shortly after daylight on board the Galena, to whom I reported in writing, having prepared my report the evening before. As this report is a matter of record, it is unnecessary to allude to it further at this time. The general told me that he had determined to go to Harrisons Landing, and that I would be wanted there as soon as possible to look to our lines of de- fense. He left early in the morning. When he had gone I asked the captain of the Delaware to set me ashore at Carters, some 3 miles below. This he thought it imprudent to do, as he was the only gun. boat left behind, and he might want all his crew at any moment. About 3 p. m. we landed at Carters, but we found that Major Pleas- onton had left with our horses early in the morning, so we were forced to go to Harrisons Landing by water. I found your tent just at dark, but did not succeed in seeing you until early next morning. Tuesday, the 3d, in company with Captain MeAlester and Lieutenant Comstock, I rode over the ground in our front, and before night, assisted by the sketch which you gave me that morning, I was enabled to give the general-in-chief such informatiou as he desired to enable him to give orders about posting the troops. The nature of Herring, or Birds, Creek and the necessity of holding its left bank I had ascer- tained from the mast-head when I went down the James River a few days before. Saturday, Sunday, and Monday, the 5th, 6th, and 7th, I was engaged without intermission in fixing the details of our line of defense, in lay- ing out~ works, directing the proper slashings, making communications, & c. To Captain McAlester I assigned the supervision of the work on the hill in fromit of our center; to Lieutenant Comstock the defense of the line of Kimage~s Creek, on our left, and to Lieutenant Farquhar the construction of the works and rifle pits on our right. These work Page 142 142 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CuAP. XXIII. are now well advanced toward completion. In two days more, if the troops do their duty, they will be finished. Late in the evening of the 7th, just as I had finished laying out the last line, to which I thought it necessary to give my special attention, the withdrawing of General Kearnys right, so as to form a proper con- nection with General Franklin, the general-in-chief sent for me to meet him on the steamer Metamora. He wished me to make a more minute examination of the opposite shore with a view of occupying it. This I did on Tuesday, the 8th, and reported to him that I considered the most dangerous point for our flotilla to be the wooded shore on the opposite bank, just above Mr. Coles house, nearly opposite the mouth of Herring (Jreek. Wednesday and Thursday, the 9th and 10th, ovemcome by the great Leat and my previous exertions and anxiety about our situation, I was ~varned to seek rest. Friday, the 11th, I rode over the whole line, but as it was raining, the troops were doing but little. All of which is respectfully submitted. B. S. ALEXANDER, Lieutenant- Colonel and Aide-de- Camp. Brig. Gen. J. G. BARNARD, Chief Engineer, Army of the Potomac. No. 4. Reports of Brig. Gen. Daniel P. Woodbury, U. S. Army, commanding Engineer Brigade, of operations from May 18 to June 30. HEADQUARTERS ENGINEER BRIGADE, Camp, New Bridge, Va., May 29, 1862. GENERAL: Pursuant to your circular of May 21, requiring reports of the operations of the Engineer Brigade, I have the honor to render the following report of the operations of the Fifteenth and Fiftieth Reg. iments, composing Engineer Brigade, since its arrival at White House Point, May 18. The Fifteenth Regiment was divided into three detachments, assigned to Captains Perry, Ketchum, and Chester, respectively. Captain Perrys detachment was assigned the duty of collecting the canal barges loaded with engineer property at White House fitting out pontoon trains, & c. A train of thirty-four pontoon-boats, with their accessories for the con- struction of a bridge, each boat containing the materials for one bay, was fitted out and securely anchored, ready for immediate use, and the extra pontoon-boats safely moored. Captain Perry, with his detach- ment, rejoined his regiment at Cold Harbor on the 25th instant. The second detachment, under Captain Ketchum, was assigned the duty of repairing roads and bridges on common roads. I condense from his daily reports as follows: May 19.Monday night built bridge where the main road from White House crosses Black Creek. Single span 26 feet; five 10-inch stringers; covering, 2 and 3 inch plank. May 20.Corduroyed 1,000 feet of road about 1 mile west of Black Creek. The same afternoon took up and rebuilt bridge over Mill Creek at the grist-mill. Two spans 18 and 20 feet; roadway, 12 feet; four pine stringers, 9 inches; covering, 2-inch oak plank Page 143 CHAP. XXIII.) GENERAL REPORTS. 143 May 21.Overtook the advance; reported to General Franklin received instruc- tions from him to go ahead on New Bridge road. \Vent on and encamped about 1,000 feet inside our pickets; unab1 to get to the site of New Bridge on account of pres- ence ot the enemy on north side of the river. May 22.Unable still to take any measurement of the bridge, which condition of things continued natil Sunday. May 25.Took measurement and commenced framing bridge. May 26.Completed framing of bridge. May 27.Getting out saw-logs to be cut into plank for covering bridge. Engaged ~il night in hauling timber to site of bridge. May 28.Finished hauling timbers and plank to site of bridge after night. May 29.Took possession of saw-mill; got out timber for permanent bridges. Length of bridge over the Chickahominy River, known as New Bridge, 114 feet, with seven spans; 10-inch stringers, four in number; width of roadway, 10 feet. The third detachment, under Captain Chester, was also assigned to the duty of repairing roads and bridges. I condense from his daily reports as follows: Sinc~~ the 18th instant I have followed the road along which General Stoneman s command passed, repairing such as required it, laying corduroy, and building small bridges. May 19 and 20.Laid corduroy and graded about 150 feet of road near the first crossing of the turnpike road and the railroad after leaving White House; also built four small bridges and laid corduroy at various points on the road along which Gen- eral Franklins command passed from the crossing of Black Creek to a point half a mile beyond the blacksmiths shop; in all, abont 1,000 feet of road corduroyed, and much ditching and grading. Finding the road crossing the valley about a mile and a half beyond the last point mentioned (about half a mile beyond the White Church) im- l)assable at midnight, built the bridges across streams about 8 feet wide and 5 feet deep; used in each nine or ten stringers, of from 10 to 15 inches in diameter, lai don crib abutments; also laid corduroy over about 800 feet of road in manner as follows: Longitudinal stringers were first laid over these sticks averaging 7 inches in (liame- ter, the interstices again filled with smaller sticks, and the whole covei ed with brush ~nd dirt. A large portion of the force was kept constantly employed in ditching and grading, and the work thus performed was not less valuable than that before de- scribed. From this time until the present date my detachment has followed the roads over which General Franklins division passed, leaving the Hanover road, however, at the cross road near present headquarters by General Woodburys orders for a point nearly on Chickahominy Creek, abo6t a mile above New Bridge. The work executed on the road since then is too various in character to describe in detail. I will mention, however, important work performed near each of the two mills; also that since we have been encamped near the Chickahominy roads have been cut through the woods in aggregate about three-fourths of a mile in length, about 50 feet in width, and have collected about 1,000 heavy sticks to be laid in the bottom for small bridges and cordu- roys. The men have worked cheerfully and faithfully at whatever hour I have called theni out, and I am much indebted to the officers for their energetic co-operation. The Fiftieth Regiment was also divided into several detachments. One detachment, under Lieutenant Roosa, was left at White House Point for the purpose of unloading the barges and guarding the engi- neer property at that point. A second detachment, under Captain Gilbert, was also left for the purpose of preparing a pontoon train. A train of thirty-four boats, with their accessories, for the construction of a bridge, one bay in each, was fitted out and anchored, ready for im- mediate use. Two pontoon trains complete are now moored at White House Point, ready for use for transport by land or water. A third detachment, under Captain Spaulding, was assigned to the duty of con- structing trestle bridges. I condense from the report of Colonel Stuart, his commanding officer, as follows: The detachment nnder Captain Spaulding, consistin of Companies C and li, put in a trestle bridge over the Chickahominy at Bottoms ~ridge Crossing and made the necessary approaches on Thursday, May 22, and a second of the same character on Friday, May 23. These bridges were each 120 feet long. They are in constant use. Since the 23d this detachment has been making examinations for crossings; has made some roads and transported trestles, & c., for one bridge to a point one ml a ove New Bridge. Captain Spaulding reports that he has two trestle bridges ready to be thrown over the Chickahominy as soon as a crossing is decided upon Page 144 144 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIII. To show the character of the bridges last referred to I will state that on Saturday last, May 24, seventy-nine regiments, morc thau 900 wagons, and several batteries of artillery passed over these two bridges at Bot- toms Bridge Crossing between sunrise and sunset, as reported to me by First Lieutenant line, of Company E, in charge of guard at that crossing. A fourth detachment, under Major Embick, was assigned to duty on Richmond and York River Railroad. He reports as follows: I commenced work on the railroad bridge near Tunstalls Station on Monday, May 19, and on Saturday, the 24th, about 5.30 p. in., the first locomotive passed over. The bracing and filling up around mud-sills was completed on the 26th. This bridge con- sists of one span 50 feet, 21 feet high of trestle work, and would have been completed much sooner but for the lack of facilities for getting timber from the woods to the bridge, the scarcity and very indifferent assortment of tools, and some bad weather. The detachment aLso repaired a portion of the track, which work was finished on Tues- day, May 27. A fifth detachment, under Colonel Stuart, was also assigned to the same duty. He reports as follows: On Friday morning, May 23, I reached the railroad bridge over the Chickahominy with detachments from Companies I and K, where I found three spans of trestle work, each ii feet wide and 15 feet high, and one truss spau of 44 feet, same height, entirely destroyed by fire; two other trestle spans xvere partially destroyed. Found a hand car and a quantity of timber at a saw-mill 3 miles east of bridge, near the track, which were brought up and work commenced. On Sunday, the 25th, Captain OGrady and First Lieutenant Andrus, of this regi- ment, made a thorough examination of the bridge west of the portion destroyed, about 1,000 feet in length, and also of the track for 4 miles west to Fair Oak Station, and reported the bridge-work in safe condition for passing over. On Monday morning the trestle spans were repaired and work commenced on truss span, when Engineer Charles McAlpine arrived with 40 bridge carpenters of the Gov eminent bridge-builders and a car load of sawed timber and a full supply of necessary tools. With their valuable aid the bridge was completed on Tuesday, May 27, at 7 p. in., when a locomotive passed over the bridge and went 3 miles beyond. I bave left 10 men as a guard at the bridge until relieved, and respectfully recommend that a larger guard be sent there from some other regiment, as the bridge is long and high and requires a much larger guard. RECAP1TTJLATION. Bridges built and r~paired.One bridge, single span, 26 feet, at Black Creek; one bridge, two spans, 18 and 20 feet, respectively, roadway 12 feet, at Mill Creek; four small bridges on the turnpike between Black Creek and a point half a mile beyond the blacksmiths shop; three bridges between the last point mentioned and half a mile beyond the White Church, over streams 8 feet in width and 5 in depth, built with stringers laid on crib abutments; two trestle bridges, 120 feet in length, across the Chickahominy at Bottoms Bridge; timber got out and framed for a bridge across the Chickahominy at New Bridge, 114 feet in length, seven spans; two trestle bridges ready to be thrown at the same spot. Railroad bridges.One bridge, one span, 50 feet in length, 21 feet in height, trestle work, near Tunstalls Station; one bridge, three spans, trestle work, each 11 feet in width, 15 feet in height; one truss span, 44 feet in width, 21 feet in height; two trestle spans repaired over the Chickahominy; assisted by forty Government bridge-builders. Roads re~paired.One hundred and fifty feet graded and corduroyed on the turnpike from White House at railroad crossing; 1,000 feet ditched, graded, and corduroyed between Black Creek and a point half a mile beyond the blacksmiths shop; 800 feet ditched, graded, and corduroyed near White Church; 4, 00() fee t road, 50 feet in width, cut through the woods near the Chickahominy; 1,000 feet corduroyed Page 145 CHAP. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 145 mile west of Black Creek 1,000 sticks cut and collected for corduroy- ing the road near New Bridge. Respectfully submitted. D. P. WOODBURY, Brigadier- General of Volunteers. General J. G. BARNARD, Ckief Engineer, Army of the Potomac. HEADQUARTERS ENGINEER BRIGADE, Camp near New Bridge, Va., June 7, 1862. GENERAL: I have the honor to render the following report of the operations of the Fifteenth and Fiftieth Regiments, composing the En- gineer Brigade, for the first week of the month of June: A detachment of the Fifteenth Regiment, under Captain Ketchum, was employed for several days getting out lumber at the saw-mill, when the shaft of the balance-wheel broke and tendered the machinery use- less. The lumber was delivered to Lieutenant Nichols, Fourth Vermont Volunteers, by order of Colonel Alexander. The further operations of Captain Ketchums detachment are contained in Colonel 1~Inrphys regi- mental report, from which I extract the following: Captain Ketchuin relieved Captain lirainerd, of the Fiftieth Regiment, to build a trestle bridge 2 miles below New Bridge. Owing to the character of the bottom and the sudden rise of water much delay was experienced; but at 2 a. m. on the 2d instant a bridge 330 feet in length, consisting of seven trestles and seven pontoon-boats, was constructe(l. Captain Ketchum was assisted in this work all night by a detail from the regiment under Major Magruder. Until the 5th instant Captain Ketchums men were employed in framing supple- mental suppu~rts to trestle caps, lashing side rails, and straightening up trestles, & c., on account of the fall of the water. Subsequently he was detailed to relieve Captain Chester at the lower foot bridge, where he was again assisted by a detail under Major Magruder. This work was continued until 9 p. m. of the 5th, when, owing to the darkness and the cramped condition of the men from long-continued standing in the water, the work was stopped, after laying upwards of 500 feet of bridge. Captain Ketchum is now framing the timber for a permanent structure (New Bridge), thu bridge previously framed by him having been used by the United States Engineers under Captain Duane. In this work Captain Ketchum is assisted by a detail of car- penters from the Fiftieth Regixient. A second detachment of the Fifteenth, under Captain Chester, has been employed in cutting and preparing corduroy material, and also on the following pieces of work: 1st. A road leading from the rear of General Smiths headquarters to the New Bridge road. On this there was a distance of about half a mile that was graded by throw- ing out sand from ditches, and many spots w~tre corduroyed and five small bridges built. 2d. A continuation of the trestle bridge laid by Captain Spaulding. In this Captain Chesters men were assisted by a detail from this camp, working at night. The road passing the skirt of woods approaching this bridge has been corduroyed for a long dis- tance. Captain Spauldings bridge terminated abruptly in deep water, and in order to continue it all the trestle and pontoon material that could be found was used before commencing with corduroy. The whole distance of crib and corduroy from the termina- tion of the trestle bridge to the point now completed is 900 feet. Of this some 400 feet of corduroy requires adjusting before heavy artillery can safely pass, and one place of about 30 feet in length is still open, hut will be closed to-day. Stringers are also par- tially in position in advance, and Captain Chester is quite confident that all the ma- terial portion of the bridge will be completed to-day. 3d. A foot bridge for infantry where General Naglee commenced a crossing of the creek. This bridge is now 760 feet in length, and crosses two deep channels, in which the water was respectively 7 and 9 feet deep. Last night when Captain Chester with- drew the detachment there was no spot between the end of the bridge to the one already constructed by General Naglee in which the water was over 1 foot deep, and as the distance is not over 250 feet in length, the water rapidly falling, and most of the 10 R RVOL X Page 146 146 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIII. material already prepared, it will probably be entirely completed to-day. It is proper to state that the difficulty of constructing this bridge was materially increased for the following reasons, vie: All small corduroy or crib material was cut and prepared at a distance of more than a mile from the bridge. The road intervening was impassable for teams, at one time being covered with water for a distance of 100 yards from 14 inches to :3j feet in depth. This detachment spent the whole of one stormy night in temporarily arranging this road in order that the teams furnished to haul corduroy could be rendered available. For this purpose they carried several thousand rails a distance of 400 yards. At daylight the same men commenced the bridge and completed a length of 140 feet during the morning, when they were relieved by a detacbment under Major Magruder~ who advanced the work about 500 feet more. Yesterday a further force of 65, men nuder Lieutenant Lubey, and six wagons were sent to assist. In addition to the work done by these separate detachments a foot bridge, constructed on small trestles, has been built for a distance of about 1,200 feet across the river and overflowed bottom laud near the bridge built by Captain Ketchum. The main stream was spanned by three canvas pontoons with their accessories. It is now in a condi- tion for the passage of infantry in single file. In obedience to your orders, during the storm on the night of June 3 Major Magru- der, with 117 men, built a rifle pit across tbe west end of Captain Ketchum~s bridge for the protection of those guarding it. Of the Fiftieth Regiment, one company is stationed at White House in charge of pontoon and intreiiching property, engaged for the last few days in loading poiitoons and their accessories on the cars to send to Dis- patch Station. A detachment under Lieutenant Hine has been stationed at Bottoms Bridge for the purpose of guarding and strengthening the two trestle bridges at that point. I give a short extract from Lieutenant lines report of the 1st and 2d iiistant: During the day and night of the 1st the water remained stationary. At 3 a. mu. on the 2d instant the river suddenly commenced rising at the rate of 6 inches per hour, and by S a. m. the bridges were impassable, all of the approaches being washed away. I applied last night in person to General Heintzelmau,,sent a dispatch to the nearest brigade (Third, Hookers division) this morning, then went myself for nmen but it was 10 oclock before any were on the gr und, and 1 oclock before communication was open across the bridge. At 10.30 a. m. the water was 3 feet and 2 inches higher than at 3 a. in., when it com- menced rising, and the bridges in imminent danger of bfing swept away, when, as a last resort, I cut the dikes on both sides of the river between here an(l the railroad bridge, innndating the whole valley, but spreading the water so much that it rose no higher. By this the bridges are saved, and I have 200 men now at work raising the approaches and completing the timber bridges I had commenced. By daylight to- morrow morning I shall have a bridge 24 feet wide, capable of sustaining any required weight, coml)leted. I have kept General Heintzebnan apprised by telegraph during the day of the condition of the bridge, so that no serious interruption has occurred. On the 4th instant Major Embick, with a detachinent of two com- panies, was sent to Bottoms Bridge to assist Lieutenant line. This detachment has constructed a permanent 1)ridge, double roadway of the strongest description; two spans, 30 feet; four spans, 15 feet; length; 120 feet; width of roadway, 24 feet. The approaches on either side have been cordnroyed for the distance of 1,200 or 1,30() feet, nuder the direction of officers of this detachment. This bridge will render unnecessary the two trestle bridges at this point. A detachment under Captain Spaulding was directed to construct a trestle bridge about half a mile above New Bridge. On the 2d instaut Captain Spaulding reports: O~ving to the sudden rise of the river having floated all the bridge materiaL at the point where it had been deposited, to prevent its being observed by the enemy it be- came necessary for me to remove all the material to higher ground to prevent its being carried off before it could be used in the bridge. As this work was nearly all done in the water, the operation was necessarily a slow one, 80 that I did not get to work at the construction of the bridge until about daylight. When I had the bridge about three-fourths complete the second trestle cap from the bank broke, making it necessary for me to dismantle all of the bridge except one span to put in a new cap Page 147 CHAP. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 147 When the bridge was again entirely completed across the main stream I found that the rapid current was fast undermining the legs of the trestle in the main channel, and I was compelled to dismantle 40 feet of the bridge about the center and put in one of the pontoon-boats. Owing to the delay caused by these reconstructions the time occupied in constructing the bridge was longer than I had expected, but the south abutment was put in and the bridge finishes at noon yesterday. When the bridge was completed yesterday I returned to camp, leaving the approach at the south side of the river to be built by Captain Chester. Durino- the construc- tion of the bridge the approach on this side was built by Captain Perry, of the Fif- teenth, who also rendered me valuable assistance in securing the north end of the bridge. With the slight changes suggested by you to accomaiodate the bridge to the falling or lower stage of water, and which I hope to have finished before the south approach is ready for use, the bridge is perfectly secure for infantry in two ranks, and as safe for the passage of artillery as this plan of trestle can be made without strengthening it beyond the original plan. This bridge is feet in length. Colonel Stuart, in his regimental report, speaks in the highest terms of the skill, energy, and enduraiice exhibited by the officers and men engaged on this work, and of their great exposure in the stream, which had become very deep and rapid before the trestle could be placed and secured, and of their ntter indifference in regard to the enemys shot and shell, which fell at one time in close proximity to them. The bridge has been strengthened by placing piles beneath the tres- tle caps, to prevent injury from the extreme high water. A detachment under Captain Brainerd commenced the lower trestle bridge. Of the difficulties attending the construction of this bridge Colonel Stuart says: One hundred feet of trestle bridge, which had been prepared for the stream when at low-water mark, an(l made up without a pontoon boat, which was not of sufficient length nor of the right character for the stream, swollen as it was by the recent rains on the night the work was commenced. Added to this, the unlooked-for and remarkable rise of water on Sunday morning rendered it necessary for the men engaged in the ~onstruction of this bridge to work for nearly twelve honrs in the cold water, frequently having to dive to place the legs of the trestles and swimming to reach the opposite bank; and this too darkness of the night. mostl~- in the RECAPITULATION. Bridges .One permanent bridge at Bottoms Bridge; two spans, 30 feet; four spans, 15 feet; length, 120 feet; roadway, 24 feet. One tres- tle and pontoon bridge, about 1 mile above New Bridge, by a party of the Fiftieth, nuder Captain Spaulding; length, ; 900 feet of crib and cordnroy on south approach; by various details from the army, as- sisted by a party of Fifteenth, under Captain Chester. One trestle and pontoon bridge, 1 mile below New Bridge, of seven trestles and seven l)Ontoons; length, 330 feet; by a party of the Fifteenth, under Captain IKetchum. One foot bridge, about 14 miles below New Bridge, of small trestle, covered with plank. Three canvas-boats span the main chan- nel; length across the river and overflowed bottom lands, 1,200 feet; by a detachment of the Fifteenth, under Colonel Murphy. One bridge for infantry, 24 miles below New Bridge, connecting with General Nag- lees bridge; length, 1,010 feet; width, 4 feet; by the Fifteenth, under Captain Ketchum and Captain Chester. Five small bridges, on the road from General Smiths headquarters to New Bridge, by detail from the Fifteenth, under Captain Chester Page 148 148 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIII. Roads.Two thousand five hundred feet graded and corduroyed on road from General Smiths headquarters to New Bridge by details from the Fifteenth, under Captain Chester. Five hundred feet corduroyed over bottom-land on the north approach to the infantry bridge by de- tails from the Fifteenth, under Captain Chester. iRifie pit 50 yards in length, constructed for the protection of the south approach of the lower trestle bridge by details from the Fifteenth, nnder Major Ma- gruder. D. P. WOODBURY, Brigadier- General of Volunteers. General J. G. BARNARD, Chief Engineer, Army of the Potoma& . HEADQUARTERS ENGINEER BRIGADE, Camp Lincoln, Va., June 19, 1862. GENERAL: Since my last report, of June 7, the Engineer Brigade has been engaged chiefly in the construction of a permanent bridge across the Chickahominy nearly opposite Dr. Trents. This bridge was commenced June 9, and completed so as to allow the passage of teams June 14. it was subsequently covered with earth, and the approaches, constructed under Colonel Alexander by other regiments, were com- pleted on the 16th and 17th instant. The dimensions of the bridge are as follows: Length, 1,080 feet; roadway, 11 feet; number of cribs, 40; number of trestles, 0. The accompanying drawing will furnish any other details required.* The Third Vermont Regiment, Colonel Hyde commanding, furnished valuable assistance in covering a portion of the crib work after completing excellent approaches on the south side. For the last week Captain Spaulding, with a detachment of 250 men, has been engaged in constructing an infantry bridge about 1 mile above the permanent bridge. Good progress has been made in the work. June 17 and 18 several detachments of the brigade, amounting to some 400 men, were engaged in constructing bridges and corduroying on the road leading to the railroad station near Fair Oaks and the road from general headquarters to General Smiths division. I have not yet received the reports of the officers in charge of the work. June 19, a detachment of 50 men, with their officers, still engaged on the road to Smiths division; a detachment of 500 men, with their officers, employed constructing fascines; 224 fascines were made on the line of the railroad near Fair Oaks Station. D. P. WOODBURY, Brigadier-General of Volunteers. General J. G. BARNARD, Chief Engineer, Army of the Potomac. HEADQUARTERS ENGINEER BRIGADE, Near Palmouth, Va., February 7, 1863. DEAR GENERAL: I referred some of the queries in your letter of the 3d to Major Spaulding,* whose camp is some 3 or 4 miles off. He hap- Not found Page 149 CRAP. XXIII] GENERAL REPORTS. 149 pened to be absent building a pontoon bridge for Sigels corps over Potomac Creek, and his answer did not come until last night. Most of our papers relative to the Chickahominy campaign are in Washington in the third story of the house adjacent to my residence. I answer your questions as well as I can, taking them up in order. Major Spauld- lug, of my brigade, left the White House in charge of about thirty pairs of trestles and four canvas-boats, with accessories complete. On the same day he built two trestle bridges over the Chickahominy at Bot. toms Bridge of 80 feet span each. On the night of the same day the remainder of this bridge equipage was taken to Cold Harbor. This was the advance-guard train. On June 28 I was directed to send away all my bridge teams to the White House. I took the liberty of keeping six of them. Duane turned over the balance of his bridge equipage to me after setting aside enough to build two bridges at New Bridge. The balance numbered but a few pontoons, which were all used a.t the lower trestle bridge. After the battle of Seven Pines 1 brought up about twenty-four pontoons, with accessories, but was never able to obtain more than half teams enough to move the equipage all together. I cannot now tell what became of the lower trestle bridge. In the foot bridge, a little below that tres- tle bridge, three canvas-boats were used, running lengthwiMe over the Stream. I cannot tell what became of them. I think I can find out what became of this and of the lower trestle bridge, and will let you know as soon as I do. Major Spauldings letter, which I inclose here- with, answers several of your questions. The trestle bridge, the crib bridge, and the two foot bridges over the White Oak Swamp, all at one place, were destroyed by a detachment of the Fifteenth N~w York, under Lieutenant-Colonel Colgate, assisted by a detachment of the Fifth New Hampshire, under Colonel Cross. Lieutenant Comstock I think has already answered your questions to him. I regret that I did not see you when I was last in Washington. Company prevented a call which I had intended to make on the night preceding my return. In your letter of the 4th you request the detail of some officer in the Engineer Brigade as your assistant. I am quite willing that Hargous should be detailed, but I do not even know him by sight. I think Far. rell would not have recommended him unless he was a person pretty - well qualified foi the place. You can return him if you do not find him useful. I will ask General Hookers permission to order him to join you. Respectfully, B. P. WOODBURY. Brigadier-General BARNARD. Linclosure No. 1.1 Report of Capt. Wesley Brainerd, Fiftieth New York Engineers. CAMP NEAR NEW BRIDGE, VA., June 2, 1862. SIR: Agreeably to your instructions I proceeded on Saturday after- noon last (May 31) to make a reconnaissance of the Chickahominy in the direction l)reviously indicated by you, with a view to determine the most favorable l)Osition for a bridge. I succeeded in finding a ver Page 150 150 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIII. good approach to the stream at about dark. The following sketch shows the character of the spot selected as it then appeared: A represents the road leading to the approach. B, a point of land opposite, apparently the main-land, C appeared to be a small swale, which at that time could have been crossed by one or two trestles or corduroy. D represents land partially covered by water and filled with brush or trees. H, a ditch running parallel with the road. As I had but 120 feet of bridge, I concluded to place it in the direc- tion of A B, and, in my opinion, had the water remained at the same height as at the time I made the reconnaissance, the bridge could have been laid with little difficulty. I received your order to construct the bridge at about 11 oclock, and proceeding with the train to the spot, I found the stream somewhat swollen and rising rapidly. After cutting away the brush at the side of the stream I commenced laying the bridge three feet above the level of the water. The water continued rising very fast, and the current became so swift as to render the work ex- tremely difficult. At about 4.30 oclock I had succeeded in placing three lengths of trestles, when I was relieved by Captain Ketchum, Fifteenth Regiment New York Volunteers, and returned with my men to camp. At that time the water had risen so as nearly to submerge the bridge. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, WESLEY BRAIKERD, Captain Company C, Fiftieth Regiment New York Volunteers. General D. P. WOODBURY, Commanding Engineer Brigade. [Inclosure No. 2.] DETACHMENT FIFTEENTH NEW YORK ENGINEERS, Near New Bridge, Va., June 2, 1862. GENERAL: Agreeably to your instructions I proceeded to the bridge below New Bridge, arriving there at about 7 oclock in the morning of yesterday. My instructions were to relieve Captain Brainerd and his command, and then to make an examination to determine at wllat point the direction then being pursued would strike the opposite bank, the na- ture of the soil at such point, and the.length of bridge required, and, if 01 I// Page 151 CHAP. XX1II.~ GENERAL REPORTS. 151 J deemed it necessary, change the direction of the structure. Soon after my arrival on the ground a canvas pontoon was brought, of which I took possession and commenced making the examination above alluded to. When about half way across the stream I was ordered to return by Colonel Lansing, of the Seventeenth New York Volunteers, who said that he had special instructions from General McGlellan to see that bridge completed, and by Lieutenant-Colonel Pettes, of your bri- gade. I returned to the shore and endeavored to find you 5 report the above facts. Not succeeding, I was ordered by both of the gentle- men above iiamed to go to work on the bridge, which I did, and con- tinued working in that direction until your ai~rival on the ground, at about 9 oclock, when the necessary examination was made and the (lirection of the bridge changed. Having commenced another bridge in the new direction, everything went on smoothly until I reached the sixth trestle, when, owing to the rapid rise of the water, I deemed it necessary to raise the abutment- in endeavoring to do which, having raised the shore ends of the balks, the whole structure surged inshore and fell with a crash. I immediately went to work clearing away the wreck, and am happy to state that nothing was either lost in the current or broken. When everything was cleared away I commenced rebuilding, and connected with the op- l)Osite shore at about 2 oclock this morning. I would also beg leave respectfully to report that I was very much annoyed by the constant imiterference of officers higher in rank than myself, who caine to me ordering me to hurry tip the work, and repre- senting that they had the authority of the general commanding. Hoping that you will deem this report satisfactory, I remain, your obedient servant, WILLIAM A. KETCHUM, Captain Fifteenth New York Engineers, (Joindy. Detachment. General D. P. WOODBUImY, Co~nmanding Egnineer Brigade. [Joclosure No. 3.1 CAMP NEAR NEW BRIDGE, VA., June 2, 1862. GENERAL: In obedience to your orders I went to the river night before last with a part of my detachment at the point selected by you for the crossing, and commenced the necessary preparations for laying the bridge. Owing to the sudden rise of the river having floated all the bridge materials at the point where it had been deposited, to prevent its bemng observed by the enemy it became necessary for me to remove all the material to higher ground, to prevent its being carried off before it could be used in the bridge. As this work was nearly all done in the water, the operatiomi was miecessarily a slow one, so that I did not get to work at the construction of the bridge until about daylight. ~Vhmen I had the bridge about three-fourths completed the second trestle cap from the bank broke, ~flaking it necessary for me to dismantle all the bridge except omme span to put in a new cap. When the bridge was again completed across the main stream I ihund that the rapid current was fast undermining the legs of the tresi les in the maui channel, and I was compelled to dismantle 40 feet of the bridge about the center and put in one of the pontoon-boats. Owimig to the delay caused by these reconstructions, the time occupied in constructing the bridge was longer than I had expected, but the south abutment was putin an Page 152 152 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIII. the bridge finished at noon yesterday. When the bridge was com- pleted yesterday I returned to camp, leaving the approach at the south side of the river to be built by Captain Chester. During the construc- tion of the bridge the approach on this side was built by Captain Perry, of the Fifteenth, who also rendered me valuable assistance in secnring the north end of the bridge. With the slight changes suggested by yon to accommodate the bridge to the falling or lower stage of the water, and which I hope to have finished before the south approach is ready for use~ the bridge is perfectly secure for infantry in two ranks, and as safe for the passage of artillery as this plan of trestle can be made without strengthening it beyond the original plan. Of the time required to complete the south approach I am not able to speak with any certainty, as I ani not familiar with the ground. Very respectfully, I. SPAULDING, Captain E~ftieth New York Voluntec,- Engineers, Commanding Detachment Engineer Brigade. Brig. Gen. D. P. WOODBURY, (ommanding Engineer Brigade. No. 5. Report of Brig. Gen. Andrew A. Thunphreys, U. S. Army, Chief of Topo graphical Engineers. HEADQUARTERS THIRD DIVISION, FIFTH CORPS, February 20, 1863. GENERAL: In compliance with a request received through Brig. Gen. S. Williams, assistant adjutant-general, that I would make a report upon the operations carried on under my directions while serving as chief of topographical engineers with the Army of the Potomac, I submit the following hurried and imperfect sketch, regretting that the circumstances by which I am surrounded render it difficult for me to present even this meager account: About December 1, 1861, I was assigned to special duty on the staff qf Major-General McClellan, commanding the Army of the Potomac, ~and when that army tools the field came into command of the officers of my corps serving with it. Previous to taking the field every avail- able source was exhausted that promised to furnish information, gen- eral or special, respecting the character of the region in which the operations were to be conducted. The topographical information obtained was, however, very meager, and continued, careful reconnais- sance was necessary to guide the march of the various portions of the army, to exhibit the relations between them, and to designate the posi- tions for depots and the lines of supply. Iteconnaissances were likewise made of the enemys several positionsat and near Yorktown, on the Chickahominy, and on the approach to Richmond from that stream, and also of the positions occupied by our army at Yorktown, on the Chick- ahominy, and at Harrisons Landing. From these reconnaissances detailed maps of the scene of operations were prepared, multiplied by photography, and distributed to the commanders and staff officers of the various subdivisions of the army. It is not necessary that I should enumerate the various reconnaissances that were made and the partic- ular object of each. A list of the chief maps that resulted from th Page 153 CHAP. XXIII.] GENSERAL REPORTS. 153 operations of that branch of the staff will sufficiently indicate the char- acter and extent of its labors. These maps were as follows, viz: 1. Of the position of Yorktown and Warwick Creek and River, with the approaches from James, York, and Poquosin Rivers. 2. Of the position of Williamsburg and the approaches and the adja- cent country. 3. Of the approaches to Richmond between the Pamunkey and Chick- ahominy. 4. Of the positions on the Chickahominy. 5. Of the approaches to Richmond from the Chickahominy. 6. Of the position at Harrisons Landing and the approaches and the country adjacent fromMalvern Hill to Charles City Court-House. From these maps and the Coast Survey maps of the James and York Rivers and the State map of Henrico County a very detailed map was prepared in three l)arts, embracing the country between the James and York Rivers, and extending from Old Point Comfort to Richmond. Since these maps can present comparatively little of the information required concerning a country that is the scene of military operations, they should be accompanied by a memoir. Notes were collected by me with the object of preparing one, and it was my intention to give so much of the physical geography of the region in which the campaign was carried on and the territory contiguous as was necessary to ex- hibit clearly the characteristic topographical and hydrographical feat- ures; the nature of the soil; its natural growth and degree and kind of cultivation, and the direction and character of the routes of commu- nication, both by land and water. The characteristic features, natural and artificial, of the several positions of Yorktown, Williamsburg, the Chickahoininy, Richmond, Malvern Hill, and Harrisons Landing, would likewise have been described. Continued sickness during the occupation of the position of Harri- sons Landing prevented my accomplishing this task, and immediately after the withdrawal of the Army of the Potomac from the peninsula of the James and York Rivers I was, at my own request, assigned to the command of troops, and the division of new troops that I have com- manded since that time has occupied all my time. Besides the officers, Coast Survey assistants, and civil engineers, who con~tituted the more or less permanent force of the topographical en- gineer department of the Army of the Potomac, many officers of the Corps of Engineers and of the line of the army and volunteer force served temporarily under my orders. Their names will be found upon the maps prepared from the reconnaissances in which they assisted, but I should not permit the opportunity to pass without acknowledg- ment of the zeal and efficiency with which the duties assigned them were executed. Those who served more permanently under my orders were, Lieut. Col. W. R. Palmer, Capt. El. L. Abbot, First Lients. Orlando G. Wag. ner and N. Bowen, Topographical Engineers; Lieut. George A. Custer, Fifth Cavalry; Capt. James Hope, Second Vermont Volunteers; First Lient. Carswell McClellan, New York Volunteers; Messrs. F. W. Dorr and J. W. Bonn, assistants United States Coast Survey; Messrs. Fred. Churchill, F. W. Vaughn, H. H. Humplireys, Walter Taylor, civil engineers, and Mr. James McMackin, draughtsman. I should not omit to mention my indebtedness to Col. G. K. Warren, Fifth New York Volunteers (now brigadier-general of volunteers, cap Page 154 154 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIII. tam Corps Topographical Engineers), for the valuable assistance he rendered in the reconnaissances and in the preparation of the maps. It is not necessary that I should mention in detail the services per- formed by the gentlemen just named. Their duties were executed with energy, indnstry, and intelligence, and upon suitable occasions I have brought their conduct to the notice of the major-general commanding the Army of the Potomac, and I hope their valuable services may yet meet with the reward they deserve. In this connection I beg leave to submit herewith a copy of a letter dated June 19, 1862, addressed by me to Brig. Gen. S. Williams, assist- ant adjutant-general Army of the Potomac, recommending Lients. H. L. Abbot and N. Bowen, Topographical Engineers, for promotion by brevet, the former for highly meritorious conduct, and the latter for distinguished conduct in a reconnaissance of the Chickahoininy, made by him near New Bridge on May 24. In that letter I likewise requested that some reward mtght be conferred upon Mr. F. W. Dorr, assistant United States Coast Survey, for the valuable services he rendered in reconnaissances of the enemys positions. Besides the duties they performed under my immediate orders, Lieu- tenant-Colonel Palmer served nnder General Stoneman; Lieutenant Abbot, throughout the siege of Yorktown, under General Barnard Lieutenant Bowen under Generals Keyes and W. F. Smith, and Lieu- tenant Wagner under General lleintzelman. In the reports of those generals I have no doubt an appropriate acknowledgment of the value of the services rendered by those officers will be found. The duties of the officers associated with me were not performed with- out severe loss, and it became my painful duty to report the death of Licut. Col. XV. H. Palmer, Topographical Engineers, on June 18, of disease caused by exposure in the zealous discharge of duty, and of First Lient. Orlando G. Wagner, ~opographical Engineers, on April 21, of a wound received while examining the enemys works at Yorktowmm. In the death of Lieutenant-Colonel Palmer the corps lost a gallant and accomplished officer, devoted to its interests; in the death of Lieutenant Wagner a gallant and highly promising young officer, whose brief term of duty with the Army of the Potomac gave earnest of a distinguished future. I am sensible of the very imperfect manner in which I have complied with the request of Major-General McClellan, and regret extremely my inability at this time to present a paper more in accordance with his wishes, and exhibiting more clearly the nature amid extent of the opera- tions (and their results) of the topographical engineer department of the army commanded by him, their bearing upon the movements of that army, and their evidence of the great difficulties that army overcame. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, A. A. HUMPHItEYS, JIaj. Top. Enyrs. ~d Brig. Gem. Vols., Comdg. Third Div. Brig. Gen. H. B. MARCY, Chief of Staff of Major-General MicCicUan, New York. No. 6. Report of Col. Charles P. Kingsbury, U. S. Army, Chief Ordnance Officer. PITTSBURGH, PA., January 24, 1863. SIR: Nearly all the papers connected with my duties while serving with the Army of the Potomac were left, when I ~vas detached there Page 155 CHAP. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 155 from, to my successor. I shall have to rely, therefore, upon memory for the statement asked for in your letter of the 20th, but which I hope will convey with sufficient minuteness of detail the information desired by General McClellan. The duties referred to extended through a period of about eleven months, and my object will be to give a brief abstract of the more prominent facts pertaining theieto. The want of arms was one of the principal difficulties to be overcome in the prep- aration of the Army of the Potomac for the field. From an inadequate appreciation of the magnitude of the impending conflict, or from some other cause, no provi~ion was made at the commencement of the war for a supply of arms, except from the Springfield Armory. No en- courageinent was then offered to private manufacturers in the United States, and I believe no attempt was made to import arms until after General McClellans arrival in Washington, in the latter part of July, 1861. Indeed, I have been informed that the appropriation made near the close of the extra session of that year for the purchase of arms was on the estimate of an officer not of the Ordnance Department. Most of the arms originally furnished were the altered percussion. musket, to the reception of which there was an unconquerable aversion from almost the entire army, the objection to them being partly, per- haps, due to prejudice, but generally to their known inferiority. The alteration from flint to percussion was in many cases not well done, and from the hard usage to which they were subjected in the hands of raw troops they were so liable to become unserviceable that officers and men soon lost all confidence in them, and to a certain extent they were a prolific source of demoralization. Reports were constantly re- ceived from commanders of regiments and from military boards, con- demning them without discrimination, and not seldom expressing an unwillingness to engage the enemy with such weapons. Many of the foreign arms which were substituted for them were but little better, and after a brief trial in camp served only as a basis for the renewal of complaints. Thus experiments were going on for months in the ex- change of one suspicious musket for another of similar quality. Notwithstanding these continuous transfers and new issues [it was] about January 15, 1862, I believe, when two division commanders, by direction of the President, made an official inquiry as to the condition of their department, and whether that condition was such as to prevent an immediate advance. There were, I think, between thirty and forty regi- ments still armed with the altered musket, and others with foreign arms of perhaps inferior quality. Nor was this all. When the army left Wasbington two or three kinds or calibers of arms were often found in the same regiment, and in the entire army there were probably not less than ten varieties, and of almost as many calibers, from the man- ufactories of the United States, England, France, Belgium, Prussia, and Austria. This variety of caliber was m~ constant source of rouble and anxiety in keeping up a supply of suitable ammunition for the field, and as the wagons of the ordnance trains were not properly marked, so as to reveal their contents at a glance, extraordinary exer- tions were required to 5Upl)ly th3 troops during the movement from the Chickahominy to Harrisons Landing. Thus, with the exception of the inferior quality of a portion of the arms, and a dangerous variety of cali- bers, the iiifantry of the Army of the Potomac, I believe, took the field with an ample supply of ordnance material of unexceptional quality. The armament of the cavalry was also attended with vexation and delay, but to some extent this was due to indecision or difference of opinion among some of the officers of that branch of service. It wa Page 156 156 THE PENINSULAR. CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIII. at one time determined to abandon the carbine and convert all the mounted troops into light cavalry; but soon after taking the field this arrangement was changed, and application was made for carbines, which had but recently been condemned as an incumbrance to mounted troops. These were furnished not as fast as they were wanted, but as fast as they conld be procured from the department. The supply of field artillerysmooth bore and riflewas abundant and generally of excellent quality. At an early day I addressed a letter to General McClellan recommending that no more 6-pounders be re- ceived, and that the smooth-bore batteries be formed, as far as practi- cable, of light 12s or Napoleons. This suggestion was approved, and the army was thus liberally provided with what, perhaps, proved to be the most efficient part of our artillery. Of the ride ammunition there was some complaint, and officers were divided in opinion as to the rela- tive merits of the different kinds employed. It may be stated, how- ever, that in some instances sufficient care had not been observed in the fabrication, and that its use was attended with but little less danger to ourselves than to the enemy. After leaving Yorktown the principal depot was at the White House, and when the communications with that point were threatened several millions of cartridges for small-arms and artillery were rapidly trans- ferred from thence to the vicinity of Savage Station and what was known as Forage Station. From these temporary depots such of the troops as had exhausted their ammunition in the various and protracted conflicts of June 26 and 27 were resupplied, and were thus enabled without any lack of material, to fight and win the battles of Savage Station, White Oak Swamp, Glendale, and Malvern Hill, and when the army reached James River several steamboats laden with the re- mainder of the supplies from the White House were already at the landing. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, C. P. KINGSBURY. Brig. Gen. S. WILLIAMS, Assistant Adjutant- General, New York. No. 7. Report of Brig. Gen. Stewart Van Vliet, U. S. Army, Chief Quartermaster, of operations from July 27, 1861, to July 10, 1862. QUARTERMASTERS OFFICE Washington, August 2, 1862. GENERAL: I have the honor to submit a brief report, for the informa- tion of the general commanding, of the operations of the quartermasters department in connection with the Army of the Potomac from the com- mencement of its organization until its arrival on the banks of the James River at the termination of the sanguinary battles in front of Richmond: The general commanding arrived in Washington and assumed com- mand of the troops around that city toward the .end of July, 1861, and I was detailed by him as chief quartermaster on the 27th of the same month. But a few weeks previous to this these troops had been de- feated at Bull Run, where much of the material of the army had bee Page 157 CHAr. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 157 lost, and almost everything required in the organization of a large army had to be provided. As soon as I entered upon the discharge of my duties I commenced making preparations to collect together the vast and various supplies required by a large army. The depot for quarter- masters supplies in this city, under the able administration of Col. D. II. Rucker, of the Quartermasters Department, had to be much extended to enable me to collect the requisite material, and notwithstanding the prompt approval of my requisitions by the Chief of the Quartermasters Department, General Meigs, there were many obstacles to the successful discharge of these duties. Probably the greatest difficulties I had to encounter arose from the inexperience of the newly-appointed officers who were placed under me and of the new regiments. The first thing to be done was to provide transportation. As the difficulties of subsisting the large number of animals required by the army in Washington were very great, owing to the want of sufficient channels of communication with it,it was decided to establish a depot of transportation at some point in the rear. In consultation with the general commanding, Perryville, on the left bank of the Susquehanna, at the point where the railroad connecting Baltimore and Philadelphia crosses that stream, was selected as the most suitable place, as it could be reached both by railroad and water, and was removed from all chance of interruption by the enemy. In accordance with this decision Capt. C. C-. Sawtelle, assistant quartermaster, was ordered on the 8th of August to take post there and organize a train of 1,50 wagons. New regiments from the loyal States were now arriving in great numbers, and were immediately furnished with supplies and put in camp around Washington. Transportation, & c., were issued to them as far as possible on the war allowance. Four wagons, drawn either by four horses or mules, were allowed each full regiment, one for the medical supplies of the regiment and one for the regimental headquar- ters, making in all six wagons to a regiment, and this was substantially the regimental allowance during the campaign, varied occasionally~ however, by the exigencies of the service. Besides these wagons there were large trains organized for the transportation of subsistence~ ammunition, pontoons, & c. An immense depot for clothing, camp an& garrison equipage was likewise established in Washington, and vast amounts of these articles were hurried forward from New York and. Philadelphia. On the 19th of October the Potomac River, by which channel we had received most of our supplies, was closed by the enemys batteries From this time until the latter part of February, 1862, all the supplies, forage, subsistence, clothing, & c., required for the army, and all the supplies required for the city of Washington, were brought across the single.track railroad connecting Baltimore with Washington. The capacity of the road was taxed to its utmost, but the work was satis- factorily done. Some conception of the amount of work done may be formed when it is known that of forage alone about 400 tons were re- quired daily. In the latter part of February it was decided that the Army of the Potomac should move on Richmond by the way of the Peninsula This made it necessary to procure a large number of vessels to transfer the army to its new base, Fortress Monroe, and the procuring of these vessels was intrusted to the Hon. John Tucker, Assistant Secretary of War. Lieutenant-Colonel Ingalls, who had reported to me for duty soon after my arrival in Wasbington, and had been by me assigned as chie Page 158 158 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIII. quartermaster to the troops on the south bank of the Potomac, was ordered to report to Mr. Tucker, for the purpose of taking the imme- diate charge of the transports chartered, and to superintend the embar- kation of the troops. As the Potomac was still closed by the guns of the enemy, arrangements were made for embarking the troops at Annapolis and Baltimore. I had the wharves at the former place enlarged, and the transports had commenced to arrive when the move- meuts of the army opened the Potomac. Orders were immediately issned for the transports to rendezvous at Alexandria, and arrange- ments were pushed forward rapidly to embark the troops at that point. Everything was ready for a movement as regards the troops, but the transports, many of which were sailing vessels, could not reach Alexan- dria in sufficient numbers to move a division until the middle of March. On the 9th of March there had rendezvoused at Annapolis ten side- wheel steamers and five propellers. On the evening of March 16th or morning of the 171 h the troops com- menced embarking at Alexandria, and in abont twelve days the bulk of the Army of the Potomac, with its vast material, was transferred to the Peninsula. I had previously ordered Captain Sawtelle to break up his depot at Perryville, and to transfer the wagons, ambulances. animals, & c., to Fortress Monroe. Some two or three months previous to this I had ordered a large amount of forage to be purchased and stored in the city of New York. This had been put afloat just before the embarkation of the troops, and the vessels directed to repair to Fortress Monroe and keep their cargoes on board until further orders. In the niean time I had ordered Capt. C. W. Thomas, assistant quarter- mast& r, to Fortress Monroe to take charge of the depot to be established there for the army. As soon as everything was embarked at Alexandria I proceeded to Fortress Monroe and rejoined the general commanding, who had pre- ceded me to that place. The magnitude of the movement can scarcely be understood except by those who participated iii it. Each division took with it its own transportation as far as it was practicable and the remainder, together with the supply trains, were pushed forward as rapidly as possible. When the campaign of the Peninsula commenced the Army of the Potomac had with it 3,600 wagons and 700 ambulances and spring wagons, and this transportation remained complete until the army arrived on the banks of the James River, with the exception of ordinary losses and the loss of a few wagons by the raids of the enemy and oii the march to the James River. In transferring the army and its material, and furnishing it with supplies during the campaign, the fol- lowing number of vessels were emI)loyed, viz: 71 side-wheel steamers, 29,071 tons; 57 propellers, 9,824 tons 187 schooners, brigs, and barks, 36,634 tons, and 90 barges, 10,749 toiis, making in all 405 vessels, of a tonnage of 86,278 tons. Many of these vessels were discharged after the army was transferred to the Peninsula, but it was necessary to retain the greater number of them, as our supplies were obliged to be kept afloat to follow the advance of the army. Though Fortress Monroe was our main depot, the nature of the country and the condition of the roads rendered it impossible to haul our supplies by wagons from that point. As soon as the leading divisions of the army landed at Fortress Monroe they were pushed forward, and the enemy retii ing behind their lines, stretching from the James River to Yorktown, opened to us the York River and its tributaries as far as Yorktown, enabling us thereby to establish our depot at the mouth of Cheesemans Creek and at Shi Page 159 CHAP. XXIHJ GENERAL REPORTS. 159 Point, near the mouth of the Poquosin River, which was done on the 6th of April. I beg here to submit a copy of a letter to the Quartermaster-General (marked A), which will show the positions of these points and the diffi- culties which had to be overcome in supplying the army. These depots remained unchanged during the siege of Yorktown, but when the enemy evacuated that place they were immediately broken 111) and everything transferred by water at once to Yorktown. As the army advanced up the Peninsula our depots were successively changed from Yorktown to the south bank of York River, opposite West Point, thence to Cumberland, on the Pamunkey, and finally, on the 20th May, they were established at White House, the point where the railroad from West Point to Richmond crosses the Pamunkey River, 23 miles from Richmond Extensive wharves were at once constructed by throwing our barges and canal-boats ashore at high water and briUging them over. The rail- road bridge across the Pamunkey had been burned by the enemy, aiid the rolling stock of the road removed. From a reconnaissance in front the railroad was found to be uninjured, with the exception of two or three small bridges, which had been burned. In anticipation of mov- ing along this road toward Richmond rolling stock for the road had l)ecn purchased, and a competent force employed to work it. Working l)artics were immne(Iiately put on the road and the engines and cars landed, and in a few days the road was again in running order, and cars loaded with supplies were coustantly running to the front. The real troubles in supplying the army commenced at this point, owing to the condition of the roads, rendered almost impassable by frequent and long-continued storms. In reference to this I beg to submit copies of three reports, marked B, C, and D, made to the Quartermaster- General. At this point our large (lepots remained until the battle of Gaines Mill, the 27th of June. During this time the army was in front of Richmond, from 15 to 20 miles in advance, and all of its immense sup- l)lies were thrown forward by the railroad and the large supply trains of the army. The frequent and heavy rains, by injuring the railroad and imnl)airing the wagon roads rendered it a matter of great difficulty at times to transport the large amount of necessary material and supplies, but in no instance, I believe did our department fail in dischargimt~ time duty devolving upon it. Of forage and subsistence alone over 500 tons were daily required by the army. Adding to this the other neces- sary supplies swelled this amount to over 600 tons, which, rain or shine, had to be handled at the depots each day and forwarded to our lines. The difficulties of supplying an army of 100,000 men are not generally comprehended. Each man consunmes 3 pounds of provisions per day, and every horse 26 pounds of forage. One hundred thousand men would therefore eat up 150 wagon loads of subsistence daily, and it can therefore be readily seen that an armny of this size could leave its depots but a short distance in the rear in mnarching through a country desti- tute of sul)l)lies and depending omm carrying everything with it. The affair of Gaines Mill occurred on the 27th June. Several days previous to that date the indications were that a decisive battle would be fought, and the general commanding directed me to take the neces- sary steps to prevent the immense supplies at our depot at White House from falling into the hands of the enemy, and to have a certain amount of forage and supplies transferred to James River for the use of the army should it be found necessary to move it from the Chicka- hominy to that river. On the 23d of June I telegraphed to Colone Page 160 160 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIII. Ingalls, the quartermaster in charge of the depot at White House, as follows: I want you to designate some forage vessels which have on board about 25,000 bush- els of oats, and 10,000 bushels of corn, and 400 tons of hay to be sent immediately to James River. Between 500,000 and 600,000 rations now afloat will be designated by Captain Bell to be sent to same place. Towing power should be got ready at once. At the same time I telegraphed, by direction of the commanding-gen- eral, to Commodore Goldsborougli to convoy these vessels to the gun- boats then in James River at or near City Point. I also directed Colonel Ingalls to throw to the front by railroad and wagons (the latter to come by the way of Bottoms Bridge) all the supplies he possibly could, so as to have a sufficient amount with the army should our lines of communication be cut. On the 25th of June I again telegraphed to Colonel Ingalls as fol- lows: You will have your whole command in readiness to start at any moment. Please consult with Lieutenant Nicholson, of the Navy, to have his vessels placed in such a position that he can protect our depot. There will be no attempt to turn our flank for a day or two, but from all the information we have it is supposed that Jackson will be coming down very soon. On the 26th of June I telegraphed Colonel Ingalls as follows: Dont fail to send down into the broad river below West Point all the ves~els in the Pamunkey that are not required soon. Three or four days forage and provisions are all that should be retained afloat at White House. This is a precautionary measure entirely, but must be attended to at once. - It will be seen from this that everything had beeii carefully consid- ered, and every precaution taken to guard against our supplies falling into the hands of the enemy, should it be found necessary for the army to fal1~ back on the James River. The battle of Gaines 1~Iill rendered this movement necessary. On the evening of the (lay on which that affair occurred, in consultatioii with the general commaiiding, it was determined to put our transportation in motion for the James River with the view of saving it, and not to destroy it unless it was absolutely necessary to do so to prevent it froni falling into the hands of the enemy. Accordingly the trains were immediately started, and on the afternoon of the 29th were all safely across XVhite Oak Swamp. Final orders were also given to Colonel Ingalls to break up the depot at White House and remove it to James River. This was most satisfac- torily accomplished. All our vessels dropped down the river in safety; the rolling stock of the railroad was destroyed, and nothing was left for the enemy except the charred timbers of the White House, to which some incendiary, in positive disobedience of orders, had applied the torch. Early the next morning the traimis were again put in motion, the enemy shelling the rear, but doing little or no damage, and in the evening I had the satisfaction of seeing them parked on the banks of the James River in the vicinity of Malvern Hill. The enemy again shelled the rear of the trains at Malvern, but with little effect. In this most difficult movement every officer of our department, as far as I could ascertain, did his duty well; but I beg to call particular atten- tion to Captain Bliss, assistant quartermaster, who was at that time serving on my stalL He was continually riding along the lines, ren- dering most valuable assistance in regulating the trains and preventing unnecessary alarm among the employ~s of the department. Captains Batchelder and Norton, and Lieutenant Tolles, acting assistant qua Page 161 CnAP. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 161 termaster, were also very efficient, and rendered important service. On our arrival at James River J found that Colonel Ingalls had arrived by water with our store vessels, and stel)s were immediately taken to supply the army from Haxails Landing. After the battle of Malverii Hill, J uly 1, it was decided to move down the river to Harrisons Bar, which movement was commenced that night, and the next day found the entire army in camp at that point, with the great bulk of its trans- l)ortatioll and material, a few wagons being delayed by the muddy roads until the 3d. I cannot close this report without calling particular attention to the very valuable assistance which I received on all occasions from Col. Rufus Ingalls, the officer of the Quartermasters Department next to me in rank with the Army of the Potomac. Of indomitable energy and great resource, he was always ready and prompt in the discharge of his duty. I would beg also to recommend to favorable consideration Captain Sawtelle, assistant quartermaster, and Captain Rankin, act- ing assistant quartermaster, ~vlmo rendered most valuable assistance during the campaign of the Peninsula. Always in responsible and iml)ortant positions, they discharged their duties alike creditably to themselves and a(lvautageously to the service. I am, vcry respectfully, your obedient servant, STEWART VAN VLIET, Brigadier- General and Quartermaster. Brig. Gen. R. B. MARCY, Chief of Staff. [Iflcmo8uxe A.] CA1VIP WINFIELD SCOTT, VA., In front of Yorktown, April 28, 1862. GENERAL: With regard to the operations of our department as con- nected with this army I have the honor to report that I believe that everything is working very satisfactorily. We have had great difficul- ties to encounter, but they have been overcome, and the wants of the army have been and are supplied promptly. The best evidence of this is that there have been no complaints. Our army is stretched across the Peninsula, the right resting near Yorktown and the left near James River. All our supplies are drawn from the depots at Cheesemans Creek and Ship Point, except for a small portion of the left wing, which are obtained from Fortress Monroe. The only difficulties have arisen from the character of the country, which is nearly level and covered with a dense growth of pines. The surface of the country is sandy, resting on quicksand, and during rainy weather the roads are soon ren- dered imnpassable, empty wagons even sinking to their beds. Nearly every foot of the roads has been corduroyed. A great many of these roads have been badly made and are exceedingly rough, and the conse- quence is that the wear and tear of our transportation has been very great. Large working parties are now on them, and if we should have any more goo(l weather they will soon be much improved. I find that mules are the only animals fit for this rough service. Our horse teams suffi~r severely, amid I would recommend that hereafter no more horse teams be provided for our armies, no matter in what part of the cou:~try they may be serving, as mules are far more serviceable and economical. Our main depots are at Fortress Monroe, Cheesemans Creek, and Ship Point. I have placed Captain Sawtelle in charge of the depot at the fortress, assisted by Captain Thomas, and Colonel 11 R RVOL X Page 162 162 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIIL Ingalls in charge of that at Cheesemans Creek, assisted by Captain Rankin, acting assistant-quartermaster, Captain Pinner, brigade qn ar- termaster, and Captain Wagner, brigade quartermaster. The latter is in charge of the clothing and camp and garrison equipage. The bulk of the clothing, & c., is kept at Old Point, as I do not (lesire to accu- mulate any great amount of stores here, as it would embarrass our movements when we advance. Ship Point is at the mouth of Poquosiu Iliver, and is used exclusively as the depot for subsistence stores. Cheesernans Creek depot is about one mile to the ~vest of Ship Point, at the junction of Cheesemans and Goose Creeks, and is used fbr forage, quartermasters stores, and camp and g~irrison equipage. This depot is about four miles from headquarters, and the supplies from it have to be transported a distance of 3A- to 7 miles. There is a small depot on Back Creek, from which General F. J. Porters division is supplied, the distance of land transportation being about the same as from Cheesemans Creek. There is another small creek (Wormleys), which empties into the York River about 2.~ miles below Yorktown. This creek has 4~ feet of water, and heavy ordnance is sent into it in barges. It is, however, under the fire of the enemys guns, and can only be used at night. Yesterday one of our barges loaded with four hundred 13-inch shells was delayed until daylight, when the enemy opened fire oii the boat, and burst a 100-poumid shell in it and sunk it. The shells will be saved. 1 send you a map of the scene of our operations with the roads plainly delineated. I beg here to state that I have received the most cordial and efficient assistance from the officers of our department in charge of the depots a.t Fortress Monroe and Cheesemans Creek, and that Colonel Crosman and Major Belger, as well as Colonel Itucker, have tilled all my reqii. sitions with the greatest promptness. I feel under many obligations to them for it. I forward you herewith a copy of a circular which I have issued to the officers of our department on duty with the army. I am, very repectfully, your obedient servant, STEWART VAN VLIET, Brigadier- General and Quartermaster. General M. C. MEIGS, Quartermaster-General U. S. Army, Washington, D. 0. [Inclosure B.] WITHIN Two MILES OF CHICKAHOMINY, May 23, 1862. GENERAL: * * * Since my last communication I have estab- lished our final depot at White House, time point where the West Point Railroad crosses the Pamunkey River, 23 miles from Richmond. The army now occupies the hue of the Chicka!iominy fromim 16 to 18 miles in advance. Supplies are now hauled by laud from the depot, and owing to the nature of the roads it is about the utmost limit at which an army of this size can be supplied by wagon transportation. I trust, however, that in two days I shill have the railroad in running order, when all anxiety with regard to supplies may be dismissed. I have had all the rolling stock of the railroad or(lered to the White House instead of West Point. About twenty-five cars are now landed, and two engines will be put upon the track this evening. The bridge- builder,s and carpenters only reached the White House last evening. They are now building the two small bridges between White Hous Page 163 GENERAL REPORTS. 163 and Chickahominy which were burned by the rebels. These will be Iiiiished by to-morrow evening, when supplies can be brought on the road to within 7 miles of our extreme right wing. Our left will have to haul only about 2 miles. Only one spun of the Chickahomiiiy Bridge has been burned. The bridge across the Pamunkey and one short bridge near West Point will be rebuilt as soon as the road in front is put in running order. When that is done West Point can be made a depot also. It possesses many advantages. There is a good wharf, and 20 feet of water can be carried there, up one of the finest rivers I have ever seen. Two or three days would have beeii gained in putting the road in order had the proper vessels been forwarded from Baltimore. By some mistake the vessels which should have sailed first sailed last. I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, STEWART VA1~ VLIET, Brigadier- General and Quartermaster. General M. C. MEIGS, Quartermaster. General U. S. Army, Washington, D. C. [Inclosure C.] CAMP NEAR CHICKAHOMINY, June 5, 1862. GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 21st ultimo in regard to taking horses from the teams for artillery purposes. This is impracticable at the preseiit time, as our transportation is insufficient, owing to the very bad condi- tion of the roads. I have never seen worse roads in any part of the country. Teams cannot haul over half a load, and often empty wagons are stalled. Our loss of animals is very great. The railroad is of great assistance, but it does not allow us to dispense with our wagons, as with the exception of very few the troops are not on it. The heavy rains of yesterday have injured the railroad very materially, having wash ccl it away in several places. Heavy working parties are on it, and I hope to have it in running order again to-day. The difficulties under which our department has to labor, owing to the frequent and heavy rains and the nature of the country in which we are operating, are very great. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, STEWART VAX VLIET, Brigadier- General and Quartermaster. General M. C. MEIGS, Quartermaster-General U. S. Army, Washington, P. 0. [Inclosure D.] CAMP NEAR CIIICKAHOMINY, June 9, 1862. GENERAL: In view of the re-enforcements ordered to this army (twenty-three regiments), seven of which have already arrived, I have the honor to state that I this day telegraphed you for one hundred and fifty wagons and teams complete. This should be in addition to the transportation with McCalls division, which it is supposed he will bring with him. It now requires every means of transportation we possess, both rail and wagoii, to keep the army supplied with forage l~nd subsistence. Had we had such weather as we had reason to expec Page 164 164 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. (CHAP. XXIII. at this season of the year we should have had no difficulty whatever in supplying every want, but we have had one continued series of storms ever since we landed on the Peninsula. Notwithstanding this draw- back, however, I believe I can assert that no army of this size, under similar circumstances, or any other, has been better or more regularly sup~)lied. The railroad is in good working order from the depot on the Pamunkey to our front, though the recent heavy rains damaged it to a considerable extent. This road of course assists us vastly, though a small portion of our force only is immediately on it. Most of our suJ)plies are obUged to be transported by wagons. Our transportation as a general thing is still in fair condition, but if the rains continue we will be injured very materially. It is often the case that empty wagons stall, and no teams can ever haul more than 1,000 pounds. Caseys division lost a few wagons in the recent battle but nothing to embarrass us. It lost, however, all of its shelter-tents, knapsacks, canteens, & c. These articles are being replaced from the White House depot. The railroad bridge across the Pamunkey is being rebuilt, and could be finished in a few days, but I am delaying it, as we want for the l)resent the river above the bridge, as we have a forage station at Garlicks Landing for the right wing of the army. The moment the army crosses the Chickahominy the road can be put in running order to West Point, if we desire to use it. At present the depot at White House answers our wants. When we get possession of Richmond our supplies, a portion at least, can come by Fredericksburg and the James River, though the latter river will be rather unsafe unless we clear the southern bank of gaerrillas, which can be easily done. I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, STEWART VAN VLIET, Brigadier- General and Quartermaster. General M. C. MEIGS, Quartermaster-General U. S. Army, Washington, D. (ii. No. 8. Report of Brig. Gen. Rufus ingalls, Chief Quartermaster, of the operations from Augwst, 1861, to September 2, 1862. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, OFFICE OF CHIEF QUARTERMASTER, Camp near Falmouth, Va., February 17, 1863. GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 20th ultimo, asking for a report of the ow rations of the quartermaster~s department from the time I succeeded General Van Vliet to the date of transfer of the command by General McClellan.* I desire to state that I have been connected with this army from its first organization; that I was chief quartermaster on the south side of the Potomac while our forces were in front of Washington until Maich last, when I took charge at Alexandria of the embarkation of the army to the Peninsula; that I followed it there and established successively * So much of this report as relates to operations subsequent to September 2 will appear in the reports covering operations of the Army of the Potomac from Septem- ber 2 to November 9, 1862. See Series I, Vol. XIX Page 165 CH~ XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 165 depots of supply, first at Fortress Monroe, afterwards at Cheesemans Creek, Yorktown, Worm1ey~, and Queens Creeks, Franklins Lauding, opposite West Point, Eltham, Cumberland, and White House, on the York and Pamunkey Rivers, and Harrisons Landing, on the James. It is presumed that my predecessors report will explain the methods and principles on which the quartermasters department was organized. Operations so extensive and important as the rapid and successful em- barkation of such an army, with all its vast equipments, its transfer to the Peninsula, and its supply while there, under its many vicissitudes, had scarcely any parallel in history, certainly no precedent in our coui~- try. Several of our depots had to be established under many enibar- rassrnents. At Cheesemans Creek the harbor was exceedingly small, the channel was narrow, and the water at low tide was very shallow. The roads leading to Yorktown were fearfully muddy and full of quicksand. Still the army was mainly supplied from that point until the evacuation of Yorktown. Wharves were constructed of canal-boats and barges, vessels towed in and out at flood tides, the roads were cor- duroyed, and the depot was made quite equal to meet all requirements. The depot at White House was made very perfect and efficient. Ten or twelve barge wharves were constructed for use of the various staff~ departments. The railroad was put in thorough repair, and the army on the Chickahominy was kept well supplied. On the 28th of June, in execution of orders previously given by General McClellan, instructing me what to do in certain contingencies, I abandoned the White House depot, leaving no public property be- hind of any value or use. At the moment of depat ture the rebels had possession of our railroad, had cut our communications with the army, and were in march to the Pamunkey. I succeeded in removing all the transports (over four hundred) from that narrow and tortuous river without accident or delay, and conducted them immediately to Fortress Monroe, thence up James River, to meet the army on its arrival. I reached Haxalls on the evening of the 30th, some two hours before the general commanding, to whom I reported my arrival with the supplies. it was decided to take up a position on the left bank of the James a short distance below the mouth of the Appomattox, consequently on the 1st of July I established the depot at Harrisons Landing. It seems almost a miracle, our successful escape from White House. Had our vessels got entangled on the bar at Cumberland, had the enemy inter- rupted our passage at some of the narrow bends, the consequences to the army would have been fatal. My safe exit from York and prompt arrival on James River was most singularly opportune and providential, and I count these days of service from the 28th June to the 1st July, 1862, as the most important and valuable of my life. On the 10th of July following I was announced the chief quarter- master in place of General Van Vliet, who retired at his own request, and who while with this army rendered arduous and responsible service, amid from whom I parted with sincere regret. The battles before Rich- inond during the latter part of June rendered a reorganization of the quartermasters department necessary. Inspections were immediately made, and reports obtained of all means of transportation, clothing, and forage on hand with the troops, and prompt measures were adopted at once to supply all deficiencies and necessary wants. It appears from my records that on the 20th following there were present with the army about 3,100 wagons for baggage and supplies, 350 ambulances, 7,000 cavalry, 5,000 artillery, and 5,000 team horses and 8,000 mules. Upon the river was a large fleet of transports, having on board an abundanc Page 166 [CHAP. XXIII. 166 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. of supplies of all kinds. The army was then perfectly equipped so far as I observed, and. was in condition, excel)t in point of numbersof which I was not the judgeto move forward. The withdrawal of the army having been ordered early in August, I)reparatlons were perfected to secure our trains from attack by the enemy while evacuating the place and at same time from obstrueting the 1)assage of our troops. One corps having been thrown across the Chickahominy near its mouth over a pontoon bridge of some 2,000 t~et iii length, the supply trains were then driven over without delay, and sent forward rapidly on the roads to Yorktown and Fortress Monroe. After having given all proper orders in regard to the breaking up of the depot I left with the general commanding, and supervised the withdrawal of the trains. The march was conducted with great order and celerity, without the loss or abandonment of any public property of any further use. The fleet of transports was conducted to Fortress Monroe by Lieut. Col. C. G. Sawtehle, assistant quarterniaster, in a most skillful and successful manner. This officer broke up the depot at II arrisons Landing on the morning of the 16th of August, the same day the general commanding left by land and moved toward the Chick- aliominy. Colonel Sawtelle performed this duty with marked ability, and rendered most valuable assistaiice in the evacuation of White House, and constantly since to the present time. On arrival at Yorktown and Fortress Monroe the troops were em- barked as rapidly as our means of water transportation would allow for Aqnia and Alexandria, in order to unite with the forces under General Pope. The cavalry and means of land transportation were the last to be shipped. Much of the cavalry did not arrive until after Pope had fallen back on the defenses and had been relieved in command. Many of the baggage trains were still behind, and did not come up until this army was reor~anize. General i~iiazi after and I by Popes re~erss, had reached the Antietani. Great exertions were required and made to supply the army on its march in the Maryland campaign. * * * * * * * I am, general, very respectfully, your most obedient servant, RUFUS INGALLS, Chief Quartermaster Army of the Potomac. Brig. Gen. B. B. MARCY, Chief of Staff Major-General McClellan, New York City. No. 9. Report of Cot. Henry F. Clarke, U. S. Army, Chief Commissary of Sub sistence, of operations from August 1, 1861, to November 9, 1862. OFFICE CHIEF COMMISSARY SUBSISTENCE, ARMY POTOMAC, Camp near Falmouth. Va., February 1, 1863. GENERAL: In compliance with the request communicated to me in your letter of the 20th ultimo I have the honor to furnish the following report of the operations of the subsistence department pertaining to the Army of the Potomac during the period I served on the staff of Major-General McClellamm as chief commissary of that army: I joined the staff of General McClellan August 1, 1861, at Wash- ington, D. C. While the Army of the Potomac was in the vicinity o Page 167 CHAP. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 167 that city it was amply supplied with subsistence from the depots estab- lished by the department at the city, Alexandria., and Forts Runvon and Corcoran. Commissaries of subsistence of the volunteer service reporting for duty with this army were, with their clerks, first sent to the depot at Alexandria, Va., for instruction, and afterwards assigned to brigades. Much attention was given to them by the officers in charge of the depot, and great good has resulted to the service from this system, which is yet continued in all l)racticable cases. To be prepared for the probable future movements of the army, in Febrnary of last year more than 600,000 corn plete rations were loaded on six propellers at New York and sent to Alexandria., Va., to be in readiness to accompany the troop transj)orts when they shonid sail. These stores were intended for immediate issue to the several com- mands at their points of landing. In addition to the stores just named 2,500,000 complete rations were loaded on vessels at New York and sent to Fort Monroe, Va., to await further orders. About the middle of March, so soon as the movement of the army to the Peninsula was determined upon, a large quantity of subsistence stores was dispatched from Washington by steamers and barges in tow of steamers to Fort Monroe, Va. The stores in the steamers were to supply the additional demands that would be made for rations at that post. The barges with their cargoes were to be towed, as the army advanced up the Peninsula, to points of landing on the Chesapeake Bay and the York mmd Pamunkey Rivers the most convenient for issuing stores, and which might be accessible only by vessels of light draught. During the period of l)reparation beef cattle were shipped from Baltimore and New York to Fort Monroe, and kept in depot at the latter place for the future use of the Army of the Potomac. In the desire to be prepared for any emergency Capt. (now Lient. Col.) George Bell, commissary of subsistence, U. S. Army, was relieved from the charge of the depot at Alexandria, and directed to make arrangements to establish depots on short notice at any points at the terminus of water transportation that might thereafter be designated. How well he complied with those directions will appear in the course of this report. Orders were issued that each command in embarking should carry with it not less than six days rations, at least three days of them to be cooked and in the haversacks of the men. On the 18th day of March, 1862, the first troops (a division of lleintzelmans corps) left Alexandria for Fort Monroe, and other portions of the army followed as fast as transports were furnished. March 23 Captain Bell, accom- panied by Capt. (now Lieut. Col.) A. P. Porter, commissary of subsist- ence, U. S. Army, and a large force of clerks and laborers, left Wash- ington for Fort Monroe, and arrived at the latter place the next day, having under his control the six propellers laden with subsistence stores. While at Fort Monroefrom March 24 to April 5Captain Bell and party assisted Capt. (now Lient. Col.) J. McL. Taylor, coin- missary of subsistence, U. S. Army, depot commissary, in issuing sub- sistence to the troops as they arrived and were established in camps in the vicinity of that l)ost at Hampton and Newport News and in discharging vessels laden with subsistence stores. The army having advanced to the vicinity of Yorktown, Captain Bell was directed to establish a depot at Ship Point, Poquosin River. He arrived with his party and a number of vessels laden with subsistence stores at the place designated on the evening of April 5. On the 6th a wharf was constructed with barges and plank obtained from th Page 168 168 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIIL platforms left by the enemy in the small work on that point. At this time and during the stay of his command in the vicinity General 0. 0. iloward rendered important assistance. April 7 a large amount of stores was issued, all commands making application for them being supplied. While the army remained in front of Yorktown it was principally supplied with subsistence stores from this depot. On account of the badness of the roads and their location some few of the commands at first sent their wagons to Fort Monroe for rations. The quartermasters department could give but little assistance in the way of force to lighter and discharge vessels laden with subsistence stores, and our department was obliged to render that and other service, besides performing its own legitimate duties. Fortunately our foresight had caused us to be prepared in a good degree for the emergency. Three (lays rations could be issued at one time to each command, which was more than the execrable roads would permit the limited number of wagons to transport. As required, beef cattle were driven from the corral at Fort Monroe to the vicinity of the army, and by Capt. E. M. Buchanan, commissary of subsistemice of vol- unteers, issuing commissary of subsistence at headquarters, distributed to the several commands. May 5 the depot at Ship Point was broken up, and a few hours afterwards established at Yorktown, where the issuing immediately commenced. On the 8th 90000 rations of meat and bread were sent to the army near Wilhiamsburg, to meet any urgent demands after the battle, the quartermasters department promptly furnishing the transportation. The same day with much difficulty, on account of the shallowness of the water, a depot was opened at Queens Creek, about 12 miles above Yorktown. It was soon removed to Biglers Wharf, 5 miles farther up York River. May 11, Capt. H. K. Thatcher, Fourteenth United States Infantry, acting commissary of subsistence, left Fort Monroe in charge of a large herd of beef cattle to overtake the army, and all vessels coming from Washington with beef cattle were thereafter directed to proceed with their cargoes to the depots to be established on the Pamunkey River. Following up the advance of the army, on the 10th of May Captain Porter established a depot at Eltham, on the Pamunkey River, 5 miles above its mouth, where a large amount of stores was issued. He was joined the next day by Captain Bell with his force and a number of supply vessels from below. Capt. E. W. Coffin, commissary of subsistence, volunteer service, was left in charge of the permanent depot at Yorktown. Leaving Capt. B. Granger, commissary of subsistence, volunteer service, in charge of sufficient stores to supply the rear divisions of the army yet to pass near Eltham, on the 13th of May Captain Bell l)roceeded to Cumberland Landing. He arrived there with his party and a number of supply vessels, established a depot the same day, and was ready to meet any demands for rations. On the 14th stores were sent to the White flouse for the advance guard of the army, under General Stone- man, and to establish a depot there. The next day Captain Porter went up with a force and took charge. On the 19th, Captain Bell broke up the depot at Cumberland Landing, and taking with him all the barges and schooners he had the means of towing, l)rocee(led to the White House. By means of trestles, made of lumber obtained at York- town, besides lumber that we had on hand, and barges, a good wharf ~was immediately constructed at this point. Immense quantities o Page 169 ChAP. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 169 stores were unloaded here and shipped by wagons and railroad to the front. As soon as the York River Railroad was put in operation, May25, Qtptaiii Granger was directed to select a suitable point near the Chick- ahominy River and establish a depot. Dispatch Station, about 1 mile from that river, was selected as being the most convenient for issuing stores, as well as on account of the roads leading to it from the positions occupied by the army. May 27 Capt. Thomas Wilson, commissary of subsistence, IT. S. Army, who joined at the White House on the 18th of that month and rendered valuable assistance there, established a depot at Savage Station, on the railroad, about 3 miles beyond the Chickahominy River, to supply those l)ortions of the army in that vicinity. May 30 Captain Wilson left the depot at Savage Station in charge of Capt. 11. Holmes, commissary of subsistence, volunteer service, and June 3 established a depot at Orchard Station, near Fair Oaks, about miles from Richmond. From this depot the advance troops of the army were supplied. Owing to the limited railroad transportation and the impracticable condition of the roads, the stores first seiit to the depots in front and supplied from them were chiefly the necessary articles of the ration salt meats, hard bread, coffee, tea, sugar, and salt; but after a supply had accumulated which would admit of the cars bringing the complete ration the other less essential articles were regularly received and issued, as well as antiscorbutics in large quantities. Capt. J. 1~. Woodward, commissary of subsistence, volunteer service, arrived at Eltham May 11, and superintended the landing of beef cattle from vessels at that point, and with his party took charge of them. On the 14th he marched with the cattle so received for Cumberlaud Land- ing, arrived there the next day, and reached the White House on the 16th, where a large corral was established for the receipt and issue of beef cattle. May 20 Captain Thatcher arrived at the White House with his large herd of beef cattle from Fort Monroe, and turned it over to Captain Woodward. On the march, though encoul)tering many difficulties, Captain Thatcher conducted his herd successfully and in the most sat- isfactory manner. From the corral from time to time a sufficient num- ber of beef cattle were driven forward to supply the army, and were distributed to the different commands by Captain Buchanan. June 18, in compliance with instructions given to me by the com- inanding general, Captain Bell proceeded to Yorktown, selected vessels containing 800,000 rations, and had them forwarded to near City Point, on the James River, where they were placed, under protection of the gunboats, to await further orders. June 26 Captain Bell was directed to continue sending hard bread and other important articles of the ration to the front during the day and night, and then to reship all he could of the large amount of stores on shore. At the same time lie was ordered to be prepared, in the event of the approach of the enemy in considerable force, to destroy all the subsistence stores not reshipped, and then to proceed to Fort Monroe where he would find further orders. Captain Woodward was directed to proceed at once to the vicinity of Savage Station with all the beef cattle then at the XVhite House. The same day Captain Granger was directed to break up the depot at Dispatch Station, and to send the stores as fast as possible to Savage Station. After supplying the h~pitals in that vicinity with rations he succeeded in removing hi Page 170 170 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAiGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIII. stores to the place indicated without any loss whatever. Captain Wood- w~r(l started early next morning, the 27th, with his herd, keeping well to the left of our lines. By taking the road via Baltimore Cross Roads and Bottoms Bridge at 10 a. m. he reached the place designate(l. Jnne 28 instructions ~vere sent to Cal)taiu Bell to at once destroy all subsistence stores at the White House not then r~shipped, and to pro- ceed with his party and supply vessels via Fort Monroe up tb.e James River to the vicinity of City Point. Oving to telegraphic cominunica- tion having beeii cut off by the enemy these instructions (11(1 not reach him, but, acting on previous directions, and with his never-failing good judgment and energy, he accomnl)lished the work at the right time. At 2.:30 p. m. on the 28th General Stonemans command retired to the White house, and General Casey, with the guard, commenced embarking. The property of the quartermasters departirment was soon in flames. Further delay being deemed unsafe and unnecessary, at 4.30 P. in. fire was set to the subsistence stores yet on shore, and as previous I)repa- ration had been made, their destruction was complete. Owing to the large amount of subsistence stores on shore, the difficulty of getting vessels on short notice for their reshipment, and the necessity of comi- tinning to send certain supplies to the army in front so long as the communication by railroad remained open, it was iml)ossible to have saved the large amount of stores destroyed at the White House. Captain Bell and party left the White House at 5.30 p. m. on that day for Fort Monroe, having previously sent all the supply vessels in that direction. The same (lay instructions were gil-en to Captain Wilson to issue rations freely to all the troops calhing for them, and not to stand upon the usual forms; to regulate his inovemnemits by those of Gemmeral Sumners comlnan(1, an(l, previous to abandoning the depot at Orchard Station, to destroy all subsistence stores there that wOul(l otherwise fall imito the hammds of the enemy. Similar instructiomis were given to Captain Holmes relative to the depot at Savage Station. Thme bospital near by was well sul)plied with rations. Previous orders had been given that the mens haversacks an(l all the wagoims possible slIOnl(l be filled and haden with the principal articles of the ration. On the 29th, the armny having commenced the movement to change its base to the James River, the subsistence stores then at the two depots last named were effectually destroyed. The parties that had been in charge of them joined the army, and reported for duty on the march and on our arrival at the James River. Captain Granger was placed in charge of a train of wagons, laden with subsistence stores, to relieve as far as possible any troops rummnimmg short omi the march. He con- (lucted time train, overcoming many difficulties, and issued the stores to the troops holdimm g Malvern Hill. June 29 Captain Woodward, as directed, moved his herd of beef cattle, then numbering 2,518 head, on the i-oad leading to the James River via White Oak Swamp. The next mnorning cathy he crossed the swamp and grazed his cattle not far beyond during the day. At (laylight on the 30th he continued the march, and at 10 a. m. took a by-road, which being free from obstructions, he reached the James River at 3 p. m. No beef cattle were lost on this mnarch, which fact, con- sidem-ing the number in the herd, that time roads for much of the dis- tance were narrow and skirted on either side by thick woods, and were crowded with trool)s and wagons, certainly reflects great credit on Captain Woodward, Johmm ONeil, the chief herder, and upon the em- ploy~s in care of the cattle. During the night of the 30th all the supplies in the train attached t Page 171 Ciiir. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 171 headquarters were sent from ilaxalls Landing to the troops at Malvern Hill. It was now necessary to have stores brought to the nearest ac- cessible points on the James River with the least possible delay. By arrangement of the commanding general with Capt. John Rodgers, U. S. Navy, commanding the naval force in that vicinity, early on the morning of July 1 I went on board of the gunboat Maratauza, corn- inanded by Commander Thomas H. Stevens, U. S. Navy, and was taken to near Harrisons Landing, where the supply vessels previously sent from Yorktown to meet an emergency, the steamer J. R. Spauld- ing, laden with subsistence stores, and some other vessels were at anchor, all under the protection of gunboats. As directed, the J. H. Spaulding at once proceeded to Carters Land- ing, where Captain Wilson, corn missary of subsistence, U. S. Army, was in waiting with a party, and immediately commenced discharging her. Two of the schooners were the same morning towed to ilaxalls Landing, the Maratanza convoying them. Captain Granger was soon ready with a party at that place, and commenced to discharge and issue the stores. It having been determined that the army should take position during the night of July 1 at Harrisons Landing, on the evening of that day most of the stores discharged at Carters Landing were reloaded, and the steamer proceeded to that vicinity. Stores were issued at Haxalls until 11 p. in., when most of those remaining on shore were reshipped. At both places a good supply of rations was left for the wounded and sick. Early the next morning the two schooners were towed by the gunboats to Harrisons Landing. Capt. G. Bell, commissary of subsistence, U. S. Army, arrived with his su~)ply vessels and entire party at Harrisons Landing on the even- ing of July 1, and on the morning of the 2d commenced discharging and issuing stores to supply all pressing wants. The Long Wharf was then the only place of landing, and only vessels of medium draught could get to the head of it. Under the circumstances it was impossible to fully supply the army from that point. On the 3d we obtained possession of the wharf at Westover, where we had greater facilities for discharging and issuing stores than at any l)revious landing. The herd of beef cattle was driven durimig the after- noon of the 1st and morning of July 2 to the vicinity of Harrisons Landing, where there was plenty of good feed and water. During the stay of the army here, from July 2 to August 15, it, was abundantly supplied with subsistence. Our stores were principally received from New York and Washington. All the beef cattle came from the latter place iii steamers, and in schooners in tow of steamers, arranged for the pur- pose. As soon as arrangements could be made fresh vegetables imi large quantities were received from New York, Baltimore, and Norfolk, and soft bread from the latter place and Fort Monroe, and issued as equally as possible to the several commands. Dried apples and peaches and desiccated vegetables were issued continuously from the first Large quantities of fresh vegetables here, as at the White House, were spoiled. Just before leaving Westover two vessels were loaded with dried fruit alone, which we had on shore for issue. The army commenced the march for Yorktowmm and Fort Monroe Au- gust 14, each command having been (hirected to carry with it at least eight days rations. Early on the morning of the 15th the herd of beef cattle, under Captain Woodward, started for Yorktown via the vontoon bridge over the Chickahominy River. and arrived in that vicinity on the 17th Page 172 172 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAr. XXIIL On the evening of the 15th, under the direction of Captain Bell, the depot at Westover was broken up, and the supply vessels yet there proceeded to Fort Monroe, the propellers taking the sail vessels and barges in tow. Many of our vessels had previously been sent down the river by the quartermasters department. For some time we had had from fifty to sixty days rations for the entire army, ashore and afloat, at Westover. Captain Bell arrived at Fort Monroe on the 16th, and assisted Captain Taylor in discharging vessels and arranging for issuing to the troops on their arrival from above. On the 18th Capt. A. P. Porter proceeded with a party and several vessels laden with subsistence to Yorktown, where he assisted Capt. E. W. Coffin, the depot commissary of subsistence at that place, in landing stores to supply any wants of the troops passing and to em- bark at that point. On the 21st Lient. Col. G. Bell (promoted from captain) left Fort Monroe and arrived at Aquia Creek the next day. Lient. Col. A. P. Porter (promoted from captain) arrived at same Place the next day from Yorktown. At Aquia Creek every possible assistance was given to the officers of the department on duty there in discharging stores and sending them to the front. On the 28th Lieutenant-Colonel Bell, with his party and a number of supply vessels, arrived at Alexandria. August 30 Capt. B. Granger was placed in charge of a supply train of seventy-five wagons for General Popes army, with orders to l)roceed to Manassas. He arrived at Ceutreville while that army was engaged in the second battle of Bull iRun. He turned over most of his stores to Capt. A. S. Austin, commissary of General Hookers division. The brigades of Generals Newton and Hancock were also supplied at Cen. treville. September 1 Captain Wilson was sent to Fairfax Station, on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, to take charge of the depot previously established at that place for the purpose of supplying the troops of General Popes army. On the afternoon of the 2d he received orders from Col. E. G. Beckwith, chief commissary of subsistence of that army, to issue stores to all who required them, but load up the cars with the greatest dispatch, and when loaded go tQ Alexandria. Cap. tam Wilsou complied with his instructions to the satisfaction of all con- cerned. Entering upon the Maryland campaign September 8, accompanied by Captain Wilson, I joined the commanding general at Rockville, Md. Each command previous to taking up the march had beeii directed to carry with it as many days rations as possible in the wagons and mens haversacks. On the 10th Lient. Col. A. P. Porter, assisted by Capt. B. Granger, established a depot for the issue of rations at Rockville. A herd of beef cattle, in charge of Capt. W. It. Murphy, commissary of subsistence of volunteers, had been previously sent to that vicinity. Several canal barges laden with subsistence stores arrived at Seneca Creek from Washington in the night of the 10th, and Capt. W. H. Douglass, com- missary of subsistence of volunteers, was placed in charge, to issue to all commands that could be best supplied from that point. To meet the wants of the army as it advanced, on the 12th the Com- missary-General was requested to have 600,000 rations of the principal articles forwarded at the earliest moment possible to Frederick City, or as near to that place as they could be transported by railroad. The same day Lieutenant-Colonel Porter, leaving Lieut. Wi~liain B. Kim. ball, Thirteenth Regiment Massachusetts Volunteers, in charge of th Page 173 ChAr. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 173 stores at iRockville, with Captain Granger and his force of clerks and laborers, returned to Washington, and as soon as the arrangements were perfected there and in Baltimore proceeded, via the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, for the purpose of establishing a depot at the most ad- vanced point practicable in our possession. On the 14th the stores ordered forward by the Commissary-General commenced arriving at the Monocacy River. The railroad bridge at that place having been destroyed by the enemy the cars could l)1oceed no further, and a depot was established there, from which the army was mostly supplied until after the battle of Antietam. The wagons of the different commands used for the purpose in charge of the coin- missaries transported the stores to the points in front where required, and when empiled returned to the depot for further supplies. Some wagon trains, laden with the articles of stores most needed, were (lis- patched directly from Washington, one of which, in charge of Capt. A. C. Voris, com Inissary of subsistence of volunteers, was well conducted, and arrived opportunely. Captain Wilson was sent to take temporary charge of the depot at the Monocacy River. lie succeeded, under many difficulties, during the evening and night of the 14th, in supply- ing the demands for rations, and was relieved early the next mqrning by Lieutenant-Colonel Porter, and rejoined me at headquarters. Leaving the vicinity of Rockville on the 12th, Captain Murphy, with his herd of beef cattle, followed closely the advance of the army during the campaign, and issued to the commissaries of the different com- mands as required. Capt. J. II. Woodward left Washington the same day with a large herd of beef cattle. After arriving in the vicinity of the army, during the march he kept sufficiently near, and from time to time issued cattle to Captain Murphy, so that the herd of the latter might be kept full enough in numbers to supply the daily wants of the army in that article. Captain Woodward obtained supplies of beef cattle from Washington by sending back on the road to meet and bring forward the different herds started from that place for him. Soon after the battles of South Mountain and Antietam there were as many as twenty-two hospitals for the wounded and sick at Frederick City. Lient. G. T. Castle (now captain and commissary of subsistence, volunteer service) was acting commissary for them an satisfaction to all concerned. , d gave entire Subsequently, on September 17, many of the hospitals established in the vicinity for the wounded and sick were supplied by Capt. J. H. Coxe, commissary of subsistence, volunteer service, issuing coin mis- sary of subsistence at headquarters, arid Captain Buchanan was left near Sharpsburg in charge of a depot for their future supply. September 21 a subsistence depot was established at Hagerstown, Md., by Capt. W. II. Bell, commissary of subsistence, U. S. Army, assisted by Capt. J. A. Doyle, comnmissary of subsistence, volunteer service. For some time there was much delay in the transportation of stores over the raiJroad from Washington and Baltimore to this place. The officers in charge of the depot, however, did all in their power to comply with all requisitions for supplies. On the 24th Captain Wilson was directed to establish a depot at Sandy Hook, Md. The following day his depot was in full working order, and a large amount of suI)l)lies was issued to the troops. The railroad bridge over the Potomac River having been rebuilt October 8, Captain Wilson, leaving Capt. J. C. Read, commissary of subsistence, volunteer service, in charge at Sandy Hook, established a depot at Harpers Feriy. The different commands of the army of course dre Page 174 174 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAr. XXIIL supplies from the depots most convenient to them. To be fully pre- pared to supply the army with stores for the Virginia campaign, the depot at Sandy Hook was broken up on the 25th October and re-estab- lished the same day, under Capt. J. C. Read, at Berlin. A large por. tion of the army crossed the Potomac at this l)oint, the remain(ler cross- ing at Harpers Ferry. As soon as the troops commenced cr3ssing the river a depot was established at Lovettsville, Va., and Lient. G. W. Chandler, E iglith Michigan Volunteers, acting commissary of subsistence, placed in charge. Captain Wilson, having previously been relieved from duty at Harpers Ferry, and directed to proceed to Alexandria for the pur. pose, left the latter place with his force of clerks and laborers and a train of cars laden with subsistence stores November 3, and the same day established a principal depot at Manassas, from which to establish sub-depots for supplying the army when it shonld come sufficiently near the lines of railroad on its march from Berlin toward Warren- ton, Va. November 6 Captain Wilson opened a depot at Thoroughfare Gap. He closed it the same day, and the next day established depots at White Plains and Salem. The grade of the railroad being heavy, and the trabek in bad condition, it was impossible to transport. more than a limited amount of stores to the depots just named. That any reached them in season was mainly due to the energy and perseverance of Cap- tain Wilson and his assistants. They were broken up, and the giand depot established at Gainesville on the 8th, from which point and Manassas (the stores being forwarded promptly by railroad from the depot at Alexandria) the army was supplied until depots were estab- lished at Warrenton and Warrenton Junction, November 10 and 11. Lieutenant-Colonel Porter was left in charge of all the subsistence (le- pots on the line of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. As soon as the troops had advanced into Virginia and ceased to draw stores from Lovettsville and Berlin, in compliance with directions given him lie had the stores then remaining at those depots removed to Harpers Ferry, and, in addition, sent from Frederick City sufficient to make an aggregate of 600,000 rations at the former place. Leaving at Frederick City a months supply for the troops and hos- l)itals there and in that vicinity, the balaice of the stores were reshipped trom that depot to Alexandria. Lieutenant-Colonel Porter also pre- l)ared with his party to proceed to the same h)lace, to be in readiness for further duty with the army. Captains Woodward and Murphy, with their herds of beef cattle, followed closely the army into Virginia, having the same relation to the troops and to each other that they had in the campaign of Maryland. November 2 a large herd of beef cattle, held in readiness on the south side of the Potomac, moved forward in charge of Capt. M. R. Came, commissary of subsistence of volunteers, in the direction of Manassas and Gainesville to meet the army. It arrived in good season, and other herds were subsequently received in a like manner. During the Maryland campaign and the march of the army into Vir- ginia the department had to depend altogether upon its own resources to unload and reload its stores at the depots and to perform other necessary duties foreign to it. Major-General McClellan was relieved from the command of the Army of the Potomac at Rectortown, Va., November 7, 1862. Throughout the campaigns of the Peninsula, Maryland, and Virginia, no complaint of moment against the subsistence department reache Page 175 ChAr. XXIII.J GENEEAL REPORTS. 1 t~i~ my ear, and I believe it gave general satisfaction to the army, the Gov- ernment, and to the country. The following are the numbers and classes of vessels laden with sub- sistence stores discharged by the laborers of the subsistence depart- inent while on the Peninsula. More than nine-tenths of them had entire cargoes: Class. a ~ ~ ~ ~ i Ships, barks, brigs, and schooners 7 46 54 28 8 143 Steamers 3 2 6 33 19 03 Propellers 13 23 21 22 13 92 Barges and canal-boats 10 28 2 1 .. -. 41 Total. ~ 8~ 84~ ~ 339 This includes two large ships, and many barks, brigs, schooners, aiid prol)ellers of the largest size. Besides, we loaded a Ilulnber of vessels of diikrent classes ~vith supplies in changing depots from OlLC l)Iace to another. in some cases we were colnpelled to lighter vessels as fir distant as 35 miles from the depot. One hundred and twenty-two ves- sels with subsistence stores inteiided for this army and sent to the Peninsula were afterward discharged at Alexandria. There was not a vessel consigned for the subsistence department of this army while it was on the Peninsula that has not been satisfactorily traced np and accounted for. Tile steam-hoisting arrangement on a barge for discharging vessels, furmiished by the Quartermasters Department ~n oar recoi inendation, enabled us to gain both in time and labor arid successfully lneet any urgent demands for stores. It proved invaluable, and was true economy to the Government. The sheet-iron ovens furnished by the department and used by sev- eral of the colulnands at Harrisons Lauding proved a decided success. But little of the large supply of extract of coffee sent to us was issued, the trooI)s as a general thing preferring to do without coffk~e altogethler than to use it. The ration of it was too small by one-half, and it was believed to produce diarrhea. The following suggestions and remarks may be of value in future operations: When salt beef or pork is for immediate use a reduction for wagon transportation of 56 l)OlindS per barrel can be made by cutting the heads ~f the barrels in such a manner as to allow the brine to escape. If each brigade commissary were provided with a wagon containing a box to fit the entire inside of it, divided off into a sufficient number of compartments for beans, rice, coffee, sugar, salt, and weights and measures, keeping them constantly full, the heavy loss by broken l)aclt- ages would be avoided and the convenience be great. A wagon could be retaine(1 for the purpose, or the box be removed when in a l)erllRI- nent camp and again replaced when necessary to move. When movements are made similar to those of the Peninsular CaIn- paigil it would be advailtageous to have a boat fitted up with cooking arrangememits for supplying sniall detachments of troops with a meal ilnmQdiately on their landing. The reduction of the ration to its old standard for field service, allow- ing, in addition to it, the present issues of fresh vegetables, would fur Page 176 176 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. (CHAr. XXIII. nish the troops while on that service with quite as much food as they use, and be a source of saving to the Government. The success of the subsistence department of the Army of the Poto- mac is attributable to the following circumstances: The department at Washington made ample previous provision for sending supplies to the Peninsula, and subsequently promptly corn- plied with all the requisitions and requests made of it for this arniv (lulling that and the Maryland and Virginia campaigns. It moreover oave its a(lvice and countenance to the officers charged with its duties b an(l reputation in the ~Cl(l, and those officers worked together in per- fect harmony for the plll)lic good. From first to last the commanding general had entire confidence in the (lisposition and ability of the do- l)artmcllt to accolni)lish all that would be require(l of it. The miumber and efficiency of the officers kept on depot (luty and of the em~)loyes engaged, besides our dependence uI)oil ourselves iii all matters whether legitimately belonging to our department or not, mate- rially con(lnced to our success. During the Peninsular Campaign we assumed control over all vessels laden with subsistence stores, and kept in reserve for emergencies several propellers so laden, using them be- sides for towing purposes when required. In very many cases the otli- cers of the (lepartment superintended in person and gave all necessary orders for making up tows and cliamiging the location of vessels from one depot to ammother. The valuable services rendered to this army by Col. Amos l3eckwith, aide-dc-camp and commissary of subsistence, U. ~. Army, depot commissary at Washington, D - C., from the comnmeiic~- ment of the war, cannot be estimated. He gave his advice and assist- ance in fitting out our expeditions, and subsequently forwarded most promptly beef cattle and other supplies for the army. He has been un- tiring in the performance of his arduous duties, and never once Ihiled us. The name of Capt. George Bell, commissary of subsistence, U. S. Army (now lieutenant-colonel), appears frequently iii this report, and always connected with highly important duties. lie was charged with establishing depots on the Peninsula and with their administration. Previous to leaving Washington in March of last year he provided a large force of clerks and employ~s, and otherwise fitted himself out with such admirable foresight that he was prepared forevery emergency, and on the first occasion, amid ever thereafter, accomplished much more miecessary ~vork than properly pertained, to the department at the dif ferent depots. His duties were constant, of the greatest momnent, alm(l laborious yet he ever performed them at the proper time and imi the right way. The services of Capt. A. P. Porter, commissary of subsist- ence, U. S. Army (now lieutenant colonel), were highly imuportant. For more than two months after the commencement of the Peninsuhir Campaign he was the only officer immediately assisting Captain Bell in his various duties, and ably did he sustain him. He gave his at- tention and assistance in constrimeting temporary wharves at the dif- ferent points of landing, in establishing depots, discharging vessels~ in supplying rations for the troops on the shortest possible notice, and on every occasion on which they were required or could be useful. While acting on his own responsibility during the Maryland camnpaigmi, he ~ustained, if he could not improve, his reputation as one of the best officers of the department. It has already beemi noticed that in the establishment and adininistra- tion of depots at advanced points on the line of railroad and otherwise on the Peninsula, during the Maryland campaign, and again in Vir- ginia, Capt. Thomas Wilson, commissary of subsistence, U. S. Arm Page 177 CHAP. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 177 (not yet promoted), rendered highly valuable services. In the accom- 1)lishment of his duties he had many serious obstacles to overcome. His never-flagging energy and perseverance always enabled him to achieve the desired results. Besides the services of Capt. Brownell Granger, commissary of subsistence, volunteer service, already referred to, he gave important assistance at the depot. He was always ready and willing, and ever discharged his duties with promptness, intelli- gence, and entire success. Capt. W. H. Bell, commissary of subsistence, U. S. Army, success- fully managed aihuirs at the ilagerstown subsistence depot. The duties of Capt. J. II. Woodward, commissary of subsistence of volunteers, with the beef-cattle herds on the Peninsula, during the Maryland and Virginia campaigns, were laborious and highly impor- tant. He performed theni to the entire satisfaction of all concerned. And Capt. W. R. Murphy, commissary of subsistence of volunteers, charged with like duties in the last two campaigns mentioned, was like- wise successful in their performance. Besides the officers already mentioned, (iapts. R. Holmes, J. C. Read, A. B. Mott, H. M. Swift, R. C. Stickney, J. A. l)oyle, 1). D. Wiley, 0-. S. Leland, J. Benedict, G. F. Thompson, commissaries of subsistence, volunteer service, at different times assiste(l at the (lepots and acquitted themselves with much credit. I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant, H. F. CLARKE, Colonel, Aide-de- Camp, and Commissary of Subsistence. Brig. Gen. S. WILLIAMS, Assistant Adjutant-General Army of the Potomac. No. 10. Report of Surgeon Charles S. Tripler, U. S. Army, Medical Director, Army of the Potomac, of operations from March 17 to July 3. DETROIT, MICH., February 7, 1863. GENERAL: In compliance with your instructions I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the medical depart- ment of the Army of the Potomac during the time I was connected with it as medical director: This time naturally divides itself into two l)eriods: The first* em- bracing the time from the beginiiing of the organization of that army to that of its taking the field; the second from the latter time to the completion of the change of base to Harrisons Landing, on the James River. * * * * * * * PART II. The army being about to take the field, certain measures preparatory to the movement suggested themselves. I may mention here that a great deal of presumptuous intermeddling with the medical department of this army occurred from time to time. * Part I appears in Series I, Vol. V, pp. 76113. 12 U UVOL X Page 178 178 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIII. Sensation preachers, village doctors, and strong-minded women, sud- denly smitten with a more intimate knowledge and thorough perception of the duties and administration of the medical department of an army than I had been able to acquire in more than thirty years experience and study, obtruded their crude suggestions, and marring when they could not make, and paralyzing when they attempted to quicken, suc- ceeded by their uninformed zeal, innocently enough, perhaps, but not the less unfortunately on that account, in defeating measures I had much at heart, had carefully contemplated, and intended to carry into effect at the proper time. There were a number of medical officers of the army on duty in the hospitals in Washington who in my opinion ought to have taken the field when the army moved, and it had always been my intention to put them there at that time; but while the hospital system was being organ- ized their services were required in instructing others without military experience in the method of administering those establishments, that they might be made capable of carrying them on when the public service should require the regular medical officers in the field. In the mid. dle of January some members of the Sanitary Commission undertook to regulate this matter for me, by urging that citizens should be em- ployed in the hospitals and the army surgeons sent into the field, at the same time asserting that citizens were as capable of performing the hospital duties as the officersa matter about which they knew nothing, and as to which they were not called upon to express nor competent to form an opinion. In the end I was defeated in this very matter. I might, perhaps, have accomplished it if I had been let alone. Early in March the sick were removed from the field to the general hospitals. Convalescents were left in the camps, that they might the more readily be returned to duty when well, arid that they might form a part of the garrison of the works when the army was put in motion. Instructions for the government of the medical officers in battle were prepared, in which minute directions were given as to the manner of forming field depots for the wounded, the organization of the parties of medical officers to serve at each, the methods of preparing for the refreshment and professional care of the wounded when brought in, the distribution and employment of the Ambulance Corps, & c. I succeeded in getting a small supply of portable soup from the subsistence depart- ment, which was (listributed to the regimental surgeons, and its use strictly limited to times of battle. The different regiments being all supplied with medicines, stores, hospital tents, & c., amid a wagon each to transport their supplies, and the sick requiring it having been removed from the camps to the hos- pitals, the army, so far as my department was concerned, was ready to move. On the 11th day of March it was put in motion for Fairfax Court-House. The enemy having disappeared from our front a return to Alexandria was ordered, and after an interview with yourself, in which I received instructions to govern me for further arrangements, I left Fairfax Court-House for Washington at night-fall of the 14th of March. In the mean time orders had been issued in Washington limiting your command to the Army of the Potomac in the field and organizing that army into corps. The latter order so changed the organization as to make it necessary and expedient to assign an experienced medical officer to each corps as a medical director, the idea of a corps darmlc being that it should be a complete army in itself. Here I intended to bring in th~ senior medical officers of the army in the hospitals i Page 179 CHAP. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS 179~ Washington as medical directors. I intended so to distribute them;. to break up the Washington arrangements; to send purveyor as well as hospital surgeon into the fieldin short, to transfer everythin gin Washington to Fort Monroe, whither you informed me we were to proceed. On my arrival in Washington the Surgeoii-General informed me that he had resumed the control of hospitals and purveyor; that I must use my inspectors for medical directors, and appoint another pur- veyor, as the one in Washington could not be spared. I was further infbrmed that I could not strip Washington of supplies; that I could take part of what was there, and that the remainder of what I wanted would be ordered from New York to meet me at Fort Monroe. I was obliged to acquiesce. I then addressed to the Surgeon-General the letter in the appendix marked M. A medical purveyor was appointed and ordered to report to me from Baltimore. This officer promptly obeyed, but was in too feeble health to undertake the duty. I then substituted Asst. Surg. R. H. Alexander, of the Army, who entered upon and continued to discharge the duty up to the time I was relieved at Harrisons Bar. The medical directors were assigned to corps as follows: Keeney to Sumners, Brown to Keyes, Millian to Heintzelinaus, and Magruder to McDowells. Keeney and Milhau had beeii my inspectors, and had acquired valuable experience as such during the Pur months they had been employed on that duty. I had left Keeney in Washington to attend to the business of my office during my absence at Fairfax Court-House. Sumners corps, to which he was assigned, having beemi left for a time in the vicinity of Manassas, Ke eney remained behind when I joined at Fairfax Seminary. Without consultation with the headquarters of the army to which he belonged, he was relieved and J. F. Hammond substituted. This officer joined General Sumner promptly and conducted the business of his department well, but I cannot help complaining of the act itself as inexpedient and unjust. I remonstrated against it at the time upon principle, but without avail. The medical directors having been finally arranged to the corps, I prepared for their use the instructions in the appendix marked N. On the 17th March I saw General Van Yliet in Washington in refer- ence to ambulances. He told me that 36 four-wheeled were then en route from Perryville for Fort Monroe; that he would send 86 more from Washington, and 140 two-wheeled in addition to those then in possession of the regiments. This was the best that could be done. Those from Perryville reached Fort Monroe in good season, and were distributed by Captain Sawtelle a from April 9 to May 1 nd the others did not arrive until March 29 the headquarters were transferred to the steamer Com- modore, at Alexandria. While still at the wharf, the Sanitary Com- mission made application for three representatives of that association to be permitted to accompany the army and for facilities for transporting such supphes as they might think proper to send. The matter being referred to me, I agreed to the proposal upon certain conditions, which were accepted, and which I afterwards indorsed upon their official communication as follows: The proposal of the Sanitary Commission has my concurrence, provided their agents shall consult with me before making issues to the troops, and that their reports shall be submitted to my inspection before they are transmitted for publication. These terms were agreed to,~ but not observed. It is proper I should now give my reasons for imposing them. The Sanitary Commission, through the courtesy of Dr. Wood, Actin Page 180 180 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIII. Surgeon-General, had been placed in a semi-official position by the Secretary of War, and had been active in soliciting and obtaining many comforts for the inmates of our military hospitals, which they were engage(l in distributing very liberally wherever an opportunity offered. While the army was encamped at Washington I had no control over these issues. By urgent appeals to the patriotism of the people their store-houses were kept well filled. So long as we rcniained at Wash- ington there coul(l be no difficulty about transportation, and there was but little ground for apprehension that the Su~)ply would fail. When we moved to the Peninsula the case was altered. Holding the relation that body did to the public and to the army, we had a right to look to them for such supplies as our wounded might need, and which could be obtained from no other ~onrce. Moreover, I knew that every l)ollnd of transportation was an object in the field. I (leternuned, therefore, to economize their resources, that they should not be unnecessarily sqllan(lered in the camps, but should be kept in reserve, when they could be commanded in ally emergency, such as a battle or the fitting up a hospital or a hospital ship. I considered further that it was not honest to solicit these contributions from the l)ublic upon the plea of urgent necessity, and then wasting where there was no necessity. The rich gave money. It was not prol)oscd to (listribute that, and it could not have been used upon the Peninsula if ii had been. The 1)001 gave the labor of their hands ill making up articles of clothing and the like for the sick and wounded. They had a right to be assured that their contributions should be caretully and judiciously used. I had reason to believe that in many instances they had not been so used, and I (le- sired to arrest this abuse if it really did exist, as well as to prevent it if attewpted. At the earnest soheitation of Mr. Ohunstead I was afterw-ards induced to withdraw this stipulation, he assuring inc that tile contributions of the public were so large that they could not 1111(1 store-room for them unless they were allowed to dispense them ad libiturn and that he would pledge himself to have at my command 15,000 sets of clothing and dressings at any time a battle should come off. At that time I was expecting about 6,000 casualties at Yorktown. April 1 the headquarters left Alexandria and arrived at Foit Monroe on the 2d at 6 ~ in. The muext day I had an interview with Dr. Cuyler, and arranged with him for the reception of 1,000 wounded in the hos- pitals under his char~e. I had been in hopes of getting more room, 1)ut was convinced it could not be safely relied npon. On the 4th we marched to Great Bethel, and on the 5th, throiioh a heavy rain, to a cluster of huts some 5 miles from Yorktown. On the 6th 1 visited Ileintzelmans l)ositioii in front of Yorktown, inspected his hospital department, and found that his medical director, Milhan, had made excellent arrangenments fo his field hospitals in case of a battle. Some of the depots, however. l)loved afterwards to be withimi range of the enemys guns, amid we were obliged to abandon them. On the ~th I went to Ship Point amld inspected the rebel huts there. We had then three large clusters of huts, most of them nearly new and in good conditionone at Ship Point, one about 4 miles from there on the road to Yorktown, and the third at our own camp, near the road to Fort Monroe. These, with a few smnall dilapidated meet- ing-houses and private dwellings, scattered h~in Youngs Mill to Cheesemans Creek, were afterwards used as hospitals. The accom- mo(lations afforded by these buildings, it was evident, would not be adequate to our wants, even with the 1,000 provided for at For Page 181 CHAP. XXIII.j GENERAL REPORTS. 181 Monroe, in case of a severe action at Yorktown. The country, also from Warwick Court-House to York River at our position was but a succession of swamps, that in warm weather would be too prolific of malarial poison to a(lmit of our establishing military hospitals there. I therefore determined to arrange, if possible, with the department at XVashin~ton for the reception of all the wounded in excess of the 1,000 at some of the hospitals North. Colonel Iiigalls agreed promptly to transport my men from any point on York River to such hospitals as I might indicate. With this un(lerstandilig I telegraphed and wrote to the Acting Surgeon-General on the 14th of April. (See appendix 0.) April 20 I received a reply from Dr. Wood, acceding to my proposal, an(l making certain suggestions as to sefl(ling certain classes of wounds to l)articular points. That seemed to me to be difficult of execution, if not impracticable. I had at that time made arrangements to keep a hospital steamer constantly at Cheesemans Landing for the reception ot wounded only. It was necessary that this hospital should receive all the wounded indiscriminately. On the 13th six eminel)t surgeons, (leI)ute(l by the Governor of Mas- sachusetts by authority of the Secretary of War, arrived in camp and offered their services. They were particularly charged to look after the Massachusetts Volunteers, but with a zeal as creditable as it was rare, and a patriotism as conspicuous as it was disinterested, they expresse(l their readiness and their desire to render their services wherever they could be most useful. The party consisted of iDrs. Cabot, Hodges, Gay, Parks, Hart.well, and ilomaus. A part of these gentlemen were assigned to the Massachusetts troops in Sumners corps; the others fitted up a portion of the huts on the Ship Point road as a field hospital for the regulars. They had precisely the same means as every olter surgeon had. WTith these means they were soon at the head of a model establishment for the field. After the evac- uation of Yorktown and the battle of Williamsburg they repaired promptly to the town, and there rendered most important services to the wounded. On the 19th Prof. Henry H. Smith, Surgeon-General of Pennsylvania., arrive(l with the steamer Win. Wliildin, (:omph-telY fitted til) with bed- ding, stores, instruments a corps 18 an(l and a of surgeons dressers, Pill coml)leinent of Sisters of Charity for nurses. lie brought with butt also the means of embalming the bodies of the dead. This kind office he cheerfully liertornied for numbers of men from other States. Surgeon-General Smith, upon being informed of my plans, entered into them with hearty good-will, and seconded them with an earliest zeal and a refreshing inte)ligence that showed he had not acquired his knowledge of hospital administration in Laputa. Soon after his arrival the steamer Commodore was assigned to me by the Quartermasters Department. Dr. Smith took charge of her equipment, and in a short time had her ready to receive 900 wounded. This vessel and the Win. Whildin then became our receiving ships, one of which was to be con- stantly imi position to receive the ~vonnded. Soon after our arrival in front of Yorktown malarial and typhoid fevers again appeared, though not with any alarming rapidity. The greatest prol)ortioml occurred in Keyes corps, on our left. The country C~eiipied by him was the worst on the I~eninsula, and, in addition to that. one of his divisions was composed of omit- ne\vest troops. Desirous of keeping the army as little encumbered as T)O55iblC with sick, that its movements mio-ht not be embarrassed on timat aoeoummt, I took meas- ures to send to the North those too ill to move with us Page 182 182 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXI11 On the 17th of April 315 such patients were reported to mea very small number considering the strength of the army, the wretched weather, the character of the country, & c. The transport Massachu- setts was prepared for them and on the 20th was dispatched for An- napolis. Adhering to the same plan as other men fell sick, I provided the means of transporting them also, and for this purpose I availed myself of the services of the Sanitary Commission. May I, Mr. Olmstead, the secretary of that association, had one boat, the l)aniel Webster No. 1, in his possession, a steamer on which he could carry 250 patients. At his request I procured the Ocean Queen, a steamer of the largest class of sea-going ships, and turned her over to him. He agreed to fit her up in forty-eight hours after getting possession of her. It took rather longer than that, however, and then she carried but about three-fifths of the iiumber she should have carried. Of course in inaugurating a system of this kind under our circum- stances some delays, some awkwardness, and some confusion were to be expected. If I had had at my disposal a few medical officers of expe- rience, these arrangements could have been iuiade with more rapidity and precision. As it was, with the exception of the Surgeon-General of Pennsylvania, I had no one on the water who had the faculty of rapid systemization, but all seemed (lispose(l to do the best they could, and I believe the operations at Yorktown were fully as successful as could have been hoped for. Mr. Knapp, an agent of the Sanitary Counmis- sion, was particularly zealousa little too much so at times. Without my knowledge he took possession of the Commodore, intendiiig to fit her up and officer her with New York surgeons to send to New York with wounded. This did not suit my views at all, and would simply have rendered that steamer less than half as efficient as 1 intended she should be. Of course I forbade that, l)ut I agreed to give him the Elm Ciby, the next steamer, with perhaps permission to go to New York. In the mean time a few of our men were being wounded and treated in our hospitals. On the 17th April General Smith had an important affair on our left, in which 32 men were reported to me as killed and 100 wounded. The wounded were sent to the hospital ships. On the 26th 12 men of a Massachusetts regiment were wounded and sent to the ships. In irregular firing dnrino the siege several more of our men were wounded, and disposed of in the same manner. I have already stated that the army was well supplied with medical stores and the means of transporting them before it was put in motion. What was my surprise, then, so soon as we were in position before York- town, tofi nd my office flooded with requisitions for more. Upon inquiry, I found that these things had in many instances been left by the troops in their old camps. Liquors had very generally disappeared. Various excuses were rendered that were not satisfactory. The medical officers seemed to suppose that the medical director was to furnish them with fresh supplies at every change of position, and had taken no pains to transport their stores from Washington to the Peninsula. It was some time before I could remedy this piece of improvidence at all. My store-ship, after having reached Fort Monroe, was detained there by a storm, and when she reached Ship Point it was found very difficult to laud her supplies. 1 succeeded finally in getting her a berth at Cheese- mans Creek, and was then enabled to get on more rapidly. My sup- plies of stimulants, however, 1 wing very limitedthose ordered from New York not arriving till very lateI was compelled to refuse to issue to the regiments the little omi lmn(l, for the purpose of being sure of having some at least in the event of a battle. I distributed what w Page 183 CHAP. XXflI.] GENERAL REPORTS. 183 had to the medical directors of corps, with instructions for its prudent use. (See appendix P.) The first of the large supply from New York reached Fort Monroe April 14; the last did not reach the purveyor until the 1st of May. These supplies were shipped by different vessels, and were mingled with other stores, so that they could not be got at until after tedious and vexatious delays. On the 9th of May I wrote and telegraphed to the Surgeon-General for bedding, & c., hoping it might be ordered up immediately from Fort Monroe. It was dispatched from Washington the next day, and reached us at White flouse, but at a much later date than I had hoped for. I telegraphed to the Surgeon-General on the 16th of May and wrote him fully on the 19th. (Appendix li.) On the next day some of them ar- rived. (Appendix R.) On the 29th nearly all were received. (Ap. pendix S.) On the 2d of June another invoice of 556 packages was received at White House from New York. To avoid the delay attendant upon sending requisitions to me during the important operations before Richmond on the 27th of May, I author. ized the medical directors of corps to approve of them, and directed the purveyor to issue upon their orders. On the 23d of May I directed the purveyor t~ purchase a large quantity of portable soup and to distribute it to the several corps. On the 11th of June I directed the medical di- rectors of the corps to see to it that their regiments were supplied with everything necessary and to fill up all deficiencies immediately. (Ap- pendix S2.) This done, there seemed to be no more that I could do to insure that a sufficiency of all necessary supplies should be on hand in the conflicts soon to occur. If any regiment suffered afterward for want of these things it was due to the negligence or inefficiency of their own officers. There was an abundance of supplies at White House. The way to procure them was not only indicated, but the medical officers were repeatedly enjoined to provide themselves in season, and the chiefs of corps were directed to see that they did so provide. The works in front of Yorktown being nearly ready for the bombard- ment and assault, on the 27th of April I proceeded by your order to select positions for the field depots for our wounded on the right. I was accompanied by Captain Abbot, of the Engineers, and was gov- erned by his advice as to protection from the fire of the enemy. While engaged in this duty several shots were thrown by the enemy at our working parties, and from observation of their effect and direction I was satisfied that the l)OSitiOnS selected would afford all the protection required for our ol)erations. On the 29th I proceeded to Sumners position, and with the assistance of General Sedgwick a similar selec- tion of depots was made for the front of that corps. Immediately afterward the embarkatioii of the sick was commenced. Sumners, Hei ntzelmans, and a part of Keyes corps were relieved. A letter in the appendix, marked 53~ will show what hospital resources we had at that time. May 2 1 telegraphed to the medical director of Keyes corps to break up his hospital at Youngs Mill, and the 4th to concentrate his sick, with a suitable allowance of medical officers, nurses, and subsistence, and to keep his transportation well in hand for any further movement. The same date I inquired for how many men he would want accommo- dation. The next morning the officer left in charge of the sick at War- wick Court-House reported 232 men; before night they had increased to 800. I then sent an assistant of my own to see to the matter, and before his task was completed more than 1,200 were collected in th Page 184 184 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA [CHAP. XXIII. woods and elsewhere from that corps alone. I mention these things to show how little reports of sick, even when they could be had, were to be depended upon in making my estimates for transportation and for hospitals. Not that untrue reports were made by the surgeons, but whenever a march was undertaken straggling was permitted to go on unrestrained, and I fear was sometimes even encouraged by officers whose duty it was to have prevented it. I had frequent occasions to ask attention to this evil during the campaign. The boats of the Sanitary Commission were employed in transferring some of the sick to the North, and by the 9th of May they had relieved us of 930. We then had 2,000 on hand in Yorktown. I placed Assist- ant Surgeon Greenleaf, of my staff, at this hospital, who organized an(l conducted it admirably well. When the pressure was over he was relieved and rejoined me at headquarters. May 4 the enemy evacuated Yorktown. General Stoneman was sent in pursuit, and on that day he lost 3 killed and 28 wounded. The lat- ter were brought to the rear and placed on the Commodore. The next day the battle of Williamsburg took place. In the night I was directed to send transportation to Queens Creek for 300 wounded. The Coin- niodore was immediately dispatched in charge of one of my assistants. At noon of the 6th she returned to Yorktown, having been unable to effect a landing, on account of the shoal water. I procured a lighter from Colonel Ingalls, and taking charge of the Commodore myself, pro- ceeded with her to Queens Creek. Surgeon-General Smith accompanied me. The water was so shallow the steamer could get no nearer than 2 miles to the landing. Lieutenant Remey, of the Navy, boarded us, and courteously offered to land us in his boat. Leaving orders for the lighter to follow up the creek as soon as she came up, Dr. Smith and myself went ashore, set the ambulances in motion, collected from the depots 100 of our wounded, and got them comfortably on the Commodore by 3 a. in. One hundred wounded prisoners were collected in one of the field works near the lauding. The next morning, having organized the ambulance train, I left Dr. Smith to ship the remainder of the wounded, including the prisoners, and boarding a. tug, I hastened back to Yorktown to make fuither ar- rangements. Here I was met by an order to hurry to Williamsburg to see to the wounded there. Having (lispatched the Pennsylvania steamer Whildin to Queens Creek, accompanied by my senior as- sistant, Dr. A. K. Smith, of the Army, I hastened to Williams- burg. Here I was joined by a party of able and distinguished. sur- geons from New York, consisting of Drs. James R. WTood, I)a,vid L. Rogers, Krackowitzer, Stone A yres, and others. Drs. Cabot, Hitch- cock, and Bronson, of Massachusetts, were also promptly ~n the ground. The hospitals were distributed a ruong these gentlemen. I need scarcely say that the wounded received at their hands the most prompt and skillful attention. All the wounded in Williamsburg, comprising about 700 of our own men and 333 of the enemy, had the benefit of their care. The remainder of the wounded were attended to in the field depots near the James and York Rivers. The whole number of killed in that conflict reported to me was 460, and of wounded 1,474. * Four hundred and thirty-three wounded prison- ers were left upon our hands. Many of our men were so slightly wounded it was not necessary to send them to the hospitals. Of the prisoners 60 were too badly wounded to be removed. They were left in Williams * But see revised statement, p. 450 Page 185 JHAP. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 185 burg, under the care of Dr. D. L. Rogers, of New York. The re- mainder were ordered to Fort Monroe on the transports. Eight hun- dred of our men and 100 prisoners were sent to Fort Monroe on the Commodore, and 427 of our men and 273 prisoners on the Win. Whuldin and other transports. The Whildin sailed direct ror Philadelphia. On the 11th of May the embarkation of our own wounded was com- pleted. The prisoners from the town of Williamsburg were embarked the next morning. When the enemy was brought to bay at Williamsburg the corps of Sumner, fleintzelman, and Keyes advanced rapidly upon their posi- tion. A drenching rain began in the night of the 5th and continued the next day. I was informed that many of the regiments left their camps with nothing in their haversacks. They had no shelter from the rain, and nothing to eat. The roads were shocking. It seemed almost impossible to get supplies to them. Their privations were con- sequently extreme. As a natural result, when the columns were again put in motion a large number of men were thrown on my hands some of them sick, most of them tired and exhausted. They came straggling in from the rear of the army, without reports, nurses, or subsistence. It was impossible to create hospitals for all these men at Williamsburg. I therefore caused a selection to be made for transpor- tation to the rear, and ordered up one of the boats in charge of the Sanitary Commission from Yorktown to receive them. This boat, the Elm City, reached me during the afternoon of the 12th. I directed her, after she was filled up, to proceed to Washington. The remainder of the sick were left in Williamsburg, under the care of Dr. Bronson an(l the medical officer of General Grovers brigade. I have seen it stated in a New York paper that no provision was made for tIme shelter or professional care of the wounded at Williamsburg except by the Sanitary Commission. If this statement concerned inc alone it would not be worth noticing, but in justice to others I feel called upon to say that no agent or member of the Commission was employed in any cal)acity at Williamsburg until after all our wounded had been em- barked. The medical officers of the army and volunteers, Dr. Cabots party from Massachusetts, Dr. Woods from New York, and Dr. Smiths from Pennsylvania, performed the whole work. About the same time, to afford further relief to our hospitals, a few more of our sick men were sent North. On the 11th May 225 were dispatched from Yorktown, and on the 12th 500 more. On the 13th the steamer Doimaldson reported to inc at Williamsburg from Frank- liiis division. She was ordered to take subsistence and hospital stores on board at Yorktown and then to proceed to Alexandria. The num- ber of men she had on board was not reported nor the anthority by which she caine (lown. On the 9th May General Franklin fought at West Point. Dr. Ham- iltorm, his medical director, reported 49 killed an(1 131 wounded.* He reported also the great efficiency of the Ambulance Corps, organized under your orders October 3, 1861. One of the men of that corps was killed while engaged in removing the wounded. On the 7th of May we had 9 men of the Sixth Cavalry wounded in a skirmish near New Kent Court-House. They were cared fhr in the houses in the neighborhood. Matters being arranged at Williamsburg, I moved on the evening of the 13th to rejoin headquarters. Bivouacking at night on the road, I * But see revise(1 statement, p. 6W Page 186 186 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [Ca& P. XXIII. reached Cumberland at noon on the 14th. Here I found a number of sick, reported as unable to go on. It was raining hard, and the roads were almost impracticable. It was necessary to make some provision for the sick. I took a small tug at night and went down the river until I reached the steamer Commodore. The master of the vessel refused to go up the river without a pilot, as it would vitiate his insurance. I applied to the provost-marshal at Eltham for a pilot. He knew of none. Chancing to hear of the mate of a brig about sailing for home who was said to know the river, I sent him an order in your name to repair on board the Commodore immediately and take her up. I succeeded in getting her to Cumberland, and thus I)rOvided a hospital. Leaving her in position, on the 16th I moved with the headquarters to White Ho use. This being the new base of operations, it was necessary to establish a general hospital there. There were no buildings at all fit for the purpose, so to meet present necessities I resorted to the use of tents. A detail was ordered to pitch them. It was sluggishly furnished and most inefficient when it reported. Under the superintendence of Bri. ga(le-Surgeon Baxter, one of the best officers in the service, with 150 men we succeeded in two days work in getting but 34 tents pitched. At the end of four days 100 were readyall we could command. Cook- ing caidrons were got in readiness, subsistence procured, bed-sacks filled, & c., without delay. The army being again in motion, more sick and a multitude of stragglers rushed in upon us. Our store-ship and the hospital trans- ports being up, I detailed the Daniel Webster No. 1 to convey a party of the worst cases to Boston. These men were ordered to be selected with great care from those in the hospital tents. T~vo hundred and sixty was the number to be received. Before one-half this number was sent from the hospital the ship was reported filled. Stragglers had rushed on board without authority and taken possession. I sent a brigade surgeon to expel them, but without avail. I then deter. mined to send no more men from the Peninsula on accouiit of sickness if there were any meaus of avoiding it. Orders in relatiomi to the selec- tion of cases were useless. I am sure that hundreds of malingerers succeeded in deserting their colors on the hospital transports in spite of every effort of mine to prevent it. The regimental officers might have prevented it. I could not. After the 260 had left on the Daniel Webster I found 1 020 in the hospital tents, and of these 900 were reported to me by the medical officers in charge as men with such trifling ailments that they should never have been l)ermitted to fall to the rear. A letter to the medical director of Keyes corps (appendix S4) will show how I endeavored to prevent such abuses. Another, marked S5, shows the capacity and organization of the general hospitals at White House and Yorktown. Much censure and abuse having been indulged in toward you as well as myself for not having appropriated the dwelling at White House to the general hospital, I append a copy of a special report made to you on that subject. (See appendix T.) While still at White House, I received a telegram from the front that scurvy had appeared in two brigades of the army, one of these being .the regulars. I could scarcely credit the accuracy of the information. I knew that that bri- gade had obeyed orders issued in relation to the use of vegetables and the manner of cooking their rations. Still I did not think it 1)rudent to disregard the report, and accordingly I telegraphed to Washington for lemons and potash. I procured a few boxes of lemons from the store Page 187 CHAP. XXIII.1 GENERAL REPORTS. 187 of the Sanitary Commission at once, and carried them with me to the front. Having set the hospital at White House in motion, Brigade Surgeon Baxter in charge, I loaded three wagons with hospital sup- I)lies, and on the 21st May started once more in pursuit of the army. I found headquarters at Tunstalls Station. The next day they were advanced to Cold Harbor. Here I investigated the report with regard to scurvy, and found it to be erroneous. I, however, requested the Adjutant-General to compel the men to use desiccated vegetables, and to make and nse soup daily unless that were rendered impossible by reason of being actually on the march; the use of fried fresh meat to be absolutely forbidden; boiled or roasted beef to be substituted. On the 23d I returned to White House, and the next day proceeded to Yorktown to inspect the hospitals there. I found them in want of some articles of clothing and bedding, but generally in good order and well arranged. One of them, in the Nelson House, with Miss Dix for housekeeper, was very neat. On my return I inspected the hospital ships, made arrangements for completing their equipments, and directed the Sanitary Commission to send I ,000 shirts, 300 wrappers, 300 pairs of slippers, and 1,000 sheets to the Yorktown hospital. I then inspected the hospital at White House, made contracts with 1)ineteefl ~)hysicians from Massachusetts (sent promptly by the Surgeon-General of that State in ans~ver to a telegram from me), placed eight of them on duty at NVhite House, and sent the remainder to Yorktown to relieve as many reolinental medical officers, who were forthwith ordered to their regiments. I found stragglers still coming into the hospitalssome really sick, who said they had been sent by their surgeons. On my return to headquarters I met 125 just coming into Dispatch Station to take the trainsent down in ambulances in direct violation of the standing orders of the army. I inspected these men on the spot, and sent a number back to their regiments. When I reached my tent I again brought this matter to the notice of the headquarters, feel- ing convinced we should soon have no army unless this practice was arrested. (See appendix U.) May 27 General F. J. Porter fought and defeated the enemy at Han- over Court-House. In this battle there were reported to inc 62 killed and 210 wounded.* Of the latter, 138 only went into the hospital. One hundred and twenty-three wounded prisoners fell into our hands. Am- bulances were l)romptly sent for the wounded, and hospitals prepared for them in William Gaines and Hogans houses and outhouses. Hogans house being under fire, I was afterward obliged to remove the inmates (inisoners) to Dr. Gaines buildings, below. The wounded having been collected and attended to, I requested Colonel In galls tq order the Knick- erbocker to be in readiness to receive them that day (30th). I also directed the Elm City to carry 400 sick from White House to Yorktown. These boats were in possession of the Sanitary Commission. Neither of them were ready. I then directed our own boat, the Commodore, to be l)laced in position to receive the wounded, and requested Surgeon-Gen- eral Smith to take the general direction of affairs at that point. (See I then substituted the Daniel Webster No. 2 for the Elm City to convey the sick. This was met by further objection, and I was obliged to reiterate the order peremptorily, with instructions to the surgeon in charge of the hospital to call upon Colonel Ingalls to order the boat up and send the men off if there were any trouble. One hundred and * But see revised statement, p. 685 Page 188 188 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXHL four wounded were sent down and received by Dr. Smith on the Coin- modore that day; of these 47 were prisoners. It was intended to re- move the remainder of the wounded the next day, but a heavy rain coming on, we were obliged to defer it. That day at 2 p. in. the enemy attacked our left flank at Fair Oaks. The action lasted till night-hill.. It was resumed the next morning, and continued till 11 a. in. Immediately upon the commencement of the battle the boats at White House were ordered to be in teadiness to receive the wounded. Stir- geons.were placed on board those in need of them. Other surgeons, volunteer and contract, of whom I had a su~)ply at White House, were brought up to the field depots. The transportation of the wounded was begun that night and steadily kept up till completed. This was accomplished by the 7th of June. I never received complete retnrns of the losses in this action. Iu Keyes eirps 3S2 were killed and 1,731 wounded. In Sumners the wounded were abont 1,000, and in Heint- zelmans 750. The whole number sent from White House by the steammi- ers was 3,580. Of these, 167 were conveyed to Philadelphia by the Win. Whildin. June 8 a skirmish took place in front of Sumners position, in which we had 4 killed and 23 wounded. During all this time there were of course some men sick in the field hospitals. It was perceived they would be more and more in the way as new conflicts occurred, and it became necessary to devise some means of getting them to the rear. For this purpose I directed the establishment at Yorktown to be enlarged to the capacity of 2,500 or 3,000 beds, so that I might relieve White House hospital and keep it clear for an emergency. The instructions to the officers in charge are in appendix marked W. I was in hopes I should haye received before this the 400 hospital tents I had asked for while we were at Yorktown. About one-half of them arrived the middle of June. I requested General Van Vliet to have 100 pitched at White House for an exten- sion of that hospital, and to deposit 75 at Savage and Fair Oaks Sta- tions for use in another battle. June 4, abo~it 450 sick were sent to Boston by the Sanitary Commis- skin, contrary to my orders. I had received instructions from the Surgeon-General to send no more sick North for a certain time, and had refused l)ermission for this ve~sel to go to Boston; still she ~vas sent. I (10 not doubt that the agent thought it made no difference where he went, but he was none the more excusable for that. However, if civil- ians are allowed to have anything to do with military matters confusion cannot be avoided. They see things only from their own limited stand- l)oint will form and act 111)011 their own opinions, and in ninety-nine cases in one hundred go wrong. June 19, I authorized Mr. Olinstead, of the Commission, to fill the steamer Daniel Webster No. 1 and the Spaulding from the White House and Yorktown hospitals, and proceed with them to New York. A very lar~e number of rebels killed at Fair Oaks were interred by our trool)s; still many were left unburied. They had fallen or had been carried into the woods, and had thus escaped observation. In the course of time they became so offensive as to seriously incommode our camps. Disinfectants were sent to be strewn over the grounds, and every exertion was made to abate the nuisance. Still,it. had n oten- tirely ceased when we left the vicinity. June 14 scurvy was again reporte(1 as having appeared in Sumners corps. I sent an able medical officer to investigate it, who found six cases in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Massachusetts Regiments an Page 189 CHAP. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 189 several others acquiring the predisposition to the disease. My re- ports and action on this will be Ibund in the appendix U2 and U3. It will be seen from these repor~ that the occurrence of scurvy even in this very limited degree was due alone to the neglect f officers to en- force the orders from your headquarters in relation to the use of veg- etables by the men. These orders were reiterated, whether with any better success I do not know, but I heard no more of scurvy. At this time I found it necessary to ask that so much of General Orders, 102, March 19, 1862. as authorized commanders of corps to grant leaves of absence for fifteen days to medical officers should be rescinded. Fifteen days would take them home, but it was a rare thing to find them at their posts at the expiration of it. Notwithstanding we had under contract nearly a hundred citizen physicians, the regiments were scarcely much better provided than when we began to fill vacancies in this way Several of the contract physicians themselves soon repented of their bargains and begged to be relieved. As their contracts could be determined at their own pleasure, I could only refuse to terminate them myself, but could not prevent their doing so. To obviate this iluonvenience for a i-easonable time, at least, I wi-ote to the Surgeon- t~en era], to request him for the future to stipulate with these gentlemen that they should not termina~e their contracts in less than three months. My suggestion was adopted, and we were thus enabled to retain sex-e~-al who would otherwise have left us. Desirous of leaving nothing undone to l)roInote and preserve the health of the army at this critical period, I resolved to call upon the whole body of the medical officers for then- opinioli5 and advice. For this purpose I addi-essed to the medical (hirecters a circular, under date of June 18 which will be found in the al)l)endix X. I received before the final conflicts reports from several ot these, and all agreed that nothing of aimy consequence had been left undone that the medical department could do. Better shelter for the men, less work, and in a few instances new clothing, were all that seemed to be wanting. June 12 the headquarters were removed to the right bank of the Chickahominv, near Dr. Trents house. Some firing- and shelling took l)lace from day to day, but without any damage to us. On the 13th the enemy made a raid to our rear, doing but little ham-ni. Our railway commnnications were not interrupted. On the 15th, the roads theim fom- the first time admitting of it, I succeeded in transfer-ring the remuaiimder of the Hanover wounded to the floating hospitals at White house. June 16 I took measum-es for ~)rovi(ling a receiving hospital foi- the wounded at Savage Station, the headquarters of General Heintzel- nman. Dr. Swinburne, of Albany, N. Y., a surgeon known to inc by reputation, and one who had rendered some service at White House amid Fair Oaks, having rel)orte(l to rue under contract, I dil-ecte(l him to prepare this depot. under the supervision of Surgeon Milhau, medical director of Heintzelmans corps. Every facility was given Dr. Swin- burne for this l)urpose, lam-ge details of men, all the tents we could command, abundance of subsistence, & c. there were several out- houses at the Station that were directed to be vacated; some sick in them belonging to Keyes corps were traimsferred to White House. An ice-house near Savages house was filled with ice. In twelve days, with a detail of 100 men, or as many of them as chose to report to Dr. Swin- burne, succeeded in getting the buildings cleaned, 25 tents pitched, two or three caldrons for making soup in position, water-casks pr Page 190 190 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, YA. [CHAr. XXIII. pared and filled with water, hospital stores and dressings, and was prepared to receive the wounded. June 17, 600 sick were ordered from White House to Yorktown, to make room for wounded I expected soon to be called upon to provide for. The same day the medical officers were ordered again to provide themselves with portable soup. Tents were also ordered to be pitched near the railway terminus at White House, for the reception of wounded upon the arrival of the cars. On the 20th I visited White House again and inspected the arrange- ments. I met there Mr. Brunot, of Pittsburgh, Pa., who had come on with a party of well-qualified nurses to offer their services.. No more devoted band, none perhaps so much so, had ever presented them- selves. I quartered them temporarily upon the hospital steamer Lou- isiana. At the right time they repaired to Savage Station, performed ever-memorable service, and crowned their self-sacrifice by cheerfully volunteering to remain with the wounded we were obliged to leave in the hands of the enemy when we retired to James River. Returning to headquarters on the 21st, I sent Dr. D. L. Rogers, of New York (who had rejoined me some days before, the hospital at Williamsburg having been broken up), to the left bank of the Chicka- hominy, to evacuate upon White House all the field hospitals upon that side. This duty was zealously performed, and all that could be re- moved were removed. From this time events hurried on with great rapidity. I sent an order to the purveyor at White House to throw a large quantity of sup- plies upon Savage Station. By telegraph I received the reply that all was packed up and the boat ordered to fall back to West Point. This was exceedingly vexatious. We were tolerably well supplied, and Ihad, asb efore reported, a reserve of three wagon loads in my own camp; nevertheless this contretemps was a great disappointment and caused me much anxiety. In a few days the boat returned. As soon as I heard of it I repeated my order (June 27) and telegraphed also to the Sanitary Commission to send up supplies. The effort was made, but too late. On the 28th our communications were cut off. I received nothing from below but some hospital tents, and they came just in time to be burned or to fall into the hands of the enemy. On the 25th we had a smart skirmish on our left. The wounded, who were very few, were sent to White House. On the 26th General McCall fought at Meclianicsville. This (livision had joined on the 18th, and I could not succeed in getting a report from it of any sort. The sick were sent into the camp at headquarters without notice, without a report, a nurse, or a crust of bread. I was obliged to send theni to Savage Station, to occupy room I wanted for wounded men. On the 27th General Porter fought at Gaines Mill. Ambulances were sent to him, and his wounded brought into Savage Station. The cars were kept in motion, and as many as could be sent down were sent to the floating hospitals. A large train was loaded at 10 a. in. on the 28th, when we found that the railway was in possession of the enemy, and I was reluctantly compelled to take the men back to the hospital. All the time the services of every one that could be coin- manded were employed in attending to the wounded. There were about 1,300 in the tents, buildings, and on the lawn. My assistants, McClellan and Greenleaf, with some of Mr. Brunofs party, were most active and efficient in providing for the refreshment and subsistence of the wounded. Asst. Surg. A. K. Smith, of the army, with Dr. Swin- burne and a number of medical officers of volunteers and contrac Page 191 Ca& p. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 191 physicians, were employed in the necessary operations and dressings. No exertion seemed to be too great, no fatigue too exhausting, for the self-sacrificing zeal of every one of those gentlemen. In the afternoon I received orders to leave all that could not walk, with a supply of surgeons, nurses, subsistence, and hospital stores, to fall into the hands of the enemy. I caused the wounded to be carefully examined, and 650 were reported to me as unable to move. A number of them, however, did contrive to get away and reach the James River in safety. I then called for volunteers to remain with the wounded, and, to the credit of the medical gentlemen be it said, all that I wanted immediately expressed their readiness to undertake the duty. One of them, a friend from my boyhood, Dr. H. J. Milnor, of New York, lost his life from exhaustion in this self-sacrifice. Dr. Swinburne having had the organiziug of the hospital, I constituted him chief of the party, and furnished him with a letter to the rebel commander in these words: HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, June 28, 1862. Dr. Swinburne, a volunteer surgeon, with a number of other surgeons, nurses, and attendants, have been left in charge of the sick an4 wounded of this army who could not be removed. Their humane occupation commends itself under the law of nations to the kind consideration of the opposing forces. It is requested that they may be free to return as soon as the discharge of their duties with the sick and wounded will permit, and that the same consideration shown to the Confederate sick, wounded, and medical officers that have been captured by our forces may be extended to them. A large amount of clothing, bedding, medical stores, & c., have been left both at Sav- age Station and Dr. Trents house. By command of Major-General McClellan: CHS. S. TRIFLER, Surgeon and Medical Director Army of the Potomac. To the COMMANDING GENERAL CONFEDERATE FORCES, or COMMANDING OFFICER. On the morning of the 29th the headquarters moved in the direction of James River and arrived at Haxalls Landing the next day. The actions at Savage Station, White Oak Swamp, and Malvern Hill oc- curred in quick succession. So far as circumstances would admit the wounded were conducted or found their way to this point, to Carters, and to Harrisons Bar. To the latter position the headquarters were transferred on the night of July 1. The next day a heavy rain fell, deluging our wounded,many of whom had no shelter. Some of our hospital ships at that time having reached Harrisons Bar, I procured a lighter from the quartermaster and commenced shipping the wounded, but I was obliged to suspend this operation by orders from yourself, as the wharf was absolutely necessary for landing subsistence. Every- thing possible, however, was done for the comfort of the wounded. Tea, coffee, soup, and stimulants were being constantly prepared and issued. 1~Iy train of reserve stores had happily succeeded in reaching the posi- tion, and the supplies held out until we were able to get more from the purveyors store-ship in the stream. On the 3d my successor, Dr. Letterman, having reported, I turned over the department to him. The reports of killed and wounded in this series of conflicts, I presume, were made to Dr. Letterman. I left the arnmy before there was time to prepare them. During this campaign the army was favored with excellent health. No epidemic disease appeared. Those scourges of modern armiesdys- entery, typhus, cholerawere almost unknown. We had some typhoid fever and more malarial fever, but even these never prevailed to suc Page 192 192 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIII. an extent as to create any alarm. The sick reports were sometimes larger than we cared to have them, but the great majority of the cases reported were such as did not threaten life or permanent disability. I regret I have not before me the retained copies of the monthly reports, so that I might give accurate statistics. I have endeavored to recover them, but have been unsuccessful. My recollection is that the whole sick report never exceeded ~ per cent. of the force, and this included all sorts of cases, the trivial as well as rhe severe. The Army of the Potomac must be conceded to have been the most healthy army in the service of the United States. In reflecting upon the history of the medical administration of the Army of the Potomac many defects are perceived. Some of them may be remedied in future; others, I fear, cannot. For the first time the United States has assembled very large armies. Our staff system has been severely tried. I am not called upon nor am I prepared to say whether the other departments have proved successes or tailures. My own department was neither a complete success nor a very decided failure. The most serious impediment in the way of its success was undoubtedly the want of military habits and training in the medical officers. The general impression among the l)eople seems to be that a good citizen physician is fully competent to discharge the duties of a regimental surgeon, and 1 have no idea that anything I can say will be effective in disabusing the public mind of a notion that I know to be as mischievous as it is erroneous. In my opinion it is impossible to im- provise an efficient medical staff. No nation in the world except our own has ever attempted it So little was known among us about a medical department for an army when the present rebellion grew seri- ous, that in the first project for a grand army one assistant surgeon only was provided for a regiment of 1,200 men, and of so little consequence was the character of even that one considered to be, all sorts of doctors steam, eclectic, and even advertising quackswere sometimes commis- sioned as medical officers; men innocent of any such vulgar acquire- orthography; who had much 1 ments as men never even seen, ess per formed, a surgical operation. The great majority of the medical offi- cers were certainly highly respectable members of the profession, but still there were enough of the ignorant and illiterate to prove what I have said, that, so far as the public notion of what was required for a medical officer was concerned, any one called Doctor~ was competent to perform the duties of a military surgeon. I see no remedy for this unless a large stan(ling army is hereafter kept up. In so vast an establishment as the Army of the Potomac without a rigid adherence to system nothing could have been accomplished. It would have been impossible to supply it; to know whether it was sup- plied or not; to reduce its supplies to a minimum bulk, so that they could be transported; so to limit the extent of the trains as that the supply wagons should be accessible. Now this system ~vas intelli- gently termed red tape, and medical men fresh from civil life, who ouoht to have been learners, were encouraged by outside philanthro- pists to disregard a restraint they found irksome, and to assert a prac- tical independence of it as a mark of a strong mind. By firmness and the aid of the more intelligent brigade surgeons a fair progress was made in controlling and correcting this evil, but there were some who were incorrigible. Transportation for medical supplies was provided, but, as we have ~eemi, they were in many instances left behind, because there was n Page 193 CHAP. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 193 transportation; the colonels had takeii the ~ to wagon carry other baggageat least that was the excuse olkred. Want of discipline was seriously felt in the difficulty of getting~ reports from the medical officers. It was inconvenient to make them; inconvenient to send them in; the necessity for tlieni was not apparent. The habit of obedience to orders, whether the reason for them is com- prehended or not, is one of slow gro~vth, and particularly among med- ical men brought up in civil life. I never could get coniplete reports even while we were in Washington. After we took the field that dif~ ficulty was much increased. Still, for the successful administration of the department, these reports were absolutely necessary. The nuniber of medical officers was too limited. One surgeon an(l one assistant were allowed to a regiment. No l)1ovisiol~ was made for a staff, from which details to supply hospitals could be made, or an officer detached to supply a vacancy from illness, (leath, or resigna- tion. This was a great oversight. The medical director could not rem- edy it. There was unquestionably a deficiency of hospital tents upon the Peninsula, but it all that were issued to the regiments at Washington had been carefully transported by them they would have had enough. They, too, were left behind in many instances, both on the Pot oniac and at Yorktown. Want of transportation was agaimi the excuse. Some one will ask, Why did you not arrest, try, and dismiss the medical officers who were derelict ~? How much better ott should we have been in that resort? Who were to take their places? Wlieii would they reach us? Would the new swarm have been any better than the old, appointed under the same auspices, drawmi from the s~mnie sources, and with no experience at all? The fault was not with them; it was the fault of the system. Origi- nal vice cannot be atoned for nor its consequences averted by repeU- tion. The evils which flow from injudicious counsels can seldom be remove(i by the application of partial seventies. The failure of the medical department of ~e Army of the Potomac to meet a just public expectation (if it did so Thil, which I dispute) was due to a deficiency in the number of officers, to the denial to themu of a proper official position, they being consi(lered only as doctors, to be called upon to prescribe for a man reporting sick, but not author- ized to meddle in any way with the police customs of the camp, or to insist on any measures for the preservation of the health of the mcii, to their not being permitted to control their own transportation when fur- nished to them, and to the incompeteucy of a portion of the officers them selves. The duties of the medical department are administrative and profes- siomial. The same officer should not be charged with both; one alone is sufficient to employ the powers of the ablest mmd. The adminis- trative duties require experiencea military and professional training to be acquired only by time and ol)portunity. We have committed the fault in this war of imposing administrative duties upon officers with neither experience in them nor talent for them. We have charged individuals with the most important of these duties who have never seen a single campaign, have never heard a hostile shot, have never seen a regiment collected together in the field. It is possible it may l)e judicious to do so, but experience and observation have up to this time taught a diff~rent lesson. This war may show that IRehoboam was right after all in dismissing the 01(1 counselors because they were 13 R RYOL X Page 194 [CHAP. XXflIt. THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA~ vld and taking counsel of the inexperienced for no better reason than because they were young. The administrative dnties of the medical (lepdrtment among the con- tinental nations are chiefly committed to exl)erielLce(I officers of the line. In France these officers are called military intendants. In Russia I believe they have no distinct title. In Great Britain, however, these duties are l)ertorIned by medical officers win) have qualified themselves for them by faithful service in infrrior gra(les. The British is a prac- tical, the French a theoretical, nation. I think the experience of the Crimea has shown the British system to be the best. The military intendant being a non-professional man cannot understand that the laws of nature may reqtrire a modificatiomi of an army regulation to prevent mischief. The medical administrative officer will })robably be better qualitmed to judge as to this J)OiILt, and having the advantage of equal military experience with the other will not be likely to embarrass The operations of a campaign by medical follies that are harmless only in the newspapers. Some capital plans were suggested to me for the comfort of the sick and woun(lcd while on the Peninsula. The difficulty in the way of adopting them w-as that the Yorktown road was not a I3roa(lway, nor the railway to White House the New- York Central. Cars might have been fitted up for the hospital (leI)artment while we were upon the Chick- ahominy if we had had the ca.rs ; if we h ad had the time and means to ?fit them up; if the road had not been required for the transportation of ammunition, subsistence, and forage. The army was, perhaps, unfor- tunate in having a medical director who supposed it was assembled to make war, and that cartridges were more indispensable than bed-quilts. For a medical (lepartment in the field I would provide, if it were pos sible, that a surgeon of a regiment should have served not less thait five years as an assistamit surgeon. This is the law in relation to the Regu- lar Army, but for an irregular and temporary force it is plainly imnl)os- sible. While we insist upon the primiciple for efficiency we are com- pelled to yield it for expediency. The British army has a surgeon and three assistants to a reginiemit of Lfantry of 1,023 men. They have also a staff of thirty-nine adniinistra- tive and one hundred and forty-nine executive medical officers. The latter are for hospital (luties and the like. In the field one medical officer to 250 men is, in my opinion, a mnini- mumn. It is not necessary to keel) so many constamitly with a regiment, but some are always required for detached service, such, for instance; as our hospitals at White House amid Yorktown and the hospital tramis- ports. These demands must always occur in a camnpaign. They should be provided for in timne, and not left to chance. Scientific citizen sur- geons volunteered their services at the battles on the Peninsula, but how many found their way to Port Royal or to Yicksburg. At the headquarters of an army there should be a chief surgeon, an aide-de-camp to the commanding general, with the same rank ~s the chief of the other departments of the staff. This oflicer, being charged with the administration of the medical department, should be authorized to give orders in the nanme of the cOmluan(ling general in relation to all matters connected with the health of the army; the ~upervisiomm of certificates of disability for discharge, pension certiti- cates, applications for leave of absence for ill-health, sanitary sugges. tions, and regulating the establishing and furnishimig of hospitals, and the like, He should have one aide at least for each corps darrnJe of which the army is composed. For such an armny as the Army of th Page 195 ChAP. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 195 Potomac he will require at least three clerks, one of whom ShOLll(l bc a coml)etent hospital steward. This assistance is necessary for recording corresI)oudence, making the reports required at headquarters aiid at Washington, aiid for dispensing medicines at the headquarters. An assistant quartermaster and an assistant commissary of subsistence are absolutely necessary to the chief surgeon. These officers, holding official relatiomis to their resl)ective departments, can so much more readily command and frirnish the supplies in possession of those depart- ments than a medical officer, who has to make requisitions for what he wants upon a quartermaster or commissary already overwhelmed with business. I am surprised it bad never been thought of until I brought it to the notice of the present Surgeon-General while we were at Yomk- town. if I had had these officers on the Peninsula I could have fitted up and supplied our hospital ships and stationary hospitals with com- paratively little trouble or delay. I could have kept the ambulance trains more in hand, could have known more about them, and could have taken much better care of them. The advantages of such an arrangement are too obvious to require to be urged upon a military man. For each corp8 darrnce of which an army is composed a chief surgeon should be placed upon the stall of the commander of the corps. lie should have an assistant and a clerk. If the corps is more than 25,000 strong, he should have two assistants. He should have also an acting assistant quartermaster and commissary. This officer will take charge of the ambulance and supply train, and when temporary hospital arrangements are to be made for the corps he will provide the tents an(l buildings, anti will see to the drawing anti placing in position of the necessary subsistence. While we were on the Peninsula I knew in two instances the valuable time of a medical officer wasted in the effort to get from commissaries subsistence for which his patients were suffering, and for which he had an order from headquarters. This officer would take charge of the hospital train upon a march, see that the wagons were not misapplied, distribute them to the brigades and regiments upon their arrival in camp, muster, pay, and subsist the teamsters, forage the horses, & c. The guard for the hospital train would be the Ambulance Corps if a regular ambulance corps is authorized, or the drilled hospital attend- ants if we are compelled to use them upon the plan adopted in Wash- ington. In the latter case we might by this means hope to keep these men together. They could not very well be removed and their places supplied by uninstracted men or not at all, at the caprice of cob mels. The chief surgeon of the army should have on his staff one experi- enced medical officer of the army for each corps darmn6e, to be kept constantly employed in sanitary inspections. It is in the field we want these officers, and where, in my view, their duties are all-important. No medical man of less than ten years military training is, in my opin- iou, competent to perform these duties in the field. Any intelligent physician can inspect the police of a city hospital. One inspector can- not do justice to more than 25,000 men. This I know from experience. The chief surgeon of the army, the chief surgeon of the corps, and the inspectors should constitute a council of health, and should assem- ble weekly if practicable, examine the medical reports, the reports of the inspectors, & c., deli berate upon all matters pertaining to the health of the army, and submit through the chief surgeon to the commanding general the result of their deliberations. Batteries having no regimental organization, or at least not actin Page 196 196 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIII. together as regiments, should have an adequate medical force. I should recommend one surgeon as administrative officer for each eight batteries, and one assistant surgeon for ea cli battery. An army in the field must have its general supply train or transj)orts for hospital sup- plies. A medical purveyor or storekeeper will be in chargc of these st6res. To get supl)lies from the purveyors store to the troops I found very perplexing, both in Washington and on the Peninsula. Now, by having an assistant quarterin aster attached to the chief surgeon of each corps, with the hospital train under his charge, this difficulty is at once obviated. The hospital train for a large army should consist of two four-wheeled ambulances, four caco lets (or horse-litters), one ordinary baggage wagon for medicines, stores, tents, and cooking apparatus to each regiment. Instruments, medicines, and dressings for daily use should be trans- ported in panniers or the hospital knapsacks. The reserve supplies in the baggage wagon should be packed in cases of uniform size, exactly fitted to the wagon-box, numbered, and the contents of each marked upon it. The French transport system is admirable, and could be readily adapted to our service. I cannot close this report without expressing my appreciation of the conspicuous services of Surgs. J. F. Hammond, J. B 13 rown, an(l J. J. Milhau, the medical directors of Sumners, Keyes, and Heintzehnans corps; Surg. B. II. Alexander, medical purveyor; Surg. A. K. Smith and Assist. Surgs. E. McClellan amid C. 11. Greenleaf, my own aides. I think I am justified in asserting that there was no duty these officers were called upon to perform that was not well an(l proLu~)tIy done; that their zeal never faltered, their ability never failed. It my de- partment was conducted to your satisfactiomi the efforts of these gen- tlemen contributed most essentially to that result. Anmong the volun- teer medical officers, in my opinion Brigade Surgeons Lyman, Crosby, Baxter, Bently, and Dougherty deserve special notice for ability and efficiency. I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant, CilS. S. TRIPLER, Surge& n, U. S. Army, ifedical Director Army of the Potomac. Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN, U. S. Army, Commanding General Army of the Potomac. [App~dix M.] ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Medical Directors Office, Washington, March 1~5, 1862. SiR: I have the honor to request that field supplies for 140,000 men may be put up by the medical purveyor immediately, to be transported with Major-General McClellans army wherever it may be ordered. I have appointed Assistant Surgeon I3artholow medical purveyor for this army. He has been ordered by telegraph to report to me without delay. General McClellan has directed his chief quartermaster to furnish the transportation for these supplies as soon as they are ready. The general intends to move in from forty-eight to seventy-two hours. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, CIIS. S. TIRIPLER. - Surgeon and Medical Director Army of the Potomac. Surgeon-General FINLEY, U. S. A Page 197 CHAP. XXIII] GENERAL REPORTS. 197 [Appendix N.] HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Med. Directors Office, Theological AS~erninary, Va., Mar. 19, 1862. SIR: Having been assigned to the staff of General , as medical director of his corps darm6e, you will please observe the following in- structions I have reason to believe great impro~idence exists in relation to the accumulation, care, and expenditure of medicines and hospital stores. You will require the brigade surgeons or other senior surgeons in your corps to inspect personally the supplies of the several regiments or de- tachments under their supervision, and to certify to you that they have done so, and find the supplies already furnished to have been faithfully and economically used, and that any new supply required is reall necessary before you approve a requisition. After you have rigorously scrutinized these requisitions you will indorse your action upon them, and then forward them to this office. You will specially forbid any requisition to be sent to this office directly or through any other channel than yourself. None will be noticed c c supplied by me coming through any other channel. You will inspect frequently the several commands under your supervision, and see that their hospital departments are kel)t in order and always ready for any emergency. It will be a never-ending source of mortification if in the aI)proaching conflict anything really necessary for the proper care of the wounded that the medical department has the power to supply should be found wanting. There is a (lisposition among inexperienced medical officers to accumulate superfluous drugs, and to transport them to the exclusion even of surgical appliances of infinitely more impor- tance. It will be your duty to watch and guard carefully against this error. When your corps is ordered to move there will be of course, some men unable to march. These must be left in the general hospitals. Upon the late march to Fairfax Court-House a large number of men were sent into the general hospitals. In a great many instances these men were selected without any judgment. Hundreds were received with no disease that should have excused them from duty. Your at- tention is called to this, that you may take vigorous measures to pre- vent such an abuse in future. The Surgeon-General of the Army has takeii the general hospitals under his immediate care. You will there- fore communicate with him in time as to the number in your corps it will be necessary to send to general hospital, and take his orders as to where to send them. You will send a dnplicat.e of this estimuate to this office. instructions for medical officers in battle have been prepared and issued from headquarters. You will endeavor to cairy them into effect, and see that the officers concerned are instructed in the several duties therein assigned to them. The reports required to be made by medi- cal directors of divisions to the medical director of the army will be made to you, and by you transmitted to inc with as little delay as prac- ticable. You will make a monthly return of the medical officers of your corps to inc. You will see that the monthly reports of sick and wounded are promptly made out at the end of each month and handed to you, to be transmitted to me. You need not consolidate them, but send them all to me without delay. You will see that the weekly reports of the sick of the several regiments are regularly sent in and forwarded to me. The diseases prevailing must be stated in these reports. This information is absolutely necessary at these headquar Page 198 198 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIII. ters. Certificates of disability, approved by the division boards when- ever practicable, will also be forwarded to this office through you. A medical purveyor has been appointed for this army, and will accompany it into the field. He will establish a depot as near the seat of operations as practicable. Sufficient supplies for this army have been ordered to that depot, and it is therefore niiiiecessary for regi- mental medical officers to send iii daily trifling requisitions, that only encumber the files aIl(l embarrass the operations of the purveying department. Inquiries are constantly ma(le about ambulances. This department has given every attemition to that subject, and if a reasonable supply of these carriages is not at the right place at the right time the resl)olIsi- bility for the failure (loes iiot rest with the medical director. The medical officers of your corps you will require to transact their business with you, and through you with this office. Wheim additional medical aid is required anywhere within the limits of your corps ~ou will assign any medical officers, including the brigade surgeons, whose services can be commanded with the least inconvenience to that duty. Frequent communication, both personally amid by letter, with this office is invited and enjoined. Your suggestions will always be received with pleasure and carefully considered. Every facility in mny l)O\VC~ will be afforded you in the performance of your duties and in sustain- ing your authority. I rely with confidence upon your zealous co-oper- ation in making this the model army of the Republic, so far as depends upon its me(lical department. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, CilS. S. TIIIPLER, Surgeon and Medical Director Army of the Potomac. To MEDICAL DIRECTORS OF ARMY CORPS. [Appendix 0.1 HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Medical Directors Office, Camp Winfleid Scott, April 14, 1862. SIR: I had the honor to send you a telegram this morning in rela- tion to the disposition of the wounded we shall have in the approach- ing attack upon Yorkto~vn. To guard against failure I address you also by letter. Considering the number of men likely to be engaged and the very limited and uncomfortable accommodations to be had here, it will be absolutely necessary to send the bulk of the wounded to Fort Monroe and to Washington or some other point North. Surgeon Cuyler very promptly offered to put his sick in tents to make room for our wounded; but his hospital, I fear, will not be sufficiemit for our necessities. There is a good road from here to Cheesemans Landing, a distance of 4 miles, where transports can be assembled to receive the men. They can be comfortably sent from there to any point you may indi- cate. Please let me know your views in relation to this. Last night six medical gentlemen from Massachusetts reached this camp to serve as volunteers. They were sent by the Governor of Massachusetts by authority of the Secretary of War. Their aid will be very acceptable. I have sent three of them to Sumners corps and three to Heintzelmans. The Massachusetts reginments are distributed between those corps. I have to request that the honorable Secretary of War will direct the proper departments to furnish such ~urgeomms as may tender their ser Page 199 CHAP. XXIII] GENERAL REPORTS. 199~ ices under his invitation with a horse and tent each, with the necessary servants, and the privilege of purchasing subsistence of the commis- saries. They cannot be made comfortable in any other way. I learn this morning by telegraph that a portion of the supplies or- dered from New York a mouth ago has reached Fort Monroe. Their arrival is most timely, as our field supplies are almost exhausted. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, CIIS. S. TRIPLER, Surgeon and Medical Director Army of the Potomac~ Surg. IR. C. Woon, Acting Surgeon- General, Washington, D. C. [Appendix P.] HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POToMAc, Medical Directors ~ee, Camp Winfield Scott, April 12, 1S62~ SIR: Your letter of April 11 has beenreceived. I find that in very- many instances the sUpl)lies on hand in regiments in their old camps have been left behind under various pretexts that are not satisfactory to me. Want of transl)ortatiou is most usually alleged. I-low this can be when the troops came by water I cannot understand. I have (letennuied, therefore, to issue no more three-months supplies, but to confiue the issues to such articles as are required for immediate use. Liquors will be sent to medical directors of corps, to be issued in their discretion, in hopes that by this means there may be some preserved wimemi we are brought into action. We are now at least four weeks (listant from our sources of supplies, aIl(1 unless some economy is observed in the use of important articles we shall be destitute when most in want. In many instances I observe great waste in the expend- iture of bandages. These articles must not be thrown away whelk once used, but washed out and used again till worn-out If the medical officers will reflect upon what is before them, and the responsibility to which they will be held, the most indifferent among them will see the necessity for counting every pin before it is used. Their own credit~ as well as the comfort and lives of the soldiers under their care, de- pends upon their vigilance in preserving their supplies. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, CHS. S. TIRIPLER, Miedical Director Army of the Potomac~ MEDICAL DIRECTOR KEYES CORPS. [Appendix R.] HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Medical Directors Office, White House, May 18, 1862. It is absolutely necessary that not less than thirty contract physiciansx should be sent to this army at once, to fill the places of medical officers sick and on detached service. The supplies that left Washington on the 11th have not yet reached here. We are nearly exhausted. I suggest that nle(hical supplies be sent in charge of a special agent, to be deliverca to the purveyor to whom they are directed. Medical supplies have been found store(l un(ler other 5lip~)lie5 in the hold of vessels, and detained there for weeks in this river. We must have four-wheeled ambulances; two-wheeled are good for nothimig. I asked for 140 four-wheeled some time ago. A lot of two- wheeled have been receive(l since, but are altogether insufficient Page 200 200 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIII. We want steamer hospitals, properly fitted up for 5,000, provided with 1)hysicialls, nurses, and stores. CHS. S. ThIPLEJi, Medical Director. To the SURGEON-GENERAL, Washington, D. 0. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TIlE POTOMAC, Medical Directors Office, White house, May 19, 1862. Sin: I had the honor to address you on the 9th instant in relation to the necessities of this army. In that letter I stated that unless cer- taiii supplies for which I had telegraphed that day reached me in five (lays this army would be in peril. It is now ten days, aiid they are not here. I hear there are supplies at Fort Monroe directed to Yorktown, and have telegraphed 1)r. Cuyler to send them up here immediately. The army is marGhing to day, and a battle may occur at any time. We are not prCl)are(l for it. I telegraphed you yesterday that we wante(l steamers l)roperly fitted up for 5,000 men, 1)rovided with ~)lLysicians, nurses, and stores. This is an absolute and instant necessity. The Sanitary Commission is doing what it can to relieve us of our sick, but they cannot do it with sufficient rapidity. We have 2,000 sick at Yorktown and vicinity, 600 at Williamsburg, and 1 have a prospect of having 1,000 more thrown on my hands from the advancing ai~my to-day. For the accom- modation of these men I have 100 hospital tents ordered, but with two days work I have been able to get but 34 pitched. I have no physi- cians to detail for the work. The men from the ranks will not do the duty of nurses. My stores are almost exhausted. if a battle take place within a few days I have no place to put the wounded. I must have relief, and that at once. I can no longer stagger under such an accumulation of difficulties. Seven medical gentlemen from Boston and New York joined inc yes- terday to offer their services for the expected battle. I have gladly accel)ted their offer. The first duty I have imposed upon them is to assist in prescribing for the sick now ~)ressing in upon me. One of them I have been obliged to ask to go to the First United States Cavalry to replace Assistant Surgeon Quinan, who reports sick. I have but one assistant surgeon for each regiment of regular cavalry, and less than that for each regiment of regular infimntry. When one of them falls sick I have no one to replace him. The ambulances I asked for are not here. The march from Williams- burg to this point has destroyed a large l)roportion of those we had. The two-wheeled ambulances forwarded from Washington are insuffi- cient if they were even endurable for the wounded. Very respeetbully, your obedient servant, CUS. S. THIPLER, & trgeon and Medical Director Army of the Potomac. Brig. Gen. W. A. HAMMOND, ASurgeon- General U. S. Army. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Medical Directors Office, White House, May 20, 1862. Telegram received. We are this mnoment receiving the cooking utensils and furniture and the liquors sent by Dr. Laub. On the invoice with the latter are 100 ounces of quinine. I do not know how much of this has been ordered. A requisitiomi for 2,000 ounces wa Page 201 ChAP. XXILI.1 GENERAL REPORTS. 201 forwarded last week. I did not see Dr. Asche. He did not report to me. I heard he was at Yorktown some time since with supplies for the Saiiitary Commission. Dr. Alexander offered to receipt to him for nil he had, and he refused. The organization of the hospitals at Yorktown is progressing favor- ubly under Assistant Surgeon Greenleaf, but we want one large hos- l)ital here. I have 100 hospital tents pitched and occupied. I am sell(liIig away 200 of these patients by the Daniel Webster to-day. We ought to have 500 hospital tents here, and I wish the 400 more to be sent. The details for pitching the tents are so slow that it took 150 men two (lays to ])iteh the 100. General McClellan has ordered all the transports at command for carrying the sick and wounded, but many of them were unfit. Only two were fitted up, and I had not the means to fit more. I cannot afford the necessary details of medical officers for sick tranaports. ~urses, and particularly cooks, are not to be had. The bedding now on hand here is 2,524 blankets, 23 bed-sacks, and 24 pillow-ticks. I have this moment seen a bill of lading of 18 bales of blankets on board a traIIsl)ort in the river. The Elm City will be stationed here as a receiving ship for surgical cases, and will receive 400. Another that will take 200 will be ready at the end of the week. The 50 two-wheeled ambulances have arrived, but I am compelled to keep them for the sick, as the four-wheeled ambulances are not suffi- cient. It must be borne in mind that this army is in motion, and my prov- ince and hospitals extend from Yorktown to Williamsburg, thence to Cumberland and White House, and now our advance is 12 miles from the latter. I have to contrive for all this extent of country, and I have the aid of only one officer of experience on my staff. CHS. S. TIIIPLER, Medical Director. Surg. Gen. W. A. HAMMOND, Washington, D. C. [Appendix Si.] HEADQUARTERS ARMY OP THE POTOMAC, Med. Directors Office, Camp near New Bridge, Va., May 29, 1862. Sin: I have the honor to report that I have made contracts with nineteen physicians from Massachusetts and one from New Jersey, and that four others have reported, under contract, from Washington and NewT York. These have enabled me to suJ)J)ly the general hospitals at White House and at Yorktown, and to order to their regiments the medical officers who were left at those places with the sick. Should you be able to send me the others I have asked for I hope to be able to relieve this army from its I)resent embarrassments in this respect. The bedding and hospital furniture ordered to York River have reached the l)Lmrveyor. A considerable supply of stimulants has also come to hand (some of it, however, in bad order), -but no quinine has yet ar- rived. We are desperately in want of this article. Unless the sup- plies ordered from Philadelphia were sent by a special agent there is no calculation to be made as to when they will reach the purveyor. They may be afloat somewhere upon the York River for weeks and no inti- mation of their whereabouts given to the purveyor Page 202 202 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. !CIJAP. XXIII. I think that this army is now occupying a better locality, and that we may look for an improvement in the health of the men. Still, rains are very frequent, and some of our camps are in consequence damp and wet. The excitement of being in presence of the enemy, and the daily expectation of a conflict and occasionally the actual occurrence of one, will tend to keep the men in better health and spirits. The rains keep the roads in shocking condition. We have great difficulty in getting up supplies. The railway is in ~vorking order to within from 3 to 15 miles of our several camps. This is of much assistance. Still, its capacity in rolling stock is very limited, and there are no suitable cars for carrying sick and wounded. I have used the covered freight cars for transporting sick, but could only take 100 at a time. The great difficulty, however, is in getting the men over the roads to the railroad station. [had calculated that we should fight our great battle before Rich- mond, and, if successful, we should have the whole city, if necessary, for a hospital; but this anticipation has not been realized so far. We had a smart affair on our right the day before yesterday, in which we had near 200 wounded. The exact number is not yet rel)ortcd to me. We are now bringing them here in ambulances, a distance of some 15 miles. I cannot send wounded men over the road to the station in its present condition, and so have to make temporary provisions for them here. This I find very difficult. If the number of wounded increase it will be a very serious matter. I have floating hospitals at White House for 2,000 men, but to get 1 11cm (lown there is the great diffi- culty. I have authorized and directed Mr. Olmstead, of the Sanitary Com- mission, to purchase a cargo of ice for distribution to the hospitals ashore and afloat in the York River. This has been dof~c. I have also directed the medical purveyor to purchase one hundred cases of portable soup for distribution to the several regiments and independent commands of the army. So many frauds have been practiced upon the service by malingerers that I have been reluctant to send any more of our sick to the North. We never get any back that have been sent there, and I know there are hundreds in New York who ought to be in the field. Still, I think I shall be compelled to send off another transport from White House with some 400 men. I infer from your last letter that they can be received in Washington, and will send them there. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, CilS. S. TRIPLEII, Medical Director Army of the Potomac. Brig. Gen. W. A. IIAxIMoND, Surgeon. General. [Appendix s2.] HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Medical Directors Office, June 11, 1862. Are the regiments of your command prepared with all necessary medicines, instruments, and dressings for the fieldG? If by careful exam- ination you find that deficiencies exist, you will cause the surgeons to make out the necessary requisitions, and you will detail one medical officer to proceed with the whole of them to the medical [)urveyor a Page 203 CHAP. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 203. the White House, in order that the needed supplies may be brought ujy with as little delay as possible. CHS. S. TRIPLEB, Medical Director. Surg. J. F. HAMMOND, Second Corps. Brigade Surgeon HAMILTON, Fourth Corps. Assistant Surgeon MILHAU, Third Corps. Written to Dr. LYMAN, Porters Corps. Dr. BROWN, Franklins Corps. Dr. ilAssoN, Cookes Cavalry Corps. rAppendix 53.] HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Medical Directors Office, Camp Winfield Scott, May 2, 1862. COLONEL: In view of present circumstances and the necessity that you should be advised of what will l)robably be needed for this army, I have to say that, in my opinion, a vigorous resistance will be made at this point. It is the part of prudence at all events to be l)rcpared for it.. It is impossible to establish hospitals on this Peninsula for our sick and wounded. The chinate, the means of suitable supplies of bedding, stores, and a medical staff, as well as the certainty of an immediate forward movement after the capture of Yorktown, alike forbid the attempt. We must, then, send elsewhere the sick and wounded. I cannot foresee at what time transportation for this purpose will be needed, or in what quantities at a time. We are now endeavoring to send 600 sick to New York. We have, as you know, the Commodore and Win. Whuldin, fitted up and ready for the wounded. They will ac- conimodate about 600. I expect to send the Commodore about four times to Fort Monroe, so that we can assume she will relieve us of about 1,000 to 1,200. We shall there have to send other transports to more distant parts. We have room for the following numbers: Annapolis, 250; Baltimore, 700; Alexandria, 400; Georgetown, 400; Washington, 1,500; Philadelphia, 600; New York, 2,000; Albany, 1,500; Fort Mon- roe, 1,000. 1 expect to want transportation to the Pill extent of this. list during the siege and immediately after the capture of Yorktown. We shall need a steamer for a hospital for wounded constantly at your landing. As one is loaded and dispatched another must take her place. For the sick we can from time to time make an approximate esti- mate; for the wounded we cannot. If; then, you can have as many boats fitted up with berths as will be necessary to make the trips re- quired to these several points, so as to have one or two constantly at the landing, it will meet the case. We want them well supplied with goo(1 water and with facilities for cooking. I will always eiideavor to give you as long notice as possible of special wants for the transporta- tion of sick. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, CHS. S. TIIIPLER, Surgeon and Medical Director Army of the Potomac. Lieutenant-Colonel IN~ALLS, Aide-dc- Camp and Quartermaster, Cheesemans Landin Page 204 204 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIIL [Appendix St.] HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE PoTOMAc, Medical Directors Office, White House, May 17, 1862. SIR: Your note of the 14th instant is now before me, being the first moment I have been able to command to attend to such matters for twelve days. It is impossible for me to make provision for relieving the several corps of this army of the men who report sick from (lay to day. Until this march such a thing was never heard of I have en- deavored to answer and satisfy such calls from the time the army left Yorktown. The consequence has been that as often as I have removed ~a detachment of sick from a regiment an equal number has demanded the same privilege immediately. This I feel sure is because the men expect by this means to be sent home. Not less than 1,200 men strag- gled in or were collected by my agents in the woods after Keyes corps left Warwick Court-House. The report made to me was that about 230 were left. A similar operation was repeated at Williamsburg, and now I find the same thing going on at Cumberland and here. If a camp is changed, a load of sick who ought to be treated by their regimental surgeons is sent to me without authority of any kind. These men ought and must be treated in their regiments. The regulations of the army make it the duty of the quartermasters to transport the sick on a march when called on to do so by the medical officer. (Sec paragraph 1100.) If the practice that has prevailed for the last three months is permitted to go on it may save trouble to the regimental surgeoiis and quartermasters department, but it will destroy this army. If men can be sure of being sent home by being thrown upon the hands of the me(lical director of this army, the contagion of homesickness will spread till there is not a sound man left here to carry a musket. The medical directors of the corps must rely upon themselves for l)ro- viding necessary accommodations for the sick of their corps near their own l)ositions. What means you need I will furnish if it is possible. The purveyors boat is now at this landing, and if any of your regiments are in need of further supplies I will have them issued. I believe all requisitions that have been sent in from your corps have been filled. I am endeavoring to establish a general hospital here by pitching tents. In a few days I hope to be able to receive patients, but only such as absolutely reqnire to be thus treated. My hospital tents will furnish no l)etter shelter than those of the regiments. When patients are to be sent to the general hospital al)plicatiou mnnstbe made betbrelmand ,stating the iiuinber to be sent and tIme disease of each man. If they can be re- ceived, permission will be given to send theni in. When sent, the de- scriptive list must accompany them. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, CHS. S. THIPLER, Surgeon and Medical Director Army of the Potomac. Surg. J. B. BROWN, Fourth Corps dArm~e. [Appendix 5.] HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Medical Directors Office, ]lIay 27, 1862. SIR: I have the honor to report, in compliance with yours of May 22, ihat the general hospitals in this department are I. At Yorktown, Va., in houses in the town, in frame buildings pu Page 205 CHAP. XXIII.] GENERAI~ REPORTS. 205 up by the rebels, and in hospital tents. The medical officers attached are Brigade Surg. W. H. White, Volunteers; Drs. F. J. Ainsworth, Joel Seaverns, W. Lamb, Beurine Carpenter, F. A. Howe, Jonathan Brown, Henry H. Fuller, A. J. Cummings, J. II. Morse, 0-. S. Hitchcock, and J. Q. A. McAllisterall from Massachusetts, on contract. This hospital has been organized by one of my assistants, Dr. C. li. Green- leaf, U. S. Ar my, and until yesterday was officered by regimental med. ical officers left behind with their sick. After I had made the contracts with the Massachusetts gentlemen I sent eleven of them to relieve the coniniissioncd officers and ordered the latter to their regiments. II. At White House, Va. This hospital consists of 105 hospital tents at presentall I have been able to command. It will probably be ex- tended when more are received. One-half of these tents have been fur- nished with plank banquettes. The remainder will be similarly fur- nished when the lumber can be procured. Brigade Surg. J. H. Baxter7 Volunteer service, is at present in charge. He is to be relieved by Bri- gade Surg. A. T. Watson in a few days. Drs. Alexander Bicker, of New York; W. K. Fletcher, L. D. Seymour, Benj. Campbell, of Massa- chusetts; A. E. Stocker, Asa Milett, Joseph Underwood, Francis C. Greene, and F. LeB. Monroe are the surgeons in attendance. When this hospital was organized, the medical service was performed gratui- tously by Drs. Cogswell, Swinburne, Lansing, Willard, and Kneeland, of New York, and iDrs. Page and Hall, of Massachusetts. They were relieved on the 26th by the contract physicians above mentioned. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, OHS. S. TRIPLER, Surgeon and Medical Director Army of the Potomac. Brig. Gen. W A~. HAMMOND, Surgeon- General U. S. Army, Washington, D. C. [Appendix T.] HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Medical Directors Office, June 22, 1862. GENERAL: I have the honor to report that in obedience to your instructions I proceeded to White House on Friday afternoon (20th), and returned yesterday. I called upon Colonel Ingalls, and in com- pany with him examined the house known as the White House as well as the outbuildings, grounds, and spring. The house is two stories in height, with two small rooms on each floor, with a very small wing at each end on the lower floor, a cellar under the main building, and with no attic. The four rooms in the main building can each accommodate 5 l)atients. One of the wings can accommodate 3 or perhaps 4 l)atielmts; the other is a sort of pantry, and has on one 5i(lC the opening for the stairway to descend into the cellar. This room is unfit for any other purpose than a dispensary or kitcheii. The cellar is dark, damp, and foul, and, in my opimmion, should of itself forbid time occupation of the house as a hospital. The greatest num- ber of sick the house can accommodate is, then, 24, leaving n~ room for the n11r5C5. The outbuildimigs are entirely unfit for hospital pur- poses. The groumids consist of a lawn, shaded by locust trees, and a kitchen izarden. The lawn affords room for about 25 hospital tents. The kitchen garden is of loose soil, I)arts of it rather low, aimd imm wet weather would be muddy and uncomfortable. By ditching it might be drained. The spring is at the foot of the l2anh, near the dairy-house Page 206 206 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAI. XXIII. The water is good, similar to that of the other springs that have been prepared for the use of the men. The supply of water in the spring within the grounds is very scanty. The hospital steward told me he had abandoned it, because he found it required two hours and a half to fill a barrel of water. The spring is inaccessible to wagons. it has always been at the service of the hospital. I inclose the order of Colonel Ingalls to this effect. If this house were used for hospital purposes it could only be made available for the quarters of the sur- geons attached and for a dispensary. The sick would require hospital tents upon the lawn. If the grounds were occupied in this way, as they are altogether insufficient for the whole establishment, it would necessitate the organization of a separate administrationsurgeons, cooks, stewards, & c.au expenditure of personnel that we caimot very well afford We have now 170 hospital tents pitched on the l)lailtatloll, well arranged and well policed; the camp well drained; the adminis- trition tents, the cooking apparatus, and the subsistence tents cen- trally located and convenient for all parties. Thirty-five more tents are on the ground, and are being pitched as the force at our disposal will allow. Sixty-five of these tents have plank floors. The remaining 35 of the first 100 would have been floored if the lumber bad been on hand. The delay in receiving this, howe ver, has developed an inter- ~sting and important fact: The mortality iii the floored tents has been very sensibly greater than in those without floors. I have directed the surgeon in charge to prepare tables showing the comparative rates of deaths in the two classes of tents for my information. If lumber is received, I will suspend the flooring of the remaining tents until these tables can be examined and the question set at rest. I must remark that although the whole of the tents occupied were in good police, and an air of comfort pervading them, still those without floors were decidedly superior in these respects to the others. In relation to the relative advantages of hospital tents and buildings for hospital purposes, I think that among those at all familiar with the subject there is but one 01)inionthat the tents are decidedly the be.st. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, (illS. S. TIIIPLER, Surgeon and Medical Director Army of the Potomac. General It. B. MARCY, Chief of Staff Army of the Potomac. [Appendix U.] HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Medical Directors Office, May 29, 1862. GENERAL: I have the honor to report that I am convinced a very large proportion of the number lost to our army from our camp at York- town to this point is due to the straggling that has been permitted, both in breaking up of encampments and on the line of march. Hundreds were collected in the woods and in houses and huts iii our old position at Camp Winfield Scott who were not borne upon the surgeons reports. I sent out officers to search for these men, and of many who could not be collected in this way we heard by accident, and brought them in after days of privation had brought on actual disease. It would seem there could have been no roll call before the troops took up their line of march, 50 all along the line of march whoever pleased would drop out, lie by in the woods out of sight, and then for days would be stra Page 207 CHAP. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 207 gling to the rear in search of shelter. I believe they have all been gathered in. Certainly every effort has been made to effect this object. I have been officially informed that Caseys division has lost some 3,500 men within the last two months from sickness and straggling combined. I am further l)ersuaded that a large iiumber of men have found their way to the hospitals at the North in our transports who were perfectly well, at least when they arrived. Dr. Satterlee wrote me in a letter, received yesterday, that he had seen numbers of snch in New York. Wiieii orders have been issued to send the sick to the general hospitals in transports, owing to the general neglect to send descriptive lists with the men there have been no means of ascertaining whether those who found their way on board were authorized to do so or not. I would suggest, then, that the most stringent orders should be issued that no man shall be sent to a hospital at the rear, whether on shore or afloat, without his descriptive list and a report from the surgeon of his regiment to accompany him; these reports and descriptive lists to be handed to the medical director of the corps or the senior medical officer of the independent command before the men are permitted to leave their regi- mental hospitals. When these lists are presen4ed, the medical director of the corps or other senior medical officer to inquire of the nle(lical director of the army by telegraph where these men shall be sent, and shall inform him exactly how many there are. No man to be sent to general hospital who is beyond all hope of recovery. Where the point to which the men are to be sent is indicated, the quartermaster of the corps to make provision for their transportation to the railway and for cars to convey them to the transports or general hospital at White House. I have also to suggest the propriety of taking some measures to have the well men of this army now in the Northern hospitals sent back to their regiments. I feel confident that more than 1,000 men perfectly fit to join their regiments are now idle in the general hospitals. I have given or(lers to this effect at Yorktown and White House and have no no (loubt they are obeyed in these hospitals. I would further recommend the prohibition of huckstering at White House and Yorktown, as well as near any of our camps. Much mischief is done by the sale of improper articles of food to the men. Milk, corn bread, fresh vegetables, and eggs are unexceptionable, but all other articles should be forbidden. It would be well to limit the sale of the proper articles to some particular locality at White House and York- town, so that it could be readily and frequently inspected by some offi- cer, to insure the exclusion of all forbidden articles. Yery respectfully, your obedient servant, CHS. S. TRIPLER, AS~urgeon and Medical Director Army of the Potomac. Brig. Gen. S. WILLIAMS, Assist ant Adjutant- General. [Appendix U21 HEADQUARTERS ARMY OP THE POTOMAC, Medical Directors Office, June 14, 1.862. GENERAL: Surg. J. F. Hammond, medical director of Sumners corps, having telegraphed me this mornimig that there were some signs of scurvy in that corps, I sent Dr. A. K. Smith over at once to investi- gate the matter. Dr. Smith reports to inc that he found six cases i Page 208 208 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIII. the Nineteenth and Twentieth Massachusetts Regiments, Danas bri- gade, and several more acquiring the predisposition to scurvy. General iDana informed Dr. Smith that lie had been unable to obtain vegetables (such as potatoes) for his men for a long time. Paragraph 1202, General Regulations, confines the issue of anti-scor- butics to the sick, and then they are to be paid for out of the hospital ftind. 1 think, however, that potatoes have been made part of the ration by act of Congress. It is certain that vegetables are absolutely necessary to prevent scurvy, and if, as in our l)resent circumstances, they cannot be purchased by the men, the Subsistence Department mnst supply them, or the men will become scorbutic. I have ordered a supply of lemons and cream of tartar from White House to Sumners corps. I have also telegraphed to Colonel Clarke to issue, if possible, potatoes, dried apples, pickles, and desiccated vegeta- bles to the men, and have promised to furnish him with any authority he needs that I can procure. I think the issue of these first articles absolutely necessary, and have no doubt it will speedily arrest the di~- ease. The desiccated vegetables are less reliable, as the men dislike to use them. They should, however, be compelled to do so. Potatoes come in this shape, an& I believe the commissary has them on hand. I have the honor to recommend that fresh potatoes, fresh onions, dried aI)ples, and desiccated vegetables be immediately ordered to be issued as parts of the daily ration, and that commanding officers be charged with the duty of seeing them daily and properly used. As I am closing this letter I receive the following dispatch from Colonel Clarke in reply to my telegram. Potatoes, dried apples, and desiccated vegetables have been sent to the depot near Fair Oaks Station, from which General Sumners corps draws its supplies. More will be sent. I do not know a single command in which Special Orders, 155, Headquarters Army of the Potomac, have been complied with. Could not the medical directors insist on having it carried out in their respective corps? The means, then, of preventing scurvy have always been ready for issue in the subsistence department. The responsibility for its occur- rence rests with those who have neglected to use these means. I think stringent orders necessary to compel regimental officers to see that their men are l)rovided with and habitually use these necessary articles. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, CIIS. S. TRIPLER, Miedicat Director Army of the Potomac. General iR. B. MARCY, Chief of A~taff Army of the Potomac. [Appendix Us.] HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Medical Directors Office, June 17, 1862. SIR: In compliance with instructions in your letter of June 2, in reference to my report of the existence of scurvy in this army, ! have the honor to state that I received a telegram from headquarters while I was engaged at White House in organizing a general hospital, intorin- ing me of the appearance of scurvy in two brigades, and (lirecting me to send for lime-juice, & c. I telegraphed you on the 21st of May for lemons in obedience to that order, expressing at the time a doubt of the accuracy of the report. This doubt was based on the fact that one of the brigades was that of the regular imiftuitry. I knew that these troops had been furnished with (Iesiccute([ vegetables, amid that som Page 209 CHAP. XXIII] GENERAL REPORTS. 209 of them had used them regularly. Orders for this issue had been pro- mulgated long before, as well as instructions as to the method of cook- ing to be adopted by the troops. I called upon the chief commissary to inquire into the matter, and learned that the men very generally refused to use the desiccated vegetables; that he had abundance of them, and could not get rid of them. Even potatoes had been suffered to rot upon his hands and in the camps. A general order was again applied for and issued on the 23d of May, requiring the troops to draw and use the desiccated vegetables in soup daily, unless prevented by being actually on the march; prohibiting the frying of meat, and commanding it to be always roasted or boiled. Upon my arrival at headquarters I inquired into the grounds of the 1el)ort, and learned that it had been made by the medical director of General F. J. Porters corps, Dr. George II. Lyman. This gentleman, one of the ablest and most energetic umedical officers of the volunteer service, informed me that he had not seen any cases, but had considered it his duty to make it known for prudential reasons as soon as it was mentioned to him by Brigade Surgeomi Waters and by some young assistant surgeon of the Regular Army. I sent for Dr. Waters, and found he had seen no cases; that it had been reported to him by some volunteer regimental surgeon. I directed him to have time men brought to me immediately for inspection, He subsequently rel)orted to me that the patients had been sent to the general hospital at White House. A short time afterward I visited this hospital, and there found two cases sent down as cases of scurvy. I examined them. One had no signs of scurvy about him ; the other was a rather robust man, with an erythematous patch upon one shin, swelling of the leg and knee, discoloration of the hams, without hardness, and with no swelling or sponginess of the gums. The affection caine on, according to the ac- count of the patient, in one night, from sleeping without shelter after a hard days march through deep mud. I could not consider this case scorbutic under the circumstances, and accordingly, feeling relieved as to the fact, I reported that no scurvy existed in this army. About this time the lemons arrive(l and were distributed through the several corps darm6e. On the 14th June, Surg. J. F. Hammond, medi- cal director of Smuners corps, reported to me by telegraph that there were some cases of scurvy in that corps, and requesting a further sup- i~Y of lemons. I ordered to him immediately all that remained of the consignment, as well as a quantity of cream of tartar. I then sent my senior assistant, Dr. A. K. Smith, to insl)ect the men said to be affected. His report I inclose.* Upon receipt of this I telegraphed to Colonel Clarke, commissary of subsistence at White House, a request to send l)otatoes, dried apples, and pickles to Sumners corps. He replied that these articles were at the depot from which General Sumner drew his supplies and that he would send more. I also addressed a letter on the subject to General Marcy, chief of staff, to endeavor to get some more stringent orders issued on this important matter. I inclose a copy of that letter. I have seen Colonel Clarke since, and he assures me his assistant commissaries have not been able to make the men use the desiccated vegetables; that he had plenty of them, and they were always ready for issue. If the men will not use the means of l)revent- ing scurvy, and if their officers will not make them use them, cases of the liscase must be expected to occur. To meet the cases existing I telegraphed you yesterday for a further Not found. 14 R RVOL X Page 210 210 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIII. supply of lemons, and 1 am issuing cream of tartar wherever I hear any signs of the disease. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, OHS. S. TRIPLEIR, Surgeon and Medical Director Army of the Potomac. Brig. Gen. W. A. HA~n1oNn, Surgeon-General U. S. Army. No. 11. Report of Surg. Jonathan Letterman, U. S. Army, Medical Director Army of the Potomac, of erperations from July 4 to September 2. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Med. Directors Office, Camp near Falmouth, Va., Mar. 1, 1863. GENERAL: In compliance with the directions contained in your com- munication of January 20, 1863, I have the honor to submit the follow- lug report of the operations of the medical department of this army from July 4, 1862, to November 7, 1862, viz: In obedience to orders from the War Department, dated June 23, 1862, I reported on the 1st day of July following to General McClellan at Haxalls Landing, on the James River, for duty as medical director of the Army of the Potomac, and after the arrival of the army at Har. risons Landing was placed on duty as such on the 4th day of that month. I attempted on the 28th of the previous month to report to the corn- manding general from the White House on the Pamunkey River, but was prevented from doing so by the movements of the aimy, and was compelled i~o proceed by way of Fortress Monroe and the James River to his headquarters. The change which was taking place in the posi- tion of the army when I left the White House rendered it necessary that the medical supplies and the transports for the wounded and sick should also be sent up the James River to meet the wants of the army. - Upon inquiry, not ascertaining that any orders had been issued in the case, I assumed the authority, and directed Assistant Surgeon Alexander, U. S. Army, the medical purveyor, and Assistant Surgeon T)uuster, U. S. Army, the medical director of transportation, to proceed up that river with their supplies and vessels with all possible dispatch. They reached Harrisons Landing in time to be of the greatest service. The army when it reached Harrisons Landing was greatly exhausted. The malaria from the borders of the Chickahominy and from the swamps throughout the Peninsula to which it had been so freely exposed now began to manifest its baneful effects upon the health of the men. In addition to this the troops, just previous to their arrival at this point, had been marching and fighting for seven days and nights in a country abounding in pestilential swamps and traversed by streams greatly swollen by the heavy rains, which made that region almost a Sarbonean bog. The labors of the troops had been excessive, the excitement intense. They were called upon to subsist upon a scanty supply of food, and but little time even to prepare the meager allowance. They had little time for sleep, and even when the chance jresented itself it was to lie in the rain and mud, with the expectation of being called to arms at any moment. The marching and fightin Page 211 CHAP. xxm.~ GENERAL REPORTS. 211 in such a country, with such weather, with lack of food, want of rest, great excitement, and the depression necessarily consequent upon it, could not have other than the effect of greatly increasing the numbers of sick in the army after it reached Harrisons Landing. Scurvy had made its appearance before its arrival there, the seeds of which had doubtless been planted some months previously, and was due not merely to the want of vegetables, but also to exposure to cold and wet, working and sleeping in the mud and rain, and to the inex- perience of these troops in taking proper care of themselves under difficult circumstances. This disease is not to be dreaded merely by the numbers it sends upon the reports of sick. It goes much further, and the causes which give rise to it undermine the strength, depress the spirits, take away the energy, courage, and elasticity of those who do not report themselves sick, and who yet are not welL They do not feel sick, and yet their energy, their powers of endurance, and their willingness to undergo hardship are in a great degree gone, and they know not why. In this way it had affected the fighting powers of the army, and much more than was indicated by the numbers it had sent upon the reports of sick. All these influences were not without their effect upon the medical officers as well as upon the rest of the army. A number of them became sick from the exposure and privations to which they had been subjected, and those who did not succumb entirely to these influences were worn-out by the excessive labor reqi~ired of them during the campaign upon the Peninsula, and especially by the labor incident to the battles immediately preceding the arrival of the army at Harrisons Landing. The nature of the military operations unavoidably I)laced the medical department, when the army reached this point, in a condition far from being satisfactory. The supplies had been exhausted almost entirely or had from necessity been abandoned; the hospital tents had been almost universally abandoned or destroyed; the arrangement of the ambulances was not in such a state as to render very effective service, and the circumstances under which the army was placed required a much larger number of medical officers to perform the duties which were thrown upon that portion of the staff. It was impossible to obtain proper reports of the number of the sick in the army when it reached Harrisons Landing, nor had the causes just referred to produced their full effects. After about 6,000 had been sent away on the transports 12,795 remained. The data on which to base the precise percentage of sick and wounded could not be obtained at this date, but from the most careful estimate which I could make in the absence of positive data the sickness amounted to at least twenty per cent. On the 1st of July I directed the Harrison house to be taken and used as a hospital, as it was the only available building for the pur- pose in that vicinity, although entirely inadequate to meet the wants of the army. Only a few wall tents could be obtained at that time with which to enlarge the capacity of the hospital. No hospital tents could be procured. The rain began to fall heavily early on the morning of the 2d, and continued with little interruption until the evening of the 3d. A few wounded came to the hospital on the 1st and on the 2d, and thereafter for several days they came in great numbers. Relays of medical offi- cers were required to work day and night, and continued to work faithfully until all the wounded who desired assistance had received it Page 212 212 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIII. The absence of tents prevented shelter being provided, and the vast majority, being slightly wounded, were obliged to find protection from the rain as best they could, the more serious cases being kept in the building. The labors of the medical officers were excessive, but no relaxation was given until all who required treatment had received it. The greatest difficulty experienced at this time was providing proper food, which very many needed much more thaii any medical or surgical aid. Very soon large caldrons and supplies of beef stock were obtained from the medical purveyor and hard bread from the commissary de- partment, by means of which an excellent soup was prepared and freely issued, relays of cooks being at first employed night and day. This hospital was afterwards sufficiently enlarged by hospital tents to coii- tam 1,200 patients, and when the army left Harrisons Landing the tents were removed to Craney Island, near Fortress Monroe, and a hos- ital established there by Surgeon Stocker, U. S. Volunteers, who con- ducted the removal and the re-establishment of the hospital speedily and well. The transports for the sick and wounded, except those that had been sent North from the Pamunkey River, reached the army on the 2d of July. These vessels were fitted up with beds, bedding, medicines, hiosl)ital stores, food, with many delicacies, and with arrangements for their preparationeverything, indeed, that was necessary for the comfort and well-being of the wounded and sick. Surgeons, stewards, and nurses were assigned to their respective boats, and remained with them wherever they went. I doubt if ever vessels have been so completely fitted up for the transportation of sick and wounded of an army as these vessels had been by the orders of the Surgeon-General. The shipment of the wounded and sick began on the 2d of July in the rain, and was continued day and night until a very large number had been sent away. The want of shelter and proper acconimodations at that time at Harrisons Landing rendered it necessary to send aw-ay many who under more Thxorable circumstances would iiot have been sent out of the army. The weather was so inclement and the mud so excessive that there was an evident disposition on the l)alt of medical officers to look leniently upon any case of sickness or of wounds which presented itself. Had they not been sent on board they must have remained out in the rain and mud, without shelter and without proper food. On the 15th of July about 7,000 had been sent to Fortress Monroe and North. This number having been sent away a large number still remained, and dun ng the first week whilst the shipment was in progress the troops were feeling seriously the effects of the late campaign. The deadly malaria was now producing its full effects and together with the want of proper food and the exposure to the rains which had fallen so continuously, and the fatigues endured, was now being fully manifested in the prevalence of malarial fevers of a typhoid tyl)e, diarrheas, and scurvy. Whilst the shipment of wounded and sick was going on, and as soon as the ~)ressing necessities of the first few days were provided for, my attention was given to ascertaiii the most expeditious meth~d of improving the health of the army. The results of the investigations made and the means considered proper for adoption (many of which had been enforced before it was written, the good effects of which were daily apparent) in the case were set forth in a cominumcation I transmitted to you on the 18th of July. An extract from this communication was published to the army in orders, and from this extract I quote the following, in order to recall to your mind th Page 213 CHAP. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 213 views which I then had the honor of submitting for the consideration of the commanding general, viz: The diseases prevailing in our army are generally of a mild type and are not in- creasing. Their chief causes are, in my opinion, the want of proper food (and that improperly prepared), exposure to the malaria of swamps and the inclemencies of the weather, exces~sive fatigue, and want of natural rest, combined with great excitement of several days duration, and the exhaustion consequent thereon. I would recom- mend, to remedy these evils, that food, with abundance of fresh vegetables, shelter, rest, with a moderate amount of exercise, be given all the troops, and general and per- sonal police be enforced. To accomplish this I would suggest that an abundant sup- Ply of fresh onions and potatoes be used by the troops daily for a fortnight and thereafter at least twice a week, cost what they may; that the desiccated vegetables, dried apples or peaches, and pickles be used thrice a week; that a supply of fresh bread, by floating ovens or other methods, be distributed at least three times a week; that the food be prepared by companies and not by squads, and that there be twe men detailed from each company as permanent cooks, to be governed in making the soups and cooking by the inclosed directions; that wells be dug as deep as the water will permit; that the troops be provided with tents or other shelter to i)rotect theni from the sun and rain, which shall be raised daily and struck once a week and placed upon new ground; the tentes dabris also to be placed over new ground once a week; that the men be required to cut pine tops, spread them thickly in their tents, and not sleep on the ground; that camps be formed not in the woods but at a short distance from them, where a free circulation of pure air can be procured, and where the ground has been exposed to the sun and air to such an extent as to vitiate the noxious ex- halations from damp ground saturated with emanations from the human body and from the decaying vegetation. Sleep during the day will not compensate for the loss of it at night, and I suggest that as far as possible the troops be allowed the natural time for rest; that not more than two (Irills per day be had, one in the morning fioui ti.15 to 7 and one in the evening from 6230 to 7.15; that the men be allowed to sleety until sunrise, and that they have their breakfast as soon as they rise. This, with the labor required for policing, will be sufficient during the present season. That when troops march they should have breakfast (if only a cup of coffee) before starting, and after their arrival in camp each man be given a gill of whisky in a canteen three- fourths filled with water. I would also recommend that the strictest attention be paid to policing, general and special; that all the troops be coumpelled to bathe once a week, a reginment at a time, if possible, being marched to the river, from a brigade, one hour after sunrise or an hour and a half before sunset, to rem aiim in the water fifteen minutes; that sinks be dug and used, 6 inches of earth being throwim into them daily, and when filled to within 2 feet of the surface new sinks to be dug and the old ones filled up; that holes be dug at each company kitchen for the refuse matter and filled in like manner; that the entire grounds of each regiment be thoroughly policed every day, and the refuse matter, including that froum stables and wagon-yards, be buried 2 feet below the surface or burned; that dead animals and the blood and offal froum slaughtered animals be not merely covered with a layer of earth, but buried at least 4 feet under ground; that the spaces between regiments be kept policed, and no nuisance whatever be allowed anywhere within the limits of this army, and that regimental commanders be held strictly accountable that this most important matter is attended to. I think if these suggestions be carried into effect that we may witis. reason expect the health ot this army to be in as good a state as that of any army in the field. Every effort is being mnade by the commissary and quartermasters departments to provide such articles as I have mentioned belonging to their departments. This extract will, perhaps, be sufficient to explain the views enter- tained by me on this subject, so vital to the army and to the country.. After about 7,000 sick an(l wounded had been sent away there remained 12,9Th, making a total of nearly 20,000. The greater por- tion of the army reached Harrisons Landing on the 2d of July. On that day I addressed a letter to the Surgeon-General, asking that 1,00~ hospital tents and 200 ambulances might speedily be sent for the use of the army. I felt convinced that great destitution in tents would be found to exist and that many ambulances had been lost, and that it would be necessary to have both of these articles replaced. The tents I consi(lered would be especially needed to shelter the wounded and sick, whom it would be desirable to keep with the army. No one thing so much disheartens troops and causes homesickness among those wh Page 214 214 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXI1I are well as sending sick to hospitals outside of the army to which they belong. Such was the experience of the armies in the Crimea~, and such is the experience of all armies. On the 7th of July the following communication was sent to me from Washington by the Quartermaster. General: You were this day telegraphed as follows, viz: Have ordered tents for 50,000 men sent to Harrisons Landing. Few hospital tents on hand; more making. For the present I advise the use of some of the wall tents lately shipped to Harrisons Land- ing. But why not send your sick and wounded at once to Fort Monroe, to be trans- ferred to a healthier place? Sick and wounded are not useful at such a place as that at Harrisons Landing. On the 9th of July General Meigs informed me that he had ordered 200 ambulances from Philadelphia and 250 hospital tents from Wash- ington to Fortress Monroe, saying the remaining 750 hospital tents will be forwarded as soon as made. Three hnndred hospital tents reached Harrisons Landing on the 18th of July. On the 1st of August I was informed that a large number had arrived, together with a number of ambulances. The tents, as far as they were needed, were used for the accommodation of the sick. The ambulances were dis- tributed before we left. Before the communication to you of July 18 was written the existence of scurvy attracted my serious consideration, and upon consultation with Colonel Clarke~ the chief commissary of the army, large supplies of pota- toes, onions, cabbage, tomatoes, squash, and beets and fresh bread were ordered by him. The first arrival of anti-scorbutics was on the 7th of Jnly; potatoes and onions arrived on the 20th, and thereafter the sup- plies were so abundant that potatoes, onions, and cabbage rotted at the wharf for want of some one to take them away. The fresh bread was eagerly sought for by the men, as they loathed the hard bread, which they had used for so many weeks. This loathing was no affectation, for this bread is difficult to masticate, is dry and insipid, absorbs all the secretions poured into the mouth and stomach, and leaves none for the digestion of other portions of the food. The craving for fresh bread was founded in reason, and was not a mere whim. In addition to these vegetables and fresh bread procured by the commissary department, 1,500 boxes of fresh lemons were issued by the medical purveyor to the various hospitals and to the troops. The beneficial effects of this treat- ment soon became perceptible on the health of the men, and when we left Harrisons Landing scurvy had disappeared from the Army of the Potomac. While the army remained at this place supplies of every kind apper- taming to the medical department were abundant and large amounts were issued; as it was found necessary to resupply almost the entire army. Ice was freely and almost continuously supplied by the med- ical purveyor to the general and regimental hospitals and to the trans- ports. The recommendations contained in the extract taken from my com- munication to you of July 18, which I have quoted, were ordered to be carried into effect by the commanding general. The subject of police throughout the army, I may here state, was called to your attention in a note addressed to you on the 12th of July. Inspections were made frequently by medical officers in the different corps, by officers sent Ul)Ofl this duty from the medical directors office, and by myself, to see that the instructions just alluded to were enforced. The duty was laborious, and especially so during the excessive heat in July and August. These inspections were purposely made irregularly, both as regards time an Page 215 CHAP. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 215 commands. The beneficial effects of the orders and the inspections were very evident in the improvement of the various camps and regi- mental hospitals. In a few regiments the sickness increased; in some others it remained nearly stationary, and in others it decreased one. half. On the whole, the health of the army was improving. On the 30th of July I informed the Surgeon-General that the number of sick in the army was about 12,000, 2,000 of whom could take the field. The cases became less severe and were manageable, more readily yielded to treatment, and continued so until the army evacuated Harrisons Landing. It is impossible to convey in writing to any one not mingling with the troops a true idea of the improvement which took place in the health of the troops while we were encamped at that place. The number re- ported sick on the regimental returns cannot by any means be taken as the true condition of the health of the army upon its arrival there. It does not give the real amount of its effective fighting strength. The want of proper nourishment, the poisonous exhalations from the streams and swamps of the Peninsula, the labor undergone2 and the anxiety felt had undermined the strength and withered the spirits of a great many who were apparently well. The effective strength of the army when it reached Harrisons Landing and for some time thereafter was less than the returns would indicate. And then, on the other hand, there are many ways in which improved health manifests itself that cannot be adequately described. There was so much in the appearance, in the life and vivacity exhibited by the men in the slightest actions, even in the tone of the voice, which conveyed to ones mind the impression of health and spirits, of recovered tenacity of mind and body, of the pres- ence of vigorons and manly courage, an impression which to be under- stood must be feltit cannot be told. The real strength of the army when it left Harrisons Landing was greater than the large number at that time sent on the transports for the sick would lead you to suppose. It was agreeable to notice that the measures adopted for the improve- ment of the health of the troops were so ably and so cordially seconded 1)y the medical directors of corps, that by their exertions and that of the officers under them encouraging results were brought about, and that they ~vere so able and so willing to assist in restoring the health and re-establishing the vigor of the Army of the Potomac. Time showed that those who were not sick were well, that the spfrits of the troops had risen, and that the army when it left Harrisons Landing was in a better condition by far than when it reached that place, and that there was every evidence to expect the health of this army to be in as good a state as that of any army in the field. From the 15th of July the transports for the sick were chiefly em- ployed in bringing over wounded and sick exchanged prisoners from Richmond and carrying them to the Northern cities, principally -to Baltimore, Philadelphia, and New York. They were almost wholly occupied in this duty until the 3d of August, at which time the last were received at City IRoint. Shortly after communication was opened with the Confederate authorities; large supplies of fresh lemons, brandy, lint, & c., were, by direction of the general commanding, sent to City Point, to be turned over to them for the use of the wounded, but would not be received by them, and were returned. As the general coin- manding visited the vessels as they returned from that place loaded with our wounded and sick, he will, doubtless, remember the pains takeii to have these men in every respect well cared for. I inspected every vessel before it was allowed to leave for the North, that I migh Page 216 216 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIII. be certain that everything was done, and done properly, that was neces- sary for the welfare of those on board. Three thousand eight hundred and forty-five sick and wounded were thus transported. After this time a portion of these transports, which had been while North taken from their legitimate use, were occupied in carrying exchanged Confederate prisoners from the North to City Point. On the return of these boats from this service to Harrisons Landing they were found to be excessively filthy, and required a great deal of labor to render them again suitable for the transportation of the sick. The use of these vessels in this way embarrassed me. On the 6th of August I informed the Surgeon-General by telegraph that I sent away yesterday 700 sick from the army. My boats are in use with the Con- federate prisoners. If my boats are thus interfered with by the authorities beyond this army, I hope I shall not be held accountable if the sick of this army are not prop- erly sent away. On the 3d of August the shipment of the sick from the army coni- menced, and was carried on as rapidly as the transportation could be obtained. It will be perceived from what I have just said that I had at my disposal only a portion of the boats set apart for that purpose, and the hospitals I had drawn plans for, and which the commanding general had directed the chief quartermaster to procure, were not allowed. These two things alone embarrassed me much. The following extract from a letter I addressed to the Surgeon-General will show to some extent the difficulties in the way of the rapid shipment of the sick under which I labored on the 13th of August: I left on the 10th of August 150 hospital tents at Fort Monroe to be pitched near the Mill Creek hospital, and to-day have had 200 more sent from here, and have sent As- sistant Surgeon McMihlan to superintend putting them in order, and have sent Assist- ant Surgeon McClellan to superintend the hospital near Camp Hamilton. The tar(li- ness exhibited at Fort Monroe in the erection of that hospital has been a 5Ct10U5 annoyance. From. the appearance of things at Point Lookout I shall be surprised if the hospital there is ~nished before the 1st day of Noveiuber proximo. From this state of things and from the fact of the hospitals which were sent for by Lieutenant- Colonel Ingahls, chief quartermaster of this aruly, some time since, the plans for which were drawn up by me, and which were ordered to be carried into effect by General McClellan, having been refused, as I am informed, by General Halleck, I have been more seriously embarrassed. These buildin~s were to have been erected about this time at such point as I should have selected, an(l would have contained about 3,000 sick, and this army would be able to move. Some of the sick transports have been nsed for other purposes, carrying Confederate prisoners and General Burusides troops and loaded with supplies. All this has caused serious delay in removing the sick from this point, and have been circumstances over which no one here has any control. Colonel Ingalls made every effort iii his power to aid in removing the sick, and placed at different times boats temporarily at my disposal for this purpose, amouuting in all to ten. Some of these could make but one trip; others made more, and carried in all, from the 9th to the night of the 15th of Angust, 5,945 men; 1,908 were sent away before the 9th on the regular transports. The total number sent away con- sequent upon the movement of the army was 14,159. The largest nuin- ber of boats was obtained on the 15th, and on that day and night 5,629 were sent away. This fact will, I think, lead the commanding general to believe that the medical department was not idle. The delay arising from the use of the transports for purposes other than that for which they were designed it was impossible for me to avoid, and at the same time was the cause of another serious evilthe want of time to have the cases to be sent away properly examined. From this cause many were taken on board who should not have been received. Many cases wer Page 217 CHAP. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 217 sent from regiments which had marched by colonels or captains, with- out the knowledge of the medical officers, from negligence or favoritism, who were fully able to do the duty required of them, and under the cir- cumstances it became necessary to send them on the boats. This state of things could have been prevented had the medical department Pill control of its vessels when the preparations were commenced to ship the sick. The delay occasioned by the causes I have alluded to rendered the case at last an emergt:icy, under the pressure of which it was impossible to have every case thoroughly examined. There are always numbers of skulkers and worthless men in the army who are on the watch for an opportunity to escape duty, and these are always the cases w-hich require the most careful examination; and these are the men who raise the cry of the inhumanity, want of attention, and cruelty of surgeons, which is so frequently taken up and echoed and re-echoed from one end of the country to the other. Out of 3,000 cases examined upon our arrival at Fortress Monroe 000 were fit for duty and ordered to their regiments. When the time and the means are considered it will, I think, be conceded that seldom have so large a number been transported without accident and without suffering. A careful and attentive medical officer was placed on each boat with medical supplie.s sufficient for use. Credit is very deservedly due to Dr. Dunster and the medical officers of the vessels for the manner in which this large number was transported and provided for. The labor was great. The supplies appertaining to the medical department were, owing to the excellent manner in which the purveying was performed by Assist- ant Surgeon Alexander, in every way abundant while at Harrisons Landing, and when the army left that place it was, so far as the medi- cal department was concerned, fully, ii might almost say elegantly, equipped with all that was requisite for another campaign. The subject of the ambulances, after the health of the troops, be- came a matter of importance. Medical officers and quartermasters had charge of them, and as a natural consequence little care was exercised over them, and they could not be depended upon during an action or on a march. It became necessary to institute some system for their man- agementsuch that they should not be under the immediate control of medical officers, whose duties, especially on the day of battle, prevented any supervision when supervision was more than at any other time required. It seemed to re necessary that whilst medical officers should not have the care of the horses, harness, & c., belonging to the ambu- lances, the system should be such as to enable them at all times to procure theni with facility when wanted for the purposes for xvhich they were designed, and to be kept under the general control of the medical department. Neither the kind nor the number of ambulances required were in the army at that time, but it nevertheless was neces- sary to devise a system that would render as available as possible the material upon the spot, particularly as the army might move at any time, and not wait for the arrival of such as had been asked for, only a portion of which ever came. In order to inaugurate a system which would make the best of the materials on hand and accomplish the objects just referred to, the following order was written and published by direction of the commanding general: GENERAL ORDERS, HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TIlE POTOMAC, No. 147. Camp near H(OTi8Ofl8 Landing, Va., Angust 2, 1~62. The following regulations for the organization of the ambulance corps and the management of ambulance trains are published for the information and governmen Page 218 218 ~ PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIII. of all concerned. Commanders of army corps will see that they are carried into effect without delay: 1. The ambulance corps will be organized on the basis of a captain to each army corps as the commandant of the ambulance corps, a first lieutenant for a division, second lieutenant for a brigade, and a sergeant for each regiment. 2. The allowance of ambulances and transport carts will be 1 transport cart, 1 four- horse and 2 two-horse ambulances for a regiment; 1 two-horse ambulance for each battery of artillery, and 2 two-horse ambulances for the headquarters of each army corps. Each ambulance will be provided with two stretchers. 3. The privates of the ambulance corps will consist of two men and a driver to each ambulance and one driver to each transport cart. 4. The captain is the commander of all the ambulances and transport carts in the army corps, under the direction of the medical director. He will pay special attention to the condition of the ambulances, horses, harness, & c., requiring daily inspections to be made by the commanders of division ambulances, and reports thereof to be made to him by these officers. He will make a personal inspection once a week of all the ambulances, transport carts, horses, harness, & c., whether they have been used for any other purpose than the transportation of the sick and wounded and medical sup- plies; reports of which will be transmitted through the medical director of the army corps to the medical director of the army every Sunday morning. He will institute a drill in his corps, instructing his men in the most easy and expeditious method of putting men in and taking them out of the ambulance, taking men from the ground and placing and carrying them on stretchers, observing that the front man steps off with the left foot and the rear man with the right, & c. He will be especially careful that the ambulance and transport carts are at all times in order, provided with attend- ants, drivers, horses, & c., and the kegs rinsed and filled daily with fresh water, that he may be able to move at any moment. Previous to and in time of action he will receive from the medical director of the army corps his orders for the distribution of the ambulances and the points to which he will carry the wounded, using the light two-horse ambulances for bringing men from the field and the four-horse ones for carrying those already attended to farther to the rear, if the medical director con- siders it necessary. He will give his personal attention to the removal of the sick and wounded from the field and to and from the ho3pitals, going from point to point to ascertain what may be wanted, and to see that his subordinates (for whose conduct he will be responsible) attend to their duties in taking care of the wounded, treating them with gentleness and care, and removing them as quickly as possible to the places pointed out, and that the ambulances reach their destination. He will make a full and detailed report after every action and march of the operations of the ambu- lance corps. 5. The first lieutenant assigned to the ambulance corps of a division will have com- plete control, under the commander of the whole corps and the medical director, of all the ambulances, transport carts, ambulance horses, & c., in the division. He will be the acting assistant quartermaster for the division ambulance corps, and will receipt and be responsible for the property belonging to it, and be held responsible for any deficiency in ambulances, transport carts, horses, harness, & c., pertaining to the am- bulance corps of the division. He will have a traveling cavalry forge, a blacksmith, and a saddler, who will be under his orders, to enable him to keep his train in order. He will receive a daily inspection report of all the ambulances, horses, & c., under his charge from the officers in charge of brigade ambulance corps, will see that the subordinates attend strictly to their duties at all times, and will inspect the corps under his charge once a week; a report of which inspection he will transmit to the commander of the ambulance corps. 6. The second lieutenant in command of the ambulances of a brigade will be under the immediate orders of the commander of the ambulance corps for the division and have superintendence of the ambulance corps for the brigade. 7. The sergeant in charge of the ambulance corps for a regiment will conduct the drills, inspection, & c., under the orders of the commander of the brigade ambulance corps, and will be particular in enforcing rigidly all orders he may receive from his superior officers. The officers and non-commissioned officers of this corps will be mounted. 8. The detail for this corps will be made with care by commanders of army corps, and no officer or man will be selected for this duty except those known to be active and efficient, and no man will be relieved except by orders from these headquarters. Should any officer or man detailed for this duty be found not fitted for it, representa- tions of the fact will be made by the medical director of the army corps to the medi- cal director of this army. 9. Two medical officers from the reserve corps of surgeons of each division, and a hospital steward, who will be with the medicine wagon, will be detailed by the medi- cal director of the army corps to accompany the ambulance train when on the march Page 219 CHAP. XXIII.l GENERAL REPORTS. 219 the train of each division being kept together, and will see that the sick and wounded are properly attended to. A medicine wagon will accompany each train. 10. The officers connected with the corps must be with the trains on a march, ob- serving that no one rides in the ambulances without the authority of the medical officers, except in nrgent cases; but men must not be allowed to suffer, and the offi- cers will, when the medical officers cannot be found, use a sound discretion in this matter, and be especially careful that the men and drivers are in their proper places. The place for the ambulances is in front of all wagon trains. 11. When in camp, the ambulances, transport carts, and ambulance corps will be parked with the brigade, under the supervision of the commander of the corps for the brigade. They will be used, on the requisition of the regimental medical officers, transmitted to the commander of the brigade ambulance corps, for transporting the sick to various poiut~ and procuring medical supplies, and for nothing else. The non- commissioned officer in charge will always accompany the ambulances or transport carts when on this or any other duty, and he will be held responsible that they are used for none other than their legitimate purposes. Should any officer infringe upon this order regarding the uses of ambulances, & c., he will be reported by the officer in charge to the commander of the train, all the particulars being given. 12. The officer in charge of a train will at once remove anything not legitimate, and if there be not room for it in the baggage wagons of the regiment will leave it on the road. Any attempt by a superior officer to prevent him from doing his duty in this or any other instance he will promptly report to the medical director of the army corps, who will lay the matter before the commander of that corps. The latter will at the earliest possible moment place the officer offending in arrest for trial for disobedience of orders. 13. Good serviceable horses will be used for the ambulances and transport carts, and will not be taken for any other purpose excepL by orders from these headquar- ters. 14. The uniform for this corps is: For privates, a greeA band 2 inches broad around the cap, a green half chevron 2 inches broad on each arm above the elbow, and to be armed with revolvers; non-commissioned officers to wear the same band around the cap as a private, chevrons 2 inches broad and green, with the point toward the shoulder, on each arm above the elbow. 15. No person will be allowed to carry from the field any wounded or sick except this corps. 16. The commanders of the ambulance corps on being detailed will report without delay to the medical director at these headquarters for instructions. All division, brigade, or regimental quartermasters having any ambulances, transport carts, am- bulance horses, or harness, & c., in their possession will turn them in at once to the commander of the division ambulance corps. By command of Major-General McClellan: S. WILLIAMS, A88i8tant Adjutant-General. Owing to the delay in receiving the printed copies the enforcement of the order was prevented until within a few days previous to the evacuation of Harrisons Lauding. As soon as they were received steps were at once taken to have the order carried into effect. The system being new and so radically different from any hitherto in vogue no little labor was required to put it in operation. As only a few days elapsed between the distribution of the order and our leaving Harri- sons Landing there were many details that could not be attended to. However, imperfectly as the order was carried into effect on the march from that place to Yorktown and Fortress Monroe, during which it was first tried, and from the cordial approval of the medical directors of corps who alluded to the subject after our arrival in Washington in the early part of September, J felt convinced the system would work well. The contrast exhibited during the battles fought by Gen- eral Pope in Virginia in the latter part of August between the action of the ambulances belonging to the Army of the Potomac, a few of which were able to reach the battle-fields, and those of corps in which the system ordered by General McClellan did not exist, I have been informed was very striking in favor of the former. At the battle of Fredericksburg, which took place on the 13th of December, 1862, this system, I may be allowed to say, was for the first time properly put i Page 220 220 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. (CHAP. XXIII. operation, and owing to the nature of that engagement severely tested. It worked very satisfactorily, not only to me, but also in the opinion of the general officers in command; all the wounded being brought from the field the same night, although the battle lasted until after dark, except those between the lines. While at Harrisons Landing, everything having been done that was. considered necessary and that time permitted to place the medical department on a proper footing for active service,little was required of me during onr march to Fortress Monroe, nor did anything occur in the medical department worthy of mention. Upon our arrival there steps were immediately taken to have the well men who had unavoid- ably been allowed to go on the transports to Fortress Monroe sep- arated from those unable to perform their duties, and sent to their regiments. Whilst the army was at Harrisons Landing the hospitals at Point Lookout, Fortress Monroe, and its immediate vicinity, Portsmouth, and. Newport News were within the jurisdiction of the Army of the Poto- mac, and all of them I visited. On the 1st of August there were in these hospitals 1,820 patients. During that month, including the hos- pital at Craney Island, to which I have already alluded, they received 5,191; ma king a total of 7,011. Of these 716 were returned to duty, 101 discharged, 4 sent on furlough, 9 deserted, 218 (paroled prisoners) sent to Annapolis, and 84 died, leaving under treatment 5,879 on the 31st of August. In these hospitals aimd camps 66 surgeons, 12 medical cadets, 12 hospital stewards, 537 nurses, and 126 cooks were on duty during the month of August. The army had to be transported by water from this place North. All the vessels that could be obtained (the transports fitted up for the sick, as well as others) were required by the quartermasters depart- inent for this object. It appeared that it was necessary to have the troops transported with rapidity, as they were sent with scarcely any baggage. From this it resulted that the ambulances and all their appurtenances were left behind, to be sent up as vessels could be spared for the purpose. Some of the vessels never arrived. A large portion of the medical supplies were also left behiud-~-in some cases everything but the hospital knapsackby orders of colonels of regi- ments, regimental quartermasters, and others; in some cases without the knowledge of the medical o~cers, in others notwithstanding their protest. For such acts as these medical officers have been severely censured, and they were censured afterward for not having the very supplies which had been left behind in this manner. From the date of the embarkation of the troops at Fort Monroe up to the time when the general was placed in command of the defenses of Washington I know personally but little of the medical depart- ment of the Army of the Potomac. It was not under my control.* * .* * * * * * Yery respectfully, your obedient servant, JONATHAN LETTERMAN, Surgeon, U. S. Army, and Medical Director Army of the Potomac. Brig. Gen. S. WILLIAMS, Assistant Adjutant-General, Army of the Potomac. Remain4er of report will appear in Series I, Vol. XIX, embracing operations of the Army of the Potomac from September 2 to November 9, 1~62 Page 221 CHAP. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 221 No. 12. Reports of lIfaj. All)ert J. ]Jliyer, Chief Signal Officer. CAMP NEAR HARRISONS LANDING, VA., July 18, 1862. GENERAL: I have the honor to submit the following preliminary re- port of services rendered by officers and men of the Signal Corps since the date of my communication of June 22.* The following-named officers have been exposed under fire in the dis- charge of their duties during the recent movement of this army, and in the engagements of June 25, 26, 27, 29, and 30, and July 1. In each case the officers have well performed the duties on which they were ordered, often under circumstances of dangerous exposure: In the engagement of June 25, with General F. J. Porters heavy bat- ter~es on our right and with General Hookers advance near the Will- iamsburg road: First Lient. W. S. Stryker, Twelfth West Virginia Volunteers Second Lieuts. J. C. Wiggins, Third New Jersey, and N. H. Camp, Fourth New Jersey, at General Porters batteries. Second Lients. W. G. MeCreary, One hundred and second Pennsylvania, and E. A. Denicke, Cameron Rifles, New York Volunteers, with General Hooker, near Williamsburg. At Mechanicsville, June 26: First Lients. B. F. Fisher, Third Penn- sylvania Reserves, and F. Birney, Twenty-third Pennsylvania Volun- teers. Second Lieuts. J. C. Wiggins, Third New Jersey; F. Homer, Sixth New Jersey, and Isaac Beckett, Fifty-sixth New York. At the battle of Gaines Mill, June 27: First Lieuts. B. F. Fisher, Third Pennsylvania Reserves, and F. Birney, Twenty-third Pennsylva- nia Volunteers. Second Lieuts. J. Gloskosky, Twenty-ninth New York Volunteers; J. C. Wiggins, Third New Jersey; N. H. Camp, Fourth New Jersey, and F. Homer, Sixth New Jersey. At the battle of Savage Station, June p9: Second Lients. J. C. Wiggins, Third New Jersey Volunteers; N. H. Camp, Fourth New Jersey Volunteers; F. W. Marston, Fortieth Pennsylvania Volunteers; W. H. R. Ned, Ninety-fifth Pennsylvania Volunteers; D. S. Tompkins, Fifth Michigan, and E. A. Denicke, Cameron Rifles, New York Volun- teers. At the battle of Malvern Hill, June 30: First Lieuts. L. B. Norton and G. H. McNary, Tenth Pennsylvania Reserves; F. Birney, Twenty- third Pennsylvania Volunteers, and Second Lieut. J. F. Robbins, Ninety- sixth Pennsylvania Volunteers. At the battle of Malvemn Hill, July 1: First Lients. B. F. Fisher, Third Pennsylvania Reserves; F. Ellis, Forty-second New York Volun- teems, and Charles Herzog, Forty-first New York Volunteers; Second Lients. Joseph Gloskosky, Twenty-ninth New York Volunteers, aiid F. W. Marston, Fortieth Pennsylvania Volunteers. These officems have been chiefly under artillery fire, which they have encountered from almost every variety of caliber and in almost every degree of intensity. They have been screened whenever it was prac- ticable from musketry fire. There have been narrow escapes, but no casualties. Two of the officers have been touched, their clothing torn by fragments of shell. The services of the following-named officers entitle them to especial mention: At the evacuation of the base of operations at White House Point, Va., and while that point was threatened with attack by the enemy, See Part III, p. 243 Page 222 222 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIII. comnmnication was for thirty-six hours maintained between the army on shore and the different gunboats of the flotilla in the Pamunkey covering that position. To the co-operation of the land and naval forces thus secured the success of that movement was in part due. For their services at this place are mentioned: First Lieuts. W. S. Stryker, Twelfth West Virginia Volunteers, and J. H. Hutchinson, Third Vermont, stationed on shore; First Lieut. James S. Hall, Fifty- third Pennsylvania Volunteers, on flag-ship Chocura. Th the engagement of June 25, at the advance of General Hooker upon the Williamsburg road the approach of the enemy, hidden by woods from our army, was observed by signal officers stationed in a tree trop, and the information was signaled to General S. P. Heintzel- man, commanding on the field. On this information some timely move- ments of our own forces were made. On this day, also, direction was given to a field battery near General Hookers position. For their services at this point are mentioned: First Lieut. C. S. Ken- dall, First Massachusetts Volunteers; Second Lieuts. NV. G. MeCreary, One hundred and second Peunsylania Volunteers, and E. A. Denicke, Cameron Rifles ,New York Volunteers. At the same day information was communicated by signal officers across the Chickahominy as to the range and effect of the fire of the heavy batteries stationed on Hogans and Gaines Hills, then occupied by General F. J. Porter, and firing npon the position of the enemy at Old Tavern. The officers who served with these batteries are already mentioned. At the battle of Mechanicsville signals were not nsed, the smoke settling so quickly upon the battle-field as to render them invisible. Under the circumstances, the officers were employed as reconnoitering officers, and by their observations gave some information as to the move- ments and position of the enemy and the direction of our artillery. At the battle of Gaines Mill signal communication was established on the field from the right and left flanks of our army, drawn up in line of battle, to the central position, occupied by General F. J. Porter. These stations were established prior to the engagement and maintained under fire until the action became general. For services rendered preceding and during this action are mentioned: Second Lieut. J. Gloskosky, Twenty-ninth New York Volunteers, sta- tioned at the end of Bridge No. 5 and in advance of the left wing First Lient. B. F. Fisher, Third Pennsylvania Reserves, and Second Lieut. J. C. Wiggins, Third New. Jersey Volunteers, with the right wing, and Second Lient. N. H. Camp, Fourth New Je~rsey Volunteers, stationed with the commanding general. On Sunday, June 29, at the commencement of the flank movement from the Chickahominy and preceding and at the commencement of the battle of Savage Station, reconnaissances of the position and of the advance of the enemy were made by signal officers, and reported by signals to Brig. Gen. W. F. Smith, near Dudleys house, and Briga- dier-General Sumner~ on the field of battle. For service on this occasion are mentioned: Second Lients. F. NV. Marston, Fortieth Pennsylvania Volunteers, and E. A. Denicke, Cam- eron Rifles, New York Volunteers, reporting to General Smith the movenients of the enemy from observatory station near Dudleys house; Second Lieut. J. C. Wiggins, Third New Jersey Volunteers, stationed near the railroad, in advance of the center of the line of battle.; First~ Lieut. F. Birney, Twenty-third Pennsylvania Volunt~rs, on the Will Page 223 CHAP. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 223 iamsburg road; Second Lieuts. F. W. Marston, Fortieth Pennsylvania Volunteers, and W. H. iR. Neel, Ninety-fifth Pennsylvania Volunteers, at the center. During the action Lients. N. II. Camp, E. A. Denicke, and J. C. Wiggins volunteered for a dangerous duty. Upon the arrival, du.ring the flank movement of this army to its present base, of the advance of the Fourth Army Corps, General E. D. Keyes commanding, upon the banks of the James River, communica- tion was at once established and afterward maintained between our army and the naval forces operating upon the river. During the battle of Malvern Hill, on the afternoon and night of June 30, communication [was had] between the forces on the field of battle and the general commanding the army on board the United States steamship Galena, while he remained on board that ship, and between the different gunboats taking part in the action, both prior to taking up their positions for action and after they had taken those positions. Communication was also had between the fleet and our forces at other points on the banks of the James River. The firing of the gunboats on this day was in great part directed by signals from the field of battle, and the shells were thus thrown with precision and effect. The officers upon the field were exposed to a serioi~is fire. For their services on this occasion are mentioned: First Lieut. G. II. McNary, Tenth Pennsylvania Reserves; First Lieut. F. Birney, Twen. ty-third Pennsylvania Volunteers, and Second Lieut. J. F. Robbins, Ninety-sixth Pennsylvania Volunteers, stationed near General Porters headquarters. First Lient. Charles llerzog, Forty-first New York Vol- unteers, on the left and near the advance. Second Lieut. W. G. Mc- Ureary, One hundred and second Pennsylvania Volunteers, at Haxalls house. First Licut. C. S. Kendall, First Massachusetts Volunteers, near the river bank. First Lieut. II. fl. Clum, Fifth Wisconsin Vol. unteers, on board United States steamship Galena. Second Lieut. A. B. Jerome, First New Jersey Volunteers, on board United States steam- ship Aroostook; and First Lieut. L. B. Norton, Tenth Pennsylvania Volunteers. During the battle of Malvern Hifl, July 1, and the operations of that day and the ensuing night, constant communication was kept up between our forces on land and on the fleet, co-operating at various points on the James River. There was communication also between different portions of our army on land and also between different ves- sels of the fleet. This communication was maintained by officers on the field, some of them exposed to a heavy fire. The positions occu- pied by officers, wherever stationed, on that day and night were those requiring arduous labor and involving serious responsibility. On this day, as on the preceding, the fire of the Navy was directed and regu- lated almost entirely by the signal officer from the battle-field and from ship to ship. For their services during this battle are mentioned: First Lieut. F. Biney, Twenty-third Pennsylvania Volunteers, and First Lieut. F. E. Yates, Fourth Excelsior Regiment, stationed near General F. J. Porter on the battle-field and communicating with the gunboats. First Lient. F. Ellis, Forty-second New York Volunteers; First Lieut. Charles Ii er- zog, Forty-first New York Volunteers; Second Lieut. J. Gloskosky, Twenty-ninth New York Volunteers, and Second Lient. F. W. Marston, Fortieth Pennsylvania Volunteers, stationed near the left advance. First Lient G. H. McNary, Tenth Pennsylvania Reserves, and Second Lieut. N. II. Camp, Fourth New Jersey Volunteers, near General lleintzelman, on the right. Second Lieut. J. C. Wiggins, Third Ne Page 224 224 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXITL Jersey Volunteers, and Second Licut. G. II. MeNary, Tenth Pennsyl- vania Reserves, and Second Lieut. W. G. MeCreary, One hundred and second Pennsylvania Volunteers, near General Porter. First Lieut. fl. It Clum, Fifth Wisconsin Volunteers, on board United States steam- ship Galena. Second Lient. Isaac Beckett, Fifty-sixth New York Vol- unteers, on board United States steamship Mahaska. Second Licut. E. A. Denicke, Cameron Rifles, New York Volunteers, and Second Lient. A. B. Jerome, First New Jersey Volunteers, on board the United States steamshfl Aroostook. First Lieut. C. S. Kendall, First Massachusetts Volunteers, on Haxalls house; and First Lieut. B. F. Fisher, Third Pennsylvania Reserves. In the movements of the night of July 1 and on July 2 from Malvern Hill to the position now occupied by this army; in obtaining and con- veying throughout the night of July 1 information to the general coin- manding the army, then on board the United States steamship Galena, as to those movements of the forces he had remained to superintend; in directing by his order on July 2 the position of the gunboat covering- the rear of the wagon train, and which repelled the attack of the enemy on that train; in establishing communication between general head- quarters on its arrival at this l)lace and the fleet; in the observation and the announcement of the approach of the enemy to shell this camp on July 3; in designating to the gunboats where they could have the opportunity to be of service to the army on that day, and in reconnoiter- ing and reporting upon the retreat of the enemy, valuable services were Tendered. For these services are mentioned: First Lient. II. H. Clum, Fifth Wisconsin Volunteers, on board United States steamship Galena; First Lieut. C. S. Kendall, First Massachusetts Volunteers; Second Lient. J. Gloskosky, Twenty-ninth New York Volunteers- Second Lient. J. C. Wiggins, Third New Jersey Volunteers, and Second Lieut. F. W. Mars- ton, Fortieth Peunsyl vania Volunteers. On June 3, just after the battle of Fair Oaks, while this army lay north of the Chickahominy, the pickets of the left wing, which was then south of the Chickahoininy, and the position of which was not before known to be at any point visible from the right wing, were discovered at a distance of 3 miles across the swamp by the signal officer on duty at Hogans house. Communication was had over the swamp and the fact established that part of our left wing was visible. The swanip was then impassable between the points, and the enemy held the ground between them. This communication was kept up for many days by officers exposed to and often under the artillery fire of the enemy. The records will show the importance of the messages transmitted and the bearing they had upon the movements of this army. The communi- cation was between the general commanding the army, Generals W. B. Franklin, F. J. Porter, and W. F. Smith. The officers most exposed on these stations have been once men- tioned. Others who served faithfully will be mentioned hereafter. I have the honor further to state, as in l)lace in this report of recent ol)erations with this army, the following will be claimed in a more de- tailed report as in reference to the value of the services rendered by these officers and men of the Signal Corps of the Army: 1st. That without the co-operation of the Army and Navy the evacu- ation at this base of operations at White House Point, Va., could or would not have been conducted with the system and success which marked it, and that co-operation could not have been obtained in an Page 225 CHAP. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 225 other way than by the presence of the signal officers detailed for that duty. 2d. That while the army occupied both sides of the Chickahominy in the engagement of June 25, in the battles of Mechanicsville and Gaines Mill, at the commencement of the flank movement to the James River, and the battle of Savage Station, information was procured by signal officers and intelligence transmitted un(ler circumstances which with- out their presence would have rendered its transmission impossible, and that this intelligence was useful. 3d. That in the battle of Malvern Hill intelligence transmitted upon the field of battle was useful, and that the entire naval force was wielded and directed by the general in command in a manner which would have been without the services of the corps impossible. 4th. It will be claimed for the corps that Lieut. W. G. McCreary, acting signal officer, from the observatory station established at Haxalls June 30, On the commencement of the attack on our rear, first dis- covered later in the afternoon the advance of the column of the enemy moving down the river and upon the left of our position, then at Mal- vein Hill; that this discovery was made by hini while the column was about 5 miles distant; that the column was watched by him until he had formed an estimate of its numbers; that its approach and its dis- tance from our left was then communicated by signals by him to Gen- eral McClellan, on board the United States steamship Galena; that the immediate movement of the gunboats to attack this column was conse- quent upon this information; that the movement was by the services of signal officers carried out more rapidly than it; could otherwise have 1)een done, and that by the promptness and intelligence with which the gunboats were enabled by signals to go into action and to direct their fire they contributed largely to the repulse of this column of the enemy. 5th. That by the arrival and by the fire at the proper time of the gunboats, directed, at the request of General McClellan on the evening of July 2, to repel the enemy, then attacking the rear of our wagon train, then near Harrisons Landing, the enemy was repulsed, and a serious confusion of the train and consequent loss was prevented. This movement would not have been so rapidly made had it been necessary to convey the orders and information otherwise than by the services of the signal corps. 6th. That within an hour after the arrival of this army at the James River the army was placed in co-operation with the naval forces, assist- ing it, and that then and in the battle ensuing, and up to the present time, the services of the entire naval forces on this station have been so secured and made available for action as they could in no other manner have beeii. A similar control of the fleet has been assured to this army throughout the campaign. I thus early state these facts, and claim such services to have been rendered by the corps, for the reason that the battles are recent and those are now l)resent by whom the propriety of the claims may be yen- fled. It may be important to the officers and men now composing the corps that their services should not be lost sight of, or some of them hereafter claimed to have been rendered by others. I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant, ALBERT J. MYER, Signal Officer, Major, U. S. Army. Brig. Gen. S. WILLIAMS, Assistant Adjutant-General, Army of the Potomac. 15 R RYOL X Page 226 226 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAr. XXIJJ. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER, Washington, D. (1., October 21, 1862. GENERAL: * * * * * * CAMPAIGN OF THE PENINSULA.* The last days of March were days of labor. The signal camp of instruction was abandoned. The detachments of instructors (of which mention has been made) were formed and ordered to the armies of Generals ilalleck and Butler. The office of the signal officer was, at the snggestion of Capt. Samuel T. Cushing, Second Infantry, U. S. Army, and acting signal officer, placed iu charge of that officer, who well arranged and superintended its duties while the army went through the campaign of the Peninsula. The Signal Corps of the Army of the Potomac was partially reorganized. A detachment of officers and men was assigned to each army corps. The last equipments for the field and camp were completed, and the corps was then ready to accompany any movement of the Grand Army. Whatever time was else unemployed was given to the vigorous practice in signals of those whose short ex- perience at the camp of iustructiou had rendered this practice neces- sary. As the embarkation took place at Alexandria the signal officers of each army corps were distributed among the vessels carrying those corps. The aid they gave in.the regulating, by the rapid telegraphing of messages, the embarkation of the forces, the facility with which the movements of the loaded transports were through them directed, and the precision they were able to cause in the arrangements for the ~e- barkation of the great bodies of troops at the end of the voyage were subjects of pleasing surprise and of favorable comments, official and unofficial, among the numerous generals and other officers who were witnesses. Especial mention was made, I am informed, by Maj. Gen. Fitz John Porter of the services rendered on this voyage by the signal detachment which, commanded by Lieut. H. L. Johnson, Fifth Con- necticnt Volunteers, and acting signal officer, accompanied the forces under ~eneral Porter. The detachment serving with General lleintzelman was so well appreciated that a detail from it was sent back by that general from Fortress Monroe to aid in the sailing of the divisions under General Hooker, which, then belonging to Heintzelmans corps, were to sail at a later date. The signal officers accompanying the corps commanded by General Keyes on the voyage down the Potomac were much em- ployed. The signal detachments commanded by Lients. N. Daniels, ThirdWisconsinVolunteers,and acting signalofficer,andF.Wilson, Fifth Pennsylvania Reserve Volunteer Corps, and acting signal officer, and assigned, respectively, to the corps commanded by Major-General Sumner and Major-General McDowell, did not accompany the move- ment of the Army of the Potomac at this time. On March 31 the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac, on board the steamer Commodore, moved from Alexandria. A reserve party of seven officers, with their flagmen, accompanied them. The enlisted men of this party, the horses, stores, and wagons, with the extra stores for the corps of the Army of the Potomac, were on the same day shipped upon a sailing vessel. On the evening of April 2 the steamer Commo- dore arrived at Fortress Monroe, Va. * The preceding portion of this report appears in Series I, Vol. V, pp.6976 Page 227 CHAP. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 227 On April 3 the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac were nom- inally stationed a mile north of Hampton, Va. But very few tents were pitched, however, and this camp could hardly with propriety be styled one. During the movement down the river it had been made known that a movement of combined land and naval forces against Yorktown was intended. As soon as headquarters had moved from the steamer Com- modore an interview was had with Commodore Goldsborough, then commanding the fleet near Fortress Monroe, and arrangements were made to send a detachment of signal officers and men on board the flo- tilla, then under orders to sail for Yorktown, under the command of Commodore Missroon. On the next day the army transport with stores, & c., arrived. A night of hard labor sufficed to discharge her, and early on the following morning the reserve signal detachment, fully equipped, with its stores and means of transportation, was ready for the field. A detachment of 3 officers and 6 men, commanded by Lieut. J. W. De Ford, Eleventh Pennsylvania Reserve Volunteer Corps, and acting signal officer, was ordered to the fleet. A few hours rest was given to men and horses, yet stiff from the voyage, an%I at sunset on the 5th of April the party moved toward the front. A rapid night march over roads crowded with immense trains of wagons, and through fields, to avoid obstacles else impassable, and part of a days toil through deep mud on narrow ways, encumbered with the impediments of a great army, brought the party on the afternoon of April 6 to the camping-ground, near Dr. Powers house, of the first regular camp of headquarters of the Army of the Potomac made on the Peninsula in time to pitch their tents with the first there pitching. The general advance of the Army of the Potomac had been made on April 4. On that night headquarters bivouacked at Big Bethel. On the following night they occupied a few uncomfortable sheds of a rebel cantonment near the now-selected encampment. In the general advance of the army the army corps under General Keyes moved upon the James River side of the Peninsula, and after heavy skirmishing touched the enemys lines at Lees Mill, near the Warwick River. The country into which this army corps moved was almost unknown to our generals. It was fiat and covered with dense forests. The low for- mation of the ground and heavy rains had made it swampy. Through this the roads, nearly impassable, led. On all the march the detach- ment of the signal corps serving with these forces, under Lieut. B. F. Fisher, was on duty. There were no elevated points whence general observation could be had, and the character of the country made signaling impossible. The duties of such temporary reconiiaissances as are made by sconts in such cases devolved upon the signal officers. They were among the first to follow the devious roads, to recognize the presence of the enemy, to study with their telescopes his strength and movements, and to hasten to report as well as they could such facts as they were able to note to the generals with whom they served. The advance of this column was checked near the line of the Warwick River, and General Keyes established his headquarters at Warwick Court-House. The column under Geneml Heintzelman, moving on the York side of the Peninsula, passed through a country difficult indeed, but both more open and better drained than that penetrated by the forces under General Keyes. The division of Maj. Gen. Fitz John Porter con- stituted the advance of this column, and after minor encounters wit Page 228 228 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CUAP. XXIII. the enemy, in which they precipitately fled, it came under fire, and was checked by the guns and works at Yorktown. The duties of signal officers accompanying this column were, as with the other wing of the army, those of exploration and reconnaissance. General Heintzelman established his headquarters at the saw-mill near the head of Wormleys Creek, on the Hampton road. On the 6th of April a number of vessels of the fleet appeared in the bay off Yorktown. A few exchanges of shots with the enemys bat- teries bearing upon the river front convinced the naval commanders that with wooden vessels they could not pass between Yorktown and Gloucester, nor could they encounter without disaster the heavy metal and plunging fire of the enemys guns. The fleet drew out of range, and anchored in the Roads about 3~ miles from Yorktown. THE SIEGE OF YORKTOWN. Our forces were in this position when in headquarters camp No. 1, near Yorktown, it was first made known that the corps commanded by Major-General McDowell had been withdrawn from the Army of the Potomac. The hope felt by many that this corps was in some way to turn the enemys defensive lines at Yorktown fell. At the same time reports were received of reconnaissances made along the lines in front. Earthworks seemed to be found everywhere, and everywhere bodies of the enemy, vigilant and of unknown numbers, resisted any threatened assault. There were heavy rains, and the mud grew deeper. A siege was becoming inevitable. On the 10th of April headquarters camp moved to Camp Winfleld Scott, in front of Yorktown. At about this date the army corps coin- manded by General Sumner arrived. The signal detachment, com- manded by Lieut. N. Daniels, acting signal officer, accompanied this corps. In the bay below Yorktown, at an estimated distance of from 3 to 4 miles from headquarters camp and in sight, lay the co-operating fleet, of which the United States ship Wachnsett was flag-ship. From the shore of this bay southerly to nearly the bank of the James River the Army of the Potomac was stretched, buried in thick woods, and so hidden that rarely could more than a division be seen together, and often not more than a regiment was visible from any one point of view. The rebel lines reached through a light country from the works of Yorktown proper to nearly the navigable waters of the Warwick River. To pass from the right to the left of our lines, following the narrow and winding earth roads and the miles of corduroyed ways through the woods was a journey of several hours, during which one came by surprise, as it were, upon regiments and brigades of soldiers encamped here and there in the forests, and batteries of heavy field artillery in position among trees and shrubs, and bearing often upon an enemy whose lines and forces, hidden by other trees and shrubs, were invisible. Along all this line there was the picket firing of both musketry and artillery. On the right, between the works at Yorktown and the fleet below, desultory shots of enormous weight were thrown to and fro from rifled ordnance and 11-inch guns. On land, along the front, if a venture- some picket or curious signal man of either army showed himself within gunshot, or climbed a tree for observation, he was fired at as game. If a group was gathered together anywhere it was customary to disperse it with a shell from a rifled gun. The appearance of a Page 229 ChAP. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 229 officer with a telescope, or with any instrument of reconnaissance, rarely failed to elicit this attention. On the left the rebel gunboat Teazer would now and then creep up the Warwick from the James River and try the ranges of her heavy guns upon the points where her commander supposed our camps might be. With the exception made by the opening of the trenches and the placing of our siege batteries (only one of which ever opened fire), this state of affairs was Without change throughout the siege. There were some skirmishes, occasional artillery duels, and the affair of the Burnt Chimneys, or Lees Mill. Scattered along this advanced line were the stations of the signal officers, and their duties brought them every day upon and near it. It thus happened to them, serving in their turns in front, that so many of their number came to be at different times during the siege exposed to the enemys sharpshooters, or, what was by far more common, to the fire of his artillery. Wherever stations were known or supposed to be the enemy day after day directed practice shots, either with guns from their batteries, or, as it once or twice happened, with lighter pieces brought for the purpose. In the list of officers whose names I had the honor to lay before the general commanding in my report of June 26, 1862, there is, I believe, no one who was not at some time during the siege exposed and near the enemy. The courage and persistence with which some of these officers held the posts to which they were ordered (though in danger day and night for a week together) was worthy of commendation. With the army thus located the chief signal officer early found cause for regret that official indifference had prevented the construction of the field telegraph trains with which it was at first intended to equip the Signal Corps. With trains of the character of those now in use with the Army of the Potomac it would have been easy to have con. nected,in one day after their arrival before Yorktown, the principal headquarters of the army. The insulated wire would be even safer running through the wood land than when extended by the side of roads. There were no field telegraphic trains with the army. On the 7th of April, in obedience to an order of the general com- manding, telegraphic communication by signals had been opened with the fleet, the detachment of signal officers ordered at Fortress Monroe having on that day joined it. The shore station, known as the head- quarters station (No. 1), was at a barn near Camp Winfleld Scott. From this day until the close of the siege there was, by day and night, a transfer of messages to and from the flagship of the fleet, and here, as on the fleet, a constant watch observed at once the signals made by either those afloat or on the shore. Iii dense fogs, in rains, and some- times when the flag-ship, moving down the river, was shut out from view, this communication failed. To provide for these contingencies another station (No. 7) was opened at a house upon the shore of the bay, at the boat-landing of the fleet. This station was to send messages which could not be sent direct from the headquarters station. It was sometimes used for conferences and conversation by signals between the naval officers on the fleet and the officers of the army on shore. It was likewise in communication when necessary with headquarters sta- tion aud with the fleet. A station (No. 6) was, at different times in the progress of the siege, established at th~ Farinholt house, at the month of Wormleys Creek. It was intended to communicate by signals to the fleet in any sudden danger that might arise at the point and to transmit to the headqua Page 230 230 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIfl ters station the knowledge gained from observations made here. This station was little used. When, on the 30th of April, the siege battery of 100 and 200 pounder Parrott guns, which had been established at this place, opened upon the works at Yorktown and Gloucester, signal officers at this station were communicating with others placed at Moores house, near Yorktown~ who thence reported the effect of the shots in so far as they were able to note them. The signal officers at the battery were of course ex- posed to the shots with which the enemy replied to the battery near which they were stationed. The signals were not permitted to be in- terrupted. The signal officers at Moores house were directly in the line of both fires, the shells from the combatants passing high in the air over their heads. This position, though one of little danger, was not desirable, some of the large shells falling short and exploding near it. A signal station (No. 5) communicating with the fleet had been opened at Moores house on the 7th of April. This point was chosen with a view to directing the fire of our naval gnus in the attack on Yorktown, then thought to be impending, and also for the purpose of momentarily informing the fleet of the progress of our land forces, whose assault was to be simultaneous. Moores house (located on the bank of York River) was directly under the heaviest guns of Yorktown, a mile distant. The beach at the foot of the bank on which the house was placed was commanded by the water battery on the beach at Yorktown. Trees clustering along the top and water edge of the bank, and reaching from near the enemys works nearly to this house, offered a cover for rebel sharp- shooters. This station was first visited and long messages sent from it to the fleet by a party of the corps on the third day after the army arrived before Yorktown, and while the place was yet some distance beyond our pickets. As a station of observation and communication this point was unrivaled. From it one looked down upon the works at Gloucester and their approaches, about 2 miles distant; upon the wharves and water batteries at Yorktown and the whole channel of the river and the bay spread out in view. Inland there cou]d be traced the outline of the works at Yorktown proper, and there was had in view much of the open country between those works and our lines. This place was now permanently occupied as a signal station, communi- cating with the station at headquarters. When the signal flag was first discovered by the enemy near this house two light field pieces were run up by them in easy range and the officers were driven from their station by their fire, but only to return so soon as the fire ceased. As the sieg& ~ advanced the fire on the station became more serious. Lieut. Israel Thickstun, Eighty-third Pennsylvania Volunteers, and acting signal officer, was stricken senseless by a fragment of a shell while serving on it. The shells were very frequently exploding near it, the station receiving many of the shots aimed at our parallel in front of it. The working station was not reasonably tenable. The officers were instructed to shelter themselves near Moores house, and to make report by signals only in case of emergency. The station was thus held until the evacuation of Yorktown. Its occupation was of the most use in the early days of the investment, when there were fears of a possible sortie of the enemy in that direction. A station (No. 4) of observation was established in a point of woods south of Yorktown, at the junction of the Hampton and Warwick roads. This station was a mile from the works at Yorktown, and yet nearer the enemys work known as the Red Redoubt. Communications henc Page 231 CHAP. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 231 by signals were sent to a signal station (No. 2) placed on the saw-mill at General Heintzelmans headquarters, and were thence reported to headquarters station. Another station of observation (No. 3), in like manner repeating its messages through Station No.2, at General Heint- zelmans headquarters, was established on the Warwick road, in a piece of woods north of the cleared land in front of Lees Mill, and near a~ small lunette, afterward taken by our forces. The post of observation of the officers here placed extended through a piece of woods southerly to the open ground in front of Wynns Mill. The position of these stations was easily discovered by the enemy~ They were held through the siege with much risk to the officers ordered upon them. It was necessary to keep the officers there posted on duty for several days in succession, so that they might well know the local- ities of the enemy. The stations were hidden from the view of the rebel gunners. The danger was of injury from the fragment s of the many shells thrown at the position during the thirty days they were occupied. A signal flag was displayed in a tree, in sight of the enemy, at Sta- tion No. 3. The attempt to remove it was made hazardous by the enemys musketry. These completed the line of stations on the right. The dense woods covering the center and left of the army rendered signaling there im- possible except from artificial stations. Soon after the siege had com- menced the chief signal officer was directed by the general command- ing to cause signal towers to be erected and to be occupied as sta- tions of observation and communicatioii (if that was possible) along the front. It was hoped, also, that by observing from such points of view, and reporting the ranges of the shot and shell, the fire of guns and mortars soon to open on Yorktown .might be accurately directed. These instructions were communicated to Licut. B. F. Fisher, acting signal officer, commanding the signal detachment on the left of the army, and Lieut. N. Daniels, acting signal officer, commanding that with the center. The sites for the towers on these portions of the line were at once selected by these officers. Large working parties reported to them, and the work of construction was commenced. On the right of the line, also, the positions for three towers were selected, and the timber for their construction was drawn from the woods and shapened. Of these towers one (fl) was to be on the shore of the bay, near Farinholts house. A second (F) was to be on the high bank near the dam crossing Worm- Icys Creek. The third (G) on the elevated plain near the Clark house and near Camp Winfield Scott. None of these were, however, com- pleted when the evacuation of Yorktown took place. A station had been built close to Camp Winfield Scott, in an immense tree. This was sometimes used for purposes of observation. Other stations or perches were now made on trees close to the trenches and batteries of our approaches. From one of these, near Moores house, and at a height of about 80 feet from the ground, could be had a dis- tinct and close view of the enemys works at Yorktown. At the center Lieutenant Daniels, acting signal officer, caused to be raised a lofty structure of logs (E) near our picket line in front of Lees Mill, and overlooking part of the enemys works there placed. This tower was constantly occupied by a detail of signal officers as a station of observation, and whatever facts could thence be noted were reported to General Sumner. It was often visited by other officers, whose duties were aided by the observations here made. This structure was in close range of the enemys guns. Though partially hidden by trees Page 232 232 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. tOHAP. XXIII. it might have been demolished by them. They hesitated, however, to fire upon it, curious (as I have since been informed) to learn for what it was intended. Along the left of the line the parties commanded by Lieut. B. F. Fisher, acting signal officer, erected four tower stations (A, B, C, D). These stations were occupied, and communicated with each other by signals. The positions commanded views of parts of the enemys lines. The reports thence made were sent to General Keyes headquarters. The enemy brought a light gun to bear upon one of these towers and sometimes fired upon it, but they were neither able to seriously disturb its occupants nor to interrupt their labors. With this enumeration have been mentioned all the permanent stations estab- lished during the siege. The duties of reconnaissances and communication performed by the officers of the Signal Corps when not occupying these stations have been before referred to. There was no day in the siege but that they could be found in front of the enemys lines closely watching his works, and there was in consequence no day but on which some of them were exposed to the dangers of this position. Of the character of the reports made and messages sent by these officers the general commanding had knowledge at the time. On the 16th of April, 1862, occurred the affair of the Burnt Chim- neys, or Lees Mill. Mention has already been made by name ~f the officers particularly engaged at this place. Time messages sent by them were sent at very short distances, and I have no reliable information as to their importance. They were useful, perhaps, in conveying intelli- gence which might if otherwise sent have necessitated the greater exposure of other officers. The observations reported by some of the officers were made from tops of trees they had climbed f~r the purpose. In the last days of April the division commanded by General Frank- lin arrived on transports at Shipping Point. These troops were kept on shipboard for several days, and it was supposed they were to be moved against the enemy at Gloucester. A detachment of 5 officers and 12 men, commanded by Lieut. D. E. Castle, Nineteenth Indiana Volunteers, and acting signal officer, was assigned to duty with these forces, and reported to General Franklin, whose headquarters were then on shipboard. EVACUATION OF YORKTOWN. By the first days of May our approaches were nearly completed, the siege and mortar batteries were in position, and the day was reported fixed on which they were to open fire. Lieutenant Ned states in his report that two days previous to the evacuation of Yorktown and the main line of worksthat is, on the morning of May 2, 1862Lieu- tenant llerzog, acting signal officer, and himself reported to General Smith, commanding near Lees Mill, the evacuation of the enemys main works at that place. I am miot informed that this message was sent to general headquarters. On the night of May 2 the unusual silence of the enemy so attracted the attention of the general commanding that in a message ordered to the fleet that night he mentioned that this silence might indicate an evacuation or a sortie, and asked that a gunboat be sent to draw the enemys fire. The gunboat Marblehead moved up the river near the batteries, and, firing upon them, drew a number of shots in reply. On the morning of the 3d of May a signal message was received from Licut. A. B. Jerome, First New Jersey Volunteers and acting signa Page 233 CHAP. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 233 officer on Station No. 3, near Wynns Mill, that the enemy were de- stroying their barracks. This was not supposed to have particular bearing upon an evacuation. On the same afternoon the enemys fire opened as usual about sundown, anti increased in rapidity after night- fall, until at midnight the roar of artillery was almost incessant. Shot and shell were thrown in all directions, as though fired at random, and with ranges which had rarely been reached before. Signals with torches were prohibited at Station No. 2 by the general there commanding for fear of drawing the enemys fire. The signals made from stations at the front (Nos. 3 and 4) were therefore not answered, and no messages were received. About midnight a confla- gration was observed in Yorktown. About 2 a. m. on the 4th the firing ceased, and between that hour and daylight our troops entered the works. Soon after daylight a message was received from Moores house, announcing, Our flag flies over Yorktown. The claim is made by the signal officers stationed at the towers (C and E) on the center and left of our lines that the first positive infornia- tion of the evacuation of the works in front of them was given by theuf to Generals Sumner and Keyes, with whom they were respectively serving. This report is said to have been made from the tower near Wynns Mill at 4.30 a. in., and from the tower in front of General Keyes at daylight. On both the center and the left signal officers went into the works with the first troops that occupied them, and, signaling back reports, gave positive assurance of the absence of the enemy. About 7 a. m. a message from the general commanding announced to the fleet the evacu- ation of Yorktown. Lieut. . T. It. Clark, acting signal officer with the fleet, on board the Marblehead, had previously, at 5.30 a. in., observed the evacuation from that vessel, and had at that time signaled the report to the flag- ship. The fleet at once moved from its anchorage, and occupied the chan- nel between Yorktown and Gloucester. Upon the first announcement of the retreat of the enemy a party under command of Lieut. II. L. Johnson, Fifth Connecticut Volun- teers, and acting signal officer, had been sent to Yorktown to estab- lish a signal station in that place, and to send officers to open commu- nication across the river to Gloucester as soon as that place could be safely entered. The officer detailed for this purpose was fairly on his way across the river in a skiff to occupy Gloucester before the enemy had abandoned that position. He was recalled to save him from capture. As the fleet moved up the enemy hastily abandoned that point, and a signal officer landed with the advance of our troops who occupied it. By 10 a. m. stations had been established (and were working) at Farinholts house, Yorktown, Gloucester, and on the fleet, the stations at Gloucester and on the fleet communicating to headquarters through the station on Farinholts house. Communication with the fleet had not been suspended during the movement of the vessels from the anchorage to Yorktown. The mes- sages transmitted this morning were numerous and important. The general commanding received at Camp Winfield Scott reports from Gloucester and Yorktown and from the senior naval officer (on board the flag-ship, some miles distant and out of sight) frequent statements of the position of the fleet; of reconnaissances made up the river and as far as West Point by steamers ordered on that duty; of captures made Page 234 234 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIIL and of the naval plans and orders. In return, he communicated his own wishes (to which he had immediate response) and his plans for the movement of the combined fleet and army. Among other messages thus telegraphed was one from the general- in-chief, announcing his intention to move up the river that day the transports with the troops under General Franklin, aiid asking a con- voy of war vessels; one relating to the reported embarkation of the enemy at a wharf beyond Williamsburg (which embarkation it was desired to prevent), and one to save the railroad bridge across the Pamunkey River, which the fleet proposed to destroy. The reports from the fleet showed that the river was without obstruc- tion as far as the White House, that the white flag was flying at sev- eral points on its banks and at West Point, and that no troops were there visible.- The wharf beyond Williamsburg was reported as destroyed by fire and as yet burning. One or two large vessels were found on the stocks at West Point. The signal stations on the right of the army, other than those above mentioned, were this day abandoned, and the parties were concentrated to accompany the advance of the army. Late in the afternoon the sound of cannon announced that the advance guard of the army had overtaken the enemy and commenced the battle of Williamsburg. BATTLE OF WILLIAMSBURG. On the 5th of May headquarters of the Army of the Potomac were still at Camp Winfield Scott. The last ~irrangenients were making for the movement of General Franklins forces, which, sailing up the river and to land at West Point, would turn any position taken by the enemy lower down upon the Peninsula, and would also threaten the flank of their retreating columns. The signal officers with this command, some time before detailed to it by order of the commanding general, had been distributed among the transports. Other signal officers of the fleet detachment were on the gunboats to accompany them. The services of these officers will have particular mention in relation to the battle at West Point. The signal detachments of the left and center, in charge of Lieuten- ants Daniels and Fisher, acting signal officers, had moved forward with the advance of the columns to which they were attached. The movement to Williamsburg encountered the gravest (lifficulties in miry roads, puddled by the footsteps and broken into ruts and great holes by the wheel-tracks of the retreating army. These roads led through forests. A heavy rain had been falling all day. At general headquarters we had heard the sounds of a continued battle since daylight. About 3 p. m. officers of the staff arrived from the front. The chief signal officer was notified that the general com- manding was about to go upon the field, and was instructed by him in person that communication was desired between the army at Williams- burg and the gunboats which were to be sent up from the fleet that night to act with it. He was directed to arrange officers for this com- munication. In obedience to these orders additional officers, carryii~g with them full written instructions as to the arrangements to be made, were sent to report to Lient. J. W. IDe Ford, Eleventh Pennsylvania Reserve Volunteer Corps, and acting signal officer, on board the flag- ship. Two signal officers were to be placed on each gunboat sent to take part in the action. Of these one was to land, if necessary, and join ou Page 235 CHAr. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 235 troops near Williamsburg wherever they might be visible. The com- munication of the gunboats to any point on shore visible from their decks and held by our forces was thus made certain. Lieut. H. L. John- son, acting signal officer, was ordered to the front with a detachment of six officers and their men, which had the day before been concen- trated. This party started immediately. By the time these arrangements were completed it was night. It was very dark, and rain still fell rapidly. The signal detachments of the forces with Generals Sumner and Keyes, moving with the columns on the march to Williamsburg, acted during the march as scouts to reconnoiter and as aids to carry mes- sages and reports. Their duties in this character were continued on the field of battle. The smoke, the mist, the heavy rain, and the dense woods rendered signaling impossible. Some of the officers were posted by the officers in charge of the detachments where they could use their telescopes, and whence they announced to the commanders near them, either by orderlies or in person, such movements of the enemy as they were able to see. Toward evening General McClellan arrived and went upon the field of battle on the right. Soon after his arrival, in reply to an inquiry made by him whether communication could be had witl~ the gunboats expected to arrive at night, Lieut. B. F. Fisher, acting signal officer, reported to him, and received his orders to establish the communication required. This was successfully accomplished upon the arrival of the vessels, though the night was one very unfavorable for signaling. The shore station was about a mile inland from the river and close to the field of battle. The fact was communicated to the commanding general as soon as accomplished. Lieutenant Fisher caused another signal station to be erected near one of the works on the battle-field, and made ready to call for and direct the fire of the guhboats, should it be needed, at daylight. The acting signal officers who assisted Lieutenant Fisher, and those on the gunboats, whose care and watchfulness contributed to the re- sult, are entitled to equal credit. The names of these officers, and of others who deserve mention at this place, are given in my report of June 18, 1862. There is reason to believe that the knowledge of this com- munication was of some importance to the commanding general. At daylight the enemy had evacuated their works and were in retreat be- yond Williamsburg. A signal station had been established at the mouth of Queens Creek, from which various messages were sent until the store-ships, with supplies, began to arrive. On the arrival of the chief signal officer on the morning of the 6th communication was opened from the gunboats to other stations well inland and was kept open at the request of General W. F. Smith, whilst the troops moved forward to occupy Williamsburg and until that village had been occupied in force. The fleet of transports with General Franklins command was passing up the river to West Point as our troops were marching into the place. The headquarters of the army halted at Williamsburg some days, while the trains of the army were brought up through the almost impassable roads and the wounded of the battle were cared for. Fresh troops were pushed forward in pursuit of the enemy, while those which had suffered most in the en- gagement followed more slowly. The advance guard, under General Stoneman, pursued closely the retreating army. A party of three sig- nal officers, with their men, accompanied this guard, and was actively employed watching the enemy and reporting their movements. On the day following our arrival the chief signal officer was ordere Page 236 236 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CMAP. XXIII. to connect by signal stations, if possible, the village of Williamsburg with West Point. It was the plan that communicating stations should be placed on three schooners, anchored some miles apart in the river, and the messages sent from a station on shore at West Point were to be repeated through the schooner stations to another station on land at the mouth of Wormleys Creek; hence through other stations they would be sent to Williamsburg. The distance was about 20 miles. The schooners were to be brought from Yorktown. With much labor and many tiresome delays the stations were at length established May 9, but only on the day on which headquarters, moving again to the front, left them useless. At Williamsburg, as at Yorktown, the chief signal officer felt deeply the want of field telegraphic trains, which would have rendered com- munication, at least over part of this distance, certain and easy. BATTLE OF WEST POINT. While general headquarters were at Williamsburg the battle of West Point was fought. The command of General Franklin, arriving at that place under convoy of the fleet on the afternoon of May 6, had by the morning of May 7 been so far disembarked that a large force of infantry was on shore, but not yet in perfect condition for action. It was without cavalry and but poorly snpplied with artillery. The dis. embarkation from numerous transports of various descriptions was yet in progress. The position was almost surrounded by thick woods, which came down near to the river. The country, which was difficult, was not well known by our troops. Whilst our forces were thus opened the pickets were driven in and heavy volleys of musketry announced the approach of the enemy under General Lee, advancing in great force to the attack with the hope, doubtless, that our troops, taken unprepared and ye~ landing, could be routed and driven into the river. At the same time a battery of heavy field guns opened from a height at once upon the army and the transports. It was a moment of serious danger, and the most rapid action was necessary. Part of the signal officers of the expedition had landed with the troops to whigh they were assigned. The firing on shore caused those on the war vessels and the transports to be everywhere on the alert. General Franklin, on the Mystic, at West Point, was sent for by sig- nals. The order went quickly from the shore to the fleet, and as quickly from ship to ship, to move up and cover the army with their fire. With a promptness impossible without this communication the vessels were brought into position, and threw in the fire of their great guns to aid that of our army. The contest was not long; the enemys batteries were silenced, and their troops, repulsed and broken, fell back through the woods, fol- lowed for a long distance by the shell of the Navy. On the 9th of May headquarters moved from Williamsburg, and on the following day they were at Ropers Meeting-house. While here a line of repeating stations was formed, connecting the headquarters of the army with the troops at West Point. It did not work well, how- ever, and was used only for the practice of the officers. At this place the corps was joined by a detachment from the camp at Georgetown, bring- ing with it the first field telegraph train ever used in the field by an army of the United States. It was that of which mention has been made as partially completed and as used at the camp of instruction Page 237 CHAP. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 237 It was a light structure, on wheels, carrying reels, from which there could be spun out insulated wire. It was fitted with telegraphic instru- ments of a kind before unused. It had been intended that the reels of this train should carry ii~ miles of wire, so prepared that it might be laid on the ground and used anywhere without the escape of the elec- tric current. Different hinderances had made it impossible to furnish more than 4 miles of a copper wire, coated with gutta-percha, and of a rather inferior quality. The magnetic electric instruments, devised for the train by a mechanic of New York, were of new invention. The work- ing current for these instruments when placed on telegraphic ~ is generated by a pile of magnetsa part of the instrument itself. The letters of the alphabet are plainly marked on the dial. To cause the letters to be indicated at either end of the line, or to read them, are operations so simple as to be within the power, with little practice, of almost any soldier who can easily read and write. The instrument is used without fluids, with out galvanic batteries of any kind, and is compact, strong, and portable. For use with flying telegraph trains on the field of battle, and for military telegraphing in general, I have regarded such instruments as necessary. I am of the opinion that it will be recalled at some time hereafter, with no little pride, that field telegraphic trains of this character and thus equipped were first brought into use by the Signal Corps of the Army, and were first used with the Army of the Potomac. The remains of this train, to which some his- toric interest already attaches, are now preserved at signal camp of instruction, Georgetown, D. C. In the first attempts to experiment with and use this train an unex- pected difficulty was encountered. The soldiers, unused to the coated wire, and seeing it stretched for miles along fences or lying on the ground near the road, would cut it and break it to examine its char- acter. Some of them thought it an invention of the enemy. On the 13th of May general headquarters were established at Cuin- berland. When, soon after our arrival here, the alarm was given that the headquarters train was endangered and that the enemys forces were advancing, the general commanding, with his staff; started for the field in person. A detachment of five signal officers, equipped, accompanied him. The alarm was groundless. - There was some communication here by signals with the vessels in the river. A line of five signal stations was also established from this place to the advance guard under General Stoneman, then occupying White House. A few messages were sent to and fro over this line, but its principal use was for practice. OIi the 16th of May headquarters camp moved to White House, on the Pamunkey River. Among the reconnaissances made by signal officers from this place was ouc to the Cliickahominy, near Bottoms Bridge, at, perhaps, the first time the waters of that stream were seen by any of our army. On the ensuing day the corps commanded by General Keyes moving up to occupy a position near Bottoms Bridge, Lient. II. L. Johnson, acting signal officer, with a detachment of signal officers and their men, was ordered to report to and remain with him for duty. From that time until after the passage of the Chickahominy this detachment served nuder General Keyes, and always with the advance of the corps. A station of observation was at once established near Bottoms Bridge, whence the movements of the eiiemy whose pickets were now in sigh Page 238 238 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. ICHAP. XXIII. across the river, were visible, and thence by a signal line communicated numerous reports to General Keyes headquarters. On the day of the passage of the Chickahominy a part of this detach- ment crossed with the first troops, and opening a station on the bluff near Burnt Chimneys and close to the picket line, placed that point in communication with General Keyes headquarters, then at Old Tavern. This duty led to a remarkable collision. The advanced signal party was annoyed by the enemys picket firing from a farm-house near them. The station would soon be untenable. The signal detachment was quietly mounted, and then, on the order of its commander, furiously charged the offending pickets, as the story ran, with telescopes. The panic-flight of the enemy evinced their dread of the novel armament. The party carried, however, revolvers as well as field glasses. From this date the detachment served with the advance of the forces on the southerly side of the Chickahominy, carrying their stations up to the front at Fair Oaks. The camp was located near the headquar- ters of Generals lleintzelman and Keyes. While general headquarters were at White House the wire of the field telegraphic train was extended a distance of 3 miles, lying on the ground and hung on bushes by the sides of the road. Experiments were made in transmitting messages while the wire was in process of reeling out. They were successful, and attracted much attention by their novelty. A line of four repeating signal stations was established from White House to General Stonemans advance guard, a few miles distant. This line was well worked, and was used for official messages. On the 19th of May headquarters were moved to Tunstalls Station, on the West Point and Richmond Railroad. As the army moved from White House the advance guard, under General Stoneman, pushed rapidly forward to Old Cold Harbor, and with its advance encountered a small force of the enemys cavalry at Gaines Mill, near New Bridge. A detachment of signal officers accompanied this advance, joining the small party which had served with General Stoneman previously. With the column moving in the field these officers were found every- where iu the advance and perched upon the roofs of the prominent dwellings. They sometimes anticipated the march of the advance guard. The distances over which they could work, however, were, from the formation of the country, generally short, and a single mes- sage could go by courier almost as rapidly as by signals. The labor of so large a party seemed unnecessary, and the greater number was ordered by General Stoneman to discontinue, that officer retaining with his advance the three who had accompanied him from Williamsburg. On the next day the advance guard reached the banks of the Chicka- hominy at New Bridge. Some scattered forces of the enemy and a few guns, very plainly exposed, were visible on the crest of the hill on the Richmond side of the Chickahominy. On the northerly side, on the first elevated ground of the river bank, were the Hogan and the Gaines mansions. These houses were about three-quarters of a mile distant from each other. From a point near the Hogan house could be had an extensive view of the bottom lands bordering the river and of the country upon the opposite bank. A station of observation was estab- lished here under the direction of Lieut. N. Daniels, acting signal officer, and was held for some days while outside of our pickets. This station afterward b~caine one of much importance. On May 22 headquarters were established near Cold Harbor. From general headquarters to the station in front near Hogans house a lin Page 239 CHAr. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 239 of six repeating stations was made. The officers were kept constantly on these stations. Messages were transmitted to and from the front over this line with reasonable rapidity and accuracy. There were no great movements of the enemy visible from the station of observation, and there was little to report. The chief value of this line, as of the other repeating lines established at Williamsburg and White House during the march of the army, was in the practice and consequent skill which work upon them gave the officers on stations. From headquarters camp at Cold Harbor parties were sent out to reconnoiter the course of the Chickalrominy from Bottoms Bridge to New Bridge, and to select those prominent points which might serve in case of need as communicating stations. These parties were instructed to also note prominent points in view on the southerly side of the Chickahominy. The knowledge of the country gained by them showed it practicable to communicate by signals between the portions of the army occupying the northern and those at this time on the southern side of the Chickahominy. The stations would be, however, some distance to the rear of the advance on both sid~s of the river, and that on the south side of the Chickahominy near to the railroad, on which a line of electric telegraph was then building. It was not thought worth the while to occupy them. From Cold Harbor the insulated wire of the field telegraph was run out a distance of two miles for one day to a point near the headquarters of the advance guard. These headquarters moving, it was reeled up on the same day. THE SKIRMISH AT MECHANICSVILLE. Early in the afternoon on the 24th of May our artillery opened upon the enemy for the first time on this part of our lines at New Bridge. The fire, sustained for some time, elicited no response. During its progress the advance guard, under General Stoneman, with a brigade under General Davidson, moved toward the village of Mechanicsville, then known to be held by a force of the enemy. The artillery joined the column on the march. A detachment of seven signal officers, hastily collected from stations in the vicinity, moved with our forces. From the upper story of Austins house, a dwelling located on a high bank on the east side of Beaver Dam, a first view was caught of the enemy on the other side of the Chickahominy, near Mechanicsville Bridge, and of the spires of Richmond. Before the fact that the enemy was visible could be annoniziced to the commanding general the head of the column, ascending on the Mechaiiicsville road to the crest on the west side of Beaver Dam, was received by a discharge of the ene~ys artillery, and the engagement was commenced. At the same time a battery of two guns, stationed on the south side of the Chickahominy near a foot bridge, opened in a vain attempt to reach the left of our line near Austins house, on the east side of Beaver Dam. It was not known what force of the enemy might be near this battery. A signal officer was stationed on the left of our lines to watch it and report by signals any movement of the enemy in that direction to another officer stationed near the battery engaging the enemy on the west side of Beaver Dam, and also to another officer stationed with the battery firing from near Austin& house. The skirmish was of short duration. Our troops were hardly deployed in line of battle when the enemys fire ceased, and they retreated to Me. ~chanicsville Page 240 240 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIII. A signal officer stationed on Austins house reported six guns as moving near that village. It was dark by this time, and the troops bivouacked for the nigbt. By order of General Stoneman two signal officers were sent to report to General Davidson, and a code of rocket signals was arranged by which to indicate certain movements if made by his forces during the night. At daylight the troops advanced upon the village, and after some artillery firing occupied it. As the line moved up General Stoneman, at his headquarters near Austins house, was kept informed of its progress, and of the moment of the occupation of the village, by signals from the officers who accompanied the troops. As soon as the village was occupied a courier was dispatched ordering the wire of the field tele- graph to be mn out from a dwelling near the Hogan house, by this time occupied by General W. F. Smith as his headquarters, to a point near Mechanicsville. This was done, with a few hours labor, in a heavy rain, and soon after noon the telegraphic communication was established from the headquarters of General Davidson, near Mechanicsville, to the division headquarters of General Smith. The ease with which this was done illustrated the rapidity with which under more favorable cir- cumstances such communication might be made available. On the day following the occupation of Mechanicsville a station of observation was established near that village, which was held almost constantly while our troops occupied the place. On the next day an expedition was made by a force of two companies of cavalry, with a detachment of mounted artillery and a field piece, under the command of Maj. A. S. Webb, of the Rhode Island Artillery, to examine the country in the vicinity of the Richmond and Virginia Central Railroad. Two signal officers joined the expedition for the purpose of recon- naissance. This expedition penetrated the enemys lines for some miles, driving in their pickets and scattering their supports, and finally reaching the railroad at a station near Greenshaws, 12 miles from Richmond. The track was destroyed and set on fire in two places. In this work of destruction the turpentine from the canteens which signal soldiers carry was found to be a useful auxiliary. By the time the party reached the railroad it had been reduced by pickets left on dif- ferent roads and guards at houses to about 25 men. The drums of the rebel force camped in the vicinity could be distinctly heard beating the alarm. The party returned to our lines unmolested. On May 26 headquarters camp was established near New Bridge. BATTLE OF HANOVER COURT-HOUSE. On the evening of May 26 the chief signal officer was informed that a force under General Fitz John Porter would move at daylight to at- tack the enemy at Hanover Court-House. He was directed to provide a signal party to accompany it. A signal party of 7 officers, with their men, fully equipped and with three days rations, were ordered to move with the troops at daylight. The chief signal officer accompanied this party. It had rained during the night and part of the previous day. On the morning of the 27th it was still raining. The columns move4 with difficulty and slowly. At about. 11 a. m. the outposts of the enemy were encountered. About noon the head of our column near Hanover Court-House came suddenly npom~ a force of the enemy apparently advancing to meet it Page 241 CHAP. XX~.] GENERAL REPORTS. 241 The lines of both armies were formed at once and the battle commenced with artillery. At nearly the right of our line oar principal battery was posted, and was instantly engaged. A few hundred yards to the right of this bat- tery, and in front of our line, was a clump of woods, from which was had a good view of the enemy and also of the fields they occupied. Lieutenants Marston, Fortieth Pennsylvania Volunteers, and acting signal officer, and Gloskosky, Twenty-ninth New York Volunteers, and acting signal officer, were ordered to establish a station here to observe the enemy and to report by signals to Lieutenant Homer, Sixth New Jersey Volunteers, and acting signal officer, who was placed at the bat- tery, and to headquarters station, iiear the general commanding. Lieut. G. fl. McNary, Tenth Pennsylvania Reserve Volunteer Corps, and acting signal officer, was posted on a house some distance in the rear of the battery and commanding a view of the fields in front. He was directed to report at headquarters station. (It was intended to use this station to conimunicate with the front in case our line advanced fighting.) Lieutenant Thickstun, Eighty-third Pennsylvania Volunteers, and acting signal officer, was placed upon a house on the left, where he could see the open country, in order to report any movements of the enemy from that direction. Lieutenants Norton, Tenth Pennsylvania Reserve Volunteer Corps, and acting signal officer, and Wiggins, Third New Jersey Volunteers, and acting signal officer, were held in reserve. All the officers mentioned were in the range of artillery fire. The fire upon the stations occupied by Lieutenants Marston and Gloskosky, Homer, and McNary was particularly severe. The flag had no sooner been raised on the advanced station than it was greeted by a volley of musketry. Though immediately screened behind trees, its position was much exposed throughout the action. Lieutenant Homer, stationed with the battery, received, of course, his share of the shots directed at the guns, whilst Lieutenant McNary, posted in the rear of the battery, was in line of shots, which went over it, and seemed by his elevated position to attract not a few intended for himself. Messages were received from the advanced station by the station at the battery, directing the aim of the guns, announcing the retreat of the enemy, and replying to a question as to the nationality of a body of troops which appeared on the field; this latter, fortunately, just in time to prevent our own forces, which advan come in view, from receiving the fire of~ cing, had that moment our guns. The enemy were driven from their first position after a contest of an hours duration. Our line advanced toward Hanover Court-House in pursuit. The stations at first established were abandoned by order of General Porter. The signal officers were sent forward with the first skirmishers, reconnoitering and reporting from elevated points in the field and on the right and left of the line as it advanced. A station was erected on the top of a large house overlooking the field of battle near which it was and the valley in which the village of Hanover is located. From this station a report was made that some regiments of the enemy with artillery were visible in the valley near Hanover. Our advance soon after moved rapidly to that village. The signal party was hurried to the front to seek the position of the enemy, and kept on the road going west of Hanover until a camp of the enemy was visible. It was here learned from the returning troops that the general advance of the army was not in this direction, whilst the sounds of 16 R RVOL X Page 242 242 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIIL artillery announced that a conflict had recommenced near the first scene of battle. Hastily turning back, the party again arrived on the field just as the last shots were fired. On the following day the army occupied the same position. The dead were l)nried the wounded were cared for. The condition of the enemys camp showed with what haste they had retreated. A station of observation was opened on a prominent house near the field of battle, whence frequent reports were made to headquarters. Other minor stations were also established. The officers were called in from these stations at sunset. It was thought there might be a battle on the following day, and an order was sent back to camp directing more officers to report the next morning. The party bivouacked on the field. At daylight the next morning the chief signal officer was ordered by General Porter to send a party to General Emory, under whose command expeditions had been sent out during the night. The head- quarters of General Emory were found at a church or school-house beyond Ha~uover. They were connected by a line of repeating stations with those of General Porter yet upon the battle-field. The chief signal officer was also directed to extend a line as far toward the left on the Ashland road as was l)racticable. The head- quarters of General Morell, commanding on the left, were connected by repeating stations with general headquarters, and when, a few hours after, the signal detachment ordered in the night arrived, this line was extended a mile and a half toward Ashland. A signal station was erected upon the roof of the mansion before mentioned. About 9 a. m. a dense cloud of smoke was reported as visible from this station. It was some miles distant and in the direction taken by one of our expeditions. Not long after a signal dispatch from General Emory announced that our trooJ)s had reached Ashland and the de- struction of the railroad bridge. This was followed by other brief mes- sages and reports. Orders went soon after to General Emory to call in his forces. The object of the advance on Hanover (the destruction of the enemys communications by railroad north) had been accomplished, and the army corps was about to rejoin the Army of the Potomac. The signal lines were ordered to be broken up. The last messageone of All quiet~~~ came from the left. The party was concentrated and moved for their camp on the Chickahominy. At 1 oclock all our troops were in motion on their return, and the headquarters of General Porter had left the field of battle. THE SIEGE OF RICHMOND. The siege of Richmond may very properly date from the time at which headquarters camp was established at New Bridge. By the closing days of May the left wing of the Army. of the Potomac had advanced along the railroad toward Richmond to beyond Fair Oaks. It was concealed in the dense woods, and held the swampy and uncomfortable ground on the south side of the Chickahominy. Its advanced pickets were just in view of great cleared fields and high grounds, which, if attained, would bring diem almost within range of Richmond and in healthy encampments. The right of the army was stretched along the northern banks of the Chickahorniny from Bottoms Bridge to beyond Mechanics- yule. There were bridges at Bottoms Bridge, at the railroad crossing, at a point above the railroada ctrduroy struatmire, known as sumner Page 243 GENERAL REPORTS. 243 Bridgeand three bridges nearly completed; one at, one above, and one below the location of New Bridge. The open country mentioned as in front of the left wing reached to the bridges at New Bridge, and here were large fields on both the north and south sides of the Chicka- hommy. The corps of Generals Heintzelman and Keyes occupied the southern side of the riv& r. The northern side was held by the corps of Generals Sumner, Hooker, and Franklin. The signal party serving on the south side of the river, pnder Lient. H. L. Johnson, Fifth Coiinecticut Volunteers, and acting signal officer, had been working faithfully under most disadvantageous circumstances. They were shut in everywhere by swamps and thick woods; there were no poitits from which they could communicate to advantage; the army was new; the generals did not know how to employ signal officers, and the officers had yet to gain by service experience as to the best modes in which to employ themselves. There were, however, signal stations along the railroad, connecting General Heintzelmans headquarters at Savage Station with the front beyond Fair Oaks, and the officers had reconnoitered faithfully, but with little success alono- th for points of observation. , e picket line On the northern side of the Chickahominy the field telegraph line was extended along fences and in trees from general headquarters to near Mechanicsville. The soldiers had ceased to cut the wires, patrols had been established, and the line was working successfully and with little interruption. There was a station of observation near Mechanicsville, and the sta- tion near Hogans house, above New Bridge, which had been occupied from the time the advance of the army reached it. From this station could be seen the line of thick woods in which we knew the left of the army lay covered; but though it was scanned carefully every day, and often with glasses, no friendly soldier was visible. BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. On the 30th day of May was fought the battle of Seven Pines. This battle was fought in the rain and in a thick woods, and without any prearranged plans on the part of our forces. The left of the army resisted the fnriou~ attack of the enemy wherever and however they were able, fighting in the dark as it were, sometimes first knowing the presence of the foe by receiving his fire. With such circumstances and on such ground it was impossible for the signal officers to use signals, nor does it seem from their reports that they acted as recon- noitcring officers, reporting by courier. Some of them joined the staffs of different generals and served gallantly enough as aides. The tempta- tion for a signal officer to convert himself into an aide is always serious, the duties of the latter, as rendered in our service, requiring less care and much less trouble; for this reason, and to discourage the practice, no mention was made in my l)reliminary report of any services of sig- nal officers at Seven Pines. The fight raged furiously from about noon. From a signal station near Hogans house the shells could be seen bursting in the air and the smoke rising above the tree-tops, while the sounds of the battle were distinctly audible. About 3 p. m. a brigade, forming, as it seemed, a part of the enemys left, moved in line of battle, with skirmishers in front, across the open fields south of New Bridge, to join the action. A few guns were at the same time fired by a battery near them. Th Page 244 244 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XX~. movement of these troops was visible by many of our officers at Hogans house and excited comment by its steadiness. The fire continued heavily long after night-fall, and when it ceased both armies only rested for the struggle of the following day. THE BATTLE OF FAIR OAKS. On the evening of the 31st of May the chief signal officer was in- formed at headquarters of the result of that days battle. It was known in the night that General Sumner had succeeded in crossing the Chick- ahominy with his corps, that the progress of the enemy was checked, and that there would be a battle in the morning. It was announced in the evening as the plan that the corps of Franklin and Porter would cross in three columns the three bridges near New Bridge at daylight, the crossing to be covered by the fire of numerous batteries posted on the first rising grounds north of the river. This would bring a force on the flank of the enemy, engaging with his front our troops near Fair Oaks. It was reported, also~ that there was trouble at the crossing of Bottoms Bridge, the bridges being crowded with wagons and troops. A signal party was ordered down in the night to render assistance, if it should be required, by transmitting orders from one side of the river to the other. There was no occasion for the services of this party. All officers and men of the signal party fit for duty were ordered to be ready to move from camp before daylight. At daylight the next morning the whole army was under arms. The signal party was moved to near New Bridge, and parties were arranged to accompany the columns to cross as follows~ viz: Four officers with their men reported to the commander of each column; two were to cross at each bridge with the troops and two to remain with the batteries detailed to cover that column. Of the officers crossing at each bridge with the first troops one was to carry the white the other the red signal flag. The white flag was to transmit messages relating to the general service; the red was to be used to direct the fire of the artillery. The communicating officers stationed at the battery were similarly equipped as to their flags and had similar instructions. Orders were sent to the station near Mechanicsville to carefully watch every movement of the enemy in that direction, and to report by the line of field telegraph to general headquarters each half hour. There were two balloons fastened and floating in the air some hundred feet from the ground. One of these was near Mcchanicsville, the other close to Gaines house. An officer was sent to each of these, with direc- tions to ascend; the one near Mechanicsville to report by signals from the car of the balloon to a point near headquarters any information he might gain; the other, at Gaines house, to attempt to open conimuni- cation from the car with any signal officer serving with the left whose attention he could call or with any signal officer after our troops should advance and have crossed the river. These ascensions were made as ordered, but without results. Very little could be seeii from the bal- loon near Mechanicsville; there was no reply from the left to the sig- nals made from the car of that near Gaines house. The scene near New Bridge after daylight was one of interest. The morning was clear and still; the sun shone brightly after the rain which had fallen in the night; there were everywhere bodies of troops ready to cross, and batteries of cannon from their chosen position covered almost every point of the opposite slope. At the bridges working par. ties were working busily. Now and then shots were exchanged acros Page 245 CH~. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 245 the river. It seemed as though the moment of battle had come, but the bridges were not ready. It was whispered soon that they could not be finished in some hours; then not completely on that day, and later it was known that the crossing was impracticable. The heavy rains had had their effect. The stream had risen and was still rising. It had overspread its banks, the treacherous soil was saturated, and the bot- tom of the valley had become a morass. While the troops of the right thus waited, we heard the roar of the battle raging at Fair Oaks, and soon after came tidings of the defeat of the enemy. The services of the signal party with the left in this battle were in character similar to those of the day before. They were aides, and car- ried many important messages. The signal party at New Bridge were kept in the field all day, and bivouacked there at night on this and the following day, to be ready for their part in any movement that might be ordered. On the 2d of June the enemy had retreated to Richmond. On the 3d of June a party of signal officers, with their men, under Lieut. Franklin Ellis, of Tammany Regiment, New York Volunteers, and acting signal officer, was ordered to pass our line and make a re- connaissance as far as James River, to ascertain the practicability of communication by signals between our army and the naval vessels then lying in the river. This party reached the river at Westover and there boarded a flag-of-truce boat. It then returned by way of Charles City Court-House. Communication by signal was found to be impracticable. It was thought by the officers that messages might be sent by rockets or from the car of a balloon. COJ~flIUNICATION OPENED BETWEEN THE RIGHT AND LEFT. Up to the date of the battles of the Seven Pines and Fair Oaks, as has been mentioned, no portion of the left of the army had been visible from ground held by the right. The enemy had some guns on the heights near New Bridge and troops in the woods near Prices house. From the station near Hogans house we could discern with glasses two guns and numbers of troops near James Garnetts House. The result of the battles of May 31 and June 1 had not enabled the left to reach the open country in their front; they were yet hidden by the woods. From the time the construction of the bridges near New Bridge had commenced there had been, now and then, artillery firing between our batteries posted to cover them and the enemys guns near Prices tiouse. After the battle of the Seven Pines the enemy seemed to increase their force at this point, earthworks began to be visible, and their artillery had better ranges. From this time for as long as the army remained before Richmond the defenses on the southern side of the Chickahominy grew more formidable. It was customary to fire on either side at any object that attracted attention, and sometimes it seemed only for practice. The signal station near Hogans house was close to a battery of 2G-pounders, and thus received its share of pro- jectiles. On the second of June an officer at this station observed with his tele- scope a number of men moving in a spot of cleared ground among the woods on the other side of the swamps of the Chickahominy, and beyond the enemy. They seemed to have just reached the place. They were about 3 miles distant, and wore our uniform. This, how Page 246 246 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIII. ever, had ceased to be distinctive, the enemy wearing it, and with im- punity, whenever they could obtain it. Two signal officers, with their men, were ordered to cross the river at Sumners Bridge, and to reach this spot if found to be held by our army. It was dark when they reached this bridge, and it was found impassable. Early the next morning they crossed at the railroad, and after a journey of about 10 miles from their point of departure reached the clearing on Goldings farm, which was found to be occupied by the advanced pickets of Gen- eral Bnrns brigade. Their signals were seen at once and answered from the station at Hogans, and it was then first known that our forces on the opposite sides of the Chickahominy were in view of each other. These stations were worked from this day until the morning of the bat- tie of Gaines Mill, and for the first days with some danger, the enemy knowing the positions of both and trying often to reach them with artil- lery. They were then, and for some time after, of importance; to com- municate by courier between the points requiring a difficult ride of some 7 miles. On the day following the occupation of this station the divis- ion commanded by General Smith crossed the Chickahominy and en- camped on Goldings farm. This signal line then became his mode of communication with general headquarters, and so remained while head- quarters were on the northern side of the Chickahominy. When it was proposed that General Smiths command should move on Old Tavern officers were designated to accompany it. The make of the country was such that they could while moving have kept con- stant communication with the forces north of the Chickahominy. During these days stations were established at different times at Aus- tins house, at the bridges, and at the batteries near New Bridge when- ever movements were heard of as contemplated, or when unusual firing on our part or on that of the enemy offered a chance for the service. With the left of the army the officers had by this time established perches in tree-tops, and had gained a knowledge of localities which rendered their reports of some service to the generals receiving them. About this time information was received at headquarters of the cavalry raid led by the iebel General Stuart, who, with two regiments and some horse artillery, passe(I the rear of our army, attacking the railroad train, and taking a number of prisoners near Tunstalls Station. The news of this near approach of the enemys forces created munch alarm at the depot at White House, at which there were then but few of our forces. At the request of Colonel Ingalls, who commanded the depot, a signal officer, Lient. F. W. Owen, Thirty-eighth New York Yolunteers, and acting signal officer, came ashore froni one of the gun- boats, and established a station that night on one of tile chimneys of the White House. The war vessels took l)ositions in which they could cover the depot with their fire. The enemy did not attack it. On the 13th of June general headquarters moved to Camp Lincoln, on the south side of the Chickahominy. The field telegraph wire, which had been so long stretched to Mechanicsville, was on this (lay ordered to be reeled up, and the traili to follow headqudrters to the other side of the Chickahomniny. On the next day this wire was stretched through the woods to General Smiths headquarters at Gold- ings, and the line was working. From this station at Goldings com- munication was kept by signals with the station at Hogans, and with another station now permanently established on Austins house, near Beaver Dam. There was a station of observatiomi at Mechanicsville. The messages received from these stations at Goldings were transmitted by the field telegraph line to general headquarters near Trents house Page 247 CHAP. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 247 Reports were required to be made tljree times each day and at mid- night. The mist and smoke of the camps which overhung the valley often interfered with the regularity of the reports. There was, lJE)~~- ever, each day a general information as to the condition and move- ments of the enemy visible from the stations. The signal party which had been serving with the left of the army here joined the main party. The diftereut (letachments serving with the Army of the Potomac were from this time concentrated in one party, from which details were made for duty at different points as they were required. Experience had shown that a signal party servin~ with so large an army was most usefully managed when kept together, to be distributed at the order of the chief signal officer to those points where on any day their services might be required, the chief signal officer in his turn obtaining at headquarters such knowledge of the plans of our own army and the position of the enemy as would enable him to direct the details at the proper time to Positions in which to take part in contemplated movements. Lieutenant Fisher, as senior officer, was placed in immediate charge of the party thus concentrated. It was the prevailing opinion now that the battle of Richmond would be fought on the open grounds before mentioned, and which were now in our front, as we approached Old Tavern. Every preparation was made for the (luties of the signal officers when the army should advance. it would be their place on the day of the attack to keep in communica- tion the forces which would be co-operating on both sides of the river. The country in front was favorable. The sickness resulting from some months exposure and hardship began to tell seriously on the strength of the signal party; but those who remained were well drilled, and waited with eager expectation. Each day evidences of the enemy in our front grew stronger. On the south side of the Chickahomniny l)icket firing was almost constant. It was stopped sometimes by agreement. On the extreme left there were numerous skirniishes, some of theni of such magnitude as to be almost battles. Shells were very often thrown into our lines and were replied to by our artillery. In front of our right, stretching up the left bank of the (ihickahominy, the enemys earthworks grew more numerous an(I their artillery was heavier. One day they brought a 64- poLIn(ler rifled gun, of which they had placed one or two in battery, to bear upon the station at Hogan~s, amid fired dehiberatelyat the officers, who steadily continued their signaling until ordered to cease. This station was made so frequently a target that it was ordered to be moved to the edge of the woods, where it was hidden from the view of the enemy, though in the range of their guns. With the same gun some shots were thrown at the station at Austins, but failed to reach it. The shells from these guns were thrown far over our canips opposite to them on the north side of the Chickahominy. There were on our side no l)ieces of sufficient caliber to reply to them. A few days after some 4~-inch rifled guns were received, and a day was set aside (the 25th of June) to try their range upon the batteries and the camps of the enemy. ENGAcrEMENT OF JUNE 25. On the 24th of June orders were received to so arrange for the next day signal l)arties as to be able to direct from the south side of the river the fire of heavy guns to open ott the follo~ving day from posi- tions micar Hogans house and also near Gaines house. It was intended to silence the 64s before mentioned, and also to direct the fire upon a Page 248 248 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CRAP. IXIII. earthwork in the vicinity of Old. Tavern and upon some positions of tl~e enemy near Garnetts house. Lieutenants Camp and Wiggins, act. ing signal officers, who had been serving for some time at the Hogan. house station, petitioned that, as this was to be active service, they might remain during the cannonade. Three additional officers were ordered to join them, and Lieut. XV. S. Stryker, Ninth New York State Militia, and acting signal officer, was sent to arrange the communica- tions on the north side of the river. Lieut. B. F. Fisher, acting signal officer, was sent with a party of four officers to report to General Smith, and was instructed to arrange the communications on the south side of the river. On the following morning the officers were posted, and were in com- munication at the following points in view of each other, viz: At the battery at Hogans house, at New Bridge, at the battery near Gaines house, on Smiths redoubt, and in the edge of the woods near James Garnetts. The fire commenced at daylight, and was for a time met with a spirited reply by the enemys guns. During this cannonade a screen which had been erected to hide Lieutenant Wiggins (station near New Bridge) from the view of the enemy was penetrated, at a moment his duties called him outside of it, by a cannon shot from their guns. The fire for a time was quite severe. Later in the day the enemys guns ceased to reply. In front of our left our picket line extended through the open fields near Garnetts, the enemys line of l)ickets being in the same field, in view and quite near theni. As the shot from our long-range guns on the north side of the river fell their range and effect were noticed by an officer on our picket line. Messages were sent from time to time by him to an officer stationed behind the first fringe of woods, whence the report went by signals to the batteries on the other side of the river. In the afternoon the shots ranged near the earthworks at Old Tavern, and as they fell in the woods close to them shouts, as of masses of men, could now and then be heard. Our guns were evidently so placed that they could seriously annoy the enemy and aid us in our advance. The firing ceased at sunset. It was to be resumed on the following morn- lug. Lieut. B. F. Fisher, acting signal officer, was ordered to take charge of all the details for this (luty and to rel)Ort to General Porter at daylight. The signal telegraph line was ordered this night to be reeled up and to report to General Porter in the morning. It was anticipated there might be an engagement on the north side of the river. ACTION IN FRONT OF FAIR OAKS ORCHARD. On the day that this cannonade was takitig place on our right the ac- tion in front of Fair Oaks Orchard was fought upon our left. At this engagement there were present at different times Generals Hooker, Heintzelman, and McClellan. A detachment of four signal officers, with their men, Lieut. W. G. McCreary, One hundred and second Pennsyl- vania Volunteers, and acting signal officer, commanding, had been sent at daylight to report to General Hooker. In the action which ensued Lieutenants McCreary and Denicke, acting signal officers, were posted in a tree-top in front of Caseys redoubt, from which they overlooked the positions of the enemy not visible from the ground. Hence mes- sages were sent in reference to the direction and range of our artillery when engaged to Lieut. C. S. Kendall, First Massachusetts Volunteers, and acting signal officer, stationed with the batteries on the Williams Page 249 AIAP. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 249 burg road. The movements of the enemys troops visible from this position, and some of them important, were reported to Lieutenant Beckett, acting signal officer with General Heintzelman. The station on the tree-top was rendered unpleasant by now and then musketry fire and occasional shots from the enemys sharpshooters. In addition to the services rendered by reporting the location and movements of the enemy, the reports from this station caused to be stopped during the action the fire of one of our batteries which was persistently throw- ing its shells among our own men. The station was held until after the action had ceased. General Hooker had requested that this detach- ment should be returned to him each day while he held this position. EVACUATION OF WHITE HOUSE. Early on the morning of June 26 a report received at headquarters from Lieutenant Fisher, then at General Porters headquarters, indi- cated that our heavy batteries near there would not open on that day. At noon on this day it was first inlimated to the signal officer that an attack by the enemy in force upon our right, on the north side of the Chickahominy and upon our depot at White House, was anticipated, and that a change of base to James River might be necessary. A tele- gram was instantly sent to General Casey, then commanding at White House, requesting that a staging for a signal station be raised at once upon the roof of the White House. Lieut. XV. S. Stryker, acting signal officer, was ordered to proceed from general headquarters to White House, and, assuming charge of the communications there, to arrange with the signal officers upon the gunboats for their prompt co-opera- tion. Lieutenant Stryker left immediately for his station, some 20 miles distant. By noon of the following day the communications had been arranged. From this moment until the last of the evacuation the signal officers here (on shore and on shipboard) were actively on duty. To the per- fect understanding thus had between our land and naval forces may be attributed in some degree the success of the complete evacuation of that depot in the face of an advancing enemy. Brigadier-General Stoneman, falling back past XVhite House with his light brigade on his way to Yorktown, here arranged by signal messages to place his wearied infantry on the vessels, and requested that a signal officer ac- company him on his march down the Peninsula. Lieut. F. W. Owen, Thirty-eighth New York Volunteers, acting signal officer, was detailed for that purpose. The last message sent announced the close approach of the enemy. A few moments later the fleet of transports got under way. The White House was set on fire by some unknown person after the last officer and man connected with the Signal Corps had left it. BATTLE OF. MECHANICSVILLE. About 4 p. m. on the 26th of June a message from Lieutenant Fisher, acting signal officer, then at Hogans house, north of the Chickahominy, announced that the enemy was moving down the north side of the Chick- ahominy; that there would be a battle at Mechanicsville, and that all the troops then on the north side had been ordered to be ready to cross to the south of the Chickahominy. Lieutenant Fisher was about to leave, with the officers collected from the different signal stations near him, for the point at which the battle was expected. Very soon after a message from General Reynolds announced that with the troops unde Page 250 250 TIlE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIII. his comjnand he had fallen back to a predetermined position near Beaver Dam. At almost the same time at which this message was received the roar of the battle at Mechanicsville made it evident it had commenced. At the commencement of this battle Lieutenant Fisher distributed his officers as follows, viz: Lientenant Beckett, acting signal officer with a battery on the right of our line, about 100 yards from a promi- nent house on the field: Lieutenant Homer, acting signal officer, with the extreme right; Lieutenant Wiggins, acting signal officer, with the reserve. Lieutenant Fisher, with Lieutenant Birney, took post on the roof of the house mentioned, and at which a battery was stationed. From these positions, which were occupied as points of observation, the officers were able, by the aid of their glasses, to obtain information which could not otherwise have readily been given. Their reports were made to the different commanders near whom they were serving. Signals were not used upon the field of battle. The fire upon the sta- tions occupied by the officers upon this field was quite severe. The fire of artillery continued until about 9 & clock at night, and when it closed our troops everywhere had held their positions. During this action one officer had been left at the Hogan station, communicating with the sta~ tion on 0-oldings farm. It ~vas presumed that this station was con- stantly watched by the enemy. There is always a possibility that the key to signal communication may be by accident or betrayal in the possession of the enemy. It is customary for this reason to disguise true messages, and to send with an especial signal messages intended to deceive. On this night, as soon as the firing had ceased, the chief signal officer instructed the Hogan station to send, in l)lain view of the enemy, the message, The five divisions have arrived. As our forces intended to leave the posi- tion, this message, if it conld by any accident be interpreted by the enemy, would lead them to believe, that we l)roposed to hold it. No other messages were sent this night. The field telegraph train, which had arrived from the south side of the Chickahominy on the morning of this day, had been ordered to be extended from General Porters headquarters, which later in the day (luring the battle was the position of General McClellan, to a point near 01(1 Cold Harbor. The wire had been reeled out accor(lingly. It had fallen again among new troops, who investigated its comI)osition l)y cutting it, and the officer going to Cold Harbor had been warned that the enemy were approaching that position an(1 that it would not be held by our troops. The line was not working. Under these circumstances the wire was now ordered to l)e reeled up an(l time train to recross the river. At about 10 oclock the officers and mcmi collected froni the field of battle were gathered at Hogans station, and arrangements were made for them to take part in the battle of the following day. It was the impression at this time that a great battle would be fought the next day on the south side of the Chiekahoininy. Lieutenant Fisher was ordered to return to the signal camp near general headquarters, (tud to rejoin at daylight, with a(IditioIlal officers, the party on the northside of the Chickahominy, to serve with General Porter. The remainder of the patty (with the exception of four officers detached to General Hooker) fit for duty was ordered to be at the station at Goldings farm, equipped, and there to await orders to move with the forces on the south side of the river. The officer in charge of the wagons of the signal detachment was ordered to be ready to strike camp at any time and to accompany the movement of general head- quarters Page 251 CHAP. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 2511 BATTLE OF GAINES MILL. Before daylight on the 27th of June the sound of cannon announced that the battle had recominenced. Word was sent to Lieutenant Fisher to carry out the instructions given him the night before. The signal detachment serving at Gaines Mill numbered eight officers, with their flagmen. As our troops fell back from Mechanicsville the station at Hogans house was abandoned, the enemys skirmishers being then in the same piece of woods and not far distant. When our forces took up their position near Gaines Mill Lieutenant Fisher disposed of the officers of his command as follows, viz: Lieu- tenant Gloskosky, acting signal officer, was statione(l near the north end of Duanes Bridge, whence he observed and reported the move- ments of the enemy in the valley of the Chickahominy at points where they crossed the river from the south to the north side to take l)art in the action, and upon the heights on the m~orth side, adjacent to the stream. These reports were signaled to Lieutenant Camp, acting sig- nal officer stationed near General Porters headquarters. Lieutenants Wiggins and Fisher were upon the right of the army, and reported the appearance and advance of the enemy coming in the direction of Gaines Mill and Cold Harbor. These reports were sent to Lieiftenant Homer, near General Porters headquarters. Lieutenants Tompkins and Beckett were ordered to open communi- cation across the Chickahominy from a point near General Porters headquarters to a point near General Smiths headquarters. These officers failed to make this communication. The persistence witli which some of the officers held their stations in the ensuing battle of that day attracted attention. Lieutenant Gloskosky, reporting from the left, early drew upon himself the fire of the enemys guns, to which he paid but little attention, and held his station until the destruction of the bridge behind him ren station. , dering it necessary that he should change his The station on the right was held by the officers upoin it until they were notified that to hold it longer, while it involved very great risk, would be useless. From all the stations reports were sent to General Porter, near the Adams house, as the enemy drew near, and until, in the smoke and confusion of the general engagement, messages could no longer be sent. About 2 l~ m. the chief signal officer received instructions from the general commanding to open communication from the position then occupied by the general near Trents house to General Porters head- quarters on the field of battle on the north side of the river. It would have been easy to carry out this order had it l)een earlier given, and it would have been possible to do so had our troops on the north side beemi able to hold their position. As the action resulted, the stations one at Trents house, the other in a tree ne~ir General Porters head- quarterswere no sooner determined upon than it became necessary to abandon them. With the retreat of our forces at sunset efforts to estal)lish this communication ceased. Durimig the progress of this en- gagement Lieutenant Denicke, Cameron Rifles, and acting signal officer, stationed at Smiths redoubt, was able to render some service by report- ing the effects noticed with his telescope of the shots directed from the battery of 20-pounder guns there stationed upon the enemy appearing near Gaines house. The detachment held in reserve on the south side of the river rendered on this day no material assistance. There was no advance of our force Page 252 252 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CUAP. XXIII in which they could take part. Late in the afternoon some of them were placed upon stations near Smiths redoubt, at Trents house, and at two farm-houses at different points lower down on the Chickahominy, one of these being the Dudley house, to endeavor to communicate with the stations on the field on the north side of the river. It was impos- sible to effect this, and when our forces, after the battle, retired across the Chickahominy the officers of both parties rejoined their camp iiear general headquarters. Headquarters camp had moved on the after- noon of this day, and was established this night at Savage Station. ENCAMP~IENT AT SAVAGE STATION. On the next day (Saturday) there was no general engagement. The greater portion of the signal party, wearied by the duties of the two preceding days and nights, were kept in camp to rest and to be at hand if they were needed. A detachment of 4 officers, with their men, Lieut. W. G. McCreary, acting signal officer, commanding, was sent to rel)ort to General Hooker in front. About noon this day it was known that the enemy, victorious at 4iI~rairies Mill, had reached the line of the railroad to White House, and their cavalry was seen near Bottoms Bridge. Telegraphic communica- tion with the depot at White House was broken. At very nearly the same time Lieutenant Hastings, acting signal officer, who had started from White House on the morning of this day with a wagon load of signal stores and without escort, and who had crossed his wagon at the ford at Bottoms Bridge (the bridge being destroyed) in the presence of the enemys cavalry, reported to the chief signal officer at general headquarters camp his safe arrival with his charge on the south side of the Chickahominy. This was the last arrival of wagons from the depot on the Pamunkey. Lieutenant Hastings was ordered to join with his train the great trains by this time moving on all main roads toward the new base upon the James River. Early this morning the chief signal officer had been notified that General Keyes corps had crossed the White Oak Swamp and was near Charles City Cross-Roads. He was instructed to send two signal officers, with their men, to report to him. In obedience to this order Lients. Charles Herzog, acting signal officer, and Franklin Ellis, acting signal officer, were ordered to join General Keyes. They were supplied with rockets, and a code of rocket signals was arranged, by which, if rockets could be seen, communication could be had from the position held by General Keyes to general headquarters. They were further ordered that, having first obtained the permission of General Keyes, they would push on to the James River, and put themselves in communica- tion, if possible, with the naval forces there lying. The dense woods of White Oak Swamp, beyond which General Keyes forces were, precluded the possibility of signaling by flags by day. An attempt was made to run out the telegraph wire to reach his headquarters. It was laid for a short distance. The thronging of the immense trains upon the road leading from Savage Station to White Oak Bridge, and the imperfect character of the apparatus, rendered its farther extension impossible, and the effort was after some hours aban doned. The wire was ordered to be reeled up, and the officers in charge of the train were instructed to move it, as soon as there was opportunity, toward James River. At sunset officers were stationed to watch for the rockets, should any be thrown ill) from General Keyes corps. During this day large forces of the enemy could be seen from nea Page 253 CHAP. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 253 Dudleys house moving on the north side of the Chickahominy in the direction of the railroad and on the roads leading to White House. Our forces in front and on the south side of the Chickahominy occu- pied their usual lines. Large numbers of wounded from the fields of Mechanicsville and Gaines Mill were gathered at the Savage house and in the grounds surrounding it, at the railroad station. The wagons of the signal party were kept packed, and the party was held in readiness to move. By evening it had become generally understood that head. quarters were to move that night, and the order had been circulated that all were to be in preparation to march at the shortest notice. The tents were finally struck at about 2 a. m. MOVEMENT FROM SAVAGE STATION. It had been raining during the night, and at daylight a thick fog was hiding the movements of both armies. Instructions were given before dawn to Lieutenant Fisher to report at daylight with a party of five officers and their fiagmen at General Smiths headquarters, still near Goldings farm, and afterwards to acco~upany any movement of the troops of that portion of the army, now our right, during the ensuing day. A station of observation was ordered to be established at Dudleys house. Four officers, with their men, were to report as usual at daylight to General Hooker. The remainder of the party was to be in reserve near Savage Station, and there to wait for ftu-ther orders. All trains were to move at once for the depot on James River. Soon after daylight it was evident that the general movement of the army which had been taking place drew near its completion. The rear of the last train moving from the front was in the open fields surrounding Savage Station. Headquarters moved across White Oak Swamp. About 7 a. m. the fog, which had shut out everything, lifted, and from the station at Dudleys house long lines of the enemys troops could then be seen moving on the north side of the river as if toward White House, and halted at the different roads leading from the bridges. The movement was evidently in force. A report of these facts was sent by courier to General McClellan. An hour later the forces under General Franklin, moving back from our lines in front by way of Trents house, began to occupy positions at Dudleys house and near Savage Station. The signal officers serving with this portion of the army, stationing themselves on trees and on house-tops as the troops moved back, reported to General Franklin and his division commanders such movements of the enemy as they could see, until the enemys pickets had crossed the river from the northern side, and until in the afternoon the last troops moved from Dudleys house to go upon the battle-field at Savage Station. the officer upon Dudleys station leaving it with the rear guard. At noon the troops under Generals Hooker and Heintzelinan were occupying the second line of defenses in front of Savage Station and on both sides of the Williams- burg roads. There were occasional skirmishes and exchange of cannon- shots near this place, but the enemy had not shown themselves in force. The sounds of a slight engagement near Sumners position was audible for a time, but soon ceased. The troops were everywhere on the alert and in good spirits, and the retreat seemed making with precision. Squads of men at this time were destroying at Savage Station l)roperty it had been found necessary to leave behind. Close to the Williamsburg road at Savage Station a siege howitzer, a piece of the siege train, had become disabled by some breakage of its carriage Page 254 254 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIILL The officer iu charge had piled wood under and on top of it, and set- ting tire to the mass, which blazed UI) fiercely, was quietly waiting some time after the gun had been rendered useless for its entire destruction. A train of cars laden with ammunition and provisions stood on the railroad track close to the station. This was being dismantled. A great pile of boxes of hard bread stood by the road hear the hospital. This was to he left, it was said, for the sick and wounded. The wagon trains had passed out of view from Savage Station. There remained only the troops designated to hold for a time this positiou. The signal officers who had reported to General Hooker in the morn- ing, though reconnoitering, had not beeii called upon for any active service. The reserve party yet remained at Savage Station. THE BATTLE OF SAVAGE STATION. Early in the afternoon the troops of Generals Sumner and Franklin, falling back from the positions they had held in the morning, began to form their line upon what was to be the battle-field. About 4 p. m. the laden train of cars standing upon the track was fired. Another train attached to a locomotive was started at speed and without guidance toward the broken railroad bridge crossing the Chickahominy. Soon after a terrific explosion iu that direction announced the destruction of large supplies of ammunition. Our lines were formed upon the east side of the open grounds at Savage Station, the left of the line extending in the woods upon the south side of the Williamsburg road. As the line was forming the signal officers, who had been held ready during the day, together with those coming in with the different bodies of troops, were assigned to stations. Lieutenants Birney and Yates, acting signal officers, were posted on the Williamsburg road as far toward the front as they could be visible, with instructions that one of the party should proceed yet far- ther toward the enemy, supposed to he approaching in that direction, to reconnoiter; and, returning, his reports should be sent by signals to the central station, placed near the point at which the Williamsburg road leaves (going toward White Oak Swamp) at Savage Station. Lieutenant Wiggins was placed at a point where the railroad track first enters the cleared ground from the direction of Richmond. Hence the railroad is a long way visible. Lieutenant Wiggins was to i-eport any advance of the enemy upon the railroad or from that direction. Lieutenant Tompkins, acting signal officer, was placed where the right of our line rested on the deep cut of the railroad east of Savages house. He was to report any force appearing on our right by the road from Trents house or over the bridges of the Chickahominy. At the central station were posted Lieutenants Neel, Marston, and Denicke, acting signal officers. The arrangements were hardly com- pleted when a message from the station on the Williamsburg road and a verbal report made by an officer from that station announced the en- emy as not far distant, and moving on the railroad slowly, and with artillery. This report was sent to General Sumner. Other reports soon indicated the presence of the enemy at other points in our front. The shells from their guns began to strike in the edge of the woods near the signal officers there stationed. A final report from Lieutenant Wiggins estimated the distance of the enemy from his station ni yar(15. These reports were forwarded to General Sumner, who, in reply to the last, said he was coming upon the field in person. The officers wer Page 255 C:IAr. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 255 ordered in from the advanced stations. General Sumner came upon the field. At the commencement of the action, which 110W opened, some shells were thrown from a howitzer on the enemys right, near Williamsburg road, directly among the tents crowded with the wounded surrounding Savage Station. A white flag sent from the hospital was met by the enemy, and thereafter the range of this gun was carefully altered. No other shells fell among the sufferers. A few moments later the enemy showed themselves on the line of the railway, and opened upon the troops near the central signal station with a gun of the heaviest caliber. The piece is reported to have been either an 8-inch columbiad or a 64-pounder rifle, mounted upon a rail- way car, and moved upon the railway. The range and service of the piece were splendid, and its fire was most annoying until silenced by a battery of Parrott guns near our center. The signal flag offered too perfect a mark to be used among troops in its presence, and the station here, with the one established before the action, on the right of our line, and now practically useless, ceased working. Much of the battle of Savage Station was fought on open ground, our lines advancing across the plain to close with the enemy, who held the edge of the woods on the west side of the cleared ground from the railroad to beyond the Williamsburg road. The musketry firing, as the lines closed with each other, was very severe. As our different lines moved up it was thought at one time it would be necessary to establish a signal station far to the front and at a point much exposed to the enemy. Lientenants Camp, Wiggins, and Denicke, acting signal officers, volunteered to work this station, and took their places with the line, ready to move up when it should be ordered. By the time the line had advanced the enemy had been driven back, and the station was un- necessary. It was dark when the conflict ended. It was fully 9 oclock before the reports were received from the battle-field. The place of combat, on which they sought the dead and wounded with torches, the trains of cars yet burning on the railway track, a hospital and large grounds crowded with the suffering of other battles, and long lines of troops, lit up now and then with a lurid light by the explosions of am- mwrition among the burning stores, were some of the incidents of the scene. Some time after dark the chief signal officer was requested by Gen- eral Sumner to carry to General McClellan, then on the other side of White Oak Swamp, the message that lie had repulsed the eneniy after a severe action and with severe loss on both sides; that he was confi- dent that he could repulse their whole force again in the morning, and that lie was most anxious to hold his then position at Savage Station. The message caused some excitement upon its delivery at general head- quarters. The signal party at Savaoe Stati battle-field. _ on bivouacked near the The troops nuder General lleintzelman moved from the works which they had been holding during the day at about the same time that the line of battle was formed at Savage Station. These tioops crossed the W hite Oak Swamp on roads higher up than those leading over the princil)aI crossing. The signal officers accompanied the columns. There was no occasion tor their active service. General headquarters camp was established this night on the south side of White Oak Swamp. Our trooI)s were all night moving over from Savage Station. The enemy, quieted by the sharp check they had received in their defeat of the afternoon, showed no signs of imm Page 256 256 TIrE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, V~. diately pressing the pursuit. On this night, as on the days and nights before, the great trains were to be found stretched out upon the road or moving slowly to their destination. The signal party, which had bivouacked near Savage Station after the battle, crossed the swamp at about 4 a. m. They rested near the crossing. The morning of June 30 was clear and pleasant. On this day was to be made the last march necessary to place the troops in the new posi- tion on James River. The troops everywhere were in motion, seem- ingly in good spirits. The trains moved steadily upon the roads with- out confusion, halting at times to allow the cavalry and artillery to pass to the front, to take up their assigned positions. The corps commanded by General Keyes was well in advance and known to be near the river. General headquarters were at a house upon the road near where the camp had been, about 3 miles from White Oak Swamp. Soon after they were established here the signal detachment assigned to General Hooker, of General Heintzelmans corps, the pre- ceding day reported for duty. They were instructed to hasten forward with General Keyes advance, and on his arrival near the James to put that officer in communication with the gunboats. Lieutenant Herzog, acting signal officer, also reported here in person the fact that Lieutenant Ellis, acting signal officer, and himself had, in obedience to orders given on Sunday at Savage Station, accompanied a small party of cavalry sent forward by General Keyes, had reached James River on the night before, and had there boarded one of our war vessels; that he had again visited the James River on the night of the 29th, whence he had now just returned. The position of the fleet had been ascertained. No enemy in force had been seen in going or returning. The report was read to General McClellan. The officer was ordered to rejoin General Keyes. Headquarters soon after moved upon the road toward Haxalls Landing. The signal detachment which had bivouacked near White Oak Cross- ing was, with the exception of two officers, retained with himself by Lieutenant Fisher, acting signal officer, this morning ordered forward by that officer to report to the chief signal officer at general head- quarters. This party reported just in time to be present at the first engagement on Malvern Hill. Before noon General Keyes, with the advance, had reached the James River without encountering the enemy, and all the roads of communication were opened. The corps com- manded by General Fitz John Porter was at and on the roads near Malvern Hill. The signal officers who had accompanied the fleet from James River were in communication with those who had been sent forward with General Keyes, and a perfect understanding of their relative move- ments and positions had been thus given by the land and naval forces. Communication had been opened from a point just below Haxalls to the flag-ship Galena, lying off City Point. The rear of the army was yet at White Oak Swamp. The change of base (to James River) seemed to be a thing accomplished, and that without molestation. A very short time afterward the tumult of the cannonade at White Oak Swamp announced the enemys attack in that direction. The position of Malvern Hill, nearly 2 miles from the James River, and yet commanding a view of that stream, is perhaps as perfect as could be chosen for combining by the use of signals the operations and the fire of land and naval forces. From the summit of the hill the roads leading to Richmond by the river and passing Turkey Bridg Page 257 CHAr. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 257 are overlooked, and even where the roads approaching pass through dense timber the dust raise(l by moving columns, showing through the tree-tops, indicate to an observer here placed their position. A signal station was now ordered to be established on the roof of a small house at this point. A station of observation was ordered to be placed on ilaxalls house, whence a long view is had of the river and the roads near it. Two officers were placed on board the gunboat Aroostook, which lay in sight of the station at iNlalvern Hill and also of the ilaxalls station. There was one officer (Lieutenant Clum, acting signal officci) on board of the flag-ship Galena, which had now moved up to near Haxalls from lower down the river. All this time sounds of a general conflict in our rear were increasing. The battles of White Oak Swamp, New Market, and Glendale had opened an(l were progressing. The commanding general, who, leaving ilaxalls, had ~iddeii toxvard the front at the first sounds of the cannonade, returned, and went on board the flag-ship to confer with the naval commander. A signal message was sent to him from Malvern Hill, reporting the lines of communication open. Orders were sent to the signal officers on board the gunboats to watch the Statiol) on Maivern Hill in case they weiit iiito action. Soon after this Lient. W. 0. MeCreary, One hundred and second Pennsylvania Volun- teers, acting signal officer, stationed on a house at ilaxalls, noticed, about 5 miles up the river and approaching, clouds of dust, which, as he thought, indicated the movement of a column of the enemy. The fact, mnentione d by him to two officers of the generals staff attracted no attention. Watching this movement for some time, d tiring which he was able to form an estimate of the strength of the supposed column and the distance it had advanced, Lieutenant MeCreary, acting signal officer, reported the fact by signals to General McClellan, still on board the Galena. An instant reply inquired how far the emiemy was distant, and the answer was met by the announcement that the gunboats woald move iii) an(l shell them. The Haxall station was ordered to immediately report by signals to the general any further facts of il4terest that might occur. The gun- boats were got nuder way at once, and signals passed from one to another to Come on and shell the enemy. At this time we had strong batteries on Malvern Hill and a considerable force in that vicinity. The plain on top of the hill was crowded with wagons, and the stragglers from the remainder of the army were being here gath- ered and formed together. There were preparations to meet an attack, but it was not exl)ectecl immediately. The enemys column moving down the River road came rapidly through the woods to a point within close range and opened on the heights with field artillery. The long lines of dust in the woods and beyond them marked the positions of their infantry. The contest was rapi(l and decisive. With the first of the enemys shell the hill was cleared as if by magic of wagons and of stragglers, which went down the hill together, and rapidly on to Haxalls by hundreds. Our batteries on the hill came promptly into position and opened in reply, while the great guns of the fleet threw in their shells fairly among the enemy. Almost as soon as time gunboats had left Haxalls Station the signal station on Malvern Hill had come in view to the signal officers stationed on the mast-tops, and the signal messages from the field, Fire one mile to tIme right, Good shot, Fire low and into the 17 R RYOL X Page 258 258 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [ONA?. XXIX1. woods near the shore, & c., were reported to the gunners in a few minutes after their broadsides were opened. The gunboats continued their fire for some time after the land batteries had ceased, and until the enemys colunms, repulsed and scattered, were out of range and hidden from view. With the first lull of the firing came inquiries by signals from Gen- eral McClellan as to the progress of the battle still raging with other parts of the army. The reply from General Porter brought the com- manding general quickly on shore and on the field, which he reached after night-fall. Messages went to and fro between the field and the gunboats until after dark, when the vessels moved down the river. At the beginning of the action the signal flag stationed and working on a house on Malvern Hill, directly in front of the enemys batteries, seemed to attract their attention, and several shots, some of them pass- ing very close, were thrown at it. No injury was done, however, and the working was not suspended. The number of messages crowded on this station from all parts of the army was too great to admit that all of them should be sent. During this action other stations were established communicating from the position of General Porter, after he came upon the field, to where our advanced batteries (under General Griffin, stationed a mile distant, on the Quaker road) were firing on the enemy. Some messages in reference to this firing were thence communicated to General Porter. These field stations were withdrawn at dark. A detail of officers and men was posted at the Malvern Hill station, to be on the alert through- out the night in the case of an emergency, and an officer was sent to one of the gunboats, by the order of General McClellan, to open com- inunication thence that night if it was practicable. The vessel had moved so fir down the river that the signals were not visible. The stations at ilaxalls, communicating with the fleet near there, were retained. Mention has been made of the names of officers in my pre- liminary report. The headquarters camp was this night at Haxalls Station. The next day was fought the principal battle of Malvern Hill. THE BATTLE AT MALVERN HILL. The preparations for this battle commenced at daylight. The officers who had been placed on board the fleet the preceding day had remained throughout the night. Other officers were now sent to the vessels which it was expected would take part in the action. The stations on Malvern Hill and at Haxalls remained as they had before been posted. Orders were sent to Lieutenant Fisher, acting signal officer (who, arriving from White Oak Swamp, reported for duty this morning), to establish stations on the right and left of our lines (which the whole army had formed in the night), near Malvern Hill, and as far in front as was practicable. The central station was to be near the station com- municating with the Navy, which was also near the position occupied by General Porter on the crest of Malvern Hill. In obedience to this order Lieutenant Camp, acting signal officer, was posted on the house at General Heintzelmans headquarters, communicating with Lieutenant McCreary, acting signal officer, stationed near General Porter; Lieu- tenants Gloskosliy and Ellis, acting signal officers near the headquar- ters of General Couch, on the left, communicating with Lieutenant Wig- gins, acting signal officer at the central station; Lieutenants Birney and Yates, acting signal officers on station to communicate with th Page 259 CHAP. lxiii.] GENERAL REPORTS. 259 fleet. The station at Haxalls was occupied by Lieutenant Kendall, acting signal officer. All these lines were working fairly before the enemy had made any attack in force. The naval forces held the same positions as on yesterday, and awaited the word of the general com- manding ou the field how and where to throw their fire. Signal offi- cers were in the tops of each, by whom the signal messages were read as sent. About noon the enemy advanced on our left. Our batteries on land opened, and a signal order brought to their assistance the fire of the fleet, the shells of the great guns passing high over portions of our army and plunging into the woods through which the enemy were moving. The conflict at this point terminated, after a severe struggle, with the repulse of the enemy. One of the first messages sent from the signal station on the left was a call for more men. At that time our lines seemed hard pressed. A message from this station announced to General McClellan, upon his arrival on the field about 2 p. in., the repulse of the enemy, then just effected by General Couchs division. During this con test this signal station was found to be under so severe a fire that it was necessary to order it to be moved to where it could be better covered from view. It was then posted behind a fringe of trees, and there worked under fire throughout the day. In the lull of the engagement after the first attack, and when the firing recoin- menced in the afternoon, it was engaged with frequent messages relat- ing to our own troops and to the enemy. Reports of varions character and importance passe(l over this line until night, when with the final repulse of the opposing army the officers were put upon night stations where our lines of battle had been, and there remained working until the order came late at night to evacuate the position. The forces on the right were not extensively engaged this day, and few communications passed over the line extending to General ileint- zelman. The communication with the naval vessels through all of this day was complete. The fire of their guns was controlled by the general on the field as readily as was that of his own batteries. The messages to open fire, to cease firing, to fire rapidly, to fire slowly, to fire to the right or left, to alter the elevation of the guns, the ranges, the length of fuses, & c., passed continuously. At one time the order went to fire only single guns, and to wait after each the signal report of the shot. About 6 p. in., while the last attack was raging, it wa~ signaled, Fire rapidly; this is the crisis of the day. The fire of the Navy covered the left of our army. It was turned upon our enemy, more than 2 miles distant from the ships in the woods and invisible from the vessel, with precision. It was not the fault of naval officers or men that one or two of the shells struck in our own ranks. The guns had been trained in obedience to signal messages closer and closer to our lines, until the variations usual in such long flights of the shell caused the accident. It must be borne in mind that from early in the day until dark they threw an almost continuous fire, and sometimes by broadsides, along the flank of our army, and over a part of it up to its front. The attention of the general commanding the army was called to the names of some of the officeis present in my report of July 18, 1862. The battle of Malvern Hill closed after dark with a terrific cannon- ade and the absolute repulse of the enemy. The plain was held by our troops, and the foe, beaten everywhere, were flying. The signal officers were ordered to bivouac at their stations, to be ready to join the ~xpecte4 gwvemei~t c~f the troops at daylight Page 260 260 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. (CHAP. XX1II. MOVEMENT FROM MALVERN HILL. About an hour later the chief signal officer, then at the deserted camping ground at Haxalls, whence headquarters had that evening moved to Harrisons Landing, was informed that the whole army would move that night for Harrisons Landing, and he was ordered to arrange such communication that General McClellan, who would remain on board the Galena off Haxalls, might be in communication with General Keyes, whose corps was the rear guard, and be also informed of the manner in which the march was made and of any occurrences iii rela- tion to it. An order was sent to the signal party npon the battle-field notifying the officers of the order, and directing them to accompany the move- ment of the troops. Lieutenant Kendall, acting signal officer, established a station on the bank of the river. and through the imight reported from time to time to General McClellan, throngh Lieutenant Cluin, acting signal officer upon the flag-ship, the names of the (lifferent corps and divisions and the times as they passed on the road on their march down the river. A message was also sent at (lawn reporting the condition of the troops and the character and conduct of the march. The general corn inanding the army communicated with General Keyes in rethrence to it. Soon after daylight the mnovememit was so far completed that the last troops and trains were passing. The corps of General Keyes was in position to cover the roads on which our forces were moving. It was raining heavily. A message was received from General McClellan a little later, about 9 a. in., announcing his departure to superinten(1 the landing of fresh troops at Harrisons Landing, and the flag-ship moved down the river. The signal station held up to this time by Lieutenant Kendall was now abandoned. At about this hour the last wagons of the trains were entering the clearing at Haxalls. Time rear guard of the army was crossing the bridge over Turkey Creek, alrea(ly swollen by the torrents of rain which had fallen. The timbers of th~ bridge had been partially cut, and trees on time sides of the road were weakened, to ob- struct it as soon as the rear guard had l)asse(l. Time trains, though re- tarded by swelling streams and the mud, were mnovimmg in good order upon the road, and General Keyes, whose corps covered the rear, had every confidence that the mnoveinent would be completed with success. In this movement fromn ilaxalls to Harrisons Landing time roads ~vere at one tinme so encumul)ered that trains ~vere not l)erllmitted to niove upon them. It was thought somne of the waoons would be lost. In these circumstances the instruumemmts taken from the field telegraph train were sent forward upon horseback. The reels of wire were to follow as occasion offered. Of these one reached Ilarrisomms Lammding in safety. The other, broken upon the road, was destroyed by the oflicer in charge. The last detachment of two signal officers an(l their men, who had been kept back to enable the rear to be covered l)y the naval guns if necessary, now rejoined general headquarters, established at Harrisons Landing, 6 miles belo~v Ilaxahis. A report of the state of the march was made to the general comnnmandimmg. The road from Haxahls to Harrisons Landing is at mrmany points, if not throughout its whole course, within the range of canimomi-shot from the river. It was recomnnmeLm(led that should the enemy attempt to follow our trains in force, two signal officers be placed upoim a gunboat to be sent up the river to attack them. Of these officers, one, landing an Page 261 CI?AP. 3~XTIT.] GENERAL REPORTS. 261 taking a position whence the enemy could be seen, could direct upon them the guns of the vessel, a~lthough the troops upon whom the fire was turned might be invisible to the gunners. The flag-ship of the fleet now lay off 1-larrisons Landing. Communication was opened between that vessel and general headquarters. Officers were stationed to make it permanent. The roof of the Harrison mansion offered the most elevated position on which to establish a station of observation. A detail of men was set to place thereon a temporary staging and to clear away the treetops which interfered with the view. It was now late in the afternoon of what had been a dark, rainy, and uncomfortable day. The rear of our trains had arrived within 2 miles of their destination. A force of the enemy following, and getting in range, opened upon them with two pieces of artillery. The teamsters were becoming anxious and alarmed, the roads were full, and there was danger of a confusion which might cost us the loss of a large number of wagons, with their stores. A message was sent by order of General McClellan to the flag officer ot~ the fleet to notify him that the enemy were annoying the rear of the trains, and to ask that a vessel move up to repel them. The distance and l)osition were given. The Maratanza was signaled from the flag-ship of the duty required, and steamed off immediately. The second shot from her 11-inch gun fell close to the enemys baftery. It was hastily withdrawn. The staging on the man- sion was so far completed on this night as to be fit for use. The de. tachiments of the signal party, with the exception of those officers and mneim on the gunboats, fi a(l rejoined, and the party was this night en- cam l)e(l near general headquarters. The morning of the 3d of July was dark and cloudy. The camping ground at Harrisons Landing is surrounded by creeks and swamps, and the heavy rains, with the tramplings of thousands, had converted the l)lowed fields into inorasses of mud. It was difficult to move between camps on foot or from one part of the army to another. Everything was wet, cold, and uncomfortable. The greater mass of the army lay in the open grounds which surround Harrisons mansion. Some of them were weary with the ceaseless marching and fighting of the past week, and were confused and depressed by movements they did not un(lerstan(l. There was that disorder and uiisettled condition of affairs w-hich must always atten(L the movements of so great an army made under the circumstances in which ours had moved from the Chick- ahominy and marched and fought its way to the James. About 8 oclock the report of a gun and a shell whistling into camp indicated the presence of the enemy and excited attention everywhere. From the station on top of the mansion the smoke of the gun could be seen rising above the trees in the direction of and beyond Westover Church. Other shots followed, the shells falling nearer, and the enemy seemed to be a(lvancing slowly. Some time elapsed; the fire continued; forces supposed to be the enemy could be seen showing themselves in the open ground near the church. Our men began to grow restless. Exaggerated rumors came in from the front that tIme enemy in three strong columns were advancing upon our position. The commanding general had gone on board of one of the transports and had not yet returned. The flag officer commanding the fiect signaled to know what was the firing, and whether the Navy could render any assistance. A reply was sent at first that it was the enemy, and that the commanding general was omi board the Ariel, a~nd then a message that if a gunboat was sent a mile down the river the smoke of the enemys guns could be seen fromn her decks Page 262 262 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [OnAr. XXIII. At this time the commanding general reached the flag-ship with the Ariel; was informed of the facts, and came at once on shore, having signaled from the vessel the fact of his coming and a reply to a ques- tioii about preparation. The whole army was under arms to meet the enemy, the men moving out cheerfully for the anticipated battle. Two signal officers had been sent to the front, with instructions to proceed as far as possible to reconnoiter, and to report to the station on the mansion. The chief signal officer was now ordered to see that communication was kept with the vessels of the fleet, and to establish a station con- necting this communication with a point near the position which the general commanding took on the field. A few moments kiter the guns of the war vessel down the river were heard as her fire opened upon the woods where the enemy had been seen, and presently a couple of rounds from a field battery in front silenced the enemys guns. A signal message sent from the front to the mansion station asked that the gun- boat dowim the river might cease until our forces could reconnoiter the positions lately held by the enemy. This message was sent to the tiag- ship. It could not be signaled from the shore or the flag-ship instantly to the vessel engaged, an(l her fire was kept on the woods. A squadron of our cavalry sent on a reconnaissance caine in sight of her officers, and the guns were at once turned upon them as enemies. Fortunately one of the signal officers detailed for the station at the front had accompanied the reconnaissance. His signals were recognized on the vessel, communication was opened, and the gunboats fire ceased. The reconnaissance showed no enemy in our front in force. A dispatch reporting the resnlt was signaled from the officer who had accompanied the reconnoitering party to the general commanding. An hour or two later the camp had resumed its quiet. On this day the detachment of four officers and their men who had been at White House during the evacuation of that place reported for duty. On the night of the 4th of July the commanding general had received information which induced the belief that an attack would be made upon our position by the whole force of the rebels on the following day. The chief signal officer was instructed to so arrange cominunica- tion that the gunboats statione(l to cover the right and left flanks of the army at points respectively aboup 2 miles above and 2 miles below the mansion station should be in communication with that station; that from this station communication should also be had to the flag-ship and as far toward the front as was practicable. Stations were also to be arranged on each flank of the army on shore, communicating thence to the flanking gunboats. Lieutenant Fisher was instructed to arrange the shore stations. Lieutenant Stryker was sent to post the officers on the fleet. On the morning of the 5th all the preparations had been made. The enemy, however, did not advance the attack. There was no engage- ment. These stations were afterward adopted as the permanent sta- tions, and were held thereafter for the forty-one days our army lay at Harrisons Landing. The accompanying map and report will illustrate the positions. A week later the positions at Harrisons Landing had become so strong that anticipations of an attack by the enemy had ceased. The army awaited re-enforcements to resume the offensive. The officers of the Signal Corps, wearied and exhausted by three months of constant movement and labor (many of them sick from diseases incident to th Page 263 CRAP. xfln.1 GENERAL REPORTS. 263 climate and brought on by exposure), were, with the exception of those on the permanent stations, gathered into one car~p, that they might be rested. The party was re-equipped and reorganized. Its members had profited by the experience they had gained in the field, and after a few days of repose were ready again for service. At midnight on the 30th of July the enemy, who had crept down after dark with two batteries, opened fire from the right bank of the James River at two pointsone opposite the mansion station, the other opposite Westoverupon the encampment of our army and the trans- ports in the flyer. A report of the position of their batteries was made by the officer on the mansion station, and was sent to the general corn- manding just at the close of the bombardment. During this cannonade the officers on the stations on our right flank were on the alert. The gunboat Maratanza, lying on our right, engaged the battery at West- over and drew its fire. The foretop, in which Lieut. Paul Babcock, jr., ~eventh New Jersey Volunteers, and acting signal officer, had posted himself, was struck by a cannon-shot while that officer was calling the flank station on shore with his lights. The stores camp of the signal party was for a time endangered this night by the shells which fell in it. A corporal of the party was killed and one man wounded. On the following day our forces occupied both banks of the James River. As soon as they had permanently established themselves on the right bank signal stations were posted, which placed them in com- munication with the signal lines before mentioned, and at the same time enabled the fire of the fleet to be called at any moment, and to be directed to cover them. On the 5th of August, and in the temporary absence of the chief signal officer, Lieutenant Fisher was in command of the signal party of the Army of the Potomac. On this day General Hooker, with two divisions, moved to reoccupy MalvQrn Hill. In the brief combat that followed Lieutenant Camp, acting signal officer, posted on the field at the Mellert house and over 2 miles inland, directed the fire of the steamer Port Royal on the position of the enemy at Malvern, and by his messages notified its commander of the progress of this action. He also first reported the retreat of the enemy. On the following day a line of stations connected General Hookers headquarters on Malvern Hill with general headquarters at Harrisons Landing, 8 miles distant. Re-enforcements were sent for by this line, and over it were passed the messages which directed some of the movements, and finally the withdrawal of the expedition. The re- ports of Lieutenants Fisher and Camp, herewith, have reference to this operation. From the date of this expedition until the 15th of August (the time of the evacuation of Harrisons Landing) there were no operations of magnitude. There was the usual routine of messages between the permanent stations and across the river. On the day of the evacuation of Harrisons Landing the station on the Harrison mansion was one of the last points abandoned, and a party of two signal officers with their men served with the rear cavalry of the rear guard, under General Pleasonton, as the columns moved down the Peninsula. When the troops were gathered near Fortress Monroe stations were posted at Newport News and on that fortress, and these were worked until the army embarked for Alexandria to take part in the campaigns then making in Northern Virginia Page 264 264 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIII. The maps herewith exhibit, as nearly as practicable, the location of those signal stations established during the campaign of which it has been possible to obtain record. The sub-reports of the acting signal officers are also submitted for the information to be gained from them. This main report has been drawn in the form of a narrative, in order that the general commanding ma.y have laid before him the circumn- stances under which the duties of the corps were attelnpte(l and the labor which attended them. This has beeii necessary in a first report of this character. The Signal Corps of the Army of the Potomac was not (luring the Peninsula Campaign so circumstanced as to be most effective. There was reason to regret in almost every battle and position the want of the field telegraph trains, so essential to the greatest usefulness of organi- zations of this kind. Appropriations for the other proper stores were first made by Congress at the end of February. The sums were not subject to the draft of the signal officer until May. The army was new. The duties of the corps were novel, and were un(lCrstood by but few generals in the service. The acting signal officers were all of vol- unteers, without any experience in military usage. They had been hastily instructed and equipped, and were thrown upon their first cain- paign in a country very difficult for their duties and into battles and operations of unusnal magnitude. There were few at first who aided them, even when it was in their power. It was often difficult to obtain official information of contem- plated movements. It was due to the good material selected from the State regiments for the CO~l)5 that so situated, the officers and men achieved omi the Peninsula the success they did, and toiled willingly through unusual labor with a zeal and effort which attracted there the attention of the general commanding the army. Very respectfully, general, your obedient servant, ALBERT J. MYER, Signal Officer, Major, U. S. A., and 0. 5. 0. Army Potomac. The ADJUTANT-GENERAL, Army of the Potomac. No. 13. Reports ofF. J. Allen [Allen Pinkerton], Chief of Secret Service Division. IIDQRS. PROVO5T-MARSIIAL-GENERAL, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Washington, D. C., March 29, 1862. GENERAL: I have the honor to submit the following information relative to the forces and defenses at Yorktown an(l Gloucester Point, as extracted fromu a report of one of my ol)eratives, made to you on November 15, 1861; the date of his visit to the above-named places being October 26, 1861: That, as my operative was informed, General Magruder (whose head- quarters were at Yorktown) commanded all the forces on the Peninsula bounded by James and York Rivers, and also those on Gloucester Point, his command at that time including twenty-seven regiments of infantry, 1,200 cavalry, and four field batteries, containing each from four to six guns, iron and brass, rifled and smooth bore. That Colonel Crump was in command of the forces at Gloucester Point, where wer Page 265 CHAP. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 265 then encamped two regiments of infantry, two companies of cavalry, and one field battery, consisting of four brass and two iron guns, rang- ing from 6 to 12-pounders. That on the beach at Gloucester Point was a heavy earthwork, with twelve mounted guns, ranging from 32 to 64 pounders. That the intrenchinents surroundiiig all the guns and forces (with the exception of one regiment of infantry) above specified coin- mence about one-fourth of a mile above the aforesaid earthwork on the point an(I run, in a somewhat circular form, until they again strike the York River about half a mile below the said earthwork. That these intrenchmeuts are composed of split ~)ine logs, set up en(lwise inside, with an earth bank outside about 12 feet at the base, the earth being taken from the outside front, thus making a (litch of some 5 or 6 ft~et in depth and the same in width at the top. That at about the center of this breast~vork is a 64-pounder mounted on a high carmiage, which trav- erses on a circle calculated for a sweep of the whole land side of the intrenchments, which is a clear field of about 700 acres, boumided by timber on the north and York River on the south. That between Octo- ber 26 and November 11, 1861, the rebels commenced a heavy earth- work on an elevation 50 yards back fi-omn the water, 30 to 35 feet above the water level, and 200 yards lower down the river than the earth- work at the point first mnentione(l. That said earthwork had an in- trenchment in front partly finished, 8 to 10 feet wide at the top, 5 to 6 feet in depth, the front of the cmnbankument perpendicular, alI(i the back of the ordinary slope. That on this work were employed more than 100 soldiers. That in order to draw out the real purpose of this for- tification my operative asked Colonel Crump if it was an infantry breastwork; that the colonel replied: 0, no, sir- its a battery, amid we intemid to mount six heavy guns thereonfour 32-pounders and two 64-pounders. (For masked batteries below Gloucester Point see re- port of this date extracted from statemnent of Thnggold.) That the landing at Yorktown is in front of a hill which rises with a slope some 25 feet above the beach, on the top of which hill, and in fromit of the town, is an earthwork mnounting six or eight guns, 32 to 64 pounders, of which guns my oJ)erativc saw six, but was informed by the sentinel that there were eight. That this last-named battery is about three- quarters of a mile from that on Gloucester Point, to which it is nearly opl)osite, but a short distamice lower down. (For further particulars concernli)g Yorktown battermes, see rcj)ort of this date on statements of Maurice and Ringgold) That, as my operative was informned by a hicutenamit 1mm the rebel army, fromn Yorktown down the Peninsula to- ward Fort Monroe are small creeks amid inlets running into both the York and James Rivers. That many of these creeks or inlets head near each other and i-un in opposite directions into the different rivers. That for nearly 15 miles down froni Yorktown breastworks were throwmm up on the several l)oilits of land between the headings of these various creeks or inlets, said breastworks facing toward Fort Monroe, and mounted with 18 to 64-poumiders. All of which is respectfully submitted by your obedient servant, E. J. ALLEN [ALLEN PJNKERTO~]. Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN, Commanding U. S. Army Page 266 266 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. (CHAP. XXIII. IIDQRS. PROVOST-MARSHAL-GBNERAL, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Washington, D. 0., March 29, 1862. GENERAL: I have the honor to submit the following information relative to the forces and defenses at Yorktown, Williamsburg, Bethel, & c., as extracted from various reports previously addressed to you from these headquarters: That from the statement made by James II. Maurice, deserter from the Second Florida Regiment, rel)orte(l on to you on February 1, I am enabled to select the following concerning defenses on the Yorktown Peninsula, to wit: FORTS, DEFENSES~ ETC., NEAR YORKTOWN, VA. Fort Grafton is 4 miles southeast by south from Yorktown and one- quarter of a mile back of an inlet from York River; contains four 32. pounders; that in the northeast corner being rifled and protecting a powder magazine. Artillery fort, adapted for field pieces, three-quarters of a mile southeast from Fort Grafton, 4~ miles southeast from York- town, on an old road leading from this fort to Back Creek. Breastwork for cannon on the north side of Poquosiu Creek, by an old mill. York- town is surrounded by a breastwork, on which 32-pouiiders are mounted, the number of which was not knowii by informant. That the magazine is in Coruwallis Cave, at the foot of the bluff on which the town is built. That in immediate proximity to this magazine is a fort contain- ing six guns, not rifled; is covered with sods for concealment, and can- not be seen until close at hand. Fort half a mile south-southwest from Yorktown, mounting three 32-pounders, one rifled; fort tthree-quarters of a mile south-southwest from Yorktown, mounting two 32-pounders. Rifle pit from the bridge on Back Creek northwest to the shore and along the shore westerly; that it is concealed, the earth dug from it being thrown into the water. Fort at Gloucester, opposite Yorktown, contains two 1O-iimch columbiads, one ritled cannon of European manu- facture, and two or three 32-poundersin all five or six guns. Inform- ant was simlhciently near to pel-ceive that these guns were genuine. In- formant was told, and understood from general report, that Williams- burg was well fortified, but cannot sj)eak on that point from personal observation - That from the statement made by William H. Riuggold, who left Gloucester November 6, 1861, reported on to you on December 2, 1861, I am enabled to present the following concerning the defenses on the Yorktown Pen iiisula, to wit: - That at Gloucester Point proper, York River, is a battery of nine 32-pounder colunibimmds, pointing up, down, and across the river; that on the bluff encircling Gloucester Point is a continuous embankment about 1~ miles in length from the river above to the river below; that this emnbankment was used as a sentinel-walk, and that on the inside thereof was a single gun, commanding the country road coming from the north. That on Bryants plantation, 2~ muiles below Gloucester Point, are two masked batteries, commanding the river, each containing one gun, one battery being situated on each end of the plantation. That around Yorktown on the land side is a continuous embankment, about 3 miles in length, and mounted with heavy columbiads, commanding all ap- proaches to the town; that within the embankment or breastwork ar Page 267 OnAP. hut] GENERAL REPORTS. 267 minor intrencliments. That at Yorktown there was a battery, consisting of five heavy columbiads, mounted on the heights of the town, directly opposite the Gloucester batteries, and commanding the river. That what has been called Coruwallis Cave was used as a magazine for ammuni- tion; that the principal magazine was then (November 5) on the bluff about 75 yards back of Coruwallis Cave, in an embankment on the upper side of the old road leading up into the town; that under the bluff just below Coruwallis Cave, concealed from upward-bound ves- sels behind a point on the river, is a battery of four or five short guns of large caliber, supposed to be shell guns; that this battery cannot be seen by vessels ascending the river until they have passed the point of land concealing it and are directly opposite the said bat- tery. That there are iron gun-carriages at Ship Point, 8 miles below Toos Point; that up to November 5 there were no batteries on the York River Railroad between West Point and Richmond. That there were no fortifications or batteries on York River above Yorktown and Gloucester Point, or between the York and Rappahannock Rivers, ex- cept at Gloucester Point. That on December 9, 1861, my operative conversed with a lieutenant in General Magruders command, said lieu- tenant being then on furlough at Richmond; that my operative asked the lieutenant if any farther defenses had been made at West Point or on the York River within a mouth, and that the lieutenant replied, No;~ adding that the defenses at Gloucester Point and Yorktown were considered sufficient to protect the river. That the statement of James II. Maurice, nuder date of February 1, concerning the forces on the James and York River Peninsula, is sub- stantially as follows, to wit: Encamped 3 miles southwest of Yorktown~-Second Florida, Colonel Ward, 700 to 800 men; Sixteenth Georgia, Colonel Cobb; Thirteenth Louisiana, Colonel Sulakowski. Cobbs Legion, 4~ miles south of York- town and 2 miles southeast from the Second Florida. Fifty-fifth Vir- ginia, 44- miles south-southeast of Yorktown and half a mile back from the head of the creek. Fifth Virginia Artillery, Fort Grafton, 4 miles south-southeast of Yorktowii. Two regiments, names not known, on the Coruwallis battle-ground. Three regimeirs immediately south of Yorktown. Several regiments at Williamsburg. That William H. Ringgold, an intelligent colored man, in report addressed to you December 2, 1861, specifies the following re~imci its as being on the Yorktown Peninsula and at Gloucester IN)int: Sixth Georgia Infantry, Colonel Colquitt, numbering 1,000 men, within the intrenchments at Yorktown above described. Louisiana Zonaves, numbering about 950, encamped a short distance below Yorktown. Second Alabama Infantry, 1,050 men, 3 miles from Yorktown, on the road to Hampton. Fifth North Carolina Infantry, 800 men, 8 miles from Yorktown, on the road to Big Bethel. Eighth Alabama Infantry, Colonel Winston, 1,000 men, near Big Bethel Church. Cobbs Legion, 5 or 6 miles from Big Bethel Church, 2~ miles west of the ioad to Hampton and opposite Little Bethel. This Legion consists of about 400 cavalry, armed with Maynards rifles, an(l 600 infantry, all from Georgia, commanded by Thomas C. Cobb. Several Louisiana regi- ments at Williamsburg. At Gloucester Point, 5,000 infantry, 160 cav- alry, and two companies of artillery. That the total rebel force on the York and James River Peninsula was estimated by the rebels at 25,000 men. That there is a telegraph from ilichmnond to West Point, also from Yorktown and Great Bethel to Richmond via James River an Page 268 268 TILE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. (OnAP. XXIII. Grove Wharf. That there is much Union feeling among the poorer classes on the York and iRappahannock Rivers, especially among the oystermen and fishermen. All of which is respectfully submitted by your obedient servant, E. J. ALLEN [ALLEn PINKERTON]. Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN, Commanding U. S. Army. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TIlE POTOMAC, Camp at Yorktown, May 3, 1862. GENERAL: I have the honor to report the following information relative to the forces and defenses of the rebel Army of the Potomac and also of the rebel Army of the Peninsula, obtained to (late, which has been extracted from current statements made at these headquarters by spies, contrabands, deserters, refugees, and I)risoI~ers of war, in the order of time as hereinafter indicated, and which at the time of recep- tion were made the subject of special reports to you; that portion of this report having reference to the rebel Army of the Potomac as included in the summaries relative thereto being also derived iii part from previous rel)orts made to you in rethrence to the rebel Army of the Potomac. I have also apI)ended to this report a varied summary of those forces and defenses, showing by diffhrent combinations about the I)roba1~le number of these forces and the locality aud strength of their defenses. The summary of general estimates of the rebel army at Yorktown shows their forces to date of latest information to be 100,000 to 120,000, such being the medium estimates, and taken from statements deemed most reliable, the information upon which they are based having been derived from officers of their army an(l from persons connected with their commissary department at Yorktowmm, the latter of whomim stated the daily rations issued there to be 119,000. The summary also shows that s1mecific information has been received of twenty-two different knowim brigades, forty-five regiments, and three battalions infantry, two regimelits cavalry, one legion of 2,500 men, and ten co mnpanies artillery, which specific informimation, though fornmimmg but a small portion of the rebel army, is all that it has been possible to obtain, owing to want of time and time very ral)i(l and continued accumnulation of troops at this point re-enforcing their army. It may, however, salhly be assumed that the mediumn estimates stated (100,000 to 120~000) are nuder rather than over the mm ark of the real stremmgth of rebel forces at Yorktown. It is also shown by statements in the report that rebel re-enforce- ments at Yorktown commenced to arrive on the 25tl~ March in consid- erable numbers, and have continued arriving ever since to date of latest informuation, one brigade having lauded at Kings Mill, James River, on the 1st instant. All of which, general, is respectfully submitted, by your obedient servant, E. J. ALLEN. Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN, Commanding Army of the Potomac Page 269 CHAP. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 269 HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Camp Lincoln, near Richmond, June 26, 1862. GENERAL: I have the honor to report the following information relative to the forces and defenses of the rebel army of the Peninsula, including the forces and defenses of Yorktown up to the time of the evacuation and of Richmond and vicinity up to date of this report; this information having been obtained and extracted from statements made at these headquarters by spies, contrabands, deserters, refugees, and prisoners of war, in the order of time as hereinafter indicated, and which at the time of reception were made the subject of special reports to you. I have also appended to this report a varied summary of those forces and defenses, showii~g by different combinations about the prob- able number of these forces and the locality and strength of their de- fenses. The summary of the general estimates of the rebel army at Yorktown up to about the time of the evacuation shows their forces to be 100,000 to 120,000. The specific information regarding the rebel army at York- town, obtained to date, shows the following-named organizations: Twenty-two brigades, ninety-one regiments, three legions, two battal- ions infantry, five battalions artillery, sixteen companies artillery, and two compammies infantry. This information is necessavily limited, because the rapid accumula- tion of rebel troops at Yorktown and their subsequent changes of organ- ization rendered it impossible to obtain but a partial specific knowledge of their forces. The summary of general estimates of the rebel army shows their forces to be at this time over 180,000 men, and the specific information already obtained warrants the belief that this number is probably comi- siderably short of the real strength of their army, ~vhich is as follows: Two hundred regiments infrmntry and cavalry, including the re-enforce ments just arrived of Jacksons and Ewells forces (eight battalions), five battalions artillery, twelve companies infantry and independent cavalry, and forty-six companies of artilleryimi all about forty or fifty brigades. The forces nuder General Jackson just arrived have been ascertained by general estimate and by I)artial specific information, and the number is probably about ~0,000, which immeludes about 10,000 sent from Richmond to re-enforce him lately, an(l which only reached him and formed a junction at a very recent (late. The summary shows the number of earthworks conJl)leted by the rebels in the vicinity of and for the defense of Richmnond to be fifty- two, and the specific number of guns shown to be mounted on thirty-six of the same is about~ 203, lea~~iiig sixteen fortifications without specific in- formation as to the number of guns. All of which, general, is respectfully submitted, by y6ur obedient servant, E. J. ALLEN. Maj. Gen. GEORGE B.- MCCLELLAN, Gommandin~ Army of tkc Potomac. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Camp at Harrisons Landing, Va., August 14, 1862. GENERAL: I have the honor to report the following information of the forces and defenses and the movememmt of the forces of the rebel army of Richmond and vicinity from the time of commencing th Page 270 (CHAr. lulL 270 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, TA. Seven-days Battles at Mechanicsville to date of this report, including the niovemeut from Richmond to the valley of Jackson and his forces and the re-enforcements sent to him from the army at Richmond, which information has been derived from statements made at these headquar- ters by spies, contrabands, deserters, refugees, and prisoners of war, in order of time as hereinafter indicated, and which at the time indicated were made the subject of special reports to you. I have also appended to and made it part of this report a varied summary of these forces and their movements, together with summary of the defenses in the vicinities of Richmond and Petersburg, showing the probable number of these forces and the position and strength of their defenses. The summary of general estimates shows 200,000 men to have com- posed the rebel army of Richmond about the time of the Seven-days Battle, which estimates are abundantly confirmed by the specific infor- mnation obtaiimed lip to date of this report, as will be seen by reference to the table showing organization of the rebel army accompanying and I)art of this report. It is also shown that the rebel losses in the seven battles before Rich- mond in killed, wounded, missing, and prisoners was at least 40,000 men. It is also showii that General Jackson left for Gordonsville early in July with 40,000 men, and that at least as many more were sent to re-eiiforce him before the 10th of August, thus leaving the entire rebel force in the vicinity of Richmond and Petersburg, according to infor- mnation received up to date of this report, 80,000 men. The table of specific organizations of the rebel army shows that they had forty- six brigades, two hundred and fifteen regiments, nineteen battalions, and one company infantry, one legion, eleven regiments cavalry, two battalions, and six companies ditto three battalions artil- lery, and seven ty-six batteries of artillery; in all equaling two hundred and fifty-two regiments. Of course, in the nature of the case, this spe- cific information does not cover their entire army, and must, therefore, ba taken as below even a minimum estimate. All of which, general, is respectfully submitted, by your obedient servant, E. J. ALLEN. Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, Commanding Army of the Potomac. LInclo8ure.] DEFENSES OF RICHMOND. The statements in this and previous reports show the number of for- tificatiors for the def~nse of Richmond to be flfty-t~Vo, and that the number of gnus mnolinted upon thirty-six of them is 201 to 205, while the number upon the remaining sixteen is not given. These fortifica- tiomis ame shown to be located about as follows: one fort on the plank roa(l northwest of Richmond- one fort on Deep Run turnpike, near the fair grounds; one on Bacon Quarter Branch Creek, north of Rich- momid; four on Brook tnrnpike; one on road between Brook turnpike and Meadow Bridge road; three on Meadow Bridge road and Central Railroad; six on and near Mechanicsville turnpike; one on Union Hill; one on Race Course; one on Church Hill; three at and below Rocketts; one 3 miles below Rocketts, between River and Old River turnpike; two on Marion Hill; one on Fulton Hill; one at junction of Darby- town and Charles City roads; four on old stage road to WiUi~ Page 271 Ca& P. XXflL GENERAL REPORTS. 271 burg; four on and near New Bridge road, 5 miles from Richmond; two near Mrs. Prices and Dr. Garnetts, on Chickahominy Bluff; one on Charles City road; one at Balls Bluff, and one at Fort Darliiig; one on Nine-mile road, and other similar breastworks and rifle pits in the vicinity of the front line of the rebel army on the Chickahominy. GENERAL ESTIMATES OF THE REBEL FORCES IN VIRGINIA. Jacksons army of the valley was 15,000 prior to recent re-enforce- ments from Richmond. Rebels had opposed to us at the Seven-days Battles 100,000 men, and estimated our force at 70,000. One hundred and twenty-five thousand men said to have followed our army on its retreat. Jacksons valley force was 8,000 to 10,000 men; was re-enforced by Ewell with 10,000 from the Rappahannock, making it 18,000 to 20,000. rfwel~~e thousand to 15,000 men were sent from Richmond to re-en- force Jackson, but did not reach him until he was on his way to Rich- mond from theShenandoah Valley. Jacksons force now consists of Ewells division, about 12,000 men; (1. W. Smiths division, about 12,000 to 15,000 men; Jacksons own division, about 8,000 to 10,000 men. The whole Richmond army now (July 10) numbers probably 200,000 men, and has been estimated at 250,000. Georgia regiments recently filled by recruiting to 1,100 or 1,200. Said to be 20,000 to 25,000 troops at Petersburg. Troops from Beau- regards army are daily arriving. Heard a rebel lieutenant say that the rebel army numbered 190,000; our army generally estimated by the rebels at 130,000. Surgeon Powell, returned Union prisoner, states that the admitted rebel loss in the Seven-days Battles was 19,000. A British subject who arrived per flag of truce, an(l is a compositor by trade, states that he set up for the Richmond Examiner an item stating that of 14,000 men led into the second days tight by General A. P. Hill he only brought out 6,000. Rebel troops in the Seven-days Battles, including Jacksons whole force, estimated~at 220,000 to 260,000. Jacksons forces going north are usually estimated at 50,000, but the estimates raiige from 30,000 to 80,000. It is customary at the South, in speaking of regiments, to call them thousands, but the regiments will not average over 700. Jackson was said to have taken with him into the valley one hun- dred regiments. Rebel army previous to the late battles was estimated at 250,000; killed and wounded, 45,000 to 50,000. About 20,000 troops are iii the vicinity of Petersburg. About July 5 50,000 were encamped between Petersburg and Richmond. That about two weeks ago 25,000 troops were received from the South per Petersburg Railroad, said to have come from Charleston, S. C. Jackson said to have taken 40,000 troops with him to the valley. Rebel killed and wounded in the late battles estimated at 25,000 to 75,000. Jackson said to bave with him in the valley 60,000 men. Rebel army of Richmond estimated at 130 00 forces and the troops south of James River. 0, exclusive of Jacksons Jacksons estimated at 110,000, of which number 30,000 were r Page 272 [CHAP. xxm. 272 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. cently sent him from Richmond and 60,000 from the south via J~ynch- burg. One hundred pieces and three or four car loads of artillery from the South went to Fredericksburg depot on July 29, 1862, said to be foi Jackson. Beauregards forces are believed to be mostly in Richmond. Thirty thousand to 40,000 disciplined trOol)S supposed to have been received in Richmond shortly before the comnienceinent of the Seven. days Battles. About 50,000 troops were encamped around General Lees headquar ters on July 28, 1862. One hundred and eighty thousand at Richmond prior to re-enforce. ments from Charleston; 40,0(W) taken by Jackson to the valley. He was afterwards re-enforced by 60,000 from the cotton States. Rebel army estimated at 250,000 by the people of Ricllmon(l. (The above statement was made by officers of the Fe(leral Army who escaped from Richmond.) Two trains daily of ten to fifteen cars each, loaded with troops, entered Richmond from Petersburg for four or five weeks prior to August 8, 1862. Fifty thousand troops repOrte(l in Iticlimnond to have been sent to Jackson within four weeks prior to above (late. Jackson said to have taken 75,000 trOOl)5 from Richmond. Nearly the whole rebel force said to have been employed against McClellan at the battle of MechanlcsvilLe. No. 14. Report of Colonel Robert 0. Tyler, First Connecticut Heavy Artillery, commanding siege iramu. HEADQUARTERS FIRST CONNECTICUT ARTILLERY, July 15, 1862. GENERAL: From the disembarkatiomi of my regiment at Cheesemans Landing, on the 12th of April, 1862, until this date, most of the services of the regiment have been l)erfornle(l, directly or indirectly, under your orders. At Yorktown, as director of the siege, and at Gaines Mill, Chickahouiiny, and Malvern 1-Till, the portions of the regimemit engaged have beemi ummder your immediate orders. Under these circumstances 1 would respect fully request permission to submnit a report of the services of my regimmmemit upon the Peninsula. Siege of Yorldown.At Yorktown, under all the difficulties of trans- portation, my regiment kept pace with the engineers imi laying platforms and plaeimmg guns and material in position. Six batteries, mounting forty-eight gumis and mortars, were fully armed and equipped; twenty- three additional guns audI mortars disembarked. it is unnecessary to call attention to the amount of labor required in such battQries as No. 1, mounting 100-pounder and 200-pounder Parrotts, and No. 4, mount- ing 13-inch sea-coast mortars, all of which exceed in weight any guns previously placed in siege batteries, or to say howmnuch the heavy firing from No. I for four consecutive days may have had to do with the evatimmatiomi of that l)lace. On the day of the evacuation the six batteries equipp~d were l)mepared to throw 175 tons of metal daily into York- town. M~ regiment subsequently removed all this material from tb~ batLrit~s and re-embarked it Page 273 CnAr. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 273 Hanover Court-llouse.The greater portion of this work having been completed, I reported with ten companies of my regiment to you at White House on the 28th of May. Upon the services performed by the regiment in reconnaissances near Old Church, in destroying all the means of crossing the Pamunkey below Hanover Court-House, and in the action near that place, a report has already been forwarded to your office. My regiment formed the advance of the infantry nuder General Cooke which followed the rebels on Stuarts raid, when they marched 42 miles in thirty-seven hours, as has been reported by Colonel Warren, Fifth New York Volunteers, commanding the Volunteer Reserve Brigade. Upon the 2.0th of June 1 was ordered to bring up a battery of five 44 Inch Rodmaii guns and one of five 30-pounder Parrotts, and to place them in position near New Bridge. The disembarkation of the guns and inatemial at White House commenced on the 21st of June and u pon the 24th these guns were in position, with ammunition and material complete, in Batteries Sykes and Porter, under the command of Major Kellogg, and in charge of Company F, Captain Dow, Company B, Cap. tam Cook, and Company B, Captain Brooker. Gaines Mill.Upon June 25, under your direction, these batteries opened upon the rebel batteries on the opposite side of the Chicka- hominy, doing, as i-eported by the signal officer, much damage, dis- mounting the enemys largest gun and compelling him to remove his camps. Cliickahominy.Upon the 26th his batteries again opened, and at 6 p. m. of that day we moved across the Chickahominy, where they re- ])orted to General Smith. Here they were joined by two 10-pounder Whitworths, under Lieutenant Sedgwick, which had been brought round with their material by way of Baltimore Store and Bottoms Bridge. Upon the following day (June 27) these batteries were placed in position on Goldings Hill, commanding both banks of the Chicka. hominy, where they were fought during the day under a severe fire, and when the services of the guns could no longer be useful they were retired, and the companies formed by Major Kellogg and led into the line of infi~ntry defending that positiona fact specially noticed by General Smith in his report. The casualties of this day were two men killed and wounded. I wish especially to call your attention to Lieutenant Sedgwick,in command of the two Whitwortlis, which with only 20 men he removed by hand a distance of 2~ miles, the second gun being brought away when our pickets were retiring past the guns. Upon the 20th of June the regiment was ordered to report to Gen- eral Barry for duty as heavy artillery. The companies not in battery or in depot at White House were marched to Orchard Station by Lieu- tenant-Colonel White. The rapid advance of the enemy prevented the removal of my hospital from near Cold Harbor, where many of my sick, including two officers (Lieutenants Faxon and Harwood) and my hospital attendants, were taken prisoners. On the night of the 28th and the morning of the 29.h the guns under Major Kellogg were suc- cessfully retired behind White Oak Swamp, where they joined the remainder of the siege train, which had been in position and in depot at Fair Oaks Station, in front of Sumners corps, and commanded by Major Hemingway, under whose orders were Company E, Captain Rockwood; Company H, Captain Hubbard; Company K, Captain Ager. The successful removal of these guns and stores from Orchard Station 18 R RYOL X Page 274 274 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [Ciw~. XXIII. is greatly due to the exertions of these officers; more especially of Cap- tain Hubbard, who was left in charge of the rearmost train. On the night of the 29th the train was retired from White Oak Swamp to Turkey Bend. On the 30th of June 1 received an order to report to you with such guns as there was still ammuiiition remaining for. Mah~ern llull.During the night of June 30 five 4A-inch itodmans, five 30-pounder Parrotts, two 8-inch howitzers, and two 10-pounder Whitwortlis, manned by Companies F, D, B, K, and 1, and commanded by Captains Dow, Cook, Brooker, and Ager, and Lieutenant Hatfield, nuder Majors Hemingway and Kellogg, were transported from the camp at Turkey Bend, and under difficulties which you will well understand were taken chiefly by hand up the steep ascent of Malvern Hill, with their ammunition and material, the companies working ~ll night after their previous tedious marches. The guns occupied the heights of Malvern Hill, were served under your personal orders, and were said to have caused much destruction to the head of the enemys approaching column. The casualties of this day were one killed and three wounded. The companies, after working all the night of the 30th to place these guns in position and fighting them during the whole of the day of the 1st of July, spent that night in retiring the guns to the present depot, near Westover Landing. The remaining guns, the ammunition of which had been exhausted, were also safely and expeditiously retired to Harrisons Landing by the other companies under Lieutenant-Colonel White. At Westover Landing we formed a junction with that portion of the regiment and of the siege train under the command of Major Doull which had been cut oft at White House. 1 would respectfully call your attention to the fact that all the am- munition used at Maivern Hill had been transported by way of Gaines Mill, Savage Station, and White Oak Swamp to that place, and that the officers and men with the guns had been almost constantly laboring day and night from the 21st of June, and to the fact that out of twenty- six heavy guns twenty-five arrived safely at this place. This was accom- l)liShed under almost unheard-of difficulties, with mule trains, constantly breaking down, driven by frightened citizen teamsters, who deserted whenever the fire became heavy. Frequently teams had to be pressed into the service to replace those which had been exhausted by time labor of drawing the guns, and sometimes for miles the guns were drawn by hand by the different companies of the regiment. One howitzer was abandoned near Savage Station, the carriage having become so dis- abled it was impossible to remove it. Under the direction of Lieutenant Jackson tIme carriage was burned and the howitzer rendered perfectly unserviceable. To the field officers, company commanders, and men already men- tioned I feel that a debt of gratitude is due for the inimnense labor they performed and the difficulties they cheerfully overcame. I wish ad- ill dition, to mention time services of Lieutenant and Quartermaster Rob- ins, Lieutenants Whittelsey and Jackson acting ordnance officers, to whose energy the safe bringing through of the ammunition trains is mostly due, and also to bear testimony to the great assistance rendered me on all occasions by my adjutant, Lieutenant Pratt. I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant, It. 0. TYLER, Colonel First Connecticut Artillery. Major-General PORTER. Commanding P~fth Provisional Army Corps Page 275 CHAP. XXIII.] GENERAL REPORTS. 275 No. 15. Report of General Joseph B. Johnston, 0. S. Army, commanding Depart- ment of Northern Virginia, of operations from April 15 to May 19. HDQRS. DEPARTMENT OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, Jtlay 19, 1862. SIR: Before taking command on the Peninsula I had the honor to express to the President my opinion of the defects of the position then occupied by our troops there. After taking command I reported that the opinion previously expressed was fully confirmed. Some of my objec- tions to the position were that its length was too great for our force; that it prevented offensive movements excel)t at great disadvantage, and that it was untenable after the guns of Yorktown were silenced a result admitted by all our officers to be inevitable from the enemys great superiority in artillery. York River being thus opened, a large fleet of transports and 500 or 600 bateaux would enable him to turn us in a few hours. It seemed to me that there were but two objects in remaining on the Peninsula: The possibility of an advance upon us by the enemy, and gaining time in which arms might be received and troops organized. I determined, therefore, to hold the position as long as it could be done without exposing our troops to the fire of the pow- erful artillery, which I doubted not would be brought to bear upon them. I believed that after silencing our batteries on York River the enemy would attempt to turn us by moving up to West Point by water. The great fatigue and exposure incident to their service told very severely upon the health of our troops. In three days, ending May 3, about sick were sent to Richmond. Circumstances indicating that the enemys batteries were nearly ready, I directed the troops to move toward Williamsburg on the night of the 3d by the roads from Yorktown and Warwick Court- House. They were assembled about Williamsburg by noon of the 4th and were ordered to march, by the road, to Richmond, Major-G-eneral Magruder leading. Early in the afternoon the cavalry rear guard on the Yorktown road was driven in and rapidly followed by the enemy. Brigadier-General MeLaws was sent with the brigades of Kershaw and Semiucs to support the cavalry. He met the enemy near the line of little works constructed by Major.General Magruders forethought; made his dispositions with prompt courage and skill, and quickly (Irove the Federal troops from the field, in spite of disparity of num- bers. I regret that no report of this handsome affair has been made l)y General McLaws. Major-General Magruders march was too late to permit that of Major-General Smith the same afternoon. His division moved at day- break on the 5th, in heavy rain and deep mud. About sunrise the rear guard was again attacked. The action gradually increased in magnitude until about 3 oclock, when General Longstreet, command- ing the rear, requested that a part of Major-General Hills troops might be sent to his aid. Upon this I rode upon the field, but found myself compelled to be a mere spectator, for General Longstreets clear head and brave heart left me no apology for interferencQ. For details of the action see accompanying reports. Our wounded and many of those of the enemy were placed in hos- pitals and residences in Williamsburg Page 276 276 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [Cair. Xliii. Major-General Smiths division reached Barhamsville (18 miLes), and Major-General Magruders, commanded by Brig. Gen. D. R. Jones, the Diascund Bridge, on the Chickahominy road, on that day. Those of Major-Generals Longstreet and Hill marched from Williamsburg (12 miles) on the 6th. On that evening Major-General Smith reported that the enemys troops were landing in force on the south side of York River, near West Point. On the following morning the army was concentrated near Barhams- yule. In the mean time it had been ascertained that the enemy occu- pied a thick and extensive woods between Barhamsville and their land- ing place. Brigadier-General Whiting was directed by General G. XV. Smith to dislodge him, which was handsomely done. The brigade of General Hood and part of that of Colonel Hampton performed the service. You are respectfully referred for details to the accompanying reports. Want of means of subsistence compelled the army to move toward Richmond, the divisions of Smith and Magruder taking the roa(l by New Kent Court-House and those of Longstreet and Hill that along the Chickahominy. On the evening of the 9th the army halted its left near the cross roads on the New Kent Court-House road and its right near the long bridges. In this position the York River Railroad sul)l)lied us from Richmond. On the 15th the attack upon the battery at Drewrys Bluff by the enemys gunboats suggested to inc the necessity of so placing the army as to be prepared for the enemys advance up the river or on the south side, as well as from the direction of West Point. We therefore crossed the Chickahominy to take a position 6 or 7 miles from Itichimmoud. That ground being unfavorable, the present position was taken upon the 17th. Had the enemy beaten us on the 5th, as he claims to have done, the army would have lost most of its baggage and artillery. We should have been pursued from Williamnsburg and intercel)tC(l from West Point. Our troops engaged, leaving Williamsburg on the following morning, marched but 12 miles that day, and the army in its nmarch to the cross-roads averaged less than 10 miles a day. Had not the actiomi of the 5th been at the least discouraging to the enemy, we would have been pursued on the road and turned by way of West Point. About 400 of our wounded were left in Williamsburg because they were not in condition to be moved. Nothing else was left which we had horses to draw away. Five field I)ieces, found by the chief quar- termaster at the Williamsburg wharf, were abandoned for want of horses and harness. In the three actions above mentioned our troops displayed high cour- age, and omY the march endured privatiou and hardship with admirable cheerfulness. Most respectfully, your obedient servant, J. E. JOHNSTON, General. General COOPET~, Adjutant and Inspector General Page 277 CHAP. XXIII.] SIEGE OF YORKTOWN, VA. 277 APRIL 5MAY 4, 1862.Siege of Yorktown, Va. SUIARV OF TIlE PRINCIPAL EVENTS. April 4, 1862.Advance of the Army of the Potomac from vicinity of Fort Monroe. 5,1862.Skirmish near junction of the Warwick and Yorktown Roads. Skirmish near Lees Mill. 911, 1862.Reconnaissances in front of Yorktown. 16, 1862.Engagement at Lees Mill, Burnt Chimneys, or Dam No. 1. 22, 1862.Franklins division arrives in York River. May 4, 1862.Yorktown occupied by the Union forces. REPORTS, ETC. No. 1.Organization of the Army of the Potomac, commanded by Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, during the siege of Yorktown. No. 2.Brig. Gen. Oliver 0. Howard, U. S. Army, commanding First Brigade, Sec- on(l Division (Richardsons), Second Corps, of operations April 47. No. 3.Brig. Gen. Fitz John Porter, U. S. Army, commanding division, of opera- tions April 46. No. 4.BrPr Gen. John H. Martindale, U. S. Army, commanding First Brigade, of operations April 47. No. 5.Col. Charles W. Roberts, Second Maine Infantry, of operations April 413. No. 6.Col. James Barnes, Eighteenth Massachusetts Infantry, of operations April 414. No. 7.Col. Jesse A. Gove, Twenty-second Massachusetts Infantry, of operations April 412. No. 8.Col. Charles A. Johnson, Twenty-fifth New York Infantry, of operations April 413. No. 9.Brig. Gen. George W. Morell, U. S. Army, commanding Second Brigade, of operations April 49. No. 10.Brig. Gen. William F. Srriith, U. S. Army, commanding Second Division, Fourth Corps, of operations April 412. No. 11.Col. Hiram Berdan, First U. S. Sharpshooters, of operations April 421. No. 12.Lient. Henry XV. Kingsbury, commanding Battery D, Fifth U. S. Artillery, of operations April 5. No. 13.Licut. Charles E. Hazlett, Battery D, Fifth U. S. Artillery, of operations Ap~il 5. No. 14.Capt. Augustus P. Martin, Battery C, Massachusetts Light Artillery, of operations April 5. No. 15.Capt. William B. XVeeden, Battery C, First Rhode Island Light Artillery, of operations April 5. No. 16.Brig. Geii. John XV. Davidson, U. S. Army, commanding Third Brigade, Second Division, Fourth Corps, of operations April 512. No. 17.Brig. Gen. John J. Peck, U. S. Army, of operations April 530. No. 18.Brig. Gen. Winfleld S. Hancock, U. S. Army, of reconnaissance toward York- town, April 6, with indorsements. No. 19.Brig. Gen. Fitz John Porter, U. S. Army, as Director of the Siege of York- town from April 7May 5. No. 20.Brig. Gen. John G. Barnard, U. S. Army, Chief Engineer Army of the Poto- mac, of operations during the siege. No. 21.Lieut. Cyrus B. Comstock, Corps of Engineers, U. S. Army, of Confederate works at Gloucester Point, Va Page 278 278 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. [CHAP. XXIII. No. 22.Brig. Gen. William F. Barry, U. S. Army, Chief of Artillery Army of the Potomac, of the siege. No. 23.Col. Henry J. Hunt, commanding Artillery Reserve, of operations April 15 June 25. No. 24.Maj. Alexander Doull, Second New York Artillery, Ordnance Officer of Siege Train, of the siege. No. 25.Brig. Gen. Erasmns D. Keyes, U. S. Army, commanding Fonrth Corps, of operations April 415. No. 26.Brig. Gen. Charles S. Hamilton, U. S. Army, commanding Third Division, Third Corps, of operations April 1112. No. 27.Col. Charles T. Campbell, Fift~y-seventh Pennsylvania Infantry, of skirmish near Yorktown April 11. No. 25.Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, U. S. Army, of the engagement of Lees Mill, or Burnt Chimneys. No. 29.Brig. Gen. William F. Smith, U. S. Army, commanding Second Division, Fourth Corps, of engagement at Lees Mill, or Burnt Chimneys. No. 30.Capt. Romeyn B. Ayres, Fifth U. S. Artillery, Chief of Artillery Smiths division, of engagement at Lees Mill, or Burnt Chimneys. No. 31.Capt. Terence J. Kennedy, First New York Battery, of engagement at Lees Mill, or Burnt Chimneys. No. 32.Capt. Thaddens P. Mott, Third New York Battery, of engagement at Lees Mill, or Bnrnt Chimneys. No. 33.Brig. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock, U. S. Army, commanding First Brigade, Smiths division, of engagement at Lees Mill, or Burnt Chimneys. No. 34.Brig. Gen. William T. H. Brooks, U. S. Army, commanding Second Brigade, Smiths division, of engagement at Lees Mill, or Burnt Chimneys, with congratulatory order. No. 35.Col. Breed N. Hyde, Third Vermont Infantry, of engagement at Lees Mill, or Burnt Chimneys. No. 36.Capt. Fernando C. Harrington, Third Vermont Infantry, of engagement at Lees Mill, or Burnt Chimneys. No. 37.Col. Edwin H. Stoughton, Fourth Vermont Infkntry, of engagement at Lees Mill, or Burnt Chimneys. No. 38.Col. Henry A. Smalley, Fifth Vermont Infantry, of engagenment at Lees Mill, or Burnt Chimneys. No. 39.Col. Nathan Lord, jr., Sixth Vermont Infantry, of engagement at Lees Mill, or Burnt Chimneys. No. 40.Brig. Gen. Charles S. Hamilton, U. S. Ar my, commanding division, of en- gagement near Lees Mill, or Burnt Chimneys. No. 41.Maj. Gen. Edwin V. Sumner, U. S. Ariuy, of skirmish near Yorktown April 22. No. 42.Brig. Gen. John W. Davidson, U. S. Army, commanding Third Bi igade, Smiths division, of operations April 1922. No. 43.Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, U. S. Army, of an affair near Yorktown, April 26, with congratulatory letter from Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War. No. 44.Brig. Gen. Cnvier Grover, U. S. Army, commanding First Brigade, hookers division, Third Corps, of an affair near Yorktown April 26. No. 45.Brig. Gen. Daniel Butterfield, U. S. Army, as General of the Trenches, April 27. No. 46.Brig. Gen. David B. Birney, U. S. Army, ns General of the Trenches, April 28. No. 47.Brig. Gen. Erasmus D. Keyes, U. S. Army, commanding Fourth Corps, of operations on the left, April 2729, with indorsement Page 279 CHAP. XXIII.] SIEGE OF YORKTOWN, VA. 279 No. 48.Brig. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock, U. S. Army, commanding First Brigade, Smiths division, of reconnaissance toward Lees Mill April 28. No. 49.CoL Hiram Buruham, Sixth Maine Infantry, of reconnaissance toward Lees Mill April 28. No. 50.Col. Francis L. Viuton, Forty-third New York Infantry, of reconnaissance toward Lces Mill April 28. No. 51.Brig. Gen. Henry M. Naglee, U. S. Army, of reconnaissance toward Lees Mill April 29. No. 5~2.Brig. Gen. Innis N. Palmer, U. S. Army, of reconnaissance toward Lees Mill April 29. No. 53.Brig. Gen. Charles D. Jameson, U. S. Army, as General of the Trenches, May 34, with indorsement. No. 54.Col. Jesse A. Gove, Twenty-second Massachusetts Infantry, of occupation of Yorktown May 4. No. 55.Col. James McQuade, Fourteenth New York Infantry, as General of the (left wing) Trenches, May 34. No. 56.Col. Samuel W. Black, Sixty-second Pennsylvania Infantry, of operations May 34. No. 57.Col. Amor A. McKnight, One hundred and Fifth Pennsylvania Infantry, of operations May 4. No. 58.Maj. Ge,i. John B. Magruder, C. S. Army, commanding at Yorktown, & c. No. 59.Col. H. C. Cabell, First Virginia Artillery, Chief of Artillery, of actions April 516. No. 60.Brig. Gen. Lafayette McLaws, C. S. Army, commanding Second Division, of engagement at Dam No. 1 (Lees Mill). No. 61.Brig. Gen. Howell Cobb, C. S. Army, commanding Second Brigade, Second Division, of engagement at Dam No. 1 (Lees Mill). No. 62.Capt. M. Stanley, commanding Troup Artillery, Cobbs (Georgia) Legion, of engagement at Dam No. 1 (Lees Mill). No. 63.Col. Goode Bryan, Sixteenth Georgia Infantry, of engagement at Dam No. 1 (Lees Mill). No. 64.Col. William M. Levy, Second Louisiana Infantry, of engagement at Dam No. 1 (Lees Mill). No. 65.Lient. Col. Ross R. Ihrie, Fifteenth North Carolina Infantry, of engagement at Dam No. 1 (Lees Mill). No. 1. Organization of the Army of the Potomac, commanded by Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, during the 8iege of Yorktown, Va., April 5 to May 4, 1862. [Compiled from the records of the Adjutant-Generals Office.] AT GENERAL HEADQUARTERS. Prorost Guard. 2d U~ S. Cavalry. Battalion 8th U. S. Infantry. Battalion 17th U. S. Infantry. Guard8 and Orderlies. A and E~4th U. S. Cavalry. Independent company Oneida Cavalry. Stiirges Rifles Page 280 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. SECOND ARMY CORPS.Brig. Gen. EDWIN V. SUMNER. SEDGwIcKs DIVISION. Brig. Gen. JOHN SEDGWICK. Provost Guard. K, 6th New York Cavalry. Gormans Brigade. Brig. Gen. WILLIS A. GORMAN. 1st Minnesota. 15th Massachusetts. 34th New York. 52d New York. 1st Company Mass. Sharpshooters. Danas Brigade. Brig. Gen. N. J. T. DANA. 7th Michigan. 19th Massachusetts. 20th Massachusetts. 42d New York. Burns Brigade. Brig. Gen. WILLIAM W. BuRNS. 69th Pennsylvania. 71st Pennsylvania. 72d Pennsylvania. 106th Pennsylvania. Artillery. Col. CHARLES H. TOMPKINS. A, 1st llhode Island. B,lst Rhode Island. G, 1st Rhode Island. I, 1st United States. RIchARDSoNS DIVISION. Brig. Gen. ISRAEL B. RICHARDSON. Provost Guard. D, 6th New York Cavalry. Howards Brigade. Brig. Gen. OLIVER 0. HOWARD. 5th New Hampshire. 61st New York. 64th New York. 81st Pennsylvania. Meaghers Brigade. Brig. Gen. THOMAS F. MEAGHER. 63(1 New York. 69th New York. 88th New York. Frenchs Brigade. Brig. Gen. WILLIAM H. FRENCH. 52d New York. 57th New York. 66th New York. 53d Pennsylvania~ Artillery. Capt. GEORGE W. HAZZARD. B, 1st New York. G, 1st New York. A, 2d Battalion New York. A, 4th United States. C, 4tli United States. 280 1CSAP.~XXIfl Page 281 SIEGE OF YORKTOWN, VA. 281 CAVALRY. Col. JOHN F. FARNSWORTH. 8th Illinois. THIRD ARMY CORPSBrig. Gen. S. P. HEINTZELMAN. PORTERS DIVISION. Brig. Gen. FITz JOHN PORTER. Fir8t Brigade. Brig. Gen. JOHN H. MARTINDALE. 2d Maine. 18th Massachusetts. 22d Massachusetts. 13th New York. 25th New York. 2d Company Mass. Sharpshooters. Second Brigade. Brig. Gem GEORGE W. MORELL. 4th Michigan. 9th Massachusetts. 14th New York. 62d Pennsylvania. Third Brigad~e. Bri ~,. Gen. DANIEL BUTTERFIELD. 16th Michigan. 8:14 Pnn~lvani~. 12th Ncw York. 17th New York. 44th New York. Artillery. Capt. CHAIILES GRIFFIN. C, Massachusetts. E, Massachusetts. (2,1st Rhode Island. D, 5th United States. Unattached. 1st U. S. Sharpshooters. A, 5th Pennsylvania Cavalry. HOOuEI~S DIVISION. Brig. Gen. Josi~ii hOOKER. Fir8t Brigade. Brig. Gen. CUVIER GROVER. 24 Now Hampshire. 1st Massachusetts. 11th Massachnsetts. 26th Pennsylvania. Second Brigade. Col. NELSON TAYLOR. 70th New York. 71st New York. 72d New York. 734 Now York. 74th New York. Third Brigade. Col. SAMUEL H. STARR. 5th New Jersey. 6th New Jersey. 7th New Jersey. ~th New Jersey. Artillery. Maj. C. S. WAINWRIGHT. D, 1st New 101k. 4th New York Battery. 6th New York Battery. H, 1st lJnite(l States. Ciiir.~ xxm. Page 282 282 THE PCNINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. HAMILTONS Divisio~. (1.) Brig. Gen. ChARLES S. HAMILTON. (~.) Brig. Gen. PHILIP KEARNY. First Brigade. Brig. Gen. C. D. JAMESON. 57th Pennsylvania. 63d Pennsylvania. 105th Pennsylvania. 87th New York. Second Brigade. Brig. Gen. DAVID B. BIRNEY. 3d Maine. 4th Maine. 38th New York. 40th New York. Third Brigade. Brig. Gen. HIRAM G. BERRY. 2d Michigan. 3d Michigan. 5th Michigan. 37th New York. Artillery. Capt. JAMES THOMPSON. B, 1st New Jersey. B, 1st Rhode Island. G, 24 United States. CAVALRY. Col. WILLIAM W. AVERELL. 3d Pennsylvania. Briggs Brigade. Col. hENRY S. BRIGGS. 2d Rhode Island. 7th Massaclluset.ts 10th Massachusetts. 36th New York. FOURTH ARMY CORPSBug. Gen. ERASMUS D. KEYES. FIRST DIvIsION. Brig. Gen. DARIUS N. Coucn. Grahams Brigade. Brig. Gen. L. P. GRAHAM. 23d Pennsylvania. 31st Pennsylvania. Gist Pennsylvania. 65th New York. 67th New York. Pecks Brigade. Brig. Gen. JOHN J. PI~cK. 55th New York. 624 New York. 934 Pennsylvania. 98th Pennsylvania. 10~2d Pennsylvania. Artillery. Maj. R. M. WEST. C, 1st Pennsylvania. D, 1st Pennsylvania. F, 1st Pennsylvania. II 1st PennsylVIhlIiR. SuITIS DIVISION. Brig. Gen. WILLIAM F. SMITH. First Brigade. Brig. Gen. WINFIELD S. HANCOCK. 5th Wisconsin. 6th Maine. 434 New York. 49th Pennsylvania. Second Brigade. Brig. Gen. W. T. H. BROOK8. I 2(1 Vermont. 3d Vermont. 4th Vermont. 5th Vermont. 6th Vermont. (OnAr. XXIII Page 283 SIEGE OF YORKTOWN, VA. SMiTHS DIvIsIoNCoNTINuED. Third Brigade. Brig. Gen. JOHN W. DAVIDSON. 7th Maine. 33d New York. 49th New York. 77th New York. Artillery. Capt. R. B. AYRES. 1st New York Battery. 3d New York Battery. E, 1st New York. F, 5th United States. CASEYS DIVISION. Brig. Gen. SILAS CASEY. First Brigade. Brig. Gen. HENRY M. NAGLEE. 52d Pennsylvania. 104th Pennsylvania. 56th New York. 100th New York. lfth Maine. Second Brigade. Brig. Gen. WILLIAM H. KEIM. 85th Pennsylvania. 101st Pennsylvania. 103d Pennsylvania. 96th New York. 2d United SLates. 3d United States. 4th United States. 6th United States. 10th United States. Third Brigade. Brig. Gen. I. N. PALMER. 81st New York. 85th New York. 92d New York. 93d New York. 98th New York. Artillery. Col. G. D. BAILEY. A 1st New York. H 1st New York. 7th New York Battery. 8th New York Battery, BRIGADE REGULAR INFANTRY. Brig. Gen. GEORGE SYKES. 11th United States. 12th United States. 14th United States. 17th United States. 5th New York. CAVALRY RESERVE. Brig. Gen. P. ST. GEORGE COOKE. Emorys Brigade. Blakes Brigade. Brig. Gen. WILLIAM H. EMORY. Col. GEORGE A. 1-I. BLAKE. 5th United States. 1st United States. 6th United States. 8th Pennsylvania. 6th Penn sylvania. McClellan Dia goons. ARTILLERY RESERVE. Col. HENRY J. HUNT. M, 3d United States. G, 4th United States. K, 4th United Stales. A, 5th United States. I, 5th United States. K, 5th United States. A, 1st Battalion New York. B, 1st Battalion New York. C, 1st Battalion Ne~v York. D, 1st Battalioii New York. 5th New York Battery. E, 1st United States. G, 1st United States. 1(,lst United States. A,2d United States. B, 2d United States. E, 2d United States. NI, 2d United States. C, 3d United States. F, 3d lJnited States. G, 3d United States. K, 3d United States. L, 3d United States. CHAP. XXIII.] 28 Page 284 284 THE PENiNSULAR CAMPAIGN, VA. (CRAP. XXIIL CAVALRY. 9th New York. SIEGE TRAIN.